



General Assembly

Distr.: General
25 January 2011

Original: English

Sixty-fifth session

Agenda items 53 and 143

Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects

Administrative and budgetary aspects of the financing of the United Nations peacekeeping operations

Standardized funding model of the global field support strategy

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The global field support strategy was developed by the Secretary-General as a five-year process to transform the delivery of support services to United Nations field operations (see A/64/633). Recognizing the challenges faced by the Organization, the General Assembly, in its resolution 64/269, noted the overall concept of the global field support strategy and provided clear guidance as to its implementation.

Also in its resolution 64/269, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to submit proposals for a standardized funding model for the first year of peacekeeping operations on the understanding that the model should not in any way derogate from the legislative role of the Assembly in the consideration and approval of budgets.

The present report contains a standardized funding model based on the principle of achievability in the first year of operations that aims to be representative, flexible and integrated into the other pillars of the strategy. The model ensures the pre-eminence of the General Assembly's role in the budget process and provides opportunities for improved financial management through greater budgetary discipline, increased capacity to focus on critical start-up activities and strengthened operational integration and accountability.

In the present report, the Secretary-General recommends the endorsement of the standardized funding model and the exploration of further applications for the



model, in particular with regard to mission drawdown and liquidation. In addition, given the greater transparency and tighter control over the budget that a standardized funding model provides, the Secretary-General also recommends that, where warranted, prudent and agreed to by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, he be authorized to enter into commitments of up to \$150 million from the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund and equal to the full available balance of strategic deployment stocks should the Security Council decide to establish or expand a peacekeeping mission.

Contents

	<i>Page</i>
I. Context and challenges	3
A. The current environment and financing framework	3
B. Recent experience	5
C. The way forward	6
II. Key elements of a standardized funding model	7
A. Reaffirming the authority of the General Assembly to approve resources	7
B. Emphasizing budgetary discipline	7
C. Streamlining development	9
D. Strengthening operational integration and accountability	10
E. Integrating other pillars of the global field support strategy	11
III. Standard scenarios and profiles	11
A. Baseline scenario and profiles	11
B. Mission size and logistical challenges	12
C. Associated funding levels	13
D. Assessing the model against actual mission experience	17
IV. Actions to be taken by the General Assembly	17
Annexes	
I. Summary of funding arrangements for the start-up phase of new missions	19
II. Indicative timeline for the application of a standardized funding model to fund new peacekeeping missions	22

I. Context and challenges

1. Drawing on the lessons learned from several decades of operational experience, the global field support strategy delivers a comprehensive, integrated programme for achieving a number of core objectives, including the strengthening of resource stewardship and accountability while achieving greater efficiencies and economies of scale.

2. In considering the global field support strategy, the General Assembly, in its resolution 64/269, on cross-cutting issues, outlined clearly its expectations for the financial framework of the strategy. In particular, the Assembly emphasized that all field missions should be provided with adequate resources for the effective and efficient discharge of their respective mandates; reiterated the importance of strengthened accountability for the effective and efficient implementation of legislative mandates and the use of human and financial resources; and requested the Secretary-General to intensify his efforts to achieve economies of scale within and between field missions without undermining their operational requirements and the implementation of their respective mandates, as well as to submit proposals for a standardized funding model for the first year of peacekeeping operations for consideration by the Assembly at the second part of its resumed sixty-fifth session, on the understanding that the model should not in any way derogate from the legislative role of the Assembly in the consideration and approval of budgets.

A. The current environment and financing framework

3. The environment in which the Department of Field Support operates can be characterized by a portfolio of peacekeeping and other field-based operations deploying more than 139,000 uniformed and civilian personnel, an annual consolidated budget in excess of \$8 billion and funds drawn from both the regular budget and the peacekeeping budgets, each of which is governed by different legislative requirements, funding periods and internal management and reporting regimes.

4. While the recent unprecedented growth in peacekeeping has stabilized, with the expansion of commitments in countries such as Haiti (through the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)) and Somalia (through the United Nations Support Office for the African Union Mission in Somalia (UNSOA)) having been offset to an extent by the drawdown of operations in other countries, including the Central African Republic and Chad (through the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT)), the complexity of programme delivery in the field has remained largely unchanged; in the case of a number of individual mandates, it has actually increased. Furthermore, the demands of non-peacekeeping field operations, in particular the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), continue to grow significantly.

5. Given this environment, the first year of a field operation is particularly important, as there is a political opportunity in terms of the agreement reached on actions to be taken by Security Council members, the host country Government and the parties in the dispute. Rapid mission deployment during this time and in a manner that provides high quality support through the effective and transparent use

of resources is fundamental to supporting mandate implementation and realizing this opportunity. In its resolution 64/269, the General Assembly recognized the need for timely mission start-up and deployment.

6. The significant increase in recent years in the complexity and cost of United Nations field operations has served to intensify the focus on the affordability of peacekeeping operations. It has never been so important to exercise optimal stewardship of resources and to balance the competing demands of ensuring that all field operations are provided with adequate resources and, at the same time, of achieving economies of scale, greater accountability and transparency.

7. Resources for new and expanding peacekeeping operations are currently drawn initially from the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund and the strategic deployment stocks. The Peacekeeping Reserve Fund was established in 1992 (General Assembly resolution 47/217) at the level of \$150 million, at a time when total annual peacekeeping levels were approximately \$3 billion. The Secretary-General was given the authority to enter into commitments of up to \$50 million drawn from the Fund for every decision of the Security Council authorizing new operations or expanding existing ones.

8. In recognition of the increased scale and complexity of peacekeeping operations, reflected in part in the increase in funding levels from approximately \$3 billion in 1992 to over \$7.5 billion today, the General Assembly, in its resolution 64/269, authorized an increase in the commitments the Secretary-General could enter into in response to a Security Council decision from \$50 million to \$100 million from the available balance of the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund, subject to the concurrence of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions.

9. The strategic deployment stocks managed by the Department of Field Support were established in 2002 (General Assembly resolution 56/292), initially at a level of \$141.5 million in equipment and materials. Under the arrangements in effect at the time, stocks had to be replenished immediately upon deployment, and the missions were to be charged for their replenishment. In effect, this meant that receiving missions had to have sufficient funds to replenish the stocks before the stocks could be deployed and that the costs had to be charged against a commitment authority and/or financed from the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund before a new or expanding mission could draw on the stocks.

10. The limitations imposed by these requirements and the need to further leverage existing financing mechanisms to support the rapid deployment of new and expanding operations were recognized by the General Assembly, which is why, in its resolution 64/269, the Assembly authorized the Secretary-General, with the prior concurrence of the Advisory Committee and if a decision of the Security Council relating to the start-up or expansion phase of peacekeeping operations resulted in the need for expenditure, to enter into commitments of up to \$50 million of the available balance of the stores available from the Organization's strategic deployment stocks, with the drawing from the stocks to be replenished when the initial budget appropriation was received.

11. All together, these authorizations allow the Secretary-General to rapidly access \$150 million, or approximately half of the funds approved for the start-up and expansion of operations available from Member States. They represent an important

step forward in reinforcing the ability of the Secretariat to meet the expectations of Member States with regard to supporting rapid mission deployment and mandate implementation.

12. While the General Assembly, in its resolution 64/269, gave the Secretary-General increased access to resources from reserves and strategic stocks, the process for considering the budgets of new and expanding peacekeeping operations has not changed. The process is as follows:

(a) An interim financing proposal is prepared by the Secretary-General and considered by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, which, upon its concurrence, authorizes the Secretary-General to enter into commitments of up to \$150 million drawn collectively from the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund and the strategic deployment stocks;

(b) Where the financing proposal exceeds the authority of the Advisory Committee, the General Assembly considers the proposal based on the recommendations of the Committee;

(c) A full budget proposal for the full financial period, including the previously approved commitment authority, is presented to the General Assembly through the Advisory Committee.

B. Recent experience

13. Member States' commitment to supporting the financial framework of the global field support strategy has been demonstrated by the expanded access provided to the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund and the strategic deployment stocks. This support must be matched by the achievement of the strategic expectations set out in General Assembly resolution 64/269, as noted above.

14. In that regard, it is useful to consider the experiences gained in the course of recent operational undertakings, focusing in particular on financial, legislative timing and operational expectations. An analysis of the start-up phase of recently established missions, including the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS), the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), MINURCAT and UNSOA, is set out in annex I.

15. From a financial perspective, despite the normal process of budget preparation and legislative review, the establishment of new missions has been characterized by substantial under-utilization of funding made available for them in the first year. This underspending (after recognition of subsequent cancellation of prior-period obligations) exceeded 20 per cent of the total approved budget for UNMIS and UNAMID, which are the largest of the recently established peacekeeping missions. Such underspending was due mainly to the gap between what could realistically be achieved in the first year of the mandate and what was requested.

16. In terms of legislative timing, two themes emerge. First, peacekeeping missions are not always established when the General Assembly is in session, as was the case with UNAMID, which for that reason was funded initially from the budget that had been approved for UNMIS. Second, for missions established when the Assembly is in session, full funding proposals are prepared on short notice, which means that the Assembly does not have sufficient time to consider them

comprehensively. In the case of UNSOA, for example, a full budget was available for consideration, but the short time available before the end of the Assembly's session resulted in the consideration and approval of a commitment authority for a limited period of time.

17. In terms of operational deployment, for each of the missions noted in annex I, between 3 and 11 months had passed after the establishment of the missions mandate by the Security Council before funding for the first full year of operations was approved by the General Assembly. This extended process required the preparation of multiple funding requests.

18. Given the nature of the inputs, the large number of stakeholders involved and the extensive coordination required for the budget development process, the focus on preparing multiple funding proposals meant that scarce human resources both in the mission and at Headquarters were diverted from other critical tasks in the months immediately following the establishment of a mission.

C. The way forward

19. These experiences demonstrate that more needs to be done to ensure greater accountability and better financial management, while at the same time providing funds to support the rapid deployment of new or expanding operations. In terms of the former in particular, Member States have expressed concern about the significant amounts of prior-period obligations that are cancelled.

20. In that regard, any action must be taken within the existing framework, which ensures the pre-eminence of the General Assembly in considering funding proposals and providing direction to the work of the Secretariat. It is therefore proposed that Member States consider a standardized funding model as a mechanism that delivers both improved financial management and accountability through higher budget implementation rates and lower levels of cancellations of prior-period obligations, as well as more rapid financing of start-up phases and expansions.

21. It is also proposed that, should Member States endorse the use of a standardized funding model, consideration be given to granting greater flexibility in the use of the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund and the strategic deployment stocks to support the establishment of new missions and the expansion of existing missions.

22. Given that all but two of the peacekeeping missions established since 2003 have required well in excess of \$300 million for their first year of operations, enabling the Secretary-General to enter into commitments of up to \$150 million drawn collectively from the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund and the strategic deployment stocks would greatly facilitate the process of mission deployment.

23. Balanced by the greater transparency and tighter budgeting that a standardized funding model would provide Member States, it is proposed that with regard to the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund, the Secretary-General be authorized, where it is warranted and prudent and with the prior concurrence of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, to enter into commitments of up to \$150 million subject to available funds for every decision of the Security Council authorizing the establishment of a new operation or the expansion of an existing one.

24. As part of such a standardized funding model, it is proposed that with regard to the strategic deployment stocks, the Secretary-General, with the prior concurrence of the Advisory Committee, be authorized to draw upon the full balance of available stores in the stocks, to be replenished once an initial budget appropriation has been received.

II. Key elements of a standardized funding model

A. Reaffirming the authority of the General Assembly to approve resources

25. The use of a standardized funding model for new missions represents an opportunity for Member States to increase transparency and accountability by endorsing a standard set of funding elements that can be used as a basis for comparison and consistency in the start-up phase of different missions. The use of endorsed standard elements based on achievability further facilitates budgetary discipline in dynamic operating environments characterized by limited experience on the ground during the first months after a mandate has been approved.

26. The preparation of funding proposals based on endorsed standard parameters in no way impinges on the authority of the General Assembly nor does it derogate from the Assembly's legislative role in the consideration and approval of mission budgets. In accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the rules of procedure of the Assembly and the Financial Regulations and Rules of the United Nations, the Assembly has the authority to amend and adjust proposals as it deems appropriate. In this context, it is also proposed that the funding requirements, which will be based on standard parameters already endorsed by the Assembly, be accompanied by a comprehensive and mission-specific, results-based-budgeting framework, in accordance with Assembly resolution 55/231, to provide transparency and accountability to Member States with regard to how funding will be applied against programmatic priorities.

27. Since the parameters of a standardized funding model would be reviewed and endorsed during a regular session of the General Assembly, their subsequent use in response to an authorization by the Security Council for a new mission would provide for the early and full scrutiny of budget proposals, without the time pressures that normally accompany the deployment of a new mission.

B. Emphasizing budgetary discipline

28. Effective mandate implementation requires comprehensive resourcing throughout a mission's life cycle. However, as a newly established mission does not become fully operational immediately, resources must be provided progressively, to match the capacity of the mission to absorb and commit them. A core focus of the standardized funding model is to provide funding only for that which can be achieved in the first financial period rather than the funding that would normally be required to fully establish and maintain a mission.

29. For example, delays in the construction of infrastructure in a mission's first year are often cited as a reason for budget underspending. The standardized funding

model addresses this issue by proposing that funds be made available for only a part of the final structure and requirements of a fully established mission, calculated on the basis of past experience. That would allow time for experience to be gained before further resources are made available in support of a full and final construction programme.

30. Such an approach emphasizes budgetary discipline by recognizing the dynamic and volatile operational environment of newly established missions and by limiting, to the extent possible, overly optimistic assumptions by basing funding requirements on actual experience. Furthermore, it also separates the budgetary exercise from operational planning and deployment.

31. In the examples of UNAMID and UNMIS (see para. 15 and annex I), actual unspent balances and cancellation of prior-period obligations in the first year of operations amounted to approximately \$302 million for UNAMID and \$216 million for UNMIS. If the standardized funding model were applied to similar circumstances, however, there would have been a reduction in unspent balances of 91 per cent and 77 per cent, respectively. Further details are provided in section III below.

32. Such budgetary discipline would be reinforced further by the fact that, if endorsed, the standardized funding model would remain applicable for three years, after which time a revised set of standards based on mission experiences and updated cost structures could be presented to the General Assembly for its consideration. During that time, inflation and exchange rate changes would be absorbed within the model through the flexible use of resources and reprioritization.

33. It is critical to recognize that gradually making resources available to missions in line with their capacity in the first year would result in a progressive increase of overall requirements, subject to efficiency gains, between the first and second financial period, in other words as missions move from the start-up phase to full operational and programmatic capacity.

34. In addition, it is important to note that while mandates may differ, initial resource requirements in the first year of operations are largely similar across missions, with resource specificities arising from differences in mandates generally becoming evident in the second year. This operational similarity provides the basis upon which the standardized funding model is built.

35. In addition to providing the most realistic assessment of what is achievable in a start-up environment, the standardized funding model is primarily designed to support rapid mission deployment. As a result, missions are expected to prioritize their requirements in order to ensure the effective and efficient use of the resources entrusted to them and at the same time to meet Member States' expectation that missions be established as quickly as possible.

36. Mission planning, operational mobilization and deployment efforts should therefore advance with this aim. Should the total funding appropriated in the first year of operations not be sufficient to meet all of a mission's emerging requirements (for example, should uniformed personnel be deployed faster than projected), a request for additional requirements would be submitted to the General Assembly for its consideration.

37. While it is unlikely that a mission would have insufficient funding during its first year of operations given the focus of the model on actual experience, such an occurrence would ensure that resources are provided on a timely basis and as needed, instead of having Member States provide up front funding that sometimes greatly exceeds requirements that would then remain unused and returned after two years.

C. Streamlining development

38. As noted above, the process by which funding proposals are considered by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions and the General Assembly will remain unchanged. Specifically:

(a) The development and consideration of an initial commitment authority within 30 days of the mandate having been authorized is to be approved, with the concurrence of the Advisory Committee, on the basis of the standardized funding model approved by the Assembly;

(b) The development and consideration of an initial budget between 30 and 90 days after the mission has been authorized will be established on the basis of the standardized funding model for the balance of the financial period of the first year of operation of the mission, taking into account the activities that could reasonably be accomplished during the period, and the initial budget would be submitted through the Advisory Committee to the Assembly for consideration and approval, and an appropriation through assessed contributions.

39. An indicative timeline is set out in annex II. The introduction of a standard budgeting framework would, however, provide an opportunity for significantly streamlining the process by which funding proposals are developed by the Secretariat. Making the proposals more comprehensive will, in turn, limit the number of proposals that need to be considered by the Advisory Committee and the Assembly.

40. In the past (as shown in annex I), the establishment of a new peacekeeping mission required the preparation of multiple funding proposals, including a commitment authority (or several commitment authorities, depending on the mission) and a full budget proposal. Where the amount requested in the commitment authority exceeded the authority delegated to the Advisory Committee, the General Assembly too would have to consider the request and, often, approve assessments because the level of funding requested in the commitment authority exceeded the amount available in the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund.

41. The implementation of a standardized funding model is expected to result in a drastic reduction in the time needed to develop a budget proposal, as only the substantive results-based-budgeting frameworks and the staffing table would have to be developed specifically for each new mission.

42. Additional benefits of adopting a standardized funding model include the following:

(a) Improved responsiveness of the existing funding mechanism while reducing the workload of the General Assembly;

(b) Rapid mobilization of required resources (funding and staff) while minimizing the burden of detailed funding processes on staff of the mission (and staff at United Nations Headquarters), who are focused on operational planning and implementation;

(c) Reduction in the time between the moment when funding and stores are drawn from the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund and the strategic deployment stocks and the moment when the Fund and the stocks are replenished by the appropriation of a mission budget;

(d) Submission of a full budget within 90 days of the establishment of a mission without compromising operational planning, governance and accountability, as recommended in the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations ("Brahimi report", A/55/305-S/2008/809, para. 91).

43. In recognition of the fact that all missions have different start-up environments, the standardized funding model has been developed to be as representative as possible while allowing for a limited number of mission-specific conditions. The representative profile builds on the many similarities that exist in the funding requirements in the first year of peacekeeping operations. In order to ensure the robustness of the model and reinforce budgetary discipline, those factors are applied in a targeted manner against the areas of funding most affected as opposed to being applied in a general manner. In doing so, flexibility is critical, as it ensures that mission specific conditions, profiles and mandated tasks that have not yet been built into the model and need to be funded can be accommodated. Thus, the model does not include a standard results-based-budgeting framework or detailed staffing table. Rather, funding is proposed for an indicative level and staffing costs are calculated on the basis of actual deployment experience, with mission-specific frameworks and staffing tables developed for every start-up situation.

44. Other aspects specific to a mission can be accommodated within the standardized funding model through realignment. For example, if a particular mission is authorized to have a mix of uniformed personnel that differs from the standard proportion of military contingents, military observers, United Nations police and formed police units within each mandated strength level, this could be accommodated through realignment, since the funding requirements for military contingents and formed police personnel are identical, as are the requirements for military observers and United Nations police officers.

45. The elements of the standardized funding model are mutually reinforcing and must be considered as an integrated package, rather than as individual and disparate parts, in order to be effective. The model requires a focus on the reasonableness of the total envelope of funding as opposed to variances at the individual class level, as it is expected that these will offset at the overall level of a mission's budget.

D. Strengthening operational integration and accountability

46. The provision of funding on a standardized basis will have a positive impact on the strategic management of funding of field operations by improving the alignment and integration of programmatic and support activities.

47. Such alignment and integration will be possible given that, when appropriated, funding will be provided on the basis of the appropriate representative standardized

funding model, while mission programmes will be mandate-specific. The opportunity therefore exists for reinforcing the framework within which the senior leadership of a mission is able to set priorities and collectively monitor the use of funding towards those priorities throughout a given period. Resource management committees could be mechanisms for doing so.

48. Such a model would also improve accountability, as senior mission leadership would have more opportunities to determine or update its priorities based on changing events on the ground. This flexibility would be underpinned by the requirement, in the context of the performance report, to comprehensively explain, with appropriate justifications, the priorities set, activities carried out, progress made and resources utilized in the first year of operations.

E. Integrating other pillars of the global field support strategy

49. The global field support strategy encompasses the work of four distinct yet integrated pillars, which the standardized funding model has been developed to support and complement. In particular, efforts have been made to develop and deliver predefined modules and service packages. As these packages are developed, they will be incorporated into the standardized funding model.

50. As progress is made in the implementation of the strategy, it is expected that the dividends that will accrue in the delivery of support services to field missions will have a corresponding impact on the levels of resources required for the first 12 months of a peacekeeping mission, for example through improved deployment and construction capacities.

51. A conservative approach has been adopted with regard to these expected benefits, which is why they do not form part of the current model but will be incorporated into an update, expected to take place in three years, and as tangible and measurable benefits materialize.

III. Standard scenarios and profiles

52. The standards in the model are based on a comprehensive methodology involving experts from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support; the benchmarking of actual experience gained in field operations, in particular the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB), the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), MINUSTAH, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), MINURCAT, UNMIS, the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and UNAMID; the application of current ratios and contract prices from the standard costs and ratios manual for peacekeeping operations; and the use of staffing costs based on standard staff salary scales and common staff costs used in the 2010/11 peacekeeping budgets.

A. Baseline scenario and profiles

53. A baseline scenario developed using the methodology mentioned in paragraph 51 above can be summarized as having the following elements:

(a) An area of operations limited to a single, small country, designated at security phase III, with a mission footprint consisting of a headquarters in the capital city, five regional bases and the presence of military and formed police personnel across the country in battalion-sized camps;

(b) A seaport but limited road network, major mission locations easily reached by rotary-wing aircraft and a local economy that is well established and able to support the housing requirements of the mission's international civilian staff, police officers, military observers and staff officers;

(c) Uniformed and civilian personnel deployed in a phased manner over the full 12-month period on the basis of an analysis of actual deployment patterns observed during the start-up phases of peacekeeping missions and that include the rehatting of troops and the deployment of personnel in hybrid missions, as applicable;

(d) A focus on the initial establishment of mission facilities and infrastructure at headquarters and at the regional offices, and on the construction of camps for battalions deploying in the first 18 months of operations;

(e) The securing of temporary contracts for the delivery of life support services, such as rations and fuel, pending the negotiation of longer-term contracts, and the drawing of contracts for immediate construction requirements;

(f) The acquisition of equipment and facilities primarily through the strategic deployment stocks or systems contracts, with requirements calculated on the basis of personnel deployed and what can be achieved in the context of the mission's construction and establishment programme.

54. Missions that fit this profile include ONUB, UNOCI, UNMIL and MINUSTAH.

55. Building on this scenario, it is recognized that while the mandates of different missions may vary in terms of scale, scope and complexity, mandated personnel levels are a common and critical indicator of support and, by extension, funding requirements. A detailed analysis of the relationship between mandated personnel strengths and funding have indicated that, at a material level and for the first year of operations, funding requirements are driven largely by the number of deployed personnel, clustered around three representative profiles: 5,000, 10,000 and 15,000 uniformed personnel.

56. In all three cases, the numbers are expected to consist of the same proportions of infantry battalions, staff officers, military observers, specialized units (engineering companies, aviation units, hospitals and transport companies), formed police units and United Nations police. The entitlements and support requirements of military contingents and formed police personnel are identical, as are those of military observers and United Nations police. Should mandated levels for a new mission be different in composition from the standard, they can be adjusted without affecting the overall model through the appropriate realignment of funding.

B. Mission size and logistical challenges

57. Adjustments made to the baseline scenario to reflect a second set of representative missions is best derived from the application of factors relating to

mission size and logistical challenges. If subjected to such factors, the baseline scenario would be affected in the following ways:

(a) The mission would be characterized by an expanded area of operations, with a much larger mission footprint, consisting of a headquarters complex in the capital city, five regional bases and 15 team sites with military and formed police personnel present in smaller-than-battalion-sized configurations;

(b) There would be no seaport access or very long supply lines, limited inland road and communications infrastructure, difficult terrain (roads affected by rain or mountainous countryside) and the distances between mission locations would require large and small fixed-wing as well as rotary-wing aircraft as part of a significantly expanded air fleet;

(c) Troop configurations would have a higher proportion of logistical enabling units along with heavier battalion deployments.

58. Missions that fit this profile include UNMIS, UNAMID, MINURCAT and MONUC.

59. As noted in paragraph 40, the model does not include a detailed staffing table but rather generates an indicative number of civilian staff based on a regression analysis of actual civilian personnel deployment experience, mission size and uniformed personnel strengths. The results are shown in table 1 below.

Table 1
Indicative civilian personnel levels

<i>Number of uniformed personnel</i>	<i>Total indicative civilian personnel</i>	
	<i>Scenario one: baseline</i>	<i>Scenario two: baseline adjusted for mission size and logistical challenge</i>
5 000	868	1 665
10 000	1 313	2 654
15 000	1 758	3 643

C. Associated funding levels

60. The proposed requirements generated by the funding model for a 12-month period ranges from \$314.6 million for baseline scenario missions with 5,000 uniformed personnel, to \$977.7 million for adjusted scenario missions with 15,000 uniformed personnel. The model and funding requirements are set out in the figure and table 2.

Figure
Standardized funding model




Table 2
Proposed standard funding levels for a 12-month period

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	<i>Scenario one: baseline</i>			<i>Scenario two: baseline adjusted for mission size and logistical challenges</i>		
	<i>Profile 1</i>	<i>Profile 2</i>	<i>Profile 3</i>	<i>Profile 1</i>	<i>Profile 2</i>	<i>Profile 3</i>
Mandated level of uniformed personnel	5 000	10 000	15 000	5 000	10 000	15 000
Military and police personnel						
Military observers	2 673.5	5 578.3	7 968.7	2 673.5	5 578.3	7 968.7
Military contingents	82 062.7	154 673.9	234 406.4	105 797.1	198 922.3	301 595.4
United Nations police	7 535.0	15 379.8	21 882.7	7 535.0	15 379.8	21 882.7
Formed police units	6 304.5	22 066.4	34 574.9	7 751.0	27 128.7	42 530.2
Subtotal	98 575.7	197 698.4	298 832.7	123 756.6	247 009.1	373 977.0
Civilian personnel						
International staff	29 592.6	44 770.2	59 951.2	40 779.4	64 998.0	89 209.7
National staff	5 550.9	8 396.2	11 245.5	14 082.0	22 448.8	30 809.1
United Nations Volunteers	1 453.1	2 193.5	2 939.7	1 700.7	2 711.7	3 722.8
Subtotal	36 596.6	55 359.9	74 136.4	56 562.1	90 158.5	123 741.6
Operational costs						
Consultants	54.3	82.1	110.0	104.1	166.0	227.8
Official travel	792.3	1 044.8	1 297.4	1 042.1	1 479.1	1 916.1
Facilities and infrastructure	61 023.9	95 734.2	131 750.5	82 346.9	123 163.1	165 276.2
Ground transportation	32 674.9	49 609.7	65 501.7	40 285.7	59 977.7	78 612.6
Air transportation	45 322.2	45 322.2	45 322.2	142 001.5	142 001.5	142 001.5
Communications	22 839.5	25 867.7	30 968.9	30 007.1	33 715.2	39 516.3
Information technology	7 627.1	9 937.1	12 389.4	9 651.9	12 881.1	16 118.4
Medical	2 060.3	3 980.2	5 889.8	2 574.3	4 501.4	6 640.4
Special equipment	1 094.4	2 187.8	3 267.4	1 188.2	2 373.5	3 543.1
Other supplies, services and equipment	5 546.2	9 393.2	13 141.8	9 701.1	17 494.3	25 186.6

	Scenario one: baseline			Scenario two: baseline adjusted for mission size and logistical challenges		
	Profile 1	Profile 2	Profile 3	Profile 1	Profile 2	Profile 3
Quick-impact projects	400.0	700.0	900.0	700.0	900.0	900.0
Subtotal	179 435.1	243 859.0	310 539.1	319 602.9	398 652.9	479 939.0
Gross requirements	314 607.4	496 917.3	683 508.2	499 921.6	735 820.5	977 657.6
Staff assessment income	3 927.9	5 942.0	7 956.9	6 356.1	10 130.9	13 904.9
Net requirements	310 679.5	490 975.3	675 551.3	493 565.5	725 689.6	963 752.7
Total requirements	314 607.4	496 917.3	683 508.2	499 921.6	735 820.5	977 657.6

Note: Amounts will be prorated according to the duration of the commitment authority as well as the first budget.

D. Assessing the model against actual mission experience

61. As noted above, given the dynamic operational environment that characterizes the start-up phase of a mission, a core assumption is that the standardized funding model must be viewed as an integrated package and attention must be paid to ensuring that the overall level of funding being requested is reasonable rather than on individual budget items.

62. The standardized funding model has been tested by using the start-up costs for the first 12 months of operations of ONUB, UNOCI, MINUSTAH, UNMIS, UNMIL and UNAMID. The results, which are set out in table 3 below, clearly demonstrate the ability of the model to propose funding levels in line with actual experience and, as a result, dramatically improve budget implementation rates, reduce unspent balances and save on the cancellation of prior-period obligations.

Table 3

Assessment of the standardized funding model's ability to propose reasonable requests

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Mission	First 12 months of expenditure ^a	Standardized funding model		Variance	
		Reference scenario	Total requirements	Total	Percentage
ONUCI	322 620	Scenario one/5,000 uniformed personnel	314 607	(8 013)	-2.5
ONUB	302 942	Scenario one/5,000 uniformed personnel	314 607	11 665	3.9
MINUSTAH	364 850	Scenario one/5,000 uniformed personnel	314 607	(50 243)	-13.8
UNMIS	705 440	Scenario two/10,000 uniformed personnel	735 820	30 381	4.3
UNMIL	749 078	Scenario two/15,000 uniformed personnel	683 508	(65 570)	-8.8
UNAMID	925 298	Scenario two/15,000 uniformed personnel	977 657	52 359	5.7

^a Expenditure is derived from actual expenditures for the 12 months of an operation immediately following the authorization of its mandate adjusted proportionately for cancelled obligations across the relevant budget periods.

IV. Actions to be taken by the General Assembly

63. The General Assembly is requested to:

(a) Endorse the use of the standardized funding model, as proposed, for the first year of peacekeeping operations, emphasizing that the use of such a model in no way derogates from the legislative role of the Assembly in the consideration and approval of budgets;

(b) Consider and take action, including appropriation and assessment, on the peacekeeping budget proposals formulated utilizing the standardized

funding model for the first year, during the early part of the session at which the proposals are presented;

(c) Decide that, if a decision of the Security Council relating to the start-up phase or expansion phase of peacekeeping operations results in the need for expenditure, the Secretary-General is authorized, with the prior concurrence of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, to enter into commitments of up to \$150 million from the available balance of the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund and that the cumulative total of outstanding commitment authority in respect of the start-up or expansion phase of peacekeeping operations should not exceed the total level of the Fund at any one time, and to also decide to amend the Financial Regulations and Rules of the United Nations by substituting the words “150 million dollars” for the words “100 million dollars” in financial regulations 4.6 and 4.8;

(d) Also decide that, if a decision of the Security Council relating to the start-up phase or expansion phase of peacekeeping operations results in the need for expenditure, the Secretary-General is authorized, with the prior concurrence of the Advisory Committee, to enter into commitments for the available balance of the stores available from the Organization’s strategic deployment stocks and draw upon these, with the drawings from the stocks to be replenished when the initial appropriation is received.

Annex I

Summary of funding arrangements for the start-up phase of new missions

	<i>UNMIS^a</i>	<i>MINURCAT^b</i>	<i>UNAMID^c</i>	<i>UNSOA^d</i>
Mandate	24 Mar. 2005	25 Sept. 2007	31 July 2007	16 Jan. 2009
Commitment authority				
Initial authority:				
Date	31 Mar. 2005	7 Mar. 2007	17 Oct. 2006	10 Mar. 2009
Funding period	31 Mar.-30 Apr. 2005	1 Mar.-30 June 2007	17 Oct. 2006-31 Dec. 2007	10 Mar.-30 June 2009
Authority	Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions	Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions	Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions	Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions
Amount	\$50 000 000	\$46 942 300	\$309 100 000	\$43 856 000
Financing source	Peacekeeping Reserve Fund	Peacekeeping Reserve Fund	United Nations Mission in the Sudan (temporary)	Peacekeeping Reserve Fund
Additional authority:				
Date	21 Apr. 2005	—	8 Aug. 2007	30 Mar. 2009
Funding period	1 July 2004-31 Oct. 2005	—	8 Aug.-31 Dec. 2007	30 Mar.-30 June 2009
Authority	General Assembly	—	Secretary-General (Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions)	General Assembly
Amount	\$595 498 500	—	\$50 000 000	\$71 647 200
Financing source	Assessed contributions	—	Peacekeeping Reserve Fund	Assessed contributions
Further authority:				
Date	—	—	—	29 June 2009
Funding period	—	—	—	1 Jul.-31 Dec. 2009
Authority	—	—	—	General Assembly
Amount	—	—	—	\$136 085 300

	<i>UNMIS^a</i>	<i>MINURCAT^b</i>	<i>UNAMID^c</i>	<i>UNSOA^d</i>
Financing source	—	—	—	Assessed contributions
Initial appropriation				
Date	15 Nov. 2005	22 Dec. 2007	22 Dec. 2007	3 Dec. 2009
Funding period	1 July 2005-30 June 2006	1 Mar. 2007-30 June 2008	1 July 2007-30 June 2008	1 June 2009-30 June 2010
Amount	\$969 468 000	\$183 558 100	\$1 275 653 000	\$214 639 100
Strategic deployment stocks				
Use during start-up phase:				
0-3 months	\$40 153 393	\$5 873 846	\$25 651 821	\$3 582 924
3-6 months	\$9 435 487	\$19 760 025	\$173 420	\$14 572 370
6-12 months	\$8 720 423	\$3 845 040	\$22 442 196	\$474 186
Total	\$58 309 303	\$29 478 911	\$48 267 437	\$18 629 480
Start-up acquisitions (percentage)	57	65	15	20
Key deployment outcomes				
Expenditure:				
Start-up period	\$803 881 000	\$166 297 800	\$1 056 479 000	\$165 150 100
Obligations cancelled	(\$50 282 000)	(\$7 803 600)	(\$83 253 100)	—
Implementation (percentage)	78	91	77	77
Uniformed personnel:				
Mandated cap	10 750	300	25 987	—
Deployed first year	8 396	77	9 947	—
Deployment rate (percentage)	78	26	39	—
Civilian staff:				
Approved posts	3 951	1 260	5 582	240
Deployed first year	1 205	207	2 376	82
Deployment rate (percentage)	30	16	43	34


(Footnotes on following page)

(Footnotes to Annex I)

- ^a The United Nations Mission in the Sudan was preceded by an advance mission, the United Nations Advance Mission in the Sudan (UNAMIS), which was funded from the regular budget. In addition to requesting the establishment of UNAMIS, the Security Council requested that immediate steps be taken to pre-position personnel and equipment so that a peacekeeping operation could be established rapidly once authorized. A pre-mandate commitment authority of \$50 million from July 2004 (not included in the above table) provided for those requirements. A final commitment authority of \$595 million, agreed to and assessed by the General Assembly, subsumed the pre-mandate commitment authority noted above, as well as a previous commitment authority, additional funding for the period to 30 June 2005 and \$316 million for the period 1 July-31 October 2005. The full budget of \$969 million approved in November 2005 for the entire 2005/06 budget year included that \$316 million.
- ^b The United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) was preceded by an advance mission, whose mandate included taking immediate steps to accelerate preparations for an early decision on the establishment of a peacekeeping operation. A pre-mandate commitment authority of \$47 million executed from March 2007 (included in the above table as the initial funding for MINURCAT) provided for those requirements and was drawn from the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund. Although the pre-mandate commitment authority was intended to provide for the period to 30 June 2007, only \$1 million was spent by 30 June 2007 and the authority was therefore rolled over to the 2007/08 period pending the establishment of MINURCAT in September 2007 and the approval of additional funding. The pre-mandate commitment authority was then extended to support the initial operations of MINURCAT and, in December 2007, the General Assembly approved an appropriation of \$183.6 million, consisting of the \$1 million actually spent by 30 June 2007 and \$182.4 million for the 2007/08 budget year, and effectively subsuming the earlier pre-mandate commitment authority.
- ^c The deployment of a light support package and a heavy support package (amounting to approximately \$309.1 million) to support the African Union Mission in the Sudan was approved from 31 August 2006 by the Security Council. On 17 October 2006, the Secretary-General informed the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions of his intention to deploy the light support package, which would cost \$21.2 million and be financed from the 2006/07 budget of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS). On 24 April 2007, the Secretary-General informed the Advisory Committee that a further \$68.6 million would be used from the UNMIS budget to begin the deployment of the heavy support package until 30 June 2007. For the period 31 July-31 December 2007, \$85 million of funding from UNMIS was used to temporarily finance the heavy support package and the initial deployment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), along with a new commitment authority of \$50 million, pending the approval of a UNAMID budget. The value of the commitment authority and the amount used from the UNMIS budget were incorporated into the 2007/08 budget approved on 22 December 2007, making it possible for UNMIS to be reimbursed.
- ^d The establishment of the United Nations Support Office for the African Union Mission in Somalia was made possible through three separate commitment authorities that followed on from earlier pre-mandate commitment authorities provided to support the planning of the African Union Mission in Somalia and a future United Nations peacekeeping mission. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions provided its concurrence on 10 March to the first commitment authority (within the Secretary-General's cumulative authority of \$50 million per decision of the Security Council). Given the additional requirements to implement support for the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), a second commitment authority, with assessment, followed on 30 March 2009, with the effect of subsuming the earlier authority (of \$43,856,000) and replenishing the amount drawn from the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund. A further commitment authority, with assessment, was approved in June 2009 to provide initial funding for the new 2009/10 budget year.

Annex II

Indicative timeline for the application of a standardized funding model to fund new peacekeeping missions



^a Subject to the extent of mission requirements and the number of missions drawing on the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund and the strategic deployment stocks in parallel, a request may be required for an assessment of contributions by the General Assembly.