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Financing of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January and 31 December 1994

Financing of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991

Strengthened and unified security management system for the United Nations

Revised estimates relating to the programme budget for the biennium 2008-2009 under sections 3, 5, 17, 18, 20, 21, 27, 28E, 28G, 32, 33 and 35

Revised estimates relating to the financing for the biennium 2008-2009 of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

Report of the Secretary-General*

* The issuance of the present report was delayed to undertake extensive consultations within the Secretariat, including offices away from Headquarters on parameters and arrangements for the security management system and to enable the conclusions of the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination meeting held at the end of October 2008 on jointly financed security requirements in the field to be incorporated in the report.



Summary

In its resolution 61/263, the General Assembly emphasized the need for a comprehensive safety and security policy framework at the United Nations. The Secretary-General was requested to report to the General Assembly at the first part of its resumed sixty-second session on a wide range of issues including, but not limited to, threat and risk assessments, cooperation with host countries, cost-sharing arrangements, safety issues and progress made in the implementation of the standardized access control system.

Following the attack on the United Nations offices in Algiers on 11 December 2007, the Department of Safety and Security was asked to conduct a review of its security policies and procedures. In addition, the Secretary-General appointed an independent panel to establish all the facts concerning the attack in Algiers and also to address strategic issues vital to the delivery and enhancement of staff security for the United Nations in its operations around the world.

As the outcome of the review and the findings of the Independent Panel on Security and Safety would have an impact on the safety and security policy framework at the United Nations, it was deemed appropriate to delay the report requested in resolution 61/263 in order to present a comprehensive security approach for consideration by Member States.

The report of the Independent Panel was presented to the Secretary-General on 9 June 2008. It recommends, inter alia, that the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security should conduct a management review of the organization of the Department of Safety and Security. That review is currently under way, and the findings will be presented to the General Assembly in 2009 during the current session of the Assembly. In the interim, the present report contains only those elements of security that require immediate consideration by Member States, owing to the urgency of the security situation, and which are not likely to be impacted by the outcome of the management review.

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Part One

Security requirements for the United Nations under the regular budget

I. Introduction

1. In its resolution 61/263, the General Assembly emphasized the need for a comprehensive safety and security policy framework at the United Nations which provides the basis for the threat and risk assessment, cooperation with the host countries, cost-sharing arrangements and operations of the Department of Safety and Security. The Assembly also stressed that safety is a vital aspect of the mandate of the Department of Safety and Security, and requested the Secretary-General to conduct a comprehensive review of the existing safety programmes at Headquarters and other duty stations and to report thereon. Finally, while taking note of the efforts of the Secretary-General to achieve as wide a geographical balance as possible in the Department of Safety and Security, without compromising the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity, as well as to achieve gender parity, the Assembly urged him to continue his efforts and report on further steps taken in that regard. It was the intention of the Secretary-General to address all the above-mentioned issues in a comprehensive report to the General Assembly at the first part of its resumed sixty-second session.

2. Regrettably, however, the United Nations became the target of a terrorist attack in Algiers on 11 December 2007, which led to the loss of 17 lives. Following that attack, the Secretary-General requested the Department of Safety and Security to conduct a review of its policies and procedures. He also appointed an independent panel to evaluate the strategic issues vital to the delivery and enhancement of the security of United Nations personnel and premises and the changing threats and risks faced by it. The Panel would examine the inherent vulnerabilities of the United Nations operations around the world in order to build confidence among the staff within the system and enhance credibility among the Member States, civil society and other relevant stakeholders. The Panel would make recommendations on improvements needed in the systems and practices of the United Nations, as well as additional resources needed to face security challenges, where possible, to prevent the occurrence of such incidents and where they have occurred, to lessen their impact.

3. In the light of the above, and given that the outcome of the review and the findings of the Panel would have an impact on the safety and security policy framework at the United Nations, it was deemed appropriate to postpone the comprehensive report in order to present a comprehensive security approach for consideration by Member States.

4. The report of the Independent Panel on Safety and Security of United Nations Personnel and Premises Worldwide, entitled “Towards a culture of security and accountability”, was presented to the Secretary-General on 9 June 2008. One of the recommendations in connection with the United Nations security management system states that the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security should conduct a review of the present organization of the Department with the purpose of better defining roles and responsibilities, with clear lines of accountability, and identify work methods and organizational structure that privilege the field, adding

that in view of the Panel, the Department of Safety and Security will require additional human and financial resources, but their level and allocation should be determined following the management review.

5. Pending the conclusion of that review, the findings of which will be the subject of a separate report, the present report contains only those elements of security that require immediate consideration by Member States owing to the urgency of the security situation in certain duty stations and which are not likely to be impacted by the outcome of the management review. The issues from resolution 61/263 that will be included in the next report as they may be affected by the management review are: the review of safety programmes (para. 6), host country agreements (para. 15), gender and geographical balance (paras. 20-23), and the proposed conversion of temporary posts to established posts within the Department (para. 28). Also to be included in the next report is the security costs survey undertaken by the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB) for all participating United Nations security management organizations that was requested in paragraph 13 (d) of resolution 61/263.

II. Executive protection

6. The mission of the Security and Safety Service at United Nations Headquarters in New York is to enable the effective conduct of United Nations activities by ensuring a coherent, effective and timely response to all security-related threats and other emergencies. To that end, the Security and Safety Service provides services to protect staff, delegates, visiting dignitaries and other visitors at Headquarters, to prevent damage to United Nations property and to provide safe and secure facilities and to ensure an emergency early warning system 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Within this context, the task of protecting the most senior United Nations officials falls under the Service's Executive Protection Group. Close protection is also provided for certain officials away from Headquarters if a security risk assessment deems the protection necessary and this is organized by the relevant local security teams in those locations.

A. Current protection arrangements

Close protection/security detail

7. The Executive Protection Group provides close protection services for the senior United Nations officials on a shift basis. There are currently 15 officers providing executive protection services, however when viewed against the current security environment and in the context of similar protection programmes by counterpart law enforcement agencies, this number of officers for close protection of the most senior officials in the United Nations is inconsistent with industry best practices. The existing organizational policy on executive protection has not been updated to reflect the increased threat levels to the United Nations and its officials and therefore the current number of officers assigned to this task is not sufficient to provide the necessary protection.

B. Proposed changes and resource implications

8. In view of the rapidly changing security climate in which threat levels may fluctuate according to an event or adverse pronouncement, there is a need within the Security and Safety Service, New York, for a more adequate approach to the close protection of New York-based senior officials, including the Secretary-General, the Deputy Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly. The minimum standard should consider the individual's personal threat level, office held, and the threat posed to the Organization. Basic coverage does not need to be overwhelming or unnecessarily overt. It does, however, need to be consistent, which cannot be achieved with the present approach and staffing levels.

9. For close protection/security detail, there is an urgent need for a second shift to be added to address the deficiency, as the current staffing complement of 15 officers is not sufficient to mitigate the increased security risks, and allow for reasonable rest periods or working hours. It should be noted that the Secretary-General is presently accorded protection on a 24-hour/7-day basis as dictated by his assessed threat level, and that maintaining the expected high level of performance could be compromised by limited resources and long hours of work which includes frequent overseas travel. The staffing level challenge is further increased by the need to improve the basic coverage now provided to the Deputy Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly, as determined by the security threat and risk assessment.

10. The additional posts required to add another shift are twenty-six (26) security officers at the Security Service level, one of which will be a Captain, a Lieutenant and two Sergeants and 22 security officers. Further, associated non-post requirements such as uniforms, weapons, travel, vehicles, communications equipment and training to increase the security coverage for the senior New York-based officials would be required. Total requirements for the period from 1 January to 31 December 2009 are estimated at \$2,411,500, which includes \$1,281,800 in post costs and \$1,129,700 in non-post costs.

III. Protection of former Secretaries-General and other senior officials

11. In the past, courtesy services have been provided to former Secretaries-General when they visit the United Nations in New York. These services included the provision of an official vehicle with driver and a security officer. However, no protection services had been provided to former Secretaries-General until early 2007. After that date, specific threat and risk assessments necessitated the delivery of close protection to a former Secretary-General, along with support with residential and office security, both via personnel and by technical means, and during local and international travel. This was provided on a bespoke basis and by a phased approach, regularly reviewed and the provision adjusted to reflect the updated threat profile of the recipient.

12. It should be noted that global security and threat levels have transformed significantly in the last few years. Accordingly, while provision of protection services to former Secretaries-General has not been contemplated in the past, the

prevailing conditions today clearly warrant consideration of the provision of such services, where appropriate.

13. At present the Department of Safety and Security is not mandated to provide protection services to former or non-United Nations officials. Accordingly, while the security imperative require Department staff to provide such services to former Secretaries-General, these staff are not covered by the privileges and immunities of Article 105 of the Charter of the United Nations and article V, section 18, paragraph 1, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, including immunity from legal process. This is of particular concern in the light of potential liabilities from the provisions of such services, particularly in the event of use of force by security officers providing such services. Authority by the General Assembly for the Department of Safety and Security to provide protection to former senior officials would enable the future arrangements to operate within the provisions of Article 105 of the Charter of the United Nations and article V, section 18, paragraph 1, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.

A. Future protection arrangements

14. It is the view of the Secretary-General that the protection of former Secretaries-General and former senior United Nations officials be guided by the following four principles:

(a) The Organization has a moral liability to provide protection of former Secretaries-General and any former senior officials whose work for the Organization may have generated such a need;

(b) The assurance of post-service close protection contributes to an environment in which current Secretaries-General and senior officials may operate without fear of retaliation or favour, safe in the knowledge that they would be protected;

(c) Protection would not be limited only to Secretaries-General and senior officials, but also to those who have been elected/appointed by the General Assembly or the Security Council to assume certain functions;

(d) Every case would be based on a security risk assessment.

15. It is proposed, therefore, that post-service security protection will be provided to former Secretaries-General and former senior United Nations officials only if warranted by threat and risk assessments, and only if the host country authorities are unable to provide such services. The level of protection arrangements provided would be determined by the threat and risk assessment. The duration of such post-service protection would normally be limited to five years from the date of leaving office.

B. Cost and resource implications

16. Given the limited experience gained thus far and expectations that resource requirements vary significantly depending on the results of individual risk assessments, arrangements with host country authorities and the travel schedule of

the former United Nations official, it is not possible to provide a precise estimate for resources at this stage.

17. Despite the uncertainties in cost implications, the Department of Safety and Security believes that for the time being, the services provided to the former Secretaries-General could be maintained within existing departmental resources. Accordingly, no additional resources for these services are currently being sought. As further experience is gained by the Department, it is proposed that the resource implications of these services be revisited and as necessary considered in the context of future budget proposals.

IV. Standardized access control project

18. Pursuant to paragraph 44 of section XI of General Assembly resolution 59/276, the Secretary-General submitted his report of 24 February 2006 (A/60/695), in which he outlined the proposed scope, concept and revised course of action for standardized access control at all main locations of the Organization. A second report contained in document A/61/566 was submitted to further elaborate on the standardized access control measures as outlined in document A/60/695.

19. The Secretary-General proposed that the implementation of the standardized access control project be undertaken in two phases. The first phase was intended to meet compliance with headquarters minimum operations security standards (HMOSS) for perimeter protection and electronic access control. The second phase is designed to provide for compliance with those standards with regard to defined layers of security within the perimeter.

20. For the planning, integration, coordination and implementation of the standardized access control project, the Secretary-General put in place a management structure consisting of a steering group and project access control teams. The Steering Group is led by the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security, with senior-level representation from the Department of Safety and Security and the Department of Management. The project access control team (PACT) is composed of security specialists from the Department of Safety and Security and professionals from the Office of Central Support Services with expertise in information technology and facilities management. The PACT teams have been replicated at the main United Nations headquarters locations. The acronym "PACT" was adopted for common usage and the standardized access control project has become known as PACT I and PACT II respectively, in reference to the first and second phases of the project. The present report provides an update on the status of implementation of PACT I and a detailed strategy and cost estimates for PACT II.

A. PACT I

1. Procurement and contract status

21. By resolution 61/263, the General Assembly authorized the Secretary-General "to enter into commitments up to 20,208,000 United States dollars under the programme budget for the biennium 2006-2007, 1,500,000 dollars under the budget for the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and 1,975,000 dollars under

the budget for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, without prejudice to the implementation of projects previously approved for the biennium 2006-2007, to be reported in the context of the respective second performance reports, to implement the first phase of the standardized access control system". The actual requirements for the implementation of the projects in the amount of \$18,045,400 for the regular budget have been reported in the second performance report for the biennium 2006-2007 (A/62/575) under the portion related to decisions of policymaking organs. These requirements were included in the second performance report under section 32, Construction, alteration, improvement and major maintenance, and the related funds have been appropriated in the context of resolution 62/235 on the final budget appropriations for the biennium 2006-2007.

22. The procurement exercises were conducted simultaneously for all 10 duty stations (Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), United Nations Office at Geneva, United Nations Office at Nairobi, United Nations Office at Vienna, Headquarters Annex, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia), with variations in scope to address local requirements. The design-build project delivery system was used, whereby the design and construction aspects of a project are contracted with a single entity, thus reducing the delivery schedule by overlapping the design and construction phases. Nine of the 10 procurement exercises were successful and resulted in signed contracts (except ESCWA).

23. The procurement exercise for the New York Annex was completed on time, but protracted negotiations with the selected vendor continued beyond the 31 December 2007 deadline, thus precluding the use of funds authorized. The situation was further complicated by the fact that the amount of the contract was well above the estimated \$1.2 million. The increase in price over the original cost estimate is attributed to the escalation of construction costs in the New York area. The total cost of the New York Annex project is now \$2.4 million with the United Nations share being \$1.9 million and the UNDP contribution for the FF building of \$500,000. The contract was funded by reprioritizing and temporarily using funds from other projects within section 32 for the biennium 2008-2009. To ensure that sufficient funding exists for all the projects within section 32 of the programme budget for the biennium 2008-2009, it is necessary to increase funding for PACT I for the New York Annex by the amount of \$1.9 million.

24. In the case of ESCWA, only two proposals were received, one of which was disqualified for failure to follow the submission procedures, while the other was disqualified during the vendor registration process. PACT I funding for ESCWA is now included in the request for funding for second phase of the standardized access control project below.

Table 1
PACT I commitment authority and committed actual costs, by duty station as at 31 December 2007 (as per resolution A/61/263)

(Thousands of United States dollars)

<i>Duty station</i>	<i>Commitment authority</i>	<i>Actual requirements at the time of the second performance report (A/62/575)</i>	<i>Committed actual amount on 31 December 2007</i>
United Nations Secretariat (programme budget)			
New York Annex	1 200.0	1 200.0	195.0 ^c
Geneva	1 921.6	1 921.6	1 887.3
Vienna ^a	458.4	271.6	271.6
Nairobi	5 087.9	5 087.9	5 087.9
ECA	3 614.4	3 614.4	3 550.9
ECLAC	3 152.5	2 375.8	2 373.1
ESCAP	945.0	1 610.7	1 117.9
ESCWA	2 175.0	1 963.4	1.4
Subtotal (programme budget)	18 554.8	18 045.4	14 485.1
Vienna (jointly financed) ^b	1 653.2	957.1	957.1
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia	1 500.0	1 356.4	311.1
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda	1 975.0	1 975.0	1 971.2
Total	23 683.0	22 333.9	18 581.6

^a Regular budget share only.

^b Amount to be shared by other United Nations organizations.

^c \$195,000 used for consultancy services for global scope development and legal expertise for design-build contract templates. Amount of \$2.4 million was later obligated using 2008-2009 funds appropriated under section 32.

2. Status of implementation

New York Annex

25. Design work has been completed and the project is in the construction phase. The scope of work includes the upgrading of existing access control hardware (card readers, cameras and door locks). Upon completion of the project, all security systems will be standardized and fully integrated into the Headquarters primary security control centre for monitoring and response. The project is expected to be completed in January 2009.

United Nations Office at Geneva

26. This project was designed as an amendment to a larger perimeter protection project that was already in progress under the first stage of HMOSS improvements. Installation of the standardized security operating system is a significant aspect of the project. Smart card technology will be implemented and integrated with a

visitor's management system. The project includes major improvements to the control centre and will fill gaps in the perimeter closed-circuit television (CCTV) and intrusion detection systems. The project is scheduled for completion by 31 December 2008.

United Nations Office at Vienna

27. The PACT I projects support other security projects previously approved for Vienna International Centre by the General Assembly. Identification cards are read by fixed and hand-held readers at all entry points of the Vienna International Centre. "Reading" involves accessing the cardholder's data stored in a secure and redundant database. This Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) Card system is a locally designed access control system which enhances security officers' ability to identify authorized personnel entering and exiting through the access/egress points of the Vienna International Centre in both normal and emergency evacuation situations. In addition, the system records the presence/absence of persons at the Vienna International Centre and automatically generates statistical data used in capacity planning as well as, in the event of a major emergency or catastrophic attack at the Vienna International Centre, for forensic purposes. The RFID system is used in conjunction with — and as a complement to a License Plate Recognition System, which has the same features for vehicles as the RFID system has for persons. Only pre-registered vehicles can enter the Vienna International Centre. The project is scheduled for completion in March 2009.

28. It should be noted that the PACT I projects are cost-shared by the Vienna-based organizations in accordance with an established formula, according to which the United Nations share of overall project cost is approximately 22 per cent. The Vienna-based organizations agreed to allocate the necessary resources for the project in accordance with the cost-sharing formula.

United Nations Office at Nairobi

29. Design work has been completed and the project is in the construction phase. The installation of the standardized security operating system will fully integrate all security systems. The new badging system, which includes the smart card technology and a visitor's management component, will standardize all access into the compound. New and backup control centres are being constructed. The perimeter protection is enhanced with additional cameras to support the existing intrusion detection system. The installation of card readers is a major component of this project along with the installation of vehicle barriers. The project is scheduled for completion by 31 December 2008.

Economic Commission for Africa

30. Design work has been completed and the project is in the construction phase. The standardized security operating system has been installed and will fully integrate all security systems, including a visitor's management system. The new badging system, which includes the smart card technology, will standardize all access into the compound. New and backup control centres are being constructed. The perimeter protection will be improved with additional CCTV, intrusion detection, and vehicle barriers. The project is expected to be completed by end of May 2009.

Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean

31. Design work has been completed and the project is in the construction phase. The standardized security operating system has been installed and will fully integrate all security systems. The new badging system, which includes the smart card technology, will standardize all access into the compound. New and backup control centres are being constructed. The new perimeter protection includes CCTV, intrusion detection, and vehicle barriers. The civil works and security systems have been fully integrated with prior security projects that include a new visitors' screening building and vehicle barriers. The project is on schedule and is projected to be completed by 31 December 2008.

Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia

32. The first phase of standardized access control was not implemented at ESCWA owing to the absence of qualified bidders. At the request of ESCWA, the Headquarters PACT team conducted an assessment of the project and devised a plan to implement both phases of the access control project as one initiative. The assessment included updated requirements along with cost estimates. The implementation of the full standardized access control project is particularly crucial in ESCWA, as it is the only main duty station with a Security Phase II threat level.

Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific

33. Design work has been completed and the project is in the construction phase. Significant civil works improving the existing security control centre have been completed and a backup control centre will be built. The standardized operating system that will be installed will fully integrate all security systems. The new badging system, which includes the smart card technology, will standardize all access into the compound. The majority of the work is for vehicle barriers, card readers, CCTV, and intrusion detection. The project is scheduled for completion by 31 March 2009.

International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

34. Design work has been completed and based on the scope of work, construction is divided into two separate projects for CCTV and vehicle barriers. There were two procurement exercises with a vendor selected for each project. The CCTV project is in construction phase and scheduled for completion by the end of 2008. Contract negotiation with the selected vendor for the vehicle barrier project was extensive and lengthy. Owing to the delay, the Tribunal cancelled the awarding of the contract to the vendor when it became apparent that a substantial amount of the work and related payment could not be made until well into 2009. As the closing date for the Tribunals had been established, it has been decided that it would not be appropriate to continue with the project. The funds to complete the vehicle barrier project are, therefore, no longer required for Phase I and are not requested in Phase II.

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

35. Design work has been completed and the project is in the construction phase. Key elements of the project are vehicle barriers and intrusion detection at the perimeter. A visitor's management system will also be installed and integrated with

the current security management system. The project is scheduled for completion by 31 December 2008.

3. Resource requirements

36. Resources in the amount of \$1.9 million are required to ensure the completion of the New York Annex project. Currently other projects programmed within section 32 have been reprioritized and related funds released to enable procurement action for the security project. However, to ensure that all other maintenance and construction activities budgeted under section 32 are completed during the biennium 2008-2009, additional resources in the amount of \$1.9 million are requested. These resources had been previously approved for the PACT project by the General Assembly in its resolution 61/263 for the biennium 2006-2007. However, that provision has lapsed owing to the lengthy procurement negotiations.

B. PACT II

1. Overview

37. In his report (A/61/566), the Secretary-General noted that implementation of the proposed second phase of the PACT project would only begin after consideration of and approval by the General Assembly of the project proposals to be submitted to it at its sixty-second session, and that detailed cost estimates for the second phase cannot be made until the elements of the first phase have begun. The report also noted that the need for anticipated specialized technical support will be fully analysed and included in the scope review for the second phase of PACT.

38. As noted in the PACT I status update above, with the exception of ESCWA, the first phase of the project is well under way in all major duty stations. Resource requirements for PACT II, comprising capital costs, maintenance, project management, and PACT-related staffing costs, are included in the present report.

39. Dedicated resources for construction project management are key to the proper monitoring and implementation of this project and will be needed through the end of the project. Maintenance resources for system support will be required beginning the year 2010 for PACT I installations, and escalate in the year 2011 to include elements from PACT II installations. The estimated costs for maintenance for the year 2010 amount to \$2,046,200 and for the year 2011 amount to \$4,439,200. The maintenance will include such items as maintaining the physical barriers, lighting and boundary protectors and maintenance and necessary upgrades of information technology (IT) equipment such as servers, monitors, cameras, turnstiles and card readers.

40. The International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has decided not to request funds for the second phase of the standardized access control project, as the closing date of the Tribunal was recently established and is anticipated to occur within the Phase II time frame.

41. The organizations based in Vienna (United Nations Office at Vienna, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) and Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization) have been briefed on the resources necessary for PACT II and on the ongoing costs of its maintenance. The organizations have met to discuss the cost

sharing, however, as yet, an agreement on the cost sharing has not been reached. IAEA, UNIDO and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization are awaiting the decision of the General Assembly on PACT II before committing their resources to the project. The requirements detailed in the present report include both the full cost and the United Nations portion of the costs. However, the resources requested are only for the portion that would be funded under the United Nations regular budget.

2. Capital expenditures

42. The second phase of the standardized access control is designed to provide a full package of access control measures of protection beyond the outer perimeter layer and into the multiple inner layers of protection. This includes building perimeters and general access into all buildings and sensitive areas within those buildings. Local assessments have identified the inner layers of security and the appropriate security measures have been conceptually developed and are the basis of the phase two capital improvements. For some duty stations the same type of equipment used in PACT I, such as CCTV systems are being installed. However, in Phase II the installations are for separate physical locations inside the perimeter of the campuses. Below is a synopsis of the security enhancements presented by duty station.

<i>Duty station</i>	<i>Projects</i>
United Nations Office at Geneva	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Installation of access control devices for all building entrance doors • Card readers, door alarms for conference rooms • Access barrier devices (turnstiles) at selected entry points • Video surveillance to support all access points and critical locations • Access control for critical infrastructure rooms • Extension of the local area network (LAN) to support the access control systems and CCTV • Cabling and infrastructure to support all security devices and controllers • Installation of devices and support network to account for all persons present on the site at any given time
United Nations Office at Vienna	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Network expansion to integrate current security systems; access control, video, intrusion, radiation and fire • Software upgrades and licenses • Installation of infrastructure to support the network • Network storage of data and video with redundancy • Data centre implementation/control centre integration • Control centre redesign and upgrades to support integration of systems

<i>Duty station</i>	<i>Projects</i>
United Nations Office at Nairobi	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Installation of undercarriage vehicle inspection system • Door alarms and utility hatch intrusion devices • Licence plate recognition system for vehicles • Parking management system and internal vehicle bollards • Installation of card readers and alarms at office doors • Installation of speed style turnstiles at conference area • Network and infrastructure to support new devices • Data storage and redundancy • Additional CCTV to support new alarms and devices
Economic Commission for Africa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Installation of undercarriage vehicle inspection system • Alarms for infrastructure hatches and manholes • Access control devices (turnstiles) for conference areas • Parking management system and vehicle bollards • CCTV coverage for new alarms and access devices • Upgrade dedicated security network • Separate universal protection services and backup power for security systems • Infrastructure upgrades to support new systems • Backup security data centre • Installation of card readers and alarms at offices and infrastructure rooms
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Installation of card readers, cameras and alarms at internal conference rooms, record rooms and VIP areas • Intrusion detection for first external floor windows • Installation of turnstiles and controllers at conference area • Installation of cameras for main office doors and vehicle parking areas • Secondary control centre • Expanded network to support additional security devices • Additional infrastructure to support network

<i>Duty station</i>	<i>Projects</i>
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Installation of CCTV for conference rooms, elevators, parking area, infrastructure rooms and roof tops • Intrusion detection for internal areas; doors, rooms and windows • Expanded network to support new devices • Improvements to infrastructure to support expanded system
Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Vehicle barrier at four vehicle access points • Perimeter intrusion detection and CCTV coverage • Security management system and badging stations • CCTV, alarms and card readers at building entrances • Installation of alarms and CCTV at critical infrastructure rooms • Primary and secondary control centres • Install security network and supporting infrastructure
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Additional vehicle barrier for the perimeter • Intrusion detection for internal areas; doors, rooms and windows • Expanded network to support new devices • Improvements to infrastructure to support expanded system

3. Connectivity of video and access authorizations among duty stations

43. In addition to the security enhancements detailed in paragraph 42 above, a global security infrastructure project will be implemented by the United Nations PACT Team in cooperation with the Information and Technology Services Division in Headquarters. The implementation of a standard security operating system at Headquarters and other major duty stations creates a technology platform for implementing an enterprise solution for connectivity of video and access authorizations. A wide area network will be designed and installed to enable the transfer of video images and access authorizations between duty stations. For example, during a crisis at one of the duty stations, limited real time video images may be viewed at the Department of Safety and Security crisis communications centre at Headquarters. The technology will also allow for access authorizations to be transferred electronically between duty stations. As an example, once travel has been authorized from one major duty station to another, approved access will be confirmed electronically between the duty stations subject to agreed protocols. The traveller can then be granted access to enter the receiving duty station with no action required either by the traveller or the receiving duty station. This will allow the United Nations to fully maximize the benefit of a standardized access card technology and operating system.

44. The cost estimates for the capital projects were arrived at following inputs from experts on the local PACT teams, consultants in the fields of security, engineering and architecture and the pricing structure of the current contracts. Total one-time capital costs for the year 2009 for phase two projects amount to \$39,763,200, including the costs at Vienna to be cost-shared by all Vienna-based organizations. The estimated requirements for the organizational units financed from the programme budget in the amount of \$36,149,400 are proposed under section 32. The requirements for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda are proposed under its budget. Table 2 below details the requirements by duty station and type of expenditure.

Table 2

PACT II capital requirements for the 2008-2009 biennium, by duty station and type of expenditures (at 2008-2009 rates)

(Thousands of United States dollars)

<i>Duty station</i>	<i>Intrusion detection</i>	<i>Video surveillance (CCTV)</i>	<i>Access control</i>	<i>Infrastructure</i>	<i>Security network</i>	<i>Total requirements</i>
Headquarters — global project	—	—	—	—	4 000.0	4 000.0
Geneva	—	424.5	4 816.4	3 507.0	1 887.0	10 634.9
Vienna ^a	—	179.1	—	198.0	395.2	772.3
Nairobi	576.0	416.6	2 788.0	1 056.0	550.0	5 386.6
ECA	761.8	1 640.1	1 724.4	1 035.0	555.0	5 716.3
ECLAC	363.3	135.1	160.8	358.2	78.6	1 096.0
ESCAP	193.2	254.8	1 580.8	905.0	492.0	3 425.8
ESCWA ^b	675.0	1 150.0	2 165.0	671.0	456.5	5 117.5
Subtotal (regular budget)	2 569.3	4 200.2	13 235.4	7 730.2	8 414.3	36 149.4
Vienna ^c	—	635.2	—	702.0	1 401.0	2 738.2
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda	85.0	309.6	10.0	221.0	250.0	875.6
Total	2 654.3	5 145.0	13 245.4	8 653.2	10 065.3	39 763.2

^a Regular budget share only.

^b Phase two now also includes the phase one requirements (see paragraph 34 for details).

^c Amount to be shared by other Vienna-based organizations (IAEA, UNIDO and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization).

4. Construction project management

45. The construction project manager provides the United Nations with the design and construction expertise needed to control project scope, schedule changes, verify completion of work, report progress, and provide daily oversight of the contractor. This is crucial to the success of a design-build project. General temporary assistance funding is required for construction management resources for the second phase of the project. Requirements for such resources in the first phase of the project have been absorbed locally utilizing a combination of vacant posts, and redeployment of funds. This arrangement is not, however, considered sustainable for PACT II, given

the significantly higher scope of work. Therefore, it is proposed that general temporary assistance funds of \$1,327,700 be provided for construction management services for PACT II implementation equivalent to positions at the P-4 level for the duration of 2009 at each duty station except Headquarters, equating to eight positions in total. In Headquarters this position has been approved for the biennium 2006-2007, given the advance stage of its infrastructure implementation.

5. Resource requirements

46. Staffing resources are required to support the operation of the standardized access control systems. Dedicated posts are needed to administer and provide information technology system support for the new security network and to operate the 24/7 security control centres. Requirements vary among the main United Nations duty stations depending on existing systems and current support coverage for those systems and the size and magnitude of the system implemented under the standardized access control project.

47. Each duty station will require the relevant information technology staff to manage and maintain the technology infrastructure installed under the PACT projects. At each duty station, except at Headquarters, the P-3 Information Technology Officer would provide for planning support, as well as design, installation, testing and commissioning physical security systems, such as access control, closed circuit television, and/or intrusion detection systems. These officers would also manage projects involving feasibility studies, systems analysis, design, development and implementation of physical security systems or major upgrades, provide user training to clients in the Department of Safety and Security, and other related staff and providing guidance to first level technical support staff, and consultants/contractors. Support staff would also be necessary at each duty station to carry out the necessary maintenance and technical support for the security infrastructure. As most of the systems under PACT I will be in place by January 2009, it is proposed to create the P-3 Information Technology Officer posts (eight posts in total) and the General Service (Other/Local level) posts (eight posts in total) effective 1 January 2009 for all duty stations, except Headquarters. In Headquarters, the posts for the support of PACT have been approved as part of the programme budget for the biennium 2008-2009, owing to the advanced stage of its infrastructure implementation.

48. In some duty stations security staff will also be required owing to the set-up of 24/7 control centres and the implementation of entry pass and identification systems. Additional security officers are required to operate the control centres as well as to issue access passes and provide input into the related database operations. Additional security staff for these purposes at the Local level are required for the United Nations Office at Nairobi (nine posts), ECA (eight posts), ECLAC (seven posts), ESCAP (five posts) ESCWA (seven posts), and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (four posts). In the case of the United Nations Office at Nairobi and ECA, owing to the large numbers of staff from other agencies located in the compound, the complexity and size of the campus, it is also required to create an additional P-3 Security Officer post each for the United Nations Office at Nairobi and ECA to coordinate the new operations.

49. It is estimated that, in total, 58 new posts will be required at a cost of \$2,334,800 for 2009. Resources will also be required to provide the related support, such as office space, furniture, computer equipment, supplies and materials. The total support requirements amount to \$442,600 for 2009. The posts disposition and the total costs for 2009 for the posts and the associated costs amount to \$2,777,400 and are detailed in table 3 below.

Table 3
Post requirements for 2009 by duty station and function

<i>Duty station</i>	<i>P-3 (Security)</i>	<i>Local level (Security)</i>	<i>P-3 (Information Technology)</i>	<i>General Service (Other level) (Information Technology)</i>	<i>Local level (Information Technology)</i>	<i>Total</i>
Geneva	—	—	1	1	—	2
Vienna	—	—	1	1	—	2
Nairobi	1	9	1	—	1	12
ECA	1	8	1	—	1	11
ECLAC	—	7	1	—	1	9
ESCAP	—	5	1	—	1	7
ESCWA	—	7	1	—	1	9
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda	—	4	1	—	1	6
Total	2	40	8	2	6	58

50. The total resource requirements for the PACT II project are shown in table 4 below, by duty station and type of expenditure.

Table 4
PACT II resource requirements for the 2008-2009 biennium, by duty station and type of expenditures (at 2008-2009 rates)
(Thousands of United States dollars)

<i>Duty station</i>	<i>Intrusion detection</i>	<i>Video surveillance (CCTV)</i>	<i>Access control</i>	<i>Infrastructure</i>	<i>Security network</i>	<i>Subtotal — capital requirements</i>	<i>Project management</i>	<i>Posts and associated costs</i>	<i>Total</i>
Headquarters — global project	—	—	—	—	4 000.0	4 000.0	—	—	4 000.0
Geneva	—	424.5	4 816.4	3 507.0	1 887.0	10 634.9	172.6	168.1	10 975.6
Vienna ^a	—	179.1	—	198.0	395.2	772.3	34.8	41.6	848.7
Nairobi	576.0	416.6	2 788.0	1 056.0	550.0	5 386.6	165.3	580.3	6 132.2
ECA	761.8	1 640.1	1 724.4	1 035.0	555.0	5 716.3	181.2	377.7	6 275.2
ECLAC	363.3	135.1	160.8	358.2	78.6	1 096.0	155.2	457.1	1 708.3

<i>Duty station</i>	<i>Intrusion detection</i>	<i>Video surveillance (CCTV)</i>	<i>Access control</i>	<i>Infrastructure</i>	<i>Security network</i>	<i>Subtotal — capital requirements</i>	<i>Project management</i>	<i>Posts and associated costs</i>	<i>Total</i>
ESCAP	193.2	254.8	1 580.8	905.0	492.0	3 425.8	147.7	313.5	3 887.0
ESCWA ^b	675.0	1 150.0	2 165.0	671.0	456.5	5 117.5	162.3	406.9	5 686.7
Subtotal (regular budget)	2 569.3	4 200.2	13 235.4	7 730.2	8 414.3	36 149.4	1 019.1	2 345.2	39 513.7
Vienna ^c	—	635.2	—	702.0	1 401.0	2 738.2	123.6	147.3	3 009.1
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda	85.0	309.6	10.0	221.0	250.0	875.6	185.0	284.9	1 345.5
Total	2 654.3	5 145.0	13 245.4	8 653.2	10 065.3	39 763.2	1 327.7	2 777.4	43 868.3

^a Regular budget share only.

^b Phase two now also includes the phase one requirements (see paragraph 34 for details).

^c Amount to be shared by other Vienna-based organizations (IAEA, UNIDO, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization).

C. Maintenance and support requirements

51. Maintenance and support is essential but is required on a minimal basis during the first year after project completion, as general warranty and guarantee coverage is provided under the construction contract for one year after project completion and acceptance. Substantial maintenance requirements would begin in 2010 for the first phase (PACT I) and 2011 for the second phase (PACT II). Full maintenance resources would be considered in the context of the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2010-2011. Maintenance costs have been estimated based on proposals for maintenance services requested from the bidders, as part of their request for proposal in the initial phase of the project. Bidders were asked to propose maintenance cost from year two through year five of the project. The maintenance costs for the project at Headquarters have already been included in the programme budget under section 32 and formed the budget base for following bienniums.

Table 5
**Estimated recurring maintenance requirements by duty station and function
(2010-2011 biennium)**

(Thousands of United States dollars)

<i>Duty station</i>	<i>PACT I 2010</i>	<i>PACT I 2011</i>	<i>PACT II 2011</i>	<i>Subtotal 2010</i>	<i>Subtotal 2011</i>	<i>Total 2010-2011</i>
Geneva	782.0	927.0	886.2	1 060.2	1 535.0	2 595.2
Vienna ^a	24.9	26.9	37.0	24.9	63.9	88.8
Nairobi	290.0	290.0	328.0	290.0	618.0	908.0
ECA	60.0	60.0	353.0	60.0	413.0	473.0
ECLAC	330.0	330.0	160.0	330.0	490.0	820.0

<i>Duty station</i>	<i>PACT I 2010</i>	<i>PACT I 2011</i>	<i>PACT II 2011</i>	<i>Subtotal 2010</i>	<i>Subtotal 2011</i>	<i>Total 2010-2011</i>
ESCAP	95.0	95.0	350.0	95.0	445.0	540.0
ESCWA	—	—	500.0	—	500.0	500.0
Subtotal (regular budget)	1 581.9	1 728.9	2 614.2	1 860.1	4 064.9	5 925.0
Vienna ^b	88.5	95.6	131.1	88.5	226.7	315.2
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda	97.6	97.6	50.0	97.6	147.6	245.2
Total	1 768.0	1 922.1	2 795.3	2 046.2	4 439.2	6 485.4

^a Regular budget share only.

^b Amount to be shared by other Vienna-based organizations (IAEA, UNIDO, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization).

D. Update on the time frame for implementation of the project

52. In his report (A/61/566), the Secretary-General estimated that the time frame for implementation of the entire project would be between 24 and 30 months. The start date for the first phase of the project was the date of approval of that proposal by the General Assembly, 2 May 2007. All nine projects, except ESCWA, are in the construction phase and scheduled for completion by 31 December 2008, resulting in a 7- to 12-month schedule of construction. Should the General Assembly approve the proposals contained in the present report during the main part of its sixty-third session, the second phase would begin as early as 1 January 2009. Given the increased scope of work for the second phase, a reasonable schedule would call for completion by 31 December 2010. Thus the projected implementation time for the entire project would be 31 months.

53. Upon completion of the first phase, the duty stations will achieve compliance with headquarters minimum operating security standards perimeter physical security through the use of vehicle barriers, electronic access cards, CCTV systems, alarms and intrusion detection, and an integrated central monitoring of access control systems. The second phase of the standardized access control project (PACT II) will achieve compliance with access control requirements through protection beyond the perimeter layer by incorporating multiple internal layers of protection. This would include doors, windows, roofs, conference and meeting rooms, critical infrastructure rooms, elevator cars, lobby controls, archival and storage areas and parking garages. Elements from the second phase of the project will be fully integrated with the elements of the first phase of the project through the use of the standardized security operating system. Additional security enhancements required in the future may then be added on an incremental and cost effective basis. A final component of the second phase will provide for an enterprise network (Wide Area Network (WAN)) where limited real time and forensic video from the duty stations will be centrally accessible and provide for the interoperability of access cards among offices.

V. Additional security requirements in specific locations

54. In the wide range of activities carried out by the Organization, including humanitarian and development projects and high-profile political missions mandated by the Security Council, the Organization crosses paths, directly or indirectly, with multiple potential adversaries that might consider hostilities directed at the Organization as instruments to impact on or derail specific United Nations activities viewed as infringing their interests. A security risk assessment for the Middle East conducted in July 2008 determined the possibility of direct attacks against the Organization, collateral threats from possible internal hostilities, residual threats of regional conflicts triggered by or in connection with internal political crisis and threats from public unrest and disorder.

A. Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia

55. The overall objective of the Security and Safety Service in ESCWA is to enable the effective conduct of United Nations activities by ensuring a coherent, effective and timely response to all security-related threats and other emergencies. To this end, the Service provides services to protect staff, delegates, visiting dignitaries and other visitors in the United Nations House in Beirut, to prevent damage to United Nations property and to provide safe and secure facilities and to ensure an emergency early warning system 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.

56. A risk assessment has been conducted for ESCWA, bearing in mind the security situation in Lebanon, the location of ESCWA secretariat in Beirut and taking into account the fact that the duty station is already assigned a Security Phase II threat level. Resulting from the risk assessment exercises, the additional requirements for the Security and Safety Service in Beirut have been met through ad hoc redeployment of resources within the Department of Safety and Security since 2006. However, given the fact that the current security assessments for Lebanon do not foresee a change in the threats against the United Nations in the foreseeable future, it has become necessary to seek dedicated resources on a permanent basis, as the ad hoc arrangements are not sustainable.

57. The Security and Safety Service currently has 2 Professional and 53 Local level posts. These staff members perform functions related to access control (pedestrian and vehicular), security patrols, issuance of pass and identification documents, fire and hazardous material safety, security and safety training, crisis management and emergency response and the manning of the Security Control Centre.

58. Additional 45 posts for Security Officers are required for the following specific needs: (a) to staff several checkpoints around the United Nations House on a 24/7 basis, (b) to provide counter surveillance capacity, and (c) to provide close protection for the ESCWA Executive Secretary.

59. The total costs for these posts effective 1 January 2009 under the programme budget for the biennium 2008-2009 would be \$1,548,000. As the Security Officers are usually based external to the office, no provision for accommodation has been included.

B. United Nations Truce Supervision Organization

60. The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was originally established under the provisions of Security Council resolution 50 (1948) for the purpose of supervising the truce in Palestine, as called for by the Council. Since the establishment of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), UNTSO military observers assigned to the Israel-Lebanon and the Israel-Syrian Arab Republic sectors have been placed under the operational control of the commanders of UNIFIL and UNDOF to assist them in the fulfilment of their tasks. At UNDOF, UNTSO observers conduct inspections, patrols and liaison in the area of limitation and maintain observation posts and patrols in the area of separation. At UNIFIL, UNTSO military observers maintain observation posts along the Blue Line and conduct patrols in the UNIFIL area of responsibility. UNTSO military observers are deployed in the Golan Heights, South Lebanon and Sinai, at the mission's headquarters in Jerusalem and at its liaison offices in Beirut and Damascus.

61. The current security staffing levels of UNTSO include 3 Professionals, 30 Field Service and 20 Local staff. While the UNTSO office premises and residences are considered to be sufficiently secure, for the day to day operations of the UNTSO Chief of Staff, there are currently no armed security personnel assigned to his personal protection. UNTSO has traditionally been an unarmed mission over the course of its existence. Prior efforts by the mission for the host country to approve international security officers to carry United Nations-issued weapons have proved fruitless. UNTSO is currently readdressing this matter with the host country authorities based on the current security situation in the area.

62. To supplement the two security officers currently allocated to protect the UNTSO Chief of Staff, once weapons are authorized and made available, there is a requirement for four additional international security officers for the establishment of a six-person personal protection team to provide support throughout the UNTSO mission area. The proposed close protection configuration would allow for a team composed of the protection coordinator, one advance preparation officer and a two-officer protection detail, with another two officers in support on rotation.

63. To mitigate the risks posed by the changed security environment for travel of the UNTSO Chief of Staff throughout the five-country region, the team would also require resources of \$300,000 for one armoured sedan and one armoured 4 X 4 vehicle (both with B-6 level armour). In addition, to ensure that the new staff have the necessary equipment and training to undertake their duties, resources of \$109,600 for safety equipment such as ammunition, protective wear and visual and night-vision support equipment and training costs would also be required.

64. It is proposed that implementation would be effective 1 January 2009 for a total cost of \$761,600 of which \$352,000 would relate to posts and \$409,600 for non-recurrent requirements.

C. Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process

65. The Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process (UNSCO) was established in accordance with General Assembly

resolution 48/213 to ensure the coordinated work of the United Nations system for an adequate response to the needs of the Palestinian people and to mobilize financial, technical and economic assistance. The Special Coordinator has the dual role of being the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East peace process and the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General to the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Authority. The Special Coordinator serves as the United Nations focal point for the Middle East peace process, including the socio-economic aspects of the peace process and related United Nations development assistance for Jordan, Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic and the occupied Palestinian territories.

66. There are currently six close protection officers assigned to the Special Coordinator. Following the review conducted during the security risk assessment, it was determined that the existing capacity did not meet the minimum close protection requirements to support the Special Coordinator and the Deputy Special Coordinator. If some close protection officers are on leave or otherwise unavailable, the remaining protection strength would not be adequate to provide full coverage for both the Special Coordinator and his Deputy.

67. The review has established that full close protection cover would require three close protection officers and two drivers for each official. A third team, consisting of three close protection officers and one driver is required to cover for annual leave, compensatory time, sick leave as well as supporting ad hoc VIP missions in the duty station. Therefore, in total nine close protection officers and five drivers are required to fully staff the UNSCO personal protection team. This staffing will also provide the UNSCO personal protection unit with the capability to deploy an advance to neighbouring countries visited by the Special Coordinator regularly, thereby providing advance liaison capability with the Department of Safety and Security local office in the relevant country, as well as with host country authorities. The additional close protection positions have temporarily been financed utilizing resources from other areas of the programme. This arrangement is not sustainable without affecting programme delivery.

68. In this regard, in order to complete the personal security coverage of the Special Coordinator and his Deputy, eight additional posts would be required to fully staff the close protection detail (three Field Service Officers and five Local level staff). Requirements are sought effective 1 January 2009 and would amount to \$443,800 under the programme budget for the biennium 2008-2009.

D. Department of Public Information

69. Since 2005, a provision has been made under the programme budget to cover the cost of security of the United Nations Information Centre office premises. That provision is internally apportioned by the Department among the information centres based on their annual requests. Those requests are determined by the Minimum Operational Security Standard (MOSS) requirements, established by the local United Nations security officials.

70. Following the attack in Algiers, which also destroyed the United Nations Information Centre premises, the requirements have been significantly increased, following the local Security Advisers recommendations for additional measures to strengthen the security of the United Nations premises. Several information centres

are now required to add night and weekend guard duty to regular daytime security. Others have been asked to install perimeter barriers and security gates. More importantly, several information centres (in particular those in Cairo and Tunis) have been advised to relocate for security reasons along with other members of the United Nations country team.

71. Without the provision of additional funds, United Nations information centres will not be able to coordinate on security protection with the rest of the United Nations country team, and many other information centres will not be MOSS-compliant.

72. Table 6 below details the additional requirements of \$400,600 for 2009 that are associated with providing strengthened security for 14 United Nations information centres within the global network of 63 information centres.

Table 6

Estimated total additional requirements for the 2008-2009 biennium, by information centre location and type of expenditures (at 2008-2009 rates)

(Thousands of United States dollars)

<i>United Nations Information Centre</i>	<i>Rental and maintenance of premises</i>	<i>Communications</i>	<i>Other equipment</i>	<i>Total</i>
Algiers	50.9	—	—	50.9
Asunción	3.8	—	—	3.8
Brazzaville	10.3	23.0	58.0	91.3
Cairo	45.0	2.0	—	47.0
Dakar	22.2	8.0	31.6	61.8
Lagos	17.4	—	—	17.4
Lima	6.7	—	—	6.7
Manila	2.0	—	—	2.0
Mexico	1.0	—	—	1.0
Ouagadougou	10.0	—	—	10.0
Port of Spain	2.6	—	—	2.6
Rabat	28.0	1.2	12.0	41.2
Tunis	45.1	—	—	45.1
Windhoek	19.8	—	—	19.8
Total	264.8	34.2	101.6	400.6

73. It is proposed to finance these additional costs from within existing resources under section 27, Public information, in the biennium 2008-2009. Therefore, no additional resources for these services are currently being sought.

Part Two

Jointly financed security requirements for the United Nations system activities in the field

I. Introduction

74. At its meeting in Lyon, France, from 28 to 30 July 2008, the Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMN) considered the report of the Independent Panel on Security and Safety appointed by the Secretary-General following the terrorist attack in Algiers on 11 December 2007, with a view to making recommendations to the High-level Committee on Management and CEB on strengthening the United Nations culture of security and accountability. The Committee then met to consider the IASMN recommendations and formed a Steering Committee to review those recommendations and the recommendations of the Independent Panel. The outcome of the Steering Committee comprised a number of conclusions and recommendations which were endorsed by the High-level Committee on Management on 20 October 2008.

75. CEB subsequently considered the Steering Committee conclusions and recommendations and noted that the development of a strengthened security architecture would require more time and considerable resources. It further proposed that a comprehensive plan for implementation of the Steering Committee conclusions and recommendations be designed and endorsed by CEB at its next session in 2009.

76. Pending the development of the comprehensive plan, the findings of which will be the subject of a separate report, the present part of the report contains only those elements of field-related security requirements which need immediate consideration by Member States owing to the state of the security situation in certain locations. With regards to these immediate needs, CEB concluded that, prior to its spring session in 2009, any immediate needs would be submitted to the General Assembly following established budgetary procedures and framed within the existing funding arrangements, namely by utilizing the jointly financed cost-sharing methodology currently in place.

II. Aviation risk management

77. As part of its review of the current security arrangements, the Independent Panel expressed its concern with regards to the lack of a single authority that could look, in a holistic manner, at aviation risk management with regards to the travel of staff. It recommended that a dedicated safety unit should be established within the Department of Safety and Security with competent staff and resources to fulfil the safety-related aspects of its mandate.

78. Currently, within the United Nations system the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) generally deals with regulatory civil aviation issues. The ICAO primary interlocutors are national civil aviation authorities. On its part, the United Nations, through the Department of Field Service and the World Food Programme (WFP), maintains aviation safety expertise in dealing/operating large charter aircraft for the movement of peacekeeping troops and material (Department

of Field Service) and smaller charter aircraft for the movement of small numbers of staff and humanitarian supplies (WFP). IASMN has recognized that, with the global deregulation of commercial airlines, there is a need within the United Nations system to provide advice to the organizations on relative safety between scheduled commercial airlines. The DSS supported this issue through a subscription to a commercially available safety database.

79. In the past two years the United Nations common system has realized that the uncoordinated approach in the field of aviation safety has led to gaps in aviation safety advice being provided to United Nations common system staff. Many commercial airlines are not in the database. Humanitarian agencies are using aviation non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that have differing levels of safety standards. Occasionally the Department of Field Service and WFP have different opinions (and methodologies) when evaluating charter companies. Given that the Department of Safety and Security has a United Nations common system responsibility for safety and security, IASMN recommended that the Department create a capacity that could have the technical expertise to interpret information gained from United Nations, WFP and ICAO sources, as well as, if necessary, perform independent analysis and provide holistic aviation safety advice to the entire common system. A standing working group composed of aviation professionals from United Nations, ICAO and WFP has recommended a strength of that unit for providing expertise in aviation safety, operations and personnel licensing, and airworthiness. These are three separate and distinct disciplines within the aviation risk management field, and, thus, three Professional positions are required to carry out that responsibility.

80. It is thus proposed that an aviation risk management capacity be created within the Department of Safety and Security. The capacity would involve the establishment of three Professional (1 P-5 and 2 P-4) and one General Service/Other level posts. Total requirements for the period from 1 January to 31 December 2009 are estimated at \$514,100, including \$335,700 in staff costs and \$178,400 for non-post requirements.

III. Strengthening of the Division of Regional Operations of the Department of Safety and Security

81. IASMN recommended that the Department of Safety and Security strengthen its capacity to fully meet its mandate and support to the field. The following proposals aim at strengthening the Division of Regional Operations of the Department which currently provides the support to security arrangements in the field. The proposals include: (a) strengthening of regional desks capacity of the Division; (b) increased deployment of field security officers in certain locations; (c) strengthening of the managerial and operational capacity of the Division; (d) strengthening of the analytical capacity both at Headquarters and in the field; (e) establishment of security and information operations centres; and (f) creation of a standing surge capacity within the Department for immediate deployment in case of emergency.

A. Strengthening of regional desks capacity of the Division of Regional Operations

82. At its twelfth session, held on 30 September and 1 October 2006 in Rome, the High-Level Committee on Management established a technical working group to look at options for reprioritization of activities of the Department of Safety and Security and for corresponding funding mechanisms in order to best meet the objectives stated in the Strategic Framework for 2008-2009 within the no-growth security budget approved for the biennium 2008-2009. The Working Group has recommended several posts to be redeployed from lower-risk duty stations to higher-risk duty stations. Furthermore, the Working Group concluded that the Headquarters regional desks of the Division of Regional Operations would need to be reinforced in order to support the field more effectively. In view of the urgency of the situation, four P-3 posts from the Field Support Service were temporarily redeployed in 2007 to the Division of Regional Operations to reinforce the regional desks and strengthen support to the field.

83. Given that the current security assessments do not foresee any change in the threat level against the United Nations in the foreseeable future, it has become necessary to regularize the deployment of these posts to the Division of Regional Operations on a permanent basis. The effect of this redeployment on the Field Support Services is discussed in paragraphs 105 and 106 below.

B. Increased deployment of field security officers

84. Following the attack on the United Nations offices in Algiers, the Department of Safety and Security undertook an assessment of the United Nations global vulnerability. Fifteen locations of the United Nations operations have been deemed vulnerable in view of the current security coverage. It is, therefore, proposed to strengthen the field security staffing in those locations with 58 additional posts (1 D-1, 4 P-5, 7 P-4, 17 P-3 and 29 Local level posts) effective 1 January 2009. Table 7 provides information on the proposed level and location of these posts.

Table 7
Location and post level for proposed new field security officer positions

<i>Location</i>	<i>D-1</i>	<i>P-5</i>	<i>P-4</i>	<i>P-3</i>	<i>Local level</i>
Afghanistan	—	—	2	5	7
Chile	—	1	—	—	1
Ethiopia	—	1	1	—	2
Jordan	—	—	—	1	1
Kenya	1	1	—	3	5
Mauritania	—	—	—	1	1
Morocco	—	—	—	1	1
Pakistan	—	—	1	3	4
Somalia	—	—	2	—	2
Sri Lanka	—	—	1	2	3

<i>Location</i>	<i>D-1</i>	<i>P-5</i>	<i>P-4</i>	<i>P-3</i>	<i>Local level</i>
Thailand	—	1	—	—	1
Tunisia	—	—	—	1	1
Total	1	4	7	17	29

85. The D-1 post for Kenya and four P-5 posts for Kenya, Chile, Ethiopia and Thailand are sought to follow the Lebanon model where the country Chief Security Adviser has the Chief of the Security and Safety Section of the regional commissions and the Deputy Security Adviser reporting to him/her. Both the United Nations Office at Geneva and the United Nations Office at Vienna already have existing Chiefs of Security and Safety Sections (P-5 posts) who serve as the Chief Security Adviser. In Chile, Ethiopia and Thailand, the senior security official, the Chief of Security and Safety of the regional commission is at the P-4 level.

86. Activities in Kenya, Chile, Ethiopia and Thailand include year-round high-level conferences/events (Heads of State and Ministers), visits by the Secretary-General and Deputy Secretary-General, and hosting of world and regional high-profile meetings. These countries also serve as regional hubs for United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, all with national and regional activities. Risk levels in the three countries are also significant in terms of global threat and various natural and man-made threats, which have the potential to affect a great number of individuals covered by the security management system. The level of the most senior United Nations official in these regional headquarters locations/regional hubs is the Under-Secretary-General, who is also the Designated Official. The creation of a Chief Security Adviser post for Chile, Ethiopia and Thailand at the P-5 level would be commensurate with the level of responsibility and accountability. With regards to Kenya, it should be noted that some 1,600 International and 2,100 national staff members are working in the country for the United Nations system, with 4,000 international and 5,500 national dependants predominantly based in Nairobi. The country is currently operating under Security Phase I to III conditions and hosts more than 70 regional and country-based offices of the United Nations system organizations. Owing to the sheer size and complexity of the Nairobi duty station, it is proposed that the Chief Security Adviser post for Kenya be established at the D-1 level.

87. Total requirements associated with strengthening of the field security capacity for the period from 1 January to 31 December 2009 are estimated at \$5,743,900, which includes \$3,792,100 in staff costs and \$1,951,800 in non-post requirements.

C. Strengthening of the managerial and operational capacity of the Division of Regional Operations

88. It is proposed to strengthen the managerial and operational capacity of the Division of Regional Operations to provide enhanced support to the field. Additional three posts are proposed for that purpose, as follows:

Deputy to the Director of the Division of Regional Operations (D-1) — In order to improve the management and overall effectiveness of the Division, as well as, improve the support to the field and other clients, a Deputy Director post is

proposed for establishment at the D-1 level. This position will be responsible for assisting the Director in the strategic management of regional operations both at Headquarters and in the field. In order to permit better efficiencies within the Division and responsiveness to the field and senior United Nations leadership, including security requirements linked to humanitarian crises and natural disasters, the Director must be able to focus his attention on strategic level issues affecting high-risk duty stations. Furthermore, an enhanced development of the Division for a continuing partnership for security with host Governments will be a permanent strategic focus for the Director. This in turn reinforces the need for the Deputy post to be at the D-1 level to oversee the day-to-day operational requirement of the Division. In fulfilling this role, the Deputy must provide guidance and direction to seven officers at the P-5 level within the Division. Owing to the needs for frequent travel of the Director, the Deputy Director will often serve as officer-in-charge of the Division. In 2007, the most senior officials of the Division served as the Officer-in-Charge for 157 days. This is expected to increase with the continuing work with host Governments.

Security Coordination Officer (P-4) — The Security Coordination Officer at the P-4 level is required for the East Africa regional section of the Division, which at present is staffed with 1 P-5, 1 P-4 and 1 P-3 to cover 21 countries with 7,000 international and 25,000 national staff members. Of these, 3,500 international and 10,000 national staff are deployed to countries with a high security phase in effect, which exceeds the number in other regional desks and therefore requires additional resources.

Operations Officer (P-4) — The workload within the Operations Section is beyond the capability of the one P-4 and one P-3 assigned to it. A significant portion of the work is dealing with a crisis or other emergency situations and mandated requirements that involve more than one regional desk. Additionally, there has been a significant increase in surge capacity that is managed by this section: the first six months of 2008 have already surpassed all surge deployments for 2007 by 13 per cent. There is a 240 per cent increase in the surge deployment for the first six months of 2008 compared to the same period for 2007. This requires a considerable amount of time to find qualified security advisers, develop deployment instructions, resolve issues, and to coordinate surge capacity deployment with both gaining and losing Designated Officials in any given country. The additional Operations Officer at the P-4 level would supplement the existing capacity to ensure the growing surge requirements could be managed efficiently and effectively.

89. Total requirements for the period from 1 January to 31 December 2009 are estimated at \$459,700, which includes \$300,600 in staff costs and \$159,100 in non-post requirements.

D. Strengthening of security analytical capacity

90. The security risk assessment is the fundamental requirement for security management at each location where United Nations personnel are located, by which the risks are determined for which mitigation measures (including MOSS) are required.

91. In connection with the Threat and Risk Assessment Unit, the Independent Panel found that the resources available to the Unit to carry out continuous threat

and risk assessments are inadequate (there are four Professional-level posts at Headquarters, and no dedicated resources at the field level). Consequently, the Panel recommended the establishment of security analyst posts at the high-risk locations.

92. The security analyst is the adviser to the chief security adviser/security adviser on threats affecting the United Nations. Analysts are especially trained to add a qualitative and quantitative dimension to security information gained in their assigned country. The development of security-related trends that are likely to affect United Nations humanitarian and development activities form the basis of the analysts' threat assessments. The threat assessments are incorporated in the risk assessments that derive risk mitigation options. Designated officials, security management teams' members and programme managers rely heavily on the chief security adviser/security adviser's security risk assessment to make sound judgements on programme activity in the context of staff safety. The product is sound (thoroughly considered security advice that enables proactive programme management decisions) rather than those that are reactive to adverse events. Countries without this capability are typically at lower risk, where the host Government is reliably able to provide access to analysed information.

93. Strengthening of the security analysis capacity in the field requires an additional 15 posts at the P-4 level and 14 posts at the P-3 level which are proposed for a number of countries, including 7 posts in Asia and the Pacific, 9 posts in West Africa, 3 posts in East Africa, 2 posts in Europe and the Americas and 8 posts in the Middle East. Half of the additional analysts are sought at the P-4 level to ensure that these analysts have sufficient technical skills and commensurate practical experience that is critical to the complex highest risk duty stations.

94. Total requirements for the period from 1 January to 31 December 2009 are estimated at \$4,550,900, which includes \$2,773,200 in staff costs and \$1,777,700 in non-post requirements.

95. The Independent Panel also recommended that additional analyst posts be established within the Threat and Risk Assessment Unit at Headquarters to expand its competency and capacity to assess risks beyond terrorism. It is thus proposed to establish three P-4 posts to enhance regional threat coverage, one P-2 post for information management and two General Service/Other level posts within the Division, for media monitoring and collation.

96. Total requirements for this purpose for the period from 1 January to 31 December 2009 are estimated at \$683,200, which includes \$430,900 in staff costs and \$252,300 in non-post requirements.

E. Establishment of security and information operations centres

97. The role of the security and information operations centres is to establish and maintain security situational awareness in order to minimize risk to programme delivery and to enhance the safety of the United Nations staff and property. The two principal functions of the security and information operations centres are to report on security incidents and inform the United Nations country team of the prevailing security situation, and to provide the chief security adviser with analysis of the current and developing security situation to ensure provision of sound advice to the designated official and the security management team. The security and information

operations centres is operated 24 hours a day, 7 days a week and is staffed and equipped to perform the secondary functions of provision of periodic security reports and trend analyses to the Department of Safety and Security, provision of security advisories to the staff, programme implementing partners and the NGO community, liaison with the host country and Member State missions on security information that affects the United Nations safety and programme delivery. The security and information operations centre also functions as the Crisis Coordination Centre during emergency periods. Centre operations staff also develops contingency plans to complement emerging security trends, carry out mission tracking to ensure continuous awareness of staff dispositions and supervise and direct Emergency Communications System operations.

98. The security and information operations centre adds a significant qualitative dimension to the conduct of programme delivery by providing the requisite human and technical resources for detailed security analysis, trend identification, contingency planning and emergency response coordination. These functions are well beyond the capacity of an unsupported chief security adviser in a complex duty station. The intent is to establish security and information operations centres in high-risk countries, where the complexity of the United Nations operations requires the provision of continuous, precise security advice. The current immediate requirement is five country-level centres, two based in Asia and the Pacific, two in East Africa and one in the Middle East. A country-level centre would consist of two analyst posts at the P-4 level, two Operations Officer posts at the P-4 level, and a post of the Chief of the security and information operations centre at the P-4 level, for a total of 25 posts for five locations. Security and information operations centres will be co-located with other Department of Safety and Security structures deployed in those countries.

99. Total requirements for the period from 1 January to 31 December 2009 are estimated at \$4,117,500, which includes \$2,585,000 in staff costs and \$1,532,500 in non-post requirements.

F. Establishment of surge capacity

100. Surge-capacity deployments are an essential part of the crisis response capability of the Department of Safety and Security. Security advisers are deployed in various roles required to assist the Designated Official in carrying out his/her expanded duties during a crisis. These include the development of security risk assessments, assisting with ongoing evacuations, assisting with planning for a potential evacuation, assisting with the development of other contingency plans, coordination with host Government authorities during a crisis, assisting the country team's crisis management team in the execution of their duties, review and advise on current security arrangements and mitigating measures, conduct hostage incident management duties during a hostage taking, and develop and disseminate situation reports concerning the ongoing crisis.

101. The Department of Safety and Security does not have a "standing" ready reserve deployment team of security professionals. Instead, it must rely on the use of existing resources at duty stations designated as surge capacity locations as approved by the High-Level Committee on Management following recommendations contained in the report of the technical Working Group on Safety and Security dated

27 October 2006. While 15 countries have been identified as surge capacity in that report, the overwhelming need for Security Advisers in crisis situations has exceeded the ability of the Department of Safety and Security to rely solely on 15 countries. In order to meet the demands, the Division of Regional Operations must deploy Security Advisers from available duty stations around the world, thereby taking resources away from other locations and increasing response times and costs. For example, in 2007, 73 per cent of all surge deployments have occurred from non-designated surge countries and for 2008, so far 71 per cent have originated from non-surge designated countries.

102. The surge requirements for the Department of Safety and Security have increased significantly over the past three years. This surge capacity requirement is reflected as follows:

(a) 2006 — a total of 44 Department of Safety and Security security professionals for a total 1,101 work-days;

(b) 2007 — a total of 35 Department of Safety and Security security professionals for a total 1,147 work-days for 14 incidents requiring surge capacity;

(c) 2008 — a total of 73 Department of Safety and Security security professionals for a total 2,498 work-days for 21 incidents requiring surge capacity.

Emergency deployments were made to the following countries, some of them on multiple occasions: Algeria, Cameroon, Chad, Comoros, Georgia, Kenya, Lebanon, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Pakistan, Somalia, the Sudan, Turkmenistan, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

103. It is proposed to position 10 P-4 Surge Security Officers in New York to address that requirement. When not deployed, they would work on 24/7 shifts in the Department of Safety and Security Communications Centre (which currently is staffed with only one Professional) under the direct supervision of the Deputy/Senior Operations Officer, Division of Regional Operations, who has overall responsibility for surge deployments. These 10 posts would be permanent posts that would be specifically identified as the surge capacity. It is envisioned that the incumbents of these posts would be deployed year round given current surge trends which is expected to reach four deployments per month by the end of 2008. Once deployed, a Surge Officer would report to the designated official/chief security adviser in the country to which he/she is deployed.

104. Total requirements for the period from 1 January to 31 December 2009 are estimated at \$1,918,800, which includes \$1,034,000 in staff costs and \$884,800 in non-post requirements.

IV. Strengthening of the Field Support Services

105. In its review following the attacks on the United Nations offices in Algiers on 11 December 2007, the Independent Panel stressed that further attention should be paid and resources dedicated for educating all actors within the United Nations security management system, as the United Nations endeavours to develop an institutional culture that embraces security. The Panel has pointed out, for example, that at the current rate of training it would take six years to train all security management teams once.

106. Pending a thorough review of planning, development and delivery of security training, it is proposed that the gap created by the four posts redeployed out of the Training and Development Section should be filled through four new posts at the P-4 level under a specialized career profile which would allow the Department to attract senior security trainers with extensive experience in the field. Total requirements for these four new posts for the period from 1 January to 31 December 2009 are estimated at \$534,700, which includes \$360,800 in staff costs and \$173,900 in non-post requirements.

V. Summary of resource requirements for jointly financed security activities and the United Nations share of the jointly financed requirements

107. The following table summarizes the resource requirements required under part two of the present report for the jointly financed security activities:

Table 8

Resource requirements for the jointly financed activities for the biennium 2008-2009

<i>Requirements</i>	<i>Paragraphs of the report</i>	<i>Total for the biennium 2008-2009 (Thousands of United States dollars)</i>	<i>Number of posts proposed</i>	
			<i>Professional</i>	<i>General Service/ Local level</i>
Aviation risk management	80	514.1	3	1
Field Security staffing	84	5 743.9	29	29
Division of Regional Operations management and operational capacity	88	459.7	3	—
Security Analysts — Field	93	4 550.9	29	—
Security Analysts	95	683.2	4	2
Security and information operations centre	98	4 117.5	25	—
Surge capacity	103	1 918.8	10	—
Training and development	106	534.7	4	—
Total		18 522.8	107	32

108. These proposals are to strengthen the safety and security of the United Nations system operations in the field. The total costs of \$18,522,800 are cost-shared with other United Nations system organizations. The financial responsibility of each participating organization is based on its proportional share as contained in the annex to document A/62/641. It should be noted that IASMN used full incumbency rates in its estimates and, therefore, the costs in its report amount to \$29.7 million. Those costs have been endorsed by CEB. The cost estimates in the present report have been adjusted to take into account the standard reduced incumbency rate used in United Nations established budget methodology when costing new posts in the first year of creation. The United Nations is responsible for 23.79 per cent of the

jointly financed costs and, therefore, the United Nations share to be borne by the regular budget would amount to \$4,406,600 for the biennium 2008-2009.

VI. Summary of resource requirements and request for action to be taken by the General Assembly

A. Summary of resource requirements

109. The following tables summarizes the resource requirements under the programme budget for the biennium 2008-2009 by section (table 9) and object of expenditure (table 10) arising from the proposals contained in parts one and two of the present report.

Table 9

Summary of resource requirements for the biennium 2008-2009 by section

<i>Budget section</i>	<i>Part one — Section II Executive protection</i>	<i>Part one — Section IV Standardized access control</i>	<i>Part one — Section V Additional security requirements</i>	<i>Part two — Jointly financed activities in the field</i>	<i>Total for the biennium 2008-2009</i>
3. Political affairs	—	—	443.8	—	443.8
5. Peacekeeping operations	—	—	761.6	—	761.6
17. Economic and social development in Africa	—	177.5	—	—	177.5
18. Economic and social development in Asia and the Pacific	—	155.5	—	—	155.5
20. Economic and social development in Latin America and the Caribbean	—	169.4	—	—	169.4
21. Economic and social development in Western Asia	—	166.1	—	—	166.1
28E. Administration, Geneva	—	168.1	—	—	168.1
28G. Administration, Nairobi	—	191.2	—	—	191.2
32. Construction, alteration, improvement and major maintenance ^a	—	38 049.4	—	—	38 049.4
33. Safety and security ^b	2 411.5	2 336.5	1 548.0	4 406.6	10 702.6
35. Staff assessment	—	—	—	—	950.2
Subtotal (regular budget)	2 411.5	41 413.7	2 753.4	4 406.6	51 935.4
Vienna — other entities share ^c	—	3 009.1	—	—	3 009.1
Field activities — other entities share	—	—	—	14 116.2	14 116.2
Subtotal (regular budget and jointly financed)	2 411.5	44 422.8	2 753.4	18 522.8	69 060.7
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda	—	1 345.5	—	—	1 345.5
Total	2 411.5	45 768.3	2 753.4	18 522.8	70 406.2

^a Includes the United Nations regular budget portion of the jointly financed budget for section 32 in Vienna (\$772,300).

^b Includes the United Nations regular budget portion of the jointly financed budget for section 33 in Vienna (\$76,400) and the United Nations regular budget portion of the jointly financed budget for field activities (\$4,406,600).

^c Amount for Vienna to be shared by other United Nations organizations (\$3,009,100). In total the Vienna costs are \$3,857,800 made up of the other United Nations organizations share (\$3,009,100) plus the United Nations share (\$772,300+\$76,400).

Table 10

Resource requirements required under the programme budget for the biennium 2008-2009 by object of expenditure

<i>Object of expenditure</i>	<i>Part one — Section II Executive protection</i>	<i>Part one — Section IV Standardized access control</i>	<i>Part one — Section V Additional security requirements</i>	<i>Part two — Jointly financed activities in the field</i>	<i>Total for the biennium 2008-2009</i>
Posts	1 281.8	1 921.1	2 343.8	—	5 546.7
Other staff costs	162.1	984.3	—	—	1 146.4
Travel of staff	400.0	—	18.7	—	418.7
Contractual services	70.9	—	22.0	—	92.9
General operating expenses	105.7	252.3	—	—	358.0
Supplies and materials	146.4	2.8	—	—	149.2
Furniture and equipment	245.6	126.4	368.9	—	740.9
Improvement of premises	—	38 049.4	—	—	38 049.4
Grants and contributions	—	76.4	—	4 406.6	4 483.0
Staff assessment	—	—	—	—	950.2
Subtotal (regular budget)	2 411.5	41 413.7	2 753.4	4 406.6	51 935.4
Vienna — other entities share	—	3 009.1	—	—	3 009.1
Field activities — other entities share	—	—	—	14 116.2	14 116.2
Subtotal (regular budget and jointly financed)	2 411.5	44 422.8	2 753.4	18 522.8	69 060.7
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda	—	1 345.5	—	—	1 345.5
Total	2 411.5	45 768.3	2 753.4	18 522.8	70 406.2

110. The total cost for the biennium 2010-2011, including the delayed impact for the regular budget, is estimated in the amount of \$33,543,700 (\$20,559,100 for posts and associated costs for part one of the report, \$5,925,000 for PACT maintenance in part one of the report and \$7,059,600 for the regular budget share of the jointly financed activities in part two of the report).

B. Actions to be taken by the General Assembly

111. The General Assembly is requested to:

(a) **Authorize the Department of Safety and Security to provide protection to former senior officials, if warranted by threat and risk assessments, and only if the host country authorities are unable to provide such services;**

(b) **Approve the total additional resource requirements under the regular budget for the biennium 2008-2009 in the amount of \$50,985,200 (net) or \$51,935,400 (gross) under section 3, Political affairs (\$443,800); under section 5, Peacekeeping operations (\$761,600); under section 17, Economic and social development in Africa (\$177,500); under section 18, Economic and social**

development in Asia and the Pacific (\$155,500); under section 20, Economic and social development in Latin America and the Caribbean (\$169,400); under section 21, Economic and social development in Western Asia (\$166,100); under section 28E, Administration, Geneva (\$168,100); under section 28G, Administration, Nairobi (\$191,200); under section 32, Construction, alteration, improvement and major maintenance (\$38,049,400); under section 33, Safety and security (\$10,702,600); and under section 35, Staff assessment (\$950,200), to be offset by an equivalent amount under Income section 1, Income from staff assessment;

(c) Approve effective 1 January 2009 the establishment of the following posts under the regular budget for the biennium 2008-2009:

<i>Regular budget section</i>	<i>Professional (P-3)</i>	<i>Field Service Officer</i>	<i>General Service- Other level</i>	<i>General Service- Local level</i>	<i>Security Service</i>	<i>Total</i>
3. Political affairs	—	3	—	5	—	8
5. Peacekeeping operations	—	4	—	—	—	4
17. Economic and social development in Africa	1	—	—	1	—	2
18. Economic and social development in Asia and the Pacific	1	—	—	1	—	2
20. Economic and social development in Latin America and the Caribbean	1	—	—	1	—	2
21. Economic and social development in Western Asia	1	—	—	1	—	2
28E. Administration, Geneva	1	—	1	—	—	2
28G. Administration, Nairobi	1	—	—	1	—	2
33. Safety and security	2	—	—	81	26	109
Total	8	7	1	91	26	133

(d) Approve the jointly financed requirements for the field activities of \$18,522,800 and the establishment effective 1 January 2009 of 139 posts to be cost-shared for the biennium 2008-2009, based on the current cost-sharing methodology confirmed by General Assembly resolution 59/276 and the current shares determined under this methodology and reported in annex I to document A/62/641;

(e) Approve the requirements for the jointly financed security budget for Vienna of \$3,857,800 and the establishment effective 1 January 2009 of two posts under the jointly financed security budget for Vienna;

(f) Approve the requirements of \$1,345,500 under the budget for the biennium 2008-2009 of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the establishment effective 1 January 2009 of two posts under the budget for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda for the biennium 2008-2009.