

**General Assembly**

Distr.: General  
10 November 2008

Original: English

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**Sixty-third session**

Agenda item 148

**Financing of the African Union-United Nations****Hybrid Operation in Darfur****Performance report on the budget of the African Union-  
United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur for the period  
from 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2008****Report of the Secretary-General****Contents**

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## Summary

The present report contains the performance report on the budget of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) for the period from 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2008.

The total expenditure for UNAMID for that period has been linked to the Operation's objective through a number of priorities in the areas of peace process; security; rule of law, governance and human rights; humanitarian liaison, recovery and development; and support.

### Performance of financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars. Budget year is from 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2008.)

Category	Apportionment	Expenditure	Variance	
			Amount	Percentage
Military and police personnel	279 576.3	237 866.7	41 709.6	14.9
Civilian personnel	113 026.4	64 373.3	48 653.1	43.0
Operational costs	883 051.0	754 238.6	128 812.4	14.6
<b>Gross requirements</b>	<b>1 275 653.7</b>	<b>1 056 478.6</b>	<b>219 175.1</b>	<b>17.2</b>
Staff assessment income	11 380.2	6 692.3	4 687.9	41.2
<b>Net requirements</b>	<b>1 264 273.5</b>	<b>1 049 786.3</b>	<b>214 487.2</b>	<b>17.0</b>
Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted)	—	—	—	—
<b>Total requirements</b>	<b>1 275 653.7</b>	<b>1 056 478.6</b>	<b>219 175.1</b>	<b>17.2</b>

### Human resources incumbency performance

Category	Approved <sup>a</sup>	Planned	Actual (average)	Vacancy rate (percentage) <sup>b</sup>
Military observers	240	50	79	(58.0)
Military contingents <sup>c</sup>	19 315	9 608	5 470	43.1
United Nations police	3 772	1 099	833	24.2
Formed police units	2 660	613	95	84.5
International staff	1 507	493	289	41.4
National staff	3 415	949	689	27.4
United Nations Volunteers	548	244	98	59.8
Temporary positions <sup>d</sup>				
International staff	59	38	19	50.0
National staff	40	21	1	95.2
Government-provided personnel	6	4	—	100.0

<sup>a</sup> Represents the highest level of authorized strength.

<sup>b</sup> Based on monthly incumbency and planned monthly strength.

<sup>c</sup> Includes personnel deployed to the African Union Mission in the Sudan for the period from October to 31 December 2007.

<sup>d</sup> Funded under general temporary assistance.

The actions to be taken by the General Assembly are set out in section V of the present report.

## **I. Introduction**

1. The African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur was established by the Security Council in its resolution 1769 (2007) for an initial period of 12 months.

2. The budget for the establishment of the Operation for the period from 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2008, set out in the report of the Secretary-General (A/62/380), amounted to \$1,477,766,300 gross (\$1,466,209,700 net). It provided for 240 military observers, 19,315 military contingents, 3,772 United Nations police personnel, 2,660 formed police personnel, 1,579 international staff, 3,455 national staff, including 55 international and 30 national staff under general temporary assistance, 548 United Nations Volunteers and 6 Government-provided personnel. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, in paragraph 91 of its report (A/62/540), recommended that the General Assembly appropriate \$1,326,622,900 gross for the establishment of UNAMID for 2007/08.

3. Pursuant to section IV of General Assembly resolution 49/233 A, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions authorized the Secretary-General to enter into commitments up to the amount of \$50 million to meet the most immediate and essential preparatory steps to support the establishment of UNAMID and to reimburse Governments contributing troops to the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) for costs associated with military contingent personnel deployed in Darfur for the period from 1 October to 31 December 2007.

4. The General Assembly, by its resolution 62/232 A, established a special account for UNAMID and appropriated an amount of \$1,275,653,700 gross (\$1,264,273,500 net) for the establishment of the Operation for the period from 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2008. The total amount has been assessed on Member States.

5. During the period from 1 July to 31 December 2007, the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) supported the implementation of the heavy support package to AMIS. Associated charges in the amount of \$84,769,102 were transferred to UNAMID once the special account for UNAMID was established by the General Assembly, and resources were appropriated to it.

## **II. Mandate performance**

### **A. Overall**

6. In paragraph 1 of its resolution 1769 (2007), the Security Council decided that the mandate of UNAMID should be as set out in paragraphs 54 and 55 of the report of the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission (S/2007/307/Rev.1). By the same resolution, the Council also decided that no later than 31 December 2007, UNAMID would assume authority from AMIS with a view to achieving full operational capability and force strength as soon as possible thereafter. The Council further decided that UNAMID should assume operational command authority over personnel deployed to AMIS and the heavy support package in order for it to perform its mandated tasks, as its resources and capabilities permitted, immediately upon transfer of authority from AMIS to UNAMID.

7. With the establishment of UNAMID, the UNMIS regional office in El Fasher and three sub-offices in Nyala, El Geneina and Zalingei were subsumed into UNAMID effective 1 January 2008, along with associated resources, including 563 posts.

8. Pursuant to the mandate approved by the Security Council for UNAMID, the Operation's overall objective is to achieve a lasting political solution and sustained security in Darfur.

9. In view of the fact that UNAMID had just been established and was still under development at the time of the preparation of its proposed budget for 2007/08, the budget for that period provided an outline of the results-based-budgeting frameworks at the component level which were derived from the UNAMID mandate, comprising the peace process; security; rule of law, governance and human rights; humanitarian liaison, recovery and development; and support. The complete results-based-budgeting frameworks were presented to the General Assembly in the context of the Operation's budget for 2008/09 (see A/62/791 and Corr.1 and 2), and the actual performance against the indicators of achievement and outputs will be reported to the Assembly in the performance report on the budget of UNAMID for that period.

## **B. Budget implementation**

10. During the period from its inception to December 2007, UNAMID focused on the establishment of an initial operational capability for its headquarters, including the command and control structures through which its operational directives were implemented, and on the strengthening of AMIS through the deployment of the heavy support package. This was followed by extensive preparations for the transfer of authority from AMIS to UNAMID, which took place on 31 December 2007.

11. In fulfilment of the mandate related to the peace process, as outlined in paragraphs 54 and 55 of the report of the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, the Operation's main priorities for the reporting period were as follows: to provide good offices and ensure that reconciliation initiatives were coordinated with security, recovery and development efforts in Darfur; to establish an all-inclusive Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation process; to broadly disseminate information concerning the mandate of UNAMID, the Darfur Peace Agreement and any subsequent agreement reached; to assist in preparations for the conduct of the referendums provided for in the Darfur Peace Agreement; and to facilitate the complementary implementation of all peace agreements in the Sudan and pursue an approach consistent with the national provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

12. During the reporting period, despite the mediation efforts of the African Union and the United Nations Special Envoys for Darfur, the political process for Darfur remained at a standstill and the road map developed by the Special Envoys reached an impasse. This was due to the lack of both a firm commitment of the parties to the Darfur conflict to move the peace process forward and a common position of the movements to engage with the Government of the Sudan. In addition, the fragmentation of the movements, the deteriorating security situation and the ongoing crisis between Chad and the Sudan further complicated efforts to encourage the parties to move forward with substantive peace talks.

13. During the reporting period, in cooperation with UNMIS, UNAMID monitored national developments and activities in Darfur, facilitated discussion of the Darfur Peace Agreement, supported the conduct of the national census and continued preparation for boundary demarcation, as stipulated in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and Darfur Peace Agreement.

14. The Joint Mediation Support Team, UNAMID and the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation process continued to coordinate closely in engaging civil society organizations, internally displaced persons and leaders of the native administration through regular meetings in all three states with a view to increasing awareness of the Operation's mandate, broadening inclusiveness and preparing them to act as the political platform for the implementation of any subsequent peace agreements.

15. Consistent with its grass-roots approach, the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation process sought the views of the Darfurian diaspora on issues related to reconciliation, development, administration, identity, democracy and compensation. The Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation process also provided assistance to a four-day equestrian festival held in El Daien, Southern Darfur, from 30 May to 2 June 2008. The festival brought together participants from a broad spectrum of tribes in Darfur, including senior leaders from the Rizeigat, Fur, Fellata and Zaghawa, who were joined by scholars, activists, editors and leading figures from the cultural community across the Sudan. The festival provided a traditional platform for tribal leaders to meet UNAMID senior staff and to engage in dialogue, mediation and reconciliation.

16. The Sudan's fifth population and housing census was carried out from 22 April to 6 May 2008 despite opposition from both non-signatories and signatories to the Darfur Peace Agreement. UNAMID promoted the census and provided limited support through the transportation of census materials throughout the three states of Darfur.

17. Although conditions in Darfur did not permit the scaling up of recovery and development efforts, a review of the initial arrangements for the coordination of the humanitarian operation was begun so as to provide for a transition to recovery and development as soon as security and political conditions permitted.

18. In fulfilment of its mandate related to security, the Operation's priorities for the 2007/08 period were as follows: to contribute to the protection of civilians and provide security for vulnerable populations; to support the establishment of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process in cooperation with national institutions as called for in the Darfur Peace Agreement; and to work with the movements' police liaison officers (envisaged in the Agreement), as well as the local and national authorities, to help ensure that they carry out core policing functions in accordance with international standards of human rights and accountability.

19. The continued insecurity, the slow pace of readying deployment sites, the lack of equipment required to bring the former AMIS infantry battalions up to United Nations standards and other logistical challenges associated with transporting goods into the mission area, substantially delayed the deployment of the Operation's uniformed personnel in Darfur. As at 30 June 2008, the total strength of UNAMID was 11,969 personnel, including 164 military observers, 7,675 military contingent personnel, 1,694 United Nations police officers, 144 formed police personnel and 2,292 civilian staff.

20. Despite the delayed deployment of its uniformed personnel, the force expanded its presence in all three states of Darfur to include areas controlled by the Sudan Liberation Army and Sudan Liberation Movement and some areas under the control of non-signatory movements, such as Korma in Northern Darfur, as well as areas of Western Darfur that had experienced increased insecurity following the fighting in Chad earlier in 2008.

21. The Operation also steadily increased its impact on the ground through re-energizing and expanding patrols as well as conducting them for longer periods. Firewood patrols were reinstated to protect women, who were among the most vulnerable. In Nyala, Southern Darfur, UNAMID deployed the first formed police unit. In response to the instability in Western Darfur, UNAMID increased its patrol presence and investigation activities, including the conduct of joint military and police patrols in the northern corridor of the state and the development of a plan to conduct at least three short- and long-range patrols together with two night patrols from every company location to camps for internally displaced persons throughout the sector each week. By June 2008, those activities involved conducting 2,320 confidence-building patrols in 738 villages across the three Darfur states, 773 escort patrols, 249 administrative patrols, 129 investigative patrols and the provision of convoy security, as required.

22. Progress was made in community policing. A total of 277 internally displaced persons in Southern Darfur and 225 persons in Western Darfur underwent basic training in community policing and started working in partnership with the local Sudanese police to support the maintenance of law and order in the camps.

23. UNAMID police conducted training and capacity-building for government police in order to ensure that their work meets internationally accepted human rights standards. Priority was given to the training of local police in due process and in methods for investigating gender-based violence, with particular emphasis on promoting the human rights of women and children. Those activities also entailed the development of “train-the-trainer” programmes which were designed to make the local police force self-sufficient in conducting its own training courses.

24. A team from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support visited the Sudan in April 2008 and, in collaboration with the Operation, developed an enhanced deployment plan which aimed at achieving 80 per cent deployment of the authorized strength of UNAMID by the end of 2008. The success of the plan was predicated on a number of prerequisites, including the deployment of key enabling capacities, such as engineering, multirole logistics, medical and transport units, and six new self-sustaining battalions with a light engineering capacity, as well as the upgrade of 10 former AMIS battalions to United Nations standards. At the end of the 2007/08 period, most of the prerequisites remained unfulfilled for various reasons, including the security situation in Darfur, delayed force generation and other logistical challenges associated with land and customs clearance. The delays in deployment of uniformed personnel were also attributable to delays in the movement of contingent-owned equipment from Port Sudan and El Obeid to Darfur, coupled with the onset of the rainy season.

25. The Joint Special Representative and senior staff of UNAMID conducted regular meetings with the Government of the Sudan on developments in Darfur and the deployment of the Operation. Weekly security meetings were also held between

UNAMID and officials of the Government of the Sudan in the three sector headquarters.

26. The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme did not commence owing to the lack of coordination structures at the national level and the slow pace of the peace process, which stalled the achievement of an all-inclusive peace agreement and the attainment of a satisfactory level of security conducive to the establishment of the programme in Darfur. A national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration strategy was adopted in December 2007, a reintegration policy was endorsed by the Government of the Sudan in March 2008, and a multi-year plan was signed in June 2008.

27. With regard to rule of law, governance and human rights, the main priorities of UNAMID for the 2007/08 period were as follows: to effectively address property and land disputes and compensation issues related to the Darfur Peace Agreement; to mainstream human rights within the Operation (that is, monitoring, investigation, reporting, advocacy, protection, advisory, and institution and capacity-building activities); and to engage with the parties to the Darfur Peace Agreement to identify appropriate actions to stop, prevent and/or pre-empt violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

28. UNAMID, through its Human Rights Section, conducted monitoring work through regional offices in El Fasher, El Geneina, Nyala and the sub-office in Zalingei, focusing on the following priority areas: extrajudicial killings, sexual and gender-based violence, arbitrary arrest and detention, and torture and ill-treatment in detention. During the reporting period, UNAMID carried out 120 field missions and held regular meetings with both local and regional authorities. Monitoring of trials, in particular cases of sexual and gender-based violence, as well as visits to detention centres were undertaken.

29. Reports on the human rights situation in Darfur were prepared on a daily, weekly and monthly basis for the Secretary-General, the Security Council and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). In collaboration with OHCHR, a report was issued in March 2008 on the attacks on villages in Western Darfur in January and February 2008. In this connection, UNAMID also provided support to the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Darfur during her visits to Darfur in March 2008, including transport, security, and arrangement of meetings with local interlocutors and the international community.

30. In addition, in January 2008, UNAMID held meetings with the Advisory Council for Human Rights, the Government agency responsible for human rights, to discuss various issues, including coordination, human rights reporting and the promotion and protection of human rights in Darfur. Meetings were also held with donors to discuss the implementation of human rights projects. During the period from January to June 2008, the Operation conducted a total of 16 training activities in Darfur targeting internally displaced persons, students, judges, lawyers, armed movements, personnel of government authorities, including police, prosecution, legislators and the native administration.

31. UNAMID was also involved in training the movements in human rights and in building the capacity of the government police and the movements' police.

32. The delayed implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement precluded work on property and land disputes and on compensation issues.

33. With regard to humanitarian liaison, recovery and development, the main priorities for UNAMID for the 2007/08 period were: to ensure the establishment and functioning of effective liaison mechanisms among UNAMID, the humanitarian community and the multiple actors, and to ensure that critical areas of cooperation were identified.

34. The Operation provided support to victims of gender-based violence and their parents, protected the confidentiality of their cases and educated survivors and victims about gender-based violence. During the reporting period, UNAMID conducted a programme to build the skills of women in Darfur as a way of equipping them to be active players in the local socio-economic sphere. Under this programme, six training activities were conducted by the Gender Advisory Unit.

35. In response to continued attacks against humanitarian workers, the Operation also increased its capacity to provide armed escorts for humanitarian convoys throughout Darfur. During the reporting period, UNAMID conducted a total of 773 armed escorts.

36. Coordination mechanisms with United Nations agencies, programmes and funds were established at the level of the three Darfur states through meetings of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee. At the headquarters level, a Darfur-wide liaison mechanism called "Delivering as One" was under development. The mechanism aimed at accelerating and building an integrated capacity to provide, together with the United Nations country team, the humanitarian community and international financial institutions in Darfur with a coherent approach to cross-cutting issues, such as gender and human rights. In the interim, the Humanitarian Liaison Office conducted this liaison through the resident/humanitarian coordinator and the United Nations country team in Khartoum, as most United Nations agencies, programmes and funds were structured on a state-by-state basis.

37. Critical thematic areas of cooperation were identified in the fields of protection of civilians, protection of humanitarian space and the facilitation of humanitarian access. A humanitarian liaison mechanism was established to ensure an adequate exchange of information between UNAMID and United Nations agencies, programmes and funds, in particular in areas where humanitarian workers could not operate for security reasons.

38. UNAMID participated at the state level in United Nations country team protection working groups, led by OHCHR. The Operation initiated the drafting of a policy directive to coordinate the work of all concerned with respect to the protection of civilians.

39. The training modules for the military, police and civilian components of the Operation were upgraded to ensure a good understanding of humanitarian methods of operation. In addition, briefings were provided to the humanitarian community to ensure better understanding of the UNAMID mandate.

40. During the reporting period, the Operation's support priorities were characterized primarily by the establishment of UNAMID and its headquarters as well as the three regional offices in El Fasher, Nyala and El Geneina and the regional sub-office in Zalingei; the deployment of military and police personnel, contingent-owned and United Nations-owned equipment; and the recruitment of



civilian personnel. UNAMID also established offices in key locations outside Darfur, including the Khartoum Liaison Office, co-located with UNMIS, and the Joint Support and Coordination Mechanism in Addis Ababa. Support was also provided to the mediation efforts of the Special Envoys of the African Union and the United Nations through the Joint Mediation Support Team.

41. For its support activities, the Operation relied on its main logistics base in Nyala and on a number of structures established outside Darfur, including a forward operational logistics base with warehousing capacity and a transit facility in El Obeid, as well as a support office, co-located with UNMIS, in Port Sudan, the main port of entry for goods by sea for both UNAMID and UNMIS. The Operation also endeavoured to ensure the smooth and seamless transition from the heavy support package and AMIS forces to UNAMID. As former AMIS troops were not fully self-sustained, the Operation also had to shift its focus to provide support to the incoming troops and the existing 31 former AMIS camps. This included the challenge of procuring all basic goods and services necessary to keep the camps and the non-standard equipment operational. UNAMID also facilitated movement of the equipment and assets required for the deployment of military and police personnel through the involvement of third-party logistics contractors hired under the UNMIS inland transportation contract.

42. During the reporting period, deployment efforts were hindered by the severe logistical challenges associated with harsh environmental conditions, underdeveloped communications and poor infrastructure in Darfur, as well as the long land transport and supply lines from Port Sudan.

43. Prevailing security tensions and the 10 May 2008 attack on Omburman caused delays in the rotation of troops already present and the deployment of new units to Darfur. In addition, airports in Darfur were repeatedly closed and UNAMID convoys were suspended in Northern Darfur, resulting in further delays in the deployment and movement of core equipment.

44. The recruitment of civilian staff was also a challenge during the reporting period, as many candidates declined invitations for interviews and offers of appointment due to the harsh living and working conditions in Darfur and general security concerns. The Operation's ongoing efforts to recruit and retain staff focused on a comprehensive outreach programme and the upgrading of all UNAMID premises and accommodation facilities outside the camps to comply with minimum operating security standards and minimum operating residential security standards.

45. Difficulties were also encountered in the movement of equipment from Port Sudan to Darfur by road (1,400 miles), due primarily to security conditions, customs clearance processes and the relatively limited number of local contractors. In order to resolve the bottlenecks in the movement of equipment from Port Sudan through El Obeid to Darfur, the Operation had to airlift equipment, where appropriate.

46. Owing to the logistical challenges associated with the movement of assets and materials, which were further compounded by the lack of material handling equipment, a large portion of the facilities and infrastructure could not be constructed. Further delays were the result of difficulties in identifying land for construction and obtaining permits.

47. Notwithstanding those challenges, the Operation obtained from the Government of the Sudan, under the provisions of the status-of-forces agreement signed in February 2008, land parcels in Northern, Southern and Western Darfur, including those required for the super camps, and commenced enabling works for

those camps as well as the expansion of existing camps and preparation for the construction of new camps.

48. The rising security challenges also resulted in UNAMID taking measures to improve its defensive infrastructure. However, the field defence equipment and supplies and security and safety equipment which were transferred from UNMIS and AMIS were sufficient to sustain the Operation's scaled-down construction projects in the 2007/08 period, thus reducing expenditures for those engineering items in the reporting period (see also para. 74). The Operation enhanced the physical perimeter of existing premises at each deployment location by erecting Hesco Bastion walls, raising observation towers and illuminating base perimeters with floodlights. The existing offices and guest houses in Darfur were also upgraded to comply with the minimum operating security standards.

49. With the delayed deployment of personnel and the difficulties encountered in finding suitable contractors to carry out the drilling of underground water sources, UNAMID utilized 24 water sources which were made available from AMIS and 11 from private vendors. With the use of water purification equipment, the Operation used the 35 water sources to provide the bulk of the water requirements during the reporting period. Those sources were not reliable, however, and the issuing of water to peacekeepers was scaled down to cope with the reduced yields of groundwater resources, particularly during the drier months of the year.

50. UNAMID conducted a survey to determine the capacity of the existing water sources and developed a support plan to secure them in the future. The plan provided for medium- and long-term measures, including the improvement of existing water sources, identification of potential drilling sites to be developed by UNAMID, and the utilization of Hafirs (underground reservoirs for storing rainwater), dams and recycled wastewater from sewage treatment plants. The Operation also selected contractors for the identification of drilling sites and borehole drilling.

51. In the area of air operations, although delays were encountered in the deployment of aircraft, UNAMID still placed a high reliance on air operations as the terrain of Darfur inhibited movement over land. The delayed deployment of aircraft was due primarily to the lack of parking space in airfields, delays in the clearance of aircraft by the Sudan Civil Aviation Authority and difficulties in generating military air assets.

52. With regard to the general installation of communications and information technology infrastructure, while UNAMID achieved approximately 90 per cent of primary radio communications in Northern and Western Darfur, owing to the delayed deployment of equipment, only 45 per cent of primary communications were achieved in Southern Darfur.

### **C. Regional mission cooperation**

53. The regional mission coordination activities of UNAMID were characterized primarily by the inter-mission coordination undertaken with UNMIS, in particular, in the area of humanitarian liaison. In addition, UNAMID and UNMIS established liaison and coordination mechanisms in respect of military and police activities. UNMIS shared its experience on deployment and related operational issues. The police components of UNAMID and UNMIS coordinated to ensure consistency in police development activity. UNMIS also supported UNAMID with the deployment,

induction and rotation of military personnel, the establishment of a training capability and the generation of operational documents.

54. The cooperation and collaboration between UNMIS and UNAMID in support areas, which were later finalized through a memorandum of understanding signed in July 2008, included common services, including space allocation and shared facilities, security, air fleet management and aircraft utilization, joint movement control operations, property management, transport services, medical services and communications and information technology services.

55. In the area of air operations, UNAMID made use of several fixed-wing aircraft and heavy cargo helicopters of the UNMIS air fleet on a cost-reimbursable basis, and of the UNMIS ground handling services contract to support the Operation's aircraft landing in Khartoum and in El Obeid.

56. UNAMID also provided support to the UNMIS personnel performing functions related to return, recovery and reintegration as well as protection who remained in Darfur. Reciprocally, all UNAMID staff based in UNMIS premises in Khartoum were supported by UNMIS.

57. The main port of entry for goods by sea for UNAMID and UNMIS during the reporting period continued to be Port Sudan, where both were co-located. UNAMID also utilized the UNMIS logistics base at El Obeid, shared common services with the Mission, used its existing commercial contracts and deployed additional personnel to carry out the functions and higher volume of movements directly related to UNAMID activities.

58. To maximize the effective use of resources and obtain efficiencies, UNAMID also worked closely with the UNMIS Procurement and Engineering Sections with a view to facilitating the acquisition of key construction commodities and coordinating the establishment of local and regional systems contracts. UNAMID established, in cooperation with UNMIS, its Khartoum Liaison Office and a guest house in Khartoum. Effective collaboration was also undertaken with the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea to obtain engineering support to establish the Joint Support and Coordination Mechanism in Addis Ababa.

59. With regard to cooperation with other peacekeeping operations in the region, UNAMID also made use of fixed-wing aircraft of the United Nations Mission in Liberia and the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire to rotate its troops during the period. During the reporting period, the Operation commenced the establishment of liaison mechanisms with the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad to provide for regular sharing of information in matters related to regional security.

#### **D. Partnerships and country team coordination**

60. The coordination structure between the Operation and the United Nations country team included regular meetings at both the state and national levels, to ensure complementary efforts. This was further facilitated by contact between UNAMID and the inter-agency management groups, which were chaired by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs on behalf of the resident/humanitarian coordinator in each Darfur field location. The groups carried out planning and coordinating functions, formulated targeted draft policy and performed strategic situation analysis.


### III. Resource performance

#### A. Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars. Budget year is from 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2008.)

Category	Apportionment (1)	Expenditure (2)	Variance	
			Amount (3)=(1)-(2)	Percentage (4)=(3)÷(1)
<b>Military and police personnel</b>				
Military observers	2 635.6	4 876.8	(2 241.2)	(85.0)
Military contingents	211 663.1	182 891.6	28 771.5	13.6
United Nations police	42 467.8	43 763.0	(1 295.2)	(3.0)
Formed police units	22 809.8	6 335.3	16 474.5	72.2
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>279 576.3</b>	<b>237 866.7</b>	<b>41 709.6</b>	<b>14.9</b>
<b>Civilian personnel</b>				
International staff	84 410.7	45 267.6	39 143.1	46.4
National staff	17 401.0	8 524.7	8 876.3	51.0
United Nations Volunteers	6 471.6	4 615.7	1 855.9	28.7
General temporary assistance	4 743.1	5 965.3	(1 222.2)	(25.8)
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>113 026.4</b>	<b>64 373.3</b>	<b>48 653.1</b>	<b>43.0</b>
<b>Operational costs</b>				
Government-provided personnel	155.8	3.0	152.8	98.1
Civilian electoral observers	—	—	—	—
Consultants	400.8	221.3	179.5	44.8
Official travel	5 233.6	1 875.5	3 358.1	64.2
Facilities and infrastructure	589 973.5	486 170.0	103 803.5	17.6
Ground transportation	73 600.0	87 433.8	(13 833.8)	(18.8)
Air transportation	83 474.1	72 397.3	11 076.8	13.3
Naval transportation	—	—	—	—
Communications	56 574.3	48 996.9	7 577.4	13.4
Information technology	31 609.4	27 892.2	3 717.2	11.8
Medical	9 021.9	1 074.7	7 947.2	88.1
Special equipment	1 386.9	97.3	1 289.6	93.0
Other supplies, services and equipment	30 620.7	27 210.4	3 410.3	11.1
Quick-impact projects	1 000.0	866.2	133.8	13.4
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>883 051.0</b>	<b>754 238.6</b>	<b>128 812.4</b>	<b>14.6</b>
<b>Gross requirements</b>	<b>1 275 653.7</b>	<b>1 056 478.6</b>	<b>219 175.1</b>	<b>17.2</b>
Staff assessment income	11 380.2	6 692.3	4 687.9	41.2
<b>Net requirements</b>	<b>1 264 273.5</b>	<b>1 049 786.3</b>	<b>214 487.2</b>	<b>17.0</b>
Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted)	—	—	—	—
<b>Total requirements</b>	<b>1 275 653.7</b>	<b>1 056 478.6</b>	<b>219 175.1</b>	<b>17.2</b>

## B. Monthly expenditure pattern



61. Progressively increasing expenditures during the period from January to June 2008 were attributable to the continuing deployment of the Operation and to the raising of a large volume of obligations under operational costs towards the end of the financial period upon completion of the procurement process, which were related to the acquisition of equipment and services and which involved long procurement lead times.

## C. Other income and adjustments

(Thousands of United States dollars)

<i>Category</i>	<i>Amount</i>
Interest income	6 086.9
Other/miscellaneous income	181.2
Voluntary contributions in cash	—
Prior-period adjustments	—
Cancellation of prior-period obligations	—
<b>Total</b>	<b>6 268.1</b>

## D. Expenditure for contingent-owned equipment: major equipment and self-sustainment

(Thousands of United States dollars)

<i>Category</i>	<i>Expenditure</i>
<b>Major equipment</b>	
Military contingents	18 637.4
Formed police units	1 838.4
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>20 475.8</b>
<b>Self-sustainment</b>	
Facilities and infrastructure	529.5
Communications	223.0
Medical	67.1
Special equipment	94.8
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>914.4</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>21 390.2</b>

<i>Mission factors</i>	<i>Percentage</i>	<i>Effective date</i>	<i>Last review date</i>
<b>A. Applicable to mission area</b>			—
Extreme environmental condition factor	2.6	1 Jan 2008	—
Intensified operational condition factor	3.8	1 Jan 2008	—
Hostile action/forced abandonment factor	3.3	1 Jan 2008	
<b>B. Applicable to home country</b>			
Incremental transportation factor	0-3.0		

## E. Value of non-budgeted contributions

(Thousands of United States dollars)

<i>Category</i>	<i>Actual value</i>
Status-of-forces agreement <sup>a</sup>	361.5
Voluntary contributions in kind (non-budgeted)	—
<b>Total</b>	<b>361.5</b>

<sup>a</sup> Includes Government-provided facilities.

#### IV. Analysis of variances<sup>1</sup>

	<i>Variance</i>	
<b>Military observers</b>	(\$2 241.2)	(85.0%)

62. The additional requirements under this heading were attributable mainly to the unplanned transfer of AMIS military observers upon the transfer of authority from AMIS to UNAMID resulting in the higher actual monthly average strength of 79 military observers compared with the budgeted monthly average strength of 43 observers (after application of a delayed deployment factor of 15 per cent). In addition, with effect from March 2008, the mission subsistence allowance rates applicable in Darfur were revised to \$188 per person per day for the first 30 days and \$143 thereafter, compared with the budgeted rates of \$166 and \$116, respectively.

	<i>Variance</i>	
<b>Military contingents</b>	\$28 771.5	13.6%

63. The unspent balance was attributable primarily to fewer rotations than planned and the delayed deployment of new military contingents owing to the volatile security situation, delayed force generation, the slow pace of upgrading deployment sites, slow movement of equipment through the main supply routes into Darfur and other logistical challenges associated with land use and customs clearance. In addition, the reduced requirements were also due to the lower actual expenditure for the reimbursement of the former AMIS troop-contributing countries for contingent-owned equipment and the delayed deployment of the contingent-owned equipment of incoming contingents.

	<i>Variance</i>	
<b>United Nations police</b>	(\$1 295.2)	(3.0%)

64. The additional requirements under this heading were due to the increase in mission subsistence allowance rates (see para. 62 above), offset in part by lower actual expenditures for the emplacement travel of police personnel, as the majority of police personnel deployed were transferred from AMIS in January 2008.

	<i>Variance</i>	
<b>Formed police units</b>	\$16 474.5	72.2%

65. The unspent balance was attributable primarily to the delayed deployment of formed police personnel owing to the volatile security situation, delayed force generation, the slow pace of upgrading deployment sites, the slow movement of equipment through the main supply routes into Darfur and other logistical challenges associated with land use and customs clearance. The actual monthly average strength during the reporting period was 95 formed police personnel

<sup>1</sup> Resource variance amounts are expressed in thousands of United States dollars. Analysis is provided for variances of at least plus or minus 5 per cent or \$100,000.

compared with the budgeted strength of 460 (after application of a 25 per cent delayed deployment factor). In addition, requirements in respect of reimbursement of contingent-owned major equipment and freight charges associated with the deployment of contingent-owned equipment were substantially reduced owing to the actual deployment of only one formed police unit, compared with the planned deployment of 14 units.

	<i>Variance</i>	
<b>International staff</b>	\$39 143.1	46.4%

66. The unspent balance was attributable primarily to the delayed recruitment of international staff, as many recommended candidates were reluctant to accept offers of appointment owing to the security situation and harsh living and working conditions. The actual monthly average strength of international staff during the reporting period was 289 persons compared with the budgeted strength of 468 (after application of a 5 per cent delayed recruitment factor). In addition, provisions made in the budget for international staff were based on the actual average expenditure by grade over the 2006/07 financial period taken for all missions, whereas the actual average expenditure by grade level was lower by some 13 per cent. Furthermore, requirements for the hazard pay were lower than budgeted since the early months of the reporting period, most of the newly recruited personnel were stationed in Khartoum owing to delays in the construction of office and accommodation facilities in the regions.

	<i>Variance</i>	
<b>National staff</b>	\$8 876.3	51.0%

67. The unspent balance was attributable primarily to the delayed recruitment of national staff owing to the delayed construction of office facilities in the regions and the inadvertent recording of charges associated with national staff for the period from July to December 2007 against general temporary assistance. The actual monthly average strength of national staff during the reporting period was 689 compared with the budgeted strength of 949 national staff, with no delayed recruitment factor applied.

	<i>Variance</i>	
<b>United Nations Volunteers</b>	\$1 855.9	28.7%

68. The unspent balance was attributable primarily to the delayed deployment of United Nations Volunteers owing to the security situation and harsh living and working conditions. The actual monthly average strength was 98 Volunteers compared with the budgeted strength of 146 (after the application of a 40 per cent delayed deployment factor).



	<i>Variance</i>	
<b>General temporary assistance</b>	(\$1 222.2)	(25.8%)

69. The additional requirements were attributable mainly to the inadvertent recording under this heading of expenditures related to national staff for the period from July to December 2007, offset in part by the delayed recruitment of international and national staff owing to the security situation and harsh living and working conditions as well as to the delayed construction of office facilities in the regions.

	<i>Variance</i>	
<b>Government-provided personnel</b>	(\$152.8)	(98.1%)

70. The unspent balance under this heading was due to the non-deployment of corrections officers, as discussions with contributing countries were still ongoing during the reporting period.

	<i>Variance</i>	
<b>Consultants</b>	\$179.5	44.8%

71. The unspent balance resulted from the delayed delivery of training programmes owing to the prevailing security situation and the slower deployment of the Operation's civilian personnel. In addition, consultancy services budgeted for the preparation of the master plan to conserve potential heritage sites were not provided owing to the non-availability of consultants.

	<i>Variance</i>	
<b>Official travel</b>	\$3 358.1	64.2%

72. The unspent balance was attributable to reduced requirements for non-training official travel owing to the prevailing security situation. It was also attributable to reduced requirements for training-related official travel owing to the delayed deployment of civilian personnel, which resulted, in particular, in the lower number of 70 international staff participating in induction training at the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy, as compared with the planned number of 300 staff.

	<i>Variance</i>	
<b>Facilities and infrastructure</b>	\$103 803.5	17.6%

73. The unspent balance was attributable mainly to delays in the implementation of construction projects. While the main construction contract was signed in October 2007, owing to the limited engineering and contract management capacity of UNAMID and the delayed delivery of engineering equipment owing to the time required for flight and customs clearance, the commencement of works was delayed until March 2008. The contractor was therefore not able to execute all the required task orders by the end of the reporting period. The delays were also due to the difficulties in identifying land for construction and obtaining permits. To alleviate

the impact of delays in construction projects, the Operation initiated, within its limited capacity, a number of construction and alteration projects by using in-house resources and hiring individual contractors.

74. The unencumbered balance also resulted from reduced actual requirements for the reimbursement of former AMIS troop-contributing countries for self-sustainment costs, as well as the delayed deployment of incoming contingents and formed police units. The reduced requirements were also attributable to the limited procurement capacity available within the Operation owing to the delayed deployment of civilian personnel. In addition, the transfer of security and safety equipment and field defence equipment and supplies from AMIS and UNMIS led to reduced actual requirements for those items, as explained in paragraph 48.

75. The lower actual requirements were partly offset by higher actual expenditure attributable to the advance procurement of prefabricated facilities and generators, given the need to secure timely delivery of procured items in view of long procurement lead times, as well as the acquisition of additional prefabricated facilities and tents needed to upgrade and expand the former AMIS camps.

	<i>Variance</i>	
<b>Ground transportation</b>	(\$13 833.8)	18.8%

76. The additional requirements under this heading were attributable primarily to the advance procurement of passenger vehicles, trucks, material-handling equipment and specialized vehicles given the need to secure their timely delivery in view of long procurement lead times, as well as the increase in acquisition costs of approximately 20 per cent according to a new systems contract. The additional requirements were partly offset by reduced requirements for diesel fuel, oil and lubricants, liability insurance, workshop equipment and repair and maintenance owing to fewer number of vehicles in operation during the reporting period.

	<i>Variance</i>	
<b>Air transportation</b>	\$11 076.8	13.3%

77. The unspent balance was attributable mainly to reduced requirements for airfield services, rental and operation as well as aviation fuel owing to the lower than planned level of aviation activities resulting from the delayed deployment of aircraft, the limited parking space for aircraft and restrictions on flights. The lower requirements were offset in part by reimbursement to UNMIS of guaranteed costs associated with use by UNAMID of shared aircraft.

	<i>Variance</i>	
<b>Communications</b>	\$7 577.4	13.4%

78. The unutilized balance under this heading was attributable primarily to reduced requirements for commercial communications and spare parts owing to the delayed deployment of the Operation. The unencumbered balance also resulted from reduced actual requirements for the reimbursement to former AMIS troop-

contributing countries of self-sustainment costs and the delayed deployment of incoming contingents and formed police units.

79. Reduced requirements were offset in part by the acquisition of communications equipment in support of former AMIS troops and for the establishment of community police centres.

	<i>Variance</i>	
<b>Information technology</b>	\$3 717.2	11.8%

80. The reduced requirements under this heading were attributable mainly to lower actual expenditures for the acquisition of spare parts and supplies owing to the delayed deployment of the Operation's personnel.

	<i>Variance</i>	
<b>Medical</b>	\$7 947.2	88.1%

81. The unspent balance was attributable to reduced actual requirements for the reimbursement of self-sustainment costs to former AMIS troop-contributing countries and the delayed deployment of incoming contingents and formed police units. In addition, the delayed deployment of the Operation's personnel resulted in lower actual expenditures related to medical services and supplies.

	<i>Variance</i>	
<b>Special equipment</b>	\$1 289.6	93.0%

82. The unspent balance was attributable to reduced actual requirements for the reimbursement of self-sustainment costs to former AMIS troop-contributing countries and the delayed deployment of incoming contingents and formed police units.

	<i>Variance</i>	
<b>Other supplies, services and equipment</b>	\$3 410.3	11.1%

83. The unspent balance was attributable primarily to lower actual requirements for bank charges owing to the reduced volume of the Operation's banking transactions, as well as reduced requirements for freight and related costs, acquisition of personal protection gear and training fees, supplies and services, owing to the delayed deployment of the Operation.

84. The underexpenditures was offset in part by additional requirements related to the procurement task force and hiring of procurement officers for a six-month period, as well as acquisition of additional security uniforms and flags and decals.

	<i>Variance</i>	
<b>Quick-impact projects</b>	\$133.8	13.4%

85. The reduced requirements under this heading were attributable to the delayed establishment of the review committee and the related monitoring and evaluation

mechanisms, as well as to the delayed deployment of personnel in substantive areas and the lead time necessary for the identification of implementing partners. Expenditure reflected costs associated with 42 projects which covered all three Darfur states in both urban and rural areas, mostly in the areas of education, water and sanitation, health, agriculture and empowerment of women.

## **V. Actions to be taken by the General Assembly**

**86. The actions to be taken by the General Assembly in connection with the financing of UNAMID are:**

(a) **To decide on the treatment of the unencumbered balance of \$219,175,100 with respect to the period from 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2008;**

(b) **To decide on the treatment of other income for the period ended 30 June 2008 amounting to \$6,268,100 from interest income (\$6,086,900) and other/miscellaneous income (\$181,200).**

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