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**Proposed programme budget for the biennium 2008-2009****Estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council****United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq****Report of the Secretary-General***Summary*

Part one of the present report sets out the proposed resource requirements for the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) for the period from 1 January to 31 December 2008, totalling \$151,076,200 net (\$157,758,900 gross).

Part two includes requirements for the period from 1 January to 31 December 2008 for the provision of safe and secure facilities in Baghdad for UNAMI, in the amount of \$180,150,000.

Accordingly, the total provision set out in the present report amounts to \$331,226,200 net (\$337,908,900 gross).



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## **Part one**

### **United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq: continuing operations**

#### **I. Background and overview**

1. In its resolution 1483 (2003), the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative for Iraq. Subsequently, in its resolution 1500 (2003), the Council established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI). In its resolution 1546 (2004), the Council affirmed that the United Nations should play a leading role in assisting the people and the Government of Iraq in the formation of institutions for a representative government. Consequently, UNAMI played a key role in supporting two national elections and a referendum on the Iraqi Constitution. The mandate of UNAMI as contained in resolution 1546 (2004) was renewed in resolution 1557 (2004).

2. On 10 August 2007, the Security Council adopted resolution 1770 (2007), which updated and enhanced the United Nations mandate in Iraq. The mandate has been extended for 12 months and, as circumstances permit, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and UNAMI, at the request of the Government of Iraq, will:

(a) Advise, support and assist:

(i) The Government and the people of Iraq in regard to advancing their inclusive political dialogue and national reconciliation;

(ii) The Government of Iraq and the Independent High Electoral Commission in regard to the development of processes for holding elections and referendums;

(iii) The Government of Iraq and the Council of Representatives in regard to constitutional review and the implementation of constitutional provisions, as well as the development of processes acceptable to the Government of Iraq for resolving disputed internal boundaries;

(iv) The Government of Iraq with regard to facilitating regional dialogue, including on issues of border security, energy and refugees;

(v) The Government of Iraq, at an appropriate time, and in connection with progress on reconciliation efforts, with regard to planning, funding and implementing reintegration programmes for former members of illegal armed groups;

(vi) The Government of Iraq with regard to initial planning for the conduct of a comprehensive census;

(b) Promote, support and facilitate, in coordination with the Government of Iraq:

(i) The coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance and the safe, orderly and voluntary return, as appropriate, of refugees and displaced persons;

- (ii) The implementation of the International Compact with Iraq, including coordination with donors and international financial institutions;
  - (iii) The coordination and implementation of programmes to improve the capacity of Iraq to provide essential services for its people and continue active donor coordination of critical reconstruction and assistance programmes through the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI);
  - (iv) Economic reform, capacity-building and conditions for sustainable development, including through coordination with national and regional organizations and, as appropriate, civil society, donors and international financial institutions;
  - (v) The development of effective civil, social and essential services, including through training and conferences in Iraq when possible;
  - (vi) The contributions of United Nations agencies, funds and programmes to the objectives outlined in resolution 1770 (2007) under the unified leadership of the Secretary-General through his Special Representative for Iraq;
- (c) Promote the protection of human rights and judicial and legal reform in order to strengthen the rule of law in Iraq.

3. Notwithstanding the difficult and challenging security environment in which it must operate, the performance of UNAMI in 2007 has been very good. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General and UNAMI have continued to play a key role in promoting dialogue and reconciliation among the political players. The Mission has also assisted the Government in strengthening its capacity to meet the needs of the Iraqi people, particularly in the delivery of essential services and the protection of human rights. The Mission worked closely with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to draw attention to the need for greater international support for displaced Iraqis, both those inside Iraq and those living in host countries abroad. It supported the Government of Iraq in its efforts in Baghdad on 10 March 2007 and at Sharm el-Sheikh on 4 May 2007 to establish more effective mechanisms with its neighbours, notably the working groups on border security, energy supplies and displaced Iraqis. In support of the constitutional review, UNAMI has hosted a series of successful multiparty dialogues to discuss divisive constitutional issues and has submitted a series of discussion papers to the Constitutional Review Committee to assist in its deliberations. UNAMI observed the selection process for the Board of Commissioners following the establishment of the Independent High Electoral Commission and organized training for the new Commissioners. UNAMI continues to monitor human rights violations and issues a quarterly human rights report. This has become an effective means of raising international awareness; specific issues requiring the attention of both the Government of Iraq and the Kurdistan regional government are highlighted. The growing number of calls by Iraqi leaders and key Member States for a larger United Nations role underscores the important contribution that UNAMI is making, as well as respect for its potential as a significant and neutral international actor in Iraq.

4. The United Nations remains one of the lead institutions in promoting peace and development, particularly through the International Compact with Iraq, officially launched in Sharm el-Sheikh on 3 May 2007. The Compact, co-chaired by the Government of Iraq and the United Nations, with the support of the World Bank,

will bring together the international community and multilateral organizations over the next five years to help Iraq achieve its national vision. With assistance from regional and international partners, the Government of Iraq will work towards building a new framework for the country's economic transformation and integration into the global economy. UNAMI has been requested to play a leading role in establishing a secretariat for the Compact to ensure its successful implementation. This represents a deepening of its current role as facilitator and liaison between the Government of Iraq and the international donor community.

5. The Department of Political Affairs, as the lead department on Iraq, is the main provider of policy and managerial guidance to UNAMI. The Department provides guidance on a range of substantive issues, including political facilitation, national reconciliation, constitutional and electoral support, human rights and humanitarian and reconstruction assistance. Together with other relevant departments, including the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Field Support, the Department of Management and the Department of Safety and Security, the Department of Political Affairs also provides guidance on many operational issues, including the management of the mission, staffing, budget preparations, strategic and administrative planning and logistical support. The Iraq Operations Group, an interdepartmental and inter-agency body under the chairmanship of the Department of Political Affairs, facilitates communication, planning and coordination among various elements of the United Nations system in support of UNAMI.

6. The UNAMI budget is based on the revised concept of operations for the United Nations presence in Iraq, including the latest developments concerning the International Compact with Iraq. The implementation of the concept of operations will take place according to the UNAMI operational plan that is currently under development. The key assumptions regarding the Mission's budget are outlined below:

(a) Constitutional and electoral activities will continue at a high rate in 2008, particularly in implementing the outcome of the constitutional review process, as well as the organization of major and complex electoral events, including governorate and municipal elections, as well as possible referendums on Kirkuk and amendments to the Iraqi Constitution. Political, humanitarian, development, reconstruction and human rights activities in UNAMI will continue at an increased tempo in 2008;

(b) Circumstances permitting, UNAMI intends to increase its presence in Iraq, but staff ceilings and accommodation restrictions may limit its presence in the international zone to staffing levels similar to those established in 2007;

(c) Common services (e.g., the provision of living accommodation, catering facilities and other basic services) will be provided by UNAMI in a coordinated manner and on a reimbursable basis to all United Nations offices, agencies, funds and programmes operating in the mission area. These services are currently covered by a memorandum of understanding between the Mission and United Nations offices and agencies in Kuwait and Erbil. Similar agreements will be developed in Baghdad in the near future. Further, the United Nations liaison detachment in Basra was temporarily relocated outside of Basra because of deteriorating security in early 2007 and the need for an alternative location;

(d) UNAMI will continue to move gradually towards greater self-reliance. This will inevitably require increased investment and staff resources for support and security purposes. In this regard, the Mission intends to initiate the process for the construction of an integrated United Nations compound in Baghdad by the end of 2007, with construction intended to be carried out through 2008;

(e) UNAMI out-of-country offices will be consolidated through the relocation of its Kuwait office to Amman. The changes in organizational structure resulting from the consolidation at the new location will be submitted in the context of the budget proposal for 2009.

## II. Mission mandate and planned results

7. The objective, expected accomplishments and indicators of achievement are presented below.

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**Objective:** To achieve political stability, security and prosperity in Iraq.

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*Expected accomplishments*

*Indicators of achievement*

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(a) Progress towards national reconciliation in Iraq

(a) (i) Increased number of consensus-building meetings both among Iraqi leaders and with other key interlocutors (e.g., neighbouring and regional countries) to promote national dialogue

*Performance measures*

2006: 20 meetings

Estimate 2007: 30 meetings

Target 2008: 40 meetings

(ii) Number of laws adopted by the Council of Representatives with direct implications for the national reconciliation process, such as the laws on de-Baathification, local and governorate elections, amnesty and hydrocarbons (oil-revenue sharing)

*Performance measures*

2006: 0 laws

Estimate 2007: 4 laws

Target 2008: 4 laws

(iii) Number of signed agreements on the final status of disputed territories (in the context of article 140 of the Constitution)

(b) Progress in the implementation and promotion of the Constitution

*Performance measures*

2006: 0 signed agreements

Estimate 2007: 1 signed agreement

Target 2008: 3 signed agreements

- (b) (i) Number of laws adopted by the Iraqi Parliament to implement key provisions of the Constitution, particularly with regard to the establishment of key institutions

*Performance measures*

2006: 1 law (establishment of the Independent High Electoral Commission)

Estimate 2007: 4 laws

Target 2008: 6 laws

- (ii) Increased number of events of civil society, political and special interest groups promoting ownership of the Constitution

*Performance measures*

2006: 10 events

Estimate 2007: 20 events

Target 2008: 35 events

- (iii) Increased number of established governmental and independent institutions in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution

*Performance measures*

2006: 1 institution (Independent High Electoral Commission)

Estimate 2007: 2 institutions

Target 2008: 4 institutions

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*Outputs*

- Political facilitation and reconciliation through the good offices of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General
- Consultations with relevant parties in Iraq and regional neighbours with a view to advancing national dialogue and reconciliation, as well as on achieving agreements on the final status of disputed territories

- Provision of technical and legal advice, through regular consultations and workshops, to the Government and the Council of Representatives on the development of effective constitutional amendments and legislation as well as the creation of constitutional institutions
- Provision of technical and legal advice, through regular consultations, to regional and governorate authorities on the development of regional constitutions
- Provision of technical and legal advice to governorate officials on the design of new regional governorate structures and the establishment of the independent institutions envisaged by the Constitution
- Regular workshops in support of a media and civic education campaign (newspaper advertisements and articles, television and radio broadcasts)
- Regular workshops for representatives and professionals from the various communities and religious groups of Iraq aimed at increasing the sense of ownership of the Constitution
- Regular meetings with the members of the Council of Representatives and Government officials, as well as the diplomatic community, to ensure proper coordination of international assistance and expertise in support of the implementation of the Constitution

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*Expected accomplishments*
*Indicators of achievement*

(c) Conduct of electoral events and strengthening of the Independent High Electoral Commission

(c) (i) Adoption of the required electoral laws for the conduct of elections and referendums

*Performance measures*

2006: 0 laws

Estimate 2007: 1 law

Target 2008: 3 laws

(ii) Increased number of electoral events conducted

*Performance measures*

2006: 0 events

Estimate 2007: 0 events

Target 2008: 2 events

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*Outputs*

- Regular technical and legal advice to the Council of Representatives on drafting a legal and regulatory framework for the conduct of electoral events
- Continuous technical electoral advice to the Board of Commissioners and the electoral administration of the Independent High Electoral Commission
- Regular capacity-building activities and workshops on electoral issues, as well as study trips for the members of the Board of Commissioners, to strengthen the operational and technical capacity of the Independent High Electoral Commission

- Regular consultations with members of the diplomatic community and electoral institutions to coordinate international donor and technical electoral support for the Independent High Electoral Commission

<i>Expected accomplishments</i>	<i>Indicators of achievement</i>
(d) Progress towards strengthening the rule of law and improving respect for human rights	<p>(d) (i) Increased number of established centres for the rehabilitation of victims of torture</p> <p><i>Performance measures</i></p> <p>2006: 0 centres</p> <p>Estimate 2007: 1 centre</p> <p>Target 2008: 4 centres</p> <p>(ii) Establishment of a national human rights commission by the Council of Representatives</p> <p><i>Performance measures</i></p> <p>2006: No</p> <p>Estimate 2007: No</p> <p>Target 2008: Yes</p> <p>(iii) Increased number of training sessions for staff at the Ministry of Human Rights and Ministry of Justice with a view to strengthening their capacities to fully carry out their mandates</p> <p><i>Performance measures</i></p> <p>2006: 8 sessions</p> <p>Estimate 2007: 12 sessions</p> <p>Target 2008: 16 sessions</p>

*Outputs*

- Conduct of regular capacity-building activities to enhance the capacity of the human rights commission, the Ministry of Justice and civil society
- Regular legal and political advice (through consultations) to the Iraqi Government on human rights issues, including effective institutional arrangements to guarantee full respect for human rights and the reform of Iraqi laws to ensure consistency with international standards
- Regular advice to Iraqi political and community leaders (through consultations) on how to promote gender equality and women's full and equal participation in decision-making structures at all levels

- Regular coordination meetings in Baghdad, Basra, Erbil, Amman and Kuwait with representatives of the Government and of national and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) present in Iraq on the implementation of a comprehensive human rights strategy with a view to strengthening the rule of law and human rights standards
- Regular technical advice to national and local NGOs (through consultations) on local capacity-building for human rights monitoring
- Production and distribution of CD-ROMs with relevant human rights publications available in Arabic to relevant ministries, including the Ministries of Human Rights, Interior and Foreign Affairs, as well as to other Iraqi Government representatives and civil society groups, such as women's groups and local NGOs
- Facilitation and conduct of regular joint training programmes with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and other United Nations partners (Special Rapporteurs on torture and detention, UNHCR, the United Nations Children's Fund) for Iraqi Government officials and representatives of civil society
- Regular training workshops to strengthen the capacity of the staff of the library of the Ministry of Human Rights
- Facilitation of and participation in regular meetings organized jointly with the United Nations Development Programme, OHCHR, international and national experts and representatives of the Government of Iraq to advise on issues related to transitional justice and on the establishment of key institutions, such as the human rights commission
- Nationwide multimedia public information programmes in support of human rights, including weekly radio programmes, monthly advertisements in local newspapers and monthly articles in national newspapers

<i>Expected accomplishments</i>	<i>Indicators of achievement</i>
(e) Increased relief, recovery and reconstruction in Iraq	(e) (i) Increased number of meetings of the Iraq Compact secretariat to monitor the implementation of the Compact  <i>Performance measures</i> 2006: Not applicable Estimate 2007: 2 meetings Target 2008: 12 meetings  (ii) Increased percentage of governorates accessible to humanitarian, reconstruction and development organizations  <i>Performance measures</i> 2006: 50 per cent of governorates Estimate 2007: 50 per cent of governorates Target 2008: 60 per cent of governorates

(iii) Increased donor contributions to the expanded Humanitarian Response Fund

*Performance measures* (contributed during the year)

2006: Not applicable

Estimate 2007: \$5 million

Target 2008: \$10 million

(iv) Increased donor contributions for relief, recovery and reconstruction activities

*Performance measures*

2006: \$164 million

Estimate 2007: \$200 million

Target 2008: \$300 million

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*Outputs*

- Technical and expert advice to the secretariat of the International Compact with Iraq on the implementation of the Compact
  - Co-chairing of the International Compact
  - Organization of regular workshops and technical assistance to strengthen the capacity of Iraqi ministries in the development of a national contingency plan and the necessary coordination and response mechanisms for the delivery of humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations in Iraq
  - Conduct of periodic needs-assessment missions
  - Regular reports to international partners, donors and Iraqi authorities on appropriate levels of assistance
  - Monitoring of the implementation of programmes, projects and activities funded by donors
  - Regular monitoring of the impact of humanitarian assistance and adjustment of reconstruction and rehabilitation programmes to strengthen assistance to vulnerable populations
  - Regular reports on violations of international humanitarian law, promotion of human rights and humanitarian assistance, including the protection of civilians in conflict and the safeguarding of humanitarian space
  - Regular coordination meetings with NGOs and donors to strengthen regional coordination and monitoring mechanisms
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### External factors

8. The objective of the mission is expected to be achieved provided that (a) circumstances are conducive for the United Nations to carry out its role as mandated by the Security Council; (b) the security situation in Iraq does not negatively affect its political transition process; and (c) there is continuing political will for United Nations involvement by both the Government of Iraq and Member States.

## III. Resource requirements

9. The proposed resource requirements for UNAMI for the period from 1 January to 31 December 2008 are estimated at \$151,076,200 net (\$157,758,900 gross), as shown in tables 1 and 4. Tables 2 and 3 detail the staffing requirements. The report allows for a comparison between total requirements for 2008 compared to total requirements for 2007 as approved by the General Assembly in its resolution 61/252 and set out in the report of the Secretary-General (A/61/525/Add.5) and the related report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (A/61/640 and Corr.1).

Table 1  
**Total resource requirements (net)**

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	1 January 2006-31 December 2007			Requirements for 2008		Variance analysis 2007-2008	
	Appropriations	Estimated expenditures	Variance	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	Total requirements 2007	Variance
	(1)	(2)	(3)=(1)-(2)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)=(4)-(6)
Military and civilian police personnel costs	30 233.2	22 897.9	7 335.3	14 920.7	—	11 818.8	3 101.9
Civilian personnel cost	121 120.2	117 361.3	3 758.9	70 672.6	—	56 897.5	13 775.1
Operational costs	94 457.7	83 039.1	11 418.6	65 482.9	20 683.3	58 274.2	7 208.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>245 811.1</b>	<b>223 298.3</b>	<b>22 512.8</b>	<b>151 076.2</b>	<b>20 683.3</b>	<b>126 990.5</b>	<b>24 085.7</b>

Table 2  
**Total staffing requirements**

Category of expenditure	Professional category and above									General Service and related categories			National staff		
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Subtotal	Field/Security Service	General Service	Subtotal	National Officers	Local level	Total
	Approved 2007	1	2	2	8	19	70	81	28	211	249	3	463	82	469
Proposed 2008	1	2	2	9	20	71	80	24	209	234	3	446	97	495	1 038
<b>Change</b>	—	—	—	1	1	1	(1)	(4)	(2)	(15)	—	(17)	15	26	24

10. The total staffing establishment proposed for UNAMI for the period from 1 January to December 2008 amounts to 1,038 civilian personnel, comprising 446 international staff (209 Professional positions and 237 positions in the Field Service and General Service categories) and 592 national staff (97 National Officers and 495 General Service (Local level) staff), 8 Military Liaison Officers and 298 contingent personnel of the guard units.

11. The proposed staffing reflects a net decrease of 17 international positions (2 Professional and 15 Field Service) and a net increase of 41 national staff positions.

12. A breakdown of the staffing establishment by location is provided in table 3.

Table 3  
Staffing requirements by location

	<i>Professional category and above</i>								<i>General Service and related categories</i>			<i>Local level</i>		<i>Total</i>	
	<i>USG</i>	<i>ASG</i>	<i>D-2</i>	<i>D-1</i>	<i>P-5</i>	<i>P-4</i>	<i>P-3</i>	<i>P-2</i>	<i>Sub-total</i>	<i>Field/ Security Service</i>	<i>General Service</i>	<i>Total inter-national</i>	<i>National Officers</i>		<i>Local level</i>
<b>Approved 2007</b>															
Baghdad	1	1	2	8	13	40	41	20	126	104	1	231	37	178	446
Basra	—	—	—	—	1	4	6	2	13	29	—	42	15	37	94
Erbil	—	—	—	—	1	4	5	2	12	28	—	40	12	37	89
Kirkuk	—	—	—	—	—	2	4	—	6	7	—	13	6	28	47
Kuwait	—	—	—	—	1	12	14	1	28	57	1	86	1	124	211
Amman	—	1	—	—	3	8	11	3	26	24	1	51	11	65	127
<b>Total 2007</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>211</b>	<b>249</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>463</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>469</b>	<b>1 014</b>
<b>Proposed 2008</b>															
Baghdad	1	1	2	8	14	39	38	16	119	108	1	228	51	170	449
Basra	—	—	—	—	1	3	6	2	12	13	—	25	11	38	74
Erbil	—	—	—	—	1	5	5	2	13	31	—	44	15	54	113
Kirkuk	—	—	—	—	—	3	4	—	7	6	—	13	4	32	49
Kuwait	—	—	—	1	1	13	17	1	33	54	1	88	2	121	211
Amman	—	1	—	—	3	8	10	3	25	22	1	48	14	80	142
<b>Total 2008</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>209</b>	<b>234</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>446</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>495</b>	<b>1 038</b>
<b>Change</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>(1)</b>	<b>(4)</b>	<b>(2)</b>	<b>(15)</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>(17)</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>24</b>

13. Changes in the staffing establishment for individual substantive and administrative offices compared to that for 2007 are set out below.

## A. Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General

	<i>Professional category and above</i>								<i>General Service and related categories</i>			<i>National staff</i>		<i>Total</i>	
	<i>USG</i>	<i>ASG</i>	<i>D-2</i>	<i>D-1</i>	<i>P-5</i>	<i>P-4</i>	<i>P-3</i>	<i>P-2</i>	<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>Field/ Security Service</i>	<i>General Service</i>	<i>Total international</i>	<i>National Officers</i>		<i>Local level</i>
Approved 2007	1	—	1	—	5	8	2	—	17	4	—	21	9	10	40
Proposed 2008	1	—	1	—	5	7	3	—	17	4	—	21	27	7	55
<b>Change</b>	—	—	—	—	—	(1)	1	—	—	—	—	—	18	(3)	15

14. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General, at the Under-Secretary-General level, assists the Secretary-General in the implementation of the UNAMI mandate and is responsible for overall management of the Mission and coordination of all activities of the United Nations in Iraq. The Special Representative also serves as the designated official for security in Iraq. Reporting directly to the Special Representative are the Principal Deputy Special Representative for Political Affairs, Electoral Assistance and Constitutional Support and the Deputy Special Representative for Humanitarian Coordination, both at the Assistant Secretary-General levels; the Chief of Staff, at the D-2 level; and the heads of the Human Rights Office, the Public Information Office and the Safety and Security Service and the Chief Administrative Officer, all at the D-1 level. As the designated official, the Special Representative will also chair the meetings of the Security Management Team, and the Chief Security Adviser will report to him directly on security-related issues. The Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General will comprise the immediate Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, the Office of the Spokesperson, the Field Support Coordination Unit, the Iraq Compact Coordination and Monitoring Unit, the Resident Auditor and the Office of the Chief of Staff.

### Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General

*Existing positions (22): 1 Under-Secretary-General, 3 P-5, 4 P-4, 1 P-3, 3 Field Service, 6 National Officers, 4 Local level*

*International staff: Increase by 1 position (1 P-3) (redeployment)  
Decrease by 4 positions (3 P-5, 1 P-4) (redeployment)*

*National staff: Decrease by 3 positions (Local level) (redeployment)*

15. It is proposed to strengthen the audit capacity of UNAMI by the establishment of one additional post of Auditor (P-3), who will be responsible for providing management consultancy advisory services to the UNAMI management, contributing to global audit assignments and deputizing and supporting the Resident Auditor in all audit-related activities. Functions for this position will be accommodated through the redeployment of a P-3 position from the Electoral Assistance Office, the functions of which are no longer required.

16. It is further envisaged to redeploy the positions of the heads of area offices, one each in Basra and Erbil (P-5), and of the Conduct and Discipline Officer (P-5) to the Executive Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-

General/Office of the Chief of Staff to reduce the number of staff directly reporting to the Special Representative in order to allow more time for him or her to focus on urgent political issues.

17. It is also proposed to redeploy four positions, the functions of which are no longer required, to other offices, as follows: one P-4 position to the Political Affairs Office; two Local level positions to the Public Information Office to perform functions of Information/Web Assistants; and one Language Assistant (Local level) to the Political Affairs Office.

### Office of the Chief of Staff

*Existing positions (18): 1 D-2, 2 P-5, 4 P-4, 1 P-3, 1 Field Service, 3 National Officers, 6 Local level*

*International staff: Increase by 3 positions (P-5) (redeployment)*

*National staff: Increase by 18 positions (National Officers) (7 new and 11 redeployments)*

18. It is proposed to redeploy from the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General the positions of heads of area offices, one each in Erbil and Basra (P-5), and the Conduct and Discipline Officer position (P-5), the incumbents of which will continue to perform their existing functions, and to establish 18 Liaison Officer (National Officer) positions, the incumbents of which will be deployed to the assigned governorates, engage with relevant authorities and be responsible for staying abreast of all relevant developments, programmes, projects and activities pertinent to the UNAMI mandate in the political, constitutional, electoral, human rights, humanitarian assistance, reconstruction and development areas and for regular reporting on key developments to the Chief of Staff.

19. Eleven National Officer positions will be accommodated through redeployment, with nine positions being redeployed from the Political Affairs Office and one position each from the Human Rights Office and the Medical Services.

## B. Substantive offices

	<i>Professional category and above</i>								<i>General Service and related categories</i>		<i>National staff</i>		<i>Total</i>		
	<i>USG</i>	<i>ASG</i>	<i>D-2</i>	<i>D-1</i>	<i>P-5</i>	<i>P-4</i>	<i>P-3</i>	<i>P-2</i>	<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>Field/ Security Service</i>	<i>General Service</i>	<i>Total inter-national</i>		<i>National Officer</i>	<i>Local level</i>
Approved 2007	—	2	1	6	11	36	38	8	<b>102</b>	6	2	<b>110</b>	63	55	<b>228</b>
Proposed 2008	—	2	1	7	11	39	36	6	<b>102</b>	6	2	<b>110</b>	56	62	<b>228</b>
<b>Change</b>	—	—	—	<b>1</b>	—	<b>3</b>	<b>(2)</b>	<b>(2)</b>	—	—	—	—	<b>(7)</b>	<b>7</b>	—

### **Office of the Principal Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General**

*Existing positions (4): 1 Assistant Secretary-General, 1 P-4, 1 General Service (Principal level), 1 National Officer*

*International staff: Increase by 1 position (D-1)*

20. Under the provisions of Security Council resolution 1770 (2007), the United Nations is requested to advise, support and assist the Government of Iraq with regard to facilitating regional dialogue. With a view to strengthening the ability of UNAMI to promote regional dialogue, it is proposed that a position of Director (D-1) be established in Tehran, the incumbent of which will be responsible for liaising with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran on issues pertaining to the mandate of UNAMI, assisting in formulating options to strengthen the dialogue with Iranian authorities on issues pertaining to the work of UNAMI, monitoring political developments on issues pertaining to Iraq and analysing and reporting on and overall support for the Mission's efforts to step up its engagement with Iraq's neighbours to foster a constructive regional dialogue.

### **Political Affairs Office**

*Existing positions (48): 1 D-1, 4 P-5, 9 P-4, 6 P-3, 2 P-2, 1 Field Service, 16 National Officers, 9 Local level*

*International staff: Increase by 2 positions (P-4) (redeployment)*

*National staff: Increase by 5 positions (Local level) (4 new, 1 redeployment)  
Decrease by 9 positions (National Officer) (redeployment)*

21. It is proposed to redeploy a position of Coordination Officer (P-4) from the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Political Affairs Office in Kirkuk, owing to political developments in Kirkuk, and to redeploy one Electoral Assistance Officer position (P-4) in New York to serve as a Political Affairs Officer (P-4), also in New York. This is necessary because of the shift in the focus of the mission from supporting immediate electoral events to broader political activities, such as promoting national and regional dialogue, which has led to a steady increase in the workload of the political team in New York. In particular, at the last expanded ministerial meeting of Iraq and its neighbours, in Istanbul on 1 November 2007, the participants endorsed the establishment of a support mechanism, with strong United Nations assistance, to coordinate and follow up on the decisions reached by the expanded ministerial process and the three regional working groups, on border security, energy and refugees and internally displaced persons. As a result, there will be much greater demands on the political team in New York to assist, support and promote the ongoing process of regional dialogue.

22. Further, in order to provide support for the daily work of area offices and to facilitate the effective understanding and communication of all programme interventions with the Government, NGOs and other concerned entities, it is proposed to establish five positions of Language Assistant (Local level), comprising two new positions each in Erbil and Kirkuk and one position in Amman, which will be accommodated through redeployment from the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

23. Seven Political Affairs Officers (National Officers) in Baghdad and one Political Affairs Officer (National Officer) each in Kirkuk and Basra are to be

redeployed as Liaison Officers (National Officers) to the Office of the Chief of Staff and will be responsible for consolidating all liaising activities in the governorates, including reporting as described in paragraph 18 above.

### **Electoral Assistance Office**

*Existing positions (28): 1 D-1, 2 P-5, 9 P-4, 10 P-3, 1 Field Service, 5 Local level*

*International staff: Decrease by 5 positions (redeployments)  
Increase by 1 position (1 P-4) (reclassified from P-3)*

24. To reflect the operational needs and demands for the coming year, the Mission is recommending the redeployment of six positions because they are no longer required, or their functions are being supported by other providers of assistance to the International Electoral Assistance Team, such as the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), or programmes funded by IRFFI cluster G. The positions comprise the following: Chief Capacity-Building Officer (P-5), Information Technology (IT) Specialist (P-3), Capacity-Building Officer (P-3), Operations Officer (P-3) (Amman) and Electoral Assistance Officer (New York) (P-4).

25. The existing position of Reporting Officer (P-3) is proposed to be reclassified to the P-4 level, with a change of functions to accommodate those of an External Relations Officer (P-4). The External Relations Officer will work closely with counterparts in the External Relations Division of the Independent High Electoral Commission, providing expert advice on media relations, political party and entity relations and candidate liaison services and supporting electoral observation programmes. The post will also support the Chief Technical Adviser and Chief Operations Officer in providing information and advice on political-party strategies and interactions with the Independent High Electoral Commission.

26. It is proposed that the Chief Capacity-Building Officer position (P-5) be redeployed to the Office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Humanitarian Coordination to accommodate the need for a Head of Humanitarian and Development Affairs (P-5). It is also proposed that the Electoral Assistance Officer (P-4) in New York be redeployed to serve as a Political Affairs Officer (P-4) in the same location. Three P-3 positions will be redeployed to accommodate the functions of an Auditor (P-3) in the Office of the Special Representative, a Humanitarian Affairs Officer (P-3) in the Office of the Deputy Special Representative for Humanitarian Coordination and a Constitutional Affairs Officer (P-3) in the Constitutional Support Office.

### **Constitutional Support Office**

*Existing positions (16): 1 D-2, 1 D-1, 1 P-5, 3 P-4, 3 P-3, 2 P-2, 3 National Officers, 2 Local level*

*International staff: Increase by 1 position (P-3) (redeployment)  
Decrease by 2 positions (P-2)*

27. It is proposed to create an additional position of Constitutional Affairs Officer (P-3) to manage the process of advising on the legislative requirements for the Constitution, including all aspects of the 2007 constitutional review, accommodated through redeployment from the Electoral Assistance Office, as well as to abolish two positions at the P-2 level.

### **Office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Humanitarian Coordination**

*Existing positions (73): 1 Assistant Secretary-General, 1 D-1, 1 P-5, 8 P-4, 11 P-3, 3 P-2, 3 Field Service, 1 General Service (Other level), 24 National Officers, 20 Local level*

*International staff: Increase by 2 positions (1 P-5, 1 P-3) (redeployment)*

28. The recognition by the international community and the Government of Iraq of the fact that the humanitarian situation in Iraq is deteriorating and that some 8 million people are already in need of assistance led to the preparation of a strategic framework for humanitarian action in Iraq, and UNAMI is now developing a plan of action in coordination with the United Nations country team, NGOs, the Government of Iraq and donors.

29. The proposed Head of Humanitarian and Development Affairs (P-5) will be responsible for the coordination of humanitarian activities with the Government of Iraq, the international donor community, numerous NGOs and the United Nations country team, including the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs presence in Iraq. The Head of Humanitarian and Development Affairs will focus on addressing the need for all partners of UNAMI to take an active role in response to the dire humanitarian crisis affecting the Iraqi people. It is expected that the Humanitarian Unit of the Office will also have direct involvement in the programming, financing, implementation and monitoring of emergency activities and will continue to provide the requested support to the United Nations country team through its office in Amman and through its expanded presence in Iraq. Further, the Head of Humanitarian and Development Affairs will support the secretariat of the International Compact with Iraq, co-chaired by the United Nations, which will be manned by a minimum of four international senior consultants supporting the Iraqi Government in the first stages of the implementation of the Compact. A newly established Humanitarian Affairs Officer (P-3), whose primary responsibilities include ensuring the integration and coordination of all actors providing humanitarian assistance in Iraq, will support a strengthened humanitarian response from Baghdad.

30. Both functions will be accommodated through the redeployment of positions and the reformulation of functions from the Electoral Assistance Office.

### **Human Rights Office**

*Existing positions (46): 1 D-1, 2 P-5, 5 P-4, 6 P-3, 1 Field Service, 18 National Officers, 13 Local level*

*International staff: Increase by 1 position (1 P-4) (redeployment)*

*National staff: Decrease by 1 position (1 National Officer) (redeployment)*

31. The Baghdad office will increase its activities to promote respect for human rights, including increased support for Iraqi ministries with a view to strengthening their capacity in this regard. It is therefore proposed to establish an additional Human Rights Officer position (P-4), redeployed from the Safety and Security Service, where the functions are no longer required, who will assist the Senior Human Rights Officer (P-5) in developing human rights promotion activities, coordinate and implement, together with OHCHR, the European Union and other

donors, human rights promotion projects, and liaise and interact with the secretariat of the International Compact with Iraq, which will require professional expertise to ensure the successful achievement of benchmarks.

32. One National Officer position, the functions of which are no longer required, will be redeployed to the Office of the Chief of Staff to accommodate the functions of a Liaison Officer.

### Public Information Office

*Existing positions (13): 1 D-1, 1 P-5, 1 P-4, 2 P-3, 1 P-2, 1 National Officer, 6 Local level*

*National staff: Increase by 5 positions (3 National Officers) (new), (2 Local level) (redeployment)*

33. The main changes in staffing relate to the increase in national staff to strengthen the public information capacity in Baghdad, Amman, Erbil and Kirkuk, which should allow for better capturing of information, for providing information faster and more reliably and for building capacity of government counterparts. In this respect, it is proposed to create three new Information Officer positions (National Officers), one each in Amman, Baghdad and Erbil, to compile, analyse and report on local and regional media, and to redeploy two Local level positions no longer required in the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to perform the functions of an Information Assistant (Local level) and Web Assistant in Erbil (Local level).

## C. Safety and Security Service

	<i>Professional category and above</i>									<i>General Service and related categories</i>		<i>National staff</i>		<i>Total</i>	
	<i>USG</i>	<i>ASG</i>	<i>D-2</i>	<i>D-1</i>	<i>P-5</i>	<i>P-4</i>	<i>P-3</i>	<i>P-2</i>	<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>Field/ Security Service</i>	<i>General Service</i>	<i>Total inter-national</i>	<i>National Officer</i>		<i>Local level</i>
Approved 2007	—	—	—	1	1	8	13	19	42	111	—	153	7	115	275
Proposed 2008	—	—	—	1	1	7	12	16	37	101	—	138	12	137	287
<b>Change</b>						<b>(1)</b>	<b>(1)</b>	<b>(3)</b>	<b>(5)</b>	<b>(10)</b>		<b>(15)</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>12</b>

*Existing positions (275): 1 D-1, 1 P-5, 8 P-4, 13 P-3, 19 P-2, 111 Field Service, 7 National Officers, 115 Local level*

*International staff: Decrease by 15 positions (1 P-4, 1 P-3, 3 P-2, 10 Field Service)*

*National staff: Increase by 27 positions (5 National Officers, 22 Local level)*

34. In order to safeguard the staff and activities of UNAMI and United Nations agencies, funds and programmes in Iraq, the United Nations Safety and Security Service has undertaken a number of initiatives to better align its structure and personnel elements. First, the structure has been reviewed in accordance with expected roles and tasks in 2007 and 2008. Second, the modus operandi will change

and the focus will be more on self-reliance, as self-protection responsibilities gain prominence. This approach will enable effective and safe operations in an environment of potentially reduced support by the Multinational Force. Third, the security situation has increased the demand for specific skill sets for security staff, and employing individuals with appropriate qualifications will improve future liaison with the host Government and improve the interface with UNAMI administration, logistics and procurement systems while increasing the quality of security-related staff.

35. A detailed breakdown of staffing changes is provided in the following table:

### Requested new positions

<i>Location</i>	<i>Unit</i>	<i>Grade</i>	<i>Functional title</i>	<i>Number of positions</i>
Erbil	Security and Safety Unit	National Officer	Security Officer	2
Kirkuk	Security and Safety Unit	National Officer	Security Officer	1
Kuwait	Security and Safety Unit	National Officer	Security Officer	2
Amman	Security and Safety Unit	Local level	Security Guard or Assistant	6
Baghdad	Security Communications Unit	Local level	Radio Operator	2
Baghdad	Special Investigation Unit	Local level	Administrative Assistant	1
Basra	Security and Safety Unit	Local level	Field Security Assistant	1
Amman	Security Communication Unit	Local level	Radio Operator	6
Erbil	Security and Safety Unit	Local level	Security Guard	6
<b>Total</b>				<b>27</b>

### Proposed abolitions

<i>Location</i>	<i>Unit</i>	<i>Grade</i>	<i>Functional title</i>	<i>Number of positions</i>
Baghdad	Security Information and Operations Centre	P-2	Security Officer	(2)
Kuwait	Security Information Analysis Unit	Field Service	Security Officer	(1)
Amman	Mission Planning Cell	Field Service	Security Officer	(1)
Basra	Security Communication Unit	Field Service	Security Officer	(1)
Baghdad	Mission Planning Unit	Field Service	Security Officer	(1)
Amman	Mission Tracking Unit	Field Service	Security Officer	(1)
<b>Total</b>				<b>(7)</b>

### Proposed redeployments from the Service

<i>Location</i>	<i>Unit</i>	<i>Grade</i>	<i>Receiving office/section</i>	<i>Number of positions</i>
Basra	Security and Safety Unit	P-4	Human Rights	(1)
Baghdad	Special Investigation Unit	P-3	Medical Services	(1)
Baghdad	Security Information and Operation Centre	P-2	Office of the Chief Administrative Officer	(1)
Amman	Operations Support Unit	Field Service	Medical Services	(4)
Kuwait	Security and Safety Unit	Field Service	Communications and Information Technology	(1)
<b>Total</b>				<b>(8)</b>

### D. Division of Administration

	<i>Professional category and above</i>									<i>General service and related category</i>		<i>National staff</i>			
	<i>USG</i>	<i>ASG</i>	<i>D-2</i>	<i>D-1</i>	<i>P-5</i>	<i>P-4</i>	<i>P-3</i>	<i>P-2</i>	<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>Field/ Security Service</i>		<i>Total inter-national</i>	<i>National Officer</i>	<i>Local level</i>	<i>Total</i>
										<i>General Service</i>	<i>Service</i>				
Approved 2007	—	—	—	1	2	18	28	1	<b>50</b>	128	1	<b>179</b>	3	289	<b>471</b>
Proposed 2008	—	—	—	1	3	18	29	2	<b>53</b>	123	1	<b>177</b>	2	289	<b>468</b>
<b>Change</b>	—	—	—	—	<b>1</b>	—	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>(5)</b>	—	<b>(2)</b>	<b>(1)</b>	—	<b>(3)</b>

#### Office of the Chief Administrative Officer

*Existing positions (23): 1 D-1, 5 P-4, 4 P-3, 7 Field Service, 6 Local level*

*International staff: Increase by 1 position (P-2) (redeployment)  
Decrease by 2 positions (1 P-4, 1 Field Service) (redeployment)*

36. It is proposed to establish a position of Air Safety Officer (P-2) in the Office of the Chief Administrative Officer to advise the Chief Administrative Officer on aviation-related safety issues and developments in air operations technology so as to properly address increasing security threats and hazards in Iraq. Functions will be accommodated through the redeployment of a P-2 position, the functions of which are no longer required in the Safety and Security Service.

37. Further, the staff counselling unit, comprising the Staff Counsellor (P-4) and one Assistant Staff Counsellor (Field Service), will be redeployed to the Medical Services.

## **Medical Services**

*Existing positions (5): 1 P-4, 1 P-3, 1 National Officer, 2 Local level*

*International staff: Increase by 8 positions (1 P-5) (new), (1 P-4, 1 P-3, 5 Field Service) (redeployment)*

*National staff: Decrease by 1 position (National Officer) (redeployment)*

38. The staffing proposal represents the planning assumption of a likely withdrawal of the Multinational Force medical facility in Baghdad by the end of 2007. The additional staffing should allow flexibility in providing timely and professional health services in all UNAMI locations.

39. In this context, it is proposed to create a Chief Medical Officer position at the P-5 level, the incumbent of which will be responsible for negotiations with the high military authorities of the Multinational Force and health authorities of neighbouring countries to ensure adequate services for UNAMI. World Health Organization offices for Iraq are situated outside the country, and the smooth referral of UNAMI staff, especially in the event of massive casualties, requires substantive vision and ability to manage a variety of staff in various settings. Further, the Chief Medical Officer will be responsible for contingency planning in the event of the withdrawal of the Multinational Force medical support, as well as for managing the complex regional structure of UNAMI, including five regional offices spread over three countries, with three of the UNAMI office locations being exposed consistently to high risk of injury to staff.

40. Currently the supervisor of the P-4 Chief Medical Officer is the Chief of Administrative Services (P-5), located in Kuwait. The Chief Medical Officer is permanently located in Baghdad, as is the Chief Administrative Officer (D-1). Owing to geographical distance and differences in office hours and workdays, delays in the communication between the Chief Medical Officer and the Chief of Administrative Services cannot be avoided. The circumstances and the environment in Baghdad require that the Chief Medical Officer have direct and immediate access to his or her supervisor. The direct supervision of the Chief Medical Officer (P-5) by the Chief Administrative Officer (D-1) would enable UNAMI to increase its operational capacity and flexibility. Communication would be accelerated and problems could be discussed face to face in addressing any medical emergency. On the basis of these operational reporting exigencies, the Medical Services should be reporting directly to the Chief Administrative Officer. The situation will be reconsidered in the eventuality that the Chief of Administrative Services is relocated from Kuwait to Baghdad.

41. The Erbil office will be led by a Medical Officer (P-4) because of its size and the planned increased United Nations activity in northern Iraq. The existing P-4 position in the Service is planned to be utilized for this purpose.

42. It is further proposed to strengthen the Medical Services with the establishment of three positions for Nurses/Paramedics (Field Service) and one position of Administrative Assistant (Field Service), accommodated through redeployment from positions the functions of which are no longer required in the Safety and Security Service.

43. In addition, it is proposed to integrate all staff counselling functions, including the unit comprising the Staff Counsellor (P-4) and an Assistant Staff Counsellor

(Field Service), from the Office of the Chief Administrative Officer through redeployment to the Medical Services and to strengthen the unit with a Stress Counsellor position (P-3), redeployed from the Safety and Security Service, to address the specific demands imposed on UNAMI staff owing to the security situation in Iraq.

44. The reorganization allows the redeployment of one National Officer position to the Office of the Chief of Staff, as the National Officer position and the associated functions would no longer be required in the Medical Services.

### **Communications and Information Technology Section**

*Existing positions (82): 1 P-4, 2 P-3, 1 P-2, 26 Field Service, 52 Local level*

*International staff: Increase by 2 positions (1 P-3, 1 Field Service) (redeployment)*

*National staff: Increase by 1 position (Local level)*

45. It is proposed to establish three additional positions in Amman in preparation for the inevitable surge of logistical activities in connection with the consolidation of the Kuwait and Amman offices into one business location in Jordan. The proposed IT Officer (Systems and Web Applications) (P-3), accommodated through redeployment of a position that will no longer be required in the Logistics Support Section, will be responsible for managing systems development projects as well as the roll-out and maintenance of Mission-specific applications, including the in-Mission roll-out of the global Department of Peacekeeping Operations/ Department of Field Support enterprise applications, such as enterprise resource planning, enterprise content management, Customer Relationship Management and business process management, and the UNAMI web portal. Moreover, this position will be responsible for supporting the requirements of the Safety and Security Service, the Human Rights Office and the Public Information Office, as well as the training unit. A proposed new position of IT Assistant (Field Service), accommodated through redeployment of a position that will no longer be required in the Safety and Security Service, will provide systems development and technical support, while a position of Assets Assistant (Local level) will deal with asset management and accountability.

### **Transport Section**

*Existing positions (77): 1 P-4, 1 P-3, 8 Field Service, 67 Local level*

*International staff: Decrease by 2 positions (Field Service) (redeployment)*

*National staff: Decrease by 2 positions (Local level) (redeployment)*

46. Owing to the transfer of responsibility for fuel management from the Transport Section to the Logistics Support Section, all fuel-related posts are proposed to be redeployed, comprising two Fuel Assistants in Kuwait (Field Service) and one Petrol, Oil and Lubricants Attendant and one Store Assistant (Local level) in Baghdad.

### **Logistics Support Section**

*Existing positions (62): 2 P-4, 6 P-3, 25 Field Service, 29 Local level*

*International staff: Decrease by 13 positions (net effect of the outward redeployment of 9 positions (1 P-3, 8 Field Service), the abolition of 6 positions (Field Service) and the inward redeployment of 2 positions (Field Service))*

*National staff: Decrease by 9 positions (net effect of the outward redeployment of 11 positions and the inward redeployment of 2 positions (Local level))*

47. With a view to gaining operational benefits from the extremely close functional relationship and mutual outputs existing between the Movement Control Unit of the Logistics Support Section and the Air Operations Section, as well as the compatibility of the skill sets of the personnel, the objective of UNAMI is to carry out all staff movements and a majority of cargo movement in Iraq by using United Nations aircraft. In this connection, it is proposed to integrate the Movement Control Unit into the Air Operations Section, resulting in the redeployment of a total of 19 positions (8 Field Service, 11 Local level), the redeployment of 1 P-3 position to the Communications and Information Technology Section and the abolition of 6 positions (Field Service).

48. A total of four positions will be redeployed inward to the Logistics Support Section from the Transport Section to perform all fuel management-related activities for UNAMI (2 Field Service, 2 Local level).

### **Air Operations Section**

*Existing positions (14): 1 P-4, 1 P-3, 9 Field Service, 3 Local level*

*International staff: Increase by 4 positions (net effect of the redeployment of 8 positions (Field Service) and the abolition of 4 positions (Field Service))*

*National staff: Increase by 10 positions (net effect of the redeployment of 11 positions (Local level) and the abolition of 1 position (Local level))*

49. It is proposed to integrate the Movement Control Unit into the Air Operations Section, resulting in the redeployment of a total of 19 positions (8 Field Service, 11 Local level) as described in paragraph 47 above.

50. The integration of movement control with aviation functions results in a corresponding merging of responsibilities and the abolition of four Field Service positions and one Local level position, as well as the realignment of the functions of a Flight Following Assistant (Local level) to accommodate those of an Aviation Budget Assistant (Local level).

Table 4  
**Detailed cost estimates**  
 (Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	1 January 2006-31 December 2007			Requirements for 2008		Variance analysis 2007-2008	
	Appropriations	Estimated expenditures	Variance	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	Total requirements 2007	Variance
	(1)	(2)	(3)=(1)-(2)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)=(4)-(6)
<b>I. Military and police personnel</b>							
Military liaison officers	1 438.7	1 870.6	(431.9)	995.7	—	511.0	484.7
Military contingents	28 794.5	21 027.3	7 767.2	13 925.0	—	11 307.8	2 617.2
<b>Total, category I</b>	<b>30 233.2</b>	<b>22 897.9</b>	<b>7 335.3</b>	<b>14 920.7</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>11 818.8</b>	<b>3 101.9</b>
<b>II. Civilian personnel</b>							
1. International staff	104 215.3	99 791.3	4 424.0	60 057.9	—	49 043.0	11 014.9
2. National staff	16 904.9	17 570.0	(665.1)	10 614.7	—	7 854.5	2 760.32
<b>Total, category II</b>	<b>121 120.2</b>	<b>117 361.3</b>	<b>3 758.9</b>	<b>70 672.6</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>56 897.5</b>	<b>13 775.1</b>
<b>III. Operational costs</b>							
1. Consultants	864.9	695.0	169.9	896.6	—	135.2	761.4
2. Official travel	3 432.9	5 705.2	(2 272.3)	2 195.8	—	1 604.4	591.4
3. Facilities and infrastructure	31 014.3	36 465.1	(5 450.8)	13 534.0	—	19 594.5	(6 060.5)
4. Ground transportation	12 223.3	14 978.3	(2 755.0)	16 842.5	15 697.5	10 622.4	6 220.1
5. Air transportation	21 436.9	5 931.8	15 505.1	16 233.8	—	13 288.6	2 945.2
6. Communications	11 295.1	8 019.9	3 275.2	5 759.4	2 327.6	4 817.1	942.3
7. Information technology	6 011.6	6 137.3	(125.7)	4 096.5	2 485.0	2 780.7	1 315.8
8. Medical	864.0	548.2	315.8	836.0	77.2	395.4	440.6
9. Special equipment	20.5	17.3	3.2	95.0	93.2	20.5	74.5
10. Other supplies, services and equipment	7 294.2	4 541.0	2 753.2	4 993.3	2.8	5 015.4	(22.1)
<b>Total, category III</b>	<b>94 457.7</b>	<b>83 039.1</b>	<b>11 418.6</b>	<b>65 482.8</b>	<b>20 683.3</b>	<b>58 274.2</b>	<b>7 208.7</b>
<b>Total requirements</b>	<b>245 811.1</b>	<b>223 298.3</b>	<b>22 512.2</b>	<b>151 076.2</b>	<b>20 683.3</b>	<b>126 990.5</b>	<b>24 085.7</b>

## IV. Analysis of resource requirements<sup>1</sup>

### A. Military and police personnel

(\$14,920,700)

	<i>Appropriations 2006-2007</i>	<i>Estimated expenditures</i>	<i>Variance</i>	<i>Total requirements 2008</i>	<i>Total requirements 2007</i>	<i>Variance 2007-2008</i>
<b>Military liaison officers</b>	1 438.7	1 870.6	(431.9)	995.7	511.0	484.7

51. The provision of \$995,700 reflects requirements for eight military liaison officers deployed to Baghdad, Erbil, Basra and Kirkuk (2 each) for mission subsistence allowance (\$405,000) and clothing allowance (\$1,600) at the established standard rates, emplacement travel at \$2,300 for an estimated eight trips, repatriation travel at \$2,500 per trip for an estimated eight trips (\$38,400), death and disability (\$40,000) and costs for logistical and life support services (rations, water, accommodations) based on mission experience in 2007 at a maximum rate of \$201 per person per day (\$510,700). The estimated increase from 2007 to 2008 reflects an increase in the number of trips combined with increased estimated total life support and logistical service costs.

52. The variance for 2006-2007 reflects mainly higher actual life support service costs for the biennium based on actual needs of military observers for Multinational Force services on the ground and a resulting increased number of days of such support.

	<i>Appropriations 2006-2007</i>	<i>Estimated expenditures</i>	<i>Variance</i>	<i>Total requirements 2008</i>	<i>Total requirements 2007</i>	<i>Variance 2007-2008</i>
<b>Military contingents</b>	28 794.5	21 027.3	7 767.2	13 925.0	11 307.8	2 617.2

53. The provision of \$13,925,000 reflects requirements for a total of 298 personnel of guard units, comprising 223 already on the ground and an additional 75 planned to be deployed to Basra and Kirkuk. The total is the sum of standard troop costs (\$2,993,700) and contingent-owned equipment reimbursements (\$15,800) at the established standard rates, costs related to the emplacement, rotation and repatriation of military personnel (\$3,218,400) at an average cost of \$4,500 for 15 emplacement trips and \$3,900 for 596 rotation trips (two trips per contingent member a year), daily allowance (\$103,000) and recreational leave allowance (\$43,800), death and disability (\$119,200) and costs for logistical and life support services (\$7,431,100). Cost estimates reflect the application of a 26 per cent delayed deployment factor based on the security situation in Basra and Kirkuk. Increased requirements for 2008 compared to those for 2007 reflect mainly the planned full deployment of 298 military personnel during 2008, as opposed to a phased deployment in 2007, resulting in an increased number of rotation trips and increased logistical and life support service costs.

<sup>1</sup> Resource requirements are expressed in thousands of United States dollars.

54. Estimated savings for 2006-2007 are attributable mainly to reduced requirements for life support services based on the provision of services at lower cost by local contractors.

## B. Civilian personnel

(\$70,672,500)

	<i>Appropriations 2006-2007</i>	<i>Estimated expenditures</i>	<i>Variance</i>	<i>Total requirements 2008</i>	<i>Total requirements 2007</i>	<i>Variance 2007-2008</i>
<b>International staff</b>	104 215.3	99 791.3	4 424.0	60 057.9	49 043.0	11 014.9

55. The provision of \$60,057,900 reflects requirements for salaries (\$16,771,300), hazardous duty station allowance at the established monthly rate of \$1,300 and special Iraq allowance, requested by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions to be included in the cost estimates, as indicated in a letter from its Chairman to the Secretary-General dated 27 July 2007, at the rate of \$1,620 (\$6,608,000), common staff costs (\$9,791,200) for the staffing establishment of 446 international staff positions, mission subsistence allowance (\$14,588,400) and costs for logistical and life support services (\$12,299,000). A vacancy factor of 40 per cent has been applied to cost estimates for 2008. Overall requirements also include a three-month provision for salaries and common staff costs for the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the International Compact with Iraq and Other Political Issues (\$80,300). Increased requirements for 2008 compared to those for 2007 are attributable mainly to changes in salary scales, the increased number of budgeted days for life support services, increases in the monthly special Iraq allowance from \$1,466 to \$1,620 and hazardous duty station allowance from \$1,000 to \$1,300, partially offset by the application of a higher vacancy rate than in 2007 (up from 35 per cent to 40 per cent).

56. The variance for 2006-2007 reflects mainly higher vacancy rates than budgeted (46 per cent actual, 25 per cent budgeted in 2006 and 38 per cent actual, 35 per cent budgeted in 2007), as well as savings owing to favourable contract negotiations for life support services with local contractors.

	<i>Appropriations 2006-2007</i>	<i>Estimated expenditures</i>	<i>Variance</i>	<i>Total requirements 2008</i>	<i>Total requirements 2007</i>	<i>Variance 2007-2008</i>
<b>National staff</b>	16 904.9	17 570.0	(665.7)	10 614.7	7 854.5	2 760.2

57. The amount of \$10,614,700 would provide for salaries (\$6,817,700) and common staff costs (\$2,045,200) for the staffing establishment of 592 national staff (97 National Officers, 495 Local level staff), hazardous duty station allowance (\$1,110,200), costs for overtime (\$84,800) and a one-time special contribution award payable to each eligible locally recruited staff member in Iraq in recognition of their sustained commitment to the work of the United Nations during a period of exceptional and sustained duress (\$556,800). A vacancy factor of 35 per cent has been applied to cost estimates for 2008. Increased requirements for 2008 compared

to those for 2007 are attributable mainly to additional staff positions, as outlined in section III above, and the payment of the one-time special contribution award, partially offset by the application of a higher vacancy factor of 35 per cent in 2008, up from 25 per cent in 2007.

58. The estimated savings for 2006-2007 reflect mainly higher actual vacancy rates than budgeted (33 per cent actual, 15 per cent budgeted in 2006 and 34 per cent actual, 25 per cent budgeted in 2007).

### C. Operational costs

(\$65,482,900)

	<i>Appropriations 2006-2007</i>	<i>Estimated expenditures</i>	<i>Variance</i>	<i>Total requirements 2008</i>	<i>Total requirements 2007</i>	<i>Variance 2007-2008</i>
<b>Consultants</b>	864.9	695.0	169.9	896.6	135.2	761.4

59. The amount of \$896,600 would provide for consultancy services for the working groups on energy, on border security and on refugees, as requested by the Government of Iraq (\$654,300). The provision is based on a total of eight consultants employed for a period of 15 months and remunerated at a level equivalent to P-5, including travel costs and daily subsistence allowance. Further, the provision includes requirements for training consultants (\$242,300) to conduct training for UNAMI personnel, mainly in the areas of security, management and information and communications technology. Increased requirements for 2008 compared to those for 2007 are attributable mainly to the use of services of specialized consultants in the above-mentioned working groups, as well as to the provision for training consultants, for which no budgetary provision was included in 2007.

60. Anticipated savings for 2006-2007 reflect mainly the need for less ad hoc consultancy, as the specific knowledge in the areas of political affairs, human rights and constitutional support was available in-house.

	<i>Appropriations 2006-2007</i>	<i>Estimated expenditures</i>	<i>Variance</i>	<i>Total requirements 2008</i>	<i>Total requirements 2007</i>	<i>Variance 2007-2008</i>
<b>Official travel</b>	3 432.9	5 705.2	(2 272.3)	2 195.8	1 604.4	591.4

61. The provision of \$2,195,800 includes requirements for the travel of senior mission staff for political consultations to New York, Europe and capitals in the Middle East, for heads of sections to participate in conferences and workshops in New York (\$515,400), for travel within the Mission area and, in connection with Mission planning and administrative support, between mission locations (\$920,000), and for travel of Headquarters staff to the Mission area to provide political, electoral, logistical and safety and security support (\$417,000).

62. The provision further includes total requirements (\$343,400) for specialized training for security personnel (\$57,600) and travel to Brindisi, Italy, or other

locations for training courses in all administrative areas (\$241,300) and in the substantive areas of humanitarian affairs, human rights and conflict resolution (\$44,500). Increased requirements compared to those for 2007 reflect mainly the anticipated increased travel within Iraq and the increased participation of UNAMI personnel in conferences and workshops.

63. Estimated overexpenditures for 2006-2007 are mainly the result of an increased number of trips for consultations in connection with the future mandate of UNAMI and increased travel for security training and standardized training courses conducted in Brindisi by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support for peacekeeping operations and for special political missions supported by the Department of Field Support.

<i>Appropriations 2006-2007</i>	<i>Estimated expenditures</i>	<i>Variance</i>	<i>Total requirements 2008</i>	<i>Total requirements 2007</i>	<i>Variance 2007-2008</i>	
<b>Facilities and infrastructure</b>	31 014.3	36 465.1	(5 450.8)	13 534.0	19 594.5	(6 060.5)

64. The provision of \$13,534,000 reflects requirements for the acquisition of equipment, including construction equipment (\$107,500), electrical equipment (\$173,900), 2 refrigeration containers and 5 refrigerators (\$82,100), 2 generators (\$149,500), 10 water tanks (\$28,800), air conditioners and accommodation equipment (\$186,600), office furniture (\$73,600), office equipment (safes, projectors) (\$95,000), safety and security equipment, comprising security cameras, explosive detectors and protective suits (\$1,384,300) and firefighting equipment (\$188,300).

65. The provision further includes requirements for the rental of premises in Amman and Kirkuk (\$908,300), with premises in Baghdad, Kuwait and Basra being provided free of charge; the rental of 54 photocopying machines (\$304,100); utility costs for water (\$161,900) and electricity (\$270,000); maintenance services for equipment and to ensure compliance with minimum operating security standards (MOSS) (\$171,000); security services for office premises in all Mission locations, comprising 127 guards and 13 supervisors (\$2,656,200); alterations and renovations for existing facilities in all locations (\$1,498,000); further MOSS-related improvements (\$1,000,000); construction services totalling \$2,230,000 in connection with major rehabilitation and construction projects for storage facilities, workshops and staff welfare facilities in Amman and Erbil (\$1,560,000); concrete barriers, fences and guard booths in Amman (\$670,000); stationery and office supplies (\$150,000); generator spare parts and supplies (\$294,000); maintenance supplies (\$375,000); field defence supplies (\$225,000); generator fuel for an estimated consumption of some 750,000 litres at \$0.62 per litre, and oil and lubricants (\$716,100); and costs for sanitation and cleaning materials (\$104,800).

66. Reduced requirements compared to those for 2007 are mainly the result of fewer equipment purchases and significantly lower requirements for construction services, as all costs related to the integrated headquarters compound have been included in part two of the present report.

67. The estimated variance for 2006-2007 reflects mainly increased alteration and renovation costs and minor construction projects to improve security installations,

as well as expenditures for the design phase of the planned integrated Mission headquarters compound in Baghdad, which had been partially absorbed by the reprioritization of planned minor construction projects.

	<i>Appropriations 2006-2007</i>	<i>Estimated expenditures</i>	<i>Variance</i>	<i>Total requirements 2008</i>	<i>Total requirements 2007</i>	<i>Variance 2007-2008</i>
<b>Ground transportation</b>	12 223.3	14 978.3	(2 755.0)	16 842.5	10 622.4	6 220.1

68. The amount of \$16,842,500 would provide for the acquisition of 56 armoured vehicles (25 replacements) and 10 trailers, including freight costs (\$15,697,500), the rental of a crane (\$15,600), repairs and maintenance (\$167,500), liability insurance (\$216,300), spare parts (\$252,000) and petrol, oil and lubricants for an estimated total annual consumption of some 790,900 litres of petrol and diesel at rates per litre of petrol varying from \$0.24 to \$0.95 among all UNAMI locations and taking into account a 5 per cent off-the-road adjustment factor (\$493,600). The increase in requirements for 2008 compared to those for 2007 is attributable mainly to the acquisition of additional armoured vehicles based on the Mission's move to greater self-reliance and the anticipated security situation.

69. The anticipated overexpenditures for 2006-2007 are attributable mainly to the acquisition of three unbudgeted armoured passenger buses (Rhino) and two unbudgeted armoured ambulances to be utilized within Iraq because of security conditions, partially offset by the reduction in acquisitions of armoured vehicles (33 actual acquisitions, 44 budgeted) based on a reprioritization of the acquisition plan in 2007.

	<i>Appropriations 2006-2007</i>	<i>Estimated expenditures</i>	<i>Variance</i>	<i>Total requirements 2008</i>	<i>Total requirements 2007</i>	<i>Variance 2007-2008</i>
<b>Air transportation</b>	21 436.9	5 931.8	15 505.1	16 233.8	13 288.6	2 945.2

70. The provision of \$16,233,800 includes requirements for navigation charges (\$49,300), landing fees and ground handling charges (\$400,200), air-crew subsistence allowance (\$79,300), fuel requirements for fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft for an estimated consumption of 2,993,300 litres at \$0.58 per litre (\$1,736,100) and liability insurance (\$23,800) for fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters.

71. Further the requirements include annual rental and operating costs for two fixed-wing aircraft based on letters of assist and contractual arrangements for guaranteed fleet costs (including positioning and painting), estimated at some \$1,450 per hour for some 525 flight hours of a Lear jet and at \$650 per flight hour for some 1,100 hours for rental of a commercial cargo aircraft (\$8,027,000); and for rental and operating costs for guaranteed fleet costs (including positioning and painting) of two commercially contracted helicopters at some \$1,260 per flight hour for a total of 375 hours (\$5,918,100). The increase from 2007 to 2008 is attributable mainly to the change in the usage of fixed-wing aircraft (cargo plane in 2007, Lear jet in 2008) and associated increased flight-hour costs, as well as the increase in flight-hour costs for helicopters.

72. Estimated savings for 2006-2007 reflect the inability to contract dedicated air assets and acquire other related equipment in 2006, as no suitable vendor was identified. In 2007, only one dedicated fixed-wing aircraft was leased for six months, out of the four aircraft budgeted (two fixed-wing and two rotary-wing).

	<i>Appropriations 2006-2007</i>	<i>Estimated expenditures</i>	<i>Variance</i>	<i>Total requirements 2008</i>	<i>Total requirements 2007</i>	<i>Variance 2007-2008</i>
<b>Communications</b>	11 295.1	8 019.9	3 275.3	5 759.4	4 817.7	942.3

73. The provision of \$5,759,400 reflects requirements for the acquisition of communications equipment (VHF/UHF radios, base stations, VSAT, HF, satellite and telephone equipment) (\$2,327,600), commercial communication charges, telefax and Internet ADSL fees, satellite phone and Internet connectivity charges (\$2,056,200), communications support services for the VSAT and wide area network infrastructure (\$169,400) and communications spare parts and consumables based on 4.5 per cent of the total anticipated communications inventory in 2008 (\$349,700).

74. The provision further includes requirements for public information services comprising the production of posters, two biannual bilingual magazines, two biannual trilingual information kits for adults and children, folders and television programmes (\$375,000), radio production costs (\$30,000), costs for a media campaign and conference for national reconciliation (\$280,000), national surveys and newspaper advertisements (\$135,500) and public information consumables and supplies (\$36,000). Increased requirements for 2008 compared to those for 2007 are mainly the result of additional communications equipment purchases and higher anticipated communications charges, based on the need to improve the communications network and to replace equipment, as well as the anticipated expansion of activities of the Mission throughout Iraq.

75. Estimated savings for the biennium are attributable mainly to the non-acquisition of budgeted public information equipment and services owing to the limiting of activities because of the security situation within Iraq.

	<i>Appropriations 2006-2007</i>	<i>Estimated expenditures</i>	<i>Variance</i>	<i>Total requirements 2008</i>	<i>Total requirements 2007</i>	<i>Variance 2007-2008</i>
<b>Information technology</b>	6 011.6	6 137.3	(125.7)	4 096.5	2 780.7	1 315.8

76. The provision of \$4,096,500 includes requirements for the acquisition of 45 desktops (40 replacements), 90 laptops (22 replacements), 48 monitors (40 replacements), 65 printers, 35 servers and network equipment comprising switches, wireless and UPS equipment, routers and firewalls (\$2,485,000); software packages and licences mainly for security-related software applications (\$372,700); centralized IT support and services for contractual IT service (\$889,600); centralized IT support and data storage, the development of a comprehensive IT security system for UNAMI to safely conduct its operations and the UNAMI share of software licences and fees (\$269,200); and costs for IT spare parts and consumables (\$80,000). Increased requirements for 2008 compared to those for

2007 are attributable mainly to increased requirements for the replacement of equipment and for IT support services in connection with the development of the comprehensive IT security system.

77. Estimated overexpenditures for 2006-2007 are mainly the result of increased equipment purchases to replace damaged IT equipment, partially offset by reduced requirements for IT services and maintenance costs.

	<i>Appropriations 2006-2007</i>	<i>Estimated expenditures</i>	<i>Variance</i>	<i>Total requirements 2008</i>	<i>Total requirements 2007</i>	<i>Variance 2007-2008</i>
<b>Medical</b>	864.0	548.2	315.8	836.0	395.4	440.6

78. The provision of \$836,000 would cover the acquisition of miscellaneous medical equipment (defibrillators, monitors) (\$77,200), costs for the provision of medical services under an existing agreement with the Multinational Force (\$335,500), the acquisition of drugs, medical consumables and first-aid kits (\$420,000) and the reimbursement of contingent-owned equipment as per standard rates (\$3,300). Increased requirements for 2008 compared to those for 2007 are attributable mainly to increased acquisition of medical supplies for the UNAMI level-1 clinics in Iraq as UNAMI moves towards self-reliance and increased requirements for medical evacuations, hospitalizations and specialist consultations with staff from the Multinational Force level-2 to level-4 clinics in Iraq owing to the prevailing security situation.

79. Estimated savings for 2006-2007 are attributable mainly to the non-start-up of level-1 medical clinics in Erbil, Kirkuk and Basra owing to the security situation.

	<i>Appropriations 2006-2007</i>	<i>Estimated expenditures</i>	<i>Variance</i>	<i>Total requirements 2008</i>	<i>Total requirements 2007</i>	<i>Variance 2007-2008</i>
<b>Special equipment</b>	20.5	17.3	3.2	95.0	20.5	74.5

80. The provision of \$95,000 reflects requirements for the acquisition of observation equipment, comprising 36 binocular and night-vision devices (\$93,200) and self-sustainment costs for observation equipment for the guard units (\$1,800). Increased requirements for 2008 compared to those for 2007 reflect increased costs for specialized observation equipment.

	<i>Appropriations 2006-2007</i>	<i>Estimated expenditures</i>	<i>Variance</i>	<i>Total requirements 2008</i>	<i>Total requirements 2007</i>	<i>Variance 2007-2008</i>
<b>Other services, supplies and equipment</b>	7 294.2	4 541.0	2 753.2	4 993.3	5 015.4	(22.1)

81. The provision of \$4,993,300 includes requirements for the replacement of miscellaneous equipment (\$2,800), welfare costs for guard units (\$21,500), subscriptions to newspapers and magazines (\$114,500), production costs for business cards, official certificates, presentation booklets and invitations (\$6,000) and uniforms for security personnel and guard units (\$41,300).

82. The provision further includes training fees, supplies and services in connection with security awareness induction training courses in Amman (\$720,000), specialized security training (criminal incidents, weapons handling, casualty evacuation) (\$267,000) and fees related to IT, procurement, transport and finance training (\$199,100), official functions (\$15,000), general insurance (\$80,000), bank charges (\$65,000), rations for six weeks, covering essential staff members, based on the pandemic contingency plan for 2008 (\$110,600), provision for miscellaneous claims (\$12,400) and miscellaneous services for cleaning, garbage collection and courier services (\$988,100).

83. Estimated freight, customs clearance and insurance costs are included in the provision for the deployment of equipment to the Mission area and within the Mission (\$2,350,000). The decrease from 2007 to 2008 is attributable mainly to reductions in anticipated freight costs and in equipment purchases, partially offset by higher costs for security training in Amman and increased costs for miscellaneous services.

84. Estimated savings for 2006-2007 reflect mainly reductions in equipment purchases and in costs for freight and related services because of the non-establishment of the Kirkuk office and the slow expansion of the Erbil and Baghdad offices owing to the prevailing security situation. Additional savings under training fees, supplies and services and other services, including janitorial, cleaning and courier services, for Basra and Kirkuk are due to the non-deployment to Kirkuk and the security situation in Basra.

## **Part two**

### **Provision of safe and secure facilities for the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq**

#### **V. Introduction**

85. In paragraph 30 of its resolution 1546 (2004), the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to report to the Council on a quarterly basis on the fulfilment of the responsibilities of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI). In his twelfth report (S/2007/330), the Secretary-General provided a summary of key political developments as well as an assessment of the security situation and an update on operational and security matters.

86. The report outlined, inter alia, a requirement for the expeditious construction of a hardened integrated compound, with the necessary structural integrity to withstand direct impacts from high-calibre ordnance, such as 107-mm and 122-mm rockets, which are increasingly used in attacks on the international zone. The report reiterated the need for secure and adequate facilities for United Nations staff in Iraq and highlighted the fact that without such facilities, the United Nations would be unable to operate effectively and would have to consider winding down operations due to the unacceptable security risks currently faced by the Mission.

87. Providing secure and adequate facilities for the United Nations staff in Iraq remains a priority support issue. Accordingly, the Secretary-General advised the Security Council in a letter dated 25 June 2007 (S/2007/412) of his intention to make arrangements for the expeditious construction of a new United Nations facility

in Baghdad, including funding of the new construction, within the framework of the budget provisions for special political missions. The Security Council welcomed and expressed support for the proposal in a letter dated 6 July 2007 from the President of the Council to the Secretary-General (S/2007/413).

88. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions was informed, in a letter dated 20 July 2007, of the intention of the Secretary-General to proceed with the immediate planning for the construction of a United Nations integrated headquarters compound in Baghdad, in accordance with established building construction procedures. In its response of 27 July 2007, the Advisory Committee emphasized the requirement to submit to the General Assembly for its consideration and approval a proposal for such a construction project.

## **VI. Overview**

89. It will be recalled that at the time of the establishment of UNAMI by the Security Council in its resolution 1500 (2003), the United Nations had a building, the Canal Hotel, designated as its headquarters in Baghdad. The premises had been placed at the disposal of the United Nations by the Government of Iraq in 1988, for its exclusive use, as a headquarters for the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observation Group.

90. Over the succeeding years, the building complex housed numerous United Nations operations and activities, including the offices of the United Nations Office of the Secretary-General in Iraq, the Field Operations Unit, Baghdad, the United Nations Guards Contingent in Iraq, the United Nations Administrative Unit, Baghdad, the United Nations Iraq Relief Coordination Unit, the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission, the United Nations Special Commission, the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, the Iraq Nuclear Verification Office, the United Nations Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq, including the oil-for-food programme, and the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq. The premises also housed offices of United Nations specialized agencies, funds and programmes.

91. Unfortunately, less than a week after the adoption of resolution 1500 (2003), a suicide bomber attacked the United Nations headquarters in Baghdad, killing 22 staff and injuring more than 150. The buildings suffered catastrophic damage as a consequence of the attack, and after further attempted attacks on the complex, all United Nations international staff were withdrawn from Iraq on the instructions of the Secretary-General. The facility was subsequently placed under the protection of the Iraqi Diplomatic Police and in the care of Iraqi national staff, who continued to report to work.

92. Following the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 1546 (2004), a small team of international staff deployed to Baghdad for purposes of formally re-establishing a United Nations presence. After in-depth analysis, careful evaluation and coordination with the Coalition Provisional Authority and the Multinational Force in Iraq, it was determined that the offices of UNAMI should be located within the confines of the international zone, which is an area of the city that is heavily fortified and that remains under the protection of the Multinational Force.

93. Whereas temporary offices and accommodation for staff were initially established within the confines of the Embassy of the United States of America, the UNAMI offices were subsequently relocated to alternate facilities on no less than four separate occasions because of security concerns and in consideration of the poor standard of available infrastructure. In this connection, it will be recalled that since much of the available infrastructure had been severely damaged in the bombing campaign of the preceding war, those premises that remained were used either by the Coalition Provisional Authority, the Multinational Force or the Government of Iraq.

94. Staff accommodation was initially secured for a population of 35 personnel at the Al-Rasheed Hotel by arrangement with the Coalition Provisional Authority and the Multinational Force, which were also responsible for administering and securing the location. Those facilities, though rudimentary, were provided in accordance with the terms and conditions of an agreement concluded between the United States of America and the United Nations for the provision of services and commodities on a reimbursable basis in support of the operations of UNAMI.

95. Offices were also eventually secured in premises that were formerly a high school (Diwan School). However, this necessitated the eviction by the Coalition Provisional Authority from its headquarters of the United States Army Corps of Engineers, which had invested over \$3.5 million in refurbishment. The Coalition Provisional Authority also allocated a building site for the construction of an accommodation facility as well as a site for the establishment of a logistics support base and a residence for the Special Representative, which had also been refurbished by the Coalition Provisional Authority. Those facilities were provided at no cost and with the consent of the Government of Iraq.

96. Additional personnel were gradually deployed as circumstances permitted and in the light of the increasing requirement for specialist assistance in areas such as electoral assistance, national reconciliation, humanitarian assistance and human rights. The requisite additional accommodation was secured at the Al-Rasheed Hotel through a commercial contract with the Ministry of Tourism, which had taken over partial responsibility from the Coalition Provisional Authority and the Multinational Force for the operation and maintenance of the hotel. Although the Multinational Force continued to secure the hotel, this accommodation was eventually vacated in July 2006 on the advice of the Department of Safety and Security of the United Nations, which had deemed the facility unsafe and insecure. Alternative facilities, comprising prefabricated portable housing and the necessary support infrastructure, were secured through a commercial contract, and separate arrangements were made for security of the premises, which included the deployment of an additional complement of military personnel from Fiji for the provision of inner-ring security.

97. In view of the inability of UNAMI to operate from facilities outside the confines of the international zone and the prevailing security situation, a decision was taken in early 2006 to vacate the site of the former headquarters and to return that site to the control of the Government of Iraq. A small team of international staff deployed to the Canal Hotel in February 2006 to recover usable assets and finalize the liquidation, which included overseeing the return of property and equipment to the Government of Iraq. This task was completed without incident in a period of six weeks, and the site was vacated and formally returned to the Government of Iraq on 26 March 2006.

98. Over the past three and a half years, UNAMI has attempted to consolidate its presence in Iraq, in particular in Baghdad, and specifically with a view to ensuring the development of sustainable facilities that would provide a safe and secure working environment for United Nations staff, not only in the near term but for the foreseeable future. Unfortunately, this objective could not be achieved despite regular consultation and coordination with officials of the Government of Iraq and commanders of the Multinational Force. UNAMI presently occupies four separate premises within the international zone. However, current conditions are unacceptable for continued use over the long term. The preference in developing such facilities is to co-locate the activities in each location in one facility. The ultimate intent is to provide a safe and secure facility that would provide accommodation for all UNAMI personnel, including the United Nations guard unit, as well as office space for all staff, including internationally recruited personnel, national staff, and visiting experts and delegations. The necessary supporting logistics, security and communications infrastructure would also be included in any proposed development.

99. At present the United Nations country team for Iraq, which consists of United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, is based in Amman. While there is strong demand from the Government of Iraq that the country team be based inside Iraq, there is currently not enough office space or accommodation to enable it to do so. An integrated compound would facilitate the return and re-establishment of United Nations agencies in the country, increase administrative efficiency and promote cohesive and coordinated action. Such an arrangement would be particularly important during an initial period of political and security transition that would lead to a more stable and secure environment.

100. In response to the need for an integrated headquarters that would meet relevant security requirements, UNAMI prepared a requirements statement and a preliminary cost estimate for the development of a constructed facility in consultation with the Departments of Political Affairs, Safety and Security, Field Support and Peacekeeping Operations, with a view to having the project completed on a design-build and turnkey basis. The design-build concept is a method of project delivery in which one entity forges a single contract with the owner to provide for architectural and engineering design services and construction services.

101. The design-build model is considered the most appropriate method of project delivery, as it integrates conceptual design with functional performance, which is particularly important in the context of the prevailing security situation in Iraq. After considering the matter, the Secretary-General has concluded that the engagement of a reputable contractor to design and build the required facilities is the only course of action that would enable the achievement of the objective of having a purpose-built facility constructed before the transition of the international zone to sovereign control. Of necessity, the selected contractor must have experience working in Iraq, more specifically in the international zone; necessary security clearances that would permit a project of this scale to proceed under prevailing security conditions; professionally competent staff capable of completing projects in accordance with internationally recognized standards; the necessary facilities and equipment required to undertake a project of this magnitude; and a proven track record of delivering large-scale construction projects on time and within budget.

## **VII. Current security situation**

102. The security situation as of August 2007 remains volatile. The Multinational Force has made some measurable, albeit limited, improvements to the overall security situation in the Baghdad area. A number of political and sectarian groups and their associated armed wings continue to oppose the Multinational Force. Those groups also struggle against each other to gain political advantage. As a result, Baghdad remains a battleground, with multiple shootings, kidnappings, mortar and rocket attacks and bombings occurring on a daily basis. The rate of serious incidents across the country remains in the range of 140 to 160 per day. Within Baghdad, the international zone remains generally secure but is frequently bombarded with indirect fire (both mortars and rockets) and has been subjected to selective attacks employing improvised explosive devices. Some attempts to penetrate security have been successful despite an effective layered system of multiple vehicle and personnel checkpoints, which guard access to the international zone under the overall management of the Multinational Force.

103. Continued vigilance is required to keep United Nations facilities safe from the very real threat of rocket and mortar attacks, which can occur at any hour within Baghdad, and the ever-present threat of improvised explosive devices, which detonate frequently in the suburbs on the periphery of the international zone. Car and truck bombs (some consisting of up to 1,000 kilograms of explosive) are one of the most favoured methods of attack. Improvised explosive devices and indirect fire, employing short-range mortars operating from firing points within nearby crowded suburbs and longer-range rockets fired from more remote areas peripheral to the city, characterize the threat to the international zone.

104. Iraqi security forces are presently growing in competence and capacity, but are not yet completely ready to take over full responsibility for Baghdad and the international zone from the Multinational Force. However, as 2008 progresses, pressure for them to do so will increase. During 2008 a phased takeover by the Iraqis of security responsibilities within the international zone will become increasingly likely.

105. The management of the security posture in the international zone is subject to continuing review, but major changes are not anticipated prior to the end of 2008. However, the level of involvement of the United States and the scope of the zone are difficult to predict beyond that period. While it is not possible to estimate with accuracy the state of security at that time, it is likely that the situation will be similar to that being experienced today. UNAMI would require a secure compound to coincide with the complete drawdown of the presence of the United States in the international zone.

## **VIII. Support from the Government of Iraq**

106. The current political turmoil and insecurity have limited the ability of the Government of Iraq to support the United Nations in ways normally accorded to it in other countries. Despite the constraints, the Government considers that it is in its interest to have United Nations support. Although at present the security situation impedes such a possibility, the Government of Iraq has called on United Nations agencies to re-establish their offices in the country. It is also clear that without

government support, a United Nations presence in Iraq, however constrained, would not be possible.

107. In the future, it is highly likely that the United Nations will rely increasingly on the Government to provide it with security to carry out its activities. Once the Embassy of the United States moves into its new compound, it is expected that the security for the international zone will be returned to Iraqi control. It remains unclear whether the Iraqi security forces will be sufficiently able to protect the reconfigured international zone so as to maintain an acceptable level of risk to current United Nations facilities, at least during the next two years. This would therefore necessitate a secure, long-term and integrated compound for the United Nations to accommodate its staff in Baghdad.

108. Although there is limited space available in the international zone, the Government of Iraq has been supportive in providing UNAMI with several facilities. It has provided the United Nations with the Diwan School office compound and the residence of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General free of charge. The Government of Iraq has also provided UNAMI with a 10-year lease for the site where the long-term integrated compound would be located. It is the understanding of the Secretariat that the Government of Iraq would contribute towards the construction of the facility; full details will be provided to the General Assembly as they become available.

## **IX. Long-term perspective and planning assumptions**

109. By its resolution 1770 (2007), the Security Council updated and enhanced the mandate of UNAMI across a wide range of issues that include assistance in national reconciliation encompassing difficult boundary disputes; institution-building, including assistance for the constitutional review process; regional cooperation; organization of elections and the census; humanitarian assistance; human rights monitoring; and implementation of the International Compact with Iraq, which is a five-year initiative to channel long-term economic support to the country. The role of UNAMI in all those areas will necessarily result in the long-term involvement of the United Nations over the next decade.

110. The planning assumptions for UNAMI for 2008 and beyond are as follows:

(a) The mandate of UNAMI will continue to be renewed by the Security Council for the foreseeable future;

(b) The United Nations will continue to be considered a high-value target by extremists and armed insurgent groups;

(c) The security environment in Iraq will remain dangerous, and the area presently comprising the international zone will continue to be threatened by attack from mortars, rockets, vehicle-borne explosive devices and suicide bombers;

(d) The UNAMI integrated headquarters compound will not be completed before the new complex of the Embassy of the United States is occupied;

(e) Once the new Embassy complex is occupied, the management of the international zone will be reconfigured to involve a larger degree of Iraqi control. In the worst-case scenario, this would leave UNAMI office and accommodation areas vulnerable, isolated and very difficult to secure;

(f) It is not clear whether Iraqi security forces will be able to protect the reconfigured international zone with sufficient effectiveness to maintain an acceptable level of risk to current United Nations facilities;

(g) The capability of the Multinational Force to protect the UNAMI integrated headquarters compound will be diminished as coalition forces are reduced and repositioned;

(h) A secure air and land bridge from the UNAMI integrated headquarters compound to Baghdad International Airport will be essential.

## X. United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq integrated headquarters

### A. Planning parameters

111. In the light of extant security conditions, rigorous control procedures for managing the deployment of staff in Iraq have been put in place. The staff ceiling is controlled by the Department of Safety and Security, and it is managed on a day-to-day basis by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General as designated official for security in Iraq. The assignment and deployment of staff is needs-driven and sanctioned only once the requisite security and life-support mechanisms are guaranteed and in place. Similar arrangements are in place for managing staff deployments in other locations, such as Baghdad International Airport, Erbil and Basra.

112. The approved staffing of UNAMI for 2007 is detailed by location in the table below:

	<i>Professional category and above</i>								<i>General Service and related categories</i>			<i>Local level</i>		<i>Total</i>	
	<i>USG</i>	<i>ASG</i>	<i>D-2</i>	<i>D-1</i>	<i>P-5</i>	<i>P-4</i>	<i>P-3</i>	<i>P-2</i>	<i>Sub-total</i>	<i>Field/ Security Service</i>	<i>General Service</i>	<i>Total inter-national</i>	<i>National Officer</i>		<i>Local level</i>
<b>Approved</b>															
Baghdad	1	1	2	8	13	40	41	20	126	104	1	231	37	178	446
Basra	—	—	—	—	1	4	6	2	13	29	—	42	15	37	94
Erbil	—	—	—	—	1	4	5	2	12	28	—	40	12	37	89
Kirkuk	—	—	—	—	—	2	4	—	6	7	—	13	6	28	47
Kuwait	—	—	—	—	1	12	14	1	28	57	1	86	1	124	211
Amman	—	1	—	—	3	8	11	3	26	24	1	51	11	65	127
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>211</b>	<b>249</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>463</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>469</b>	<b>1 014</b>

113. The staff strength underlying the planning assumptions for the development of new facilities in Baghdad are as follows:

(a) A total of 180 international staff, including all senior staff, 36 members of the protective security details and 50 staff of the specialized agencies, funds and programmes (accommodation and office and work space);

(b) A total of 150 national staff (office and work space only);

(c) A total of 160 members of a United Nations guard force (accommodation and office and work space);

(d) A total of 75 contractual support staff (accommodation and office and work space for the services support contractor).

114. Although there is an immediate operational requirement for safe and secure premises for UNAMI, for planning purposes the project life cycle is estimated at 25 years, on the basis of the functional life expectancy of building components and major equipment. The development of such facilities will give the United Nations an opportunity to look to its future in Iraq, with a long-term perspective and with a view to providing facilities at a lower cost than would otherwise be the case if such facilities were provided through individual or incremental construction projects.

115. The new facility must satisfy the particular security requirements as defined by the Department of Safety and Security and as outlined in the requirements statement. Furthermore, the facility must be energy-efficient, free of hazardous materials and compliant in all respects with internationally accepted codes and standards for fire and safety.

116. The total space requirements, including those for offices, accommodation, workspace, workshops and storage, have been identified in consultation with all stakeholders. The size of buildings and the amount of space allocated was determined in consideration of the established standards of the United Nations for space allocation and with a view to ensuring that the facilities were fit for their intended purpose. For example, the kitchen and dining facility is of sufficient size for 300 persons, and the associated storage space is adequate to maintain daily operating stocks for 14 days and reserve stocks for 14 days.

117. For planning purposes, preliminary cost estimates were determined in consideration of the type of structure being provided in each instance and the type of protection that each building must afford its occupants. Obviously, buildings with level III protection will be of substantial construction and, consequently, the cost per square metre will be much higher than for those buildings that are constructed to a lower specification or standard.

118. The total duration of the project is estimated at 26 work-months, including 2 months for needs definition, conceptual planning and feasibility studies, 1 month for the approval process, 3 months for the design-build bidding exercise and contract finalization, 3 months for completion of the design phase and 17 months for construction. It is expected that the project will be completed in September 2009; however, this time frame is dependent on when approvals are provided.

## **B. Requirements statement**

119. The requirements statement has outlined the objectives and expectations in performance terms. Not only has it incorporated measures for improving safety and security, but it has also provided for the implementation of a number of sustainable

innovations, including provisions for energy efficiency, water conservation, and materials and waste management. In keeping with the environmental goals of the Organization, where possible, building equipment and systems designs will utilize innovative options and emerging technologies that promote sustainable practices, reduce resource consumption and limit waste and impact on the environment.

### **C. Design and construction process**

120. With the design-build approach, it is important to recognize the close relationship between design and construction; these processes are best viewed as an integrated system. Broadly speaking, design is a process of creating the description of the required facility, usually represented by detailed plans and specifications, whereas construction is the process of identifying activities and resource requirements to make the design a physical reality.

121. In both design and construction, numerous operational tasks must be performed with a variety of precedence and other relationships among the different tasks. Several characteristics are unique to the planning of constructed facilities, and these must be kept in mind at the very early stage of the project life cycle. They include the following:

(a) Facilities are usually custom designed and constructed and often require a long time to complete;

(b) Both the design and construction of a facility must satisfy the conditions peculiar to the specific site;

(c) Because each project is site-specific, its execution is influenced by natural, social and other locational conditions such as weather, labour supply and local building codes, among others (in the Iraq context, security and all its limitations and restrictions will weigh heavily on the planning and implementation of design and construction);

(d) The service life of the facility and any anticipated future requirements;

(e) Technological complexity and market demands, which very often require changes of design plans during construction.

122. In an integrated system, the planning for both design and construction can proceed almost simultaneously while various alternatives that are desirable from both viewpoints are examined, thus eliminating the need for extensive revisions through value engineering. Another distinct advantage is that designs can be reviewed with regard to their constructability as the project progresses through various stages of planning and design.

### **D. Owner's perspective and the process of project management**

123. The acquisition of a constructed facility usually represents a major capital investment for any owner, whether an individual, a private corporation or a public agency. Essentially, a project is conceived to meet demands or needs in a timely fashion. Since an owner is acquiring a facility on a promise in some form of agreement, it is necessary for any owner to have a clear understanding of the

acquisition process in order to maintain firm control of the quality, timeliness and cost of the completed facility.

124. By adopting the viewpoint of the owner, attention can be focused on the complete process of project management for constructed facilities rather than the historical roles of various specialists, such as planners, engineering designers, architects, constructors, fabricators, material suppliers, financial analysts and others. Waste, excessive cost and delays can result from poor coordination and communication among specialists, and it is therefore particularly important that the process of project management and the project life cycle be clearly understood.

125. Each project is unique, and accordingly the time required for each step in the process can vary considerably, with the project life cycle of a constructed facility often being very complex.

126. Once the scope of the project is clearly defined, detailed engineering design will provide the blueprint for construction, and the definitive cost estimate will serve as the baseline for cost control. In the procurement and construction stage, the delivery of materials and the erection of the project on site must be carefully planned and controlled. After the construction is completed, there is usually a brief period of start-up of the constructed facility when it is first occupied. Finally, the management of the facility is turned over to the owner for full occupancy until the facility lives out its useful life and is designated for demolition or conversion.

## **E. Organizing for project management**

127. Project management is the discipline of directing and coordinating human and material resources throughout the life of a project by using modern management techniques to achieve predetermined objectives of scope, cost, time, quality and participation satisfaction. A project organization will generally be terminated when the mission is accomplished.

128. The management of construction projects requires knowledge of modern management as well as an understanding of the design and construction process. Construction projects have a specific set of objectives and constraints, such as a required time frame for completion. While the relevant technology, institutional arrangements or processes will differ, the management of such projects has much in common with the management of similar types of projects in other specialty or technology domains, such as aerospace, pharmaceutical and energy development.

129. Generally, project management is distinguished from general management by the mission-oriented nature of a project. Specifically, project management in construction encompasses a set of objectives, which may be accomplished by implementing a series of operations subject to resource constraints. There are potential conflicts between the stated objectives with regard to scope, cost, time and quality, and the constraints imposed on human material and financial resources. These conflicts should be resolved at the onset of a project by making the necessary trade-offs or creating new alternatives. The functions of project management for construction generally include the following:

(a) Specification of project objectives and plans, including delineation of scope, budgeting, scheduling, setting performance requirements and selecting project participants;

(b) Maximization of efficient resource utilization through procurement of labour, materials and equipment according to the prescribed schedule and plan;

(c) Implementation of various operations through proper coordination and control of planning, design, estimating, contracting and construction in the entire process;

(d) Development of effective communications and mechanisms for resolving conflicts among the various participants.

## **F. Project coordination unit**

130. The head of the project coordination unit will serve as project manager. In the broadest sense of the term, the project manager is the most important person for the success or failure of any project. Under the leadership and guidance of the project manager, the project coordination unit will be responsible for planning, organizing and controlling the project. The project manager will have the authority to mobilize the necessary resources to complete the project and will coordinate the activities of team members drawn from the functional departments.

131. The project manager will have responsibility and authority to resolve various conflicts in such a way that the established project policy and quality standards will not be jeopardized. The interface between the project manager and the functional division managers will be kept as simple as possible and the project manager will encourage problem-solving rather than role-playing by team members drawn from various functional divisions.

132. There are a number of distinct areas of activity requiring project manager knowledge and attention, as follows:

(a) Project integration management, to ensure that the various project elements are effectively coordinated;

(b) Project scope management, to ensure that all the work required (and only the required work) is included;

(c) Project time management, to provide an effective project schedule;

(d) Project cost management, to identify needed resources and maintain budget control;

(e) Project quality management, to ensure that functional requirements are met;

(f) Project human resource management, to develop and effectively employ project personnel;

(g) Project communications management, to ensure effective internal and external communications;

(h) Project risk management, to analyse and mitigate potential risks;

(i) Project procurement management, to obtain necessary resources from external sources.

## **XI. Common services**

133. The proposed development is in line with the United Nations common system concept endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolution 44/211. The facility will be managed by the UNAMI administration, and costs attributable to the presence of staff of the specialized agencies, funds and programmes, including costs for the provision of services, will be recovered in conformance with the terms and provisions of the common services agreement that was signed in 2004.

## **XII. Site security**

134. Considering the nature of the construction, it will be necessary to put a security plan in place for the duration of the project. Security personnel will perform access control at the site entrances and vehicle gates by ensuring that employees and visitors display proper passes or identification before entering the facility. Security personnel may be called upon to respond to minor emergencies and to assist in serious emergencies by guiding emergency responders to the scene of the incident and documenting what happened in an incident report. Also, the presence of security personnel, particularly in combination with effective security procedures, will minimize theft, employee misconduct and violations of safety rules, property damage or even sabotage on the site. This service will be contracted commercially.

## **XIII. Management**

135. The completion of this project with maximum efficiency of time and cost will require close management attention and well-thought-out scheduling and allocation of available resources. The management requirements for the project are projected to involve three major components that are inextricably linked. The conceptual planning phase would be followed by the design phase, which would be followed by the construction phase. Whereas to date the conceptual planning phase has been managed from within available resources, the supervision, administration and management of the design and construction phases will require the establishment of a dedicated project coordination unit within UNAMI, and the contracting of consultant contract management services for the provision of total quality management services.

136. The project coordination and administration costs included for the establishment of a dedicated project coordination unit and the contracting of consultant contract management services have been estimated in the amount of \$6 million. These costs are based on the estimated needs of the project coordination unit, comprising one P-5, one P-4, two P-3 and two local level positions in UNAMI to be funded from general temporary assistance, supplemented by general temporary assistance provisions equivalent to 48 work-months of a local level position for the duration of the project. The costs of the consultant contract management services contract are estimated at \$4 million, based on the estimated needs for a team of 10 personnel, including 6 Professional-level staff, consisting of architects, engineers, quantity surveyors and other essential personnel, and 4 support personnel.

137. The contract management services contract would focus on project control, schedule compliance and performance measurement. The contract will provide the United Nations with professional advisory and management services, and its staff will report directly to the project coordination unit.

138. Design changes will be reviewed and controlled by the design approval team, which will be responsible for ensuring that the designs meet user requirements appropriately, and by a firm policy of avoiding additions to the scope of the project after completion of the design phase. The design approval team will comprise representatives of UNAMI, and the Departments of Political Affairs, Safety and Security, Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support, and requested changes will be referred for review and advice by the project coordination unit.

139. The project will remain subject to internal and external audit review for the duration of the project and any additional review and assessment from time to time, as deemed appropriate.

#### **XIV. Preliminary cost estimates**

140. The preliminary cost estimates were determined on the basis of a review of the space requirements and the size and type of buildings required. The amount of space allocated was determined in consideration of that review as well as with a view to ensuring that the facilities were fit for their intended purpose.

141. Construction costs were determined in consideration of the type of structure being provided in each instance and the type of protection that each building must afford its occupants. Buildings with level III protection will be of substantial construction and consequently the cost per square metre will be much higher than for those buildings that are constructed to a lower specification or standard.

142. Although a rough order of magnitude/costing of some \$190 million has been established (see table 5), it should be noted that these costings are preliminary in nature and that they are subject to revision on the basis of the global cost of materials and the prevailing security situation in Iraq. In addition, the estimates include provisions for a design and planning contingency of 15 per cent and a construction contingency of 20 per cent.

Table 5  
**Breakdown of project cost estimates**

(Millions of United States dollars)

<i>Project deliverables</i>	<i>Range</i>
<b>Design phase</b>	
Design costs for the integrated compound	10.0-15.0
Design and planning contingency (15%)	2.25
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>12.25-17.25</b>
<b>Construction phase (services and materials)</b>	
Offices and accommodation facilities	57.1

<i>Project deliverables</i>	<i>Range</i>
Workshops and warehouses	16.0
Facilities for staff welfare	6.5
Infrastructure and external works (power and water supply, cabling, perimeter security)	28.8
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>108.4</b>
<b>Supplies and equipment</b>	
General supplies and equipment (including \$5.4 million for acquisition of security and safety equipment)	8.0
Medical equipment	0.7
Other supplies, services and equipment	0.8
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>9.5</b>
Specialized communications and information technology equipment	6.6
Construction contingency (20%)	24.9
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>31.5</b>
<b>Miscellaneous</b>	
Project coordination, supervision and management, including travel costs	2.2
Consultant contract management services contract (project control, schedule compliance and performance measurement)	4.0
Provision for contract security	10.0
Provision for inflationary increase and currency fluctuation at 2.5% annually	7.3
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>23.5</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>185.15-190.15</b>

## XV. Cost overruns and risk management

143. While many variables have an impact on construction time and cost overruns, inflationary increases in material cost, inaccurate estimates of material, incomplete and inaccurate budgeting, inadequate contingencies for unforeseen circumstances, project complexity and overly complex decision-making processes are the main causes of cost overruns. The predominant causes of delay are design changes, poor labour productivity and inadequate planning. The traditional approach to construction carries the biggest risk, because the cost of every project is determined during design, not in bidding. Quality cannot be forced or guaranteed in the bidding stage; rather, quality must be an integral part of the design and the overall construction process.

144. The construction of an integrated headquarters in Baghdad for UNAMI will face the traditional constraints of scope, time and cost. However, a design-build negotiated contract alleviates such problems by establishing a clear understanding of the goals and how they will be achieved. In addition, financial and quality-control audits can be completed as buildings are being constructed, so that upon detection of problems, funds can be withheld immediately and the problems corrected. The specific measures proposed to prevent each potential cause of cost overruns and delays are as follows:

(a) The preliminary cost estimates are considered the midpoint of a cost range that could reasonably increase or decrease;

(b) A design and planning contingency of 15 per cent will be included in the estimates for cost changes that occur during the design phase;

(c) A construction contingency of 20 per cent has been included to reflect that the construction in Baghdad will be carried out under restrictive and limiting security conditions;

(d) The design phase will result in an open disclosure of all costs, including costs pertaining to the provision of non-design services, such as materials specification and preparation of documentation;

(e) Design changes will be reviewed and controlled by the design approval team, which will be responsible for ensuring that the designs meet user requirements appropriately and will adhere to a firm policy of avoiding additions to the scope of the project after completion of the design phase;

(f) The project will be administered and managed by a project coordination unit comprising appropriately qualified United Nations staff. The project coordination unit will be located in Baghdad;

(g) Project implementation will be overseen on behalf of the United Nations by a consultant contract management service, which will provide total quality management services, including reporting on schedule compliance and performance measurement to the project manager;

(h) A detailed reporting and information system will be implemented for purposes of project cost control, and cost reports will be submitted at regular intervals;


(i) Progress payments will be made against certification of satisfactory completion of works by the project coordination unit.

145. With the design-build system, project performance aspects of cost, schedule and quality can be clearly defined and appropriately balanced. Individual risks can be managed by the party best positioned to do so. Change orders due to drawing and specification errors are eliminated, because the correction of such issues is the responsibility of the design-builder, not the owner. Change orders due to errors and omissions are largely eliminated, because the design-builder is responsible for developing drawings and specifications as well as constructing a fully functioning facility.

146. As the needs have been outlined in the request for proposal, responses will have presented different design/cost solutions that represent the best thinking of several design-builders, enabling the owner to better manage the financial risk connected with the project.

Organization charts

A. Substantive offices




Abbreviations: FS — Field Service; GS (OL) — General Service (Other level); GS (PL) — General Service (Principal level); LL — Local level; NO — National Officer; SRSR — Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

<sup>a</sup> New positions.

<sup>b</sup> Redeployed positions.

**B. Administrative offices**



Abbreviations: FS — Field Service; LL — Local level; NO — National Officer.

## Annex II

## Summary of posts proposed for redeployment

From	To											
	Office of the SRSG	Office of the Chief of Staff	Political Affairs Office	Constitutional Support Office	Office of the DSRSG, Humanitarian	Public Information Office	Human Rights Office	Office of the CAO	Communications and IT Section	Logistics Support Section	Medical Services	Aviation Section
Office of the SRSG		3 P-5	1 P-4 1 LL			2 LL						
Political Affairs Office		9 NO										
Electoral Assistance Office	1 P-3		1 P-4	1 P-3	1 P-5 1 P-3							
Human Rights Office		1 NO										
Safety and Security Service							1 P-4	1 P-2	1 FS		1 P-3 4 FS	
Office of the CAO											1 P-4 1 FS	
Medical Services		1 NO										
Transport Section										2 FS 2 LL		
Logistics Support Section									1 P-3			8 FS 11 LL

*Abbreviations:* CAO — Chief Administrative Officer; DSRSG — Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General; FS — Field Service; IT — Information Technology; LL — Local level; SRSG — Special Representative of the Secretary-General.