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REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

1. The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament transmits herein to the United Nations Disarmament Commission and to the eighteenth session of the General Assembly a further interim progress report on the Committee's deliberations on all questions before it for the period 17 April to 1 September 1963.
2. Representatives of the following States continued their participation in the work of the Committee: Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, India, Italy, Mexico, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America.

I. Nuclear test ban

3. The Committee considered the problem of a nuclear weapon test ban at a number of plenary meetings while it was in session between 17 April and 21 June 1963.
4. On 10 June 1963, at the 142nd meeting, a joint memorandum on the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests was submitted by the delegations of Ethiopia, Nigeria and the United Arab Republic (ENDC/94).*
5. A working paper containing a synopsis of suggestions by the non-aligned members of the Conference concerning a treaty on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests, covering the period from 12 February to 10 June 1963, was prepared by the Secretariat and circulated on 19 June 1963 at the request of the delegation of Sweden (ENDC/96).*

* Asterisk indicates Conference documents which are attached hereto as annex I.

6. On 10 June 1963, it was announced that it had been agreed between Mr. N.S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. John F. Kennedy, President of the United States of America, and Mr. Harold Macmillan, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, to resume in the middle of July in Moscow the discussions on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests with the participation of the representatives of the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom.
7. On 12 June 1963, at the 143rd meeting, the United States submitted excerpts from an address by President Kennedy on peace, delivered in Washington on 10 June 1963, which included the announcement of the July discussions in Moscow (ENDC/95).*
8. The Soviet Union submitted excerpts from an address by Mr. N.S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, delivered on 2 July 1963 in Berlin, in which he expressed the readiness of the Soviet Government to conclude an agreement banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water (ENDC/112).*
9. As a result of the discussions held in Moscow between the representatives of the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom, agreement was reached on the text of a treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water, which was initialled on 25 July by Mr. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Harriman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs of the United States, and Lord Hailsham, Lord President of the Council and Minister for Science of the United Kingdom (ENDC/100/Rev.1).*
10. On 30 July 1963, the United States submitted the text of an address by President Kennedy of 26 July 1963, reporting to the nation on the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water (ENDC/102).*
11. On 30 July and 1 August 1963, at the 148th and 149th meetings, all participants in the Conference expressed satisfaction with the results of the Moscow Conference on a nuclear test ban, and with the aims proclaimed by the negotiating parties in the preamble to the treaty.

12. The treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water was signed in Moscow on 5 August 1963, by Mr. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Dean Rusk, Secretary of State of the United States of America, and Lord Home, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom.

13. At the 150th meeting, on 12 August 1963, the representatives of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States paid tribute to the contribution made by the Conference to the successful conclusion of the test ban treaty, and a statement to this effect was included in the communiqué issued by the Conference at the conclusion of that meeting.

14. Members of the Committee noted with satisfaction the large number of States that have adhered to the nuclear test ban treaty or expressed their intention to do so.

II. General and complete disarmament

15. The Committee has continued consideration of general and complete disarmament and, in accordance with the agreed agenda (ENDC/52), discussed measures of the first stage of a treaty on general and complete disarmament regarding: nuclear weapons delivery vehicles, conventional armaments, nuclear disarmament, and military bases and armed forces at such bases or elsewhere in foreign territories, together with appropriate control measures. These discussions continued to give primary consideration to a revised draft treaty on general and complete disarmament, submitted by the Soviet Union on 26 November 1962 (ENDC/2/Rev.1, transmitted as part of annex I of the Committee's report on 10 April 1963),^{1/} and to the outline of basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world, submitted by the United States on 18 April 1962 (ENDC/30, transmitted as part of annex I of the Committee's report of 31 May 1962, and ENDC.30/Add.1 and Add.2, transmitted as part of annex I of the Committee's report of 7 September 1962).^{2/}

^{1/} A/5408-DC/207.

^{2/} A/C.1/875; Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962, document DC/203, annex 1, section F.

16. On 18 June 1963, the resolution on general and complete disarmament adopted by the conference of Heads of African States and Governments, held in Addis Ababa from 22-25 May 1963, was submitted by the delegations of Ethiopia, Nigeria and the United Arab Republic (ENDC/93/Rev.1).*

17. On 14 August 1963, at the 151st meeting, the United States submitted an amendment to its outline of basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world relating to nuclear disarmament in stage I (ENDC/30/Add.3).* At the same meeting the United States also submitted draft treaty articles relating to nuclear disarmament measures in stage I (ENDC/109).*

18. On 14 August 1963, Canada submitted a revision of document ENDC/36 of 4 May 1962, entitled "Comparison of USA and USSR Disarmament Proposals" (ENDC/36/Rev.1).*

III. Measures aimed at the lessening of international
tension, the consolidation of confidence among
States, and facilitating general and complete
disarmament

19. The Committee continued consideration in its plenary meetings of such measures as could be agreed to prior to, and as would facilitate the achievement of, general and complete disarmament.

20. Under agreement between the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union, representatives of the two countries held a number of meetings, beginning on 6 May 1963, on the question of the establishment of a direct communications link between the Governments of the United States and the USSR for use in time of emergency.

21. As a result of these negotiations, on 20 June 1963, representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America signed a memorandum of understanding regarding the establishment of a direct communications link between the two Governments for use in time of emergency (ENDC/97).*

22. On 6 May 1963, at the 128th meeting, Brazil and Mexico submitted a Declaration on the denuclearization of Latin America (ENDC/87).*

23. On 27 May 1963, at the 137th meeting, the Soviet Union submitted the text of a note which it had presented to the Government of the United States of America on the denuclearization of the Mediterranean (ENDC/91).*
24. On 21 June 1963, at the 147th meeting, Mexico submitted a working paper for the Committee's consideration containing an outline draft treaty prohibiting the placing in orbit and the stationing in outer space of nuclear weapons (ENDC/98).*
25. The Soviet Union submitted excerpts from an address by Mr. N.S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, delivered on 19 July 1963 in Moscow, and answers given by Mr. Khrushchev, on 27 July 1963, to questions put to him by correspondents of Pravda and Izvestia, containing the proposals of the Soviet Union regarding measures for the lessening of international tension and facilitating general and complete disarmament (ENDC/113 and ENDC/103).*
26. On 16 August 1963, at the 152nd meeting, Canada submitted a comparison of some significant developments in United States and USSR proposals concerning the reduction of the risk of war through accident, miscalculation, failure of communications or surprise attack (1958-1963) (ENDC/110).*

IV. Meetings of the Co-Chairmen

27. During the period covered by this report, the representatives of the United States of America and of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in their capacity as Co-Chairmen of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament, have held numerous meetings. The schedule of and procedure for the work of the Conference, general and complete disarmament, the cessation of nuclear weapon tests and measures aimed at the lessening of international tension, the consolidation of confidence among States, and facilitating general and complete disarmament were discussed.

V. Procedural arrangements

28. Thirty-six plenary meetings took place between 17 April 1963 and 1 September 1963.
29. At its 145th meeting on 17 June 1963, the Conference decided to recess from 21 June to 30 July 1963.

30 At its 149th meeting, upon recommendation of the Co-Chairmen, the Conference decided to recess from 2 August to 12 August 1963, in connexion with the signing of the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water.

31. The Committee, at its 156th meeting on 29 August 1963, agreed to a recess beginning 1 September 1963. The Committee empowered the two Co-Chairmen, after consultation with the members of the Committee, to set a date for reconvening at Geneva no later than one week following the termination of the consideration of the nuclear testing and disarmament items at the eighteenth session of the General Assembly.

VI. Conference documents

32. Transmitted herewith as annex II to this report is a list of all documents and verbatim records of the plenary meetings.

33. This report is submitted by the Co-Chairmen on behalf of the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament.

29 August 1963

(Signed) S.K. TSARAPKIN
(Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)

(Signed) Charles C. STELLE
(United States of America)

ANNEX I

List of documents attached to the Report

- Ethiopia, Nigeria and United Arab Republic:
Joint Memorandum of the Delegations of Ethiopia, Nigeria and the
UAR on the question of the Cessation of Nuclear Weapon Tests
ENDC/94
- Working Paper combining a Synopsis of Suggestions by the Non-
Aligned Members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee concerning a
Treaty on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests
(12 February - 10 June 1963)
ENDC/96
- United States of America:
Excerpts from an Address by President Kennedy on peace, delivered in
Washington, 10 June 1963
ENDC/95
- Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
Extract from a statement made by the Chairman of the Council of
Ministers of the USSR, Mr. N.S. Khrushchev at a meeting in Berlin
on 2 July 1963
ENDC/112
- Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom,
and United States of America:
Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer
space, and under water
ENDC/100/Rev.1
- United States of America:
President Kennedy's address of 25 July 1963
ENDC/102
- Ethiopia, Nigeria and United Arab Republic:
Resolution adopted by the Conference of Heads of African States and
Governments, Addis Ababa, 22-25 May 1963 on General and Complete
Disarmament
ENDC/93/Rev.1
- United States of America:
Amendment to the U.S. Outline of Basic provisions of a Treaty on
General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World (ENDC/30
April 18 1963) relating to Nuclear Disarmament in stage I
ENDC/30/Add.3
- United States of America:
Draft articles VI to XIII (relating to nuclear disarmament in
stage I) of U.S. Draft of Treaty on General and Complete Dis-
armament in a Peaceful World
ENDC/109
- Canada:
Comparison of USA and USSR disarmament proposals
ENDC/36/Rev.1*
- Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and United States of America:
Memorandum of understanding between the United States of America
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics regarding the
establishment of a direct communications link
ENDC/97
- Brazil and Mexico:
Declaration on the denuclearization of Latin America
ENDC/87

ENDC/115

Annex I

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Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

ENDC/91

Note of the Soviet Government of 20 May 1963 to
the government of the United States of America

Corrigendum to the document ENDC/91

ENDC/91/Corr.1

Mexico:

ENDC/98

Working paper for the consideration of the
Eighteen-Nation Committee. Outline draft treaty
prohibiting the placing in orbit and the stationing
in outer space of nuclear weapons

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

ENDC/113

Extract from the statement made by Mr. N.S. Khrushchev,
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSE, in
Moscow on 19 July 1963

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

ENDC/103

The answers of Mr. N.S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the
Council of Ministers of the USSR, to questions put
to him by the correspondents of Pravda and Izvestia
on 27 July 1963

Canada:

ENDC/110

A comparison of some significant developments in USA
and USSR proposals concerning the reduction of the
risk of war through accident, miscalculation, failure
of communication or surprise attack (1958-1963)

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/94
10 June 1963

Original: ENGLISH

ETHIOPIA, NIGERIA AND THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC Joint Memorandum of the Delegations of Ethiopia, Nigeria and the U.A.R. on the Question of the Cessation of Nuclear Weapon Tests

The Delegations of Ethiopia, Nigeria and the U.A.R. to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee:

In fulfilment of the policies and wishes of their respective Governments;

In the light of the historic meeting of the Heads of Independent African States and Governments, held at Addis Ababa from 22 to 25 May 1963 in which they gave close attention to the urgent problem of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests which has been a source of deep concern, particularly to the African peoples and Governments;

And in furtherance of the aims and the spirit of the African Summit Conference's Resolution on the problems of General and Complete Disarmament;

Now address the following thoughts and considerations to the Nuclear Powers:

1. They are firmly convinced that the nuclear powers can agree to end all further nuclear testing, under satisfactory and safeguarded conditions, in the immediate future. Present day circumstances, as well as technical, military and economic considerations, all favour the immediate conclusion of a test-ban treaty. The positions of the nuclear powers have never been closer than at present. The whole world has pinned its hopes on the sense of Wisdom and practicality of the nuclear powers. The world will not understand or condone their failure to bridge the residual final gap on such a vital and far-reaching issue as the cessation of nuclear tests.
2. The conclusion of test-ban treaty is likely to bring about a general improvement in international relations, to herald the settlement of other pending problems, to inhibit the further spread of nuclear weapons and to contribute to the slaking of the nuclear armament's race. It will certainly put an end to radiation hazards and to the poisoning of Man's environments. It will save humanity and posterity from untold

worries and suffering. It will release the nuclear powers' much needed energy, funds, and technical knowhow and channel them to peaceful endeavours, to more profitable enterprises which are badly needed by the majority of mankind, especially by the African, Asian, and Latin-American peoples.

3. The three aforementioned Delegations are convinced that direct contacts between the nuclear powers, for example on the Foreign Ministers' level, and possibly direct communications and contacts between the Heads of the nuclear states and Governments, may prove of great value in reaching a quick and adequate solution of this problem.

It is for this reason that the Heads of African States and Governments meeting at Addis Ababa have appealed to the nuclear powers to spare no diplomatic effort and to work unceasingly towards reaching an immediate agreement fulfilling the hopes and dreams of mankind, without letting political problems inhibit the progress of their negotiations. In the light of present circumstances, time is of the essence. The nuclear powers should not let this propitious moment slip away for want of a resolute and determined effort to reach an agreement which all the world, including the nuclear powers, needs and aspires to.

4. Various non-aligned delegations to our Committee, during the last three months produced many valuable ideas and thoughts which are well-known to the nuclear powers, and which aimed at breaking the deadlock in the Geneva test-ban negotiations about the number of inspections as well as about the method of discussing the quota-figures in relation to the study of the modalities of inspections.

The three African Delegations earnestly appeal to the nuclear powers to give attention to those non-aligned ideas and thoughts as well as to their continued attempts at finding practical honourable and equitable compromises, which, in the last analysis, may prove to be good and lasting solutions to the test-ban problem.

5. Chairman Khrushchev and President Kennedy's exchange of letters in December and January on the cessation of tests has given proof of the existence, on both sides, of a welcome spirit of constructive compromise and mutual accommodation, and above all, of courage and goodwill.

6. It may very well be that science may, in the future, show beyond doubt that on-site inspections may no longer be needed to identify suspicious seismic events or to adequately control a test-ban treaty. For the time-being, however, the 3 African Delegations

recognize that three, four or so, yearly truly effective inspections - or an adequately proportionate figure spread over more years - may be needed to dispel mutual suspicions, to help build up confidence between the nuclear powers, and, no less importantly, to facilitate their reaching a practical political settlement.

7. After having maintained that there was no need for any obligatory inspections, Mr. Khrushchev's offer last December, of three on-site inspections must therefore, be taken as a sign of moral courage and good faith. In a like manner, the current British-American demarches at Moscow, and their offer of the possibility of further compromise should be encouraged and taken as a sign of political courage and goodwill.

8. The three African Delegations are convinced that they speak not only for their own people and all the African peoples, but for the whole world, when they urgently appeal to the nuclear powers to give more proof of a much needed sense of practicality and of a necessary spirit of constructive compromise and goodwill. The World will hail and appreciate any show of compromise as evidence of great moral courage, political acumen and love for peace. On the other hand, the world cannot but consider their failure to compromise over the last few remaining differences, as unwillingness on their part to end nuclear testing

and the nuclear armaments' race, essential conditions for any constructive and realistic discussion of general and complete disarmament.

9. Since there is general agreement, however, that the number of on-site inspections is less relevant than the terms of the modalities or conditions for the adequate and effective conduct of such on-site inspections, the three Delegations therefore exhort the nuclear powers to rise above quarreling on an insignificant difference of one or two inspections, and to accept a reasonable compromise-quota of inspections contingent upon adequate and effective modalities on inspection.

10. Agreement on the latter should be sought, inter alia, in these illustrative areas:

- (a) The location of the epicentre of the seismic event;
- (b) criteria for the eligibility of the seismic event for inspection;
- (c) composition of the International Scientific Committee and its role in the establishment of the criteria and the supervising of their proper application;

- (d) agreement on the initiation of inspections according to agreed criteria and to the data submitted to the International Committee;
- (e) the composition of the Inspection teams in such a way as to obviate self-inspection and to ensure the effectiveness and the adequacy of the visit;
- (f) agreement on the criteria and relevant details of the actual conducting of the inspection;
- (g) agreement on the shape and size of the inspection area;
- (h) safeguards against abuse and against the utilization of such facilities and inspection personnel in any manner that might be extraneous to the purpose of identifying the event concerned or that might endanger the security of the receiving state.

In the name of the African peoples and in the name of all humanity, the three African Delegations address this urgent appeal to the nuclear powers to give the world proof of their goodwill, of their seriousness of purpose, and of their sense of responsibility, by issuing the necessary instructions to their representatives in the test-ban negotiations to come to the quick and equitable compromise solutions which the whole world is expecting of them, and whose groundwork has already been laid during the last three months of negotiations at Geneva.

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/96
19 June 1963
Original: ENGLISH

Working Paper containing a Synopsis of Suggestions
by the Non-Aligned Members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee
concerning a Treaty on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests

12 February - 10 June 1963

(Prepared by the Secretariat and circulated at the request of the Delegation of Sweden)

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PART A -- STATEMENTSI. METHOD OF WORK1. Timing, priority and methods of discussion

BRAZIL - The widening of areas of agreement depends on both technical and political factors. The technical questions should preferably be studied by specialized technical methods. (15 February 1963, PV.98, p.19)

Brazil proposed the creation of a sub-committee of technicians or experts, because it was of the opinion that there should be a technical body which, without participating in the political debate, might give clarification on the scientific implications inherent in any treaty that the parties might attempt to sign. (27 May 1963, PV.137*, p.87)

Brazil considers that the discussion of technical details is directly linked with the question of the number of inspections. The solution of one of these questions necessarily depends upon the solution of the other, and the cessation of tests depends on both of them. Perhaps it would be possible for the Conference to consider alternately the question of the number of inspections and automatic seismic stations, and the question of the organization of inspections and the operation of the stations. Thus two parallel but not simultaneous lines of discussion would be established. Moreover, this system could be adopted for private talks between the nuclear Powers. (27 February 1963, PV.103, p.11)

BURMA - In regard to on-site inspection it would be difficult to come to agreement on numbers without an understanding being reached simultaneously on the fundamentals of the modalities of inspection. (6 March 1963, PV.105, p.10)

INDIA - The remaining unresolved issues, having been reduced to an agreed minimum, might be brought together on the basis of simultaneity of consideration. Those minimum issues might include the number of inspections, the triggering and area of inspections, the number of inspectors, the composition of inspection teams, and the number of automatic seismic stations. (20 February 1963, PV.100, p.15)

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC - Quite a few possible compromise solutions may be found in order to eliminate the difference about which should take place first -- agreement on the quota of inspections or the definition of what constitutes inspection and agreement on the modalities therefor. First, a party might be inclined to submit a new draft test ban treaty incorporating its ideas and formulations. Another suggestion might be to ask each party to submit first a working paper elaborating the outlines of its thinking on the question of a test ban. As another alternative, the different proposals about the quota number could be discussed prior to and simultaneously with other pertinent components of a draft test ban treaty. Failing an early or preliminary possible agreement on the quota number, the suggested quota numbers could be left between one, two, or three brackets. That could allow the study of the other pertinent components of the system to go on under a natural built-in limitation, in time and space, due to the size and nature of the paper itself. A time-limit might even be set on the duration of such a discussion. (18 February 1963, PV. 99, pp.15-16)

2. Conditional acceptance of quota of on-site inspections

ETHIOPIA - A minimum of three on-site inspections a year, with the possibility of increasing this number to an agreed maximum figure of eight on-site inspections, depending on the inspection arrangements that were formulated and agreed upon, could provide a reasonable basis for further negotiations. Such a basis for negotiations would allay any apprehensions that the United States might have that the on-site inspection quota and system would not have a significant deterrent value. It would also allay any anxieties the Soviet Union might have that inspection visits could be used for non-agreed purposes. (20 February 1963, PV.100, p.22)

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC - The idea that the nuclear Powers should accept the quota figure conditionally upon agreement on modalities is not a new one. As a matter of fact both parties have suggested the idea in the past. It is to be expected that, once the quota issue was satisfactorily disposed of in the foregoing manner, it should not be difficult to attain agreement on the criteria and arrangements for inspection. (10 June 1963, PV.142*, pp.21, 23)

3. "Package" proposal

(a) For discussing test ban treaty

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC - The various suggestions and thoughts contained in the Joint Memorandum of Ethiopia, Nigeria and the UAR (ENDC/94) constitute an inter-dependent and well-balanced indivisible entity which, taken as a whole, should be a satisfactory way out of the present impasse. (10 June 1963, PV.142*, p.21)

(b) Inter-relation between test ban and other measures

ETHIOPIA - It is evident that, unless measures to lower tension are agreed to and a test ban concluded, the obstacles will prove insurmountable. We therefore support all delegations that have given priority to those questions. (20 February 1963, PV.100, p.21)

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC - Agreement on the cessation of tests would be facilitated if, in their present contacts, the nuclear Powers gave some thought also to the possibility of simultaneous agreement on a few other ripe and practicable collateral measures such as an agreement to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the spreading of information relative to their manufacture or uses directly or indirectly, bilaterally or multilaterally, to other States which at present do not possess them. Another measure could be a reaffirmation by States of their officially declared policy of shunning nuclear armament and a consolidation of the foundations of the projected "non-nuclear club". If this were truly envisaged, a whole series of other preliminary and partial measures could easily fit in and bolster a well-balanced and practicable package deal, obviously built around a test-ban agreement. They could also easily come to an understanding on the inclusion in any future package deal of measures such as the reduction of the risk of accidental war, as proposed by the United States, a "peaceful co-existence" accord, and the non-aggression pact proposed by the Soviet Union. (10 June 1963, PV.142*, pp.27-30)

4. General Approach

SWEDEN - Through the statements by the non-aligned nations, a model does lie prepared if the great Powers wish to combine the various suggestions made by different non-aligned nations at the Conference. If the nuclear Powers were interested in moving forward, in a needy case like this, with the aid of a tertium datur, if they combined the five or more elements which are available in the records of this Conference, they would have a compromise model to discuss. It would, of course, not surpass their ability to improve on this model as they might deem fit. (22 May 1963, PV.135^{xx}, p.62)

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC - It should not be beyond the resourcefulness and realism of the nuclear Powers to find a mutually satisfactory agreement, based perhaps, on a quota number which is near the number offered by the Soviet Union and on effective modalities which might take into consideration the areas proposed by the United States for agreement on the modalities and which would guarantee that inspections should be more than a mere symbol. (10 June 1963, PV.142^{xx}, p.22)

II. QUOTA OF ON-SITE INSPECTIONS

1. Suggested number for annual quota

ETHIOPIA - A test ban treaty could be elaborated dealing with all aspects of a test ban and including quotas of on-site inspections per annum from a minimum of three to an agreed maximum of eight. The maximum number would of course depend on the extent of inspection arrangements, and it might well be less than eight. (20 February 1963, PV.100, pp. 22-23)

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC - Is not the acceptance of two or three inspections per year tantamount to admitting that they can be made consistent with a State's national security and that they need not necessarily represent harmful interference? Could it not prove possible or within a State's capabilities to accept for example a maximum of four to five visits under the same security arrangements? And, conversely, does not the acceptance of the theory and principle of inspection of only a fraction, let us say one-fifth, of unidentified events amount in fact to tacitly admitting that the acceptance of one-seventh or one-eighth of unidentified events, let us suppose five or four visits, should not very much affect the general picture of a few surprise-deterrent visits? (18 February 1963, PV.99, p.13)

2. Sliding scale over period of years

SWEDEN - There is the possibility of some kind of sliding scale of inspections between the numbers three and eight, as those are the numbers suggested by the two sides, perhaps starting with three inspections during the first year and gradually stepping up the number during subsequent years. Or there might, on the contrary, be reason to start with some higher number and move downwards, motivated by the hope that mutual confidence would increase with time. Or again the quota might be tied to a longer time-period than a year. (20 February 1963, PV.100, pp. 28-29)

3. Quota for period of years

SWEDEN - The quota might be tied to a longer time-period than a year. (20 February 1963, PV.100, p.29)

4. Reconsideration of quota figure

INDIA - If there is difficulty of any kind in reaching an agreed figure of inspections, then why should not both sides agree that the treaty should contain a clause providing for the reconsideration of the number of on-site inspections after a period of one year, which number should be changed only if both sides agree? That is to say, the treaty is not to be temporary; it will be firm and permanent, and the number of inspections will be there and will not be altered unless both sides agree. (20 February 1963, PV.100, p.17)

III. INITIATION OF ON-SITE INSPECTION

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC - The UAR reiterates its earlier suggestion made on 15 August 1962 (PV.70, p.24) that the nuclear Powers should turn to the study of the question: "'When should on-site inspection be necessary in practice?'" (18 February 1963, PV.99, p.14)

IV. AUTOMATIC SEISMIC STATIONS

INDIA - Perhaps there could be a parity of relationship between the number of automatic seismic stations and the number of seismic areas. That would provide a certain flexibility, a certain logic, because what has been agreed is the location of certain automatic seismic stations in certain seismic areas. (20 February 1963, PV.100, pp. 17-18)

V. TECHNICAL QUESTIONS

1. Arrangements for control machinery

SWEDEN - There are a number of practical matters which must be studied and settled outside the two or three problems which appear to be the present crux of an agreement. For example, there are decisions to be made on optimal instrumentation; the selection of seismic stations, not just inside but also outside the territories of the nuclear Powers; the arrangements for adequate data transmissions; the proper means and methods for the analysis of data, and so forth. All these are time-consuming tasks which are unpolitical in nature and might well be performed at an early pre-ban stage. There are also questions of a more administrative character, still totally a-political, such as the place for the seat of the central agency, the proper contacts with existing international scientific and technical networks, and so forth. Some of these matters may well be settled directly by the major nuclear Powers concerned, but other matters would no doubt benefit by the co-operation also of other States, or might even stand in need of such co-operation. (20 Feb. 1963, PV.100, p.25)

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC - The Committee should have every reason to expect that, once the quota issue was satisfactorily disposed of, it should not be difficult to attain agreement on impartial and adequately selected inspection ~~terms~~, and on the choice of internationally recognized sound and realistic criteria for determining the eligibility of events for inspection, and for the location of the epicentres of the events in question. Consideration might also be given to the reciprocal aspect of inspection arrangements under internationally acceptable and supervised criteria. Agreement might also be sought on realistic and meaningful delineation of the shape and size of the areas which might be opened for inspection, as well as on adequate and practical safeguards which should guarantee the security of the host state under the aforesaid circumstances. (10 June 1963, PV.142*, pp. 23-24)

2. International scientific commission

SWEDEN - The scientific co-operation which will necessarily accompany a test ban should be initiated as early as possible. On this ground Sweden reiterates the suggestions that certain steps, such as the setting up of the international scientific commission on an interim basis, be taken immediately. As practical experience shows how difficult it is to recruit prominent scientists on an inter-

national basis at short notice, it will not be considered unduly pressing to suggest that plans for the recruitment of a nucleus of a scientific commission be initiated at once. As the commission is envisaged as an impartial and not a bilateral one, the non-aligned countries perforce take an active interest in its creation. (20 Feb. 1963, PV.100, p.27)

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC - The nuclear Powers should find the international scientific commission able and ready to help them in the establishment and the proper implementation of criteria and arrangements for on-site inspection. (10 June 1963, PV.142*, p.20-25)

3. Co-operation with scientific bodies

SWEDEN - It would seem expedient to start now selection of the sites of co-operating control stations outside the territories of the nuclear Powers. For that purpose one would have to contact the international scientific unions and, of course, the governments concerned. These suggestions refer more directly to stations in seismically-quiet areas. For the monitoring of earthquakes in seismic areas local networks are required. For these tasks, a unique opportunity is opened up by resolution 912 (XXXIV) of ECOSOC on "International Co-operation in the Field of Seismological Research" which aims at expanding and re-equipping existing stations in seismic regions and at the establishment of an earthquake-warning system. An inter-governmental conference on this matter is planned to take place in 1964. This presents the Conference with a timely opportunity to join forces. (20 Feb. 1963, PV.100; p.26)

In matters concerning the scientific aspects of test ban control it is highly advisable to co-plan and co-operate with the international scientific unions concerned. The Swedish delegation has approached the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) on this matter, and ICSU is ready to consider such co-operation if that be the unanimous desire of the Committee. (20 Feb. 1963, PV.100, p.27)

VI. INTERIM ARRANGEMENT

BURMA - Nuclear tests in any form are incompatible with serious negotiations on a test-ban treaty. A suitable interim arrangement, offering reasonable protection to both sides, can be arrived at, and arrived at quickly, if the parties are really determined to reach such an agreement. (25 March 1963, PV.113, pp. 11, 12)

MEXICO - If, contrary to all hope and despite all our efforts, a permanent and comprehensive treaty is not concluded for the time being, then we must have -- as requested by the General Assembly -- a provisional agreement to suspend underground tests, which will permit of a prohibition of tests in the other three environments where no international control is required, since the national means are sufficient to identify explosions. The provisional agreement referred to in resolution 1762 A (XVII) would not be an uncontrolled moratorium, as the principle of on-site inspection has been accepted; and that would enable us to set in motion the complicated machinery of the international scientific commission proposed in the Eight Power Joint Memorandum. We should at the same time be able to acquire experience which, coupled maybe with further developments in science and technology, would provide us with a firm basis for a definite agreement to prohibit underground nuclear weapons tests. (15 March 1963, PV.109, p. 23)

NIGERIA - General Assembly resolution 1762 (XVII) is almost out of date at the present stage of negotiations. The goal is a final and lasting treaty ending all tests in all environments. (18 March 1963, PV.110, p.17)

PART B - DOCUMENTS

I. METHOD OF WORK

Joint Memorandum of ETHIOPIA, NIGERIA and the UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC (10 June 1963)

Since there is general agreement that the number of on-site inspections is less relevant than the terms of the modalities or conditions for the adequate and effective conduct of such on-site inspections, Ethiopia, Nigeria and the United Arab Republic exhort the nuclear Powers to rise above quarreling on an insignificant difference of one or two inspections, and to accept a reasonable compromise-quota of inspections contingent upon adequate and effective modalities on inspection. (ENDC/94, para.9)

II. QUOTA OF ON-SITE INSPECTIONS

Joint Memorandum of ETHIOPIA, NIGERIA and the UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC (10 June 1963)

Science may, in the future, show beyond doubt that on-site inspections may no longer be needed to identify suspicious seismic events or to adequately control a test-ban treaty. For the time-being, however, three, four or so, yearly truly effective inspections - or an adequately proportionate figure spread over more years - may be needed to dispel mutual suspicions, to help build up confidence between the nuclear Powers, and, no less importantly, to facilitate their reaching a practical political settlement. (ENDC/94, para.6)

III. MODALITIES FOR ON-SITE INSPECTION

Joint Memorandum of ETHIOPIA, NIGERIA and the UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC (10 June 1963)

Agreement on modalities of inspection should be sought, inter alia, in these illustrative areas:

- (a) the location of the epicentre of the seismic event;
- (b) criteria for the eligibility of the seismic event for inspection;
- (c) composition of the International Scientific Committee and its role in the establishment of the criteria and the supervising of their proper application;
- (d) agreement on the initiation of inspections according to agreed criteria and to the data submitted to the International Committee;
- (e) the composition of the inspection teams in such a way as to obviate self-inspection and to ensure the effectiveness and the adequacy of the visit;
- (f) agreement on the criteria and relevant details of the actual conducting of the inspection;
- (g) agreement on the shape and size of the inspection area;
- (h) safeguards against abuse and against the utilization of such facilities and inspection personnel in any manner that might be extraneous to the purpose of identifying the event concerned or that might endanger the security of the receiving State. (ENDC/94, para.10)

* Denotes provisional record.

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/95

11 June 1963

Original: ENGLISH

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Excerpts from Address by President Kennedy on peace, delivered in Washington, 10 June, 1963

I have chosen this time and place to discuss a topic on which ignorance too often abounds and the truth is too rarely perceived -- and that is the most important topic on earth: peace.

What kind of peace do I mean and what kind of peace do we seek? Not a Pax Americana enforced on the world by American weapons of war. Not the peace of the grave or the security of the slave. I am talking about genuine peace -- the kind of peace that makes life on earth worth living -- and the kind that enables men and nations to grow and to hope and build a better life for their children -- not merely peace for Americans but peace for all men and women -- not merely peace in our time but peace in all time.

I speak of peace because of the new face of war. Total war makes no sense in an age where great powers can maintain large and relatively invulnerable nuclear forces and refuse to surrender without resort to those forces. It makes no sense in an age when a single nuclear weapon contains almost ten times the explosive force delivered by all the Allied air forces in the second world war. It makes no sense in an age when the deadly poisons produced by a nuclear exchange would be carried by wind and water and soil and seed to the far corners of the globe and to generations yet unborn.

Today the expenditure of billions of dollars every year on weapons acquired for the purpose of making sure we never need them is essential to the keeping of peace. But surely the acquisition of such idle stockpiles -- which can only destroy and can never create -- is not the only, much less the most efficient, means of assuring peace.

I speak of peace, therefore, as the necessary rational end of rational men. I realize the pursuit of peace is not as dramatic as the pursuit of war -- and frequently the words of the pursuer fall on deaf ears. But we have no more urgent task.

Some say that it is useless to speak of peace or world law or world disarmament -- and that it will be useless until the leaders of the Soviet Union adopt a more enlightened attitude. I hope they do. I believe we can help them do it.

But I also believe that we must re-examine our own attitudes -- as individuals and as a nation -- for our attitude is as essential as theirs. And every graduate of this school, every thoughtful citizen who despairs of war and wishes to bring peace, should begin by looking inward -- by examining his own attitude towards the course of the cold war and toward freedom and peace here at home.

First: Examine our attitude towards peace itself. Too many think it is unreal. But that is a dangerous, defeatist belief. It leads to the conclusion that war is inevitable -- that mankind is doomed -- that we are gripped by forces we cannot control.

We need not accept that view. Our problems are man-made. Therefore, they can be solved by man. And man can be as big as he wants. No problem of human destiny is beyond human beings. Man's reason and spirit have often solved the seemingly unsolvable -- and we believe they can do it again.

I am not referring to the absolute, infinite concepts of universal peace and good will of which some fantasies and fanatics dream. I do not deny the value of hopes and dreams but we merely invite discouragement and incredulity by making that our only and immediate goal.

Let us focus instead on a more practical, more attainable peace -- based not on a sudden revolution in human nature but on a gradual evolution in human institutions -- on a series of concrete actions and effective agreements which are in the interests of all concerned.

There is no single, simple key to this peace -- no grand or magic formula to be adopted by one or two powers. Genuine peace must be the product of many nations, the sum of many acts. It must be dynamic, not static, changing to meet the challenge of each new generation. For peace is a process -- a way of solving problems.

With such a peace, there will still be quarrels and conflicting interests, as there are within families and nations. World peace, like community peace, does not require that each man love his neighbour -- it requires only that they live together with mutual tolerance, submitting their disputes to a just and peaceful settlement. And history teaches us that enmities between nations, as between individuals, do not last forever. However fixed our likes and dislikes may seem, the tide of time and events will often bring surprising changes in the relations between nations and neighbours.

So let us persevere. Peace need not be impracticable -- and war need not be inevitable. By defining our goal more clearly -- by making it seem more manageable and less remote -- we can help all people to see it, to draw hope from it, and to move irresistibly towards it.

And second: let us re-examine our attitude towards the Soviet Union. It is discouraging to think that their leaders may actually believe what their propagandists write.

It is discouraging to read a recent authoritative Soviet text on military strategy and find, on page after page, wholly baseless and incredible claims -- such as the allegation that "American imperialist circles are preparing to unleash different types of war ... that there is a very real threat of a preventative war being unleashed by American imperialists against the Soviet Union ... (and that) the political aims", and I quote, "of the American imperialists are to enslave economically and politically the European and other capitalist countries ... (and) to achieve world domination ... by means of aggressive war."

Truly, as it was written long ago: "The wicked flee when no man pursueth." Yet it is sad to read these Soviet statements -- to realize the extent of the gulf between us. But it is also a warning -- a warning to the American people not to fall into the same trap as the Soviets, not to see only a distorted and desperate view of the other side, not to see conflict as inevitable, accommodation as impossible and communication : nothing more than an exchange of threats.

No government or social system is so evil that its people must be considered as lacking in virtue. As Americans, we find Communism profoundly repugnant as a negation of personal freedom and dignity, but we can still hail the Russian people for their many achievements -- in science and space, in economic and industrial growth, in culture, in acts of courage.

Among the many traits the peoples of our two countries have in common, none is stronger than our mutual abhorrence of war. Almost unique among the major world powers, we have never been at war with each other. And no nation in the history of battle ever suffered more than the Soviet Union in the second World War. At least 20,000,000 lost their lives. Countless millions of homes and families were burned or sacked. A third of the nation's territory, including two-thirds of its industrial base, was turned into a wasteland -- a loss equivalent to the destruction of this country east of Chicago.

Today, should total war ever break out again -- no matter how -- our two countries will be the primary targets. It is an ironic but accurate fact that the two strongest powers are the two in the most danger of devastation. All we have built, all we have worked for, would be destroyed in the first 24 hours. And even in the cold war -- which ings burdens and dangers to so many countries, including this nation's closest allies -- our two countries bear the heaviest burdens. For we are both devoting massive sums of money to weapons that could be better devoted to combat ignorance, poverty and disease.

We are both caught up in a vicious and dangerous cycle with suspicion on one side breeding suspicion on the other, and new weapons begetting counter-weapons.

In short, both the United States and its allies, and the Soviet Union and its allies, have a mutually deep interest in a just and genuine peace and in halting the arms race. Agreements to this end are in the interests of the Soviet Union as well as our own — and even the most hostile nations can be relied upon to accept and keep those treaty obligations, and only those treaty obligations, which are in their own interest.

So, let us not be blind to our differences — but let us also direct attention to our common interests and the means by which those differences can be resolved. And if we cannot end now our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity. For, in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal.

Third: Let us re-examine our attitude towards the cold war, remembering we are not engaged in a debate, seeking to pile up debating points. We are not here distributing blame or pointing the finger of judgment. We must deal with the world as it is, and not as it might have been had the history of the last eighteen years been different.

We must, therefore, persevere in the search for peace in the hope that constructive changes within the Communist bloc might bring within reach solutions which now seem beyond us. We must conduct our affairs in such a way that it becomes in the Communists' interest to agree on a genuine peace. And above all, while defending our own vital interests, nuclear powers must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a humiliating retreat or a nuclear war. To adopt that kind of course in the nuclear age would be evidence only of the bankruptcy of our policy — or of a collective death-wish for the world.

To secure these ends, America's weapons are non-provocative, carefully controlled, designed to deter and capable of selective use. Our military forces are committed to peace and disciplined in self-restraint. Our diplomats are instructed to avoid unnecessary irritants and purely theoretical hostility.

For we can seek a relaxation of tensions without relaxing our guard. And, for our part, we do not need to use threats to prove that we are resolute. We do not need to jam foreign broadcasts out of fear our faith will be eroded. We are

unwilling to impose our system on any unwilling people -- but we are willing and able to engage in peaceful competition with any people on earth.

Meanwhile, we seek to strengthen the United Nations, to help solve its financial problems, to make it a more effective instrument for peace, to develop it into a genuine world security system -- a system capable of resolving disputes on the basis of law, of insuring the security of the large and the small, and of creating conditions under which arms can finally be abolished.

At the same time we seek to keep peace inside the non-Communist world, where many nations, all of them our friends, are divided over issues which weaken Western unity, which invite Communist intervention or which threaten to erupt into war.

Our efforts in West New Guinea, in the Congo, in the Middle East and the Indian subcontinent, have been persistent and patient despite criticism from both sides. We have also tried to set an example for others -- by seeking to adjust small but significant differences with our own closest neighbours in Mexico and Canada.

Speaking of other nations, I wish to make one point clear. We are bound to many nations by alliances. These alliances exist because our concern and theirs substantially overlap. Our commitment to defend Western Europe and West Berlin, for example, stands undiminished because of the identity of our vital interests. The United States will make no deal with the Soviet Union at the expense of other nations and other peoples, not merely because they are our partners, but also because their interests and ours converge.

Our interests converge, however, not only in defending the frontiers of freedom, but in pursuing the paths of peace.

It is our hope -- and the purpose of allied policies -- to convince the Soviet Union that she, too, should let each nation choose its own future, so long as that choice does not interfere with the choices of others. The Communist drive to impose their political and economic system on others is the primary cause of world tension today. For there can be no doubt that, if all nations could refrain from interfering in the self-determination of others, the peace would be much more assured.

This will require a new effort to achieve world law -- a new context for world discussions. It will require increased understanding between the Soviets and ourselves. And increased understanding will require increased contact and communication.

One step in this direction is the proposed arrangement for a direct line between Moscow and Washington, to avoid on each side the dangerous delays, misunderstanding, and misreadings of the other's actions which might occur in a time of crisis.

We have also been talking in Geneva about other first-step measures of arms control, designed to limit the intensity of the arms race and reduce the risks of accidental war.

Our primary long-range interest in Geneva, however, is general and complete disarmament -- designed to take place by stages, permitting parallel political developments to build the new institutions of peace which would take the place of arms. The pursuit of disarmament has been an effort of this Government since the 1920's. It has been urgently sought by the past three Administrations. And, however, dim the prospects are today, we intend to continue this effort -- to continue it in order that all countries, including our own, can better grasp what the problems and the possibilities of disarmament are.

The only major area of these negotiations where the end is in sight -- yet where a fresh start is badly needed -- is in a treaty to outlaw nuclear tests. The conclusion of such a treaty -- so near and yet so far -- would check the spiraling arms race in one of its most dangerous areas. It would place the nuclear powers in a position to deal more effectively with one of the greatest hazards which man faces in 1963 -- the further spread of nuclear weapons. It would increase our security -- it would decrease the prospects of war.

Surely this goal is sufficiently important to require our steady pursuit, yielding neither to the temptation to give up the whole effort nor the temptation to give up our insistence on vital and responsible safeguards.

I am taking this opportunity, therefore, to announce two important decisions in this regard:

First: Chairman Khrushchev, Prime Minister Macmillan and I have agreed that high-level discussions will shortly begin in Moscow looking toward early agreement on a comprehensive test ban treaty. Our hopes must be tempered with the caution of history -- but with our hopes go the hopes of all mankind.

Second: To make clear our good faith and solemn convictions on the matter, I now declare that the United States does not propose to conduct nuclear tests in the atmosphere so long as other states do not do so. We will not be the first to resume. Such a declaration is no substitute for a formal binding treaty -- but I hope it will help us achieve one. Nor would such a treaty be a substitute for disarmament -- but I hope it will help us achieve it.

Finally, my fellow Americans, let us examine our attitude towards peace and freedom here at home. The quality and spirit of our own society must justify and

support our efforts abroad. We must show it in the dedication of our own lives — as many of you who are graduating today will have an opportunity to do, by serving without pay in the Peace Corps abroad or in the proposed National Service Corps here at home.

But wherever we are, we must all, in our daily lives, live up to the age-old faith that peace and freedom walk together. In too many of our cities today, the peace is not secure because freedom is incomplete.

It is the responsibility of the executive branch at all levels of government — local, state and national — to provide and protect that freedom for all of our citizens by all means within our authority. It is the responsibility of the legislative branch at all levels, wherever the authority is not now adequate, to make it adequate. And it is the responsibility of all citizens in all sections of this country to respect the rights of others and respect the law of the land.

All this is not unrelated to world peace, "When a man's ways please the Lord," the scriptures tell us, "he maketh even his enemies to be at peace with him." And — not peace, in the last analysis, basically a matter of human rights — the right to live out our lives without fear of devastation — the right to breathe air as nature provided it — the right of future generations to a healthy existence?

While we proceed to safeguard our national interests, let us also safeguard human interests. And the elimination of war and arms is clearly in the interest of both.

No treaty, however much it may be to the advantage of all, however tightly it may be worded, can provide absolute security against the risks of deception and evasion. But it can — if it is sufficiently effective in its enforcement and if it is sufficiently in the interests of its signers — offer far more security and far fewer risks than an unabated, uncontrolled, unpredictable arms race.

The United States, as the world knows, will never start a war. We do not want a war. We do not now expect a war. This generation of Americans has already had enough — more than enough — of war and hate and oppression. We shall be prepared if others wish it. We shall be alert to try to stop it. But we shall also do our part to build a world of peace where the weak are safe and the strong are just.

We are not helpless before that task or hopeless of its success. Confident and unafraid, we labor on — not towards a strategy of annihilation but towards a strategy of peace.

Thank you.

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/112
22 August 1963
ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Extract from a statement made by the
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. N.S. Krushchev,
at a meeting in Berlin on 2 July 1963

Comrades!

I should like to speak about the question of the cessation of nuclear tests. As you know, it is proposed to resume negotiations on this question in mid-July in Moscow. Everyone, of course, is wondering whether an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests will now at last be concluded. This is a legitimate interest and I should like to state our views in this regard.

The Soviet Government has on several occasions declared its readiness to sign without delay a treaty on the prohibition of all nuclear tests for all time - I repeat, all nuclear tests, wherever they may be conducted. Many years ago, we raised the question of prohibiting nuclear weapons and prohibiting tests of such weapons.

But the Western Powers, particularly the United States, do not want to come to such an agreement. They are dragging out the negotiations interminably and putting forward various artificial pretexts in order to avoid the cessation of all nuclear tests. They are insisting with particular stubbornness on international inspection.

It has been proved by science and fully confirmed by practice that there is no need for any inspection for control over the cessation of tests, including underground tests. The national means of detecting nuclear explosions which are available to States, especially in conjunction with automatic seismic stations, to the establishment of which we have agreed, ensure reliable control over the cessation of all tests. Nevertheless, the Western Powers stubbornly persist in linking the question of the cessation of nuclear tests with so-called international inspections.

This means that the Western Powers' demand for inspections has something else behind it. What is it? We have long been convinced that the Western Powers need international inspections not for control over the cessation of tests, but in order to penetrate by any means into various parts of the Soviet Union for intelligence purposes. Thus, it is not a question of control over the cessation of tests, but essentially of legalized espionage.

If anyone still had any doubt before about the real purposes of the Western Powers when they demanded the carrying out of inspections, there are no grounds for this now. It is well known that at the end of last year the Soviet Government took a big step to meet the Western Powers in agreeing to two or three inspections a year. How did the Western Powers respond to that expression of good will? They not only failed to evaluate this step of ours in the proper way, but tried to impose on us a bargaining in regard to the number of inspections and the conditions under which they were to be carried out. Since then it has become even more clear that our Western partners are not concerned with concluding an equitable agreement, but wish to secure opportunities to fly all over Soviet territory and to engage in aerial photography and other matters which have no connexion whatsoever with the cessation of tests, but meet the needs of the military staffs of NATO.

It is time the imperialists realized that the Soviet Government will never forgo the security interests of its country and of all socialist countries. It will never open its doors to NATO spies. This is not a subject for bargaining. Our position on this question is clear and unshakable.

The Soviet Government is convinced that the interests of the peoples would be best served by the speediest possible conclusion of an agreement on the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests - in the atmosphere, in outer space, under water and under ground. Apparently, however, this is impossible in view of the attitude of the Western Powers.

Having carefully weighed up the situation, the Soviet Government, moved by a sense of great responsibility for the fate of the peoples, declares that, since the Western Powers are impeding the conclusion of an agreement on the cessation of all nuclear tests, the Soviet Government expresses its readiness to conclude an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. We have made such proposals before, but the Western Powers prevented us from reaching agreement by proposing additional conditions providing for extensive inspection of our territory.

If the Western Powers now agree to this proposal, the question of inspection will no longer arise. After all, the Western Powers have declared that no inspections are required for verifying the compliance by States with their obligations to cease nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Accordingly, the road is open to a solution of this problem. The Soviet Government expresses the hope that the Western Powers, going forward to meet the aspirations of the peoples, will adopt a positive attitude towards this proposal of the Soviet Government.

The conclusion of an agreement on the cessation of tests will eliminate the danger of the radioactive poisoning of the atmosphere and will avert the threat to the health of present and future generations. The conclusion of such an agreement will undoubtedly also contribute towards a general improvement of the international climate and the easing of tension and will consequently facilitate the search for mutually acceptable decisions and the solution of other international problems.

Of course, for all the significance of such an important instrument as an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests, it cannot halt the armaments race and cannot avert or even greatly reduce the threat of a thermonuclear war.

The Soviet Government therefore considers that it would be advisable straightaway, when an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests is concluded, to take also another big step towards the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of confidence between States, namely, the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the two main military groupings of States - the NATO countries and the countries parties to the Warsaw Treaty. The Soviet Union and other socialist States have been putting forward a proposal for the conclusion of such a pact over a number of years. We note with satisfaction that this proposal is meeting with ever-increasing international support, even in certain NATO countries. The time has now come to put this proposal into practice.

An agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, together with the simultaneous signing of a non-aggression pact between those two groupings of States, will create a new international atmosphere more favourable to the solution of the most important problems of the modern world, including the problem of disarmament.

These problems affect the interests of the broad masses of mankind. That is why the communists are calling upon all peoples and all sections of the population, irrespective of their political views and convictions, to join together in the common struggle to prevent another world war and to secure a lasting peace among States.

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/100/Rev.1*

30 July 1963

ENGLISH

Original: ENGLISH/RUSSIAN

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS,
UNITED KINGDOM, AND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests
in the atmosphere, in outer space,
and under water

The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the "Original Parties",

Proclaiming as their principal aim the speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations, which would put an end to the armaments race and eliminate the incentive to the production and testing of all kinds of weapons, including nuclear weapons,

Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end, and desiring to put an end to the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction or control:

(a) in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space; or underwater, including territorial waters or high seas; or

(b) in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted. It is

understood in this connection that the provisions of this subparagraph are without prejudice to the conclusion of a treaty resulting in the permanent banning of all nuclear test explosions, including all such explosions underground, the conclusions of which, as the Parties have stated in the Preamble to this Treaty, they seek to achieve.

2. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes furthermore to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, anywhere which would take place in any of the environments described, or have the effect referred to, in paragraph 1 of this Article.

Article II

1. Any Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to this Treaty. Thereafter, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties, to consider such amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to this Treaty, including the votes of all of the Original Parties. The amendment shall enter into force for all Parties upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all of the Original Parties.

Article III

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign this Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the Original Parties -- the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics -- which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all the Original Parties and the deposit of their instruments of ratification.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification of and accession to this Treaty, the date of its entry into force, and the date of receipt of any requests for conferences or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article IV

This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty three months in advance.

Article V

This Treaty, of which the English and Russian texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

DONE in triplicate at the city of Moscow the day of
one thousand nine hundred and sixty-three.

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CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/102
30 July 1963

Original: ENGLISH

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Kennedy's address of 26 July 1963

The following is the text of President Kennedy's address to the nation, July 26th, on the treaty for a partial nuclear test ban:

Good Evening, my fellow citizens:

I speak to you tonight in a spirit of hope.

Eighteen years ago the advent of nuclear weapons changed the course of the world as well as the war. Since that time, all mankind has been struggling to escape from the darkening prospects of mass destruction on earth.

In an age when both sides have come to possess enough nuclear power to destroy the human race several times over, the world of Communism and the world of free choice have been caught up in a vicious circle of conflicting ideology and interests. Each increase of tension has produced an increase in arms; each increase in arms has produced an increase in tension.

In these years, the United States and the Soviet Union have frequently communicated suspicions and warnings to each other, but very rarely hope. Our representatives have met at the summit and at the brink: they have met in Washington and in Moscow, at the United Nations and in Geneva. But too often these meetings have produced only darkness, discord or disillusion.

Yesterday a shaft of light cut into the darkness. Negotiations were concluded in Moscow on a treaty to ban all nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. For the first time, an agreement has been reached on bringing the forces of nuclear destruction under international control - a goal first sought in 1946, when Bernard Baruch submitted our comprehensive plan to the members of the United Nations.

That plan, and many subsequent disarmament plans, large and small, have all been blocked by those opposed to international inspection. A ban on nuclear tests, however, requires on-the-spot inspection only for underground tests. This nation now possesses a variety of techniques to detect the nuclear tests of other nations which are conducted in the air or under water. For such tests produce unmistakable signs which our modern instruments can pick up.

The treaty initialled yesterday, therefore, is a limited treaty which permits continued underground testing and prohibits only those tests that we ourselves can police. It requires no control posts, no on-site inspection and no international body.

We should also understand that it has other limits as well. Any nation which signs the treaty will have an opportunity to withdraw if it finds that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests: and no nation's right to self-defence will in any way be impaired. Nor does this treaty mean an end to the threat of nuclear war. It will not reduce nuclear stockpiles: it will not halt the production of nuclear weapons: it will not restrict their use in time of war.

Nevertheless this limited treaty will radically reduce the nuclear testing which would otherwise be conducted on both sides: it will prohibit the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and all others who sign it from engaging in the atmospheric tests which have so alarmed mankind: and it offers to all the world a welcome sign of hope.

For this is not a unilateral moratorium, but a specific and solemn legal obligation. While it will not prevent this nation from testing underground, or from being ready to resume atmospheric tests if the acts of others so require, it gives us a concrete opportunity to extend its coverage to other nations and later to other forms of nuclear tests.

This treaty is in part the product of Western patience and vigilance. We have made clear - most recently in Berlin and in Cuba - our deep resolve to protect our security and our freedom against any threat or aggression. We have also made clear our steadfast determination to limit the arms race.

In three Administrations, our soldiers and diplomats have worked together to this end, always with the support of Great Britain. Prime Minister MacMillan joined with President Eisenhower in proposing a limited test ban treaty in 1959, and again with me in 1961.

But the achievement of this goal is not a victory for one side - it is a victory for mankind. It reflects no concessions either to or by the Soviet Union. It reflects simply our common recognition of the dangers in further testing.

This treaty is not the millennium. It will not resolve all conflicts, or cause the Communists to forego their ambitions, or eliminate the danger of war. It will not reduce our need for arms or allies or programmes of assistance to others. But it is an important first step - a step towards reason - a step away from war.

Here is what this step can mean to you and your children and your neighbours.

First, this treaty can be a step towards reduced world tensions and broader areas of agreement. The Moscow talks reached no agreement on any other subject, nor is this treaty conditioned on any other matter.

Under-Secretary Harriman made it clear that any non-aggression arrangements across the division in Europe would require full consultation with our allies and full attention to their interests. He also made clear our strong preference for a more comprehensive treaty banning all tests everywhere, and our ultimate hope for general and complete disarmament. The Soviet Government, however, is still unwilling to accept the inspection such goals require.

No one can predict with certainty, therefore, what further agreements, if any, can be built on the foundations of this one. They could include controls on preparations for surprise attack, or on numbers and types of armaments. There could be further limitations on the spread of nuclear weapons. The important point is that efforts to seek new agreement will go forward.

But the difficulty of predicting the next step is no reason to be reluctant about this one. Nuclear test ban negotiations have long been a symbol of East-West disagreement. If this treaty can also be a symbol - if it can symbolize the end of one era and the beginning of another - if both sides can by this treaty gain confidence and experience in peaceful collaboration - then this short and simple treaty may well become an historic mark in man's age-old pursuit of peace.

Western policies have long been designed to persuade the Soviet Union to renounce aggression, direct or indirect, so that their people and all peoples may live and let live in peace. The unlimited testing of new weapons of war cannot lead towards that end - but this treaty, if it can be followed by further progress, can clearly move in that direction.

I do not say that a world without aggression or threats of war would be an easy world. It will bring new problems, new challenges from the Communists, new dangers of relaxing our vigilance or of mistaking their intent.

But those dangers pale in comparison to those of the spiralling arms race and a collision course towards war. Since the beginning of history war has been mankind's constant companion. It has been the rule, not the exception. Even a nation as young and peace-loving as our own has fought through eight wars. And three times in the past two-and-a-half years I have been required to report to you as President that this

nation and the Soviet Union stood on the verge of direct military confrontation - in Laos, in Berlin, and in Cuba.

A war today or tomorrow, if it led to nuclear war, would not be like any war in history. A full-scale nuclear exchange, lasting less than 60 minutes, could wipe out more than 300 million Americans, Europeans and Russians, as well as untold numbers elsewhere. And the survivors, as Chairman Khrushchev warned the Communist Chinese, "would envy the dead".

For they would inherit a world so devastated by explosions and poison and fire that today we cannot even conceive all of its horrors. So let us try to turn the world from war. Let us make the most of this opportunity, and every opportunity to reduce tension, to slow down the perilous nuclear arms race, and to check the world's slide toward final annihilation.

Secondly, this treaty can be a step towards freeing the world from the fears and dangers of radioactive fall-out. Our own atmospheric tests last year were conducted under conditions which restricted such fall-out to an absolute minimum. But over the years the number and yield of weapons tested have rapidly increased - and so have the radioactive hazards from such testing. Continued unrestricted testing by the nuclear Powers, joined in time by other nations which may be less adept in limiting pollution, will increasingly contaminate the air that all of us must breathe.

Even then, the number of children and grandchildren with cancer in their bones, with leukaemia in their blood or with poison in their lungs might seem statistically small to some, in comparison with natural health hazards. But this is not a natural health hazard - and it is not a statistical issue.

The loss of even one human life, or the malformation of even one baby - who may be born long after we are gone - should be of concern to us all. Our children and grandchildren are not merely statistics toward which we can be indifferent.

Nor does this affect the nuclear Powers alone. These tests befoul the air of all men and all nations, the committed and the uncommitted alike, without their knowledge and without their consent. That is why the continuation of atmospheric testing causes so many countries to regard all nuclear Powers as equally evil: and we can hope that its prevention will enable those countries to see the world more clearly, while enabling all the world to breathe more easily.

Thirdly, this treaty can be a step towards preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to nations not now possessing them. During the next several years, in addition to the four current nuclear Powers, a small but significant number of nations will have the intellectual, physical, and financial resources to produce both nuclear weapons and the means of delivering them. In time, it is estimated, many other nations will have either this capacity or other ways of obtaining nuclear warheads, even as missiles can be commercially purchased today.

I ask you to stop and think for a moment what it would mean to have nuclear weapons in many hands - in the hands of countries large and small, stable and unstable, responsible and irresponsible, scattered through the world. There would be no rest for anyone then, no stability, no real security and no chance of effective disarmament. There would only be increased chances of accidental war, and an increased necessity for the great Powers to involve themselves in otherwise local conflicts.

If only one thermonuclear bomb were to be dropped on any American, Russian or other city - whether it was launched by accident or design, by a madman or an enemy, by a large nation or small, from any corner of the world - that one bomb could release more destructive force on the inhabitants of that one helpless city than all the bombs dropped during the Second World War.

Neither the United States, nor the Soviet Union, nor the United Kingdom, nor France, can look forward to that day with equanimity. We have a great obligation - all four nuclear Powers have a great obligation - to use whatever time remains to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, to persuade other countries not to test, transfer, acquire, possess or produce such weapons.

This treaty can be the opening wedge in that campaign. It provides that none of the parties will assist other nations to test in the forbidden environments. It opens the door for further agreements on the control of nuclear weapons. And it is open for all nations to sign. For it is in the interest of all nations - and already we have heard from a number of countries who wish to join with us promptly.

Fourthly, and finally, this treaty can limit the nuclear arms race in many ways, which, on balance, will strengthen our nation's security far more than the continuation of unrestricted testing. For in today's world, a nation's security does not always increase as its arms increase, when its adversary is doing the same. And unlimited competition in the testing and development of new types of destructive nuclear weapons will not make the world safer for either side.

Under this limited treaty, on the other hand, the testing of other nations, could never be sufficient to offset the ability of our strategic forces to deter or survive a nuclear attack and to penetrate and destroy an aggressor's homeland. We have, and under this treaty we will continue to have, all the nuclear strength that we need.

It is true that the Soviets have tested nuclear weapons of a yield higher than that which we have thought to be necessary, but the 100-megaton bomb of which they spoke two years ago does not and will not change the balance of strategic power. The US has deliberately chosen to concentrate on more mobile and more efficient weapons, with lower but entirely sufficient yield, and our security is not, therefore, impaired by the treaty I am discussing.

It is also true, as Mr. Khrushchev would agree, that nations cannot afford in these matters to rely simply on the good faith of their adversaries. We have not, therefore, overlooked the risk of secret violations. There is at present a possibility that, deep in outer space, hundreds and thousands and millions of miles away from the earth, illegal tests might go undetected.

But we already have the capability to construct a system of observation that would make such tests almost impossible to conceal, and we can decide at any time whether such a system is needed in the light of the limited risk to us and the limited reward to others of violations attempted at that range. For any tests which might be conducted so far out in space, which cannot be conducted more easily and efficiently and legally underground, would necessarily be of such a magnitude that they would be extremely difficult to conceal.

We can also employ new devices to check on the testing of smaller weapons in the lower atmosphere. Any violations, moreover, involve, along with the risk of detection, the end of the treaty and the world-wide consequences for the violator.

Secret violations are possible and secret preparations for a sudden withdrawal are possible, and thus our own vigilance and strength must be maintained, as we remain ready to withdraw and to resume all forms of testing, if we must. But it would be a mistake to assume that this treaty will be quickly broken.

The gains of illegal testing are obviously slight compared to their cost and the hazard of discovery, and the nations which have initialled and will sign this treaty prefer it, in my judgment, to unrestricted testing as a matter of their own self-interest, for these nations, too, and all nations, have a stake in limiting the arms

race, in holding the spread of nuclear weapons and in breathing air that is not radioactive. While it may be theoretically possible to demonstrate the risks inherent in any treaty, and such risks in this treaty are small, the far greater risks to our security are the risks of unrestricted testing, the risk of a nuclear arms race, the risk of new nuclear Powers, nuclear pollution and nuclear war.

This limited test ban, in our most careful judgment, is safer by far for the US than an unlimited nuclear arms race. For all these reasons, I am hopeful that this nation will promptly approve the limited test ban treaty. There will, of course, be debate in the country and in the Senate. The Constitution wisely requires the advice and consent of the Senate to all treaties, and the consultation has already begun.

All this is as it should be. A document which may mark an historic and constructive opportunity for the world deserves an historic and constructive debate. It is my hope that all of you will take part in that debate, for this treaty is for all of us. It is particularly for our children and our grandchildren, and they have no lobby here in Washington. This debate will involve military, scientific, and political experts, but it must be not left to them alone. The right and the responsibility are yours.

If we are to open new doorways to peace, if we are to seize this rare opportunity for progress, if we are to be as bold and far-sighted in our control of weapons as we have been in their invention, then let us now show all the world on this side of the wall and the other that a strong America also stands for peace. There is no cause for complacency.

We have learned in times past that the spirit of one moment or place can be gone in the next. We have been disappointed more than once, and we have no illusions now that there are short cuts on the road to peace. At many points around the globe the Communists are continuing their efforts to exploit weakness and poverty. Their concentration of nuclear and conventional arms must still be deterred.

The familiar contest between choice and coercion, the familiar places of danger and conflict are all still there - in Cuba, in Southeast Asia, in Berlin and all around the globe, still requiring all the strength and the vigilance that we can muster.

Nothing could more greatly damage our cause than if we and our allies were to believe that peace has already been achieved and that our strength and unity were no longer required.

But now, for the first time in many years, the path of peace may be open. No one can be certain what the future will bring. No one can say whether the time has come for an easing of the struggle. But history and our own conscience will judge us harsher if we do not now make every effort to test our hopes by action, and this is the place to begin. According to the ancient Chinese proverb: "A journey of a thousand miles must begin with a single step".

My fellow Americans, let us take that first step. Let us, if we can, step back from the shadows of war and seek out the way of peace. And if that journey is one thousand miles, or even more, let history record that we, in this land, at this time, took the first step.

Thank you, and good night.

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**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/93/Rev.1
18 June 1963
Original: ENGLISH

ETHIOPIA, NIGERIA AND UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

Resolution adopted by the Conference of Heads of African
States and Governments, Addis Ababa, 22-25 May 1963
on General and Complete Disarmament

The Summit Conference of Independent African States meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 22 May to 25 May 1963:

Having considered all aspects of the questions of general disarmament;

Unanimously convinced of the imperious and urgent necessity of co-ordinating and intensifying their efforts to contribute to the achievement of a realistic disarmament programme through the signing, by all States concerned, of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control;

Have agreed unanimously to concert and co-ordinate their efforts and action in these various fields, and to this end have decided on the following measures:

1. To affirm and respect the principle of declaring Africa a Denuclearized Zone; to oppose all nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests, as well as the manufacture of nuclear weapons; and to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy;
2. The destruction of existing nuclear weapons;
3. To undertake to bring about, by means of negotiation, the end of military occupation of the African continent and the elimination of military bases and nuclear tests, which elimination constitutes a basic element of African Independence and Unity;
4. To appeal to the great Powers to:
 - (a) reduce conventional weapons;
 - (b) put an end to the arms race; and
 - (c) sign a general and complete disarmament agreement under strict and effective international control;
5. To appeal to the great Powers, in particular to the Soviet Union and the United States of America, to use their best endeavours to secure the objectives stated above.

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/30/Add.3
14 August 1963
Original: ENGLISH

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Amendment to the U.S. Outline of Basic Provisions of
a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful
World (ENDC/30 April 18, 1962) relating to Nuclear
Disarmament in Stage I.

Stage I. Section C. Nuclear Weapons

1. Replace the present text of sub-paragraph 2a. Transfer of Fissionable Material to Purposes Other Than Use in Nuclear Weapons, by the following:

"a. Upon the cessation of production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would each transfer to purposes other than use in nuclear weapons agreed quantities of weapons grade U-235 from past production. The United States of America would transfer _____ kilograms, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would transfer _____ kilograms of such weapons grade U-235. For this purpose, "weapons grade U-235" means the U-235 contained in metal of which at least 90 per cent of the weight is U-235."

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/109
14 August 1963
Original: ENGLISH

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Draft articles VI to XII (relating to nuclear disarmament in Stage I) of U.S. Draft of Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World

ARTICLE VI

Production and Use of Fissionable Material for Nuclear Weapons

1. Each Party to this Treaty shall:
 - a. Halt, prohibit and prevent the production, at facilities under its jurisdiction and control, of fissionable material for use in nuclear weapons;
 - b. Halt, prohibit and prevent the use in nuclear weapons of all fissionable material produced after the beginning of Stage I; and
 - c. Refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way assisting or participating in, the production anywhere of fissionable material for use in nuclear weapons.
2. Each Party shall limit the production, at facilities under its jurisdiction or control, of fissionable material for purposes other than use in nuclear weapons in accordance with the Table of Allowances set forth in the Annex on Stage I Nuclear Disarmament.
3. Each Party shall submit to the International Disarmament Organization declarations within _____ days after the beginning of Stage I and thereafter every _____, which shall list (a) the name, location, and production capacity of each facility under its jurisdiction or control capable of producing or processing fissionable material and (b) the amounts and types of fissionable material being produced at each such facility. The form of such declarations shall be in accordance with the requirements set forth in the Annex on Stage I Nuclear Disarmament.

ARTICLE VII

Transfer of Fissionable Material to Purposes Other Than Use in Nuclear Weapons

1. The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agree that each of them shall, during Stage I, transfer to depots, as stated in Paragraph 2 of this Article, specified amounts of weapons grade U-235 from its stock of such U-235 in existence at the beginning of Stage I, in order to transfer such amounts to use other than in nuclear weapons. The United States of America shall transfer not less than _____ kilograms, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall transfer not less than _____ kilograms of such weapons grade U-235. For the purposes of this Article "weapons grade U-235" means the U-235 contained in metal of which at least 90 percent of the weight is U-235.
2. Transfers pursuant to this Article shall take place at depots under the supervision of the International Disarmament Organization. The schedule of transfers, the location, establishment and operation of depots, and the safeguard procedures to be observed in making the transfers, in withdrawing transferred material from depots, and in transporting, handling and utilizing such material after withdrawal shall be as provided in the Annex on Stage I Nuclear Disarmament and in rules adopted by the Control Council of the International Disarmament Organization in accordance with Article _____.
3. The Party owning any transferred material prior to transfer shall continue to own it after transfer, subject to the limitations contained in this Article, and may withdraw such material for any purpose other than use in nuclear weapons, providing it submits to the International Disarmament Organization prior to withdrawal a statement setting forth the purpose of the withdrawal, the amount of material needed for such purpose, and the time and place at which such material will be used.

ARTICLE VIII

Transfer of Fissionable Material for Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

1. No Party to this Treaty shall transfer, or permit any individual or association under its jurisdiction or control to transfer, to any other state, or to any individual or association under the jurisdiction or control of such other state, fissionable material for use in nuclear weapons.

2. Any transfer of fissionable material not prohibited by this Article, and the transportation, handling, and utilization of such material after such transfer, shall be subject to the safeguard procedures provided in the Annex on Stage I Nuclear Disarmament and in rules adopted by the Control Council of the International Disarmament Organization in accordance with Article ____.

ARTICLE IX

Non-Transfer of Nuclear Weapons

The Parties to the Treaty agree to seek to prevent the creation of further national nuclear forces. To this end the Parties agree that:

1. Any Party to the Treaty which has manufactured, or which at any time manufactures, a nuclear weapon shall:

a. Not transfer control over any nuclear weapons to a state which has not manufactured a nuclear weapon before (an agreed date) ;

b. Not assist any such state in manufacturing any nuclear weapons.

2. Any Party to the Treaty which has not manufactured a nuclear weapon before the (agreed date) shall:

a. Not acquire, or attempt to acquire, control over any nuclear weapons;

b. Not manufacture, or attempt to manufacture, any nuclear weapons.

ARTICLE X

Nuclear Weapon Test Explosions

The Parties to this Treaty agree to be bound by the provisions of "The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in all Environments", which is set forth in the Annex on Stage I Nuclear Disarmament.

ARTICLE XI

Preparation for Stages II and III

The Parties to this Treaty agree to examine unresolved questions related to the means of accomplishing in Stages II and III the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles and, in the light of this examination, shall agree upon arrangements for the accomplishment of such reduction and elimination.

ARTICLE XII

Verification

The obligations set forth in this part of this Treaty shall be verified by the International Disarmament Organization in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, the Annex on Stage I Nuclear Disarmament, and the Annex on Verification.

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/36/Rev.1
20 August 1963

Original: ENGLISH only

CANADA

Comparison of USA and USSR Disarmament Proposals

NOTE: This document is a revision of document ENDC/36 of May 4 outlining a comparison of USA and USSR disarmament proposals. This revision takes account of changes which have occurred in the positions of both USA and USSR since that time.

* supersedes the document issued under the symbol ENDC/36/Rev.1, on 14 August 1963

STAGE I PROPOSALS

USA (ENDC/30)

USSR (ENDC/2/Rev.1)

TIME LIMIT

Three years beginning upon entry into force of treaty. (Stage I p.4)

Eighteen months beginning six months after entry into force of treaty. (Article 19)

ARMAMENTS

1. Reduction of Armaments

With the exceptions listed in Annex on Stage I Armaments Reductions, specified parties to the treaty to reduce the number of armaments in each type listed in that Annex by not less than 30% of the number existing at the beginning of Stage I. (ENDC/69, Art.V, para.1b).

Elimination of those weapons systems (rockets, military aircraft, surface ships, submarines and artillery) capable of delivering nuclear weapons except for an agreed and strictly limited number of missiles in certain categories to be retained by USA and USSR until the end of Stage II. (Article 5, para.1).
Conventional armaments and equipment to be reduced by thirty per cent for each type, the reduced armaments and equipment to be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses (Article 11, para.3).

2. Method of Reduction

Parties to declare to IDO inventories of armaments existing at beginning of Stage I of types listed in Annex on Stage I Armaments Reductions. Reductions to be carried out in three equal consecutive steps of one year each. Each step to be divided into two consecutive parts. During first part armaments which are to be destroyed to be deposited with IDO; during second part armaments to be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses under IDO supervision (ENDC/69, Art.V para.2).

International Disarmament Organization to exercise control over destruction of weapons systems capable of delivering nuclear weapons (paras.3 of Articles 5, 6, 7, 8) and over places where troops disbanded and released, conventional armaments and military equipment destroyed, and to verify conversion to peaceful uses of means of transportation and other non-combat equipment. No provision for verification of retained levels.

USA

USSR

3. Limitation on Production

States to limit production of armaments of types listed in the Annex on Stage I Armaments Reductions to allowances set out in that Annex. For each item of armament produced, an item of the same type to be destroyed, in addition to destruction required under 1 above. Production of spare parts for armaments to be limited to allowances set out in Annex on Stage I Armaments Reductions and States to be prohibited from expanding facilities for production of types of armaments listed in that Annex. States to be prohibited from producing or testing any type of armament not tested and produced prior to the beginning of Stage I. Flight testing of missiles to be limited in accordance with Annex on Stage I Armaments Reductions.

Production of weapons systems capable of delivering nuclear weapons halted, and all proving grounds demolished (paras. 2 of Articles 5, 6, 7, 8). Production of conventional armaments to be reduced proportionately to the reduction of armed forces. Reduction to be primarily through elimination of enterprises engaged exclusively in armaments production. IDC to verify dismantling. (Article 12).

4. Additional Measures

Agreement to examine and conclude arrangements to be implemented in Stages II and III to reduce and eliminate production and stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons. (Section A, para.4)

Subject dealt with in Stage II.

ARMED FORCES

1. Reduction of Armed Forces

Force levels to be limited to 2.1 million each for the United States and the USSR. All other parties to the Treaty would, with agreed exceptions, reduce force levels to 100,000 or one per cent of their population which ever is higher. In no case would force levels of such other parties exceed levels in existence upon entry into force of the Treaty. (Section 3, para.1).

Force levels to be limited to 1.9 million each for the USSR and the United States. Levels for other states parties to the Treaty to be agreed (Article 11, para.1).

USA

USSR

2. Armed Forces Subject to Reduction

Regular members of armed forces, conscripts serving full-time active duty, militarily organized security forces and other forces or organizations equipped and organized to perform a military mission. (Section B, para.2).

Enlisted men, officers and civilian employees. (Article 11, para. 1).

3. Method of Reduction

Parties initially to declare levels to IDC. One-third of Stage I reduction to be carried out in each one-year step. IDC to verify retained levels as described in G. below. (Section B, para. 3).

Reduction to be carried out primarily through demobilization of personnel released as a result of elimination of the means of delivering nuclear weapons, dismantling foreign bases and withdrawal of troops from foreign territory. IDC to verify disbanding. (Article II, paras. 2, 4)

4. Additional Measures

Parties to make arrangements to ensure that civilian employment by armed forces is in accordance with objectives of agreement on force levels. (Section B, para. 4).

Civilian employees included in definition of force level. (Article II, para. 1).

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

1. Production of Weapons Materials

Production of fissionable materials for use in weapons to be stopped. Production of fissionable materials for purposes other than use in nuclear weapons to be limited to agreed levels. (Section C, para. 1).

No comparable proposal in Stage I. (NOTE: USSR has offered to transfer Stage II measures on nuclear weapons to Stage I if the Western powers agree.)

2. Transfer to Peaceful Uses

Upon cessation of production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons, USA and USSR to transfer agreed amounts of such materials to non-weapons uses. USA to transfer kgrs, USSR to transfer kgrs. (Art. 7 ENDC/109, 14 Aug. 1963)

No comparable proposal.

USA

USSR

3. Transfer between States for Peaceful Uses

Transfers between countries of fissionable materials for purposes other than use in nuclear weapons to be subject to appropriate safeguards developed in agreement with the IAEA. (Sec. C, para 3). No comparable proposal.

4. Non-Transfer of Nuclear Weapons

States which have manufactured nuclear weapons to be precluded from transferring control of such weapons to any nation not owning them or assisting any such state in their manufacture. Parties to the Treaty which have not manufactured nuclear weapons to be precluded from acquiring control over any nuclear weapons or manufacturing or attempting to manufacture them. (Sec. C, para 4).

States possessing nuclear weapons to refrain from transferring control or transmitting information necessary for their production to states not possessing them. Parties to the treaty which do not possess nuclear weapons to undertake to refrain from producing or obtaining them and not to admit nuclear weapons on their territory. (Article 16).

5. Nuclear Weapons Test Explosions

Nuclear weapons tests to be prohibited under effective international control. (Sec. C, para.5).

The conducting of nuclear tests of any kind to be prohibited. (Article 17).

(NOTE: Agreement has been reached to prohibit tests in the atmosphere, outer space and underwater. See ENDC/100/Rev.1, July 30, 1963).

6. Additional Measures

Parties to examine the feasibility of, and agree to, means of reducing and eliminating stockpiles of nuclear weapons during Stages II and III. (Sec. C, para.6).

Subject dealt with in Stage II.

(NOTE: USA has stated its willingness to participate in such studies during the disarmament negotiations, i.e. prior to entry into force of treaty. See FV/146, p.19).

OUTER SPACE

1. Prohibition of Weapons of Mass Destruction in Orbit

Parties not to place in orbit weapons capable of producing mass destruction. (Sec. D, para.1).

Placing into orbit or stationing in outer space of any special device capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction to be prohibited until final destruction of all means of delivering nuclear weapons. (Article 14, para.1).

USA

2. Peaceful Uses

USSR

Parties to agree to support increased co-operation in peaceful uses of outer space (Sec. D, para.2).

Launching of space devices to be for peaceful purposes only. (Article 15, para. 1).

3. Notification and Pre-Launch Inspection

Advance notification to be given by Parties to the Treaty to the IDO of launching of space vehicles and missiles (Sec.D, para. 3).

Advance notification to be given by states to the IDC about all launchings of rockets for peaceful purposes. IDO to control launchings for peaceful purposes by examination of rockets or satellites at the launching sites. (Article 14, para.2).

4. Boosters

The production, stockpiling and testing of boosters for space vehicles to be subject to agreed limitations. (Sec. D, para. 4).

No comparable proposal.

MILITARY EXPENDITURES

1. Report on Expenditures

Itemized report on military expenditures to be filed with the IDO at the end of each step of each stage. (Article E, para. 1).

IDC to have full access to records of central financial offices of states in connexion with budgetary reductions resulting from implementation of disarmament measures. (Article 13, para.2).

2. Verifiable Reduction of Expenditures

Parties to the Treaty to examine questions related to the verifiable reduction of military expenditures. (Article E, para.2).

Military expenditures to be reduced in proportion to first stage reduction in arms and armed forces. An agreed portion of the funds released to go to economic and technical assistance to underdeveloped countries. (Article 13, para.1).

USA

USSR

REDUCTION OF THE RISK OF WAR

1. Advance Notification of Military Movements & Related Measures

Advance notification to be given to other Parties by specified Parties of major military movements and manoeuvres. (Sec. F, para.1).

Large-scale military movements by armed forces of two or more states to be prohibited. Advance notification to be given of large-scale military movements by national armed forces within national frontiers. (Art.17A).
See also Art.14 para.1 which prohibits, inter alia, from the beginning of Stage I: warships from leaving territorial waters and military aircraft capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction from flying beyond the limits of their national territories.

2. Observation Posts

Observation posts to be established by specified Parties at major ports, railway centres, motor highways, river crossings, and air bases to report on concentration and movements of military forces. (Sec. F, para.2).

No comparable proposal in General Disarmament Plan, but contained in Foreign Minister Gromyko's September 26, 1961 memorandum. (See also statement by USSR representative in FV/148, p.21 for additional proposals on this subject).

3. Additional Observation Arrangements

Such additional observation arrangements as might be agreed. (Sec. F, para.3).

No comparable proposal.

4. Exchange of Military Missions

Exchange of military missions between states or groups of states to be undertaken by specified parties to improve communication and understanding between them. (Sec. F, para.4).

Exchange of military missions between states or groups of states to improve communications and relations between them. (Article 17A).
(See also statement by USSR representative in FV/148, p.21 for additional proposals on this subject)

USA

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5. Communication between Heads of Government

Rapid and reliable communications to be established by specified parties among their heads of government and the Secretary-General of the United Nations. (Sec. F, para.5).

States will establish swift and reliable means of communications between heads of government and with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. (Article 17A).

(NOTE: Agreement has been reached on establishment of such communications between USA and USSR. See Memorandum of Understanding ... Regarding Establishment of a Direct Communications Link; ENDC/97, 20 June 1963.)

6. International Commission

Establishment of an International Commission on Reduction of the Risk of War to recommend further measures to reduce the risk of war by accident, miscalculation, failure of communication or surprise attack. (Sec. F, para.6)

No comparable proposal.

(NOTE: The USA proposals in Section F were elaborated in document ENDC/70, 12 December 1962).

THE INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT ORGANIZATION

1. Establishment of IDC

IDC to be established within the framework of the UN upon entry into force of the agreement. (Sec. G, para.1).

IDC to be established within the framework of the United Nations to begin operating as soon as disarmament measures are initiated. (Art.2, para.3).

2. Functions of IDC

The general function of the IDC to be to ensure compliance with the obligations undertaken by verifying the execution of measures agreed upon and assisting the states in developing the details of agreed further verification and disarmament measures. Nature of verification by IDC depends upon nature of obligation being verified.

The general function of the IDC to be to exercise control over the compliance by states with their obligations to reduce or eliminate armaments and their production and to reduce or disband their armed forces. (Article 2, para.3, e.g. paras. 3 of Articles 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, article 11, para. 4, Article 12, para. 2)

2. Functions of IDO (cont'd)

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- a. Where obligation deals only with reduction of arms, verification need only relate to reduction process.
- b. Where obligation is to halt or limit production, IDO must have access to all production facilities, wherever located. Start with declared facilities, however, relying on verification measures in (c) below to discover any clandestine activities.
- c. Where measure is one not to exceed agreed levels of armaments or armed forces or not to engage in clandestine production activities, IDO must have authority to make inspections necessary for verification, but the extent of inspection during any step or stage must be related to the amount of disarmament being undertaken and degree of risk from possible violations. Progressive zonal inspection suggested as an example of one way in which this principle might be given effect.
(Sec. G, para.3)

3. Composition of IDO

The IDO would be composed of:

- a. A "General Conference" of all parties to the treaty.
- b. A Control Council consisting of representatives of all the major signatory powers as permanent members and other states on a rotating basis.
- c. An Administrator, subject to the direction of the Control Council, with authority, staff and finances to ensure effective and impartial functions of IDO.
(Sec. G, para.4).
IDO General Conference, Control Council and Administrator would each have a wide range of functions. See ENDC/30 p.15, 16.

The IDO would be composed of:

- a. A Conference of all states parties to the Treaty.
- b. A Control Council consisting of the five states which are permanent members of the Security Council and an unspecified number of other states elected by the Conference for a two year period. The Council to represent the three principal groups of states existing in the world.
- c. A staff, reporting to the Control Council, recruited by the Council on an international basis, so as to ensure that the three principal groups of states existing in the world are adequately represented. (Arts. 40, 41, 42).

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4. Voting

No comparable proposal.

Each party to the Treaty to have one vote. Procedural decisions to be taken by simple majority, all others by two-thirds majority. (Art. 41, para.2, Art. 42, para.3).

MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN ARRANGEMENTS FOR KEEPING THE PEACE

1. Obligations Concerning Force

Parties to undertake to refrain from the threat or use of force contrary to the principles of the United Nations Charter. (Sec. H, para.1).

Parties agree to base relations on the principles of peaceful and friendly coexistence and co-operation, and to refrain from the threat or use of force (Article 3, para.1a, b).

2. Rules of International Conduct

Agreement to be undertaken to support a study by a subsidiary body of the IDO of the codification and progressive development of rules of international conduct related to disarmament. Parties agree to refrain from indirect aggression and subversion. (Sec.H, para.2)

No comparable proposal.

3. Peaceful Settlement of Disputes

All appropriate processes to be used for the peaceful settlement of disputes. Disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaty, not settled by negotiation or the IDO to be referred to the International Court of Justice. Parties to support study for more effective use of procedures for settling international disputes and institution of new procedures and arrangements when needed. (Sec. H, para.3).

Parties resolve to settle any international disputes through procedures provided for in the UN Charter (Art. 3, para.1)

Parties agree to strengthen United Nations and to conduct their relations on the basis of United Nations Charter obligations. (Article 3, para.1).

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4. Maintenance of International Peace and Security

Parties to agree to support measures strengthening the structure, authority and operation of the United Nations. (Sec. H, para.4).

Questions of safeguarding international peace and security, including preventive and enforcement measures, shall be decided by United Nations Security Council. (Article 40, para.2).

5. United Nations Peace Force

Parties conclude arrangements for the establishment, in Stage II, of a United Nations Peace Force. (Sec. H, para.5).

To ensure that the United Nations is capable of effectively protecting states against threats to or breaches of the peace, agreements to be concluded with the Security Council to make available to it armed forces, assistance and facilities as provided in Article 43 of the United Nations Charter. Peace force to be made up of national armed forces which shall be stationed within their own territories and shall be placed at the disposal of the Security Council under the command of national military authorities. (Article 18).

6. Peace Observation Group

A peace observation group to be established within the United Nations, staffed with a standing cadre of observers to be dispatched to investigate any situation which might constitute a threat or a breach of the peace. (Sec. H, para.6).

No comparable proposal.

FOREIGN MILITARY BASES AND TROOPS IN FOREIGN TERRITORIES

1. Foreign Military Bases

No comparable proposal in Stage I. Proposal in Stage II deals with reduction in bases wherever located.

All foreign military bases and depots to be dismantled. (Article 9).

2. Withdrawal of Troops from Foreign Territory

Simultaneously with the elimination of means of delivering nuclear weapons, all military personnel in foreign territories to be withdrawn. (Article 10).

USA

TRANSITION

Transition from Stage I to Stage II
dependent upon:

- a. All Stage I undertakings carried out;
- b. All preparations for Stage II completed;
- c. All militarily significant states being parties to Treaty.

During the last three months of Stage I the Control Council to review foregoing circumstances. Transition from Stage I to Stage II to take place on a 2/3 vote of the Control Council, including the affirmative vote of the USA and USSR, that these conditions have been fulfilled. If one or more permanent member of the Control Council does not agree that these conditions have been met, Stage I would be extended, upon request, by a period or periods of not more than three months.

(NOTE: In Part I, Art. 1, para 5 of ENDC/40/Rev. 1, the USA proposed that "transition from one stage of disarmament to the next takes place upon decision that all measures in the preceding stage have been implemented and verified and that any additional arrangements required for measures in the next stage have been prepared and can, when appropriate, be put into operation.")

Review by IDO during last three months of Stage I of the results of the implementation of the first-stage measures with a view to reporting on them to the States parties to the Treaty as well as the Security Council and the General Assembly. (Article 20).

(NOTE: In Part I, Art. 1, para 5 of ENDC/40/Rev. 1, the USSR proposed that "transition from one stage of disarmament to the next takes place after adoption by the IDO of a decision confirming that all disarmament measures in the preceding stage have been implemented and verified and that any additional verification arrangements required for measures in the next stage have been prepared and can, when appropriate, be put into operation.")

STAGE II PROPOSALS

Stage II would begin upon the transition from Stage I and would be completed within three years from that date. (Stage II).

The duration of the second stage shall be 24 months. (Article 28).

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ARMAMENTS

1. Reduction of Armaments

Levels of armaments to be further reduced by 50 per cent of the inventory existing at the end of Stage I. Parties not subject to the reduction of armaments in Stage I, to reduce their armaments by 65 per cent in Stage II to accomplish same total percentage of reduction by the end of Stage II as parties which had reduced their armaments in Stage I. (Sec. 4, para 1).

All armaments capable of delivering nuclear delivery vehicles are to be eliminated in stage II. (Art. 23a). Levels of conventional armaments and equipment to be reduced by 35% from original levels. The reduced armaments and equipment to be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses. (Article 24, para 2).

2. Additional Armaments to be reduced

Types of armaments subject to reduction expanded to include many of the smaller armaments not included in Stage I. Fifty per cent cut in each type of armaments. (Sec. 4, para. 2).

See subsection 1 above.

3. Method of Reduction

Same method as proposed for Stage I.

Same method as proposed for Stage I.

4. Limitation on Production

Production to be halted except for parts, within agreed limits, for maintenance of the agreed levels. (Sec. A, 4a).

Production to be reduced in proportion to the reduction of armed forces. (Art. 25).

Production of ammunition reduced to levels consistent with agreed levels of armaments and forces. Development and testing of new types of armament to be halted. (Sec. A, para 4)

5. Additional Measures

In light of the Study undertaken during Stage I, stockpiles of chemical and bacteriological weapons to be reduced to levels fifty per cent below levels existing at beginning of Stage II and production halted. IDO to check residual levels. (Sec. A, para 5).

CBR weapons to be eliminated and destroyed and instruments and facilities for combat use, and devices and facilities for storage and conservation to be destroyed, and production halted. IDO to verify destruction. (art. 23).

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ARMED FORCES

1. Reduction of Armed Forces

Force levels for the USA, USSR to be reduced to levels 50 per cent below the levels agreed for the end of Stage I (i.e. 1.05 million) and levels for all other parties to be further reduced on the basis of an agreed percentage. Parties not subject to reductions of force levels in Stage I to reduce their forces to agreed levels consistent with the levels of affected Parties. (Sec. B, para 1).

Force levels to be reduced to one million each for the USSR and the USA. Force levels for other states to be agreed. (Art. 24, para 1).

2. Method of Reduction

Same method of procedure as proposed for Stage I

Same method of procedure as proposed for Stage I.

3. Additional Measures

Agreed limitation on compulsory military training and refresher training for reserves. (Sec. B, para 3).

No comparable proposal in Stage II. See Stage III proposals.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

1a Reduction of Nuclear Weapons

In light of examination in Stage I, stocks of fissionable material declared for use in nuclear weapons to be reduced to minimum levels on the basis of agreed percentages. Reduction to be accomplished by transfer of nuclear materials from weapons use to peaceful uses. Non-nuclear components and assemblies of nuclear weapons from which fissionable materials had been removed to be destroyed. Production or refabrication of nuclear weapons from any remaining fissionable material to be subject to agreed limitations. (Sec. C, para 1).

Production of nuclear weapons to be discontinued. All nuclear weapons shall be destroyed and all nuclear components as well as all stockpiles of nuclear materials for use in weapons shall be processed to render them unfit for use in weapons and be transferred to a special fund for peaceful uses belonging to the States which previously owned the weapons. (Art. 22, para 1).

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1b Production of fissionable material for Weapons

Proposed to be halted in Stage I.

Production of fissionable material for weapons purposes to be discontinued. (Art. 22, para 2a).

2. Registration of Nuclear Weapons

All nuclear weapons and fissionable material remaining in last six months of Stage II to be registered by IDO to facilitate verification during Stage III that no nuclear weapons remained at disposal of State. (Sec. C, para. 2)

Verification of measures by IDO which shall have the right to inspect all enterprises which extract nuclear raw materials for atomic production or which uses or produces fissionable materials or atomic energy. (Art. 22, para 2b).

3. Criminal Punishment

No provision limited to nuclear weapons but see Stage II, Measures for keeping the peace section 5.

Parties to enact criminal legislation prohibiting nuclear weapons or their manufacture. (Art. 22, para 3).

MILITARY BASES AND FACILITIES

Agreed military bases, wherever located, to be dismantled or converted to peaceful uses (Sec. D).

Bases dealt with in Stage I and limited to foreign bases.

REDUCTION OF THE RISK OF WAR

Extend measures undertaken during Stage I in the light of the examination by the International Commission in Stage I.

No comparable proposal.

FURTHER REDUCTION OF MILITARY EXPENDITURES

No comparable proposal.

Reduce further their military budgets in view of further reduction in arms. An agreed portion of the funds released to go to economic and technical assistance to underdeveloped countries. (Art. 26, para 1).

THE INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT ORGANIZATION

IDO to be strengthened to ensure its capacity to verify Stage II measures. (Sec. F)

No comparable proposal.

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MEASURES FOR KEEPING THE PEACE

I. Peaceful Settlement of Disputes

In light of study of peaceful settlement of disputes during stage I, parties to agree to additional steps to assure just and peaceful settlement of disputes. Parties accept compulsory jurisdiction of ICJ. (Sec. G, para. 1).

No comparable proposal.

2. Rules of International Conduct

Continue the Stage I study of development and codification of international conduct with respect to disarmament. Rules recommended by study and approved by Control Council would be binding unless a majority disapproved within three months or unless a party formally notified others within one year that it did not intend to be bound. (Sec. G, para. 2).

No comparable proposal.

3. United Nations Peace Force

A UN Peace force to be established and to come into being within the first year of Stage II and be progressively strengthened during Stage II. (Sec. G, para. 3).

Armed forces to be continued to be placed at the disposal of the Security Council for use under Article 42 of the UN Charter. (Art.27).

4. United Nations Peace Observation Corps.

Arrangements to be concluded for the expansion of the activities of the UN Peace Observation Group. (Sec. G, para 4).

5. National Legislation

In accordance with their constitutional processes, parties will, in support of the Treaty, enact national legislation imposing legal obligations on individuals and organizations under their jurisdiction. (Sec. G, para 5).

See Stage II, Nuclear Weapons, Sub-section 3 on "Criminal punishment".

TRANSITION

Same as proposed from Stage I to Stage II. (ENDC/30 Add.2). See also Part I provisions regarding transition from Stages I to II.

Same as proposed from Stage I to Stage II. (Article 29). See also Part I provisions regarding transition from Stages I to II.

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STAGE III PROPOSALS

Stage III would begin upon transition from Stage II and would be completed within an agreed period of time but as promptly as possible.

Stage III shall be completed over a period of one year. (Art. 39).

ARMAMENTS

1. Reduction of Armaments

Subject to agreed requirements for non-nuclear armaments of agreed types for national forces required to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens, all armaments to be eliminated during Stage III. (Sec. A, para 1).

The states parties to the Treaty shall destroy or convert to peaceful uses all armaments, military equipment, and munitions, whether held by the troops or in depots. (Art. 31, para 2).

2. Method of Reduction

To be carried out in agreed sequence in manner set forth in Treaty Annex. (Sec. A, para 2).

Same Method as proposed for Stage I. (Art. 31, para 3).

3. Cessation of Production

Subject to limitations stated in 1 above, and subject to agreed arrangement in support of the UN Peace Force, all production, applied research, developing or testing of armaments to be halted. (Sec. A, para 3).

Military production to be discontinued with exception of production of agreed types and quantities of light firearms for maintaining internal order, including safeguarding frontiers and personal security of citizens, and to ensure compliance under obligations to maintain international peace and security under UN Charter. (Art. 32, para 1).

ARMED FORCES

1. Reduction of Armed Forces

All armed forces disbanded except those agreed for purpose of maintaining internal order and protecting personal security of citizens, and providing agreed manpower for UN Peace Force -- all others, including reserve forces and all organizational arrangements comprising or supporting national military establishments to be disbanded. (Sec. b, para 1).

The entire personnel of the armed forces shall be disbanded. Systems of military reserves shall be abolished. As part of the abolition of the military establishment, parties should:

- a. demobilize general staff
- b. abrogate legislative acts dealing with military establishment
- c. destroy all weapons.

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Parties entitled to retain agreed contingents of militia, armed with light firearms, to maintain internal order, including safeguarding frontiers and personal security of citizens, and to comply with obligations to maintain international peace and security under UN Charter. (Arts. 31, 33, 36)

2. Method of Reduction

Disbandment carried out in agreed sequence in manner set forth in Treaty annex. (Sec. B, para 2A).

All personnel to be disbanded. All documents pertaining to mobilization and operational deployment to be destroyed. (Art. 33, para 1).

3. Other Measures

All military conscription halted along with other inconsistent legislation. (Sec. B, para 3).

States to adopt legislation prohibiting military training, abolishing conscription and discontinuing courses for reservists. (Art. 34)

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

1. Elimination of Nuclear Weapons

In light of steps taken in Stages I and II, parties to eliminate all nuclear weapons remaining at their disposal. (Sec. C, para 1).

All nuclear weapons will have been eliminated by end of Stage II. (Art. 22, p. 16).

2. Method of Reduction

Elimination of nuclear weapons to be carried out in agreed sequence under IDO control which would provide assurance no nuclear weapons, materials or production facilities left outside of control. (Sec. C, para 2).

Measure to be carried out in Stage II. (Art. 22).

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MILITARY BASES

All bases remaining at disposal of states to be dismantled or converted to peaceful uses, except for such agreed bases or facilities within territories of States for use of agreed forces required to maintain internal order. (Sec. D.1).

Implicit in proposal for conversion of all military premises to peaceful uses. (Art. 31, para 3).

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE

Parties to report to IDO any basic scientific discovery or technological invention having potential military significance. Control Council of IDO to study discoveries and recommend measures for their control. Parties to support full international co-operation in all fields of scientific research and development. (Sec. E).

All scientific research in the military field at all scientific and research institutions shall be discontinued. All relevant blueprints and documents to be destroyed Art. 32 (1).

MILITARY EXPENDITURES

Part I article 1(2)(g) (ENDC/40 Rev.1) provides for discontinuance of all military expenditures.

Prohibition of appropriation of funds for military purposes in any form whether by governments, private individuals or social organizations. Portion of funds released to be used for assistance to underdeveloped countries. (Art. 35). See also ENDC/40/Rev.1 Art. 1(2)(g).

REDUCTION OF THE RISK OF WAR

Extend measures pertaining to Stages I and II and apply them to national forces required to maintain order and protect personal security of citizens (Sec. F).

No comparable proposal

INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT ORGANIZATION

IDO to be strengthened and maintained on a continuing basis. (Sec. G).

IDO to have access at any time to any point within the territory of any party in order to prevent the re-establishment of armed forces and armaments (Art. 38).

MEASURES FOR KEEPING THE PEACE

1. Peaceful changes and Rules of Conduct

The steps taken under Stages I and II to provide a basis for peaceful change in a disarmed world would be continued as would steps looking toward peaceful settlement of disputes and development of rules of international conduct relating to disarmament. (Sec. H, paras 1, 2).

No comparable proposal

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2. United Nations Peace Force

The United Nations Peace force would be progressively strengthened until it had sufficient armed forces and armaments so that no state could challenge it. (Sec. H, para 3).

Parties to make available to the Security Council under Art. 43, units from militia retained by it, and to provide assistance and facilities, including rights of passage. The size of these units will be specified by agreement and the command of the units shall be made up of representatives of the three principal groups of states existing in the world. All questions shall be decided by agreement of the three representatives. (Art. 37).

(NOTE: In Part 1, Art. 3, para 3 of ENDC 40/Rev. 1, the USA proposed that "during and after implementation of general and complete disarmament, states would support and provide agreed manpower for a UN Peace Force to be equipped with agreed types of armaments necessary to ensure, under agreed arrangements, that the UN can, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, effectively deter or suppress any threat or use of arms.")

(NOTE: In Part 1, Art. 3, para 3 of ENDC/40/Rev.1, the USSR proposed that "during and after implementation of general and complete disarmament, states would support and provide in accordance with the UN Charter agreed manpower for a UN Peace Force to be equipped with agreed types of non-nuclear armaments.")

COMPLETION OF STAGE III

To be determined by 2/3 affirmative vote of Control Council including the Soviet Union and the United States. If any permanent member objected, the period for Stage III to be extended for a period or periods totalling no more than three months. Question of completion then would be put again before Control Council. If 2/3 of the Council including USA and USSR voted affirmatively the Stage would be deemed to have been completed. (ENDC/30/Add.2, Sec. 1, para 3).

At end of period, IDO shall review the results with a view to reporting to states parties to treaty, Security Council and General Assembly of UN. (Art. 39).

GENERAL PROVISIONS

1. Procedure of Amendment

Parties to agree to procedure for amendment, including a conference. (General provisions, para 1, pp. 32-33).

Two-thirds majority at a conference can amend. (Art. 47).

2. Interim Agreement

Interim agreement to involve establishment of a preparatory commission. (General provisions, para 2, p. 33).

Preparatory Commission established immediately after signing. (Art. 45).

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3. Entry into Force

Treaty to enter into force upon ratification by USA, USSR and agreed number of specified states. (General provisions, para 3, p. 33).

Treaty to enter into force upon ratification by all permanent members of the Security Council, as well as those that are their allies in bilateral and multi-lateral military alliances, and by an agreed number of non-aligned states. (Art. 46).

4. Finance

Budget approved by General Conference and paid in accordance with a scale of apportionment fixed by General Conference. General Conference to have financial power. (General Provisions, para 4, p. 34).

Budget drawn up by Council and approved by Conference. Scale of apportionment fixed in treaty. (Art. 44).

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/97
20 June 1963
Original: ENGLISH
and RUSSIAN

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
AND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MEMORANDUM

OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST
REPUBLICS REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A
DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS LINK

For use in time of emergency the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have agreed to establish as soon as technically feasible a direct communications link between the two Governments.

Each Government shall be responsible for the arrangements for the link on its own territory. Each Government shall take the necessary steps to ensure continuous functioning of the link and prompt delivery to its head of government of any communications received by means of the link from the head of government of the other party.

Arrangements for establishing and operating the link are set forth in the Annex which is attached hereto and forms an integral part hereof.

Done in duplicate in the English and Russian languages at Geneva, Switzerland, this 20th day of June, 1963.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

CHARLES C. STELLE

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF
SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

S.K. TSARAPKIN

Acting Representative of the
United States of America to
the Eighteen-Nation Committee
on Disarmament

Acting Representative of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics to
the Eighteen-Nation Committee on
Disarmament

ANNEX

TO THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION
OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS REGARDING THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF A DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS LINK

The direct communications link between Washington and Moscow established in accordance with the Memorandum, and the operation of such link, shall be governed by the following provisions:

1. The direct communications link shall consist of:
 - a. Two terminal points with telegraph-teleprinter equipment between which communications shall be directly exchanged;
 - b. One full-time duplex wire telegraph circuit, routed Washington-London-Copenhagen-Stockholm-Helsinki-Moscow, which shall be used for the transmission of messages;
 - c. One full-time duplex radio telegraph circuit, routed Washington-Tangier-Moscow, which shall be used for service communications and for coordination of operations between the two terminal points.

If experience in operating the direct communications link should demonstrate that the establishment of an additional wire telegraph circuit is advisable, such circuit may be established by mutual agreement between authorized representatives of both Governments.

2. In case of interruption of the wire circuit, transmission of messages shall be effected via the radio circuit, and for this purpose provision shall be made at the terminal points for the capability of prompt switching of all necessary equipment from one circuit to another.

3. The terminal points of the link shall be so equipped as to provide for the transmission and reception of messages from Moscow to Washington in the Russian language and from Washington to Moscow in the English language. In this connection, the USSR shall furnish the United States four sets of telegraph terminal equipment, including page printers, transmitters, and reperforators, with one year's supply of spare parts and all necessary special tools, test equipment, operating instructions and other technical literature, to provide for transmission and reception of messages in the Russian language.

The United States shall furnish the Soviet Union four sets of telegraph terminal equipment, including page printers, transmitters, and reperforators, with one year's supply of spare parts and all necessary special tools, test equipment, operating instructions and other technical literature, to provide for transmission and reception of messages in the English language.

The equipment described in this paragraph shall be exchanged directly between the parties without any payment being required therefor.

4. The terminal points of the direct communications link shall be provided with encoding equipment. For the terminal point in the USSR, four sets of such equipment (each capable of simplex operation), with one year's supply of spare parts, with all necessary special tools, test equipment, operating instructions and other technical literature, and with all necessary blank tape, shall be furnished by the United States to the USSR against payment of the cost thereof by the USSR.

The USSR shall provide for preparation and delivery of keying tapes to the terminal point of the link in the United States for reception of messages from the USSR. The United States shall provide for the preparation and delivery of keying tapes to the terminal point of the link in the USSR for reception of messages from the United States. Delivery of prepared keying tapes to the terminal points of the link shall be effected through the Embassy of the USSR in Washington (for the terminal of the link in the USSR) and through the Embassy of the United States in Moscow (for the terminal of the link in the United States).

5. The United States and the USSR shall designate the agencies responsible for the arrangements regarding the direct communications link, for its technical maintenance, continuity and reliability, and for the timely transmission of messages.

Such agencies may, by mutual agreement, decide matters and develop instructions relating to the technical maintenance and operation of the direct communications link and effect arrangements to improve the operation of the link.

6. The technical parameters of the telegraph circuits of the link and of the terminal equipment, as well as the maintenance of such circuits and equipment, shall be in accordance with CCITT and CCIR recommendations.

Transmission and reception of messages over the direct communications link shall be effected in accordance with applicable recommendations of international telegraph and radio communications regulations, as well as with mutually agreed instructions.

7. The costs of the direct communications link shall be borne as follows:
- a. The USSR shall pay the full cost of leasing the portion of the telegraph circuit from Moscow to Helsinki and 50% of the cost of leasing the portion of the telegraph circuit from Helsinki to London. The United States shall pay the full cost of leasing the portion of the telegraph circuit from Washington to London and 50% of the cost of leasing the portion of the telegraph circuit from London to Helsinki.
 - b. Payment of the cost of leasing the radio telegraph circuit between Washington and Moscow shall be effected without any transfer of payments between the parties. The USSR shall bear the expenses relating to the transmission of messages from Moscow to Washington. The United States shall bear the expenses relating to the transmission of messages from Washington to Moscow.
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CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/87
6 May 1963

ENGLISH
Original: SPANISH

BRAZIL AND MEXICO

Declaration

on the denuclearization of Latin America

The delegations of Brazil and Mexico have the honour to bring to the notice of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament the "Declaration on the Denuclearization of Latin America" drawn up and approved jointly by the Governments of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Mexico on 29 April 1963.

On the instructions of their Governments, the two delegations are submitting the text of this Declaration and request the Secretariat to arrange for it to be circulated to all Member States as an official document of the Conference and to be included in the official records of this session.

Declaration

"The Presidents of the Republics of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Mexico, DEEPLY CONCERNED at current developments in the international situation which are conducive to the dissemination of nuclear weapons;

CONSIDERING that the Latin American States, impelled by their consistently peace-loving tradition, should combine their efforts to make Latin America a denuclearized zone, thereby helping to reduce the dangers threatening world peace;

DESIRING to preserve their countries from the disastrous consequences which would result from a nuclear war; and

ENCOURAGED by the hope that the conclusion of a Latin American regional agreement may contribute to the adoption of a contractual instrument on a world-wide scale.

On behalf of their peoples and Governments have agreed as follows:.

1. To announce forthwith that their Governments are prepared to sign a Latin American multilateral agreement by which the countries would undertake not to manufacture, receive, store or test nuclear weapons or nuclear launching devices;

2. To bring this Declaration to the attention of the Heads of State of the other Latin American Republics with the expressed wish that their Governments should accede to it by whatever procedure they deem appropriate;

3. To co-operate with each other and with the other Latin American countries according to this Declaration so that Latin America may be recognized as a denuclearized zone as soon as possible."

Ambassador Josué de Castro
Representative of Brazil

Ambassador Luis Padilla Nervo
Representative of Mexico

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Note of the Soviet Government of 20 May 1963 to the Government of the United States of America

"The Government of the Soviet Union deems it necessary to state to the Government of the United States the following:

"Quite recently the Soviet Government was compelled to utter a warning against the plans for the creation of a NATO nuclear force which would give the West German Bundeswehr access to atomic weapons and unleash a nuclear armaments race knowing neither State nor geographical bounds. Today the peoples are witnessing the fact that the Governments of the United States and certain other NATO members are taking further steps in the same direction.

"The point in question is the already started implementation of plans for the development of United States nuclear submarines equipped with Polaris nuclear missiles in the Mediterranean area. As possible bases for these submarines, ports in Spain and British military bases in Cyprus and Malta have been mentioned. There are reports that submarines equipped with Polaris missiles will also use ports in Turkey, Greece and Italy. Two such nuclear submarines have already entered the Mediterranean and are settling down in the coastal waters of Greece and Turkey.

"Thus the United States and some of its allies are demonstrating once again that concern for the prevention of a thermonuclear war or at least for the reduction of the danger of its outbreak is alien to their policy. Instead of joining in the efforts of those States which, in anticipation of the implementation of a programme of general and complete disarmament, are already striving to narrow the field of preparations for a nuclear war, the Powers in the lead in NATO are bringing within the orbit of these preparations yet another extensive area with a population of approximately 300 millions.

"What will be the result of turning the Mediterranean Sea into a gigantic reservoir filled with scores of missiles having megatons of nuclear load? What does it mean to turn the Mediterranean basin into a kind of missile drome where every mile of the sea's surface can be used by an aggressor as a launching site for nuclear weapons?

"In the first place, it increases immeasurably the danger that the Mediterranean and the adjacent countries may become the theatre of devastating military operations. Even States which neither have nor wish to have anything to do with the aggressive preparations of NATO - and these are the overwhelming majority in the Mediterranean - in fact find themselves in a situation where the right to control their future is appropriated by those who command the nuclear submarines cruising in the vicinity of their coasts. Under their security and sovereignty are being spread the trammels of the same dangerous policy in which the countries which have made their territories available for the location of NATO military bases have been caught.

"The alarm of the Arabs, Yugoslavs, Albanians and Cypriots, and of other peoples as well, cannot be allayed by assertions that the sending of United States missile-carrying submarines into the Mediterranean is no more than a "technical" operation to replace the land-based Jupiter missiles on the territory of Turkey and Italy with other, more improved ones. No, the replacement of United States fixed missile bases by floating ones which is now being carried out entails far-reaching political and military consequences: the spectre of nuclear war which at first set foot on the land of those countries which are themselves actively participating in the military arrangements of NATO has now been given an entry visa on all the shores of the Mediterranean Sea. Submarines equipped with Polaris missiles cruising along the shores of the Mediterranean countries would extend the area from which a nuclear attack could be launched and, consequently, would also enlarge the geographical sphere of application of the inevitable counter-measures for the purpose of neutralizing the bases of aggression.

"It is obvious that the countries in which these submarines are based permanently or from time to time, would expose themselves to the greatest danger. But there is no guarantee, nor can there be any, that a nuclear submarine will not release its death-dealing load from international waters and then try to hide off the coast of a State not forming part of the North Atlantic bloc, or that it will not fire a salvo directly from the territorial waters of that State. The likelihood of such a course of events cannot be excluded, especially as many States of the Mediterranean basin are without practical means to prevent nuclear submarines from entering their waters and only a few minutes would be required for the irreparable to be accomplished.

"The introduction into the Mediterranean Sea of NATO military vessels with nuclear weapons on board makes it necessary for the States whose security is being threatened by the North Atlantic bloc to carry out effective defensive counter-measures in order to

be in a position to repulse any encroachment upon the peaceful life of their peoples and not to leave the NATO Powers a free hand to use the Mediterranean as a spring-board for possible aggression. The peace-loving States will have no other choice than to keep their means of neutralization trained on the routes along which the nuclear submarines move, as well as on the coasts of NATO members and those countries which make their territories available to this bloc as permanent or periodic bases for nuclear missile weapons.

"It should be clear to everyone that the NATO military staffs are leading matters to the point where the Mediterranean, instead of being the shortest commercial sea route linking West and East and a traditional place of rest and international tourism, would become the lair of the carriers of nuclear death and yet another area of dangerous rivalry and conflict.

"What have the countries of the Balkan Peninsula, North Africa, the Near and Middle East, all countries situated along the perimeter of the Mediterranean or even in the depths of the continents, to gain, if missile-bearing nuclear submarines rove along their coasts? Will this increase their security or help to improve their lives? Is it possible to think that the Greeks, Turks, Italians, Frenchmen, Spaniards and other peoples of the Mediterranean will feel safer if foreign missiles and atom bombs over which they have no power or control are put in firing position on their very thresholds? Even in the event of an accidental combination of circumstances, against their will and desire the peoples of this area may become the victims of a deadly catastrophe.

"The peoples of the Mediterranean have had to suffer many things in the course of their history. From the innumerable conflicts which shook ancient Egypt, Greece, Rome and Carthage to the two World Wars in this century, this area has experienced all the vicissitudes of armed rivalry between States. But even in the Second World War, which rapidly spread to the African continent and across the Near and Far East, there was no weapon even remotely comparable in destructive power with the one now hiding in the waves of the Mediterranean Sea or with the one which would be used to deliver a counter-blow to an aggressor if this sea were used as a centre and hiding place for an aggressor. If the worst came to the worst in these days, the Mediterranean Sea would become a dead sea in every sense of the word. Many centres of civilization and culture would be threatened with a fate similar to that of Pompeii. Even people who have no religious views can understand the feelings of millions of Christians and

Moslems in connexion with the fact that in the implementation of the plans of the NATO leaders nuclear weapons would be almost under the walls of the Vatican, Jerusalem, Mecca and Medina.

"The Governments of the Western Powers try to justify their plans to station Polaris submarines in the Mediterranean Sea on the grounds that it is an open sea and that whether or not to make ports available for missile-carrying vessels is a domestic affair of the individual States. But by what right are four or five States, which have linked themselves with the policy of NATO, without considering the interests of the other Mediterranean countries, prepared to throw open the gates of Gibraltar to a stream of nuclear weapons? If, for example, the Governments of Turkey, Greece, Italy or Spain allow submarines or surface vessels with nuclear weapons on board to shelter in their waters, they will not only be trifling with the fate of their own countries but will also endanger the security of neighbouring countries.

"The Governments of the United States and the other NATO countries have not been lacking in assurances that the United States Polaris submarines are being sent to the Mediterranean Sea for 'defensive purposes' and even for the 'protection' of the countries of this area. It would be no exaggeration, however, to say that of all the existing means of waging war the United States weapon now being stationed in the Mediterranean Sea is the least fitted to serve defensive purposes but, on the other hand, it is the most suitable for any kind of provocation. The distinctive feature of the use of nuclear submarines as mobile missile bases is that they are designed to conceal preparations for, and to ensure the sudden delivery of, a nuclear attack.

"Furthermore, in the Soviet Union, and no doubt in other countries as well, one remembers the recent statements of highly placed persons in the United States to the effect that under certain circumstances the United States might take the initiative in a nuclear conflict with the USSR. The Soviet Government could not fail to pay attention also to the statements of leading military personalities in the United States to the effect that the United States submarines which have been sent to the Mediterranean Sea have been previously assigned certain targets in the Soviet Union.

"It will not be superfluous to note further that it has also often been said that the purpose of the United States Sixth Fleet, which has been roaming about the Mediterranean Sea from year to year, is to help the Mediterranean countries to protect their independence and security. But in the log-book of the Commander of this Fleet there is not a single entry of any operation in support of the sovereign rights of independence of the countries of North Africa or the Near East.

"On the contrary, the ships of the Sixth Fleet participated in preparing for an attack on Syria in 1957, which was frustrated as a result of the decisive action, in the first place, of the Soviet Union. With the forces of this Fleet the United States occupied the coast of Lebanon in the summer of 1958. United States Navy ships covered foreign intervention in Jordan. It was within sight of the Sixth Fleet that the United States NATO allies, the United Kingdom and France, together with Israel, carried out an aggression against Egypt and bombed Cairo and Port Said.

"Those are the facts. They depict quite definitely the true state of affairs.

"What are United States Navy ships seeking in the Mediterranean Sea, thousands of miles away from the national boundaries of the United States? What are the real aims that are being pursued when, in addition to surface vessels, nuclear submarines with nuclear weapons are now being sent there? The NATO measures for spreading nuclear weapons to new areas speak for themselves. And further light on the intentions of the United States is shed by the statements of United States military leaders who recently justified the need to station United States nuclear weapons in Canada by saying that in the event of war this would make it possible to draw part of a nuclear counter-blow away from the United States and divert it to Canada. This was said, it is true, in respect of Canada and not the Mediterranean Sea. But what is concerned in both cases is preparation for a nuclear war, which is being carried out within the framework of one and the same policy, and one and the same strategy.

"Some people may consider it almost the summit of military thinking to hide their nuclear missile bases as far away as possible from their own vital centres and closer to the borders of other countries. But can the millions of people living in the Mediterranean area be content with the position of hostages in which the leading Powers of NATO are trying to place them? Everything shows that the military plans of these Powers - today more than ever - include the intention, in the event of a conflict, to divert to States wholly innocent in such a conflict, part of the nuclear counter-blow which would be duly delivered to the aggressor.

"There is yet another circumstance which cannot be disregarded. As is well known, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution declaring Africa a denuclearized zone. This resolution was aimed at saving the African continent from the dangers connected with a further spread of nuclear weapons. Not a single NATO State dared vote against it. But by setting out to turn the waters washing the shores of North Africa into a nuclear missile base, the United States and its allies are flagrantly flouting this resolution of the United Nations.

"Obviously, it is no mere coincidence that the plans for sending United States submarines with Polaris missiles to the Mediterranean Sea appeared simultaneously with plans for the creation of a so-called 'multi-national' and 'multilateral' NATO nuclear force, in which a significant role is assigned to the West German revanchists and militarists. These are elements of one and the same policy - the policy of an unbridled armaments race and the spreading of nuclear weapons.

"The Soviet people is engaged in peaceful labour and wishes only peace and prosperity to other peoples. The Soviet Government firmly believes in the principles of peaceful co-existence - it is prepared to settle on the basis of these principles all questions of its relations with any other countries, regardless of social differences, without any interference in the internal affairs of other States.

"Faithful to the policy of peace and peaceful co-existence, the Soviet Union has repeatedly proposed the adoption of measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, giving its support to proposals for the creation of denuclearized zones in various parts of the world; for the elimination of military bases on foreign territories, and the immediate reduction of armaments and armed forces in the areas where the possibility of a conflict is particularly great. The Soviet Government advocates renunciation of the use of foreign territories and ports for the stationing of any type of strategic weapon, including submarines with nuclear missile weapons.

"The Soviet Union has submitted specific proposals on all these questions to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva. The implementation of these proposals would strengthen mutual confidence between States and facilitate the solution of the main problem of our time - general and complete disarmament.

"But what the United States and its allies are now doing in creating a concentrated NATO nuclear force and taking the course of spreading nuclear missile weapons to other continents and seas is placing additional obstacles in the path to disarmament.

"In the interests of ensuring international security, the Soviet Government proposes that the whole area of the Mediterranean Sea should be declared a zone free from nuclear missile weapons. It is prepared to assume an obligation not to deploy any nuclear weapons or their means of delivery in the waters of this area provided that similar obligations are assumed by the other Powers. If this area is declared a zone free from nuclear missile weapons, then, jointly with the United States and the other countries of the West, the Soviet Union is prepared to give reliable guarantees

that in the event of any military complications the area of the Mediterranean Sea will be considered as outside the sphere of use of nuclear weapons.

"Implementation of these proposals would contribute to mutual understanding and friendship in the relations between the countries of the Mediterranean area; it would enable the States of the Mediterranean basin to devote more of their forces and resources to the solution of their economic and social problems. It would at the same time be a substantial contribution towards lessening the general international tension and towards ensuring peace in Europe, Africa and throughout the world.

"The Soviet Government expresses the hope that the Government of the United States will consider with due attention the considerations set forth in this note."

Notes with similar contents were also sent to the Governments of Algeria, Cyprus, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Spain, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Arab Republic and the United Kingdom.

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/91/Corr.1
30 May 1963
ENGLISH only

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Corrigendum to the
note of the Soviet Government of 20 May 1963
to the Government of the United States of America

Page 1, 10th line, replace the word "development"
by the word "deployment".

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/98
21 June 1963
ENGLISH
Original: SPANISH

MEXICO

Working paper for the consideration of
the Eighteen-Nation Committee

Outline draft treaty prohibiting the placing in orbit
and the stationing in outer space of nuclear weapons

The Governments of

Recognizing that it is the common interest of mankind that outer space should be used at all times for peaceful purposes and should not be, and should not become, the theatre or subject of international discord;

Recognizing that the utilization and exploitation of outer space should be only for the betterment of mankind;

Recognizing that outer space and the celestial bodies are the patrimony of all mankind and that no State or groups of States may exercise any right of ownership, dominion or sovereignty, or any other right whatsoever, with respect to them;

Acknowledging that among States, irrespective of the stage of their economic or scientific development, there should prevail the principle of free and equal use of outer space for the purpose of scientific progress or for the purpose of scientific research;

Realizing that, in order that the said progress may be achieved and that the said research may be carried on fruitfully, outer space and the celestial bodies must be free of any connexion with other activities, especially those of a military nature, capable of hampering them;

Convinced that a treaty ensuring the peaceful utilization and exploitation of outer space and the celestial bodies and the maintenance of international harmony in these respects will promote the Purposes and Principles laid down in the Charter of the United Nations;

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

1. Outer space and the celestial bodies shall be utilized exclusively for peaceful purposes. Accordingly, every military measure, among others, such as the placing in orbit and the stationing in space of nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction or of vehicles capable of delivering such weapons, is prohibited. Tests of the said weapons of destruction, or of any other warlike device for military purposes, are likewise prohibited, as is also the stationing or placing in orbit of bases for launching weapons of any type whatsoever.
2. Nothing in this treaty shall prevent the employment of military personnel or equipment, provided that they are used exclusively for scientific research or for some other peaceful purpose.

ARTICLE II

1. No impediment shall be placed in the way of the freedom of scientific research in outer space or on celestial bodies, or of their utilization or exploitation. International co-operation in these respects shall be regulated among States by bilateral or multilateral treaty, but in no case in any manner contrary to the stipulations of this treaty, and in consonance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the international law applicable.
2. The performance of the obligations specified in this treaty shall not prevent the Contracting Parties from promoting to the utmost the establishment of co-operative working relations with those specialized agencies of the United Nations and other international organizations which have a scientific or technical interest in the peaceful utilization or exploitation of outer space and the celestial bodies.

ARTICLE III

1. So long as this Treaty remains in force, the Contracting Parties and any Parties which accede to this Treaty shall be bound to report to each of the other Parties, through the United Nations, any act or activity carried out for the purpose of the peaceful utilization and exploitation of outer space, and likewise the launching of any device, and the specifications of that device.

2. The Contracting Parties shall similarly be bound to report on the direct participation of human beings in programmes of research, utilization or exploitation relating to outer space or to celestial bodies.

3. The Contracting Parties shall similarly be bound to report on all of their installations, equipment or devices which are temporarily or permanently situated in outer space or on celestial bodies at the time of the entry into force of this Treaty.

ARTICLE IV

The United Nations shall be authorized to keep a record of all the information submitted to it by the Contracting Parties pursuant to this Treaty.

ARTICLE V

Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes to make appropriate efforts, compatible with the Charter of the United Nations, to ensure that no one shall carry out in outer space or on celestial bodies any activity contrary to the purposes and principles of this Treaty.

ARTICLE VI

For the purpose of ensuring that outer space and the celestial bodies are used solely for peaceful purposes and are not subject to any measure of a military character, as referred to in Article I of this Treaty, the Contracting Parties agree, to the fullest possible extent,

- (a) to exchange information concerning their scientific programmes in outer space and on celestial bodies with a view to ensuring the utmost economy and efficiency in the operations;
- (b) to exchange scientific personnel; and
- (c) to exchange scientific observations and findings.

ARTICLE VII

In the event of any disagreement with respect to the implementation of this Treaty, the Contracting Parties shall consult with each other immediately with a view to reaching a mutually acceptable solution, and shall settle any dispute solely by peaceful means.

ARTICLE VIII

The representatives of the Contracting Parties shall meet at appropriate intervals and in appropriate places for the purpose of exchanging information or consulting with one another in order to recommend measures which may be adopted by the Governments to ensure that outer space and the celestial bodies are used solely for peaceful purposes.

ARTICLE IX

This Treaty shall be open for accession to every Member of the United Nations interested in scientific research for the purpose of the peaceful use of outer space and of the celestial bodies. Any other State not a Member of the United Nations may with the consent of all the Contracting Parties, likewise be invited to become a Party to this Treaty.

ARTICLE X

1. Ratification of or accession to this Treaty shall be effected by each State in conformity with its constitutional procedures. The instruments of ratification and accession shall be deposited with the United Nations.

2. The United Nations shall inform each of the signatory and acceding States of the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession and of the entry into force of the Treaty.

ARTICLE XI

When all the signatory States have deposited their instruments of ratification, this Treaty shall enter into force with respect to the said States and with respect to the States which have deposited their instruments of accession. Thereafter, the Treaty shall enter into force with respect to each acceding State as soon as that State has deposited its instrument of accession.

ARTICLE XII

This Treaty may be modified or amended at any time with the unanimous consent of the Contracting Parties. The modification or amendment shall enter into force when the United Nations has been notified by all the said Contracting Parties that they have ratified the modification or amendment.

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/113
23 August 1963
ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Extract from the statement made by Mr. N.S. Khrushchev,
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, in
Moscow on 19 July 1963

"A few words should be said about the exchange of views, which is taking place in Moscow between the representatives of the Soviet Union, the United States of America and the United Kingdom, on the question of the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests and on other questions of mutual interest. We get the impression that there is now some hope for the achievement of an agreement on the prohibition of tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under water, if, of course, no special change occurs in the position of the United States and United Kingdom representatives.

The Soviet Government would like to reach such an agreement as would provide for the prohibition of all tests, including underground tests. It has been proved by science and practice that the prohibition of all tests, including underground tests, can be controlled by means of national technical means of detection. But the Governments of the United States of America and the United Kingdom continue to insist on the need for international inspection. They are unwilling to renounce aspirations which in reality have no relation to the cessation of tests. For what purpose are they doing this? Of course, in order to secure the opportunity to carry out intelligence work.

Thus a fairly clear picture appears - evidently we shall not succeed in reaching agreement at present on the prohibition of underground nuclear tests. The Soviet Government considers nevertheless that an agreement on the prohibition of tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under water, if achieved, will be an important and useful step forward. Such an agreement will put an end to the radioactive contamination of the atmosphere and, consequently, avert the dangerous consequences which further nuclear testing would have for the health of present and future generations. We communists, defending the vital interests of the peoples and all mankind, consider that the conclusion of an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests is in accordance with the noble principles of socialist humanitarianism.

We hope that the conclusion of an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear tests will also prove useful from the standpoint of a general improvement in the international situation. It will demonstrate the willingness of States with contrasting social systems to seek ways of concluding mutually acceptable agreements on the basis of peaceful co-existence.

The Soviet Government is convinced that, if the representatives of the Soviet Union, the United States of America and the United Kingdom were to reach agreement now not only on the prohibition of nuclear tests but at the same time also on a non-aggression pact between the NATO countries and the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, such an agreement would contribute towards a considerable improvement in the whole international situation. The signing of such a pact would be welcomed with great satisfaction by world public opinion.

Sometimes we hear it said that the form of a non-aggression pact causes embarrassment to some people in the West. Well, we think that the question of how a non-aggression pact should be formulated could be settled without any particular difficulty to the mutual satisfaction of both sides. The main thing here is not the form but the content; the main thing is that the other side also should display a desire for the easing of tension and the elimination of the state of "cold war". We should like to hope that an agreement on a non-aggression pact will also be achieved in the exchange of views taking place in Moscow.

It would also be very useful to settle such a question as the freezing of the military budgets of States or, better still, their reduction. This would undoubtedly be approved by millions and millions of people in all countries.

We think that it would be useful also to revert to our proposals, put forward as long ago as 1958, to implement certain measures for the prevention of surprise attack. What is necessary for this purpose? In the first place, we must make it impossible for an aggressor secretly to concentrate large bodies of troops, without which a surprise attack is impossible. For this purpose we consider it appropriate to establish in certain areas of the Soviet Union and of other countries ground control posts at airports, railway junctions, main roads and major ports. Of course, all this must be done on a reciprocal basis.

Such a measure does not in itself guarantee the maintenance of peace but it would be a step forward towards preventing surprise attack.

We would also be prepared to negotiate with the Western Powers in order to achieve the following agreement: the Western Powers could have their representatives with the Soviet forces in the German Democratic Republic, while our representatives would be assigned to the Western forces in West Germany.

We are also willing to negotiate on the reduction of foreign troops in the territory of the German Democratic Republic and in the territory of West Germany.

If agreement were reached on all these questions, it would be a big step towards reducing international tension and eliminating the "cold war"; it would be an important prerequisite for achieving agreement on the basic question - general and complete disarmament.

And, of course, it is necessary to settle at last the main question on which the elimination of international tension depends, namely, the German question. The only way to settle this question is by concluding a German peace treaty and recognizing the conditions which have come about as a result of the crushing of Hitler's Reich.

I repeat: the only possible way to settle the German question is on the basis of signing a peace treaty. As for the imperialists' calculations on the liquidation of the German Democratic Republic, they will no more see that than their own ears, because that is a course leading to war. Only madmen could take the risk of unleashing a thermonuclear world war. The imperialists must realize that such an adventure would end in their own destruction.

The interests of all peoples and, in the first place, the German people demand the conclusion of a German peace treaty and the settlement, on that basis, of the question of West Berlin in order to achieve a radical improvement in the situation in Europe and throughout the world."

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/103
30 July 1963
ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

The answers of Mr. N.S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, to questions put to him by the correspondents of "Pravda" and "Izvestiya" on 27 July 1963

Question: How do you assess the achievement of agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under water?

Answer: The successful conclusion of the negotiations in Moscow between the Soviet Union, the United States of America and the United Kingdom on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests is an event of great international significance. It is well known that the Soviet Union has for many years been carrying on a struggle for the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. The demand for the speediest possible settlement of this question has always been and is being supported by all peace-loving States and peoples.

We have now succeeded in coming to agreement on a treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. We consider that this is a good beginning. I should like to congratulate all the people of goodwill who have exerted their efforts to achieve agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. I should also like to pay tribute to the efforts of the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom and of their representatives, who were empowered to conduct the negotiations.

The achievement of agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests shows that given the desire and efforts of the States concerned, given good will on the part of the great Powers, it is possible to achieve success in solving international problems on mutually acceptable conditions.

Furthermore, we hope - and we think that people throughout the world now share this hope - that the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests will contribute towards a general reduction of international tension and thereby to the creation of a favourable situation for the solution of international questions that have long been ripe.

It would, of course, be wrong to labour under any delusions regarding the successes achieved and to relax our energies and determination in the further struggle for the solution of questions on which depends the consolidation of peace on earth. We must realize quite clearly that the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests does not yet mean the cessation of the arms race and, consequently, cannot in itself avert the danger of war. Nor does this measure liquidate the burden of armaments, on the production of which States are spending vast material resources.

The main task consists precisely in putting an end to the arms race, in disarmament. Only along this path can we really secure the elimination of the threat of war and relieve States of the burden of military expenditures.

That is why the Soviet Government considers that at the present time, as a result of the achievement of agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, there have emerged favourable opportunities which enable us to make progress in solving the main international problems. To do so, however, it is necessary to exert fresh efforts which will lead step by step to the consolidation of peace and to the realization of the age-old dream of mankind - general and complete disarmament. It is necessary, and in the first place for the great Powers, to set about this work without delay.

Question: On which vital international problems should, in your opinion, the attention of the peoples and governments now be concentrated?

Answer: If one speaks of primary international questions brought to the fore by life itself, I would point in the first place to such a question as the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and the parties to the Warsaw Treaty, about which a useful exchange of opinions has already taken place. The Soviet Government is convinced that the conclusion of such a pact would have a favourable effect on the whole situation, since the States forming part of the two opposing groups would solemnly declare before the whole world their decision not to use force against each other and not to threaten each other with war.

A non-aggression pact between the NATO countries and States parties to the Warsaw Treaty would have all the greater significance since it would comprise all the States which at present have nuclear weapons at their disposal. In other words, this would be a peace pact between the nuclear Powers.

In this connexion I wish to express satisfaction at the fact that, as a result of the exchange of opinions between the representatives of the Soviet Union, the United States of America and the United Kingdom on the Soviet proposals relating to a non-aggression pact, agreement has been achieved that after each of the parties has consulted its allies, discussions on this question will be continued with the purpose of achieving agreement satisfactory to all participants.

The Soviet Government is certain that if the same goodwill is shown by both sides in settling the question of a non-aggression pact as was shown in settling the question of the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, it will be possible to achieve agreement quickly also on a non-aggression pact. For our part there will be no lack of such goodwill. As regards the question of how the non-aggression pact should be formulated, we are certain that on this score there will be no difficulty in reaching agreement; there are no insuperable obstacles, nor can there be any.

There are also other measures which, in the Soviet Government's opinion, should be implemented now on the basis of mutual agreement. I have already spoken about these measures a few days ago. They are the freezing and, even better, the reduction of military budgets of States, the implementation of measures for the prevention of surprise attack, the reduction of foreign troops in Western Germany and in the German Democratic Republic, the assignment of our representatives to the troops of the Western Powers in Western Germany in exchange for the dispatch of their representatives to Soviet troops stationed in the German Democratic Republic.

On all these questions the Soviet Government is prepared to negotiate with the representatives of the Western Powers on a businesslike basis right up to the preparation and conclusion of appropriate agreements.

We appeal to the Western Powers with a proposal: let us agree on all these questions. Together we have been able to make a beginning by reaching agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. Let us now go further in the direction of reducing international tension and liquidating the "cold war". Thereby the way would be opened to the solution of the basic question - general and complete disarmament.

Of course it is necessary to solve the question on which the elimination of international tension depends most of all, namely, the question of a German peace settlement. Unless the vestiges of the Second World War in Europe are liquidated, lasting peace cannot be achieved. Everyone understands this very well. I wish to

express the hope that, as a result of the efforts of all those to whom peace is dear, a solution to the problem of concluding a German peace treaty and the normalization of the situation in West Berlin on this basis will be achieved.

The peoples want peace. That is an understandable and natural desire. It is the duty of governments to carry out these desires of millions and millions of people. That is precisely how the Leninist Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government and all the peoples of the Soviet Union understand their tasks. And they, in the future also, will not slacken their efforts to achieve that great aim.

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/110
16 August 1963
Original: ENGLISH

C A N A D A

A comparison of some significant developments in USA and USSR proposals concerning the reduction of the risk of war through accident, miscalculation, failure of communications or surprise attack* (1958-1963)

USSR

USA

Advance Notification of Major Military Movements and Manoeuvres

1958:
No mention.

1958:
No mention.

1961:
No mention.

1961:
Advance notification of major military movements within agreed areas to be provided to participating states and to the International Disarmament Organization. (USA programme for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world of Sept. 25 - Stage I).

1962:
No mention in draft treaty tabled as ENDC/2 on March 19.

1962:
Similar to 1961 proposals. (USA Outline of basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament of April 18 (ENDC/30) - Stage I).

PRESENT POSITION:

Prohibition of large scale joint military manoeuvres or movements by armed forces of two or more states. Advance notification of large scale military movements or manoeuvres by national armed forces within national frontiers.
(Amendment of July 16, 1962 to draft treaty - See ENDC/2/Rev.1).

PRESENT POSITION:

Similar to above with additional considerations set out in working paper of Dec. 12, 1962. (ENDC/70).

* This does not purport to be a comprehensive outline of all proposals since 1958 in the field of reduction of the risk of war. It covers those subjects on which both sides have submitted proposals in this context. Those areas in which both sides have not made proposals (denuclearized zones, thinning out of troops in Central Europe and International Commission on Reduction of Risk of War) are therefore omitted. Nor does this paper deal with the question of whether these proposals are separable from other measures.

USSR

USA

Observation Posts

1958:

Ground control posts to be established at agreed points at railway junctions, main roads and major ports. Areas to be covered by such control posts and number to be allotted to each side were specified. (Declaration submitted to Geneva Surprise Attack Conference on November 28).

1961:

Similar to the 1958 proposals, but no specific area mentioned. (Memorandum submitted to the U.N. General Assembly on Sept. 26).

1962:

No mention in either original draft treaty (ENDC/2 of March 19) or its revision (ENDC/2/Rev.1).

1958:

The West proposed study of the role of ground observers as one of a number of measures in this field. (Geneva Surprise Attack Conference in Nov.).

1961:

Establishment of observation posts in such locations as major ports, railway centres, motor highways and air bases to report on concentration and movements of military forces. (USA programme of Sept. 25 - Stage I).

1962:

Establishment of observation posts at agreed locations including major ports, railway centres, motor highways, river crossings and air bases to report on concentrations and movements of military forces. (USA Outline Treaty of April 18 (ENDC/30) - Stage I).

PRESENT POSITION:

Establishment in certain areas, both in the Soviet Union and in other countries on a reciprocal basis of surface control at airports, railway junctions, on motor roads and in big ports. (Speech by Chairman Khrushchev in Moscow on July 19, 1963).

PRESENT POSITION

Similar to proposals in 1962 plan. System would be useful wherever significant military activities take place. Geographic coverage would be designed to reflect military relationships in a realistic manner. (USA Working Paper submitted as ENDC/70 of December 12, 1962)

Additional Observation Arrangements

1958:

An aerial photography zone to be established 800 kilometres on either side of the dividing line between the main forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact Organization and including Greece, Turkey and Iran. In addition, a zone in the USSR east of 108° east and territory of equivalent size in the USA west of 90° west and also Japan and Okinawa. (Declaration of the USSR submitted to the Geneva Surprise Attack Conference on Nov. 28).

1958

The West proposed study of a number of means of observation and inspection in order to assess their limitations and capabilities. These included aerial inspection, ground inspection including technological aids, sea surveillance techniques, long range radar capability, other instruments of long range detection and satellite inspection. (Geneva Surprise Attack Conference in November).

USSR

USA

Additional Observation Arrangements (Contd)

1961

No mention

1961:

Establishment of such additional inspection arrangements as may be agreed.
(USA Programme of Sept. 25 - Stage I).

1962

No mention in original Draft Treaty or its revision (ENDC/2 and ENDC/2/Rev.1).

1962:

Establishment of such additional observation arrangements as may be agreed.
(USA Outline Treaty of April 18 (ENDC/30) - Stage I).

PRESENT POSITION:

No mention.

PRESENT POSITION:

In order to supplement ground observation posts, aerial observation techniques, mobile ground observation teams and overlapping radars could be employed on a basis and of a character designed to give equal assurance to all participating states. Such techniques would be initiated in agreed geographic areas with due regard to the relationship of the states or groups of states concerned.
(ENDC/70 of December 12, 1962)

Exchange of Military Missions

1958:

No mention

1958:

No mention

1961:

No mention

1961:

No mention

1962:

No mention
(Draft Treaty of March 19 - ENDC/2)

1962:

Exchange of military missions between states or groups of states in order to improve communications and understanding between them.
(Outline Treaty of April 18 (ENDC/30) - Stage I)

USSR

USA

Exchange of Military Missions (Contd)

PRESENT POSITION:

Exchange of military missions between states or groups of states for the purpose of improving relations and mutual understanding between them.
(Amendment of July 16, 1962 to draft Treaty -- See ENDC/2, Rev.1)
Exchange of military representatives.
Under this arrangement, Western Powers could have their representatives with the Soviet forces in East Germany and Soviet representatives would be assigned to the Western Forces in West Germany.
(Speech by Chairman Khrushchev in Moscow on July 19, 1963).

PRESENT POSITION:

Exchange of military missions between central military headquarters by states or groups of states, in the first instance between USA & USSR. Their functions might include:

- (a) receipt of such information or views on military matters as the host nation may wish to make available;
- (b) observation of such specific military activities as hosts might make accessible;
- (c) consultation on military matters of common concern;
- (d) participation, on request, in clarifying ambiguous situations which, for lack of authentic information, might prove disquieting;
- (e) reporting of the foregoing to its sponsor and representation of the latter's views on military matters in contacts with the host headquarters.

(ENDC/70 of Dec. 12, 1962)

Communications between heads of Government

1958:
No mention

1961:
No mention

1962:
No mention
(Draft Treaty of March 19 - ENDC/2).

1958:
No mention

1961:
No mention

1962:
Establishment of rapid and reliable communications among heads of governments of certain parties and with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
(Outline Treaty of April 18 (ENDC/30) - Stage I).

USSRUSACommunications between heads of Government (Contd)PRESENT POSITION:

Establishment of swift and reliable communications between heads of government of states and with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. (Amendment of July 16, 1962 to draft treaty — see ENDC/2, Rev.1).

PRESENT POSITION:

Additional considerations set out in Working Paper of December 12, 1962 (ENDC/70).

(NOTE: On June 20, 1963 representatives of USSR and USA signed a memorandum of understanding between their two states regarding the establishment of a direct communications link. The memorandum stated that the USSR and USA had agreed to establish as soon as technically feasible a direct communications link between the two governments. An annex outlined some details concerning the arrangement. (ENDC/97 of June 20, 1963).

ANNEX II

CHECK-LIST OF DOCUMENTS ISSUED BY THE CONFERENCE

(11 April 1963 -- 29 August 1963)

Part A - Verbatim records of the Conference /ENDC/PV. series/

	<u>Date</u>	<u>Symbol</u>
121st meeting to 156th meeting	17 April 1963 to 29 August 1963	ENDC/PV.121 to ENDC/PV.156

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Part B - Documents of the Conference /ENDC/- series/

<u>Title of document</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Symbol</u>
United States of America: Amendment to the U.S. Outline of Basic provisions of a treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World(ENDC/30 April 18 1963) relating to Nuclear Disarmament in Stage I	14 August 1963	ENDC/30/Add.3
Canada: Comparison of USA and USSR disarmament proposals	14 August 1963	ENDC/36/Rev.1
<u>ibid.</u>	20 August 1963	ENDC/36/Rev.1* English only
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Note of the Soviet Government to the Government of the United States	17 April 1963	ENDC/84
United States of America: Letter from 9 United States scientists which appeared in the "Washington Post" on Tuesday, 9 April 1963	22 April 1963	ENDC/85
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and United States of America: Statement to the United Nations Disarmament Conference, Geneva, from the Women for Peace Pilgrimage to Rome - April 21-30, 1963	3 May 1963	ENDC/86
Brazil and Mexico: Declaration on the denuclearization of Latin America	6 May 1963	ENDC/87
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic: Statement of the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic in connexion with the creation of a com- bined NATO nuclear force, 17 May 1963	22 May 1963	ENDC/88

<u>Title of document</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Symbol</u>
United Kingdom: United Kingdom Note of May 18 1963 in reply to the Soviet Government's Note of April 8 1963	24 May 1963	ENDC/89
United States of America: Text of United States reply of May 18, to USSR Note of April 8	24 May 1963	ENDC/90
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Note of the Soviet Government of 20 May 1963 to the Government of the United States of America	27 May 1963	ENDC/91
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Corrigendum to the document ENDC/91	30 May 1963	ENDC/91/Corr.1 English only
<u>ibid.</u>	4 June 1963	ENDC/91/Corr.2 French and Spanish
Brazil: Manifesto adopted in Rome on 14 March 1963 by the Special Assembly on Man's Right to Freedom from Hunger	27 May 1963	ENDC/92
Ethiopia, Nigeria and United Arab Republic: Resolution passed by the African Summit Conference at Addis Ababa on General and Complete Disarmament	10 June 1963	ENDC/93
Ethiopia, Nigeria and United Arab Republic: Resolution adopted by the Conference of Heads of African States and Governments, Addis Ababa, 22-25 May 1963 on General and Complete Disarmament	18 June 1963	ENDC/93/Rev.1
Ethiopia, Nigeria and United Arab Republic: Joint Memorandum of the Delegations of Ethiopia, Nigeria and the U.A.R. on the Question of the Cessation of Nuclear Weapon Tests	10 June 1963	ENDC/94
United States of America: Excerpts from Address by President Kennedy on peace, delivered in Washington, 10 June 1963	11 June 1963	ENDC/95
<u>ibid.</u>	11 June 1963	ENDC/95* Russian only

<u>Title of document</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Symbol</u>
Working Paper containing a Synopsis of Suggestions by the Non-Aligned Members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee concerning a Treaty on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests (12 February - 10 June 1963)	19 June 1963	ENDC/96
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and United States of America: Memorandum of understanding between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics regarding the establishment of a direct communications link	20 June 1963	ENDC/97
Mexico: Working paper for the consideration of the Eighteen-Nation Committee. Outline draft treaty prohibiting the placing in orbit and the stationing in outer space of nuclear weapons	21 June 1963	ENDC/98
Mexico: Suggestion made by Ambassador Padilla Nervo on 30 November 1962 at the 85th Plenary Meeting of the Conference concerning an Interim Arrangement suspending all Underground Tests	2 July 1963	ENDC/99
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, and United States of America: Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater	30 July 1963	ENDC/100
<u>ibid.</u>	30 July 1963	ENDC/100/Rev.1 English, French and Spanish
Corrigendum to the document: ENDC/100/Rev.1	15 August 1963	ENDC/100/Rev.1/ Corr.1 Spanish only
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom and United States of America: Moscow communique of 25 July 1963	30 July 1963	ENDC/101

<u>Title of document</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Symbol</u>
United States of America: President Kennedy's address of 26 July 1963	30 July 1963	ENDC/102
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: The answers of Mr. N.S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, to questions put to him by the correspondents of "Pravda" and "Izvestia" on 27 July 1963	30 July 1963	ENDC/103
Italy: Statement by Mr. Attilio Piccioni, Vice-President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, made in Rome on 25 July 1963	30 July 1963	ENDC/104
Mexico: Statement made by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Mexico on Saturday, 27 July 1963	30 July 1963	ENDC/105
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic: Communiqué issued by the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic on 29 July 1963	30 July 1963	ENDC/106
The People's Republic of Poland: Resolution of the Conference of First Secretaries of the Central Committees of the Communist and Worker's Parties and Heads of Governments of the Warsaw Treaty States, adopted on 25 July 1963	30 July 1963	ENDC/107
The People's Republic of Bulgaria: Statement dated 27 July 1963 by the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria on the agreement banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water	30 July 1963	ENDC/108
United States of America: Draft articles VI to XIII (relating to nuclear disarmament in Stage I) of U.S. Draft of Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World	14 August 1963	ENDC/109

<u>Title of document</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Symbol</u>
Canada: A Comparison of some significant development in USA and USSR proposals concerning the reduction of the risk of war through accident, miscalculation, failure of communication or surprise attack (1958-1963)	16 August 1963	ENDC/110
Romanian People's Republic: Statement dated 3 August 1963 of the Government of the Romanian People's Republic	20 August 1963	ENDC/111
<u>ibid.</u>	27 August 1963	ENDC/111/Rev.1 English only
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Extract from a statement made by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. N.S. Krushchev, at a meeting in Berlin on 2 July 1963	22 August 1963	ENDC/112
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Extract from the statement made by Mr. N.S. Krushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, in Moscow on 19 July 1963	23 August 1963	ENDC/113
Draft report to the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the General Assembly (Recommended by the Co-Chairmen)	26 August 1963	ENDC/114
<u>ibid</u>	27 August 1963	ENDC/114/Rev.1

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Part C - Documents containing information of an administrative nature
/ENDC/INF. series/

<u>Title of document</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Symbol</u>
List of members of Delegations to the Conference	15 May 1963	ENDC/INF.2/Rev.9
Corrigendum to the document ENDC/INF.2/Rev.9	17 May 1963	ENDC/INF.2/Rev.9/ Corr.1 English only
List of members of Delegations to the Conference	31 July 1963	ENDC/INF.2/Rev.10
<u>ibid.</u>	13 August 1963	ENDC/INF.2/Rev.11
Check-list of documents issued between 23 March 1963 and 11 April 1963	16 April 1963	ENDC/INF.4/Add.17
Check-list of documents issued between 12 April 1963 and 30 April 1963	1 May 1963	ENDC/INF.4/Add.18
Check-list of documents issued between May 1963 and 17 May 1963	18 May 1963	ENDC/INF.4/Add.19
Check-list of documents issued between 18 May 1963 and 31 May 1963	1 June 1963	ENDC/INF.4/Add.20
Check-list of documents issued between 1 June 1963 and 21 June 1963	22 June 1963	ENDC/INF.4/Add.21
Check-list of documents issued between 22 June 1963 and 29 July 1963	30 July 1963	ENDC/INF.4/Add.22
Check-list of documents issued between 30 July 1963 and 29 August 1963	29 August 1963	ENDC/INF.4/Add.23
Public release of final verbatim records and documents	11 April 1963	ENDC/INF.5/Add.16
<u>ibid.</u>	30 April 1963	ENDC/INF.5/Add.17
<u>ibid.</u>	17 May 1963	ENDC/INF.5/Add.18
Corrigendum to masthead of documents and records	8 August 1963	ENDC/INF.6

Part D - Non-governmental communications /ENDC/NGC/- series/

<u>Title of document</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Symbol</u>
List of Communications received by the Secretariat of the Conference during the period 19 March to 21 June 1963	21 June 1963	ENDC/NGC/10
List of Communications received by the Secretariat of the Conference during the period 22 June to 29 August 1963	29 August 1963	ENDC/NGC/11

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