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STRENGTHENING OF THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AND
DISASTER RELIEF ASSISTANCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
INCLUDING SPECIAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

COMMEMORATION OF THE FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY
OF THE UNITED NATIONS

SUPPORT BY THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM OF THE EFFORTS
OF GOVERNMENTS TO PROMOTE AND CONSOLIDATE NEW OR
RESTORED DEMOCRACIES

ASSISTANCE IN MINE CLEARANCE

GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES FOR DEVELOPMENT

CRIME PREVENTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTIONS

Letter dated 7 August 1995 from the Permanent Representative
of Austria to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the report of the International Colloquium on Post-Conflict Reconstruction Strategies, held at the Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Schlaining, on 23 and 24 June 1995 (see annex).

* A/50/150.

The Colloquium was organized by the Reconstruction and Development Support Unit of the United Nations Office at Vienna, in cooperation with the Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution. It was supported by the Government of Austria as a contribution to the activities relating to the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under items 20, 29, 41, 46, 70, 99, 108 and 114 of the provisional agenda.

(Signed) Hans Peter MANZ
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

ANNEX

CHAIRMAN'S SYNOPSIS AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COLLOQUIUM ON POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION STRATEGIES

Held at the Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution

Schlaining, Austria

23 and 24 June 1995

PREFACE

1. An International Colloquium on Post-Conflict Reconstruction Strategies was held on 23 and 24 June 1995 at the Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution in Schlaining. It was attended by participants from United Nations political, humanitarian and development units, specialized agencies, and the Bretton Woods institutions, donor countries and non-governmental organizations, as well as by representatives from war-torn societies. It was chaired by former Under-Secretary-General Margaret Anstee.

2. The idea for the Colloquium stemmed from the supplement to the Secretary-General's Agenda for Peace, in which he stressed the need for integrated action between United Nations organizations, the parties to a conflict and other institutions prepared to assist in the reconstruction of a country. The purpose of the meeting was to identify the practical and institutional issues that must be addressed to make this a reality.

3. The Colloquium was organized by the Department for Development Support and Management Services of the United Nations Secretariat, in cooperation with the Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution. It was supported by the Government of Austria as a contribution to the definition of the role of the United Nations in the next half century as part of the activities relating to the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations. Concerned United Nations agencies and organizations advised on the agenda through a wide consultation process and at meetings of the Organizational Committee of the Administrative Committee on Coordination (ACC) in February 1995.

4. The meeting was opened with a message from Mr. Ji Chaozhu, Under-Secretary-General for Development Support and Management Services. Mr. Ji noted that the unprecedented proliferation of civil conflicts was the result of persistent crises of economic and social disequilibrium in governance and institutions. The Secretary-General had stressed in his Agenda for Peace that only sustained, cooperative work to deal with the underlying economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems could place an achieved peace on a durable foundation. Unfortunately, with limited available financial resources post-conflict interventions are usually directed towards tackling the immediate crisis, rather than defining long-term, multidimensional and sustainable solutions. Mr. Alvaro de Soto, Assistant Secretary-General, Department of Political Affairs, emphasized that the goal of post-conflict peace-building was to prevent the recurrence of an outbreak of hostilities, with emphasis on the resolution of

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conflicts as distinguished from the settlement of conflicts. This was essentially a political task requiring an "able architect". Mrs. Olubanké King-Akérélé, Managing Director, United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), noted that piecemeal efforts would only fail and could lead to wasteful dissipation of effort and financial resources. Representatives of 24 United Nations organizations presented their views on the key issues of post-conflict reconstruction. It was agreed that the forging of an integrated United Nations system approach in post-conflict situations could be greatly assisted by the development of a strategic framework combining political, humanitarian, economic and social areas of intervention.

5. The present synopsis will be submitted to the Inter-Agency Standing Committee for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance of the ACC Consultative Committee on Programme and Operational Questions (CCPOQ) and to the General Assembly Informal Open-ended Working Group on an Agenda for Peace.

6. It is hoped that the ideas and recommendations in the synopsis will serve as a basis for a clear definition of the role of the United Nations in post-conflict reconstruction and for setting up arrangements that will ensure a swift, effective and, above all, integrated response to such situations by the United Nations system.

CHAIRMAN'S SYNOPSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

7. The Colloquium took place in agreeable, secluded surroundings which provided an atmosphere conducive to an informal and frank exchange of ideas and experience, further enhanced by unanimous agreement that the Colloquium would depart from the traditional format of United Nations system meetings and eschew the presentation of formal views of individual organizations. The participants would not present the papers they had prepared, which would serve simply as background documents. They would doff their institutional hats and speak as individuals on the major issues surrounding post-conflict peace-building on the understanding that Chatham House rules would apply and that there would be no attribution of the opinions expressed. The result was one and a half days of intensive brainstorming remarkably free of institutional hobby-horses and rich in constructive ideas and attitudes. The presence of representatives of a number of Governments, as well as of non-governmental organizations and academic and research institutions, also played a valuable part in ensuring a global and objective approach.

8. Each session began with a brief presentation of the agenda theme by two or three participants and was then opened up to general debate.

9. The present synopsis is not an agreed report of the meeting but represents the Chairman's interpretation of its main findings and conclusions. Since there was a high degree of consensus, it is hoped that the text that follows faithfully reflects the sense of the debate but its contents remain the sole responsibility of the author.

10. The main subject of post-conflict reconstruction was dealt with under four headings: (1) strategic issues; (2) needs and capabilities; (3) an integrated

post-conflict reconstruction framework; and (4) mobilization of resources. At the final session, the main conclusions and recommendations were reviewed. Since all four topics are fundamentally related, there was a marked tendency for the same themes to recur and a considerable degree of cross-fertilization between the sessions.

Strategic issues

11. With the proliferation of conflict and chaos following the end of the cold war and the growing challenge to the international community as a whole, and to the United Nations system in particular, special attention must be paid to the needs that evolve from such situations, the specific characteristics of which distinguish them from normal development problems.

12. Once peace has been restored to a war-torn society, or order re-established following a period of major upheaval, the overriding goal of the international community should be to assist in national efforts to ensure that conflict and chaos will not recur. This goal must be met over and above the needs for relief, rehabilitation and resumption of development. It involves providing channels for reintegration into productive activities in civil society for former combatants and other estranged social groups, and fostering good governance, including institutions and channels for civil discourse designed to discourage the resort to violence, such as the development of a legitimate judiciary and the building of democratic institutions. It may also require massive action in areas not normally included in development programmes, a signal example being mine clearance.

13. When a society is emerging from war or acute turmoil, its needs are qualitatively different from those of a stable society. This requires a reordering of normal priorities, as well as the incorporation of new ones. Designing a framework for such assistance is in essence a political task, albeit using a variety of tools and a wide array of expertise from all parts of the United Nations system, as well as from Governments and non-governmental organizations.

14. The political nature of this task is determined by the overriding goal, during the fragile post-war or post-chaos stage, of avoiding the recurrence of war or chaos. In almost all post-conflict peace-building this will mean a significant departure from the priorities and allocation of resources that apply in development in non-peace-related situations. Given the risk to peace that is at stake, it is essential to adjust normal activities and programmes to this overriding goal and create a specially designed framework for this transitional phase. It follows that the United Nations Secretary-General, who has a key responsibility in peacemaking efforts, should play the central role in designing that framework, with the assistance of all other relevant actors.

15. Integration became a key and recurrent theme of the discussion, applicable to many aspects of the process. The response to a country's needs in post-conflict peace-building must be comprehensive, encompassing all internal and external actors. This poses a particular challenge to the polycentric United Nations system where integration of action, rather than coordination in its traditional sense, must be the overriding aim of all concerned. This

underlines once more the crucial importance of clear and effective leadership both at the Headquarters policy level and at the operational level in the field. There must also be a smooth dovetailing of the various phases of the process - emergency relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction, a process which should eventually flow back into normal development activities once peace and the recovery process have been consolidated.

16. For that to happen, the root causes of the conflict must be identified and addressed in order to avoid the pitfall of applying mere palliatives. The ambitiousness of this aim was recognized, but it was considered essential to attempt to achieve it, although not necessarily by the United Nations system alone. Indeed, the United Nations, while providing the "umbrella" for post-conflict peace-building, should realistically assess the nature and extent of the effective support it can itself give and actively engage the involvement of all who can contribute to the process, especially all possible elements in the country itself. Local initiatives are crucial for sustained success though their nature and extent will vary from one situation to another.

17. Special efforts should be made to give the process a "human face" by emphasizing the local empowerment, equity and reconciliation aspects of reconstruction programmes. In the same context, while the process will essentially be long term, it is imperative to maintain support by bringing about some immediate, visible results that improve the lot and the day-to-day living conditions of people whose lives have long been laid waste by war and whose expectations of an early "peace dividend" will almost certainly be exaggerated.

18. A post-conflict situation is inherently one of general disarray. Ordinary people are simply trying to cope or survive - black marketeering is normal. There may be hundreds of thousands of homeless, dislocated persons, separated families, widows, orphans and war injured. The Government may be unstable or unrepresentative, or simply unable to cope, with institutions and infrastructure destroyed and technically qualified people having fled. Moreover, there may still be pockets of war, or the international community may be asked to assist people or regions that are not under the control of the Government. In such circumstances, the United Nations system must find ways of contributing to the re-establishment of a civil society that go beyond the normal practice of working only through the Government in the capital city. Confidence-building, the re-establishment of law and order and respect for human rights are as important as the reconstruction of the infrastructure.

Needs and capabilities

19. As part of the endeavour to ensure the preparedness of the United Nations system to respond to post-conflict peace-building, it is imperative to have a compendium of United Nations system capabilities in the various areas in which assistance would predictably be required. Here the Colloquium considered two documents: the proposed format of a matrix designed to reflect the capabilities of the major United Nations players under the various phases of emergency relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction; and an Inventory of Post-Conflict Peace-Building Activities, prepared by the United Nations Task Force on Post-Conflict Peace-Building.

20. The discussion on the proposed matrix was inconclusive. It was generally felt that the model presented did not sufficiently address the inherent complexities of a post-conflict situation, the need to reflect local conditions which would vary greatly from one country to another or the fact that the various phases of the process are not sequential but simultaneous, thus generating a need for interaction between the various elements. In this latter connection, there was consensus that the oft-used term "continuum" did not accurately reflect reality and should be discarded. Although some alternative formats were proposed for the matrix, it was evident that more work was needed on this aspect and, indeed, that the intricacies of post-conflict peace-building and the enormous differences between countries might well make it unfeasible to prepare a general matrix covering all situations.

21. The Inventory of Post-Conflict Peace-Building Activities was deemed very useful, especially for negotiations between the United Nations and Governments, and there was agreement that it should be completed to cover all organizations of the system as soon as possible. A number of participants stressed that the capabilities reflected in the Inventory must be based on realistic assessments and not simply pious hopes or aspirations and that, by the same token, areas essential for post-conflict peace-building where the United Nations system does not have capability should also be identified. Similarly, it must be recognized that in some situations the United Nations should not intervene at all because of a lack of real capacity to change the situation. Given the wide range of capabilities required, the importance of developing strategic partnerships, particularly between the United Nations, non-governmental organization donors and the Government and local communities of the affected country, was stressed. Such partnerships, it was suggested, could help promote the sustainability of post-conflict actions and of the United Nations own contribution. Similarly, integrated inter-agency teams should be built within the United Nations system itself.

22. All United Nations organizations need to apply a more systematic approach to "learning from experience" and ensuring that these lessons are put into practice.

An integrated post-conflict reconstruction framework

23. The Colloquium had before it a technical paper outlining a strategic planning approach for post-war reconstruction and development but the discussion ranged more widely. There was consensus that an overarching strategic framework was essential for every case of post-conflict peace-building and that this must be essentially political in nature - a macro-political strategy, essentially different from a traditional development plan, although it must necessarily be linked to the macroeconomic situation and policies of the country in question. It must deal with both technical and financial assistance requirements, with emphasis on the provision of technical assistance in the critical period immediately after the cessation of hostilities. It was strongly emphasized that timing was of the essence and that the success of such a policy framework would depend on its being prepared as early as possible, and before peace-keeping operations come to a close, although it was recognized that the feasibility of doing this would depend on the type of conflict. It should be based on a rapid

assessment of the physical, social, economic and institutional damage, and immediate needs.

24. The framework should not be super-imposed but should be the country's own reconstruction strategy. It must be tailored to individual circumstances and developed in the light of the availability of data and the country's implementation capacity, and prepared in fullest cooperation with all available elements at the national and international levels. The extent of international involvement would vary greatly from country to country, depending on the gravity of the conflict and the degree of destruction and dislocation resulting from it. In severe cases, it may be necessary to provide institutional support to the authorities for the preparation of the framework itself. Flexibility is essential and the framework should therefore be rolling. It should also have a limited life (although, depending on circumstances, this might last a number of years) until the country reaches a stage where it can "graduate" to the normal channels of international assistance (e.g., through the mechanisms of consultative groups and round tables).

25. The framework must be multisectoral but must also form an integrated and consistent whole. All concerned elements of United Nations organizations should be involved in its preparation and provide inputs into those aspects that fall within their respective mandates and capabilities so that they feel a sense of "ownership" and are comfortable operating within its confines. At the same time, it is important that the framework not be simply an aggregate of agency proposals and "pet projects" but a genuine synthesis of the country's most urgent needs, objectively prepared, to which the various United Nations organizations would contribute according to their mandates and capacities. In order to ensure a maximum and integrated response from the international community, all other appropriate external actors should also be involved in the preparation process. The aim would be to provide an "umbrella" that could encompass the contribution, not only of the United Nations system but also of all other international donors, thus providing an integrated international response to an integrated presentation of the country's needs, which would minimize duplication and ensure the optimum use of resources, both local and external.

26. A key ingredient for success is that there should be maximum integration of high-level leadership at the policy level, combined with maximum delegation to the field for the actual preparation and implementation of the framework. Here the need for the Secretary-General to take the lead during this critical phase was once more underlined. At the country level, given the political nature and importance of this interim period before normal development activities can resume, the leadership role should be vested in the Secretary-General's Special Representative, when there is one still present. In the absence of such an official, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Resident Coordinator might assume such functions but the essentially different nature of the function would need to be made clear. Ideally, the strategic document should comprise the following components:

- Political framework - the broad political setting for the maintenance of peace: governance, nation-building, democratic institutions, human rights;

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- Macroeconomic framework - the broad socio-economic environment in which reconstruction will have to operate, including economic, financial and human resource constraints and possibilities;
- Priorities, objectives and programme - projects with emphasis on:
 - (i) Strategic activities, addressing the most acute causes and consequences of the conflict, designed to promote the maintenance of peace and build confidence;
 - (ii) Rapid delivery to the most acutely damaged or disturbed areas (e.g., urban reconstruction, demobilization, de-mining, housing, community development, repair of infrastructure);
 - (iii) Restoration of production and economic capacity (e.g., through provision of seeds, fertilizer, farm machinery, fuel for agriculture and raw materials, utilities, transport for industrial and commercial enterprise);
 - (iv) Rehabilitation of basic education, health, water, sanitation and social services;
 - (v) Strengthening democratic institutions, public administration and criminal justice systems;
 - (vi) The needs of vulnerable groups (orphans, war widows, the disabled) and former combatants, including reuniting families;
 - (vii) Employment creation and income-generating activities;
 - (viii) Maximum use of locally available human resources, building materials and institutional and social structures so as to revive the economy and reduce the costs of imported goods and services.
- Financial implications - availability of domestic resources, funding gaps, nature of the support needed from the international community;
- Implementation - who does what, when and where (including aid coordination) and covering all actors, national and international, public and private, non-governmental organizations etc.;
- Monitoring and follow-up procedures - establishing benchmarks and procedures for monitoring progress and adjusting strategy in the light of experience.

27. The strategic framework should take account of the donors' general policy that their assistance should be provided to countries implementing appropriate economic policies. Nevertheless, in the early post-conflict period, the indispensable first priority must be the prevention of the recurrence of conflict and the country should therefore be given appropriate flexibility in the design and implementation of its macroeconomic policies.

28. The identification of immediate objectives, priorities, target groups and overall goals was regarded as important but there was general agreement that rigidity must be avoided because of the essentially changing and evolving nature of a post-conflict situation. Hence, while the framework would provide the strategic "umbrella", implementation must be pragmatic and tactical and quick to respond to emerging needs. There must be maximum mobilization of available human resources in the country itself, and especially of local communities and other dynamic forces in the national society. This would build intercommunal confidence, ensure that programmes and projects can be managed and sustained by local institutions and ward off the danger of a "culture of dependency". An effort must also be made to bring "black marketeering", reconstruction profiteering and general lawlessness under control.

Mobilization of resources

29. The sine qua non of successful implementation of the strategic framework, however impeccably prepared, is rapid mobilization of the necessary resources. While maximum use should be made of both financial and human capacities available in the country (a factor that will vary greatly from one country to another), there will inevitably be a large gap to be filled from external sources. In some cases, poverty is endemic where, in addition to the ravages of war, there will be a very large gap indeed. Given that post-conflict peace-building is a new and largely untried concept, the Colloquium recognized that the mobilization of such resources will be exceedingly difficult in the present climate, where only humanitarian aid seems to generate a sympathetic response, while financial flows for development cooperation are suffering a decline. Bold and innovative measures are necessary to sensitize the international donor community to the critical importance of these special needs.

30. A major educational effort is therefore required to bring home to donors that such activities are not simply relief handouts but, in a very fundamental way, are germane to their own interests. The higher costs, both financial and human, emanating from a return to war, requiring renewed international peace-keeping efforts, should be highlighted, and the trading and investment benefits deriving from a return to normality pointed out. A reminder of other negative aspects of continued instability, such as massive flows of refugees and an increase in immigrants from war-torn societies, many of whom will attempt to flee to developed countries, may also prove persuasive.

31. The special nature of post-conflict reconstruction must also be emphasized, one of the most difficult aspects being the acceptance by donors of the fact that a higher element of risk is involved and that the kind of conditions often applied to development assistance are not appropriate. The complex and unpredictable nature of post-conflict reconstruction requires greater flexibility on the part both of donors and of the United Nations system. There is also need for better coordination between donors, in which connection their willingness to work within the "umbrella" of a strategic framework prepared under the auspices of the United Nations would provide significant assurance of optimum use of the resources provided.

32. In order to get this message across, and improve receptiveness to its appeal for funds, the United Nations must present a credible image. This

involves action on a number of fronts. First and foremost, the United Nations must be seen to be "speaking with one voice" - hence, the crucial importance of demonstrated leadership by the Secretary-General, clearly recognized and accepted by the other involved elements of the United Nations system and reflected in the overarching strategic framework presented to the donor community. Clearly focused and accepted leadership of the United Nations system at the field and implementation levels is another element in establishing credibility. Timeliness and a sense of urgency are also key: all the involved parts of the United Nations system must be seen to be moving with an expeditiousness not usually found in normal development activities. By the same token, donors' pledges must be quickly transformed into firm commitments and disbursements; the present practice of annual submissions and budgets results in long delays and needs review.

33. Another important factor in establishing the credibility of the appeal for funds is the content of the strategic framework itself. It must be clearly demonstrated that it genuinely reflects the needs of the country in question in an integrated manner and is not simply a heterogeneous collection of programmes and projects that individual agencies wish to promote. The funding proposal must also be realistic in its estimates of what can be done, the timing of the various phases and the amount of resources required, both those to be mobilized within the country and those to come from outside. It is important to demonstrate that surviving internal resources - physical, financial and human (including displaced professionals) are being drawn on to the maximum extent possible and geared to the rebuilding of the country. Indications that the proposed actions will significantly contribute to good governance and respect sovereignty will also be helpful.

34. As to the presentation of external resource requirements, the traditional format of the inter-agency appeal has not always proved successful. Various alternatives were suggested, without any firm conclusion being reached. It was pointed out that, in some cases, a large donor having a special interest in a particular country could take a helpful leadership role. In general, however, it was felt that the clear leadership of the Secretary-General was essential to successful fund-raising. Non-governmental organizations could also be helpful in this crucial and challenging task.

35. Given the paucity and, in some cases, the declining quantity of traditional funding, the need to identify new sources was stressed. UNDP has already readjusted its funding policy and has a new facility to provide assistance in post-conflict peace-building. It was suggested that other organizations of the United Nations system examine the possibilities of following suit by developing contingency plans and budgets that would enable them to react quickly. There was another suggestion that, given the special nature of post-conflict peace-building, its political character and its close linkage with peace-keeping, as an essential follow-up process indispensable to the consolidation and sustainability of the international efforts already deployed, some aspects at least should, like peace-keeping, be financed from assessed budgets (e.g., for the formulation of the strategic framework itself and for mine clearance, which does not easily attract funding from voluntary donor contributions). Concern was also expressed, including by representatives of donor countries, that funding is almost invariably drawn from aid budgets when a case could be

made for a redeployment of the source of funding for peace-related operations, e.g., to defence budgets.

36. Finally, to ensure that pledged assistance is actually delivered, a formal follow-up mechanism on donor assistance should be established. This mechanism could also transmit information on the progress of the operation, based on the constant monitoring that should be undertaken at the country level, and so sustain donor interest. For this, and for more general purposes, the development of a post-conflict reconstruction information system was considered indispensable, exploiting the wide-ranging potential offered by Internet and geographical information systems (GIS) mapping facilities.

The way forward

37. The Colloquium succeeded in its objective of outlining concrete, practical proposals for effective action by the United Nations system, but its findings need to be further developed and acted upon, as a matter of urgency, if the Organization is to prepare itself adequately for the challenges that lie ahead in post-conflict reconstruction.

38. This demands action at many levels. The present synopsis and its accompanying documents are to be submitted to the Inter-Agency Standing Committee for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance of CCPOQ and to the General Assembly Informal Open-ended Working Group on an Agenda for Peace, but more is required than submission to these essentially deliberative bodies, and certain key measures can be implemented forthwith. It is to be hoped that all interested parties - the United Nations system, Governments, non-governmental organizations - will analyse this synopsis with a view to determining what steps they can take immediately. By way of illustration only, the Chairman suggests that these might include the following:

(a) Secretary-General and United Nations Secretariat:

As the core of the operation, in view of its political nature and close relationship with peace-keeping:

- Allocate responsibility within United Nations Headquarters for post-conflict peace-building and reconstruction to a focal point and assign terms of reference;
- Develop criteria and operational guidelines for involvement of the United Nations system in post-conflict reconstruction and for ensuring integrated action;
- Review the possibility of new funding sources for certain aspects of post-conflict reconstruction - e.g., a special fund, use of assessed budgets;
- Complete as soon as possible the Inventory of Post-Conflict Peace-Building Activities;
- Develop comprehensive information systems.

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(b) United Nations specialized agencies and organizations:

Expedite preparedness and operational capacity for post-conflict reconstruction by:

- Establishing a focal point;
- Preparing contingency plans and contingency budgets;
- Compiling lists of staff with previous operational experience who could be quickly drafted to assist with specific cases.

(c) Donor Governments:

- Review capabilities and modalities for ensuring a rapid and effective response to post-conflict reconstruction needs (including new sources and methods of funding or contributing in kind, new forms of partnerships with other actors), under a United Nations "umbrella" designed to avoid duplication of effort and secure optimum use of resources;
- Compile lists of operationally experienced people, equipment, services, transport etc. that could be speedily made available ("in-kind" contributions of equipment etc. could be on a loan basis).

(d) Non-governmental organizations:

- Review capabilities for ensuring a rapid and effective response to post-conflict reconstruction needs;
- Examine new forms of partnership and interaction with the United Nations that will stimulate harmonious and complementary use of respective resources and experience.

39. While intensive and concerted action from the international community is imperative to make post-conflict reconstruction effective, success will never be possible without a Herculean effort on the part of the inhabitants and authorities of the affected country itself. At the heart of initiatives to foster and sustain economic recovery and the consolidation of peace are the people living in war-torn societies. Their community leaders should urge tolerance, forgiveness and cooperation. The formation of Governments of reconciliation and national unity, comprising representatives of all groups interested in working together for social and economic reconstruction, can greatly help the process. Sustainable post-conflict recovery programmes should also be endorsed by all major political groups and a conscientious effort made to pursue consensual policies during the ensuing period of great scarcity and difficulties.

40. It is, above all, a time for all to work together in harmony as society attempts to transform the weapons of war into ploughshares.

Appendix I

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

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Appendix II

PAPERS SUBMITTED TO THE COLLOQUIUM

Background papers

United Nations Task Force on Post-Conflict Peace-Building, An Inventory of Possible Post-Conflict Peace-Building Activities.

Inter-Agency Working Group, Relief to the Development Continuum: Guidelines for an Operational Framework.

United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat), "Human settlements and the environment: strategies for action in the continuum from relief to development", workshop document.

International Labour Organization, Reintegrating Demobilized Combatants: A Report Exploring Options and Strategies for Training-Related Interventions.

United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, "The challenge of rebuilding war-torn societies", report of seminar.

Agency papers

Department for Development Support and Management Services, Strategic Planning and Programming of Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development: Basic Principles and Procedures of the Strategic Planning Approach.

Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Department of Humanitarian Affairs and its Role in the Transition from Relief to Rehabilitation; and Developing an Agenda to Review the Capacity of the United Nations Relief System.

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Post-Conflict Recovery: UNHCR's Capacities and Perspectives.

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Rebuilding of Post-Conflict Countries.

United Nations Children's Fund, UNICEF - Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Development Strategies: The UNICEF Perspective; and Emergency and Humanitarian Assistance - The Role of UNICEF.

United Nations Institute for Training and Research, UNITAR's Training Approach.

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, UNRWA and the Peace Process in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

United Nations Volunteers, Strategic Partnerships for Volunteer Action; and Humanitarian Relief and Peace-keeping Operations.

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Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, "Post-conflict reconstruction - the role of FAO".

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United Nations Industrial Development Organization, The Role of Industry in Post-emergency Reconstruction and Restructuring: A Proposal for UNIDO Inter-Agency Programme of Technical Cooperation.

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World Health Organization, Post-Conflict Health Sector Reconstruction.

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Office of the Special Coordinator for Sarajevo, Report of the Special Coordinator for Sarajevo - Action Plan for the Restoration of Essential Services to Sarajevo.

Norwegian People's Aid, Norwegian People's Aid in Former Yugoslavia - Monthly Report, May 1995.

Individual papers

Sultan Barakat, Coordinator, Post-War Reconciliation and Development Unit, University of York, and Benjamin Hoffman, Canadian International Institute of Applied Negotiation, Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Key Concepts, Principal Components and Capabilities.

Alejandro Bendana, Post-Conflict Peace-building: A Nicaraguan NGO Perspective.

Graciana del Castillo, "Post-conflict peace-building: the challenge to the UN", CEPAL Review, No. 55; and "Arms-for-land deal: lessons from El Salvador", Multidimensional Peacekeeping, Lessons from Cambodia and El Salvador.

Alvaro de Soto and Graciana del Castillo, "Implementation of comprehensive peace agreements: staying the course in El Salvador", Global Governance, No. 1 (1995), pp. 189-203; and "Obstacles to Peacebuilding", Foreign Policy, No. 94 (spring 1994).

Michael Doyle, Professor of Political and International Affairs, "Strategies of enhanced consent", The Brookings Volume (Feb. 1995).

Wade Jacoby, "Toward a theory of institutional transfer", Post-war Reconstruction: Institutional Transfer in Germany, 1945-1994.

Nils Kastberg, Permanent Mission of Sweden, Developing an Agenda to Review the Capacity of the United Nations Relief System.

Mutamba Lumpungu, Director, Austrian Relief Program for Rwanda, Moral and Physical Rehabilitation in Rwanda.

Hans Skotte, University of Trondheim, Contributions towards Reconstruction by Exiled Professionals - A Short Introduction to a Planned Approach.

Matthias Stiefel, Rebuilding War-torn Societies: An Action-Research Project on Problems of International Assistance in Post-conflict Situations; and UNDP in Conflicts and Disasters, An Overview Report of the "Continuum Project".

Viatcheslav Vlassenko, Deputy Chief of Directorate, EMERCOM, Russian Federation, EMERCOM of Russia: The Capacities in the Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters.
