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GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT:
NON-PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF
MASS DESTRUCTION AND OF VEHICLES
FOR THEIR DELIVERY IN ALL ITS ASPECTS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fiftieth year

Letter dated 3 July 1995 from the Permanent Representative of
the United States of America to the United Nations addressed
to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith a statement made by the United States Government on 1 July 1995, the occasion of the twenty-seventh anniversary of the opening for signature of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

May I ask for your kind assistance in circulating the statement as a document of the General Assembly, under item 70 (1) of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Madeleine K. ALBRIGHT

* A/50/50/Rev.1.

Annex

Statement on the occasion of the twenty-seventh
anniversary of the opening for signature of the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, 1 July 1995

On 1 July 1968, President Lyndon Johnson and representatives from 60 other countries signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the East Room of the White House. Since the Treaty was signed and entered into force in 1970, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has achieved truly historic importance.

As of 1 July 1995, over 170 countries have become non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, thereby making a legally binding commitment not to develop or acquire nuclear weapons. In addition, each one of the 179 States parties, including the 5 nuclear-weapon States, has agreed to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament, which remains our ultimate goal.

The last 12 months have been extremely productive for achieving our twin objectives of limiting the spread of nuclear weapons and reducing their number. Most importantly, in May 1995, the State parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons decided, without conditions, that the Treaty would continue in force indefinitely in accordance with article X.2 of the Treaty.

Other recent developments have also contributed to reducing the threat of nuclear war.

Since 1 July last year, 15 countries have become parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as non-nuclear-weapon States, including Algeria, Argentina, Chile and Ukraine, all of which have peaceful nuclear facilities. There remain only 10 countries in the world that are not bound by the Treaty or other comparable agreements. Of these 10, only 3 countries have not placed all their nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.

The United States has continued to dismantle nuclear weapons at a rate of between 1,000 and 2,000 per year. For the first time, the United States has placed nuclear weapons material from its stockpile under IAEA safeguards.

In December 1994, the United States and the Russian Federation, together with Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, brought the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) into force. Nine thousand nuclear weapons from United States and former Soviet strategic delivery vehicles will have been removed from deployment when the Treaty is fully implemented.

In his 21 January 1995 State of the Union address, President Clinton called upon the Senate to approve START II. The Senate responded by beginning START II hearings on 31 January. When START II is fully implemented, an additional

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5,000 nuclear weapons will have been removed from the deployed arsenals of the United States and the Russian Federation.

Also in January, the United States extended its moratorium on nuclear-weapon testing until a comprehensive test-ban treaty enters into force, on the assumption that such a treaty will be signed by 30 September 1996.

In March, President Clinton announced that the United States would withdraw permanently 200 metric tons of nuclear weapons material from its stockpile. The United States will also reduce its stockpile of high enriched uranium from nuclear weapons by converting it to low enriched uranium for use in power reactors. The United States has also agreed to purchase 500 metric tons of high enriched uranium, previously used in dismantled Russian nuclear weapons, which has been converted to low enriched uranium for use in power reactors.

Also in March, the Conference on Disarmament agreed to establish an ad hoc committee to negotiate a multilateral ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The United States and the Russian Federation have agreed to cease production of plutonium for use in nuclear explosive devices. In April, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland announced that it no longer produced fissile material for nuclear weapons.

In April, the United States, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Russian Federation and France harmonized their policies prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States that are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons except in the unlikely event of an attack by a non-nuclear-weapon State allied or associated with a nuclear-weapon State against a nuclear-weapon State or its allies.

On 11 April, the United Nations Security Council adopted by consensus resolution 984 (1995), setting forth, in unprecedented detail, the means by which to respond in the event that a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is subject to nuclear aggression or threat of such aggression.

At the 1995 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Review and Extension Conference, the parties to the Treaty agreed on an ambitious agenda including the adoption of the following measures and undertakings:

(a) Universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as an urgent priority;

(b) A universal and internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty no later than 1996; pending entry into force of such a treaty, the nuclear-weapon States should exercise the "utmost restraint";

(c) A convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

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(d) The determined pursuit of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally;

(e) The development of nuclear-weapon-free zones as well as the establishment of zones free of all weapons of mass destruction should be encouraged as a matter of priority;

(f) Full-scope IAEA safeguards as a condition of supplying nuclear equipment and material;

(g) Increasing the capability of IAEA to detect undeclared nuclear activities.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons parties also agreed to strengthening and making more substantive the Treaty's review process.

The United States fully supports this agenda and looks forward to its substantial implementation by the time of the next Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons review conference in the year 2000. In this context, we continue to urge all of the nuclear-weapon States to join in a global moratorium on nuclear-weapon testing as we work to complete a comprehensive test-ban treaty at the earliest possible time.
