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GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT: REGIONAL DISARMAMENT

Report of the Secretary-General

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* A/49/50/Rev.1.

I. INTRODUCTION

1. On 16 December 1993, the General Assembly adopted resolution 48/75 G entitled "Regional disarmament", the operative part of which reads, inter alia, as follows:

"6. Encourages States to address, in regional arrangements for disarmament and arms limitations, the question of the accumulation of conventional weapons beyond the legitimate self-defence requirements of States;

"7. Also encourages States of a region to examine the possibility of creating, on their own initiative, regional mechanisms and/or institutions for the establishment of measures in the framework of an effort of regional disarmament or for the prevention and the peaceful settlement of disputes and conflicts with the assistance, if requested, of the United Nations;

"8. Invites Member States and regions to bring to the attention of the General Assembly results achieved on regional disarmament, and requests the Secretary-General to submit a report to the General Assembly at its forty-ninth session on the basis of the replies received".

2. Pursuant to that request of the General Assembly, the Secretary-General, in a note verbale dated 2 March 1994, invited Member States to provide relevant information on this matter. The replies received are reproduced in section II of the present report.

II. REPLIES RECEIVED FROM GOVERNMENTS

AUSTRIA

[Original: English]

[3 June 1994]

Statement by the Permanent Representative of Austria,
Ambassador Martin Vukovich, to the Plenary of the
CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation (19 January 1994)

1. The purpose of regional arms control measures envisaged in paragraph A.6 of the Programme for Immediate Action of the CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) is to strengthen military security and stability in parts of the CSCE area where measures generally applicable to all CSCE participating States are not sufficient.

2. Regional measures could help overcome instabilities resulting from the redrawing of the European map after the signature of the CFE Treaty (Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe). They could also serve as a means to close dangerous gaps in the European arms control arrangements since these gaps cannot be filled through the harmonization of obligations of all CSCE participating

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States in the field of arms control, disarmament as well as confidence- and security-building.

3. When the mandate for the Forum for Security Cooperation was negotiated at the CSCE Follow-up Meeting in Helsinki, Austria had insisted that regional measures should include "where appropriate, reductions or limitations". Already at that time Austria was convinced that the situation on the territory of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is an obvious field of application for such measures.

4. The JNA, the armed forces of the former Yugoslavia, was considered to be the fifth largest army in Europe. The major part of this army was taken over by Serbia/Montenegro ("Federal Republic of Yugoslavia"), one of the five successor States of the former Yugoslavia. The armed forces of Serbia/Montenegro possess about 60 per cent of the battle tanks, 85 per cent of the ACVs, 65 per cent of the artillery pieces and 85 per cent of the combat aircrafts and attack helicopters of the former JNA, although the size of the territory and of the population of Serbia/Montenegro is less than 40 per cent of those of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The armed forces of Serbia/Montenegro are stronger in terms of quantity and quality than those of most of its neighbours.

5. Croatia, whose territory remains partly occupied after a six-month war of conquest waged by the former JNA, is for understandable reasons trying to build up its military capabilities. The same holds true for the armed forces of the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

6. While most of the neighbouring countries of the former Yugoslavia are bound by the CFE agreements limiting the personnel strength and the major conventional weapon systems of their armed forces, States which have emerged on the territory of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia seem to be engaged in an arms race endangering the stability of the whole region. Such a development is particularly threatening because this region is for nearly two and a half years the scene of the bloodiest war in Europe since 1945. There is also a high propensity in this region for further violence due to traditional animosities, latent ethnic tensions and new enmities. It is therefore imperative that military imbalances in this region will be corrected through arms control measures and not through an arms build-up.

7. It goes without saying that negotiations on arms control measures for South Eastern Europe can only begin, once a peace agreement between all parties to the conflict has been achieved and the relations between all the States which have emerged on the territory of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will be normalized. However, in parallel to the peace efforts undertaken by the ICFY (International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia), one should consider how a political settlement could be reinforced by a set of measures for military stability. Without military stability, peace in this area would remain fragile for the reasons mentioned before.

8. At the opening day of the Forum for Security Cooperation on 22 September 1992, Hungary has offered a "food for thought" for regional negotiations on the establishment of a stable balance of armed forces between

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all new States on the territory of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia at the lowest possible levels. Starting from this proposal a group of countries has developed in the course of the last 16 months a number of ideas pertinent to a possible arms control regime for South Eastern Europe. This concept is not aimed against any country; it should meet the security needs of all the countries in the region.

9. This concept is based on the idea that the maximum levels of holdings of conventional armaments and equipment as well as limits for personnel of the newly admitted CSCE States in South Eastern Europe shall be commensurate with their legitimate defence needs.

10. This concept comprises the following elements:

(a) The maximum levels of holdings and personnel limits of the newly admitted CSCE States in the region shall be agreed by them in regional negotiations with the participation of other CSCE States concerned. The agreed levels of individual States shall take into account the principle of sufficiency. Taken together these levels will not exceed the holdings of the States which existed before 1991 on the territories of the new CSCE States in the region;

(b) Conventional armaments and equipment of the newly admitted CSCE States in the region subject to limitation shall include at least the five categories of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the CFE Treaty;

(c) Paramilitary forces shall be limited in order to prevent a circumvention of obligations;

(d) All irregular forces in the region shall be disbanded;

(e) An effective verification of reductions and holdings shall be established;

(f) In addition to these obligations undertaken by the newly admitted CSCE States in South Eastern Europe, a set of appropriate CSBMs (confidence- and security-building measures) and stabilizing measures will be agreed among all regional States. Thus the arms control regime for South Eastern Europe would consist of two tiers of commitments.

11. The negotiations on such a regional arms control regime should be conducted in a regional working group to be established by the FSC in accordance with chapter V, paragraph 37, of the Helsinki Document 1992. Participants in this regional working group should be all the States which have emerged on the territory of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, their neighbours as well as certain other CSCE participating States. The agreements resulting from these negotiations should be signed by all the participants and be submitted to the Special Committee of the FSC. Limitations and related measures should have a legally binding character.

12. These are the basic ideas of a group of regional countries on a concept for military stability in South Eastern Europe.

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13. At the last CSCE Council Meeting, held in Rome on 30 November and 1 December 1993, the Foreign Ministers of the 52 CSCE participating States have affirmed that military security and stability in South Eastern Europe is important for peace and stability in the CSCE area as a whole. In this context, the Ministers have agreed that the FSC should examine a CSCE contribution to regional security in South Eastern Europe through arms control and disarmament as well as confidence- and security-building. The search for such a contribution would be complementary to the continuing efforts towards achieving a comprehensive settlement to the conflict and issues dealt with by the ICFY.

14. The CSCE is called upon to use its unique experience and capabilities in the field of conventional arms control for the establishment of military stability in South Eastern Europe.

15. Based on the aforementioned decision of the Rome CSCE Council Meeting, consultations on a concept for military stability in South Eastern Europe can begin at any time. An open-ended working group in the FSC dealing with conceptual issues can hopefully be established next spring. This open-ended group should examine a CSCE contribution to regional security in South Eastern Europe as mandated by the Rome Council Meeting, thus enabling the FSC to present its recommendations to the Budapest Summit Meeting. Austria would welcome a decision of the Budapest CSCE Summit on the concept for negotiations on arms control, disarmament as well as confidence- and security-building in South Eastern Europe.

16. Obviously, such negotiations at a South European table in the FSC can only begin once all States of the region will fully participate in the CSCE. However, it would be important that all the parties to a political settlement hopefully reached at the ICFY will, in the context of such a settlement, agree in principle to the concept for military stability in South Eastern Europe. Early progress in the negotiations on arms control, disarmament as well as confidence- and security-building in South Eastern Europe could be enhanced through a variety of incentives offered by the international community.

17. Although a priority task of these negotiations might be the elaboration of special CSBMs and stabilizing measures reinforcing a peace agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, arms control through limitations and where necessary reductions should be on the agenda from the very beginning.

BULGARIA

[Original: English]

[10 June 1994]

1. The Republic of Bulgaria is among the initiators of the European regional disarmament process in the context of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Successive Bulgarian delegations took an active part in elaborating a series of treaties which led to an unprecedented regional conventional disarmament and to the introduction of comprehensive confidence- and security-building measures. In this way, the Republic of Bulgaria contributed to

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increasing security and stability in Europe through the establishment of a stable, secure and verifiable balance of conventional armed forces at lower levels, as well as through increased openness and predictability of military activities.

2. The provisions of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty), the subsequent Agreement on the maximum levels of conventional forces and equipment concluded among the States - former members of the Warsaw Pact - and the Concluding Act of the Negotiations on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe require the reduction by Bulgaria of five types of conventional armaments and equipment and of the personnel of the armed forces.

3. The Republic of Bulgaria strictly fulfils its obligations under the CFE Treaty, performing the necessary reductions within the time-limits specified in the Treaty. This has been confirmed by the international inspections undertaken in the Bulgarian territory in compliance with the verification and control mechanism under the Treaty.

4. On the other hand, the Government of the Republic of Bulgaria is of the view that of the immense quantities of treaty-limited equipment and other weapons that remain in Europe even after the execution of the CFE commitments exceed the needs of secure stability. The interest in further measures, in the Balkans in particular, is well founded. In this regard, the Forum for Security Cooperation, established by a decision of the States participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe at their Helsinki Summit meeting in 1992, could play a vital role. The mandate of the Forum for Security Cooperation is broad enough in terms of enhancing security and stability in Europe. Especially in the disarmament field its mandate allows for the negotiation of further specific conventional disarmament measures and provisions harmonizing the obligations assumed under various international instruments in this area, bearing in particular on exchange of information, verification and force levels, as well as on new confidence- and security-building measures and "stabilization measures". The potential negotiations on all these important matters should be aimed at further substantial reductions in the area of conventional armaments and forces, in particular where military imbalances persist, and at introducing more transparency in the military field, especially with regard to modernization of the equipment and weapons for the forces of active and non-active units.

UKRAINE

[Original: Russian]

[16 June 1994]

1. In the period 1993-1994, Ukraine took steps in the field of regional disarmament in accordance with the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the 1992 Vienna document and the talks on confidence-building and security. During this period the States Parties to the treaties were provided with information (17 July 1992, 1 January 1993 and 1 January 1994) on the structure, location and numerical strength of the armed forces of Ukraine, as

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envisaged in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. Ukraine accepted and facilitated 110 inspections of its objects of verification. We conducted 22 inspections of objects of verification in the territories of other States Parties to the Treaty. Representatives of Ukraine, at the invitation of other countries, took part in inspection groups of the United Kingdom, Italy, Poland, Hungary, France and Germany.

2. In accordance with the provisions of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Ukraine needs to reduce 1,974 tanks, 1,545 armoured combat vehicles and 550 combat aircraft. By 1 June 1994, 889 tanks, 971 armoured combat vehicles and 172 combat aircraft had been eliminated.

3. According to preliminary data as of May 1994, in fulfilment of the agreements reached, 180 of 200 nuclear warheads had been transported into the Russian Federation, as envisaged in the Trilateral Statement.
