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LETTER DATED 20 SEPTEMBER 1961 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE
PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

I have the honour to transmit the documents listed below and would be grateful if this letter and its enclosures could be circulated to all Members of the United Nations for the information of the General Assembly and of the Disarmament Commission:

United States Memorandum on Composition of the Disarmament Forum,
29 July 1961;

United States Memorandum on Principles that Should Govern Negotiations
for General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World;

Letter from John J. McCloy, United States Representative at the US-USSR
Exchange of Views on Disarmament, to V.A. Zorin, Deputy Minister of
Foreign Affairs of the USSR, 20 September 1961.

(Signed) Adlai E. STEVENSON

UNITED STATES
MEMORANDUM ON COMPOSITION OF THE DISARMAMENT FORUM

The objective of the United States is the resumption of multilateral disarmament negotiations. It has made, and now reaffirms, four alternative proposals for the composition of a disarmament forum:

(1) Ten-Nation Committee: The United States remains prepared to resume negotiations in the Ten-Nation Committee, which was established by agreement among the United States, the Soviet Union, France and the United Kingdom in September 1959. The work of this Committee, which is composed of five NATO Powers (the United States, United Kingdom, France, Canada and Italy) and five Warsaw Pact Powers (the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Rumania), was left unfinished by virtue of the Soviet Union's break-off of negotiations in Geneva on 27 June 1960. It was conceived that the deliberations of this Committee would provide a useful basis for the consideration of disarmament in the United Nations. In this way, a stage would be achieved, after a basis for agreement was reached by the members of this Committee, in which all Members of the United Nations would participate in an effective way in the disarmament negotiations, which are of concern to all the nations of the world. The United States continues to believe that this represents a sound and orderly approach, which has been approved by the United Nations and which should not be abandoned.

(2) Ten-Nation Committee with Invited Presiding Officials: The United States is fully prepared to join with the other three Powers which established the Ten-Nation Committee in extending an invitation to three other nations, not members of the NATO or Warsaw Treaty organizations, to designate a chairman and two vice-chairmen of the Ten-Nation Committee. These officers would preside over meetings of the Committee, using their good offices as appropriate to facilitate the achievement of agreement, without bearing the additional responsibility of serving as official spokesmen of their Governments in the negotiations or attempting to act as formal "representatives" of a non-existent "neutral" bloc.

(3) Twenty-Nation Committee: The United States is fully prepared, considering its objective of reaching agreement on disarmament, to propose changing the original concept of the Ten-Nation Committee by an expansion of its membership so that countries not members of NATO or the Warsaw Pact can participate at the initial negotiating level, as well as through the United Nations. Such an expansion should be consistent with normal principles of equitable representation of the different regions of the world and with the desirability of selecting countries on the basis of such relevant factors as population and military capabilities. Accordingly, the United States proposes that three countries be added to the Ten-Nation Committee from Asia, three from Latin America, three from the Middle East and Africa, and one from non-NATO, non-Soviet Bloc Europe. The United States has suggested that the following States might appropriately be added: Pakistan, India and Japan from Asia; Mexico, Brazil and Argentina from Latin America; the United Arab Republic, Nigeria and Tunisia from Africa and the Middle East; and Sweden from Europe.

(4) The United Nations Disarmament Commission: If none of these alternatives is accepted by the Soviet Union, the United States proposes that substantive negotiations be resumed in the United Nations Disarmament Commission, in which all United Nations Members are represented. The United Nations Disarmament Commission would be free to establish, if it so wished, smaller sub-committees in which detailed negotiations could be conducted.

UNITED STATES

MEMORANDUM ON PRINCIPLES THAT SHOULD GOVERN NEGOTIATIONS
FOR GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT IN A PEACEFUL WORLD

The Government and the people of the United States have traditionally worked for the achievement of a peaceful world in which nations will no longer resort to war as an instrument for settling international problems. They remain dedicated to this goal.

In taking the initiative last March and suggesting a bilateral exchange of views with the Soviet Government on disarmament, the United States acted in the belief that a frank and informal discussion of issues of principle could make an important contribution to the appreciation by each side of the views and positions of the other and to effective progress along the road to a lasting peace. It also sought to meet repeated Soviet insistence that no multilateral negotiations could take place without an agreed framework for them. The United States hoped that this exchange of views would lead to a joint understanding of the guidelines for resumed multilateral negotiations - negotiations which the Soviet Union arbitrarily abandoned in 1960. Last March there appeared to be a common understanding with the Soviet Government that once these guidelines and an appropriate and representative forum were agreed upon and accepted by the other participants, multilateral negotiations would reopen on 31 July. Unfortunately, the Soviet Government took the view that such an understanding regarding both the nature of the bilateral talks and the resumption of multilateral negotiations on 31 July did not exist.

The Soviet Government stated that the bilateral talks should turn instead directly to a consideration of specific plans and that without a large measure of agreement on such specific plans there could be no multilateral negotiations. The United States believes on the other hand that negotiation of detailed disarmament plans is the concern of many States. Therefore, the United States cannot accept a procedure whereby these interested States would be excluded from participation in working out an agreement.

Consequently, the United States sought to achieve a meeting of minds on a set of principles to be submitted for approval to the other participants in multilateral negotiations. This, the United States believed, would prepare the

ground for detailed and fruitful negotiations of specific measures and programmes. Such a procedure, if followed from the outset, as was the understanding reached by Ambassador Stevenson and Foreign Minister Gromyko last March, would have provided for the presentation and discussion of a specific programme of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world in the appropriate multilateral forum at any time after 31 July. The United States regretfully saw 31 July pass without such negotiations having been commenced.

To facilitate accomplishment of the task of the bilateral exchange of views the United States representative at the bilateral talks gave the Soviet representative on 19 June a draft statement of principles setting forth the purpose of the multilateral negotiations and the principles that should guide them. This statement closely conformed to the type of statements that had previously been the subject of an exchange of views between Ambassador Stevenson and Foreign Minister Gromyko. The United States several times made revisions of its draft statement of principles in order to meet points that had been raised in the course of the bilateral talks.

The United States representative did not, however, confine himself to the presentation of these documents. In accordance with our understanding of the purpose of the bilateral exchange of views, he sought to engage the Soviet representative in a productive discussion of the principles and considerations underlying the written documents.

As is clear from the United States documents submitted during the bilateral discussions, the United States objective is to implement a programme which ensures total disarmament with States retaining at their disposal only those minimal forces and non-nuclear armaments required for the maintenance of internal order and the protection of the personal security of citizens. Apart from these internal security forces, only an international peace force would exist. All other military force would be eliminated. The programme desired by the United States would include the establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace, including the International Peace Force, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.

The United States also set forth its views on several important specific aspects of the search for agreement on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world.

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First, the United States stresses the importance of working out a total over-all programme providing for complete disarmament. The United States is prepared to work out the whole programme. At the same time, the United States cannot accept a situation where nothing concrete can be done until the very last word has been agreed for the total programme. Consequently, it urges acceptance of the proposition that without prejudice to eventual development of the total programme an attempt must be made to find the widest possible area of agreement - including any individual measures or groups of measures - and to implement such measures just as soon as they are agreed. The United States believes that while the complete programme with its admittedly complex provisions is being worked out, no opportunity should be missed to make a start. Any beginning, even the most limited, will represent progress. Moreover, it would facilitate the work on, and indeed form part of, the total programme which is the stated goal. The United States hopes that the Soviet Union will accept this practical approach. In disarmament, as elsewhere, the way to begin is to begin. This is why the United States particularly deplores the retreat of the Soviet Government for an effective agreement to ban nuclear weapons tests, which would have been a significant first step on the road to general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world.

Secondly, the United States stresses the inseparable relationship between the drastic scaling down of national armaments and the building up of international peace-keeping machinery and institutions. Any programme, even if it carries the title "General and Complete Disarmament", which does not embody this relationship is a programme for disorder and the perpetuation of disputes among nations. Nations which are expected to give up their means of self-protection must have available other effective means of safeguarding their legitimate interests. They must be protected against possible violators of a disarmament agreement by effective international enforcement measures. They must have available judicial and non-judicial procedures for the equitable settlement of disputes and for harmonizing conflicting interests and aspirations as they arise. They must be assured that change in the world will be orderly and progressive. And if necessary they must be assured of the protection of an international force capable of operating effectively for the common benefit of all nations and not in the special interest of any one nation or group of nations.

The procedures and institutions envisaged by the United States would be within the framework of the United Nations as part of the programme for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world. These procedures and institutions would not permit nations to invoke doctrines of sacred or just wars in behalf of unilateral military action since they would ensure that no one really seeking justice or the fulfillment of legitimate aspirations will need to have recourse to their own force. They would not permit arbitrary revisions of established international agreements and infringements of other nations' rights. The United States believes firmly that nations must be prepared to moderate gradually the exercise of unrestricted sovereignty and to abide by the decisions and judgements of tribunals and other bodies, even if such decisions at times may not meet with a particular nation's approval.

The Soviet Government, judging from the statements of its representative during the bilateral talks, does not appear as yet to recognize the essential requirement of the progressive development of effective peace-keeping machinery parallel to the implementation of measures leading to total disarmament.

Thirdly, the United States insists upon effective verification of all disarmament measures from beginning to end. The fundamental precept guiding the United States is that the implementation of every obligation entered into must be subject to effective verification in order to provide each participating State with confidence that every other State is fulfilling its commitments.

Verification only of the process of reducing or destroying particular elements of military strength, as proposed by the Soviet Union, does not meet the criterion of effective verification of all obligations entered into. What must be certain is not only that nations are removing certain numbers of forces and armaments from their military establishments, but also that they are not maintaining forces and armaments or engaging in activities in excess of those permitted at a given step or stage in the disarmament programme.

Any disarmament programme which professes to meet the criterion of effective verification must provide unambiguously for means of detecting clandestine or other activities not authorized in the agreement. The absence of such provision would make any disarmament plan a sham.

It follows, further, that the verification system must be fully capable of exercising the functions necessary to ensure compliance with the agreement

throughout the entire disarmament process and not just at the end of it. The phrase frequently used in Soviet statements that "under conditions of general and complete disarmament the most thorough control must be implemented" is ambiguous and does not adequately reflect the necessity for effective verification at every step and stage of the disarmament process. Indeed, it must be pointed out that if, as the Soviet Union suggests, control can be "most thorough" only "under conditions" of general and complete disarmament, but not during the process of implementing the measures leading to general and complete disarmament, it may never be possible to determine whether the "conditions" of general and complete disarmament have in fact arrived or to protect a complying party against the consequences of violation or evasion of a disarmament agreement by others.

The United States believes that effective verification requires smooth day-to-day functioning of the inspection machinery. The rights and functions of the verification system would be spelled out in detail in any agreement and in its annexes. There would of course be a political body composed as agreed by the parties, which would exercise policy supervision over the administrative arm of the control organ. But this administrative arm itself must be able to work as fast and efficiently as possible and without hindrance if it is to have the confidence of all parties. Sound administrative practice the world over and the requirement of effective verification demand efficient administration of the disarmament verification machinery. For this reason the United States rejects firmly the concept of some sort of multi-headed administrative machinery. The United States, moreover, does not agree with the effort of the Soviet Government to divide the world into three or any other number of blocs or "camps". As the United States representative indicated during the bilateral discussions, the agreement on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world should include a mechanism providing States with recourse in the event they believe that personnel of the administrative machinery are not properly discharging their functions.

The United States believes that the nature and extent of controls should depend strictly on the objective requirements for verification of each disarmament measure. The agreement and its annexes, based as they must be on adequate scientific and technical findings, should set forth in detail the verification requirements for each measure. No other consideration than assurance that each

measure will be fully and punctually implemented should enter into the specification of verification requirements. This will ensure that no legitimate security interests of any State will be adversely affected by the application of disarmament controls.

The United States believes that the elaboration of the means of verification is the joint responsibility of all States interested in the achievement of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world. The Soviet Union has for the past year suggested that, on the contrary, the West must carry the burden of elaborating a verification system. The United States urges the Soviet Government to join the United States in multilateral negotiations and in the conscientious and businesslike development of a verification system which would enable all parties to repose trust in a disarmament agreement.

The United States representative also dealt with numerous other aspects of principle in order to amplify the written documents tabled by the United States. He said the United States believes that time-limits must be worked out for the completion of all disarmament measures as well as for the completion of each stage. However, the problem of establishing these time-limits is complicated by the numerous technical problems involved in working out effective and reliable means of implementing disarmament measures. Moreover, an over-all time-limit would, of course, have to take into account the procedure for transition between stages. The United States will devote every effort toward solving these problems and hopes the Soviet Union is prepared to do likewise. Once the time-limits for the measures in each stage and for the stages themselves have been worked out, it will be possible to estimate the time-limit for the implementation of the total programme. The United States believes, however, that it would be unrealistic and dangerously misleading to pretend that a specific over-all time-limit can be established in advance.

With regard to transition from one stage to the next, the United States believes that the underlying principle must be that States will at each stage be assured that all parties have fulfilled their obligations and that the next steps in the disarmament programme can then safely be taken. Without such assurance, there would be cause for suspicion and dispute, which might disrupt the entire disarmament process. Accordingly, the United States believes that transition from stage to stage should take place upon a review of the implementation of

measures included in the preceding stage and upon a decision that all such measures have in fact been implemented as provided in the agreement. As soon as this decision has been taken, implementation of the next stage would commence forthwith. The Soviet position on this question remains obscure despite repeated United States attempts to obtain clarification.

The United States also attempted to resolve the issue of the composition of a multilateral negotiating forum. Ambassador Stevenson and Foreign Minister Gromyko had agreed previously that this would be one of the purposes of the bilateral discussions. Accordingly, the United States presented the Soviet Union with several alternative possibilities for a forum including: (1) the reconvening of the Ten-Nation Committee, which the USSR abandoned in 1960; (2) the addition to that Committee of three officers selected from other countries; (3) an expansion of the Committee by ten members selected on an equitable geographical basis, and (4) the United Nations Disarmament Commission. Unfortunately, neither the oral statements of the Soviet representative nor a Soviet aide-memoire tabled on 28 July indicated a constructive Soviet response to these United States suggestions. Disarmament negotiations cannot, of course, take place without the Soviet Government. Since that Government still appears unwilling to accept a forum of workable size and equitable composition, the United States proposes that negotiations be resumed in the first instance in the United Nations Disarmament Commission. However, if the Soviet Government agrees, the United States remains willing to resume negotiations in a Committee composed of the original members of the Ten-Nation Committee, with the addition of the following countries: from Asia - Pakistan, India and Japan; from Latin America - Mexico, Brazil and Argentina; from Africa and the Middle East - the United Arab Republic, Nigeria and Tunisia; and from Europe - Sweden. Such a committee would ensure equitable and fair representation to all geographical regions of the world. The Soviet Government is already in possession of the United States memorandum of 29 July 1961 in which the United States position on the forum issue was set forth in detail.

The views and considerations presented in this memorandum, in conjunction with the draft Statements of Principles which have been given to the Soviet Government, provide a clear statement of the position of the United States on the principles which should govern the working out of an agreement on general and complete

disarmament in a peaceful world. The United States Government has studied the Statement of the Soviet Government of 27 June 1961, the Soviet Government's aide-memoire of 19 July and 21 July, and the draft statement of principles which the Soviet representative submitted on 27 July. It has carefully taken into account the positions of the Soviet Government expressed in these documents as well as in the statements of the Soviet representative during the bilateral talks. The successive drafts of statements of principles submitted by the United States testify to its consistent effort to meet any constructive suggestion put forward by the Soviet Union. The United States hopes that the Soviet Union will similarly make a sincere effort to work out a mutually acceptable statement of principles which will permit the early resumption of multilateral negotiations.

New York City, N.Y.
14 September 1961

LETTER FROM JOHN J. McCLOY, UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE AT THE
US-USSR EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON DISARMAMENT, TO V.A. ZORIN, DEPUTY
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR

20 September 1961

Dear Mr. Zorin:

At the 18 September 1961 session of our bilateral discussions on disarmament you indicated that the draft of a joint statement of agreed principles which I submitted to you on behalf of the United States Government on 14 September 1961 would be acceptable to the Government of the Soviet Union provided the following clause were omitted from paragraph 6:

"Such verification should ensure that not only agreed limitations or reductions take place but also that retained armed forces and armaments do not exceed agreed levels at any stage."

This sentence expresses a key element in the United States position which we believe is implicit in the entire joint statement of agreed principles that whenever an agreement stipulates that at a certain point certain levels of forces and armaments may be retained, the verification machinery must have all the rights and powers necessary to ensure that those levels are not exceeded.

It appears from your statements that the Soviet Union will be unwilling to agree to a joint statement of agreed principles unless the above-mentioned clause is omitted therefrom. My Government has authorized me to inform you that, in the interests of progress toward resuming disarmament negotiations, it is willing to remove the above-mentioned sentence from paragraph 6 of the joint statement of agreed principles since it is an item to which the Soviet Union has not agreed.

His Excellency
V.A. Zorin
Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR
Permanent Mission of the USSR
to the United Nations
680 Park Avenue
New York 21, New York

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This is done upon the express understanding that the substantive position of the United States Government as outlined in the above-quoted sentence and in our memorandum of 14 September 1961 remains unchanged, and is in no sense prejudiced by the exclusion of this sentence from the joint statement of agreed principles.

The United States continues to adhere to and will continue to advance the principle contained in the omitted sentence as a necessary element in any comprehensive disarmament negotiations or agreement.

Very truly yours,

(Signed) John J. McCLOY
