



Distr.  
GENERAL

A/4853  
23 August 1961

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Sixteenth session

THE URGENT NEED FOR A TREATY TO BAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS  
UNDER EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL

Letter dated 23 August 1961 from the Permanent Representative  
of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed  
to the Secretary-General

In connexion with the request for inscription on the agenda of the sixteenth session of the General Assembly of an item entitled "The urgent need for a treaty to ban nuclear weapons tests under effective international control" which was submitted by the delegations of the United Kingdom and the United States on 15 July 1961 (A/4799), I have the honour to request that you circulate to all Members of the United Nations the attached statement by the United States Government on the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests in Geneva.

(Signed) Adlai E. STEVENSON  
Permanent Representative of  
the United States of America  
to the United Nations

STATEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ON THE CONFERENCE  
ON THE DISCONTINUANCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS

Since the beginning of history, the life of man has been shadowed by the fear of war. Since the end of the Second World War, man's fear of war has been immeasurably heightened by the invention of nuclear weapons. The elimination of war has long been man's hope; now it is his urgent necessity if he is to survive on this planet. Nothing has preoccupied humanity more in the years since 1945 than the effort to abolish war and, as part of that effort, to bring about universal disarmament.

Yet nothing has frustrated men of goodwill more than the failure of the great nations to agree on how they might safely disarm. Many things have contributed to that failure: the historic legacy of suspicion among nation-states; the inherent tension between closed and open societies; the technical difficulties of devising mechanisms of inspection and control; the political difficulties of accepting mechanisms of enforcement; even perhaps the vested interests which some dogmas and institutions may have in the perpetuation of crisis. All these things account for the terrifying gap between humanity's hope and man's achievement in the conquest of war.

From the day in June 1946 when Bernard Baruch, on behalf of the United States, offered to surrender the American monopoly of atomic weapons to a United Nations authority empowered to control all atomic activities, men have submitted a variety of plans to limit and to eliminate the weapons by which nations might destroy each other. Some of these plans have been serious; others have been mere polemics or propaganda. And yet in these sixteen years under the shadow of the mushroom cloud, almost no progress has been achieved toward serious control. The single exception - the one ray of light in a dark decade of stalemate - has been the test-ban talks in Geneva.

THE TEST-BAN TREATY

The Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests began on 31 October 1958. The participants have been the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. For over 330 sessions, representatives of these three nations have sat around the conference table in earnest discussion of intricate scientific and political questions. The forbidding technicality of the talks

has not concealed the terrible gravity of the issues at stake. And the overhanging sense of gravity produced for a time in 1958-1960 a season of genuine negotiation. There was give and take. Areas of disagreement narrowed. In two and a half years the conference succeeded in adopting a preamble, seventeen articles and two annexes of a draft treaty. While important issues remained, it seemed at last as if the great Powers could agree on at least one concrete programme as a prelude to a broader attack on the institution of war.

When President Kennedy took office in January 1961, he called for an immediate and intensive review of United States policy in order to overcome the remaining obstacles and bring the conference to a successful conclusion. Ambassador Arthur Dean, resuming the Geneva discussions in March, came with a new set of proposals designed to meet all legitimate Soviet reservations. Then, in a painstaking process, the United States and the United Kingdom combined all the new proposals plus every agreement previously reached in a complete nuclear test-ban treaty. That treaty was put on the table at Geneva on 18 April 1961.

This historic document promises to end the fear of nuclear tests and radioactive fallout through a pledge by all signatory nations not to test nuclear weapons - a pledge to be made meaningful by international inspection. How would this be done?

The treaty proposes to ban under adequate safeguards:

1. All tests in the earth's atmosphere - the main source of radioactive fallout;
2. All tests in outer space;
3. All tests in the oceans;
4. All tests underground, except those producing signals of less than 4.75 seismic magnitude.

The treaty omits underground tests below the 4.75 threshold pending improvement in detection methods through a seismic research programme. In the interim, while research is carried out on detection methods, there would be a three-year moratorium on such tests. The ultimate objective is a treaty which would ban all tests under appropriate guarantees.

After signature by the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, the treaty would be open to other nations of the world, small and large. The treaty would be policed by a world-wide detection system operated by a single

administrator and an international staff. The administrator and his staff would be under the policy direction of a Control Commission, composed of four representatives from the Soviet side, four from the Anglo-American side, and three neutrals. The headquarters would be in Vienna. The staff would operate 180 fixed control posts on land and on ships at sea, equipped with instruments for detecting illegal tests by their sound, light radio waves, nuclear radiations, radioactive debris, or earthshock. The control posts would be supplemented in doubtful cases by inspection - carried out by international teams of experts - at the site of a possible violation. To remove any fear that inspectors would "rove" beyond their immediate assignment, the treaty would lay down strict safeguards: inspection teams would be accompanied by observers from the host country, would travel along routes prescribed by the host country, and would inspect only a restricted area predetermined by the seismic data.

By itself, the treaty banning nuclear weapons testing is, of course, a limited measure. But, as a first step in the world's assault on the institution of war, it could be a measure of incalculable importance. The treaty would bring about a number of tangible gains for humanity. It would slow down the arms race. It would eliminate the risk of biological and genetic damage from radioactive strontium and the other poisonous materials cast off by nuclear explosions in the atmosphere. It would check the multiplication of new types of nuclear weapons and discourage the spread of nuclear weapons to additional nations, thereby reducing the hazard of accidental war.

Above all, it would mark a great adventure in international collaboration for peace. The test-ban treaty contains most of the issues of trust and verification found in the wider and more difficult field of general disarmament. Out of the experience with the test-ban treaty could come the mutual confidence, the tested procedures, and the concerted policies which would enable the world to mount a wider and deeper attack on war itself. If the great nations can set up a collective system which effectively abolishes nuclear tests, surely they can hope to set up a collective system which effectively abolishes all the diverse and manifold weapons of human self-destruction.

In the long frustrations of the disarmament fight, the test-ban treaty was the world's first hope of progress. It is this hope which the Soviet Union, through an abrupt and inexplicable reversal of its own position, now threatens to dash from our lips.

## THE SOVIET ALTERNATIVE

Ambassador Semyon Tsarapkin, the chief of the Soviet delegation at Geneva, said this year: "Agreement could speedily be reached on all outstanding questions on the basis of the proposals submitted by the Soviet Union." What sort of a system of control would result if agreement were to be reached on this basis? Under the Anglo-American treaty, an earthshock, if unidentified, could set in motion an immediate process of inspection and verification. What would happen under the Soviet system if an unidentified earthshock took place within the borders of the Soviet Union?

Under the Soviet system, such an unidentified event would not even be inspected in the first four years after the treaty came into force.

If the event occurred after the inspection system was operating, there is no assurance that it would be reported properly to the control headquarters. The chief of the control post would be a Soviet citizen, and it cannot be assumed that any man would inspect his own country with ruthless impartiality. Soviet proposals require, moreover, that one-third of the technical staff of control posts be persons recommended by the Soviet Government and that no member of the staff can be appointed without Soviet consent. A staff composed of persons acceptable to the host country would obviously have ample chance for malpractice in reading, analysing, or reporting the results of instrumentation.

If an event in the Soviet Union were reported to the control headquarters, a decision on its eligibility for inspection would have to be made. Unless it were possible to locate the event with complete certainty within an area of 75 square miles, it would not be eligible for inspection under the quota according to the Soviet proposal. Since the Soviet view is that to be thus eligible an event must be, in addition, in Chairman Khrushchev's words, "suspected of being an atomic explosion", the Soviet representative, through an individual interpretation of the seismic data, might even reject an inspection of an event by asserting that it was not suspicious.

If the event were actually certified for inspection, the United States and the United Kingdom would have to decide whether to use one of the three annual inspections permitted by the Soviet Union. All three inspections could not be used in the early months of a year, because the rest of the year would then be a complete holiday from inspection. This would mean that up to the last weeks

only two inspections a year would be effectively available to check on the 100 or more unidentified seismic events above 4.75 seismic magnitude each year in the whole of the Soviet Union.

If an inspection team set out to look at the site, the control organization would have to work out inspection procedures. Up to this point, the Soviet Union has resisted efforts to set forth such procedures. It now advocates the replacement of the single impartial administrator envisaged in the treaty by a tripartite administrative board - the so-called "troika". While the "troika" could not veto a formal decision to inspect - a decision made by either the United States, the United Kingdom, or the Soviet Union - it could effectively veto the practical arrangements for inspection. Therefore if an unidentified event in the Soviet Union did pass the Soviet obstacle course and was actually recorded; was read, analysed and reported to the control organization; met the arbitrary criteria imposed by the Soviet Union; and was within the quota of three insisted on by the Soviet Union - if all this were done, the Soviet representative could still obstruct the control process by refusing to agree to adequate or efficient procedures for on-site inspection. Moreover, with Soviet insistence that inspection on its territory be carried out under the leadership of a Soviet citizen whose technical staff must be 50 per cent Soviet, the reliability of the inspection operation would always be doubtful.

Under the Soviet proposal, in short, no staff would be hired, no control posts established, no instruments set up, no interpretation of seismic data made, and thus in effect no on-site inspections undertaken without the consent of the Soviet representative on the "troika". At almost every stage in the process, there would be abundant opportunity to thwart and block the mechanism of control.

The whole purpose of the test-ban treaty is to deter clandestine tests. What deterrence would this Soviet system offer? If the Soviet Union is planning no violations why does it insist on sham control?

#### BACKGROUND FOR GENEVA

The problem of fallout came sharply to the world's attention in 1954, when both the United States and the Soviet Union tested large-yield nuclear weapons in the atmosphere with marked radioactive after effects. In the next years, as

scientists analysed the long-term effects of radioactive contamination on the bones, the blood, and the germ plasm of man, concern over the continuation of nuclear testing grew everywhere in the world. In 1954 Prime Minister Nehru called for a "stand-still agreement" on nuclear testing. In 1955 the Soviet Union proposed "an agreement on the cessation of experiments with all types of nuclear weapons". In the next years, Soviet officials assailed those who wished to associate test suspension with broader disarmament measures for "artificially linking" unrelated issues. As concern spread on every side, Prime Minister Nehru in November 1957 appealed to "the great leaders, more especially of America and Russia, ... to stop all nuclear test explosions and thus to show to the world that they are determined to end this menace, and to proceed also to bring about effective disarmament".

Early in 1958 President Eisenhower suggested to Marshal Bulganin, then the Soviet Prime Minister, that technical groups take up various aspects of disarmament including the control of a test ban. A series of exchanges between the two Governments led to a Conference of Experts from eight countries at Geneva in July and August 1958. After deliberation, they concluded that a control system to detect violation of a test ban was technically feasible. In late August the United States Government, welcoming the experts' report, proposed negotiation among the nuclear Powers looking toward the suspension of tests and the establishment of the control system. At the same time the United States Government said that, unless the Soviet Union resumed testing, it would stop further testing for one year from the beginning of the negotiations.

In October 1958 the United States completed its last series of nuclear tests. The Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests opened in Geneva on 31 October. On 1 and 3 November the Soviet Union exploded nuclear devices. The United States nevertheless declared that it would continue its test suspension unless the Soviet Union conducted further tests.

#### PURPOSES OF THE CONFERENCE

The essential problem at the Geneva conference was the establishment of a system of control reliable enough to span the abyss of suspicions between the Western democracies and the Soviet Union. The need for building trust through

verifiable safeguards is, of course, basic to the survival of nations. Wherever a nation gives up any part of its military strength, it must act with utmost care, for the lives of its people are at stake. With regard to nuclear testing, the specific danger is that of clandestine testing - testing which evades the instruments of detection. Obviously, if two nations promise to stop testing and one tests secretly while the other remains faithful to the covenant, the cheating nation reaps military advantages which, in time, may become decisive.

The United States delegation laid down three requirements for effective control:

1. The system of control must be capable of detecting nuclear explosions prohibited by the treaty;
2. All events which cannot be identified as natural by the system must be eligible for inspection even though all unidentified events will not in fact be inspected;
3. The number of inspections must be related to the number of unidentified events. The inspection bridge, in other words, must vary in length between events detected and events identified.

For its part, the Soviet Union lost few opportunities to profess its desire for a test ban. Thus in January 1959 the Soviet Government declared that it had "been persistently pressing for a cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapon tests as a first and highly important step towards a radical solution of the disarmament problem".

Two and a half years of patient negotiation produced progress. In 1961, when President Kennedy ordered the review of the United States position, prospects for agreement on the first arms control measure of the nuclear age seemed favourable. The world watched the reunion of the delegates at Geneva in March 1961 with high expectation. Then at the first session of the resumed conference the Soviet representative suddenly repudiated an already agreed portion of the treaty and reversed a good deal of the progress of two and a half years.

In order to understand what happened at Geneva, it is necessary to take a hard look at the points of disagreement. Even before the 1961 meetings, these fell in two groups: the technical issues involved in detecting tests underground, and the political issues involved in inspection and control.

## UNDERGROUND TESTING

The detectability of nuclear explosions depends essentially on how large they are and where they are held. Nuclear tests in the earth's atmosphere - and it is these tests which produce nearly all the radioactive fallout - are relatively easy to identify. Even without a complete treaty control system, it is possible to identify atmospheric fall-out tests in the 5-kiloton range with high reliability. Tests in the ocean present harder but by no means insoluble problems. Tests in outer space are more tricky, but within limits the signals they generate can be recorded by a variety of instruments located on the earth or in satellites.

For all these tests, various detection methods are available, including sound, light, radiowaves, radiation, and radioactive debris. Tests underground provide a far more difficult challenge. Here the earth swallows up signals which might otherwise be detectable. Only one method is now known: the measurement of the seismic waves transmitted through the earth as a result of the earthshock. And seismic measurement is complicated by the fact that the thousands of earthquakes occurring naturally every year often give off signals very similar to those of man-made underground explosions.

In the summer of 1958, the Conference of Experts evaluated the art of underground detection on the evidence from the single underground test that had then been conducted. But more detailed evidence, emerging from the series of underground American nuclear tests in the fall of 1958, showed that the Geneva group had underestimated the difficulties of detecting underground events. In March 1959 a panel of American scientists, headed by Dr. Lloyd V. Berkner, recommended research programmes to improve seismic detection and thus restore the capability originally claimed for the detection system. The Berkner report also warned that new methods could reduce the detectability of underground explosions, especially "decoupling" - that is, conducting explosions in large underground cavities where the seismic signals would be muffled. A nuclear detonation of about 20 kilotons in Nevada tuff would give off seismic signals in the 4.75 range; if the same detonation took place in a vast cavity in hard rock, seismic signals might be reduced by as much as a factor of 300.

The new evidence confronted the conference with the fact that, given the state of the art, an agreement banning all nuclear tests under reliable safeguards was simply not feasible. For months, however, the Soviet delegation ignored the evidence and declined to admit the existence of a detection problem. When it finally agreed to a technical conference, it refused to discuss the matter in scientific terms, resorting instead to political exhortation and diatribe. Given the situation, President Eisenhower, on 29 December 1959, said that the United States was no longer bound by its self-imposed moratorium and considered itself free to resume testing, but would not do so "without announcing our intention in advance of any resumption". The United States has not resumed testing.

However, even if all nuclear explosions could not be detected, there was nonetheless no reason why an agreement should not be reached banning such tests as could be adequately monitored. In March 1960, the Soviet Union agreed in principle to the idea of a first-step treaty containing a "threshold" - that is, a treaty which would ban all aboveground tests and all underground tests above the threshold of 4.75 magnitude. At the same time, the United States and the United Kingdom accepted the Soviet request for a moratorium on underground tests below the threshold, and the Soviet Union accepted the Anglo-American request for a research programme to work out effective inspection techniques for such tests. In May 1960, Ambassador Tsarapkin declared: "The Soviet Union has no objection if the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom carry out, during the implementation of that programme, a strictly limited number of joint underground nuclear explosions in order to verify the methods and instrumentation for controlling the cessation of underground nuclear weapons tests below the stated limit". Scientists from the three nations met in Geneva and exchanged ideas on the design of the research programme.

But Soviet interest in improving seismic detection capabilities soon flagged. At the end of May 1960, Mr. Tsarapkin repudiated the view of his own scientists that a research programme was necessary. In the months since, the Soviet Union has steadfastly declined to support seismic research. In particular, the Soviet Union has done its best to prevent research into the prevention of cheating, especially through decoupling - though it seems difficult to know how the Control Commission could be expected to catch cheaters unless more is learned about the

whole cheating process. As David Ormsby-Gore, the head of the British delegation, put it: "The Soviet representative is now ... saying that, in certain cases, which are scientifically proved and which have not been denied by the Soviet Union, there would be no control, and [yet] that no attempt would be made in a research programme to achieve control".

### INSPECTION AND CONTROL

The absence of effective seismic identification makes inspection at the site of suspected nuclear explosions all the more critical. Instruments in the control posts can record and, within limits, locate an earthshock, but they frequently cannot identify it - that is, tell whether it was caused by an earthquake or an explosion. In some cases, the only way to find out may be by sending an inspection team to the site of the phenomenon.

The Geneva negotiators reached fairly quick agreement on the necessity for a veto-free quota of on-site inspections - that is, for a minimum yearly number of inspection trips which a nation would have to accept and could not veto. The British and American representatives, arguing that the number of inspections should be in reasonable proportion to the number of suspicious phenomena, proposed the "one out of five" principle - that only one out of five earthshocks be inspected. This meant that if, as the United States experts believe, over 100 large unidentified earthshocks above 4.75 magnitude occur every year in the Soviet Union, only 20 would be inspected at the site. (The United States and the United Kingdom offered the Soviet Union in return 40 inspections in their own territories.)

The Soviet delegation, however, opposed the notion that there should be any relationship between the number of inspections and the number of suspicious phenomena. It insisted, moreover, that the maximum number of on-site inspections to be carried out each year in the nuclear nations should be 3. "We simply propose this figure as a political compromise", Mr. Tsarapkin frankly said, "without any relationship to the number of earthquakes occurring annually - whether it be a hundred thousand or a thousand, a hundred or ten - without any relationship at all". The figure "3" is thus admittedly meaningless; and the reduction of

on-site inspections to so small a number emasculates the whole enterprise of inspection. In practice, Governments would tend to "store" their quota until toward the end of the year lest a violator take advantage of the exhaustion of the quota in order to conduct tests.

The Soviet Union has sought in other ways to hedge round the inspection process. Thus, though the Soviet propaganda position is nominally all in favour of automatic and veto-free inspection within the quota - inspection in response to signals on the seismograph - its precise statements in this connexion are most carefully restricted and restrictive. The Soviet Union thus insists that a seismic event, to be eligible for inspection, must be pinpointed within an area of 200 square kilometres (about 75 square miles). Because underground events frequently cannot be located with such precision and can practically never be so located with absolute certainty, this stipulation would have the effect of excluding a large proportion of (or possibly all) unidentified phenomena from inspection. On top of this, a seismic event, to be eligible for inspection, must, in the words of Chairman Khrushchev, repeated in the aide memoire of 4 June, be "suspected of being an atomic explosion". Mr. Tsarapkin has similarly said: "The inspecting side would have the right to carry out, within the limits of an established quota, the inspection of any event that was not an earthquake." The underlined phrases suggest a possible joker. These phrases may be used to prejudge the very issue which the inspection team is supposed to resolve. Even though there are criteria for inspection on which objective observers might agree, there is nothing to prevent the Soviet member of the "troika" from refusing to admit that the suspected event satisfies these criteria. In short, only events "suspected of being an atomic explosion" and located within an impossibly small area qualify, by the Soviet system, for veto-free inspection within the annual quota. If this is not the case, the Soviet delegation has steadfastly withstood all attempts at clarification.

The Soviet Union has resisted the installation of an effective system of international control in other ways. There has been argument about the time when control should begin; the Soviet position is that there should be no on-site inspection for four years after the treaty enters into force; Mr. Tsarapkin has even spoken sarcastically about the United States and the United Kingdom as being "in a hurry to initiate inspection". There has been argument about the number of control posts to be established; the Soviet Union has consistently favoured fewer

posts than necessary for effective control. There has been argument about the staffing of control posts; the Soviet Union has insisted that the chief of any control post in its own territory must be a Soviet citizen, that the chief of any on-site inspection team operating within the Soviet Union be a Soviet citizen, and that the team itself consist 50 per cent of Soviet citizens. The effect of these Soviet proposals is to whittle international inspection down to self-inspection - which means no effective inspection at all.

The professed Soviet reason for resistance to an effective international inspection system is fear of espionage. But the American and British representatives at Geneva repeatedly assured the Soviet delegation that the Government of an inspected country could assign an army of secret police to accompany the inspection team and watch its every move so long as the observers did not interfere with the technical inspection process. Moreover, the inspection would take place within an area predetermined by seismograph and limited to 200 or 500 square kilometres. (The area of the Soviet Union is 21,000,000 square kilometres; if twenty inspections were made each year in different parts of the Soviet Union, not more than one two-thousandths of Soviet territory would be inspected. In addition, most seismic events in the USSR are concentrated in remote and sparsely populated spots making up a small percentage of the total area of the Soviet Union.)

Any reasonable nation should be satisfied by these treaty safeguards limiting the scope of inspection to its essential need. One is forced to conclude that the alleged Soviet fear of espionage is no more than the conditioned reflex of a totalitarian State. The Soviet Government must recognize the test-ban treaty for what it is: a rational means - from which it has nothing to fear - of reducing the likelihood of nuclear war. It must realize that the inherent dynamism of modern weapons technology, if uncontrolled, could eventually lead to the destruction of Soviet society as well as that of the rest of the world.

#### ANTICLIMAX IN 1961

In spite of these persisting disagreements on questions of underground testing and of inspection, so much progress had been made in narrowing differences that the people of the world looked ahead with eager confidence to the resumption of negotiations in Geneva in 1961. President Kennedy had declared during his

Presidential campaign his determination to secure an "effective international agreement banning all tests"; and the result of his review of the American policy position was the development of the series of new proposals, designed to break the negotiating deadlock.

These proposals, submitted by Ambassador Arthur H. Dean on 21 March, were as follows:

1. To reduce the number of on-site inspections in each of the nuclear countries to a possible twelve, depending on the number of suspicious seismic events;
2. To reduce the number of control posts on Soviet territory from twenty-one to nineteen;
3. To extend from twenty-seven months to three years the proposed moratorium on smaller underground tests and the associated research programme;
4. To institute means for a ban on all nuclear weapon tests at high altitudes and in outer space;
5. To ask Congress for legislative authority to permit Soviet inspection of the internal mechanism of the nuclear devices used in the seismic research and peaceful uses programmes;
6. To accept the Soviet request for veto over the annual budget of the control organization;
7. To accept the Soviet demand for a parity of seats between Western and Soviet bloc States on the top Control Commission - an arrangement which would give the Soviet Union a voice in guiding the control system equal to that of the United States and the United Kingdom combined, and which would be unprecedented in an international organization.

Instead of welcoming this attempt to resolve outstanding differences, the Soviet Union responded with retraction of earlier agreements and a root-and-branch assault on long-accepted principles of international organization. In particular, it advanced the doctrine of the "troika" - the proposal that the single administrator of the control organization be replaced by a tripartite board, representing the Soviet Union, the allied democracies and the neutrals, and required to act in unanimity.

The "troika" proposal meant, of course, that each nuclear power would have a veto over every administrative act of the control organization except for the

somewhat illusory rights of inspection within the annual quota. In advancing this proposal against the idea of an impartial administrator, Soviet policy underwent a startling reversal. On 14 January 1960, Mr. Tsarapkin had assured the other delegates: "Out of the three thousand million human beings on earth we shall always be able to find someone on whom you and we can agree." Again, in February, Mr. Tsarapkin said: "In neutral countries it will always be possible to find a person, a really neutral person, who can be used for the job of carrying out the duties of administrator." In June he said: "It will always be possible to discover in the world a person acceptable to both sides for nomination for the post as administrator." Now Mr. Tsarapkin says: "It is impossible to find a completely impartial neutral person." In the words of the Soviet aide memoire, "... while there are neutral States there are no -- nor can there be -- neutral men".

While no man perhaps can be completely neutral in his innermost thoughts, many men have disciplined their innermost thoughts to make possible the equitable adjudication of particular cases; it is this neutrality in deed which underlies systems of justice everywhere in the world, including the Soviet Union, which underlies the whole philosophy and practice of science, and which equally underlies the effectiveness of international organization. Dedicated men in the United Nations and other international bodies are demonstrating every day that loyalty to their own States does not interfere with loyalty to a community of nations.

Nor can it be asserted that the "troika" is necessary to protect the Soviet Union against the wayward independence of the single administrator. Under provisions of the treaty already accepted by all sides, the administrator is made accountable to the policy-making Control Commission and can work only under its continuous supervision. His appointment and the appointment of his first deputy are subject to Soviet veto. The Soviet Union has the right to nominate two additional deputy administrators. The staff of the control organization is to include equal representation from the two nuclear sides. Decisions as to the total amount of the annual budget, and as to amendment of the treaty, are subject to Soviet veto.

Is the Soviet Union disturbed by fears that a single administrator might corrupt the control system? Or does its attitude really spring from a profound distaste for effective control at all? Chairman Khrushchev said with brutal

frankness on 10 July 1961: "Even if all the countries of the world adopted a decision that did not accord with the interests of the Soviet Union and threatened its security, the Soviet Union would not recognize such a decision but would uphold its rights, relying on force."

#### CAN THE WORLD EVER STOP NUCLEAR TESTS?

Denis Healey of the British Labour Party recently said of the test-ban negotiations: "If Nikita Khrushchev had deliberately aimed to undermine the position of those who believe that Russia recognizes a common interest with America in ending the arms race and stopping the spread of atomic weapons, he could scarcely have succeeded more completely."

In an effort to disguise its opposition to a test-ban treaty, the Soviet Union, repudiating its own long-held position that the test ban is a separate issue, now proposes that test-ban negotiations be merged with general disarmament talks. In 1959, the Soviet Government said that it "has proceeded and still proceeds from the premise that the question of ending tests can be solved straightaway independently of the solution of the other problems of disarmament, given the desire of all the nuclear powers". Its present shift of position is transparently a cynical effort to wave away the test-ban problem. For, if the nuclear Powers cannot agree on the relatively manageable problem of the test ban they can hardly hope for agreement on the far more intricate problems of general disarmament.

Merging the test-ban negotiations with the comprehensive disarmament negotiations is essentially a Soviet effort to perpetuate a situation in which the United States and the United Kingdom accept an uninspected moratorium on testing. For the United States, such a moratorium would be, in fact, inspected, not only by the will of the Government but by the relentlessly vigilant public opinion of an open society. If ever the United States were disposed to test clandestinely, it could neither conceal this course from the American people or the world nor justify it to them. But the Soviet Union, with its closed society, its Government unaccountable to parliament or press or public opinion, its actions shrouded in a veil of secrecy, can, if it wishes, conduct nuclear tests without serious fear of exposure. Without a treaty-backed inspection system, it is simply impossible to tell whether secret nuclear testing is going on in closed societies.

The danger is that secret testing may produce a technological breakthrough in nuclear weapons development, giving the testing nations a decisive advantage. For almost three years, the United States has been willing to assume the risk of not testing nuclear weapons without the certainty that the Soviet Union has likewise stopped its testing. No nation determined to protect the freedom of its people can accept this risk indefinitely.

The Soviet attitude would seem to raise a fundamental question: for the USSR, is the nuclear test ban only a pretext for propoganda and not a road to peace?

\* \* \* \* \*

But the people of the world have not given up their hope for universal disarmament. They have not given up their hope for the control of nuclear weapons or for the elimination of nuclear testing. They insist on a continuing struggle to abolish war.

The outcome of great issues depends on the cumulative effects of individual actions. Every person has a duty to inform himself of the deep significance of the test-ban treaty for disarmament and peace. And every person can help others to learn, which will often mean action through larger organizations - schools, newspapers, political parties, voluntary associations of many kinds. Then both persons and organizations should do all within their power to make their Governments hear and feel and understand the issues. Action by Governments is especially important in the United Nations, the forum of aspirations for all the world's peoples.

The test-ban treaty is a first essential step toward disarmament and the abolition of war. To reject the Geneva treaty would accelerate the arms race. It would invite the resumption of nuclear tests. Chairman Khrushchev said on 21 June of this year: "Quite a few devices requiring practical testing have been developed in the Soviet Union" - a yearning which he alone, among the leaders of the great Powers has expressed. Rejection of the treaty would require the other nuclear Powers to consider whatever steps may be necessary in their own self-defence. It would encourage the development of new weapons and the spread of nuclear weapons to additional nations. If any nation resumed fallout tests - tests in the earth's atmosphere - it would increase the genetic and biological hazards of radioactive contamination. It would defer mankind's great hope that international institutions might in time banish the curse of war.

The test-ban treaty has become the symbol of man's hope for a peaceful world. The United States and the United Kingdom are fully prepared to welcome within their borders all the international control operations necessary to insure an effective ban on nuclear testing. They ask the Soviet Union to accept no more in the way of control than they accept for themselves. If it rejects the test-ban treaty, the Soviet Union will take on itself an awful burden of responsibility for the future of mankind.

The people of the world must pray that the final effort on the part of the United States and the United Kingdom to conclude a test-ban treaty will be rewarded with success. For the sake of humanity, the Soviet Union must reconsider its stand.

-----