

REPORT OF THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. At its forty-fourth session, the General Assembly, by its resolution 44/119 C of 15 December 1989, took note, *inter alia*, of the annual report of the Disarmament Commission,¹ requested the Commission to continue its work in accordance with its mandate, as set forth in paragraph 118 c of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, ² the first special session devoted to disarmament; and also requested the Commission to meet for a period not exceeding four weeks during 1990 and to submit a substantive report, containing specific recommendations on the items included in its agenda, to the Assembly at its forty-fifth session.

2. At the same session, the General Assembly adopted the following resolutions of direct relevance to the work of the Disarmament Commission:

(a) Resolution 44/113 B, entitled "Nuclear capability of South Africa";

(b) Resolution 44/116 C, entitled "Conventional disarmament";

(c) Resolution 44/116 E, entitled "Objective information on military matters";

(d) Resolution 44/116 F, entitled "Conventional disarmament";

(e) Resolution 44/116 M, entitled "Naval armaments and disarmament";

(f) Resolution 44/116 N, entitled "International arms transfers";

(g) Resolution 44/116 Q, entitled "Review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament" report of the Disarmament Commission;

(h) Resolution 44/119 C, entitled "Report of the Disarmament Commission";

(i) Resolution 44/119 H, entitled "Declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade".

3. The Disarmament Commission met at United Nations Headquarters on 1 and 7 December 1989 for a brief organizational session and held two meetings (A/CN.10/PV.141-142). During that session, the Commission considered questions related to the organisation of work for its 1990 substantive session and took up the question of the election of its officers, taking into account the principle of rotation of the chairmanship among the geographic regions. The Commission elected its Chairman and eight Vice-Chairmen as well as its Rapporteur. The Commission also considered and agreed on the provisional agenda for the 1990 substantive session (see para. 6 below). The Commission further decided that its next substantive session be held from 7 to 29 May 1990.

II. ORGANIZATION AND WORK OF THE 1990 SESSION

4. The Disarmament Commission met at United Nations Headquarters from 7 to 29 May 1990. In the course of its session, the Commission held eight plenary meetings (A/CN.10/PV.143-150) under the chairmanship of Mr. Nana Sutresna (Indonesia). Mr. Lin Kuo-Chung, Senior Political Affairs Officer, Department for Disarmament Affairs, served as Secretary of the Disarmament Commission.

5. During the 1990 session, the Bureau of the Commission was constituted as follows:

Chairman: Mr. Nana Sutresna (Indonesia)

Vice-Chairmen: Representatives from the following States:

Argentina	Togo
Australia	Ukrainian Soviet
Austria	Socialist Republic
Ecuador	Yugoslavia
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	

Rapporteur: Mrs. Liberata R. Mulamula (United Republic of Tanzania)

6. At its 143rd plenary meeting, the Commission adopted its agenda, contained in document A/CN.10/L.26/Rev.1, as follows:

1. Opening of the session.
2. Adoption of the agenda.
3. Organization of work.
4. (a) Consideration of various aspects of the arms race, particularly the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, in order to expedite negotiations aimed at effective elimination of the danger of nuclear war;

(b) Consideration of the agenda items contained in section II of General Assembly resolution 33/71 H, with the aim of elaborating, within the framework of and in accordance with priorities established at the tenth special session, a general approach to negotiations on nuclear and conventional disarmament.
5. Substantive consideration of the question of South Africa's nuclear capability as requested by the General Assembly and the Chairman of the Special Committee against Apartheid (resolutions 37/74 B, 38/181 B, 39/61 B, 40/89 B, 41/55 B, 42/34 B, 43/71 B and 44/113 B and document A/CN.10/4).
6. Review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament.

7. Naval armaments and disarmament.
8. Substantive consideration of issues related to conventional **disarmament**.
9. Consideration of the Declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade.
10. Objective information on **military** matters.
11. Report of the Disarmament **Commission** to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session.
12. Other business.

7. At the same meeting, the Commission adopted the annex to General Assembly resolution **44/119 C**, entitled "Ways and means to enhance the functioning of the Disarmament **Commission**", which was in conformity with the provision contained in **paragraph 118 (b) of the Final Document** of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly **2/** and reads as followar

**"Ways and means to enhance the functioning of the
Disarmament Commission**

"1. Mandate

"The Disarmament Commission reaffirms its mandate contained in paragraph 118 **(a)** of the Final Document of the Tenth Special **Session** of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament (**hereinafter** referred to as the "Final Document").

"2. Decision-making method

"**The** decision-making method **described** in paragraph 118 **(b)** of the Final Document should be maintained.

"3. Agenda items

"1. The Disarmament Commission could have a general agenda and a working agenda for **each** substantive **session**. The working agenda should be agreed at the Commission's **organizational** session.

"2. For each session, the working agenda should be limited to **a maximum** of four substantive items **for** in-depth consideration.

"3. From 1991, no subject should, in principle, be maintained on the working agenda for **more** than three consecutive years. At each session, the Commission should review, for possible reconsideration, any subject that had been suspended.

"4. If no agreement can be reached on a specific agenda item, the report of the **Commission** should contain a joint statement or a Chairman's summary of the proceedings to reflect views or positions **of** different delegations, particularly in the case of those agenda **items to be suspended** for a **period of time**,

"5. At **its** 1990 session, the **Commission** should make **every** effort to conclude all its agenda **items**, except the **new** substantive **items**.

"4. Subsidiary bodies

"1. At each annual session, the Disarmament Commission should not establish more than four subsidiary bodies for its substantive agenda **items**. The allocation of the agenda **items** to the four subsidiary bodies and the appointment of chairman for these subsidiary bodies should be decided at **the** oral session of the Commission, taking into **account** the principle of equitable geographical distribution.

"2. The chairmanship of subsidiary bodies should, in principle, be rotated each **year**; however, at its organisational session, the Commission **may** decide to extend the term of **office** of any chairman in the **interest** of effective work and the speedy conclusion of an item.

"5. Duration of the substantive session

"1. The Disarmament Commission should **meet** for a period not exceeding **four** weeks for in-depth deliberations on substantive items.

"2. The duration of each substantive session, in accordance with the **established** practice, should be flexible and could be shortened. In order to **utilize efficiently** the **conference-servicing resources** available, the Commission should decide the duration of each substantive session at its organisational session.

"6. Organization of work of the session

"1 **Each session may** have a general debate on agenda **items** in the plenary meetings, not **exceeding** three **days'** duration.

"2. **Except** in the **case** of new items, there should be no general exchange of views **in** the **subsidiary** bodies. The **general exchange** or **views on new items** should **not** exceed two meetings.

"3. Subsidiary bodies could begin their work **in** parallel with the general exchange of views in the plenary meetings,

"4. No **more** than two official meetings should be held simultaneously. This restriction, **however**, would **not** apply to informal consultations.

"5. The meeting⁸ of the Commission and its subsidiary bodies should be provided with full **meeting** services.

"6. All the officers of the Commission should be elected at **its** organiaational **session**.

"7. Consultations

"The Chairman of the Disarmament **Commission** should conduct consultations on **matters** relating to the work of **the** Commission, in particular on its working agenda, year round, especially during the **meetings of** the First Committee of the General Assembly,"

8. At the same meeting, in pursuance of the provision contained in **paragraph 5 of** section 3 of that document **A/CN.10/137**, the Commission decided to conclude all **its** substantive items at the current session except for item **10**, regarding **objective** information on military **matters**.

9. At the same meeting, the Commission approved its **general programme** of work for the session and decided to establish a Committee of the Whole for the consideration of agenda items 4, 11 and 12. With regard to sub-items 4 (a) and (b), regarding various aspects of the **arms** race and questions relating to both nuclear and conventional disarmament, a contact group, under the chairmanship of Mr. Sergey **Martynov (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic)**, was established within the framework of the Committee of the Whole to consider those sub-items. The Contact Group held 10 meetings between 9 and 23 May and submitted its report to the Committee of the Whole at the third **meeting** of the Committee, on 24 Kay.

10. The Commission, at the same meeting, **decide** to establish Working Group I to deal with **agenda** item 5 on **the** question of **South Africa's** nuclear capability, and to make recommendations thereon to the Commission. Working Group I **met** under the chairmanship of Mr. Jai Pratap **Rana (Nepal)** and held **sight** meetings between 7 and 25 **May**.

11. **Also** at the same meeting, the Commission decided to establish Working Group II to deal with agenda **item 6**, on the review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, and to make recommendations thereon to the Commission. Working Group **If met** under the chairmanship of Mr. Roberto Garcia Moritan **(Argentina)** and held nine meetings between 8 and 18 May. Thereafter, the Group **met** under the chairmanship of Mr. Sergio de **Queiroz Duarte (Brazil)** and held six meetings between 21 and 25 May.

12. In addition, at the **same** meeting, the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission decided to follow the course of action of 1989 and to hold, under his responsibility, substantive and open-ended consultations on agenda item 7, regarding the question of naval armaments and disarmament. The Chairman delegated the conduct of the consultation to Mr. Nugroho Wisnumurti (Indonesia). Thirteen meetings were held between 9 and 25 **May** for the purpose of **those** consul tat ions.

13. At the same meeting, the Commission decided to establish Working Group **III** to deal with agenda item 8, **on** the question of conventional disarmament, and to **make** recommendations thereon to the Commission. Working Group III **met** under the chairmanship of Mr. Skjold G. **Mellbin (Denmark)** and held 16 meetings between 8 and 29 **May**.

14. Also at the same meeting, the Commission decided to establish Working Group IV to deal with agenda item 9, on the declaration ~~of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament~~ Decade, and to make ~~recommendations thereon~~ to the Commission. Working Group IV met under the chairmanship of Mr. Emeka Ayo ~~Azikiwe~~ (Nigeria) and held 11 meetings between 9 and 24 May.

15. The Commission also decided, at the same meeting, to establish a consultation group to deal with agenda item 10, on ~~the~~ question ~~of~~ objective information on military matters, for a preliminary consideration of the subject. The consultation group ~~met~~ under the chairmanship of Mr. Peter ~~Hohenfellner~~ (Austria) and held ~~eight~~ meetings between 10 and 24 May.

16. On 7 and 8 May, the Disarmament Commission held a general exchange of views on all agenda ~~items~~ (A/CN.10/PV.143-146).

17. At its second, third and fourth meetings, on 21, 24 and 29 May, the Committee of the Whole considered ~~the question~~ of the working agenda ~~for~~ the 1991 session of the ~~Commission~~. Various views were expressed.

18. At its 149th and 150th meetings, on 29 May, the Disarmament Commission considered the reports of Working ~~Groups I, IX, III and IV~~ on agenda items 5, 6, 8 and 9 ~~respectively~~; the report of the Consultation Group on agenda item 10; and the ~~report~~ of the Committee of the Whole on agenda item 4. The ~~Chairman~~ of the Commission presented his report on agenda item 7 to the Commission. The reports of the subsidiary bodies of the Commission and the recommendations contained therein, as well as the ~~report~~ of the Chairman on agenda item 7, are included in section IV of the present ~~report~~.

19. In accordance with past practice of ~~the~~ Disarmament Commission, ~~some~~ non-governmental ~~organizations~~ attended the plenary meetings ~~as well as~~ the meetings ~~of~~ the Committee ~~of~~ the Whole.

III. DOCUMENTATION

A. Reports and other documents submitted by the Secretary-General

20. Pursuant to paragraph 8 of General Assembly resolution **44/119 C**, the Secretary-General, by a note dated 3 **February** 1990, transmitted to the Disarmament Commission the annual report of the Conference on Disarmament **3/** together with all the official records of the forty-fourth session of the General Assembly relating to disarmament matters (**A/CN.10/136**).

21. Pursuant to paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution **44/113 B**, the Secretary-General submitted to the Disarmament Commission a preliminary report entitled "**Investigation** of recent reports that collaboration between Israel and South Africa has resulted in the development by South Africa of a nuclear-tipped missile" (**A/CN.10/138**).

22. A document entitled "Ways and means to enhance the functioning of the **Disarmament Commission**" (**A/CN.10/137**) was transmitted to the Commission by the Secretary-General.

B. Other documents, including documents submitted by Member States

23. In the course of the **Commission's** work, the documents listed below, dealing with substantive questions, were submitted.

24. A working paper entitled "Naval armaments and disarmament: promoting global progress in the field of disarmament and **confidence-** and security-building measures at **sea**" (**A/CN.10/139**) was submitted by Finland, Indonesia and Sweden.

25. A working paper entitled "Objective **information** on **military matters**" (**A/CN.10/140**) was submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

26. A working paper entitled "Naval **armaments** and **disarmament**, a protocol on sea **mines**" (**A/CN.10/141**) was submitted by Sweden.

27. A working paper entitled "Objective information on military **matters**: objectives, principles and mechanisms of openness in the military sphere" (**A/CN.10/142**) was submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

28. At its 150th plenary meeting, on 29 May, the Disarmament Commission adopted by consensus the reports of its subsidiary bodies and the recommendations contained therein **regarding** agenda items 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10. The Commission agreed to submit the texts of those reports, reproduced below, to the General Assembly. The report of the Chairman on item 7 is endorsed by all participants in his consultations. The delegation of the United States of America did not participate in the consultations and is not in any way associated with that report.

29. At the **same** meeting, the Commission adopted, as **a** whole, its report to the **General Assembly** at its forty-fifth **session**.

30. The report of the Committee of the Whole on agenda **item 4** reads as follows:

"Report of the Committee of the Whole on agenda item 4 regarding various aspects of the arms race, particularly the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, as well as a general approach to negotiations on nuclear and conventional disarmament"

"1. At its **143rd** meeting, on 7 May, the Disarmament Commission decided that, as at previous sessions, agenda item 4 should be dealt with in the framework of the **Committee** of the Whole by a **Contact Group**, open to all delegations. Mr, Sergei Martynov (**Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic**) was appointed Chairman of the **Contact Group**. Ms. **Jenifer Mackby** of the Department for Disarmament **Affairs** served as **Secretary** of the Group.

"2. The Contact Group held 10 meetings between **9 and** 23 May.

"3. The Contact Group continued the work on agenda **item 4** on the basis of the **compilation** of proposals for recommendations on **that item** contained in **annex I** to the report of the Commission to the **General Assembly** at its forty-fourth **session 1/** with the **objective** of arriving at **agreement on** them, in order to comply with the decision of the **Commission** of 7 May 1990 to make every effort to conclude all its agenda **items**, except the new substantive **item**

"4. **In** the course of the work at the 1990 session, the Contact Group updated **some** of the texts under consideration and made **some** progress **towards narrowing** areas of disagreement.

"5. The Contact Group concluded the consideration of the item with the following **statement**:

'Agenda item 4 has **been** considered by the Commission since 1979. Since **1983**, the work centred on elaborating **a** set of recommendations on that **item**. The results of prolonged and earnest deliberations **are** reflected in the "Compilation of proposals for recommendations on agenda item **4**", which is annexed to the present report. Whereas a number of recommendations (Nos. 1 and **2**; in section I, Nos. 3, 4, 6, 9, 10, 17, 18, 23 and **24**; and in section II, the introductory sentence and Nos. 1, 2, 4 and 5, which appear without brackets) on important subjects were generally acceptable, without prejudice to **the** right of delegations to review **them** as appropriate, agreement on other no less important recommendations and, consequently, on a complete set of recommendations eluded the Contact **Group**.

'The Contact Group is of the view that the appropriate course of action **in** respect of the subject of the current item 4 of the agenda should be considered by the Disarmament Commission."

31. The report of Working Group I on agenda **item 5** reads as follows:

"Report of Working Group I on agenda item 5

"1. The General Assembly, at its forty-fourth session, **adopted resolution 44/113 B** of 15 December 1989, by which **it, inter alia**, requested the Disarmament **Commission** to consider once again as a **matter of priority** during its **substantive session in 1990** South Africa's nuclear capability, taking into account, **inter alia**, the **findings** of the report of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament **Research on South Africa's nuclear capability**.

"2. The Disarmament Commission, at its **143rd** meeting, on 7 May 1990, **decided to establish Working Group I** to deal with agenda item 5 regarding the question of South Africa's nuclear capability **and** to make recommendations thereon to the Commission, pursuant to **General Assembly resolution 44/113 B**.

"3. In connection with its work, the Working Group had before it the following documents:

"(a) Report of the **Secretary-General** on South Africa's plan and capability in the nuclear field (A/35/402 and **Corr.1**);

"(b) Report of the United Nations **Seminar on** Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa;

"(c) Report of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament **Research** on South Africa's nuclear **capability** (A/39/470);

"(d) Preliminary report of the **Secretary-General** on the investigation of **recent** reports that collaboration **between** Israel and South Africa has resulted in the development by South Africa of a nuclear-tipped missile (**A/CN.10/138**);

"(e) **Conclusions and recommendations on item 5**: Working paper submitted by the Chairman of Working Group I (**A/CN.10/1990/WG.I/CRP.2**).

"4. The Working Group **met under** the chairmanship of Ambassador Jai Pratap Rana (Nepal) and held eight meetings between 7 and 25 May 1990. The **Working Group**, through the Chairman, also undertook informal consultations **during** this period. **Mr. Sammy Rum Buo** of the Department for Disarmament Affairs served as Secretary of the Working Group.

"5. At its first meeting, on 7 May, the Working Group decided to **undertake** informal open-ended consultations, through the Chairman, with a view to the elaboration of a working paper that could lend itself to consensus acceptance in the Group. In conducting the informal consultations, the Chairman, at his request, **was assisted by Mr. Raoul Delcorde** (Belgium), and **Mr. Nelson Dumevi** (Ghana), who served as co-ordinators.

"6. At the eighth meeting of the Working Group on 25 May 1990, the Chairman submitted a working paper entitled 'Conclusions **and** recommendations **on** item 5', prepared on the basis of open-ended and **intensive** informal consultations (**A/CN.10/1990/WG.1/CRP.2**).

"7. At the same meeting, the Working Group, in accordance with the decision of the Disarmament **Commission** made at its **143rd** plenary meeting **on 7 May**, decided to conclude its consideration of agenda item 5 and adopted by consensus the conclusions and recommendations on the subject, as **follows**:

'NUCLEAR CAPABILITY OF SOUTH AFRICA:
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

'1. **Guided** by the fundamental and universal principles enshrined in the **Charter** of the United Nations **and** with reference to the Declaration on **Apartheid** and its Destructive Consequences in South Africa adopted by **consensus** at the sixteenth special **session** of the General Assembly (resolution S-16/1, annex), the **Commission** reiterates its condemnation of the **continuation** of the policy and practice of **apartheid** in South Africa which is a **crime** against the conscience and dignity of mankind. While noting that certain positive developments are **now taking place** in South Africa, the **Commission** stresses that the **apartheid system** and its **institutionalized** pillars still remain in place. **In** reaffirming the right of all peoples to **self-determination**, the Commission supports all those in South Africa who strive for the elimination **of apartheid** and the building **of** a non-racial and **democratic society** in that country,

'2. The **Commission** recalls **Security Council resolution** 418 (1977) which, **inter alia**, **expressed** the Council's grave **concern** that South Africa was, at that time, at the threshold of producing nuclear weapons. The use of its nuclear capability by South Africa for nuclear weapon purposes would heighten tension and increase the threat to regional as well as international peace and security.

'3. The Commission **further** recalls that the Security Council had, by its resolution 418 (1977), determined that the acquisition by South Africa of arms **and** related **matériel** constituted a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security **and** had decided that all States shall **cease forthwith any provision to South Africa of arms and related matériel**.

'4. The issue of South Africa's nuclear capability has been brought to international attention by General **Assembly** resolution 34/76 B of 11 December 1979 and included in the agenda of the Disarmament Commission since **its** first substantive session in 1979 at the request of the Chairman of the Special Committee against **Apartheid (A/CN.10/4)**, following the conclusions of the United Nations Seminar on Nuclear Collaboration with **South Africa, held** at London in February 1979.

'5. In consideration of the **item** the Commission reaffirms **with** regard to South Africa the concern already expressed in paragraph 12 of the Final Document **of** the Tenth Special Session of the General **Assembly** (General Assembly resolution **S-10/2**). In this respect, the Commission strongly recommends that the General Assembly renew its call upon all States to adhere strictly to the relevant decisions of the Security Council.

'6. The proliferation of nuclear weapons to any country **is a matter** of serious concern to the world. South Africa's introduction of nuclear weapons to the African continent, and particularly in such a volatile region as southern Africa, not only would be a severe blow to world-wide efforts at non-proliferation but also upset many years' efforts to spare the African continent from **the** nuclear-arms race in accordance with the **Organization** of African Unity (OAU) Declaration on the **Denuclearization** of Africa.

'7. The **Commission** notes the 1977 reports of the discovery of preparations for a nuclear-weapons-test site in the **Kalahari** desert and reports about the 22 September 1979 event in the South Atlantic. These reports and the report of the Secretary-General on South Africa's plan and capability in the nuclear field (A/35/401 and **Corr.1**) and the report of the United Nations Institute for **Disarmament Research** (A/39/470) have caused legitimate and particular concern to **the** African States and the international community, **in** general.

'8. The Commission recommends that the General Assembly **bring to the** Security Council's attention the grave consequences of the development of any sort of nuclear weapons capability by South **Africa** and its implications for the **security** of African States, the proliferation of **nuclear** weapons, and the collective decision of the African States regarding the denuclearisation of Africa, which has been **endorsed** by the General Assembly.

'9. The Commission considers it **at variance** with the development of friendly relations and co-operation among States to assist South **Africa** in the development of a nuclear-weapon programme enabling the **régime** to pursue a policy of **destabilization** against the countries of the African continent. In this respect, the Commission underscores Security Council resolution 591. (1986), in **which** the Council requested all States to refrain from any collaboration with South Africa in the nuclear field which will contribute to the development and manufacture by South Africa of nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices.

'10. All States and international organisations have the duty and responsibility to contribute to the efforts towards the elimination of **apartheid**. In addition, Member States should fully implement Security Council resolution 418 (1977), unanimously adopted by the Security **Council**, in which, **inter alia**, the Council called upon **Member States to** refrain **from** any co-operation with South Africa **in** the development and manufacture of nuclear weapons. It is, therefore, the responsibility of **the** international community to ensure that effective and **concrete** measures are taken to stop the development of its nuclear-weapons capability. To this **end**, the Disarmament Commission recommends that:

'(a) States should cease forthwith all collaboration with South **Africa** in the military and nuclear field which **may** contribute, directly or indirectly, to the development of its nuclear-weapons capability.

'(b) In the light of Security Council resolutions 418 (1977), 558 (1984) and 591 (1986), the Disarmament Commission recommends that the General Assembly should urge all States to observe scrupulously their obligations concerning the **arms embargo** against South Africa. The Security Council should continue to monitor closely the **implementation of the** arms embargo against South **Africa** in all its **aspects** in order to prevent any form of assistance to the development of its nuclear-weapons capability and the Secretary-General should report thereon periodically to the General Assembly.

'(c) All States **should consider** and **respect** the continent of Africa as a nuclear-weapon-free **zone, in** accordance with General Assembly **resolution** 2033 (XX) of 3 December 1965, **in** which the **Assembly** endorsed the Declaration on **the Denuclearization** of Africa adopted in 1964 by the Assembly of **Heads of State and Government** of the Organisation of African unity. To this end, the **General Assembly** should request the **Secretary-General** to offer such **assistance** as OAU may require to advance the **realization** of these **objectives**.

'(d) The **Commission** would **consider** it an important step if South Africa accedes to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and calls upon South **Africa** to **place** all its nuclear facilities and installations under full scope IAEA safeguards. To this end, the Commission recommends **that the General Assembly** should request IAEA to report **to** the Assembly on **its** implementation.

'(e) South Africa should practise transparency and openness in its military affairs in **order** to allow for full **assessment** of its activities in the military and nuclear field by **the** international community and in particular by its neighbouring States.

'(f) The Commission recommends further that the Secretary-General should follow **more** closely **South Africa's** evolution in the nuclear field and report regularly to the General Assembly on the implementation of these recommendations and on all new developments which would require the attention **of** the international community. ' "

32. The report of Working **Group** II on **agenda item** 6 reads as **follows**:

"Report of Working Group II on agenda item 6

"1. By its resolution **44/116 Q** of 15 December 1989, the General Assembly, **inter alia**, requested the Disarmament Commission to continue its consideration of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament as a matter of priority at **its next** substantive **session**, in 1990, with a view to the elaboration of **concrete** recommendations and proposals, as appropriate, taking into account, **inter alia**, the views and suggestions of **Member States** as well as the documents on the subject **listed** in the resolution and to submit its report on the subject, including **findings**, recommendations and proposals, as appropriate, to the General **Assembly at** its forty-fifth session.

"2 The Disarmament Commission, at **its** 143rd meeting, on 7 May 1990, decided to establish Working Group II **to deal** with agenda item 6 **regarding** the role of the United Nations in the field of **disarmament**, pursuant to General Assembly resolution **44/116 Q**.

"3. In connection with its **work**, the Working Group had before it **the** following documents:

"(a) Replies of Member States to the Secretary-General **regarding** the review of the role of the United Nations in the field **of** disarmament (**A/CN.10/69** and **Add.1-8**, and **A/CN.10/71**);

"(b) Working paper submitted by China (**A/CN.10/79**);

"(c) Conference room paper entitled 'Findings, recommendations and proposals (Chairman's draft)' (A/CN.10/1986/WG.II/CRP.1);

"(d) Working paper on topic IV, submitted by Mexico (A/CN.10/1986/WG.II/CRP.2);

"(e) Statement on topic IV, submitted by India (A/CN.10/1986/WG.II/CRP.3);

"(f) Statement on topics I to III, submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (A/CN.10/1986/WG.II/CRP.4);

"(g) Statement on topic IV, submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (A/CN.10/1986/WG.II/CRP.5);

"(h) Working paper entitled 'Role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament', submitted by Canada (A/CN.10/1986/WG.II/CRP.6);

"(i) Statement on the role of the United Nations in disarmament, submitted by the United States of America (A/CN.10/1986/WG.II/CRP.7);

"(j) Comments on the paper entitled 'Findings, recommendations and proposals', submitted by the United States of America (A/CN.10/1986/WG.II/CRP.8);

"(k) Working paper containing proposals for recommendations on topic IV, submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany (A/CN.10/1986/WG.II/CRP.9);

"(l) Views and suggestions on topics IV and VI, submitted by Japan (A/CN.10/1986/WG.II/CRP.10);

"(m) Some suggestions submitted by Australia (A/CN.10/1986/WG.II/CRP.11);

"(n) Statement on topic IV.1, submitted by the German Democratic Republic (A/CN.10/1986/WG.II/CRP.12);

"(o) Proposal on topics I and II, submitted by the German Democratic Republic (A/CN.10/1986/WG.II/CRP.13);

"(p) Proposals submitted by the Union of, Soviet Socialist Republics (A/CN.10/1986/WG.II/CRP.14);

"(q) Working paper containing proposals for recommendations on topics I to III, submitted by the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (A/CN.10/1986/WG.II/CRP.15);

"(r) Working paper containing proposals for recommendations on topic IV, submitted by the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (A/CN.10/1986/WG.II/CRP.16);

"(s) Working paper entitled 'Review of the role of the United Nations in disarmament', submitted by Pakistan (A/CN.10/1986/WG.II/CRP.17);

"(t) Views and suggestions on topic IV, submitted by Norway (A/CN.10/1986/WG.II/CRP.18);

"(u) Working paper submitted by India and Yugoslavia (A/CN.10/1986/WG.II/CRP.19);

"(v) Working paper entitled 'Role of the Secretary-General in the field of disarmament', submitted by Uruguay (A/CN.10/1986/WG.II/CRP.20);

"(w) Working paper containing a proposal on topic IV.3.a, 'World Disarmament Campaign', submitted by Bulgaria (A/CN.10/1986/WG.II/CRP.21);

"(x) Working paper submitted by Czechoslovakie, Mongolia, Poland and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (A/CN.10/94);

"(y) Working paper submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany (A/CN.10/99);

"(z) Working paper submitted by the United States of America (A/CN.10/1987/WG.II/CRP.1);

"(aa) Working paper on items I, II and III submitted by Argentina (A/CN.10/1987/WG.II/CRP.2);

"(bb) Suggestions to Working Paper 1, submitted by the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic (A/CN.10/1987/WG.II/CRP.3);

"(cc) Working paper entitled 'Review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament' (A/CN.10/1987/WG.II/WP.1), annexed to the 1987 report of the Disarmament Commission (A/42/42, annex II);

"(dd) Working paper submitted by Czechoslovakia, Mongolia, Poland and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (A/CN.10/108 and Corr.1);

"(ee) Working paper submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany on behalf of the twelve States members of the European Community (A/CN.10/112);

"(ff) Document entitled 'Review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament' (A/CN.10/1988/CRP.6 and Corr.1 and 2), annexed to the special report of the Disarmament Commission submitted to the General Assembly at its fifteenth special session, the third special session devoted to disarmament (A/S-15/3, annex III);

"(gg) Report of Working Group III on the agenda items entitled 'Consideration of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and of the effectiveness of the disarmament machinery' and 'United Nations information and educational activities in the field of disarmament, including measures to mobilize world public opinion in favour of disarmament', submitted to the Committee of the Whole at the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (A/S-15/AC.1/20 and Corr.1);

"(hh) Report of the Chairman of Working Group III on the agenda ~~items~~ entitled 'Consideration of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and of the effectiveness of the disarmament machinery' and 'United Nations information and educational activities in the field **of disarmament**, including measures to **mobilize** world public opinion in favour of disarmament', submitted to ~~th~~ Committee of the Whole at the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to **disarmament (A/S-15/AC.1/21)**;

"(ii) Chairman's working paper submitted by the Chairman of Working Group III to the **Committee** of the Whole at the third special session of the **General** Assembly devoted to **disarmament** on the agenda **items** entitled: 'Consideration of the role of the United Nations in the field **of** disarmament and of the effectiveness of the disarmament machinery' and 'United Nations information and educational activities in the field of **disarmament**, including measures to **mobilize** world public opinion in favour **of disarmament**' (A/S-15/AC.1/WG.III/CRP.2/Rev.1);

"(jj) Working paper submitted by Hungary (A/CN.10/120);

"(kk) Working **paper** submitted by Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (A/CN.10/127);

"(ll) Documents entitled 'Review of **the** role of the United Nations in the field **of** disarmament' (A/CN.10/WG.II/CRP.1 and Add.1 to **CRP.4**)."

"4. The Working Group ~~met~~ under the chairmanship of Ambassador Roberto Garcia-Moritan (Argentina) and held nine meetings between 8 and 18 May 1990. At the 9th meeting, on 18 May, the Chairman of the Working Group appointed **Ambassador Sergio** de Queiros Duarte (**Brazil**) as **Friend** of the Chair to assist him. Thereafter, the Working Group ~~met~~ under the chairmanship **of** Ambassador de Queiros Duarte and held six **meetings** between 21 and 25 May 1990. The Working Group also conducted informal consultations through the Chairmen during this period. Ms. **Agnès Marcaillou** of the Department for Disarmament Affairs ~~served~~ as Secretary of the Working Group.

"5. At its first meeting on 8 **May**, the Working Group decided that the 1989 Chairman's working paper and **the** Proposals and Amendments to it, as contained in annexes III and IV to the report of the Disarmament Commission at its 1989 session **1/ should** constitute the **basic** documents for consideration of the subject.

"6. In accordance with the decision of the Disarmament Commission made at its 143rd plenary meeting, on 7 May, the Working Group, at its 15th meeting, on 25 May, decided to conclude the consideration of the **item** and adopted the following text;

'Review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament

'1. The primary purpose of the United Nations **is** to maintain international peace and security. The United Nations constitutes the only universal forum where all Member States contribute to the process of disarmament. Its role **and** responsibilities in this field are exercised

through institutional **arrangements** which Member States should utilise to fullest possible **extent**. In this connection, the effectiveness of the Organisation in the **field** of disarmament should be strengthened and the **work** of its bodies improved.

'2. All States Members of the United Nations **are** committed to the purposes of the Charter of the United **Nations** and therefore must strictly observe its **principles**. They must also observe **other** relevant and generally **accepted** principles of international law relating to the **maintenance** of international **peace** and security. Furthermore, genuine and lasting peace should be sought through their observance and the speedy adoption of **concrete** disarmament measures leading to general and **complete** disarmament **under** effective international control. Multilateral agreements on measures **of** disarmament **play** an important **role** in contributing to the maintenance of international peace and security.

'3. All the peoples **of** the world have a vital interest in the **success** of disarmament negotiations, While disarmament is the responsibility of all States, the nuclear-weapon States, in particular **those** among them which **possess** the most important nuclear arsenals, have a special responsibility for nuclear disarmament and, together with other militarily significant States, for halting and reversing the arms race. It was noted that in discharge of this responsibility important initial steps had been taken leading in this direction, and that further negotiations among some of those States were in **progress**.

'4. The United Nations should support and facilitate all disarmament efforts - unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral - and be kept duly informed, through the General Assembly or any other appropriate United Nations channel reaching **all** Members of the **Organization**, of developments in disarmament efforts outside its aegis, without prejudice **to** the progress of negotiations.

'5. All States should give due account and consideration to recommendations by the United Nations, including the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session **of** the **General** Assembly, the **first** special session devoted to disarmament, which was adopted by consensus, and act in accordance with the obligations they have assumed. All States have the right and the duty to be concerned with and to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament as stipulated in the Final Document **of** the Tenth Special **Session** of the General Assembly.

'6. Disarmament, development, relaxation of international tension, **respect** for the right to self-determination and national independence, **non-interference** in internal affairs of States, respect **for** human rights, the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the Charter and the strengthening of international peace and security are related to each other. Progress in any of these spheres has a beneficial effect on all of **them**; in turn, failure in one sphere can have negative effects on the others.

'7. The improvement in the international security situation facilitates sustained **progress** in the field of disarmament. Equally, the conclusion of concrete disarmament agreements strengthens international

peace and security. War, in particular nuclear war, must be prevented. Disarmament should be pursued in the context of strengthening international peace and security, in compliance with the Charter of the United Nations.

'6. The Conference on Disarmament has a unique character and importance as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating body, and it is important that it continue to discharge its substantive responsibilities. The Conference on Disarmament has a unique relationship with the United Nations. The Commission affirms that the work of the Conference is of great relevance to the Members of the United Nations. Accordingly, the General Assembly welcomes the decision of the Conference on Disarmament to improve its performance so as better to fulfil its responsibilities, implement its decisions at the earliest opportunity, to consider further questions related to its improved and effective functioning, to consider the question of the expansion of its membership, as well as the facilitation of the participation of States not members of the Conference.

'9. The Security Council, having regard to its special status and responsibilities pursuant to the relevant provisions of the Charter, should continue to ensure the effectiveness of its central role with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security, keeping in mind the interrelationship existing between disarmament, international peace and security.

'10. The General Assembly constitutes the main deliberative organ of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and should continue to promote disarmament and to facilitate the achievement of disarmament agreements among States, by the following means:

'(a) Special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament have contributed to strengthening international co-operation in the field of disarmament. Special sessions should be convened as appropriate to consider relevant issues such as to review and assess the results of the efforts of Member States and of the United Nations in promoting deliberations and negotiations on all relevant issues of disarmament, and to endeavour to provide recommendations and guidance regarding measures in the field of disarmament;

'(b) The First Committee of the General Assembly should continue to serve as its Main Committee dealing with disarmament and related international security questions. The First Committee should make the necessary improvements in its methods and procedures of work with a view to increasing its efficiency. In this regard, each succeeding chairman should continue to hold consultations with a view to refining further the practices and procedures of the Committee. To this end, the First Committee should take into account, inter alia, the recommendations contained in General Assembly resolution 42/42 N of 30 November 1987 and should continue to endeavour to expand areas of consensus. Bearing in mind the increasing importance that the international community attaches to the items on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, appropriate attention should be given to the consideration of the reports of the Conference. The First Committee should devote a portion of its work

programme to **consider**, under the appropriate agenda **items**, the annual report of the Conference;

'(c) The Disarmament Commission, as **the specialized** deliberative body within the **United Nations** multilateral **disarmament** machinery, allows **for** in-depth deliberations leading to the submission of concrete recommendations on specific disarmament **issues**. In order to improve the efficiency of its work, it should fully implement **the** decision concerning the ways and means to enhance its functioning. Such an undertaking would enable it to continue to play **a constructive** role within the United Nations disarmament machinery.

'11. In the exercise of his role **as** envisaged in the Charter, the Secretary-General facilitate!; the discharge **of** the responsibilities **of** the United Nations **regarding** the maintenance of international peace and security. All States should give the Secretary-General **maximum** support to enable him to discharge, as effectively as possible, his responsibilities under the Charter. In the exercise of his role, the Secretary-General should be assisted by an adequately staffed and funded Department for Disarmament **Affairs**. The **resources** accorded to the Department should be commensurate with the requirements of its mandated tasks in so far as the budgetary restraints or the United Nations permit. The role of the Department for **D'sarmament** Affairs in assisting the Secretary-General in his co-ordination of the activities of the United **Naticns** and relevant **specialized** agencies in the field of disarmament should be strengthened. When agreed by the parties, the Secretary-General of the United Nations should continue to **serve** as depositary **of** the legal instruments of multilateral disarmament agreements.

'12. In light of the modifications to the functioning of the Secretary-General's Advisory Board **on Disarmament** Matters introduced by the Secretary-General in 1989, **including** the changing of its title, the Advisory Board should continue to play a useful role, particularly in its dual capacity as the Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, as well as the Board of Trustees of the United Nations Institute for **Disarmament** Research; it could benefit from wider contacts with prominent persons **and** institutions possessing expertise relevant to the Board's work.

'13. In accordance with the **statute** and the autonomous status of the United Nations **Institute** for Disarmament Research, its work should continue to be independent-research-oriented, of a high academic standard and of practical value. The Institute should strengthen its co-operation **with** national and regional research institutes in the field of disarmament. More financial contributions would ensure a greater viability **and** the development of the Institute.

'14. The **Ad Hoc** Committee on the Indian Ocean is **a** preparatory body tasked with the completion of organiaational and substantive issues related to the convening of a Conference in Colombo which would seek to implement the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a **zone** of peace. **It** is the **view** of those voting in favour of General Assembly resolution **44/120**

that the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean should **continue** to fulfil **its** mandate.

'15. Without prejudice to the outcome of its **ongoing assessment**, the World Disarmament Campaign, as a global information programme, should continue its contributions **by informing**, educating, and **generating** public understanding **and** support for the objectives of the United Nations in the field of **arms** limitation and disarmament in a balanced, factual and objective manner. **Member** States and other entities **are** encouraged to broaden the financial base of support **of** the Campaign with further voluntary contributions as well as to co-operate by other **means so as** to increase its effectiveness. The Commission recommends that all Member States should continue to mark the observance of Disarmament Week, which was proclaimed by the General Assembly at its first special session devoted to **disarmament**, as a **week** devoted to fostering the objectives **of** disarmament. It notes that this annual observance would continue to play an important role in promoting the **objectives of** the World Disarmament Campaign.

'16. The regional **centres** for peace and disarmament should continue to contribute to the promotion of disarmament, mutual confidence, **peace** and security. In addition, the activities of these **centres** would further enhance the objectives of the World **Disarmament** Campaign. **In order to** ensure **the** effective functioning and viability of the regional **centres**, **the Disarmament Commission** encourages Member States **as** well as other entities to make contributions to these centres.

'17. The United Nations **Disarmament** Fellowship, Training and Advisory Services Programme contributes usefully to the development of greater expertise in disarmament **issues** in Member States. Consequently, the Programme should **be** continued in accordance with guidelines approved by the General Assembly at its thirty-third and fortieth sessions, duly taking into account **in** the yearly selection of fellows, the principle of adequate representation of developing countries and the need for rotation **among States**. ' "

The report of the Chairman on agenda **item** 7 reads as **follows**:

"Report of the Chairman

"1. At its forty-fourth session, the General Assembly by resolution **44/116 M** of 15 December 1989, entitled 'Naval **armaments** and disarmament', inter alia, requested the Disarmament Commission to continue, at its forthcoming session in 1990, the substantive consideration of the **question** and to report on its deliberations **and** recommendations to **the** General Assembly at its forty-fifth session.

"2. In its consideration of the item, the **Commission** had before it the following documents :

"(a) Report of the Secretary-General containing the study on the naval **arms** race (A/40/535);

"(b) Study on the naval **arms race** - replies received from **Governments** (Argentina, **Bulgaria**, China, Indonesia, Lesotho, Mexico and Sweden - **A/CN.10/77**; Australia and Norway - Add.1) **Gabon** - Add.2; Denmark, Netherlands, United **Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland** - Add.3);

"(a) Working paper submitted by China (**A/CN.10/78**);

"(d) Working paper submitted by Bulgaria, **German Democratic Republic** and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (**A/CN.10/80**);

"(e) Chairman's paper on agenda item 8 (**A/CN.10/83**);

"(f) Working paper submitted by Finland (**A/CN.10/90/Rev. 1**) ;

"(g) Working paper submitted by Bulgaria, the **German Democratic Republic** and the Union of Soviet **Socialist** Republics (**A/CN.10/92**);

"(h) Working paper submitted by Sweden (**A/CN.10/101/Rev.1**);

"(i) Chairman's paper on agenda item 8 (**A/CN.10/102**);

"(j) Working paper submitted by Bulgaria, the **German Democratic Republic** and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (**A/CN.10/109**);

"(k) Chairman's **paper** on agenda item 8 (**A/CN.10/113**);

"(l) Working paper submitted by Bulgaria, the **German Democratic Republic** and the **Union** of Soviet Socialist Republics (**A/CN.10/119**);

"(m) Working paper submitted by Sweden (**A/CN.10/121**);

"(n) Working paper submitted by Sweden (**A/CN.10/129**);

"(o) Working paper submitted by Finland, Indonesia and Sweden (**A/CN.10/130**);

"(p) Chairman's paper on agenda item 8 (**A/CN.10/134**);

"(q) Working paper submitted by Finland, Indonesia and Sweden (**A/CN.10/139**);

"(r) Working paper submitted by **Sweden** (**A/CN.10/141**).

"3. At the 143rd plenary meeting, on 7 May, the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission decided to follow last **year's** course of action and hold, under his responsibility, **substantive and** open-ended consultations on the subject. Pursuant to that decision, the Chairman delegated the actual conduct of the substantive and open-ended **consultations** to a 'friend of the **Chairman**', **in casu**, the representative of **Indonesia**, Ambassador Nugroho **Wisnumurti**. The Consultation Group held 13 meetings on the item **Mr. Lin Kuo-Chung** of the Department for Disarmament **Affairs** served as Secretary of the Consultation Group and Ms. Florence Lee **from** the same Department acted as Deputy Secretary.

"4. The meetings in the Consultation Group **resulted** in a number of substantive **findings** and recommendations on the subject. These are contained in a working paper **by** the Chairman, annex II to the report **of** the Commission, which met the approval of all delegations **participating** in the substantive consultations. **As** in the past, the delegation of the United States of America **did** not participate in the consultations and **is** not in any way associated with their **findings** and **recommendations**.

"5. In accordance with the **decision** of the **Disarmament Commission** made **at** its **143rd** plenary meeting on 7 May 1990, **it** was understood **that** the consideration of the item was concluded."

The report of Working Group III on agenda item A **reads** as follows:

"Report of the Working Group on agenda item 8

"1. The **General Assembly**, at its **forty-fourth session**, adopted resolution **44/116 C** of 15 December 1989 in which, **inter alia**, it requested the Disarmament Commission to consider further, at **its** 1990 substantive **session**, issues related to conventional disarmament. By resolution **44/116 F**, the **General Assembly**, **inter alia**, requested the Disarmament Commission to continue at its 1990 **session** the **substantive** consideration of issues related to conventional disarmament and to report to the **General Assembly** at its forty-fifth session with a view to facilitating possible measures in the field of conventional arms reduction and disarmament. By resolution **44/116 N** the **General Assembly**, **inter alia**, requested the **Disarmament Commission** to continue its deliberation on **the issue of international arms transfers** contained in the above-mentioned resolution during **its** 1990 **session** under the item of conventional disarmament.

"2. The **Disarmament Commission**, at its 143rd meeting, **on** 7 May 1990, decided to establish Working Group III **to** deal with agenda item 8 regarding **conventional** disarmament, pursuant to General Assembly resolutions **44/116 C**, **44/116 F** and **44/116 N**.

"3. In connection **with** its **work**, the **Working Group** had before it the following working papers:

"(a) Working paper submitted by Denmark (A/CN.10/88);

"(b) Working paper submitted by China (A/CN.10/95);

"(c) Working paper submitted by Hungary (A/CN.10/98);

"(d) Working paper submitted by India (A/CN.10/100);

"(e) Working paper submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (A/CN.10/103);

"(f) Working paper submitted by China (A/CN.10/118);

"(g) Working paper submitted by Nigeria (A/CN.10/124);

"(h) Working paper submitted by Costa Rica (A/CN.10/125).

"4. In the course of the deliberations, the following working papers were submitted to the Working Group: I

"(a) Chairman's draft report of Working Group' III
(A/CN.10/1989/WG.III/CRP.1/Rev.6);

"(b) Chairman's draft report of Working Group III
(A/CN.10/1990/WG.III/CRP.1 and Rev.1-8);

"(c) Working paper submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (A/CN.10/1990/WG.III/CRP.2).

"5. The Working Group met under the chairmanship of Ambassador Skjold G. Mellbin (Denmark) and held 16 meetings between 8 and 29 May 1990. Mr. Timur G. Alasaniya of the Department for Disarmament Affairs served as Secretary of the Working Group. The Working Group also conducted a number of informal consultations through the Chairman during this period.

"6. In accordance with the decision of the Disarmament Commission made at its 143rd plenary meeting on 7 May, Working Group III, at its 16th meeting, on 29 May, decided to conclude the item and adopted by consensus the following text a

'1. The Working Group recalled the priorities in disarmament established by the General Assembly in the Final Document of its Tenth Special Session, the first special session devoted to disarmament, as stated in paragraph 45, namely: nuclear weapons) other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons; conventional weapons, including any which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects; and reduction of armed forces. As stated in paragraph 46 of the Final Document, nothing should preclude States from conducting negotiations on all priority items concurrently. The Group took into account the principles derived from the Final Document which provided the perspective on and addressed the subjects of the conventional arms race and conventional disarmament as identified in paragraph 8 of the Study on Conventional Disarmament (A/39/348).

'2. In dealing with the subject-matter before it in the context established in paragraph 4 above, the Group recalled that since the Second World War there has been a large number of armed conflicts fought with conventional weapons. It was noted that certain conflicts continue and pose a threat to regional and global peace and security. The Group, however, took account of the recent overall amelioration in the international situation and the trend towards the peaceful settlement of various regional conflicts, the important role played in that regard by the United Nations and the possible positive implications of these developments for efforts related to disarmament.

'3. Attention was given to recent developments in relation to Europe, which has the highest concentration of arms and armed forces. The successful conclusion in January 1989 of the CSCE Follow-up Meeting in Vienna led to further negotiations in the field of confidence- and security-building measures as well as the new Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, both within the framework of the CSCE process,

The Group, recalling **General** Assembly resolutions **41/86 L**, **43/75 P** and **44/116 I**, welcome% the progress **made** an% considered that positive results in these negotiations **would** serve to **improve** security an% **develop** co-operation in Europe, thereby contributing to international peace and security in the world as a whole.

'4. Attention was also given to the agreement **in 1987** between Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and El Salvador on a procedure for the establishment **of** a firm and lasting **peace** in Central **America** and subsequent **declarations** and agreements, which include important steps towards **disarmament**. The Group welcomed **these declarations** and **agreements** which would **serve** to promote security and **develop** co-operation in the region. They constitute an important contribution to **international** peace an% **security**.

'5. The Group **identified a number** of **issues** and possible **measures** in the field of conventional arms reductions and disarmament which are set out below.

'6. The accumulation an% increasing sophistication of conventional arms in various regions of **the** world, particularly **by** those States with the largest military **arsenals**, have grave implications for international peace and **security**, **Agreements** or other measures in the field of conventional disarmament therefore **should be** resolutely pursued on a bilateral, regional and **multilateral** basis, due account being taken of paragraph 83 of the Final Document. Whereas States with the largest military arsenals have a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional **disarmament**, it is incumbent upon all States, while taking into account the **need** to protect their security and maintain necessary **defensive** capabilities, to intensify their efforts and **take**, either on their own or by agreement, appropriate steps in the field of conventional **disarmament** that would enhance peace and **security** in their regions as well as globally and contribute to overall progress **towards** the goal of general and complete disarmament.

'7. The limitation and reduction of conventional **arms** and **armed** forces could relate to weapons and manpower, an% **include** their deployment. **The** objective of conventional disarmament measures should be **undiminished** or increased **security** at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces. Weapons and equipment which are the subject of conventional forces reductions **agreements** should not be **transferred**, directly or **indirectly**, to States not party **to the agreement** in question. The principal **method** of **dealing** with such **reductions** should be **destruction**.

'8. The States members of two major military alliances have made progress towards an early agreement on substantial **reduction** of their **convontional** armed **forces** in Europe; **they** are urged to continue their intensive efforts to this end in **order** to fulfil the **mandate** of their **negotiations** which is to **achieve** increased security at lower levels of forces an% to eliminate the capability for surprise attack an% large-scale offensive action.

'9. In relation to negotiations on conventional **disarmament**, conscious of paragraph 83 of **the Final Document** of SSOD I, States **should** take into

account a number of factors, such as: aircumetanaes prevailing in a particular region) the **quantitative** and qualitative aspects of the **forces** which **are** the subject **of negotiations**; the **importance** of a basis of comparable **data; asymmetries** that might exist **among various countries** as a result of historical, geographical and other factors] the need to eliminate **military asymmetries** which are prejudicial to **security**; the need of States to protect their security, bearing in mind the inherent right of self-defence and the right **of peoples to self-determination** and indepeadencer the various significant implications of military strategies) the need to take steps to eliminate the capability for surprise attack and offensive action) and the implications **of arms** transfers.

'10. Although negotiations should be undertaken to facilitate and achieve substantial disarmament, and ultimately general and complete disarmament, unilateral measures could be taken in order to enhance regional **and** global peace and security.

'11. Taking into consideration the progress accomplished in the field of **conventional disarmament**, the important role **of** efforts at disarmament on a regional scale **must be recognized**. The regional approach to **disarmament** is one of the **essential** elements in global efforts. Regional disarmament **measures** should be taken at **the** initiative and with the participation of States concerned and **must** take into account the specific characteristics of each **region**. In regions where tensions **may** be high and a potential for conflict may **exist**, **measures** aimed at reducing tensions could lead to reductions and restrictions on military deployments by all States concerned and thus contribute to strengthening confidence and international peace and security.

'12. Although confidence-building **measures**, whether military or non-military, cannot serve as a substitute for **concrete** disarmament **measures**, **they** can play an important role in facilitating progress towards disarmament in that they alleviate mistrust and thus enhance international co-operation and security, whether they are taken unilaterally, bilaterally or multilaterally. Consequently, the value **of** such measures was emphasised, **it** being understood that they should always be so designed **as** to take into account the **specific** situation in and characteristics of the region in question.

'13. Conventional **disarmament** agreements must provide for adequate and effective measures for their verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and to ensure **that** the **agreements are being** observed. The **Group** noted that the **Secretary-General**, upon the request of the **General** Assembly and with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts, is undertaking an in-depth study of the role of the United Nations in the field of verification.

'14. As appropriate, negotiations on **measures** of conventional disarmament should also cover such types of conventional weapons as encompass radically new **techniques** arising from qualitative technological advances.

'15. The global expenditure on **arm and armed forces, by far** the largest part of which is attributable to **conventional arms** and armed forces, represents a **massive**, consumption of **resources** for potentially destructive purposes in a stark contrast to the urgent need for **social** and **economic** development and for **increased** international co-operation in those **fields**. Reduction in military **expenditure by releasing resources could**, therefore, entail **benefits both in the social** and economic fields as well as **in** the political field.

'16. **Arms transfers** can have serious implications for conventional disarmament, as recalled in the Final Document. **Arms** transfers should be addressed in conjunction with the **questions** of maintaining **international** peace and security, reducing international tension, enhancing **confidence**, and promoting disarmament as well **as** social and economic development. Restraint and greater openness can help in **this** respect and contribute to the promotion of international **peace and** security. In this context, the grave consequences of illicit **traffic** in arms deserve substantive consideration. The Group noted that the **Secretary-General**, upon the request of the General Assembly **and** with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts, is undertaking an in-depth study of ways and means of promoting transparency in international transfers **of** conventional **arms on a** universal and non-discriminatory basis.

'17. Taking into account the priorities in disarmament set out in the Final Document, the subject of conventional disarmament should continue to be actively pursued in the United **Nations as one significant** contribution to the endeavours of the international community towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control. In addition to deliberations by the Disarmament **Commission** on how to facilitate the process of conventional disarmament, it would be welcome if the Conference on Disarmament were to **address** the issue of conventional disarmament when practicable. The United Nations should be kept duly informed of developments in disarmament **efforts** outside its aegis, without prejudice **to** the progress of **negotiations**."

35. The report of Working Group IV on agenda item **9** reads as follows:

"Report of Working Group IV on agenda item 9

"1. The **General** Assembly, at **its** forty-fourth session, adopted resolution **44/119 H** of 15 December 1989, in which, **inter alia**, it directed the Disarmament Commission to **finalize** the preparation of **elements** of a draft resolution to be entitled 'Declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament **Decade**' and to **submit** them to the General Assembly at **its** forty-fifth session **for** consideration and adoption.

"2. **The Disarmament** Commission, at its 143rd meeting, on 7 May 1990, decided to establish Working Group IV to deal with agenda **item 9 regarding** the 'Consideration of the **Declaration** of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament **Decade**', pursuant to General **Assembly** resolution **44/119 H**.

"3. In connection with its work, the Working Group had before it the following **documents**:

"(a) Consideration of the declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade (**A/CN.10/115 and Add.1-4**);

"(b) Consideration of the declaration of the **1990s** as the Third Disarmament Decade: recommendation of **the** basic elements of the Declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament **Decade**; working paper submitted by China (**A/CN.10/116**);

"(c) **Consideration** of the declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade: working paper submitted by Nigeria (**A/CN.10/122**);

"(d) Consideration of the declaration of the **1990s** as the Third Disarmament Decade: elements for **inclusion** in a draft resolution on the declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade: **working paper** submitted **by** Bulgaria, **Czechoslovakia**, the **German** Democratic Republic and Poland (**A/CN.10/123**);

"(e) Consideration of the declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade: working paper submitted **by** Costa Rica (**A/CN.10/126**);

"(f) Consideration of the declaration of the **1990s** as the Third Disarmament **Decade**; working paper submitted **by** India (**A/CN.10/128**);

"(g) Consideration of the declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament **Decade**; working paper submitted by Canada (**A/CN.10/135**).

"4, The Working Group met under the chairmanship of **Ambassador Emek Ayo Azikiwe (Nigeria)** and held 11 meetings between 9 and 24 May 1990. Mr. Tsutomu Ishiguri of the Department for Disarmament Affairs **served** as Secretary of the Working Group.

"5. In order to expedite **the** work, **the Working Group** decided **to** take working paper **A/CN.10/135** entitled "Consideration of the declaration **of** the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade" **as a** working basis. **In** the course of examining the working paper, the Working Group identified both **areas** of agreement and other areas which need to be further considered.

"6. At its 5th meeting, **on 15 May** 1990, the Chairman of Working Group IV prepared and circulated **a conference** room paper (**A/CN.10/1990/WG.IV/CRP.1**) entitled "**Draft** declaration of the 1990s **as** the Third Disarmament Decade", which took into account the views and comments expressed by delegations during the examination of working paper **A/CN.10/135**.

"7. At its 6th meeting, on 17 May, the Chairman of Working Group IV circulated another conference room paper (**A/CN.10/1990/WG.IV/CRP.2**), reflecting the result of the informal consultations having taken place on 16 May,

"8. At its 8th meeting, on 21 May, the Chairman of Working Group IV circulated yet another conference room paper (**A/CN.10/1990/WG.IV/CRP.3**) for consideration by the Working Group. In that document, the Chairman registered the convergence of views **on** most of the **text** and tried to **focus** on a few remaining issues.

"9. At its 11th meeting, on 24 May, the Chairman of Working Group IV presented a conference room paper (**A/CN.10/1990/WG.IV/CRP.4**), which with minor further amendments was accepted as a draft declaration.

"10. In accordance with the decision of the Disarmament Commission made at its 143rd plenary meeting, on 7 May, Working Group IV, at its 11th meeting, on 24 May, decided to conclude the consideration of the item and adopted by consensus the text as follows:

**'Draft declaration of the 1990s as the Third
Disarmament Decade**

'1. The present Declaration of the 1990s as the Third **Disarmament Decade** is addressed to the global community, and deals with the hopes and aspirations of people for lasting peace and security.

'2. After a period of heightened tensions, the latter part of the decade of the 1980s saw a noticeable improvement in the way many **States** conducted their relations with one another. Despite this favourable trend, the specific goals of the Second Disarmament Decade **were not fully realized.**

'3. In a world of growing interdependence, it is essential for the international community to stimulate and deepen awareness of the common interests of the global society and of the universal interest in achieving **disarmament** and strengthening international **peace** and security. The challenges facing the international **community** today are enormous. Accordingly, the solution of these difficult and complex issues will require the political will of States in conducting dialogue and negotiations and in promoting international co-operation, including confidence-building **measures aimed at** reducing tensions and the **risk** of military confrontation among States, bearing in mind specific conditions prevailing in the region concerned. It will also require acknowledgement of the profound interrelationship of questions relating to disarmament, social and economic development and environmental protection.

'4. The international community stands on common ground in determining to make progress in **the** 1990s by resolutely pursuing disarmament along with other efforts **necessary for** attaining genuine peace and security. As **members** of the international community, we have identified the following common goals. In the nuclear field, we must continue urgently to seek early reductions in, and the eventual elimination of, **nuclear** weapons and work towards a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. To achieve **the** objective of non-proliferation in all its aspects, **all States are** encouraged to **make every** effort further to strengthen the non-proliferation **régime** and other measures to halt and prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. **The aim of the international community should be to promote co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy on a non-discriminatory basis and under agreed and appropriate international safeguards. The prevention of an arms race in outer space remains an important area to be further addressed. Many States also see the need to address naval confidence-building measures**

and disarmament issues. In the conventional field, we must seek reductions in arms and armed **forces** in all areas of the world and, in particular, where levels of concentrations of armaments are highest. In this regard, we urgently seek the successful conclusion of the negotiations on conventional **forces** in Europe. We aim for continued consideration of arms transfers in all their aspects. In the chemical field, we **must** work for the earliest conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the **development**, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction. The international community also calls for strict compliance with the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at **Geneva** on 17 June 1925. 4/ As **further** steps forward, openness and transparency on all appropriate military matters should be developed, the scope and **techniques** of verification advanced, the use of science and technology for peaceful purposes promoted and non-military threats to security addressed. All other initiatives to halt and reverse the arms race, in particular the nuclear-arms race, in all its qualitative and quantitative aspects deserve careful **consideration**. Such initiatives include the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States of the region concerned and the creation of **zones** of peace under appropriate conditions defined and determined freely by the States concerned in the **zone**. In the pursuit of the foregoing goals, the international community acknowledges the particular responsibility of countries with the largest **military** arsenals. Resources freed through disarmament could be used for the benefit of a balanced world development. These goals should be included in a comprehensive programme of disarmament, which should be concluded at an appropriate time,

'5. The United Nations will continue to foster multilateral co-operation for **disarmament**, wherein bilateral and regional efforts can be complementary and mutually supportive in attaining the purposes and principles of the United Nations. The international community can further promote disarmament through the United Nations by building upon its achievements in this field, including the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (resolution **S-10/2**), which was adopted by consensus.

'6. The international community affirms the positive role that an informed public can **play** in the process of disarmament by promoting a constructive and realistic dialogue on issues related to disarmament. In this regard, the pursuit of the World Disarmament Campaign and the observance of Disarmament **Week** will continue to play a useful role. Reflecting a growing understanding and commitment in dealing with the global problems of peace and security, it **recognizes** that non-governmental **organizations** play an invaluable role. It also supports an enhanced role for women in **developing** the conditions for enduring peace.

'7. As the world moves **towards** the twenty-first century, it is evident that future generations will need increasing knowledge and understanding of the interdependent nature of life on the planet. Education on international peace and security issues will play a fundamental part in

allowing every individual to **realize his** or **her** role **as** a responsible member of the world community.'"

36. The report of **the** Consultation Group on agenda item 10 reads as follows⁸

"Report of the Consultation Group on agenda item 10

"1. The General Assembly, at its **forty-fourth session**, adopted **resolution 44/116 E** of **15 December 1989**, in which, **inter alia**, it requested the **Disarmament Commission** to include in the agenda **of its** 1990 session an item entitled **'Objective information on military matters'**.

"2. The Disarmament Commission, at its 143rd meeting, on 7 May 1990, decided:

'A consultation group will be established for **item 10 regarding objective** information on **military** matters during the 1990 substantive session with the understanding **that** objective information on **military** matters, **as well as all other** substantive issues on the working agenda, should be given **in-depth** consideration during the 1991 substantive session of the Disarmament Commission;

'**The time-frame** for consideration of item 10 should **be** in the first half of the 1990 substantive session, i.e. the group should **not** hold any meeting after Wednesday, 16 May;

'**It** is understood that consideration **of** item 10 will **be at the** preliminary stage **during** the **1990** substantive session, not engaging in any negotiation on **a text of the subject**;

'The candidate for the chairmanship of the consultation group will **be** the representative of Austria. '

"3. The Consultation Group **met** under the chairmanship of **Ambassador Peter Hohenfellner** (Austria) and held **seven meetings** between **10 and 16 May** 1990. Mr. **Lin Ruo-Chung** of the Department for Disarmament Affairs served **as** Secretary of the Consultation Group.

"4. **In carrying out its work**, the Consultation Group had before it the report of the Secretary-General **containing** the **views** of Member **States** on the subject (**A/44/396** and Add.1 and 2) **and** the working papers submitted by Member States **as follows**:

"(a) Working paper submitted by the United Kingdom **of** Great Britain and Northern Ireland (**A/CN.10/140**);

"(b) Working paper **submitted** by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (**A/CN.10/142**).

"5. At the beginning of the 1st meeting, the Chairman of the Group made a substantive introductory statement. The first two meetings were **dedicated** to an exchange of general views on the subject in which a large number of delegations participated.

"6. Subsequently, the Group proceeded to a *discussion* of the following topics **related** to the subject-matter, according to **a structure proposed** by the Chairman of the Groups

**The meaning and significance of objective information on military matters as related to international security *and* disarmament)

"The meaning of the terms 'military matters', 'military capabilities' and 'military **activities**';

"The fields or **areas** of military matters which could **be** covered by a **possible exchange** of information)

The global and the regional dimensions of the subject, including the question of a possible global **and/or regional application of an **exchange** of information *on* military matters)

"The possible role of the United Nations, its regional centres for peace and disarmament and other regional **organizations** in the context *of an* exchange of information on military **matters**;

"The advisability of **a future** elaboration of **a** set of principles, guidelines or recommendations on objective information on military **matters**;

"The **parameters** which should *govern* a **possible** exchange *of* information on military **matters**,

"7. At its last substantive meeting, held on 16 **May** 1990, a number of delegations **made concluding** statements. At the **end** of the **meeting**, the Chairman of the Consultation Group also made a concluding **statement**.

"8. *At its 8th meeting, on 24 May 1990, the Consultation Group adopted the present report to the Disarmament Commission by consensus.*"

Notes

1/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/44/42).

2/ General Assembly resolution S-10/2.

3/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/44/27).

4/ League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138.

ANNEX I

Compilation of proposals for recommendations on agenda item 4

Recommendation No. 1

All States **Members of** the United Nations **should reaffirm** their full commitment to the purposes of the Charter of the **United Nations** and **should** strictly observe its principles **as** well as other relevant and generally accepted principles of international **law** relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, in particular, the principles of refraining **from the threat or use of force** against **the sovereignty**, territorial integrity or political **independence of** any State, or **agaⁱnst** peoples under **colonial** or foreign domination seeking to exercise their right **to** self-determination and to achieve independence; non-intervention **and** non-interference in the internal affairs **of other States**; the inviolability of international frontiers and the peaceful **settlement** of disputes, having regard to the inherent **right of States** to individual **and collective** self-defence in accordance with the Charter.

Recommendation No. 2

All **States** are urged to contribute effectively to the strengthening **of** the central role and primary **responsibility of the United Nations** in the field of disarmament. Since the process of disarmament affects the vital security interests of all States, they must all **be** actively concerned with and contribute to the measures of disarmament and **arms** limitation, which have an essential part to play in maintaining and strengthening international security.

While disarmament **is** the responsibility of all States, the nuclear-weapon States have the primary responsibility **for** nuclear disarmament and, together with other militarily significant States, for halting and reversing the arms race.

Everything possible should **be** done to enable the **Conference** on Disarmament, which is a single **multilateral** negotiating body in the field of **disarmament**, to fulfil its responsibilities by the negotiation and adoption of concrete **measures** of disarmament to promote affectively the attainment of **general** and complete disarmament under **of fective** international control.

I

Recommendation No. 3

In order to implement the recommendations and decisions contained in the Final Document of **the** Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the **first** special session devoted to disarmament (resolution S-10121, all States, particularly nuclear-weapon States and especially **those among them** which possess the **most** important **nuclear** arsenals, should **urgently** engage **in** negotiations to fulfil the priority tasks set forth in its **Programme** of Action.

Negotiations of agreements in conformity with paragraph 50 **of the** Final Document with a view to halting and reversing the nuclear-arms race and bringing about as soon as possible the achievement of the final objective defined therein,

namely, the ultimate and complete elimination of **nuclear weapons**, should be intensified or, as appropriate, urgently initiated.

Negotiations, in appropriate forums, to achieve reductions in weapons, in particular nuclear weapons, as well as other measures in the disarmament field, should be pursued and agreements concluded in accordance with paragraphs 29 and 31 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Recommendation No. 4

The **Disarmament Commission** considers as an important step in strengthening international peace and security the agreement reached at **Geneva** in November 1985 at the summit meeting of the **Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America** to accelerate the work at the negotiations between them on nuclear and space arms, with a view to accomplishing the tasks set out in the joint communiqué of 8 January 1985 of the Soviet Union and the United States, namely, to prevent an arms race in space and to terminate it on Earth, to limit and reduce nuclear arms and enhance strategic stability, as well as their agreement that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, that any conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States could have catastrophic consequences, that any war between them, whether nuclear or conventional, should be prevented, and that they will not seek to achieve military superiority.

Bearing in mind that the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, the **General Assembly** could encourage the realization of the common desire of negotiating parties, as expressed in the same joint statement, for early progress in areas where there is common ground, including the principle of a 50 per cent reduction in the nuclear arms of the **Soviet Union and the United States** appropriately applied. It is recommended that the **General Assembly** also take into account as further important steps the joint statements of the **United States-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics** of 10 December 1987 and 1 June 1988, as well as the resumption of the **United States-Soviet Union Nuclear and Space Talks**, resulting from the high-level **United States-Soviet Union** meeting at Moscow on 10 and 11 May 1959,

The **Disarmament Commission** considers that strict observance and full implementation of the Treaty between the **United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics** on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, the very first disarmament agreement ever concluded for the elimination of an entire category of nuclear weapons, represents a valuable initial step in the reduction of nuclear weapons.

The two negotiating parties should bear constantly in mind that not only their national interests but also the vital interests of all the peoples of the world are at stake and, accordingly, should keep the general Assembly duly informed of the progress of the negotiations, without prejudice to the progress of the negotiations.

The **Disarmament Commission** also considers that continuation of the practice according to which the two negotiating parties also offer information on the progress in their negotiations to the Conference on Disarmament would be useful.

Bilateral and multilateral efforts for nuclear disarmament should complement and facilitate each other.

Recommendation No. 5

[The **Conference on Disarmament**, as the single **multilateral** disarmament negotiating forum, has a **primary** role in the **negotiation** of **multilateral** disarmament **agreements**. The Conference on Disarmament should **fully discharge this fundamental task, in particular**, and as a matter of urgency, concerning the **priority items on its agenda.**]

Recommendation No. 6

All States, in particular the **major nuclear-weapon States**, are urged to pursue their negotiations on **arms limitations and disarmament with vigour** and to keep the United Nations appropriately informed of all **steps** in this field, **whether** unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral, without **prejudice to the progress** of negotiations.

Recommendation No. 7

[The Conference on Disarmament should proceed without delay to negotiations on **the** ceseation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament and, in **particular**, **begin** the elaboration of practical **measures** for the cessation of the nuclear-arms **race** and for nuclear **disarmament** in accordance with paragraph 50 of the Final Document of **the** Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, including a **nuclear** disarmament programme. Such a comprehensive, **phased** programme with agreed time-frames, **whenever** feasible, should provide for progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their **means of delivery**, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination. It should aim at the complete elimination of nuclear weapons throughout the world by the year 2000 and could consist **of three** stages :

(a) A **first** stage of five to oiyht **years, providing** for reduations in the **nuclear** arsenals of the Union of Soviet **Socialist** Republics and **the United States of America**, as well as for the **renunciation** of the **development**, testing and doployment of **space-strike** weapons by them and a moratorium on their nuclear **explosions**;

(b) A **second** stage, which would last for five to seven years and during which the **other** nuclear-weapon States would take part in the nuclear disarmament **process**;

(c) A last stage, during which the elimination of all romaining nuclear **weapons** will be completed.

Verification of the destruction or limitation of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles would be carried out by national technical **means**, on-site inspections and other measures.]

Recommendation No. 8

[A comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty prohibiting all nuclear-test explosions by all States in all environments for all time should be concluded as a matter of urgency. To this end the Conference on Disarmament should immediately proceed to the negotiations required for the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The issues of the verification of **compliance** with the agreement to be

negotiated could be **considered simultaneously** with the other substantive issues relating to a prohibition of nuclear **tests.**]

[The **Disarmament** Commission [further] **recommends** that the **General** Assembly **aacknowledge** the importance of the opening, on **9 No: mber** 1987, of full-scale **step-by-step negotiations** between the United States and the Union of Soviet **Socialist Republics** which, in accordance with their joint statement of 17 September 1987, are conducted in a single **forum** and in which the sides, as the first step, will agree upon effective verification measures which will make it possible to ratify the United **Stares** of America-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Threshold Test-Ban Treaty of 1974 and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty of 1976, and proceed to negotiating further **intermediate** limitations on nuclear testing leading to the ultimate objective of the complete cessation of nuclear testing as part of an effective disarmament **process**. This process, among other things, **would** pursue, as the first priority, the goal of the reduction of nuclear weapons and, ultimately, their elimination.]

[Pending the conclusion of such a treaty, the nuclear-weapon States are called upon to declare a moratorium on all nuclear explosions starting from a date to be agreed **among** all of them. The two **major** nuclear-weapon States **which** have conducted the **most** nuclear **explosions** are called upon to atop their nuclear tests immediately,]

Recommendation No. 9

Evory **State** has the duty to refrain in its international relations from **the** threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, **or** in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. Such **a** threat or uoo of force constitutes a violation of **international** law and the Charter of the United Nations and entails international responsibility,

The **recommandatione Nos.** 10 to 16 have been proposed taking fully into account the general applicability of recommendation No. 9.

Recommendation No. 10

In order to intensify the disarmament **process**, it should be taken into consideration that mankind today is confronted with an unprecedented threat of destruction arising from the massive and competitive accumulation of the **most** powerful **weapons** ever produced. Therefore, disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament, should be approached as a matter of highest priority and of vital importance for humanity.

Measures for the prevention of **nuclear war** and for the promotion of nuclear disarmament must take into account the security interests of nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States alike.

Recommendation No. 11

There is today wide endorsement of the statement of the two major nuclear-weapon States that a nuclear war cannot **be won and must never be fought**. Pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament, all States should **co-operate for** the adoption of practical and appropriate measures **to prevent** the outbreak of a nuclear war and to avoid use of nuclear weapons. **Not.e should he taken of existing**

undertakinga by two nuclear-weapon States about non-first use of nuclear weapons as well as declarations made by some States about non-use of any weapon, except in response to an **armed attack**.

The Disarmament Commission considers important the **agreement** on the establishment of nuclear risk reduction centres in Washington **and** Moscow, which the United **States** of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, affirming their desire to reduce and ultimately eliminate the risk **of** outbreak of nuclear war, in particular **as a result** of misinterpretation, miscalculation, **or** accident, concluded on 15 **September** 1987.

[The Conference on Disarmament should undertake, **as** a matter **of** the highest priority, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement **on** appropriate and pre **tical** measures for the prevention **of** nuclear war.]

[The Security Council of the United Nations could also take up questions of nuclear disarmament and prevention of nuclear **war**.]

Recommendation No. 12

[Nuclear-weapon States should **agree** to a comprehensive **nuclear-arms** freeze, embracing testing, development and deployment of all nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, subject to appropriate and effective measures and procedures of verification. Such a freeze should be considered as a first step in halting and reversing the nuclear **arms** race **leading** to the **complete** elimination of all nuclear weapons, [It should **begin** with an immediate **freeze** on production of nuclear weapons and fissionable material for weapon **purposes** by the two States possessing the largest **nuclear** arsenals and should be followed by substantial reductions of existing nuclear arms.]]

[The ultimate **goal of** nuclear disarmament is the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. Pending **the** attainment of this goal, the countries which possess the largest and most advanced nuclear arsenals **in** the world should take the lead in halting the test, production and deployment of all types of nuclear weapons and in drastically **reducing** and destroying all types of nuclear weapons they have deployed inside and outside their respective countries. After this, a broadly **representative** international **conference** on nuclear **disarmament** with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States can be held to discuss steps and **measures** towards thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.]

[The objective of nuclear disarmament should be pursued through negotiations, such as those **currently** under way between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, aimed at reaching agreement on mutual, balanced and effectively verifiable substantial reductions in **nuclear** weapons.]

Recommendation No. 13

[The **adequately** verified cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons would be a significant step towards halting and reversing the nuclear arms race.]

Recommendation No. 14

[All nuclear-weapon categories should be incorporated in the disarmament process.]

Recommendation No. 15

[As a measure to prevent nuclear war, pending effective measures of nuclear disarmament, all nuclear-weapon States should undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances, and to refrain from using or threatening to use such weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones. On such a basis, an international convention should be urgently negotiated and adopted with the participation of all the nuclear-weapon States to ensure the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,)

[In the nuclear age, it is all the more important that all States strictly observe their obligation, under the Charter of the United Nations, to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, taking into account their inherent right of individual or collective self-defence.]

Recommendation No. 16

[In view of the danger posed to all mankind by an arms race in outer space, in particular the impending danger of exacerbating the current state of insecurity by developments that could further undermine international peace and security, the Conference on Disarmament should urgently undertake negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space,]

In order to contribute to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, the Conference on Disarmament should intensify its work in accordance with the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee set up by the Conference,

[It is understood that the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee constitutes only a first step towards multilateral negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space.]

Recommendation No. 17

Pending comprehensive measures of nuclear and conventional disarmament, States should continue to co-operate in the development of a comprehensive set of measures for the prevention of nuclear war and of all armed conflict. These could include a wide array of confidence-building measures, including measures relating to nuclear weapons, to be negotiated in appropriate frameworks, for regional or global application.

Recommendation No. 18

Nuclear and conventional weapons as well as military forces should be reduced in a mutual, balanced and verifiable manner, particularly in regions where their concentration has attained the most dangerous levels.

Recommendation No. 19

[The nuclear-weapon States should **refrain from** military manoeuvres **in which** nuclear energy is **used for** non-peaceful purposes, **especially in** situations where nuclear armaments **are** deployed in close proximity **of** States not possessing nuclear weapons, **thus endangering** their security.]

Recommendation No. 20

[Bearing in mind that the nuclear-weapon States **should guarantee that** non-nuclear-weapon States will not be **threatened or attacked with** nuclear weapons and that declarations were made **in this** context, **negotiations** should proceed for the conclusion **[, as appropriate,]** **of** effective international arrangements to assure **[all]** non-nuclear-weapon States **[, without any discrimination,]** against the **use** or threat of use of nuclear weapons.]

Recommendation No. 21

The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in different parts of the world **on the** basis **of** agreements **and/or** arrangements freely arrived at among the States **of the region** concerned constitute an important disarmament measure [and] **[. Nuclear-weapon-free zones which will enhance world-wide security and stability]** should be encouraged, with the ultimate objective of achieving **a world** entirely **free of nuclear** weapons. In the process of **establishing** such zones, the characteristics of [each region] [the region **in** question] should be taken into **account**. [Those agreements **or** arrangements should be fully complied with and the effective respect for the status **of** such zones by **[all]** [nuclear-weapon] States [concerned] should **be subject to** adequate [agreed] verification procedures, thus ensuring that the zones are genuinely free **from** nuclear weapons.]

Recommendation No. 22

[The **establishment of zones of** peace **in various** regions of the world on **the** basis of conditions clearly **defined** and determined **freely** by the States concerned in the **zone**, and **in** conformity with international law, **can** contribute to strengthening the security of States within such **zones** and to **international** peace and security as a **whole**. In the **process** of setting up such **zones**, the characteristics of the zone and the principles of the **Charter** of the United Nations should **be** taken into account.]

Recommendation No. 23

All States should co-operate to **achieve** the goal of nuclear non-proliferation which **is**, on the **one hand**, to **prevent** the emergence of any additional nuclear-weapon States besides the **existing** five nuclear-weapon States and, on the other, progressively to reduce and eventually to eliminate nuclear **weapons** altogether. States should fully implement all the **provisions** of relevant international treaties to which they are parties. Nuclear-weapon States in particular should urgently adopt **effective** measures for halting **and** reversing the nuclear-arms race.

Recommendation No. 24

Since the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects is a matter of universal concern, all States are jointly urged to take further steps to develop an international consensus of ways and means, on a universal and non-discriminatory basis, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Recommendation No. 25

[In conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, security policies of States should have a defensive character, reflected in the structure and level of armed forces, taking into account the characteristics of each region, thus contributing to global international security.]

IX

Introductory sentence

While nuclear disarmament has the highest priority, the following recommendations on other priority measures of disarmament should be pursued together with nuclear disarmament negotiations.

Recommendation No. 1

All efforts should be exerted for the continuation and successful conclusion of negotiations on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction. To this end, the Conference on Disarmament should, as a matter of high priority, intensify the negotiations on such a convention and reinforce further its efforts with a view to the final elaboration of a convention at the earliest possible date.

In this regard, the importance of the Final Declaration of the 1989 Paris Conference of States parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and other interested States was emphasized.

Recommendation No. 2

Conventional disarmament should be resolutely pursued on a bilateral, regional and multilateral basis in accordance with paragraph 83 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament. The qualitative aspects of the conventional arms race need to be addressed along with its quantitative aspects.

In this connection, the countries with the largest military arsenals, which bear a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional armaments reductions, and the member States of the two major military alliances are urged to continue negotiations through various forums on conventional disarmament in earnest, with a view to reaching early agreement on the limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons under effective international control in their respective regions, particularly in Europe, which has the largest concentration of arms and forces in the world. In this respect, the United Nations Disarmament Commission welcomes the start of negotiations on conventional armed

forces in Europe and the continuation of **negotiations** on **confidence-security-**building measure8 in **Europe**.

All States, while **taking into** account the **need** to protect security and maintain necessary defensive capabilities, are encouraged to intensify their efforts and take, either on their own or in a regional context, appropriate steps to promote progress in conventional disarmament and enhance peace and security.

Regional disarmament measures should be taken at the initiative and with the participation of all the States concerned and must take into account the specific conditions characteristic of each **region**. Disarmament **efforts** in a **region** cannot be isolated either from the disarmament efforts in other regions **or from** global **disarmament** efforts both in the nuclear and conventional field.

Recommendation No. 3

[[An arms race in outer space should be prevented. In this context, the Disarmament Commission **welcomes** the recent **decision** taken by the Conference on Disarmament, namely:

"In the exercise of its **responsibilities** as the multilateral disarmament negotiating forum in **accordance** with paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the first special session of the **General Assembly** devoted to disarmament, **the** Conference on **Disarmament decides** to re-establish an **Ad Hoc** Committee under item 5 of its agenda entitled 'Prevention of **an arms race in** outer space'.

"The Conference requests the **Ad Hoc Committee**, in discharging that responsibility, to continue to **examine**, and to **identify**, through substantive and general **consideration**, issues relevant to the prevention **of** an **arms race** in outer space,

"The Ad Hoc Committee, in carrying out this work, **will take** into account all existing agreements, **existing** proposals and future **initiatives as** well as **developments** which have taken place since the establishment of the **Ad Hoc** Committee, **in** 1985, **and** report on the progress of its work to the Conference on Disarmament before the end of its 1987 session."

[Consequently, the **establishment** of the **Ad Hoc Committee** constitutes only a first step towards the urgent **initiation** of multilateral negotiations for **the** conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an **arms race** in **all its** aspects in outer space.]]

Recommendation No. 4

In order to create favourable conditions for success in the disarmament process, all **States** should strictly abide by the principles of **the** Charter of the United Nations as well as **other relevant** and generally accepted principles of international law **relating** to the maintenance of international peace and security, refrain from actions which **might adversely** affect efforts in the **field** of disarmament, and display a **constructive** approach to **negotiations** and the political will to reach agreements. The **climate** of confidence among nations would be significantly improved with agreements on **measures** for halting the arms race and effective reductions of armaments leading to their complete elimination. The objective at each stage of this process of disarmament should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments.

Recommendation No. 5

In the context of the World Disarmament Campaign measures should be adopted in order **that the** public in all regions of the world has access to a broad range of **objective information** and opinions on questions of arms limitation and disarmament, **and the** dangers relating to all aspects **of** the arms race **and war**, in particular **nuclear** war, to facilitate informed choices **about these** vital questions **concerning** efforts to halt and reverse the arms race. Such **a** campaign **should** promote public interest **in and** support for **the** goals **described** above and in particular **for** the reaching of agreements on measures of arms limitation and **disarmament** with a view to achieving the goal of **general** and complete **disarmament under effective international** control,

ANNEX II

Chairman's paper on agenda item 7: Naval armaments and disarmament

1. At its forty-fourth session, the general Assembly by resolution 44/116 M of 15 December 1989, entitled "Naval armaments and disarmament", inter alia, requested the Disarmament Commission to continue, at its forthcoming session in 1990, the substantive consideration of the question and to report on its deliberations and recommendations to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session.

2. In its consideration of the item, the Commission had before it the following documents:

(a) Report of the Secretary-General containing the study on the naval arms race (A/40/535);

(b) Study on the naval arms race - replies received from Governments (Argentina, Bulgaria, China, Indonesia, Lesotho, Mexico and Sweden - A/CN.10/77; Australia and Norway - Add.1; Gabon - Add.2; Denmark, Netherlands, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland - Add.3);

(c) Working paper submitted by China (A/CN.10/78);

(d) Working paper submitted by Bulgaria, German Democratic Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (A/CN.10/80);

(e) Chairman's paper on agenda item 8 (A/CN.10/83);

(f) Working paper submitted by Finland (A/CN.10/90/Rev.1);

(g) Working paper submitted by Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (A/CN.10/92);

(h) Working paper submitted by Sweden (A/CN.10/101/Rev.1);

(i) Chairman's paper on agenda item 8 (A/CN.10/102);

(j) Working paper submitted by Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (A/CN.10/109);

(k) Chairman's paper on agenda item 8 (A/CN.10/113);

(l) Working paper submitted by Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (A/CN.10/119);

(m) Working paper submitted by Sweden (A/CN.10/121);

(n) Working paper submitted by Sweden (A/CN.10/129);

(o) Working paper submitted by Finland, Indonesia and Sweden (A/CN.10/130);

(p) Chairman's paper on agenda item 8 (A/CN.10/134);

(q) Working paper submitted by Finland, Indonesia and Sweden (A/CN.10/139) ;

(r) Working paper submitted by Sweden (A/CN.10/141).

3. At its 143rd plenary meeting, on 7 May 1990, the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission decided to follow last year's course of action and hold, under his responsibility, substantive and open-ended consultations on the subject. Pursuant to that decision, the Chairman delegated the actual conduct of the substantive and open-ended consultations to a "friend of the Chairman", in casu, the representative of Indonesia, Ambaesodor Nugroho Wisnumurti. The Consultation Group held 13 meetings on the item. Mr. Lin Yung-Chung of the Department for Disarmament Affairs served as Secretary of the Consultation Group and Ms. Florence Lee from the same Department acted as Deputy Secretary.

4. In the course of the consultations participants continued their consideration of various aspects of the question including the possibility of measures of naval arms limitation and disarmament, as well as the desirability of applying confidence-building measures at sea.

5. Participants reaffirmed that the significant elements and principles that had been identified in the papers arising from the consultations held in 1986, 1987, 1988 and 1989 (A/CN.10/83, A/CN.10/102, A/CN.10/113 and A/CN.10/134 respectively) remained valid and provided a good basis for further consideration of the subject. It was acknowledged that, as stated in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, in the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bore a special responsibility, and that States with the largest military arsenals also had a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional arms reductions; these principles applied also to the naval dimension of the global arms race and related issues.

6. It was recognised that, as stated in the study on the naval arms race, naval forces are not independent of other military forces and that they should be considered in their general military context. There is no such thing as an independent naval balance or parity. By the same token, the reduction of naval nuclear forces and naval non-nuclear forces falls within the framework of nuclear and conventional disarmament respectively, and therefore should follow the general approaches of nuclear and conventional disarmament efforts. In the event that bilateral, regional or multilateral negotiations relating to naval nuclear forces and naval non-nuclear forces are conducted, such negotiations should take into account, inter alia, the following:

(a) The level of naval forces of all countries should not exceed the reasonable need for defence;

(b) Naval forces should be considered in their general military context with a view to enhancing security and stability at the lowest overall balanced level of forces and armaments;

(c) The geographically different situations of States could require different and, where appropriate, asymmetrical measures for naval forces and weapons;

(d) Such measures should be embodied **in legal instruments, as appropriate, in harmony with general principles of international law, including the Charter of the United Nations.**

7. The **present** international situation is **characterized** by progress in the **negotiations** in the **European context**, affecting mainly conventional weapons, **and** encompassing primarily land and air **forces as agreed by the parties.** In addition to this the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of **America** **are** actively conducting **negotiations** to reduce **their** strategic nuclear armaments, including sea-borne strategic nuclear **weapons.** **Consequently,** naval **forces** could become relatively **more significant** in the general military context **and in** the overall military balance.

8. In this context, the widening of the **spectrum of negotiations** to involve **also** certain naval **nuclear and** conventional forces **could** contribute to further progress **in enhancing international peace and security as well as to the promotion and consolidation of détente.** This **would** also be desirable in **order** to ensure that progress achieved in agreements involving land and/or air **forces -** conventional as well **as** nuclear - is not circumvented by the developments in the naval field. In this connection, **the stabilizing value of some naval forces** in a global context was **stressed** by a **number** of delegations.

9. The qualitative improvements in range, mobility, **firepower** and flexible use of modern **weapon systems have underscored** the interdependence of naval, air and land-based **forces** in so far as military stability requires the elimination of capabilities for surprise attack and for large-scale **offensive** action. From a military point of **view** it remains valid **not to consider** those forces as separate categories of **an** overall military balance. This is a factor of importance for the **security** of all States and in particular coastal States.

10. It was observed that the enhancement of nuclear weapons deployed at **sea** and the geographical dispersion **of** such weapons, as **well as** linking **of** all weapons **systems in** the different environments, have **given** an important **dimension to** the question **of** naval weapons, especially considering that a significant proportion of **the** world's strategic and tactical nuclear capability is deployed at **sea.**

11. Some positive **developments in** the naval armaments and disarmament were **noted:**

(a) Sea-borne strategic nuclear **weapons are the subject of negotiations** between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Both **countries have** also decided to phase out **some categories of** sea-borne **nuclear weapons;**

(b) In the Stockholm **Document** and in the current Vienna negotiations on **confidence- and security-building** measures in Europe, **some** naval activities are taken **into consideration** in so far as **they** are directly related to notifiable activities **taking** place within the whole of Europe.

12. In addition to **these endeavours,** greater effort by the world's **leading naval** powers to halt and **reverse** the naval arms race, particularly **in its nuclear dimension,** would be useful. The **short- and intermediate-range** sea-borne nuclear-weapons could **be** further addressed at negotiations. The **widespread deployment of** sea-based nuclear armed **cruise** missiles **could** become the subject of

negotiations. Such efforts should significantly contribute to the promotion of international peace and security.

13. There was concurrence of view that, at this stage, confidence-building measures of various kinds, both in the global and the regional context, would be more amenable to further consideration and possible negotiation in the appropriate forums. It was recognized that a fundamental feature of the global maritime environment, both military and non-military, was freedom of navigation and that naval confidence-building measures should be in harmony with current law of the sea. In accordance with international law, freedom of navigation and other rights of maritime navigation should not be exercised in any manner prejudicial to the security of the coastal States.

14. In this regard, suggestions of initiatives that might be of relevance included: extension of existing confidence-building measures to seas and oceans, especially to areas with the busiest sea-lanes; notification of major naval activities; the invitation of observers to naval exercises or manoeuvres; limitations on the number or scale of naval exercises in specific regions; exchange of information on naval matters; a better flow of objective information on naval capabilities; greater openness and transparency on naval matters in general; strict observance of existing maritime measures which can or are designed to build confidence; rules guiding naval activities when in conflict with civilian activities, in accordance with the current law of the sea and steps to ensure respect for existing international law with regard to the rights of vessels belonging to States neutral to a conflict. Different views were expressed.

15. The experience gained from bilateral agreements on the prevention of incidents at sea beyond territorial sea is encouraging. It was proposed that the possibility should be pursued of negotiating a multilateral agreement concerning the prevention of incidents at sea beyond the territorial sea in addition to existing agreements. This proposal made at the 1989 session of the Disarmament Commission for a multilateral agreement on the prevention of incidents at sea (A/CN.10/129) was the subject of further consideration. According to such a proposal any multilateral agreement of this nature should respond to the needs of all interested nations for enhancing safety at sea without diminishing the traditional freedom of navigation. Other delegations considered that bilateral agreements of a technical nature constituted the appropriate approach in this regard.

16. A number of participants highlighted the benefits to be derived from the maritime aspects of existing proposals for nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace in certain regions, together with recent developments such as the declaration by the General Assembly of a zone of peace and co-operation in the South Atlantic. In this context, verification of compliance with obligations of the treaties or other instruments establishing such zones is necessary. It was felt in this connection that the establishment of such zones should be in conformity with the principles of the law of the sea, including the freedom of navigation on the high seas. The varying positions of participants on this issue were noted.

17. Further discussion took place on the issue of the practicability of updating some of the existing laws of sea warfare. In this connection, specific mention was made of the possibility of updating the Hague Convention VIII of 1907 on Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines, and the possibility of further work on the development of international law concerning exclusion zones with particular reference to the safety of non-belligerent vessels engaged in peaceful maritime

activities. It was noted that these issues need extensive consideration in the appropriate forums. In this connection, it was suggested that a protocol on the use of sea mines (A/CN.10/141) be added to the existing body of international law. One possibility in this context is an additional protocol to the 1981 Convention on Prohibitions for Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. Some delegations believed existing arrangements sufficient.

18. It was recognized that the harmful effects that conflict at sea could have on the freedom of navigation and other uses of the sea, in accordance with current international law, for States neutral to or otherwise not involved in an ongoing conflict, have been amply demonstrated in recent years. The maintenance of freedom of navigation and other uses of the sea is an important objective for all States neutral to or otherwise not involved in such conflicts. The view was expressed that in order to secure the freedom of navigation, concrete future measures could include the establishment, when necessary and in accordance with existing practices, of a naval element in United Nations peace-keeping operations either alone or integrated with land and air forces. It was also suggested that, as an initial step towards exploring such a possibility, a special study could be carried out by the Military Staff Committee. Some delegations felt that such a study should not be conducted.

19. The enhancement of nuclear weapons deployed at sea and the geographical dispersion of such weapons have given rise to mounting concern on the part of many States. It was recognized that most strategic nuclear weapons are already the subject of certain bilateral negotiations. Many delegations expressed the view that early consideration should be given by States to effective measures towards the prohibition of all nuclear weapons on all ships, whether surface vessels or submarines, other than those specifically designated by agreement without undermining the defence and security needs of the States concerned. It was recalled by other delegations, however, that such negotiations and measures should not be seen in isolation from the general military context.

20. It was suggested by several delegations that, in order to enhance security and openness, the practice of nuclear-weapon States of neither confirming nor denying the presence or absence of nuclear weapons on board any particular ship at any particular time should be abandoned. Other delegations considered such a practice essential to their States' security and to strategic stability.

21. By potentially posing a threat to the marine environment, nuclear-powered vessels present particular problems. Several reported accidents involving nuclear-propelled submarines have led to proposals to extend the existing arrangements whether national, bilateral or multilateral concerning the notification of nuclear accidents to include accidents with nuclear-powered military vessels in international waters also when these accidents do not have transboundary effects. In addition, some delegations expressed the view that safety guidelines for sea-borne nuclear reactors could be considered. It was thus proposed that efforts to achieve progress in the military field should therefore be co-ordinated with efforts to eliminate potential ecological hazards at sea. Some delegations believed that this subject, while important, should not be considered in the context of disarmament. Other delegations suggested that vessels carrying nuclear weapons also present a potential problem to the marine environment.

22. It was noted that great attention had **recently** been devoted by the General Assembly to the need for **openness and transparency** in military matters as reflected, **inter alia**, in resolutions on objective information on military matters. The following suggestions were made by several delegations:

(a) Measures to **increase** openness and transparency concerning the navigation of vessels carrying **nuclear** and conventional weapons should be considered?

(b) The possibilities for exchange of information and greater openness concerning naval military structures, doctrines and major activities, including amphibious operations and joint operations of land, air and/or naval forces, should be further explored, drawing on experiences gathered, **inter alia**, within the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe;

(c) The possibilities of **sharing** information gathered through observation by satellites or other observation means over **international waters, inter alia**, in the framework of appropriate agreements, could be further studied by the participating States **separately** as well as in conjunction with similar projects involving national territories;

(d) The possibilities of using the United Nations standardised reporting system for military budgets to share information concerning naval forces could be further explored by the participating States.

23. During the course of discussion, many delegations suggested the **elaboration** of a reliable system of verification and openness in the naval sphere for agreements on confidence-building at sea and on the limitation and reduction of naval armaments. Some delegations suggested that appropriate measures for the verification could include the use of national technical means, measures based on co-operation, on-site inspections and an international verification mechanism under United Nations auspices. Other delegations highlighted the difficulty of establishing an effective **verification régime** for surface and sub-surface naval vessels,

24. In order to put the naval issues on a practical track, some delegations suggested that it would be useful to prepare an updated United Nations study on naval problems. Other delegations considered it not justified at present.

25. An exchange of views took place on a number of possible objectives and possible measures. Among the objectives and measures mentioned by many participants were:

(a) Strengthening **peace, security and stability** at a lower level of forces, taking into account the need for States to protect their security;

(b) Substantial reduction of naval forces, including their nuclear and non-nuclear arms by major naval Powers;

(c) Particular attention to armaments possessing the most pronounced offensive capability;

(d) Reversal of the geographical spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear-powered vessels on the seas and oceans;

(e) Peace-time **security in** relation to activities by military forces of many States operating at **sea** to avoid incidents and confrontation;

(f) Security for non-military activities at **sea**, such as shipping, **fishing**, off-shore activities;

(g) **Seaboard** security, **i.e.**, security of coastal States against threats and military power projection;

(h) **Non-aggression** and non-interference in internal affairs of other countries by all States, in particular major naval Powers;

(i) War-time security at sea of vessels belonging to States neutral to a **conflict**;

(j) Effective and relevant **confidence-** and security-building as well as naval **disarmament** measures.

Varying views were expressed **on** these matters,

26. It **was** suggested that consultations between interested States **on** matters related to **naval** armaments and disarmament could be a means of paving the way to international negotiations in the field of confidence-building at **sea** and **naval disarmament**.

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