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preliminary list*
THE SITUATION IN KAMPUCHEA
QUESTION OF PEACE, STABILITY AND
CO-OPERATION IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA
REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
DECLARATION ON THE STRENGTHENING
OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
DEVELOPMENT AND STRENGTHENING OF
GOOD-NEIGHBOURLINESS BETWEEN
STATES

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-fifth year

**Letter dated 2 July 1990 from the Permanent Representative of Viet Nam
to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General**

I have the honour to enclose herewith, for your information, the text of an interview on the **outcome** of the Sino-Vietnamese talks granted on 21 June 1990 by Mr. Tran Quang Co, Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister to the Viot Nam News Agency (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as an **official** document of the General Assembly, under items 32, 30, 71 and 142 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) TRINH XUAN LANG
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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ANNEX

Interview on the recent Sino-Vietnamese talks granted
on 21 June 1990 by the Vietnamese Deputy Foreign
Minister to the Viet Nam News Agency

Question 1: Public opinion expected the recent Sino-Vietnamese talks to be a good success. But this did not seem to be the case. Would you please explain the reason why this round of talks failed to produce progress?

Answer: With the desire to bring about an early normalization of relations between Viet Nam and China and conclude the Cambodian problem through a comprehensive political solution, at the talks, we have demonstrated our utmost good will and always advanced first steps aimed at narrowing a gap between the two sides in the understanding regarding the essential issues of a solution to the Cambodian problem. The lack of progress is certainly due to some unsurmountable differences between the two countries. However, the two sides reached consensus on some fundamental points.

I want to talk about the unanimous points first, namely, the two sides agreed that the Cambodian issue must be solved by an overall political solution which includes the total and internationally verified withdrawal of Vietnamese troops, a cease-fire, the cessation of foreign military aids to all Cambodian parties, the holding of free, fair and democratic general elections under international control, and establishment of a future peaceful independent, neutral and non-aligned Cambodian state having friendly relations with all other countries, particularly with close neighbours such as Viet Nam, China, the Lao People's Democratic Republic and Thailand.

A number of differences still remain to be sorted out, mainly because the two sides held different views on the issues relating to Cambodia's internal affairs. The Chinese side demanded that Viet Nam agree with China on such merely internal Cambodian affairs as concrete functions and powers of the Supreme National Council and the measures to deal with the armed forces of all Cambodian parties after the enforcement of a cease-fire,

While we do not reject China's concrete proposals regarding Cambodia's internal affairs, Viet Nam is not in a position to represent the Cambodian parties in saying "yes" or "no", as it belongs totally to Cambodia's sovereignty. We clearly told China that Viet Nam is ready to join China and other countries in respecting the Cambodians' decision as far as the Cambodian parties go in accepting China's views.

Question 2: Mr. Xu Dunxin, the Chinese head delegate, mentioned about Viet Nam's intransigent position on the two remaining key issues and that it still demanded that the Khmer Rouge be excluded from the Supreme National Council of Cambodia. Is it true?

Answer: , it is completely untrue.

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Viet Nam welcomes the results gained in Tokyo, regarding them as an important step forward leading to a political solution to **the Cambodia question**. Regarding the question of the Supreme National Council of Cambodia, we reaffirmed to the **Chinese side that** Viet Nam will respect the **agreements** reached in Tokyo between Cambodian factions on the composition of the Supreme National Council and fully agree on the principle that none of the Cambodian factions **be** excluded and that **no** Cambodian faction monopolises the Supreme National Council. We proposed **that** Chins should convince the **Khmer** Rouge faction to take part in the **cease-fire agreement** and the establishment of the Supreme National Council. Regrettably, **the** Chinese side has not responded to **our** proposal, but held Viet Nam responsible for Chairman **Hun Sen's** signing the joint **communiqué** in Tokyo with Prince Sihanouk, saying **that it meant the** exclusion of a Cambodian faction, though it **is** known to everyone that Chairman Hun Sen called upon the **Khmer** Rouge to take part in the Supreme National Council and the cease-fire agreement, and it is the Khmer Rouge which has separated itself **from** the official agreements in Tokyo.

The Chinese side demanded **that the** Supreme National Council be the only authentic supreme authority organ in Cambodia **in** the transitional period, which must have the legislative and executive **powers, and must** directly control at least five **most** important ministries: national defence, interior, foreign affairs, information and finance, while other ministries and **technical branches be managed by the two administrations** but put **under the guidance of the Supreme National Council**. Viet Nam holds that this should be the concrete **arrangement** among the Cambodian factions themselves. We are of the view that Chairman Hun Sen previously rejected the establishment of a quadripartite coalition government and now he and Prince Sihanouk **have** agreed to establish a Supreme National Council comprising 12 **members** equally divided between the two present Cambodian administrations. Therefore, the Supreme National Council is not a quadripartite coalition government. **However, the** Chinese side still demands **that the** Supreme National Council **have the** power of a quadripartite coalition government. Viet Nam holds that the Supreme National Council has the responsibility and power in implementing agreements to **be** signed on Cambodia, national reconciliation and on **organization of** general elections. Viet Nam holds that **the** two existing administrations **must** refrain from doing anything to obstruct the responsibility and power of the Supreme National Council. It is the right of **the Cambodian factions** to decide how **far they** can accept China's ideas. Viet **Nam's** stance is to respect Cambodia's sovereignty and right to self-determination, Viet Nam and China cannot represent the Cambodian factions in handling Cambodia's internal affairs.

Question 3: What is the difference between the two sides with regard to **the** armed **forces** of the Cambodian factions?

Answer: With regard to the armed forces of **the** Cambodian parties, China urged Viet Nam to share **its view** that the Cambodian **armed** forces should regroup in places marked off by the United Nations and then their numbers would **reduce** to the lowest level. The Vietnamese side declared to respect the agreements reached by the Cambodian parties in Tokyo that the armed **forces** should stay where they **were**. Viet Nam put forth **some** principles concerning the armed forces of the Cambodian parties, namely, to put an early end to the civil war **as** early as possible, continue to

honour the cease-fire, and refrain from any interference in the Cambodian political life and general elections to assure general elections be held in a really free and equitable way. Concrete measures to be taken to realize these principles are to be decided by the Cambodian parties. Viet Nam, together with China and other countries, should respect decisions of the Cambodian parties.

Question 4: The Chinese side stated that Viet Nam did not want the United Nations to play its role. What is Viet Nam's view on the United Nations role in the Cambodian issue?

Answer: Viet Nam holds that the United Nations should play an important role in the settlement of the Cambodia problem on the basis of respect for the Cambodian sovereignty as in verification of the total Vietnamese army withdrawal, control and supervision of the implementation of other agreements in a comprehensive solution to the Cambodian conflict, including the termination of foreign interference and military aid, especially the control and supervision to assure freedom, fairness and democracy of the general elections. Besides, if the Cambodian parties agree together to assign the United Nations more tasks concerning Cambodia's sovereignty, Viet Nam will be ready together with other countries to honour it.

Question 5: Are there any discussions on the normalisation of relations between the two countries at these informal talks?

Answer: The issue had been dealt with, although most of the time of the three-day meetings was focused on the Cambodian problem. The Chinese side once again affirmed that the normalisation of its relations with Viet Nam could not come before but only after the settlement of the Cambodian problem, that only when the Cambodian problem is solved will China talk of the normalisation of its relations with Viet Nam. That is the point where the policies pursued by China and by the Bush Administration meet.

In spite of difficulties, the Government and people of Viet Nam will consistently advocate the normalisation of bilateral relations between Viet Nam and China, attaching importance to the long-term and fundamental interests of the two countries. This is also in the interest of durable peace and stability in South-East Asia and Asia.

Though no agreement was made on the timing of their next meeting, the two sides wished to continue consultations. This also conform, to the aspirations of the two peoples and public opinions.

Questions 6: What is the best measure, in your view, to conclude the transitional period in Cambodia?

Answer: It is really free, fair and democratic General elections, which must be organised under strict international control, as the ones held in a really free, really fair and really democratic way in Namibia and Nicaragua by their then existing administrations. In Namibia and Nicaragua, no time was wasted in argument about power in the transitional period. The decisive factor is to reach agreements on a law on general elections and on effective measures to make sure elections will

be really free, fair and democratic under effective control of international organisations. The questions of power of the Council and armed forces should **not** be taken in order to avoid **discussions** on that key issue.

If the Cambodian parties cannot reach any **agreements** on Cambodia's **internal** affairs, **no** outside force can replace the Cambodians to settle their affairs. In that case, measures should be taken neither to make the internal disputes of Cambodia an international issue **nor** to harm any country, and foreign countries must put an end to all acts **of** intervention and support for one side against the other. If the international community neutralises Cambodia's internal disputes, all Cambodian parties will have to find **measures** to settle them soon.

Question 7: What is your comment on Xu **Duxin's** statement that Viet Nam showed no good will?

Answer: Viet Nam's unilateral troops pullout from Cambodia alone was a good will **move**, which has made an important contribution to settling the Cambodian issue. Has any country directly involved in the Cambodian issue unilaterally stopped its interference in Cambodia? Public opinion has pointed to China's persistent backing to the Polpotists as the main obstacle to a political solution of the Cambodian issue. China's remark that Viet **Nam's refusal** to settle Cambodia's internal affairs manifests its lack of good will. However, we resolutely respect the principle of non-interference in Cambodia's internal affairs,

Question 8: Why does China **now** demand the **12-member** Supreme National Council be shared among the **four** parties, not among the two **Governments** as it had agreed before, and why does **it take** a hard line on the power of the Supreme National Council and the armed forces?

Answer: China has a hard-line stance on the participation **of** the **four** parties in the Supreme National Council and armed forces because it wants both Viet **Nam** and China to have one stance contrary to the Tokyo Joint **Communiqué**. China has not approved **of** the Tokyo joint **communiqué**, and does not want to oppose it alone,
