



**General Assembly**

Distr.  
GENERAL

A/44/401  
24 August 1989  
ENGLISH  
ORIGINAL, ENGLISH/FRENCH

Forty-fourth session  
Item 63 of the provisional agenda\*

GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

Letter dated 21 August 1989 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i.  
of the Permanent Mission of the Netherlands to the United  
Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of the declaration issued by the Heads of State and Government at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council at **Brussels** on **29** and **30** May **1989** (**annex I**) and the report entitled "**A** Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament" adopted at the meeting (**annex II**).

I should be grateful if you **would** arrange to have the texts circulated as an official document of the General Assembly under **item 63** of the provisional **agenda**, in the original French and **English** languages only.

(Signed) Jaap RAMAKER  
Acting Permanent Representative

\* A/44/150,

ANNEX I

**DECLARATION OF THE HEADS OF STATE AND  
GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATING IN THE MEETING OF  
THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL IN BRUSSELS  
(29th-30th May 1989)**

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## I NATO's 40 Years of Success

1. As our Alliance **celebrates** its 40th Anniversary, we measure its achievements with **pride**. Founded **in troubled** times to safeguard our security, It has withstood the **test** of four **decades, and has** allowed our countries to enjoy in freedom one of the longest **periods of peace and prosperity** in their history. **The Alliance has been a fundamental element** of stability and **co-operation**. These are **the fruits** of a **partnership** based on **enduring common values and interests, and on unity of purpose**.

2. Our meeting takes place at a juncture of unprecedented **change** and **opportunities**. **This is a time** to look ahead, to chart the course of our Alliance and to set our agenda for the **future**.

### A Time of Change

3. In our **rapidly** changing world, where ideas transcend borders over **more** easily, the **strength** and **accomplishments** of democracy and freedom are **increasingly** apparent. The **inherent** inability of oppressive **systems** to **fulfil** the aspirations of their citizens has become equally evident.

4. In the Soviet Union, important changes are underway. We welcome the current reforms that have already led to **greater** openness, improved respect for human rights, active participation of the individual, and new attitudes in foreign policy. But much remains to **be done**. We still look forward to the full implementation of the announced change in **priorities** in the allocation of economic resources **from** the military to the civilian **sector**. If sustained, the reforms will **strengthen** prospects for fundamental **improvements** in East-West relations.

5. We also **welcome the** marked progress in some countries of Eastern Europe **towards** establishing more democratic institutions, free elections and greater political pluralism and economic choice. However, **we** deplore **the** fact that certain Eastern European **governments** have chosen to ignore this reforming trend and continue all too frequently to violate human **rights** and basic freedoms.

### Shaping the Future

6. Our vision of a just, humane and democratic world has always underpinned the policies of this Alliance. The changes that are now taking place are bringing us closer to the realisation of this vision

7. We want to overcome the painful division of Europe, which we have never **accepted**. We want to move **beyond** the post-war period. Based on today's **momentum** of **increased** co-operation and **tomorrow's** common challenges, we **seek to shape** a new political order **of peace** in Europe. We will work **as Allies** to **seize** all opportunities to **achieve** this goal. But **ultimate success does not depend on** us alone.

**Our guiding principles in the pursuit of this course** will be **the policies of the Harmel Report** in their two **complementary** and mutually reinforcing approaches: adequate military **strength** and political solidarity and, on that basis, the search for constructive **dialogue** and **co-operation**, including arms control, as a means of **bringing** about a just and lasting peaceful order in **Europe**.

8. The Alliance's **long-term** objectives are:

- to **ensure** that wars and intimidation of any **kind** in Europe and North America **are prevented**, and that military **aggression** is an option which no government could rationally contemplate or hope successfully to **undertake**, and by **doing** so to lay the foundations for a world where military forces exist solely to **preserve the** independence and territorial integrity of their **countries**, as has always **been** the case for the Allies;
- to establish a new pattern of **relations between** the countries of East and **West**, in which **ideological** and military **agonism** will be replaced with co-operation, trust and peaceful competition: and in which human rights and political **freedoms will be fully guaranteed** and enjoyed by all individuals.

9. Within our larger responsibilities as Heads of State or **Government**, *we are also* committed

- to strive for **an** international community founded on the rule of law, where all nations join **together to reduce** world tensions, settle disputes **peacefully**, and search for solutions to those issues of universal concern, **including** poverty, social injustice and the environment, on which our common fate depends.

## II Maintaining our Defence

10. Peace must be worked for; it can never be taken for granted. The greatly improved East-West political climate offers prospects for a stable and lasting peace, but experience teaches us that we must remain prepared. We can overlook neither the capabilities of the Warsaw Treaty countries for offensive military action, nor the potential hazards resulting from severe political strain and crisis.

11. A strong and united Alliance will remain fundamental not only for the security of our countries but also for our policy of supporting political change. It is the basis for further successful negotiations on arms control and on measures to strengthen mutual confidence through improved transparency and predictability. Military security and policies aimed at reducing tensions as well as resolving underlying political differences are not contradictory but complementary. Credible defence based on the principle of the indivisibility of security for all member countries will thus continue to be essential to our common endeavour.

12. For the foreseeable future, there is no alternative to the Alliance strategy for the prevention of war. This is a strategy of deterrence based upon an appropriate mix of adequate and effective nuclear and conventional forces which will continue to be kept up-to-date where necessary. We shall ensure the viability and credibility of these forces, while maintaining them at the lowest possible level consistent with our security requirements.

13. The presence of North American conventional and nuclear forces in Europe remains vital to the security of Europe just as Europe's security is vital to that of North America. Maintenance of this relationship requires that the Allies fulfil their essential commitments in support of the common defence. Each of our countries will accordingly assume its fair share of the risks, rôles and responsibilities of the Atlantic partnership. Growing European political unity can lead to a reinforced European component of our common security effort and its efficiency. It will be essential to the success of these efforts to make the most effective use of resources made available for our security. To this end, we will seek to maximise the efficiency of our defence programmes and pursue solutions to issues in the area of economic and trade policies as they affect our defence. We will also continue to protect our technological capabilities by effective export controls on essential strategic goods.

## Initiatives on Arms Control

14. Arms Control has always been an integral part of the Alliance's security policy and of its overall approach to East-West relations, firmly embedded in the broader political context in which WC seek the improvement of those relations.

15. The Allies have consistently taken the lead in developing the conceptual foundations for arms control, identifying areas in which the negotiating partners share an interest in achieving a mutually satisfactory result while safeguarding the legitimate security interests of all.

16. Historic progress has been made in recent years, and WC now see prospects for further substantial advances. In our determined effort to reduce the excessive weight of the military factor in the East-West relationship and increasingly to replace confrontation by co-operation, we can now exploit fully the potential of arms control as an agent of change.

17. We challenge the members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization to join us in accelerating efforts to sign and implement an agreement which will enhance security and stability in Europe by reducing conventional armed forces. To seize the unique opportunity at hand, WC intend to present a proposal that will amplify and expand on the position we tabled at the opening of the CFE negotiations on 9th March.<sup>(1)</sup> We will

- register agreement, based on the ceilings already proposed in Vienna, on tanks, armoured troop carriers and artillery pieces held by members of the two Alliances in Europe, with all of the withdrawn equipment to be destroyed. Ceilings on tanks and armoured troop carrier will be based on proposals already tabled in Vienna; definitional questions on artillery pieces need to be resolved;
- expand our current proposal to include reductions by each side to equal ceilings at the level 15 per cent below current Alliance holdings of helicopters and of all land-based combat aircraft in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone, with all the withdrawn equipment to be destroyed;
- propose a 20 per cent cut in combat manpower in US stationed forces, and a resulting coiling on US and Soviet ground and air force personnel stationed outside of national territory in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone at approximately 275,000. This ceiling would require the Soviet Union to reduce its forces in

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<sup>(1)</sup> France takes this opportunity to recall that, since the mandate for the Vienna negotiations excludes nuclear weapons, it retains complete freedom of judgement and decision regarding the resources contributing to the implementation of its independent nuclear deterrent strategy.

Eastern Europe by some **325,000**. United States and **Soviet** forces withdrawn will **be demobilized**;

- . seek such an **agreement** within **six** months to a year and accomplish the reductions by 1992 or 1993. Accordingly, WC have directed **the** Alliance's High Level Task **Force** on **conventional arms** control to complete the further elaboration of this proposal, including **its verification elements**, so that it may be tabled at the beginning of the third round of the CFE negotiations, which opens on 7th **September 1989**.

18. We consider as **an** important **initiative** **President** Bush's call for **an** "open skies" **regime** intended **to** improve confidence among States through reconnaissance flights, and to contribute to the transparency of military activity, to arms control and to public awareness. It **will** be the subject of **careful** study and wide-ranging consultations.

19. Consistent with the **principles** and objectives **set** out **in** our Comprehensive Concept of **Arms** Control and Disarmament which WC have adopted at this meeting, we will continue to use arms control as a means to enhance security and stability at the lowest possible level of **armed** forces, and to *strengthen confidence* by **further** appropriate **measures**. We **have** already demonstrated our commitment to those objectives: both by negotiations and by **unilateral** action, resulting since 1979 **in** reductions of over one-third of **the** nuclear holdings assigned to **SACEUR** in Europe.

### Towards an Enhanced Partnership

20. As the Alliance enters its **fifth** decade we will meet **the** challenge of shaping our relationship in a way which corresponds to the new political and economic realities of the **1990s**. As we do so, we **recognize** that the basis of our security and prosperity - and of our hopes for better East-West relations - is **and** will continue *to* be the **close** cohesion between the countries of **Europe and** of North America, bound together by their common values and democratic institutions as much **as** by their shared security interests.

21. Ours is a living and developing partnership. The strength and stability derived from our transatlantic bond provide a firm foundation for the achievement of our **long-term** vision, as well as of our goals for the immediate future. We recognize that our common tasks transcend the resources of either Europe or North America alone.

22. We welcome in this regard the evolution of an increasingly strong and coherent European identity, including in the security area. The process we **are** witnessing today provides **an** example of progressive integration, leaving centuries-old **conflicts** far behind. It opens **the** way to a more mature **and** balanced **transatlantic** partnership and **constitutes** one of the foundations of Europe's future structure,

23. To ensure **the** continuing success of our efforts we have agreed to
- **strengthen** our **process** of political consultation and, where **appropriate**, co-ordination, and **have instructed** the Council in Permanent Session to **consider methods for its further improvement;**
  - **expand the scope and intensity** of our **effort to ensure that our respective approaches** to problems **affecting** our common security are **complementary** and mutually **supportive;**
  - renew our support for our **economically** loss-favoured **partners** and **to reaffirm** our goal of improving the present **level of co-operation** and **assistance;**
  - continue to work in the appropriate **fora** for **more commercial**, monetary and technological **co-operation**, and to see to **it** that no obstacles impede such **co-operation**.

### Overcoming **the** Division of Europe

24. Now, **more** than ever, our **efforts** to overcome the division of Europe must **address its** underlying **political** causes. Therefore all of us will continue to pursue a **comprehensive** approach encompassing the **many dimensions** of the East-West agenda. In **keeping with** our **values**, we place **primacy emphasis** on **basic freedoms for the** people in Eastern **Europe**. These are also **key** elements for strengthening the stability and security of all **states** and for guaranteeing lasting **peace on** the continent.

25. The **CSCE process encompasses our** vision of a **peaceful** and most constructive relationship among all participating states. We intend to develop **it further**, in all its dimensions, and **to** make the fullest use of **it**.

**We recognize** progress in the implementation of CSCE **commitments** by some Eastern **countries**. But we call upon all **of them** to **recognize and** implement fully the **commitments** which all **CSCE** states have accepted. We **will** invoke the CSCE mechanisms • as most **recently** adopted in the Vienna Concluding **Document** - and the provisions **of** other **international** agreements, to bring **all Eastern** countries to

- enshrine in law and practice the human rights and freedoms agreed in **international** covenants and in the CSCE documents, thus fostering progress towards the rule of law:
- tear down the walls that separate us physically and politically, simplify the crossing of borders, increase the number of crossing points and allow the free exchange of persons, **information** and ideas:
- ensure that **people** are not prevented by armed force from crossing the frontiers and boundaries which we share with Eastern countries, in exercise of their right to leave any **country, including** their own:

- **respect in law and practice the right of all the people in each country to determine freely and periodically the nature of the government they wish to have;**
- see to it that their peoples can decide through **their elected authorities** what **form** of relations **they wish** to have with other countries;
- **grant the genuine economic freedoms that are linked inherently to the rights of the individual;**
- develop transparency, especially in military matters, in pursuit of **greater mutual understanding and reassurance.**

26. **The situation** in and around Berlin is an **essential** element in **East-West** relations. The **Alliance** declares its **commitment** to a **free** and prosperous Berlin and to **achieving improvements** for the **city** especially through the Allied Berlin Initiative. The Wall dividing **the city** is an **unacceptable** symbol of the division of Europe. **We** seek a state of peace **in Europe** in which **the German** people regains its unity through free **self-determination.**

### Our Design for Co-operation

27. **We**, for our part, have today reaffirmed that **the Alliance** must and will **reintensify** its own efforts to **overcome** the division of Europe and to explore all available **avenues** of co-operation and dialogue. **We** support the opening of Eastern societies and **encourage reforms** that aim at positive political, economic and human rights developments. Tangible steps towards genuine political and economic reform improve possibilities for broad co-operation, while a continuing denial of basic freedoms **cannot but** have a **negative** effect. Our approach **recognizes** that each country is unique and must be treated on its own merits; **We** also **recognize** that it is essentially incumbent upon the **countries of the East** to solve **their** problems by reforms from within. But we can also play a **constructive rôle** within the framework of our Alliance as well as in our respective, bilateral relations and in **international organizations**, as appropriate.

28. To **that** end, **We** have agreed **the** following joint agenda for the future

- as opportunities **develop**, we will expand the scope of our contacts and co-operation 'to cover a broad range of issues which **are** important to both **East** and West. Our **goal** is a sustained effort geared to specific tasks which will help deepen openness and **promote** democracy Within **Eastern** countries and thus contribute to **the** establishment of a more stable peace in Europe:
- we will pursue in particular expanded contacts beyond the realm of government among **individuals** in **East** and West. These contacts should include **all** segments of our societies, but in particular young people, who will **carry the** responsibility for continuing our common endeavour,

- . we **will** seek expanded economic and trade relations with the Eastern countries on the **basis** of **commercially** sound **terms**, mutual **interest** and **reciprocity**. Such relations should also **serve** as **incentives** for **real economic reform** and thus case **the way for** increased **integration** of **Eastern** countries **into the international** trading system;
- . we intend to demonstrate **through** increased co-operation that **democratic** institutions and economic choice **create** the **best** possible conditions **for** economic and social **progress**. The development of such open systems will facilitate **co-operation** and, consequently, **make** its **benefits** more available;
- **an important** task of our co-operation will **be** to explore means **to** extend Western **experience** and know-how to Eastern **countries** in a manner which responds **to** and promotes positive change. Exchanges **in** technical and managerial fields, establishment of co-operative training **programmes**, expansion of educational, scientific and cultural exchanges all offer possibilities which have not yet been exhausted;
- equally important will be to **integrate Eastern European** countries more fully into **efforts to meet** the social, **environmental** and technological challenges of the modern world, where common interests should **prevail**. In accordance with our concern for global challenges, we will seek to engage Eastern **countries** in **co-ordinated strategies** in areas such as the environment, terrorism, and drugs. Eastern **willingness** to participate **constructively** in **dealing** with such challenges will help **further** co-operation in other areas as well;
- East-West understanding **can** **be** expanded only if our respective **societies** gain increased knowledge **about** one *another* and communicate **effectively**. To **encourage** an increase of Soviet and **Eastern** studies in universities of our **countries** and of corresponding studies in **Eastern** countries, we are prepared to establish a Fellowship/Scholarship programme to promote the study of our democratic institutions, with candidates being invited from Eastern as well as Western Europe and North America.

### Global Challenges

29. Worldwide developments which affect our security interests **are** legitimate **mat-  
ters** for consultation and, where appropriate, co-ordination among us. Our security is to **be** seen in a context broader than **the** protection from war alone.

30. Regional conflicts continue to be of major concern. The **co-ordinated** approach of Alliance members recently has helped toward settling some of the world's most dangerous and long-standing disputes. We hope that the Soviet Union will increasingly work with us in positive and practical steps towards diplomatic solutions to those conflicts that continue to preoccupy the international community.

31. We will seek to contain the newly **emerging** security threats and **destabilizing consequences resulting** from the uncontrolled spread and **application** of **modern** military technologies.

32. **In the spirit** of **Article 2** of the Washington Treaty, we will increasingly need to address worldwide problems which have a bearing on our security, **particularly** environmental **degradation, resource conflicts** and **grave** economic **disparities**. We **will** seek to do so in **the appropriate** multilateral  **fora, in the** widest possible **co-operation** with other **States**.

33. We will each **further** develop our close **co-operation** with **the** other industrial **democracies** **akin to us** in **their objectives and policies**.

34. We will redouble our efforts in a **reinvigorated** United Nations, strengthening **its** role in conflict **settlement** and peacekeeping, and in its **larger** endeavours for world **peace**.

### Our "Third Dimension"

35. Convinced of the vital **need** for **International** **co-operation** in **science** and technology, **and** of its **beneficial** effect on global security, we have for several **decades** maintained **Alliance** programmes of **scientific co-operation**. **Recognizing the importance** of **safeguarding the environment** we have also **co-operated, in the Committee** on the Challenges of **Modern Society**, on **environmental** matters. These **activities** have demonstrated the **broad range** of our common **pursuits**. We **intend** to **give** **more** impact to our **programmes** with new **initiatives** in these areas.

### The Future of the Alliance

36. We, **the** leaders of, **16** **free** and **democratic** countries, have dedicated ourselves to the **goals** of the **Alliance** and are **committed** to **work** in unison for their continued **fulfilment**.

37. At this time of unprecedented promise in international affairs, we will respond **to** the hopes **that** it offers. The Alliance will continue to serve as the cornerstone of our **security, peace and freedom**. **Secure** on this foundation, **we** will reach **out** to those who are willing to join us in shaping a **more** stable and peaceful **international** environment in the service of our societies,

**ANNEX II**

**A COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT OF  
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT**

**ADOPTED BY  
HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT  
AT THE MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL  
IN BRUSSELS  
ON 29<sup>TH</sup> AND 30<sup>TH</sup> MAY 1989**

## I. INTRODUCTION

1. **The overriding objective of the Alliance is to preserve peace in freedom, to prevent war, and to establish a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe. The Allies' policy to this end was set forth in the Harmel Report of 1967. It remains valid. According to the Report, the North Atlantic Alliance's "first function is to maintain adequate military strength and political solidarity to deter aggression and other forms of pressure and to defend the territory of member countries if aggression should occur". On that basis, the Alliance can carry out "its second function, to pursue the search for progress towards a more stable relationship in which the underlying political issues can be solved". As the Report observed, military security and a policy aimed at reducing tensions are "not contradictory, but complementary". Consistent with these principles, Allied Heads of State and Government have agreed that arm control is an integral part of the Alliance's security policy.**

2. **The possibilities for fruitful East-West dialogue have significantly improved in recent years. More favourable conditions now exist for progress towards the achievement of the Alliance's objectives. The Allies are resolved to grasp this opportunity. They will continue to address both the symptoms and the causes of political tension in a manner that respects the legitimate security interests of all states concerned.**

3. **The achievement of the lasting peaceful order which the Allies seek will require that the unnatural division of Europe, and particularly of Germany, be overcome, and that, as stated in the Helsinki Final Act, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states and the right of peoples to self-determination be respected, and that the rights of all individuals, including their right of political choice, be protected. The members of the Alliance accordingly attach central importance to further progress in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process, which serves as a framework for the promotion of peaceful evolution in Europe,**

4. **The CSCE process provides a means to encourage stable and constructive East-West relations by increasing contacts between people, by seeking to ensure that basic rights and freedoms are respected in law and practice, by furthering political exchanges and mutually beneficial cooperation across a broad range of endeavours, and by enhancing security and openness in the military sphere. The Allies will continue to demand full implementation of all the principles and provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, the Madrid Concluding Document, the Stockholm Document, and the Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting. The last document marks a major advance in the CSCE process and should stimulate further beneficial changes in Europe.**

5. The basic goal of the Alliance's arms control policy is to enhance security and stability at the lowest **balanced** level of forces and armaments consistent with the **requirements of the strategy of deterrence. The Allies are committed to achieving continuing progress** towards **all** their arms control **objectives**. The further development of the **Comprehensive** Concept is **designed** to assist **this** ensuring an integrated approach covering both **defence** policy and arms control **policy**: these **are** complementary and interactive. This work also **requires full** consideration of the **interrelationship** between arms control objectives<sup>8</sup> and **defence requirements** and how various arms control measures, separately and in conjunction with each **other**, can strengthen Alliance security. **The** guiding principles and basic objectives which have so far governed the arms control policy of the Alliance **remain** valid. **Progress** in achieving these objectives is, of course, affected by a number of factors; Those include the overall state of **East-West** relations, the military **requirements** of the Allies, **the** progress of existing and **future** arms control negotiations, and developments in the CSCE process. **The further** development and implementation of a comprehensive concept of arms control and **disarmament** will **take** place against this background.

## II. EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND ARMS CONTROL

6. The Alliance continues to seek a just and stable peace in Europe in which all states **can** enjoy **undiminished** security at the minimum **necessary** levels of forces and armaments and all individuals can exercise their basic rights and freedoms, **Arms control alone** cannot resolve longstanding political differences between East and West nor guarantee a stable peace. Nonetheless, achievement of **the Alliance's goal** will **require** substantial advances in arms control, as well as more fundamental changes in political relations.' Success in arms control, in addition to enhancing military security, can encourage improvements in the **East-West** political dialogue and thereby contribute to the achievement of broader Alliance objectives.

7. To increase security and stability in Europe, the Alliance has consistently pursued every opportunity for effective arms control. The Allies are committed to this policy, independent of any changes that may occur in the climate of East-West relations. Success in arms control, however, continues to depend not on our own efforts alone, but also on Eastern and particularly Soviet readiness to work constructively towards mutually **beneficial** results.

8. The immediate past has witnessed **unprecedented** progress in the field of arms control, **In** 1986 the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) agreement **created** an innovative system of confidence and security-building measures, **designed** to

promote military transparency and **predictability**. To date, these have been satisfactorily **implemented**. The 1987 INF **Treaty** marked **another** major step forward because it eliminated a **whole** class of **weapons**, it established the principle of **asymmetrical** reductions, and provided for a **stringent verification regime**. Other **achievements** include the establishment **in** the United States and the Soviet Union of nuclear risk reduction centres, the US/Soviet agreement on prior notification of ballistic missile launches, and the conduct of the Joint **Verification** Experiment in connection with continued US/Soviet negotiations on nuclear **testing**.

9. **In** addition to agreements already reached, there has been substantial progress in the START negotiations which are intended to reduce radically strategic nuclear **arsenals and** eliminate destabilising offensive capabilities. The Paris Conference on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons has **reaffirmed** the authority of the **1925** Geneva Protocol and given powerful political impetus to the negotiations in Geneva for a global, comprehensive and effectively **verifiable** ban on chemical weapons. New distinct negotiations within **the framework** of the CSCE **process** have now begun in Vienna: one on conventional armed **forces** in Europe between the 23 **members** of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty **Organization** (WTO) and one on confidence- and security-building measures (**CSBMs**) **among all 35 signatories** of the **Helsinki Final Act**.

10. There has also been substantial progress on other matters important to the **West**. Soviet troops have left Afghanistan. There has been movement toward the **resolution of some**, although not all, of the **remaining** regional conflicts in which the Soviet Union is involved. The observance of human rights in the Soviet Union **and** in some of **the** other **WTO** countries has **significantly** improved, even if serious deficiencies remain. The **recent** Vienna **CSCE** Follow-up meeting succeeded in setting new, higher standards **of** conduct for participating states and should **stimulate further progress** in the CSCE process. A **new** intensity of dialogue, particularly at high level, between East and West opens new **opportunities** and testifies to the Allies' commitment to resolve the fundamental problems that **remain**.

11. The Alliance does not claim **exclusive** responsibility for this favourable evolution in East-West relations. In recent years, the East **has** become more responsive and flexible. Nonetheless, the Alliance's **contribution** has clearly **been fundamental**. Most of the achievements to **date**, which have **been described** above, **were** inspired by initiatives by **the Alliance** or its members. The Allies' political solidarity, commitment to defence, patience and creativity in negotiations overcame initial obstacles **and** brought its efforts to fruition. It **was** the Alliance that drew up the basic blueprints for East-West progress and has since **pushed them** forward towards realisation. In particular, the concepts of stability, reasonable **sufficiency**, asymmetrical reductions, concentration on the most offensive equipment, rigorous **verification**, transparency, a single zone from **the** Atlantic to **the** Urals, and **the** balanced **and** comprehensive nature **of** the CSCE process, **are** **inspired**.

12. **Prospects are** now brighter than ever before **for** lasting, qualitative improvements in **the East-West** relationship. **There** continue to be clear signs of change in the internal and **external** policies of the Soviet Union and of **some** of its Allies. The Soviet **leadership** has stated that ideological competition should play no part in inter-state **relations**. Soviet **acknowledgement** of serious **shortcomings** in its past approaches to international as well as domestic issues **creates opportunities for progress on fundamental** political problems.

13. At **the same** time, serious concerns remain. The ambitious Soviet reform **programme**, which the **Allies welcome**, will take many **years** to complete. Its **success cannot be taken for granted** given the **magnitude** of the problems it faces **and the resistance** genera& In **Eastern** Europa, progress in **constructive reform is** still **uneven** and the extent of these reforms remains to be determined. Basic human **r.ights** still need to be **firmly** anchored in law and **practice, though** in **some** Warsaw **Pact** countries improvements are underway. Although the **WTO** has **recently** announced and begun **unilateral** reductions in **some** of its **forces**, the **Soviet** Union continues to deploy military forces and to maintain a pace of **military** production in excess of **legitimate defensive requirements**. Moreover, the **geo-strategic** realities favour the geographically contiguous Sovietdominated **WTO** as against the **geographically** separated democracies of the North **Atlantic Alliance**. It **has** long been an **objective** of the **Soviet** Union to weaken the links between the European and North **American members** of the Alliance.

14. We **face** an **immediate future** that is promising but still **uncertain**. The **Allies** and the East face both a **challenge and an** opportunity to capitalise on present conditions **in** order to **increase** mutual security. The **progress** recently made in East-West **relations** has **given** now impetus to **the arms** control **process** and has enhanced the possibilities of achieving **the Alliance's arms** control objectives, which complement the other **elements of the** Alliance's **security policy**.

### III. PRINCIPLES OF ALLIANCE SECURITY

15. Alliance security policy aims to **preserve** peace in freedom by **both** political means and the maintenance of a **military** capability sufficient to prevent war and to provide for effective defence. The fact **that** the Alliance has for forty years **safeguarded** peace in Europe **but witness** to the success of this policy.

16. Improved political relations and the **progressive** development of **cooperative structures** between **Eastern** and Western countries are important components of Alliance policy. They **can enhance mutual** confidence, reduce the risk of misunderstanding, ensure that there **are in place reliable arrangements** for crisis management so that tensions can be defused, **render** the situation in Europe more open and predictable, **and** encourage the development of wider **cooperation** in **all fields**.

17. In underlining the **importance** of these facts **for** the formulation of **Alliance** policy, the Allies **reaffirm that, as stated in the Harmel Report, the search for constructive dialogue and cooperation with** the countries of the East, including **arms control and disarmament**, is based on political solidarity and adequate military strength.

18. Solidarity among the **Alliance** countries is a **fundamental** principle of their security policy. It **reflects the** indivisible nature of their security. It is expressed by the **willingness** of **each** country to **share** fairly the risks, burdens and responsibilities of **the** common effort **as well** as its benefits. In particular, the presence in Europe of the United States' conventional and nuclear **forces and of Canadian forces demonstrates that North American and European** security interests **are** inseparably bound together.

19. From its inception the Alliance of **Western** democracies has been defensive in **purpose**. This will remain so. None of our weapons will ever be used except in self-defence. The **Alliance** does not seek military superiority nor will **it** ever do so. Its aim has always **been** to prevent war **and any** form of coercion and intimidation.

20. Consistent with the **Alliance's** defensive **character**, its strategy is one of deterrence. Its objective is to convince a potential aggressor **before** he **acts** that **he is confronted with** a risk that outweighs **any** gain - **however** great - he might hope to secure **from** his aggression. The purpose of this strategy defines **the** means needed for its implementation.

21. In **order** to fulfil its **strategy**, the **Alliance** must be capable of responding **appropriately** to **any** aggression and of **meeting** its **commitment to** the defence of the **frontiers** of its **members' territory**. For the foreseeable future, **deterrence** requires an appropriate mix of adequate and **effective** nuclear and conventional forces which will continue to **be kept** up to date when **necessary**; for **it** is only by their evident and perceived capability for **effective** use that such **forces and weapons deter**.

22. Conventional forces **make** an essential contribution **to** deterrence. **The** elimination of asymmetries between the conventional forces of East and West in Europe **would** be a major breakthrough, bringing **significant benefits** for stability and security. Conventional defence alone cannot, however, **ensure** deterrence. Only the nuclear element can confront **an aggressor** with **an unacceptable** risk and thus plays an indispensable role in our current **strategy** of war prevention.

23. **The** fundamental purpose of nuclear forces - both strategic and sub-strategic - is **political**: to **preserve** the peace and to prevent any kind of war. Such forces contribute to **deterrence** by demonstrating that the Allies **have** the military capability **and** the political will to use them, if necessary, in response to **aggression**. Should aggression occur, **the** aim would be to **restore deterrence** by inducing the aggressor to reconsider his decision, to terminate his attack **and** to **withdraw and thereby to restore** the territorial **integrity** of the Alliance,

24. Conventional and nuclear forces, **therefore**, perform **different** but **complementary** and mutually reinforcing roles. **Any perceived** inadequacy in **either** of those two elements, or the impression that conventional forces could **be** separated **from** nuclear, or **sub-strategic from strategic nuclear** forces, might **lead** a potential **adversary to conclude** that the risks of launching **aggression** might be calculable and **acceptable**. No single element <sup>can</sup>, **therefore**, be **regarded** as a substitute compensating for **deficiencies** in **any other**.

25. For the foreseeable future, **there** is no **alternative** strategy for the **prevention** of war. **The implementation** of this strategy will continue to ensure **that** the security interests of **all Alliance** members are fully safeguarded. **The principles underlying** the strategy of **deterrence are** of enduring validity, **Their practical** expression in **terms of the size**, structure and deployment of forces is bound to **change**. As in the past, those elements will continue to evolve in **response to changing** international circumstances, technological progress and developments in the **scale of the threat** - in particular, in the posture and capabilities of the **forces of the Warsaw Treaty Organization**.

26. Within this overall framework, strategic nuclear **forces** provide the ultimate guarantee of deterrence for **the Allies**. **They** must be capable of inflicting **unacceptable damage** on an **aggressor** state even **after it** has carried out a first **strike**. Their number, range, survivability and **penetration** capability **need to ensure** that a potential aggressor cannot **count** on limiting the **conflict** or **regarding** his own territory as a sanctuary, **The** strategic nuclear forces of the United States provide **the cornerstone** of deterrence for the Alliance as a whole. **The independent** nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France fulfil a deterrent role of their own and contribute to **the overall deterrence strategy of the Alliance** by complicating the planning and risk assessment of a potential aggressor.

27. **Nuclear** forces below **the strategic** level provide an essential political and military linkage between conventional and strategic forces **and, together with the** presence of Canadian and United States **forces** in Europe, between the European and North **American members** of the Alliance. The **Allies'** substrategic nuclear forces are not designed to compensate for **conventional imbalances**. The levels of such forces in **the** integrated military **structure nevertheless** must take into account the threat, both conventional and **nuclear**, with which **the** Alliance is faced. Their role is to **ensure** that there are no circumstances in which a potential aggressor might discount the prospect of nuclear retaliation in **response** to military action, Nuclear forces below the strategic level thus make **an** essential contribution to deterrence.

28. The wide deployment of such **forces among** countries participating in the integrated military structure **of** the Alliance, as well **as** the **arrangements** for consultation in the nuclear **area** among the Allies concerned, demonstrates solidarity and willingness to share nuclear roles and responsibilities. It thereby helps to reinforce deterrence.

29. Conventional forces contribute to deterrence by demonstrating **the Allies'** will to defend **themselves and** by minimising the **risk** that a potential aggressor could anticipate a quick **and** easy **victory** or limited territorial gain **achieved** solely by conventional means.

**30. They must thus be able to respond appropriately and to confront the aggressor immediately and as far forward as possible with the necessary resistance to compel him to end the conflict and to withdraw or face possible recourse to the use of nuclear weapons by the Allies. The forces of the Allies must be deployed and equipped so as to enable them to fulfil this role-at all times. Moreover, since the Alliance depends on reinforcements from the North American continent, it must be able to keep open sea and air lines of communication between North America and Europe.**

**31. All member countries of the Alliance strongly favour a comprehensive, effectively verifiable, global ban on the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons. Chemical weapons represent a particular case, since the Alliance's overall strategy of war prevention, as noted earlier, depends on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional weapons. Pending the achievement of a global ban on chemical weapons, the Alliance recognises the need to implement passive defence measures, A retaliatory capability on a limited scale is retained in view of the Soviet Union's overwhelming chemical weapons capability.**

**32. The Allies are committed to maintaining only the minimum level of forces necessary for their strategy of deterrence, taking into account the threat. There is, however, a level of forces, both nuclear and conventional, below which the credibility of deterrence cannot be maintained. In particular, the Allies have always recognised that the removal of all nuclear weapons from Europe would critically undermine deterrence strategy and impair the security of the Alliance.**

**33. The Alliance's defence policy and its policy of arms control and disarmament are complementary and have the same goal: to maintain security at the lowest possible level of forces. There is no contradiction between defence policy and arms control policy. It is on the basis of this fundamental consistency of principles and objectives that the comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament should be further developed and the appropriate conclusions drawn in each of the areas of arms control.**

#### **IV. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT: PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES**

**34. Our vision for Europe is that of an undivided continent where military forces only exist to prevent war and to ensure self-defence, as has always been the case for the Allies, not for the purpose of initiating aggression or for political or military intimidation. Arms control can contribute to the realisation of that vision as an integral part of the Alliance's security policy and of our overall approach to East-West relations.**

**35. The goal of Alliance arms control policy is to enhance security and stability. To this end, the Allies' arms control initiatives seek a balance at a lower level of forces and armaments through negotiated agreements and, as appropriate, unilateral actions, recognising that**

arms control agreements are only possible when the negotiating partners share an interest in achieving a mutually satisfactory result. The Allies' arms control policy seeks to remove destabilising asymmetries in forces or equipment. It also pursues measures designed to build mutual confidence and to reduce the risk of conflict by promoting greater transparency and predictability in military matters.

36. In enhancing security and stability, arms control can also bring important additional benefits for the Alliance. Given the dynamic aspects of the arms control process, the principles and results embodied in one agreement may facilitate other arms control steps. In this way arms control can also make possible further reductions in the level of Alliance forces and armaments, consistent with the Alliance's strategy of war prevention. Furthermore, as noted in Chapter II, arms control can make a significant contribution to the development of more constructive East-West relations and of a framework for further cooperation within a more stable and predictable international environment. Progress in arms control can also enhance public confidence in and promote support for our overall security policy.

### Guiding Principles for Arm Control

37. The members of the Alliance will be guided by the following principles:

- **Security:** Arms control should enhance the security of all Allies. Both during the implementation period and following implementation, the Allies' strategy of deterrence and their ability to defend themselves, must remain credible and effective. Arms control measures should maintain the strategic unity and political cohesion of the Alliance, and should safeguard the principle of the indivisibility of Alliance security by avoiding the creation of areas of unequal security. Arms control measures should respect the legitimate security interests of all states and should not facilitate the transfer or intensification of threats to third party states or regions,
- **Stability:** Arms control measures should yield militarily significant results that enhance stability. To promote stability, arms control measures should reduce or eliminate those capabilities which are most threatening to the Alliance. Stability can also be enhanced by steps that promote greater transparency and predictability in military matters. Military stability requires the elimination of options for surprise attack and for large-scale offensive action. Crisis stability requires that no state has forces of a size and configuration which, when compared with those of others, could enable it to calculate that it might gain a decisive advantage by being the first to resort to arms. Stability also requires measures which discourage destabilising attempts to re-establish military advantage through the transfer of resources to other types of armament. Agreements must lead to final results that are both balanced and ensure equality of rights with respect to security.

- **Verifiability:** Effective and reliable verification is a fundamental requirement for arms control agreements. If arms control is to be effective and to build confidence, the verifiability of proposed arms control measures must, therefore, be of central concern for the Alliance. Progress in arms control should be measured against the record of compliance with existing agreements. Agreed arms control measures should exclude opportunities for circumvention.

## Alliance Arms Control Objectives

38. In accordance with the above principles, the Allies are pursuing an ambitious arms control agenda for the coming years in the nuclear, conventional and chemical fields.

### Nuclear Forces

39. The INF Agreement represents a milestone in the Allies' efforts to achieve a more secure peace at lower levels of arms. By 1991, it will lead to the total elimination of all United States and Soviet intermediate range land-based missiles, thereby removing the threat which such Soviet systems presented to the Alliance. Implementation of the agreement, however, will affect only a small proportion of the Soviet nuclear armoury; and the Alliance continues to face a substantial array of modern and effective Soviet systems of all ranges. The full realisation of the Alliance agenda thus requires that further steps be taken.

### strategic Nuclear Forces

40. Soviet strategic systems continue to pose a major threat to the whole of the Alliance. Deep cuts in such systems are in the direct interests of the entire Western Alliance, and therefore their achievement constitutes a priority for the Alliance in the nuclear field.

41. The Allies thus fully support the United States objectives of achieving, within the context of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, fifty percent reductions in United States and Soviet strategic nuclear arms. United States proposals seek to enhance stability by placing specific restrictions on the most destabilising elements of the threat - fast flying ballistic missiles, throw-weight and, in particular, Soviet heavy ICBMs. The proposals are based on the need to maintain the deterrent credibility of the remaining United States strategic forces which would continue to provide the ultimate guarantee of security for the Alliance as a whole; and therefore on the necessity to keep such forces effective. Furthermore, the United States is holding talks with the Soviet Union on defence and space matters in order to ensure that strategic stability is enhanced.

## Sub-Strategic Nuclear Forces

42. **The Allies are committed to maintaining** only the minimum **number** of nuclear **weapons necessary** to support **their** strategy of **deterrence**. In line with this commitment, the **members** of the **integrated military structure** have **already** made **major** unilateral **cuts** in **their** **sub-strategic** nuclear **armoury**. **The number** of **land-based warheads** in Western Europe **has been reduced** by over one-third since 1979 to its lowest level in **over 20 years**. Updating where necessary of their **sub-strategic** systems would result in further reductions.

43. **The Allies** continue to face the direct **threat** posed to Europe by **the large numbers** of shorter-range nuclear missiles **deployed on Warsaw Pact** territory and which have been substantially upgraded in recent **years**. Major reductions in Warsaw Pact systems would be of **overall** value to Alliance security. **One** of the ways to achieve this aim would be by **tangible** and **verifiable** reductions of **American** and **Soviet** land-based nuclear missile systems of **shorter** range leading to equal **ceilings** at lower levels.

44. But the **sub-strategic** nuclear forces deployed by member countries of the Alliance are not principally a **counter** to similar systems operated by members of the **WTO**. As is explained in **Chapter III**, **sub-strategic** nuclear forces fulfil an essential **role** in overall **Alliance deterrence** strategy by ensuring that **there are** no circumstances in which a potential **aggressor might discount** nuclear retaliation in response to **his military** action.

45. The **Alliance reaffirms** its position that for the **foreseeable** future there is no alternative to the **Alliance's strategy** for the *prevention* of war, which is a **strategy** of **deterrence based** upon an appropriate mix of **adequate** and effective nuclear and **conventional** forces which will continue to be **kept** up to date when **necessary**. **Where** nuclear forces are concerned, land-, sea-, and air-based systems, including ground-based missiles, **in the present** circumstances and as far as can **be foreseen** will **be needed** in Europe.

46. In view of the huge superiority of **the** Warsaw Pact in terms of short-range nuclear **missiles**, the **Alliance** calls upon the Soviet Union to reduce **unilaterally** its short-range **missile systems** to the current levels within the integrated military structure.

47. The Alliance **reaffirms that** at **the** negotiations on conventional stability it pursues the objectives **of**:

- the establishment of a secure and **stable** balance of conventional forces at lower levels;
- the **elimination** of disparities prejudicial to stability and security; and
- **the elimination** as a matter of high priority of **the** capability for launching surprise attack **and** for initiating **large-scale** offensive action.

48. **In** keeping with its **arms** control objectives formulated in Reykjavik in 1987 **and reaffirmed** in **Brussels** in 1988, the **Alliance** states that one of its highest priorities **in nego-**

tiations with the East is reaching **an agreement** on conventional force **reductions** which would achieve **the** objectives above. In **this** spirit, the Allies will **make every** effort, as **evidenced** by the outcome of the May 1989 Summit, to bring these conventional negotiations to **an early** and satisfactory conclusion. **The** United States has **expressed** the hope that this could be achieved within six to twelve months. **Once implementation** of such **an agreement** is underway, the United States, in consultation with the Allies **concerned**, is prepared to **enter** into negotiations to achieve a **partial** reduction of **American** and Soviet land-based nuclear **missile** forces of shorter **range** to **equal** and **verifiable** levels. **With special reference** to the Western proposals on **CFE** tabled in Vienna, enhanced by the **proposals** by the **United States** at the May 1989 Summit, **the** Allies **concomitantly** proceed on **the** understanding that negotiated **reductions** leading to a level below **the** existing level of their **SNF missiles** will not be **carried** out until **the** results of those negotiations have been implemented. Reductions of Warsaw Pact **SNF** systems should **be carried** out **before** that date.

49. As **regards** the **sub-strategic** nuclear forces of the members of the integrated military **structure**, their level and characteristics **must be** such that they can perform their deterrent role in a credible way **across the required** spectrum of ranges, taking into account **the** threat - both conventional and nuclear - with which the Alliance is faced. **The** question concerning the introduction and deployment of a follow-on system for **the** Lance **will be dealt with** in 1992 in the **light** of overall security **developments**. While a decision for national authorities, the Allies **concerned** recognise the value of the continued funding by **the** **United States** of research and **development** of a follow-on for the existing **Lance short-range** missile, in order to preserve their options in this respect.

## Conventional Forces

50. As set out in the March 1988 Summit **statement** and in the **Alliance's November 1988** data initiative, the Soviet Union's military presence in Europe, at a level **far in excess** of its needs for self-defence, directly challenges our security as well as our aspirations for a peaceful order in Europe. Such excessive force levels **create the** risk of political **intimidation** or **threatened aggression**. As long as they exist, they present **an** obstacle to better political relations between all **states** of Europe. The challenge to security is, **moreover**, not only a matter of the numerical superiority of **WTO** forces. **WTO** tanks, artillery and **armoured troop carriers are** concentrated in large formations and deployed in such a way as to give the **WTO** a capability for surprise attack and large-scale offensive action. Despite the most welcome publication by the **WTO** of its assessment of the military **balance** in Europe, there is still considerable secrecy and uncertainty about its actual capabilities **and** intentions.

51. In **addressing** these **concerns**, the Allies' primary objectives **are** to establish a **secure** and stable **balance** of conventional forces in Europe at lower levels, while at the same time creating greater openness about military organisation and activities in Europe.

**52.** In the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) talks between the 23 members of the two **alliances**, the Western Allies are **proposing**:

- reductions to an **overall** limit on the total holdings of armaments in Europe, concentrating on **the** most threatening systems, **i.e.** those capable of seizing and **holding territory**;
- a limit on the **proportion** of those total holdings belonging to **any one** country in Europe (since the security and stability of Europe **require** that no **state** exceed its legitimate needs for self-defence);
- a **limit** on stationed forces (thus **restricting** the forward deployment and concentration of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe); and,
- **appropriate numerical** sublimitation forces which will apply simultaneously throughout **the Atlantic to the** Urals area

**These** measures, taken together, will necessitate deep cuts in the **WTO** conventional **forces** which most threaten the Alliance. The resulting reductions will have to take place in such a way **as to prevent circumvention, e.g.** by ensuring that the armaments reduced are **destroyed** or **otherwise** disposed of. **Verification measures** will be **required** to ensure that all **states have confidence that entitlements are** not exceeded

53. These measures alone, **however**, will not guarantee stability. The **regime** of **reductions** will have to be backed up by additional measures which should include measures of transparency, notification and constraints applied to the deployment, storage, movement and **levels of readiness** and availability of conventional forces.

**54.** In the CSBM negotiations, the Allies aim to maintain the **momentum created** by the **successful** implementation of the Stockholm Document by proposing a comprehensive package of measures to improve:

- transparency about military organisation,
- **transparency** and predictability of military activities,
- contacts and communication,

and have also proposed **an exchange of views** on military **doctrine** in a seminar setting.

**55.** The implementation of the Allies' proposals in the CFE negotiations and of their proposals for further confidence - and security-building measures would achieve a quantum improvement in **European** security. This would have important and positive consequences for Alliance policy both in the field of defence and arms control. The outcome of the CFE

negotiations would provide a framework for determining the future Alliance force structure required to perform its fundamental task of preserving peace in freedom. In addition, the Allies would be willing to contemplate further steps to enhance stability and security if the immediate CFE objectives are achieved - for example, further reductions or limitations of conventional armaments and equipment, or the restructuring of armed forces to enhance defensive capabilities and further reduce offensive capabilities.

56. The Allies welcome the declared readiness of the Soviet Union and other WTO members to reduce their forces and adjust them towards a defensive posture and await implementation of those measures. This would be a step in the direction of redressing the imbalance in force levels existing in Europe and towards reducing the WTO capability for surprise attack. The announced reductions demonstrate the recognition by the Soviet Union and other WTO members of the conventional imbalance, long highlighted by the Allies as a key problem of European security.

## Chemical Weapons

57. The Soviet Union's chemical weapons stockpile poses a massive threat. The Allies are committed to conclude, at the earliest date, a worldwide, comprehensive and effectively verifiable ban on all chemical weapons.

58. All Alliance states subscribe to the prohibitions contained in the Geneva Protocol for the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. The Paris Conference on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons reaffirmed the importance of the commitments made under the Geneva Protocol and expressed the unanimous will of the international community to eliminate chemical weapons completely at an early date and thereby to prevent any recourse to their use.

59. The Allies wish to prohibit not only the use of these abhorrent weapons, but also their development, production, stockpiling and transfer, and to achieve the destruction of existing chemical weapons and production facilities in such a way as to ensure the undiminished security of all participants at each stage in the process. Those objectives are being pursued in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. Pending agreement on a global ban, the Allies will enforce stringent controls on the export of commodities related to chemical weapons production. They will also attempt to stimulate more openness among states about chemical weapons capabilities in order to promote greater confidence in the effectiveness of a global ban.

## V. CONCLUSIONS :

### **Arms Control and Defence Interrelationships**

60. The **Alliance** is committed to pursuing a **comprehensive** approach to security, embracing both arms control and disarmament, and defence. It is important, **therefore**, to **ensure** that **interrelationships** between **arms control issues** and defence requirements and amongst the various arms control areas are fully considered. Proposals in **any** one area of **arms control must take account** of the **implications for Alliance interests** in general and **for other negotiations**. This is a **continuing** process.

61. It is **essential that defence** and arms control objectives **remain** in harmony in **order** to **ensure their** complementary contribution to the goal of maintaining security at the **lowest** balanced level of **forces** consistent with **the requirements** of the **Alliance strategy** of war **prevention**, acknowledging that changes in the **threat**, new technologies, and new political **opportunities** affect options in both fields. Decisions on **arms control matters** must fully **reflect the requirements** of the Allies' strategy of deterrence. Equally, **progress** in arms control **is relevant** to **military** plans, which **will have to be developed** in the full knowledge of the **objectives** pursued in **arms control negotiations** and to **reflect**, as necessary, the **results achieved therein**.

62. **In each area of** arms control, **the Alliance** seeks to enhance stability and security. The **current negotiations** concerning strategic nuclear **systems, conventional** forces and chemical **weapons are**, however, **independent** of one **another**: the **outcome** of **any** one of **these negotiations** is not contingent on **progress** in others. However, they **can influence** one **another**: criteria established and **agreements** achieved in one **area** of arms control may **be relevant** in other **areas and** hence facilitate **overall** progress. These could **affect** both arms control possibilities and the forces *needed* to **fulfil** Alliance strategy, as well as help to contribute **generally** to a more **predictable** military **environment**.

63. The **Allies seek** to manage **the** interaction among **different arms control** elements by ensuring **that** the development, pursuit and **realisation** of their arms control objectives in individual **areas** are fully consistent both with each other and with the Alliance's guiding

**principles** for effective arms control, For example, the way in which START limits and **sub-limits are applied in detail** could **affect** the **future** flexibility of the **sub-strategic** nuclear **forces** of **members of the integrated military** structure. A CFE agreement would by itself **make** a **major contribution** to stability. **This** would be significantly **further enhanced** by the **achievement** of a **global** chemical **weapons** ban. **The development** of **confidence- and security-building measures** could influence the stabilising measures **being considered** in connection with the Conventional Forces in **Europe** negotiations and **vice versa**. **The removal** of the imbalance in conventional **forces** would **provide scope** for further **reductions** in the **sub-strategic nuclear forces** of **members** Of the integrated **military structure**, though it would not obviate the need for such forces. Similarly, this might make possible **further arms control steps** in the **conventional field**.

64. This report establishes the overall conceptual **framework** within which **the** Allies will **be seeking** progress in each area of arms **control**. **In** so doing, their **fundamental** aim will be **enhanced security at** lower levels of **forces** and **armaments**. Taken as a whole, the Allies' arms control agenda constitutes a coherent and **comprehensive** approach to the enhancement of **security and** stability. It is ambitious, but we are confident that - with a **constructive response** from the **WTO states** - it can be fully **achieved** in the coming **years**. **In pursuing** this **goal**, the Alliance recognises **that it** cannot afford to build its security upon **arms control results expected** in the **future**. The **Allies** will **be prepared**, however, to draw **appropriate consequences** for their own **military posture** as they **make concrete progress** through arms control towards a significant **reduction** in the **scale** and quality of the **military threat** they face. Accomplishment of the Allies' **arms** control agenda would not only bring **great benefits** in **itself**, but could also lead to **the** expansion of cooperation with the **East** in other **areas**. The arms control **process** itself is, moreover, dynamic; as and when the Alliance reaches agreement in each of the **areas set** out above, **so** further prospects for arms control may **be opened** up and further **progress made** possible.

65. As **noted** earlier, the Allies' vision for **Europe** is that of an **undivided** continent **where** military **forces** only **exist** to **prevent** war and to ensure **self-defence**; a **continent** which no longer lives in the shadow of **overwhelming** military forces and from which the **threat** of war has been **removed**; a continent **where the** sovereignty and territorial integrity of **all states** are respected and the rights of all individuals, including their right of **political** choice, **are protected**. This **goal** can only **be reached** by stages: **it** will **require** patient and **creative** endeavour. The **Allies** are **resolved** to continue working towards its attainment. The achievement of the Alliance's arms control objectives would **be** a major contribution towards the **realisation** of its vision.