



**General Assembly**

Distr.  
GENERAL

A/41/645  
29 September 1986  
ENGLISH  
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH/RUSSIAN

Forty-first session  
Agenda item 62 (n)

REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS AND DECISIONS  
ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS TENTH SPECIAL SESSION

Implementation of the recommendations and decisions  
of the tenth special session

Note by the Secretary-General

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## I. INTRODUCTION

In connection with paragraph 7 of General Assembly resolution 40/152 N of 16 December 1985, the Secretary-General has received a communication dated 18 September 1986 from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the text of which is reproduced below.

## II. INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM GOVERNMENTS

### UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

[Original: Russian]

[18 September 1986]

No. 661/TH

1. The situation in the world continues to be highly complex. Mountains of nuclear and all kinds of other weapons have been accumulated and yet the arms race is not slackening, but is proceeding at a faster tempo. There is now a danger that it may spread to outer space the stepped-up militarization by the United States and the entire NATO bloc is continuing. The situation is becoming ever more intolerable. The very existence of the human race is at stake, and the time has come for decisive and responsible decisions. Today it is not enough to maintain existing agreements? major practical steps are needed to combat militarism and bring about a change for the better in the development of world affairs.
2. In the face of the growing danger of a global catastrophe, the Soviet Union, as a Socialist State and as a nuclear Power, believes it is its lofty duty to do everything it can to preserve a peaceful future for the world. This belief also underlies the Soviet approach to disarmament negotiations within and outside the United Nations, which are regarded by the USSR as an important part of the struggle to stop the arms race and move on to real disarmament and the establishment of a reliable system of universal security. The way of avoiding the cul-de-sac of confrontations lies through negotiations, by means of which the ice of mutual distrust can be melted and practical results achieved.
3. The Soviet Union believes that a priority goal in arms limitation and disarmament negotiations is to break the deadlock in solving a crucial aspect of reducing the risk of nuclear war, namely, banning nuclear-weapon tests. This is the purpose of the decision of the USSR to extend its unilateral moratorium, which came into effect in August 1985, to 1 January 1987.
4. The Soviet Union believes that if the United States joined in the Soviet moratorium, there would be a real breakthrough towards halting the nuclear-arms race. This would create the necessary conditions for accelerating the conclusion of an agreement on the complete prohibition of tests. The Soviet Union is convinced that agreements on prohibiting nuclear tests could be achieved rapidly

and could be signed as early as this year at a Soviet-American summit meeting. This would be an extremely simple and at the same time effective measure, and in kind of prologue toward further progress in negotiations on nuclear weapons.

5. It is important now not to lose this historic opportunity and to set the entire system of negotiations in motion without delay with a view to preparing a draft treaty on the complete prohibition of nuclear tests. Efforts in this field should be carried out in all areas, and negotiations on any particular subject should not exclude or replace, but instead should supplement other negotiations.

6. The USSR, as previously, is prepared to initiate negotiations on the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests immediately, without linking it with any other questions, and also from the very outset to deal simultaneously at such negotiations with the questions of verification as well, so as to have a comprehensive agreement as soon as possible. For the Soviet Union, any variations are acceptable - bilateral Soviet - American negotiations, trilateral negotiations with the participation of the United Kingdom, or multilateral negotiations within the framework of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. This question should also be discussed more intensively in the United Nations, which has not yet exhausted its possibilities for solving the problem.

7. The Soviet Union's principled approach to questions of disarmament found concrete expression in the concept formulated at the Twenty-seventh Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on the establishment of a comprehensive system of international security and in the plan put forward on 15 January 1986 for the step-by-step, full and universal elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000.

8. The programme of nuclear disarmament submitted by the Soviet Union to the world community sets out schedules and guidelines for accelerating the attainment of practical agreements and gives a powerful impetus to the entire mechanism of disarmament negotiations. The wide-ranging proposals it contains forcefully state the case for a reformulation of the approach taken by all States to disarmament negotiations and of their conduct in the negotiating process. A prominent place is occupied by the call for the talks to be made more business-like and specific and to be so oriented as to take account of mutual interests and the search for compromise, while avoiding ultimatum.

9. Guided by its position of principle, the Soviet Union advocates the intensification of nuclear-disarmament negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament and at other international forums. It is prepared to continue making a constructive contribution to the search for mutually acceptable solutions.

10. At the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space-based weapons being held at Geneva on the initiative of the Soviet Union the constructive Soviet position is also formulated in accordance with the nuclear-disarmament programme involving the prohibition of space-strike weapons. Seeking to expedite the working out of effective agreements, the Soviet Union has placed on the negotiating table a whole package of wide-ranging proposals which are contingent on the immediate solution of the fundamental problems in all three areas of these talks.

11. A detailed account of the position taken by the Soviet Union and the compromise proposals put forward at the Soviet-American talks at Geneva on nuclear and space-based weapons and an objective analysis of the state of affairs at those talks are contained in an earlier letter from the Permanent Mission of the USSR to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, concerning General Assembly resolution 40/18, on bilateral nuclear-arm negotiations.
12. The Soviet Union attaches a major importance to the work of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, which is the only organ for multilateral negotiations in this area. The Soviet Union takes a most responsible approach to its participation in this forum and consistently calls for a strengthening of the authority of the Conference and its transformation into an effective forum for business-like negotiations on the whole range of questions being discussed by it, with a view to the conclusion of mutually acceptable agreements.
13. The activities of the Soviet Union at the Conference are part of the effort to avert the nuclear threat and to promote the implementation of the nuclear-disarmament programme put forward in the statement by M. S. Gorbachev of 15 January 1986. In the interest of international security, the consideration of nuclear-disarmament problems at the Conference needs to be intensified and an immediate start made in formulating practical measures to avert nuclear war and promote nuclear disarmament. The USSR is prepared to make a constructive contribution to the search for mutually acceptable solutions to these major problems in contemporary world politics.
14. The Soviet Union is firmly convinced that the conduct of multilateral negotiations and the elaboration of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests should be given the highest priority at the Conference. For this purpose, it is necessary to remove the artificial obstacle to effective work by the Conference in this area, and to demonstrate a political will. The Soviet Union, for its part, is making every effort to that end. For example, it has agreed to the most stringent monitoring of the prohibition of nuclear-weapon testing, including on-site inspection and the use of the latest advances in seismological technology.
15. The Soviet Union firmly believes that the Conference should give due consideration to the question of averting an arms race in outer space. That will not impede but, on the contrary, will facilitate a solution, at the Soviet-American talks, to the question of prohibiting space-strike weapons, in conjunction with the question of limiting and eliminating strategic nuclear weapons. Important progress in this direction would be possible with the formulation at the Conference of an international agreement to guarantee the integrity of artificial earth satellites, ban the development, testing and deployment of anti-satellite systems and eliminate any existing systems of this kind.
16. The USSR very actively supports the intensification of negotiations on chemical weapons, with a view to the urgent conclusion of an effective and verifiable convention on the prohibition and elimination of such weapons. As a practical contribution to progress in these talks, the Soviet Union recently submitted some proposals which would make the signing of such a convention possible either by the end of this year or in 1987.

17. The USSR believes that there are genuine prospects of appropriate international agreements being reached on other questions on the agenda of the Conference: prohibiting radiological weapons, ensuring the safe development of nuclear energy, strengthening security guarantees for the non-nuclear-weapon States, and working out a comprehensive disarmament programme.
18. The Soviet Union considers that the Conference on Disarmament can and should have a say in the matter of the limitation of conventional weapons and conventional armed forces.
19. The Conference, through its predecessor, the Disarmament Committee - brought into being a series of important international agreements in the field of arms limitation and disarmament. However, in recent times the practical results of the Conference have decreased considerably; for almost 10 years now, the Conference has not had a single disarmament agreement to its credit. The reason for this unfortunate situation is the unconstructive attitude of the United States and its closest allies, who are responsible for the present situation where the start of practical talks on the questions of the prevention of nuclear war, cessation of the nuclear arms race and the banning of nuclear-weapon tests has been blocked for many years. The absence from the Conference of talks on preventing the arms race from spreading into outer space is a result of the obstructionist line adopted by the Western countries which are striving to reduce the whole affair to a general discussion of that subject. Talks on the banning of chemical weapons have been dragging on for several years at the Conference primarily because the United States is putting artificial obstacles in their way. Instead of speeding up work on the Convention, the United States is active in another sphere, endeavouring to carry out its programme of chemical rearmament beginning with the production of binary chemical weapons.
20. The Soviet Union for its part will continue doing all it can to overcome the stagnation in the work of the Conference and to move towards the adoption of far-reaching decisions in the field of arms limitation and disarmament. Like most other participants in the Conference, the Soviet Union expects that, at this crucial time for mankind, the Conference will function more intensively and productively, and that it will: make a practical contribution to preventing nuclear war, limiting armaments and strengthening universal peace.
21. The position of the United States and other NATO countries at the Vienna Talks on Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments in Central Europe is out of step with the times. As everyone knows, no real progress has been made so far in these talks, and for a long time they have been at a standstill. This unsatisfactory state of affairs is the result of the persistence with which the United States and its NATO allies maintain their previous unrealistic position substituting arbitrary and tendentious demands for verification and monitoring for real measures to reduce and limit military forces and armaments.
22. Meanwhile, the necessary pre-conditions exist for the achievement of a possible understanding. A sound basis for this is afforded by the detailed draft of an agreement on an initial reduction by the Soviet Union and the United States in the land forces and armaments of both sides and related measures in central Europe

presented on 20 February 1986 by the socialist States participating in the talks. It contains new, constructive elements which pave the way for overcoming differences on a number of issues, including verification.

23. However, the NATO countries remain deaf to the realistic basis for achieving positive results proposed in Vienna by the socialist countries. Instead, the United States and NATO are relying on increasing their forces and armaments, which is incompatible with the aims of the talks.

24. The Soviet Union is interested in achieving positive results at the talks taking place in Vienna. But for that it is necessary for Western participants in these talks also to demonstrate an equal political will and understanding.

25. In order to achieve a radical breakthrough in reducing the level of military confrontation in Europe, the Soviet Union, along with other States members of the Warsaw Treaty, put forward in June of this year in Budapest, a programme for substantial reductions in all components of land forces and tactical air forces of European States and also of the corresponding forces and equipment of the United States and Canada stationed in Europe. The States members of the Warsaw Treaty are prepared to begin an objective discussion of the proposals contained in that programme at any international forum acceptable to all the participants. These proposals could be the subject of concrete discussions at the second stage of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. These States members of the Warsaw Treaty also deem it possible to convene for these purposes a special forum consisting of the States of Europe, the United States and Canada. Furthermore, they are prepared to widen the framework of the Vienna talks on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe through the inclusion of other European States and the corresponding modification of the terms of reference of those negotiations.

26. At the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, the Soviet side is doing everything it can to promote an early, successful conclusion of this Conference with concrete results. The Soviet Union, in co-operation with other participants at the Conference, has already done much to achieve agreement on such crucial questions as the non-use of force, notification of military exercises and troop movements, invitation of observers, and verification of compliance with the agreements reached. As a result, the overall situation at the Conference has changed for the better.

27. At the Conference, the Soviet side is also paying due attention to questions of verification and monitoring of the implementation of confidence-building measures. On the basis of its desire to make progress in the consideration of the unresolved problems facing the Conference, it believes that it is possible to accept the idea of inspections in order to monitor confidence-building measures. This would be done at the request of other participating States if suspicion arose regarding compliance with the confidence-building measures on which agreement has been reached.

28. All this clearly shows that the Soviet Union is demonstrating by concrete deeds its desire to achieve agreement at Stockholm. The Soviet side is entitled to

expect reciprocal steps from the NATO States. However, on a number of important questions which are being discussed at the Conference, the response of the Western participants is still patently inadequate. This applies, for example, to such problems as the limitation of the scale of military exercises.

29. The Soviet Union believes that a productive conclusion of the first stage of the Stockholm Conference would help strengthen confidence and security in Europe and create more favourable conditions for moving further to consider disarmament questions at the level of Europe as a whole.

30. By its practical actions at all negotiations on arms limitation and disarmament, questions without exception including those held outside the United Nations, the Soviet Union is clearly confirming that it has a fully responsible attitude and is setting an example of a realistic and mature approach to solving the cardinal problems of disarmament. It expresses the hope that realism and an understanding of the need for joint searches for ways of improving the international situation, for ending the senseless arms race and for eliminating nuclear weapons will also prevail in the position of the Western participants in those negotiations, and in the first place in that of the United States.