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REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS AND DECISIONS  
ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS TENTH SPECIAL SESSION

Verification in all its aspects

Report of the Secretary-General

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## I. INTRODUCTION

1. On 16 December 1985, the General Assembly adopted resolution 40/1520, the operative part of which read as follows:

"The General Assembly,

"...

"1. Calls upon Member States to increase their efforts towards achieving agreements on balanced, mutually acceptable, verifiable and effective arms limitation and disarmament measures;

"2. Invites all Member States, bearing in mind the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, to communicate to the Secretary-General not later than 15 April 1986, their views and suggestions on verification principles, procedures and techniques to promote the inclusion of adequate verification in arms limitation and disarmament agreements and on the role of the United Nations in the field of verification;

"3. Requests the Secretary-General to prepare and submit to the General Assembly at its forty-first session a report containing the views and suggestions of Member States;

"4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-first session an item entitled 'Verification in all its aspects' under the item entitled 'Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session: implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session'."

2. Pursuant to the above, a note verbale dated 3 February 1986 was sent to all Member States requesting their views and suggestions. The Secretary-General has to date received replies from Argentina, Austria, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, China, the German Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Mexico, the Netherlands (on behalf of the States members of the European Community), Norway, Sweden and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are reproduced in section II of the present report.

### If. REPLIES RECEIVED FROM GOVERNMENTS

#### ARGENTINA

[Original: Spanish]

[15 April 1986]

1. The Government of Argentina wishes to emphasize the importance and absolute applicability of the principle that any instrument in the field of disarmament must include adequate machinery for verification satisfactory to all States concerned.

/...

2. The verification procedures and techniques to be used must be determined in each case taking into account the objective, scope and nature of the instrument under negotiation.
3. It is important that the verification clauses shall be agreed on at the same time that the instrument in question is being negotiated so that the demand for prior settlement of this question does not constitute a pretext that might condition the beginning of the negotiations.
4. In this context, in order to ensure the effectiveness of any verification system, the Government of Argentina regards it essential that its structure should cover the following aspects :
  - (a) It must be absolutely free from any feature that might have a discriminatory effect. Its machinery must be based on equality of the parties' rights and obligations;
  - (b) It must provide for access by all parties to the verification machinery. Every State must have the full right to participate in international exchanges and to receive the resulting technological data without any discrimination, whether or not they contributed to such exchange, and to have access to the information in the verification systems based on national technical means.
5. Generally speaking, the verification provisions must be sufficient to guarantee the effectiveness of the treaty and should be aimed at establishing confidence in the application of its criteria.
6. The United Nations can facilitate and assist in the negotiation of verification measures and contribute to strengthening the necessary confidence in order to ensure their full effectiveness.

AUSTRIA

[Original : English]

{ 5 May 1986 }

1. Austria subscribes to the thesis that treaties in the field of disarmament and arms control should provide for a mutually agreed and sufficient formula for verification. Austria is aware, however, that even the most elaborate verification system will be unable to replace trust in the other party as the essential pre-condition for the conclusion of any treaty in the field of arms control and disarmament. As disarmament will be of vital importance to the future of mankind, the importance of verification is likely to increase.
2. Austria regrets that until now there is no agreed definition of the term "verification". It is however possible to distinguish two concepts related to the verification process, namely the challenge and the voluntary concept. Verification as a process of determining that a party is complying with its treaty obligations has valuable functions in that it deters non-compliance, promotes confidence-building and facilitates assessing the value of a treaty.

3. Verification of compliance has developed into the central issue in disarmament and arms limitation discussions between the two super-powers, which so far rely on national technical means available only to them.
4. Historical evidence from the record of bilateral experience shows that it is easier to verify a complete ban on a given weapons system than numerical limitations. Lack of precision in the wording of obligations in arms limitation treaties as well as of verification provisions can result in serious problems due to differing interpretations of treaty obligations. So far, no procedures have been developed on what steps should be taken when a violation is detected.
5. Multilateral arms control and disarmament agreements usually contain only weak provisions concerning verification, the latter component being separated from the political decision-making component.
6. Austria subscribes to the principles on verification enumerated in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (resolution S-10/2). Verification should be adequate, acceptable, appropriate, universal and non-discriminatory, and cause minimum interference.
7. Adequate verification will of course not imply 100 per cent verification, but should be able to detect beyond any reasonable doubt a violation of an agreement. Austria is aware that determining what is involved in "adequate" verification is the most controversial aspect of the issue.
8. Acceptability and appropriateness seem not to call for further comments. Universality would result in all parties participating in the verification process. As not all countries have the resources to participate directly, it is in this area that international organizations such as IAEA have been assigned an important role. Thought should be given to whether an enhanced role should be entrusted to the United Nations.
9. Before negotiating verification procedures, the capability and acceptability of verifying the obligations should be appreciated. This would involve a thorough and critical examination of the manifold factors and principles in the verification process. This would involve, for example, research into the verification issue in order to generate improved capabilities more amenable for acceptance.
10. It is only after having gathered in-depth information that verification measures could be best adapted to the purposes of the obligations that have been agreed upon.
11. In future, the role of the United Nations in the context of verification should be enhanced by strengthening its capacity to investigate allegations of non-compliance. Additional tasks could also be assigned to IAEA in areas for which the organization has already acquired substantial expertise.
12. The United Nations or IAEA could also offer assistance, advice and technical expertise to negotiators in any regional arms control and disarmament process.

BULGARIA

[Original: Russian]

[6 May 1986]

1. The People's Republic of Bulgaria regards removing the threat of nuclear war, curbing the arms race and preventing its extension into outer space as the most urgent tasks now facing mankind. In order to bring them to a successful conclusion, negotiations must be started without delay to conclude the relevant international agreements. The achievement of such specific agreements would significantly strengthen confidence among the parties to the negotiations.
2. Bulgaria feels that a political decision of States to enter into negotiations voluntarily and to undertake specific treaty commitments is the most solid guarantee that these commitments will be honoured. This also applies to agreements on arms limitation and disarmament. However, since they affect the most vital security interests of States, these agreements require additional guarantees that all participants will honour their commitments conscientiously, and that requires effective verification measures.
3. Bulgaria attaches great importance to the problems of verification and regards the establishment of a system of the strictest possible verification as an extremely important factor in the disarmament process. All parties to any disarmament agreement are equally concerned that the agreement should be strictly observed and that all participants can be absolutely confident that it will be. Bulgaria feels that the whole point of verification is that it should apply to implementation of real disarmament measures and to the observance of specific agreements in this area. Verification per se cannot be regarded as a disarmament measure. Hence, negotiations on verification must not precede the achievement of specific disarmament agreements and must not be made the pre-condition for the achievement of such agreements.
4. In Bulgaria's view, verification activity must be so organized as to help create a favourable political climate, avoid unnecessary confrontation and protect and stimulate the lawful - in terms of the treaty - activity of States. The purpose of verification is to guarantee mutual confidence in the observance of agreements and hence, so that no party's security should be jeopardized, to bolster and strengthen their awareness of the need for and usefulness of the disarmament measures taken.
5. The basic purpose of verification is to provide a mechanism for strengthening mutual confidence and understanding and for removing suspicion and fostering relations between countries. In accordance with this positive interpretation, Bulgaria feels that this purpose has two aspects. In its narrow sense, verification provides essential channels for clarifying uncertainties in the conduct of the parties and for solving a number of problems before they become too serious, and thereby creates confidence in the observance of the treaty and provides guarantees that nothing will threaten the security of the parties while it is in force. In a broader sense, verification strengthens the confidence of States in long-term security policy and in the sincerity of the other parties, and expands international co-operation on disarmament issues.

6. In such a delicate area as disarmament, respect for equality and equal security and non-infringement of the security of any party is an essential condition of verification and of the operation of verification bodies. In other words, to cite the text of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (resolution S-10/2), verification procedures must be "non-discriminatory" and " - not unduly interfere with the internal affairs of other States or jeopardize their economic and social development".
7. The only proper verification, in Bulgaria's view, is that which, first of all, is conceived within the framework of a specific arms limitation and disarmament agreement; secondly, is strictly consistent with the subject of the agreement, namely, genuine disarmament measures; and thirdly, does not go beyond its functions and competence as defined in the agreement. Verification must be an integral part of a disarmament agreement. It should not precede the establishment of specific legal norms containing obligations the performance of which is to be verified. The subject, scope, form and means of verification must be defined in the agreement itself or, to cite the text of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, "the form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement".
8. Bulgaria shares the view that verification activity, including the operation of verification bodies, may begin only when an agreement has entered into force and the parties have begun to fulfil their obligations. Hence verification must be carried out simultaneously with practical disarmament measures, and the combination of specific national technical means of verification and international forms of verification must be appropriate to the nature and scope of these measures. Verification that is not linked to its natural objective is legally meaningless and politically untenable. In this context Bulgaria feels that the forms and means of verification of the implementation of disarmament measures must be determined separately in each individual agreement, because a common standard is not possible.
9. The positive experience of the International Atomic Energy Agency in applying a safeguards system shows that the services machinery for such a verification system could be used in one way or another for verification of compliance with future agreements.
10. Bulgaria's peace-loving and constructive foreign policy is also reflected in its contribution to the solution of problems in the area of verification. The achievements of modern science and technology are turning verification problems into political ones and making their successful solution dependent solely on the political will of the parties. Bulgaria accordingly welcomes and supports the recent constructive proposals of the Soviet Union in this area.
11. Bulgaria will also continue to do everything in its power to help overcome the difficulties of disarmament verification in a constructive and mutually acceptable manner. The problem of verification, however, should not be used to put obstacles in the way of the international community's efforts to curb the destructive arms race, avert nuclear catastrophe and ensure real progress and disarmament.

BYELORUSSIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC

[Original: Russian]

[23 May 1986]

1. The Byelorussian SSR believes that the efforts of both the international community and individual States must be directed towards the elaboration of practical and effective measures to prevent nuclear war, avert an arms race in outer space, halt the arms race on Earth and achieve disarmament. Such measures are vitally and urgently necessary in view of the particularly acute nature of the military peril, especially with regard to the nuclearization of outer space, which threatens mankind with complete extinction. It is precisely the need to achieve those goals that determines the position of the Byelorussian SSR on all questions connected with verification measures in agreements on limitation of the arms race and disarmament.
2. Verification measures must facilitate the practical implementation of arrangements for limiting the arms race and bringing about disarmament. The need for the speediest possible elaboration and application of such arrangements takes on an additional dimension in view of the critical stage that the arms race has now reached: the development of military technology has already made the problem of monitoring armaments extremely difficult and has brought mankind right to the point beyond which the situation may become entirely impossible to control. It should be noted that the very States that attempt to pass themselves off as the main proponents of verification are at the same time stepping up the elaboration of types of weapons systems and methods of deployment that are less and less open to effective verification.
3. The Byelorussian SSR believes that all practical measures for arms limitation and disarmament must be reinforced by active and effective control and verification measures. The verification measures must at the same time be appropriate to the scope and nature of the obligations assumed by the parties.
4. Use should be made, subject to the actual terms of the agreement, of the best combination of various verification methods, through the utilization both of national technical means of verification and of International procedures, including on-site inspection when necessary. Experience gained in verifying the implementation of existing agreements regarding the limitation of the arms race confirms the indisputable effectiveness of national technical means. A further factor in favour of such means is that they are continuously becoming more sophisticated. In addition, supplementary arrangements to enhance the effectiveness of verification by national technical means can be elaborated and adopted if necessary. These would consist primarily of various notification procedures, as well as the exchange of quantitative data about arms. Other verification measures, up to and including on-site inspection, may also be adopted. If so, it is important that such measures should neither serve as a means for interference in the internal affairs of States nor have a detrimental effect on any of the parties involved.
5. This position is in full accordance with the Final Document of the first Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament (resolution S-10/2). This document unequivocally states that problems of verification and

adequate methods and procedures in this field should be examined and considered in the context of international negotiations on disarmament (para. 92). The Byelorussian SSR fully shares this view, and believes that demands for verification in isolation from real measures for arms limitation and disarmament are designed to impede efforts to move forward along the road to disarmament.

6. The position of the socialist States on questions of verification is consistent and constructive. They are no less interested than other Countries in being assured of the strict implementation of agreements. Verification measures that would provide such assurance constitute an important element of all their proposals on disarmament.

7. No State has contributed a more radical and far-reaching initiative on questions of verification than the Soviet Union, which has proposed a plan for general and complete disarmament under general and complete international control that also envisages the creation of an international verification organization.

8. The recent important proposals of the USSR on questions of verification, and particularly those included in the statement made by the General Secretary Of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, M. S. Gorbachev, on 15 January 1986, which contains a programme for the complete elimination of nuclear arms and other means of mass destruction (see A/41/97), will give new momentum to negotiations on arms limitation.

9. The constructive new proposals of the Soviet Union afford Opportunities for elaboration and implementation of the most radical verification measures in the course of the actual process of disarmament in its most important forms.

10. In particular, with regard to the conduct of a programme for the elimination of nuclear weapons, it appears expedient that special procedures should be worked out for eliminating them, as well as for the dismantling, conversion or elimination of the vehicles that launch them. Agreement needs to be reached regarding both the quantity of weapons to be eliminated at each stage and the places where they are to be destroyed, etc. Verification of weapons to be destroyed and subjected to limitation may be carried out both by the use of national technical means and through on-site inspection. Any other control measures are also possible.

11. In the event of a complete and comprehensive elimination of the nuclear arms in accordance with the programme proposed by the USSR, it will also be possible to establish universal international verification.

12. With regard to the cessation of nuclear weapons tests, the possibilities offered by national technical means of verification have long since rendered baseless any references to difficulties in verification. The new proposals of the USSR leave no ground for any speculative "arguments" of this sort. If the United States is finally prepared to halt all nuclear explosions, on a reciprocal basis with the USSR, effective verification of compliance with the moratorium may be fully ensured by the combined use of national technical means and international procedures, including on-site inspection if necessary. The USSR has proposed to the United States that a meeting of experts should be held for discussion of the problems involved in verifying a cessation of nuclear explosions, and that

agreement should be reached on arrangements for observers of the two countries to visit the locations of unexplained phenomena, on a reciprocal basis and on request, in order to remove any possible doubts as to whether they might be connected with nuclear explosions. The Soviet Union has expressed its willingness to take up the well-known proposal made by the group of six countries - if it is also accepted by the other side - concerning the provision of assistance in verifying the cessation of nuclear testing, including on-site inspection (see A/40/114-S/16921, annex).

13. It is essential for a final solution of the testing problem that agreement should be reached on the complete and comprehensive prohibition of nuclear arms tests. Any form of negotiations - bilateral, trilateral or multilateral within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament - may be used to achieve this objective and simultaneous attention may be devoted from the very outset of such negotiations to the solution of verification questions, in order that a comprehensive understanding may be reached in the shortest possible time.

14. With regard to the prohibition of space strike weapons, a ban on their production, testing and development should be subject to strict verification, including the opening of relevant laboratories for inspection.

15. With regard to the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons and of the industrial base for their production, it is essential that a timely announcement should be made to identify the sites of enterprises engaged in the production of chemical weapons, that such production should be halted and that a start should be made on the formulation of procedures for destruction of the corresponding production base and the elimination, shortly after the entry into force of the corresponding convention, of stocks of chemical weapons. All such measures must be carried out under strict controls, including international on-site verification. The controls should extend to both State and private enterprises. The aim of the new proposals of the USSR, put forward in April 1986 at the Conference on Disarmament, is to ensure effective verification of the prohibition of chemical weapons. The proposals are designed to ensure that systematic international on-site verification becomes a principal method of exercising international control over compliance with the basic provisions of the future convention.

15. With regard to the limitation and reduction of conventional weapons and armed forces, reasonable control measures are also possible. Such measures have been proposed by the Soviet Union in the framework of the Vienna Talks on Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments in Central Europe. The USSR's initiative of April 1986 concerning a significant reduction of all components of the land forces and tactical air forces of the European States, as well as those of the United States and Canada stationed in Europe, was accompanied by a proposal for the establishment of reliable verification at all stages of this process, both through the use of national technical means and with the help of international verification, including on-site inspection if necessary.

17. The overall Soviet view on the creation of an all-embracing system of international security envisages a strictly supervised reduction in the military potential of States to levels that are adequate and reasonable. The Byelorussian SSR considers verification within the framework of agreements on limitation of the arms race and disarmament to be an element of inter-State relations that positively promotes the security of States.

18. The main guarantee that the provisions of agreements will be fulfilled is the legal obligation upon the States that have concluded them. The political will of States to achieve disarmament that leads to the conclusion of the relevant agreements also determines their interest in complying with what has been agreed on-

19. Verification is thus NOT an end in itself. Its principal function is to ensure an effective solution of the problem of preventing nuclear war, averting an arms race in outer space, limiting weapons and bringing about disarmament in all areas.

20. The Byelorussian SSR's position is based on the premise that disarmament without verification is impossible, but also that verification without disarmament is meaningless.

CANADA

[Original: English]

[14 April 1986]

1. The Government of Canada submitted a comprehensive study on arms control and disarmament verification conducted by the Government of Canada, 1/ which is summarized below,
2. This document provides a detailed analysis of verification, an issue which the Government of Canada believes has become the single most important element in international arms control and disarmament negotiations.
3. The importance of verification centres on the fact that an arms control agreement is essentially a compromise in which each party bases part or all of its national security on the undertakings of other contracting parties rather than on its own military capabilities. All *such* agreements touch directly on the most sensitive aspects of national security. Consequently, reciprocal confidence that all parties will adhere to their obligations is essential; the more so when such agreements are negotiated and implemented in a context of political suspicion and mistrust. Verification, in simple terms, is the means by which such confidence is gained.
4. A starting point for any discussion of verification issues should be acceptance of the proposition that verification serves functions that are essential to the long-term success of the entire arms control and disarmament process. This fact has indeed already been clearly acknowledged by the international community, most notably in paragraphs 31, 91 and 92 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament (General Assembly resolution S-10/2).

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1/ Given the severe financial crisis facing the United Nations, Canada will circulate copies of its comprehensive study to all Member States and interested organizations. In these circumstances, Canada would request that only this letter be included as part of the report of the Secretary-General.

5. There is thus an international consensus that adequate and appropriate verification provisions form an essential element in all arms limitation and disarmament agreements.

6. The functions to be performed by verification are threefold: deterrence of non-compliance, confidence-building and treaty assessment. Verification is thus more than a matter of providing for a "police" function. It should help meet the need to institutionalize in the context of relations among States the kind of accepted rules, procedures and expectations as those that govern the conduct of relations among individuals in all civilized societies. Such rules and procedures do not presume bad faith or malevolent intent on the part of others, but they allow for such a possibility and provide a framework in which unjustified accusations could be authoritatively rebutted, misunderstandings clarified and resolved, and non-compliance objectively established.

7. In this connection, it should be emphasized that the verification process does not in itself address the issue of what can or should be done in the event of misconduct. No judicial function is involved. The political management of the consequences of demonstrated non-compliance is perhaps the ultimate, and most difficult and sensitive, problem in the whole arms control and disarmament process. The role of verification in this context is limited to providing, in the most comprehensive and objective way, data relevant to such behaviour. It thus can be valuable in limiting the scope for unjustified allegations and in providing a basis for reasoned and factually based decisions by the international community in instances where non-compliance is demonstrated.

8. It has been contended that the emphasis on verification has been used as a pretext for impeding or avoiding progress in the negotiation of agreements. Similarly, it has been said that verification means are also used as a pretext for the gathering of intelligence unrelated to the verification task.

9. Each of these criticisms reflects, in certain measure, an area of valid concern: about the utility of verification research not linked to specific agreements; about the political motivation that may underlie varying approaches to verification issues; and about the broad implications for the entire arms control and disarmament process of perhaps excessive concern with the perfectability of verification measures.

10. Nevertheless, Canadian experience and research with respect to verification questions indicate that intensive study of the verification issue cannot only allay many of these concerns but also facilitate the arms control and disarmament process. There are many initiatives that can be undertaken to prepare and develop a range of instruments - legal, institutional and technological - that could contribute to the potential for the verification of specific agreements. The work of the Conference on Disarmament's Group of Scientific Experts is a good example of this point. Its co-operative research into seismological techniques, despite the absence of a specific comprehensive test ban treaty, has advanced considerably the global capability for monitoring an eventual treaty.

11. General research into verification techniques also offers the promise that effective verification systems can be made less intrusive and, therefore, more acceptable to parties concerned about the potential intelligence-gathering capabilities of verification systems.

12. It has also been said that generic research into, and discussion of, verification is not productive. Such a view ignores the fact that the general principles of verification developed at the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, have applicability, in some degree, to all specific arms limitation issues. It also ignores the possibilities for developing general procedures and techniques that could then be applied in specific arms limitation contexts. For example, various procedures and techniques developed by IAEA have potential application elsewhere, including a Convention on chemical weapons. Attempts to reexamine and relate principles to the procedures and techniques involved in verification can be highly productive both in generating new ideas and solutions to specific problems and in overcoming obstacles in specific negotiations.

13. A review of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament (General Assembly resolution S-10/2), reveals several principles relating to verification. These include: (a) adequacy, (b) acceptability, (c) appropriateness, (d) universality, (e) verification methods and procedures in combination, (f) non-discrimination, (g) minimum interference, and (h) non-jeopardizing of economic and social development. It is the task of Governments and their negotiators to formulate verification provisions in conformity with these principles.

14. In the future, although it is expected that much attention will continue to focus on the bilateral arms control process, it is likely that the multilateral dimension will become increasingly significant. This reflects a number of realities: the need to deal with existing or potential weapons systems for which a large number of countries have a capability (e.g. chemical and biological weapons); the increasingly recognized interest in precluding or controlling weapons deployment in certain specified environments (e.g. the Antarctic, the sea-bed and outer space); and the growing recognition of the desirability in principle of universal commitments to agreed arms control measures ("Universality of disarmament agreements helps create confidence among States", Final Document, para. 40).

15. In this context, the experience of the United States and the Soviet Union in implementing bilateral agreements is of limited value and relevance. Each party to those agreements is to a large extent self-reliant for verification purposes; each party relies on its own personnel and technological resources, which remain under its own direct jurisdiction and control in the collection and interpretation of data. Nevertheless, in addition to the technologies that have been developed, the consultative procedures and collateral measures that the two parties have elaborated (e.g. in relation to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the SALT agreements) could be of considerable instructive value in the multilateral context.

16. For the resolution of some of the more difficult problems in the verification of multilateral agreements, however, the experience with bilateral agreements offers only partial guidance. At issue are such matters as: equitable sharing of rights, responsibilities and costs, the delegation of executive and operational responsibilities in ways that make the principles of acceptability, universality and non-discrimination operationally meaningful, and the effective co-ordination of procedures and techniques so as to ensure that the entire verification process is adequate, appropriate and minimally intrusive. Meeting these challenges will

require careful and imaginative institution-building and the creative elaboration of new international law.

17. At the conceptual level, a number of possible approaches can be envisaged. One possible approach, for example, might be for the parties to an agreement to delegate responsibility for data collection and interpretation to a selected group of countries possessing the relevant technological and other resources. In effect, much of the verification service would be obtained from those having the capability to perform it. Such an approach would need to involve a careful elaboration of agreed terms of access to information and agreed decision-making procedures for the purpose of taking action in the light of the interpreted data.

18. Other approaches proposed the notion of an international verification organization (IVO), an organization created and maintained specifically for the purpose of monitoring the implementation of arms control and disarmament agreements. An IVO could have "general" responsibilities, i.e. be responsible for conducting verification activities in relation to several different agreements. The 1978 proposal for an International Satellite Monitoring Agency (ISMA), which would rely on a specific type of technology (surveillance satellite), would seem to fall into this category. Or an IVO could be established for the purpose of conducting the entire verification process in relation to only one particular agreement, for example, a chemical weapons convention. It is conceivable that, over time, such agreement-specific IVOs could serve as stepping-stones toward the creation of a general IVO with broader responsibilities. This might, for example, permit more economical use of verification-dedicated resources.

19. It should be noted that none of the concepts outlined above involves monitoring activities by States in relation to agreements to which they are not themselves parties, nor by any other agent, except as expressly authorized by agreement of the parties. The presumption throughout has been that the principle of acceptability rules out such monitoring activity and that all aspects of the verification process must be expressly accepted by all parties to an agreement.

20. Fortunately, the international community already has some (all too limited) experience with verifying multilateral arms control agreements that can serve as a base and guide for further pioneering. Of greatest interest as a model of an agreement-specific IVO is the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) system of safeguards, which verify the non-proliferation commitments of its member States under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). IAEA has, with impressive success, confronted and coped with all the kinds of generic problems that have been cited here. It has done this, moreover, in direct relationship with a technology sector of unique sensitivity from both commercial and military perspectives. IAEA has undoubtedly had a key role in maintaining a high level of international confidence in the NPT as one of the more successful international security measures of our time. Its organization, procedures and techniques merit careful study.

21. Finally, the existing and potential role of the United Nations must be seriously considered and addressed. As pointed out in paragraph 114 of the Final Document:

"The United Nations, in accordance with the Charter, has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament. Accordingly, it should

play a more active role in this field and, in order to discharge its functions effectively, the United Nations should facilitate and encourage all disarmament measures - unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral - and be kept duly informed through the General Assembly, or any other appropriate United Nations channel reaching all Members of the Organization, of all disarmament efforts outside its aegis without prejudice to the progress of negotiations."

22. There is a need to translate principle into practical application. It has been demonstrated that initiatives can help bridge the gap between prohibition and verification and, in turn, build a stronger involvement of the United Nations.

23. The study of the Government of Canada has identified a number of other ways in which the United Nations might acquire an enhanced role in the verification process. First, it could give further consideration in the General Assembly or the Disarmament Commission to the essential role that verification plays in the arms limitation process, and therefore, in international security.

24. Second, the United Nations could examine the possibility that individual nations or groups of nations possessing verification expertise could offer such capabilities to the international community for use in the verification of multilateral agreements.

25. Third, the United Nations could undertake research and examination of the organizational structures, procedures and techniques that might be devised and further developed for use by IVO-type organizations, utilizing the rich body of documentation generated over the years in the Conference on Disarmament and elsewhere.

26. Fourth, the United Nations could provide greater assistance, advice and technical expertise to negotiators in the regional arms control and disarmament process with a view to combining international mechanisms with regional measures for verification (e.g. the control system of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which utilizes safeguards from IAEA as well as the control measures provided by the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL)).

27. Fifth, on a responsive basis, the United Nations might involve itself in the formulation and execution of verification provisions within agreements. Where a need exists, the United Nations should be prepared to help bring together verification expertise and encourage States to develop procedures through which this expertise can be applied in actual agreements.

28. Finally, given the appropriate flexibility, the United Nations could secure a stronger role in future regional arms limitation agreements. Should one or more arms limitation agreements be developed in any one region for which a space-based remote sensing system could be an appropriate verification technology, it would be both reasonable and cost-effective for this space-based verification capability to be generated by a group of capable nations and provided for use under the auspices of the United Nations or a regionally based IVO in the context of the agreement(s).

29. With or without legal provisions for verification purposes, nations will strive to collect information on the military activities of other nations that are

perceived as relevant to their own national security. Such efforts have always been, and will continue to be, a predictable aspect of national behaviour. Adequately verified arms control and disarmament agreements, however, could provide the means whereby certain of these basic information needs can be met under conditions where interference is minimized, sovereignty is respected and distrust is largely dispelled. Similarly, it is clear that compliance with any future significant arms limitation treaty will need to be verifiable to a high degree of confidence before nations will accede to the agreement. As the debate concerning allegations of non-compliance has illustrated, when this high degree of confidence in compliance does not exist, both the climate and process of arms limitation are damaged. Verification, which addresses both confidence and compliance, is at the very core of this requirement.

30. The conclusion to be drawn is that, while the negotiation and implementation of agreed verification measures will always be agreement-specific, there is a vast scope for constructive activities by Governments and international bodies in refining and expanding the technological, organizational and institutional options available for verification purposes to Governments and their negotiators.

31. Canada, through a modest verification research programme, is working to improve the verification process. It has committed resources to this end, based on the conviction that a variety of useful work on verification problems can be accomplished outside, and in advance, of negotiations towards specific agreements. To this end, Canada encourage other Member States to explore with it this vital element in the arms control and disarmament process.

CHINA

[Original : Chinese/English]

[25 April 1986]

1. The Government of China maintains that, in the light of the growing intensification of the arms race between the super-Powers and the existence of the danger of a new world war, it will be conducive to the maintenance of world peace to reach an agreement on promoting effective arms reductions. Historical experience shows that stipulation of appropriate verification measures in arms reduction agreements will help confidence-building among the signatories and the effective implementation of the agreements. Therefore, verification measures should be an essential component to disarmament agreements.

2. In its disarmament proposals and statements, the Chinese Government has stated on a number of occasions that in order to ensure the implementation of arms reductions, disarmament agreements should provide for necessary and effective verification measures. The following principles should be taken into account in international disarmament negotiations on the question of verification:

(a) As verification measures are to guarantee the concrete implementation of disarmament agreements, the provisions concerned should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the relevant disarmament agreements;

(b) The role of necessary international verification means should be affirmed. In accordance with the nature of disarmament agreements, international and national verification means can be employed in combination. In order to ensure the participation in international verification by all countries concerned on an equal footing, an international verification system should be established and perfected step by step. All the countries concerned should make available to the international verification system the necessary material and data obtained by them through national verification means;

(c) Verification measures should be both effective and appropriate. Verification should not be discriminatory in form and method, nor should it cause interference in the internal affairs of the relevant countries or hindrance to their economic and social development;

(d) The United Nations and its related international organs have made important contributions in the field of setting up an international verification system, and they should play an even more active role in future, with a view to creating favourable conditions for the relevant countries to participate in the process of verification under the auspices of the United Nations system.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

[Original: English]

121 May 1986

1. The German Democratic Republic considers verification to be an extremely important element of disarmament agreements. Conjointly with the other States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, it seeks agreements on arms limitation and disarmament that are being subjected to genuine and effective verification commensurate with the scope and nature of the obligations entered into. In that context, the German Democratic Republic will accept whatever is necessary to ensure compliance with treaty obligations towards disarmament, as was stressed by Erich Honecker, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and Chairman of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic.

2. By the same token, the proposals on arms limitation and disarmament made by the German Democratic Republic alone or in company with other socialist States foresee reliable verification measures including, if need be, on-site inspections. The German Democratic Republic emphatically supports the Soviet Union's comprehensive nuclear disarmament programme of 15 January 1986, which aims at ridding the world of all nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction by the year 2000 and provides for effective measures to verify such steps. The German Democratic Republic likewise welcomes the fact that the Soviet Union has stated its readiness on a mutual basis to open its laboratories to inspection after agreement has been reached to ban the deployment of arms in outer space. The proposals on the issue of verification recently tabled by the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic and Poland at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament are conceived to facilitate the drafting of effective verification measures that would expedite the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

3. The issue of verification is inseparably connected with concrete measures towards arms limitation and disarmament and can only be tackled in connection with clear-cut agreements on such measures. Disarmament necessitates verification, while verification in the absence of disarmament would be purely meaningless. What matters is to monitor compliance with agreed steps to end the arms race and to bring about disarmament rather than to register arms build-up, which would finally amount to legitimizing a continuing arms race.

4. Proceeding from these considerations of principle, the German Democratic Republic at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament endorsed the verification principles formulated there, adopting them as underlying principles in its approach to the solution of concrete verification issues. Consequently, the German Democratic Republic holds that:

(a) The forms and modalities of verification to be provided for in any specific agreement should depend on the purposes, scope and nature of the respective agreement;

(b) Verification would be based on equality and equal security and, in accordance with the basic principles of international law, should be non-discriminatory, should not interfere in internal affairs or jeopardize economic and social development;

(c) If necessary, a combination of several methods of verification should be employed.

5. The German Democratic Republic conscientiously complies with the commitments it has undertaken in international accords, including respective control measures. This is evidenced by the safeguards agreement that the German Democratic Republic concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the basis of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In that framework, over 300 safeguards inspections have so far been carried through in this country. The German Democratic Republic makes a substantial contribution towards further developing the IAEA safeguards system and, by organizing relevant training courses, supports the training of IAEA inspectors.

6. Verification measures are intended to enhance confidence that agreements on arms limitation and disarmament will be honoured. At the same time a certain degree of confidence is needed to reach agreement on verification measures. Normal relations among States that are based on the principles of peaceful coexistence and respect for the legitimate interests of all sides are, therefore, conducive to the development of reliable verification procedures. A policy aimed at confrontation and super-armament, on the other hand, would render more difficult not only agreement on far-reaching steps towards disarmament but on corresponding verification measures as well. A positive turn in international relations so urgently needed today, the abandonment of thought patterns of confrontation and the renunciation of endeavours to attain military superiority would also significantly improve the conditions for reaching agreement on effective verification measures.

7. Together with the other socialist States, the German Democratic Republic by concrete deeds has underscored that, in order to facilitate an understanding on disarmament, it would be ready to enter into appropriate compromises on

verification. This concerns, inter alia, the verification of a comprehensive nuclear test ban, a ban on chemical weapons and the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. The socialist countries have thus been fairly forthcoming to meet the ideas of their Western partners. More often than not, however, the other side has been evasive or came up with new demands. This is particularly obvious with regard to a comprehensive test ban.

8. The German Democratic Republic shares the view held by many States and competent scientists, namely, that all the aspects of a comprehensive nuclear test ban, including verification, have already been thoroughly examined and that a Political decision is needed now to come to a practical agreement. Taking into account the verification proposals submitted by the Soviet Union in connection with its moratorium on all nuclear explosions and the great potential of existing national technical means, it is all the more difficult to understand that the United States has prevented a test ban, invoking alleged verification problems.

9. It does not serve the cause of disarmament when flimsy pretexts are used to foment hysteria over alleged violation of agreements. Activities such as these adversely affect current negotiations and undermine existing treaties. The same holds good for attempts to discuss verification issues isolated from concrete agreements and negotiations.

10. The history of disarmament negotiations, however, proves that whenever all sides were willing to reach an agreement then workable arrangements have also been found as regards verification.

11. It cannot be overlooked that scientific-technical innovation in fields such as remote sensing by satellites and seismology has led in recent years to a rapid refinement of technical means of verification.

12. The German Democratic Republic therefore advocates having verification issues considered and settled in the context of negotiations on concrete measures of disarmament. This will make it possible, in close connection with the subject-matter of the respective agreement, to select the best combination of verification means that may embrace national forms of control and national technical means, procedures of consultation and co-operation, as well as international on-site inspections.

LESOTHO

{Original: English}

{26 February 1986}

Lesotho has no views or suggestions to formulate at this stage.

MEXICO

[Original: Spanish]

[3 June 1986]

1. In the opinion of the Government of Mexico, the Final Document adopted by consensus at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (resolution S-10/2) is quite clear with respect to verification. Paragraph 31 of that document sets forth the basic elements regarding this question that must be taken into consideration in the elaboration of any agreement on disarmament.
2. That paragraph states that "disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they are being observed by all parties". For that reason the Government of Mexico believes that a disarmament agreement that does not have an adequate verification system will be totally ineffective.
3. In addition, paragraph 31 states that "the form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement". Mexico regards that part of paragraph 31 as essential. The question of verification cannot be solved in the abstract; the system to be determined must be in conformity with the modality of each agreement. Moreover, still in connection with paragraph 31 of the Final Document, there will be cases in which it may be necessary to use a combination of various verification methods, as well as other procedures, to verify compliance.
4. While it is hardly advisable to attempt to develop a general verification system, the Government of Mexico believes that the general verification principles developed during the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament can be applicable to various agreements on disarmament. Similarly, it believes that it is possible to develop general verification techniques and procedures that can be applied to specific disarmament agreements.
5. Finally, Mexico holds that the question of verification must not be used as a pretext for impeding the conclusion of disarmament agreements desired by the vast majority of the world's peoples.

NETHERLANDS"

[Original: French]

[27 June 1986]

1. The twelve member States of the European Community believe that verification is a basic element of any agreement on arms limitation or disarmament.

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\* On behalf of the States members of the European Community.

Consequently, they view the adoption by consensus of General Assembly resolution 40/152 0 on 16 December 1985 as a particularly significant achievement.

2. In the context of reviewing the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the tenth special session of the General Assembly, this resolution reaffirms the need to concentrate efforts on seeking appropriate methods and procedures, with a view to taking into account already accepted verification principles, for while, in the the framework of international disarmament negotiations, the role of verification measures is not in dispute, it is difficult to elaborate them in concrete terms, and the divergent views on this point almost always constitute one of the major obstacles to the conclusion of agreements in the field.

3 Verification should fulfil two functions: it should monitor the implementation of the disarmament measures agreed upon, in conformity with the provisions of the agreement in question, and it should also monitor long-term compliance with the provisions of the agreement in question (for example, compliance with ongoing obligations such as arms limitation and the mutual flow of information between the contracting parties). Obviously, adequate and effective methods must be agreed upon specifically for each topic of negotiation. This creates the problem of having to tailor the verification agreements - even though they are based on the same fundamental verification principles, to the measure in question. Necessary measures range from non-interference with national technical capability, to on-site inspections. The pace of technological development in all military fields means that advanced technology must also be applied to verification.

4. The twelve member countries of the European Community therefore believe that serious thought must be given to identifying and resolving differences concerning the application of apparently accepted principles to particular cases.

5. It is not enough to declare that disarmament agreements should provide for adequate verification measures. It is also necessary to define what the term "adequate" implies.

6. Experience thus far in the framework of disarmament negotiations has shown that technical difficulties, considerable at times, are not the only obstacle to elaboration of possible verification and methods procedures. Obviously, concrete elaboration, determined by - as the resolution states - the purposes, scope and nature of the agreements cannot disregard the technical aspects and should, on the contrary, be based on the decisive input of experts. The appropriateness of an in-depth examination by experts has, moreover, already been recognized in the framework of several negotiations, and the results already achieved in Geneva by the group of seismic experts and by the chemical experts appear to be significant in this regard.

7. Expert advice, while certainly invaluable, has not, however led to clear-cut conclusions on the scope of verification measures necessary to guarantee the implementation of the various disarmament agreements.

8. The Twelve believe that the major difficulties stem, on the whole, from differences in approach to certain basic political options which are ultimately related to the degree of security that each country seeks in a disarmament agreement.

9. So far as possible, doubts about the implementation of an agreement should be avoided, since they can undermine its very objectives. Thus, the assumption, true or false, of a disarmament violation could lead countries to re-appraise their own security risks. Elimination of these risks by a build-up in military defence capability would then have the effect of eroding the agreement.

10. The scope of verification measures must therefore guarantee that every State which has signed a disarmament agreement can detect any violations of that agreement.

11. The Twelve believe that it is important to underscore in this connection the fact that resolution 40/1520 reaffirms, in the language agreed upon at the time of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, that verification measures should be "satisfactory" to all parties, in order to create the necessary confidence.

12. The formulation of this principle clearly indicates that every State has the right, in all disarmament negotiations, to press for the verification requirements it deems appropriate.

13. It also indicates that the modalities of verification agreed upon may not only avert the disastrous consequences of a chain of reactions that could be set off by mistrust, but also contribute to a progressive strengthening of mutual confidence which can only enhance the agreement's effectiveness.

14. The Twelve are convinced that these considerations should give impetus to efforts to reach a consensus that is much broader than a mere definition of the lowest common denominator.

15. Concern over the cost of verification measures, or their intrusive nature, is no justification for a narrow interpretation of their scope. This is especially true if we recognize that a priority of every State is the non-discriminatory application of measures capable not only of guaranteeing the political objectives of a disarmament agreement, but also of encouraging, by building mutual confidence, progress in negotiations in other sectors.

16. The Twelve believe that every country participating in the various arms limitation negotiations must make a substantial contribution to resolving the problems of verification which arise in respect of the agreement in question. Progress in the negotiations on the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on the prohibition of chemical weapons and in other negotiations could be expedited if all participating Governments gave concrete evidence at the negotiating table of their professed willingness to accept adequate verification measures.

NORWAY

[original: English1

{ 6 May 19861

1. Verification is an essential element in negotiations on all disarmament and arms control agreements. Such agreements must therefore contain effective verification measures that enable adequate monitoring of compliance with the agreements. The verification measures should, however, be adapted to the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement. A combination of several methods of verification could thus be employed.
2. Such methods could include, inter alia, on-site inspection on a routine and on challenge basis, international data exchange and national technical means. The international data exchange could be undertaken through the establishment of an international monitoring network. In the development and establishment of such a network it is of vital importance to make full use of the latest technological developments.
3. In order to ensure full compliance with a disarmament agreement a request for an on-site inspection should be dealt with without delay. A legitimate request for such an inspection should not be refused.
4. Research is vital in the development of efficient verification measures. The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) can play a useful role in this regard.
5. Since its establishment in 1976, Norway has taken part in the Conference on Disarmament's Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to consider international co-operation measures to detect and identify seismic events. In addition, Norway has introduced to the first and second special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament and to the Conference on Disarmament several working papers concerning the establishment of a global seismological network, which Norway believes should constitute an essential element of a verification system of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.
6. Since 1981 Norway has undertaken a research programme on verification of alleged use of chemical weapons with a view to developing proposals for procedures for verification of such alleged use. The results of the research programme so far and preliminary proposals have been presented to the Conference on Disarmament in connection with the ongoing negotiations of a global and comprehensive convention on chemical weapons.

SWEDEN

[Original: English]

[13 June 1986]

1. Sweden considers verification an integral and vital component of the process of disarmament and confidence-building. Thus, any agreement in this field will have to include adequate procedures for verification and complaints. The Swedish Government endorses the guiding principles for such procedures as outlined in paragraphs 31, 91, and 92 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament (resolution S-10/2).
2. Adequate verification can serve several purposes. The first and overriding purpose is to ensure that undertakings entered into are fully complied with by all parties. Sufficient verification provisions might serve to safeguard against unfounded suspicions and accusations. They might also deter violations by posing a credible threat of disclosure of a party that might contemplate violation of a treaty. However, and according to the Swedish Government equally important, verification can also serve to enhance the confidence of the international community in disarmament agreements. The prospects for concluding new treaties could thus improve.
3. Verification is of course not, an end in itself. However, in order to achieve significant agreements on disarmament or confidence- and security-building measures (CSBM), adequate verification procedures are required. Experience has demonstrated the close interrelationship between the elaboration of an agreement as such and the elaboration of verification provisions to assure compliance with that agreement. Experience from various negotiating forums also shows the importance of choosing the parameters in such a way that they can be verified without excessive intrusiveness.
4. The Swedish Government agrees fully with what is stated, inter alia, in paragraph 31 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, namely, that "The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement."
5. In this connection two general observations can be made:
  - (a) First, there is a relationship between the military significance of an agreement and the need for verification. The greater the significance, the greater are the demands on the provisions for verification;
  - (b) Second, the shorter the time-span between a hypothetical breach of an agreement and the security-related effects of that breach, the greater is the need for effective verification. Non-compliance with, for example, a CSBM agreement, by any one State could have an immediate, negative security impact that would be still greater if the breach could not be detected or verified. Adequate verification, therefore, is vital in such cases.

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6. Sweden has consistently considered verification issues to be matters of direct concern to all countries. Consequently, Sweden is of the view that it should not be left to the nations most advanced in military technology to determine what constitutes adequate verification of agreements that are also of vital importance for the security of other States. Therefore, Sweden has over the years invested considerable resources, mainly in its National Defence Research Institute, in order to form an independent opinion on, for example, the verification of a comprehensive test-ban treaty or a chemical-weapons convention. Sweden has also made available scientific expertise and technical facilities in order to promote international disarmament negotiations.

7. In the case of multilateral agreements, it cannot be left to the national technical means of the major Powers to assure verification. Verification methods must be found that take into account the needs of all States parties to agreements, i.e. also those States that have at their disposal comparatively limited national technical means to verify compliance. Verification arrangements set up within the framework of the United Nations can in some cases be of great importance.

8. At present the verification issue is thoroughly debated in connection with the Conference on Security- and Confidence-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe taking place in Stockholm, the deliberations about a comprehensive test-ban treaty and in the negotiations concerning a chemical-weapons convention.

9. In the future CSBM regime that hopefully will be the outcome of the Stockholm Conference it is in the first place the non-hostile intentions behind a military activity that are to be verified, as well as the central commitments in the agreement. At least two types of proposed measures require verification, namely agreed rules concerning notification and agreed constraints on military activities. Measures that could not be adequately verified in the future CSBM régime would neither be confidence- nor security-building.

10. The agreement should be designed in such a way as to add to confidence and security in Europe, not least by its contribution to

(a) Limiting the potential for surprise attack;

(b) Reducing the possibility of military forces being used for political intimidation;

(c) Gradually reducing the role of military means in maintaining security and stability in Europe.

11. To this end it is important that the measures themselves should be verifiable not only in possible major compliance disputes but also in the day-to-day implementation of the agreement.

12. In August 1985 the Swedish National Defence Research Institute arranged an international symposium on "Verification of disarmament in Europe". The purpose of the symposium was to stimulate interdisciplinary discussions of verification issues in all their aspects. The proceedings of the symposium have been published in a book that may be obtained from the Permanent Mission of Sweden to the United Nations.

13. It goes without saying that a nuclear-test-ban treaty must be adequately verifiable. Sweden is of the view that the present state of the art of seismic detection and identification, particularly when supplemented by other available methods, makes adequate verification of a treaty prohibiting underground nuclear testing possible. To prepare for such a verification system to be established there is now a need to embark on further substantial work, both in terms of drafting provisions and in the technical field. The Group of Scientific Experts set up within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva should continue its important work to elaborate the methods to be used to verify a nuclear-test ban.

14. Very advanced and detailed discussions on verification are going on in the negotiations on a chemical-weapons convention. Such a convention would certainly constitute a breakthrough not only as a true disarmament convention prescribing the abolishment of an entire weapons category, but also with respect to the mechanisms for securing the compliance of an important and far-reaching agreement. Much work is being put into elaborating a variety of verification measures adapted to the very provisions and undertakings that are to be verified. A whole spectrum of measures are envisaged, from simple data exchange to continuous routine on-site inspection, depending on the need in each case. Efforts are being made to make the routine verification provisions as widely applicable as possible with the view to minimizing the need for special so-called "challenge verification". If a useful balance between routine and challenge verification is found, the beneficial implications for disarmament agreements in other fields are obvious. In the negotiations on a chemical-weapons convention work has also come very far as regards the setting up of a full-fledged organisation for handling the implementation of fact-finding procedures, data exchange, inspection missions, etc. It includes a consultative committee, an executive council and some sub-organs.

15. Sweden has always considered the provisions for verification and complaints regarding the Biological-Weapons Convention to be inadequate. Accordingly there is a strong need for better such procedures, including a more effective consultation machinery. This will be one of the main issues at the second Review Conference of the Biological-Weapons Convention that will take place in September this year. Sweden intends to work actively for measures to strengthen confidence in the régime and for more effective complaints procedures.

16. Many practical problems relating to verification can be solved by using monitoring satellites. It is widely believed that satellite monitoring has been and remains a prerequisite for the bilateral arms control agreements that have been concluded between the Soviet Union and the United States. The solution of problems relating to verification of existing and future multilateral disarmament agreements could be facilitated by international satellite verification. France has proposed that an international satellite monitoring agency (ISMA) should be established. The United Nations study on the implications of establishing such an agency concluded in 1981 that satellite monitoring can not only make a valuable contribution to the verification of compliance with certain arms control and disarmament agreements, but that it could also play a positive role in preventing or settling international crises and thus contribute to confidence-building among nations. Bearing in mind the usefulness of satellite monitoring it should be further considered how this technology could be used for international verification.

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

[Original: Russian]

[13 May 1986]

1. Approaching the problem of verification in terms of specifics rather than on the level of general declarations, the Soviet Union feels that the main purpose of verification is to help implement measures to curb the arms race, strengthen confidence among the parties - a confidence whose foundations were laid by the very fact of their entry into an agreement on arms limitation - and obtain objective information on the actual state of its fulfilment. Hence the Soviet Union's main requirement of verification is that it should be effective. The fulfilment of this requirement is the most important guarantee of the stability of any agreement. It will make the parties confident that the obligations they have entered into will be strictly observed and the agreement itself durable.
2. Disarmament without verification is impossible, but verification without disarmament is meaningless - and this, in the Soviet view, is the essence of the matter. Every arms limitation agreement may have its own verification measures and its specific ways and means of implementing them, but what matters most in any such agreement is the arms limitation and reduction measures themselves. Verification divorced from specific arms limitation measures loses all meaning. It is absurd, for example, to concoct rules for verification and then adjust the scope and nature of the obligations to them.
3. Verification must be used in order to ensure the viability of disarmament agreements. Therefore, together with effectiveness, the other basic requirement with which the USSR approaches verification is adequacy. This means that verification measures must fully correspond to the scope and nature of the limitations established. As experience in the implementation of international disarmament agreements has shown, the principle of proportionality between verification measures and arms limitation measures has fully proved itself. That it has been laid down in a number of universally recognized international instruments, including the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (resolution S-10/2), is no mere coincidence.
4. Of the wide variety of means of verification that may be used to monitor fulfilment of the obligations of the parties under the various arms limitation and disarmament agreements, national technical means of verification have indisputable priority. This is borne out by the experience in verifying the implementation of strategic arms agreements and other previously concluded treaties and agreements. These means are becoming ever more sophisticated and are making the monitoring of arms limitation agreements more reliable.
5. The Soviet Union advocates a constructive approach to ensuring the verifiability of treaties and agreements and is prepared to co-operate in the elaboration, where needed, of additional measures, up to and including on-site inspections, which would help make national technical means of verification more effective but such measures must not serve as an instrument of interference in internal affairs, be detrimental to the interests of any of the parties, or be used for purposes wholly unrelated to those of verification.

6. Effective and adequate means of verification to give confidence in the fulfilment of the obligations undertaken by Governments are an integral part of all Soviet arms limitation and disarmament proposals. This also applies fully to the programme for the elimination of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction put forward by the Soviet Union in the statement of 15 January 1986 by M. S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (see A/41/97). In the context of implementing the extensive practical measures proposed by the USSR in this connection, the demands placed on verification methods are, of course, significantly increased. Verification must be of a kind that would give the parties the appropriate confidence that the commitments they have entered into will be implemented consistently and that no activities will be undertaken that would in any way circumvent the limitations established.
7. The Soviet programme for the complete and general elimination of nuclear weapons provides for verification of the weapons to be destroyed and limited to take place primarily through national technical means. At the same time, the USSR is ready to agree to any other additional verification measures, including, if necessary, on-site inspections.
8. Implementation of the measures called for in the programme obviously requires the development of special procedures for destroying nuclear munitions as well as the dismantling, conversion or destruction of delivery vehicles. Agreement must be reached at every stage of the elimination of nuclear weapons on how many weapons will be destroyed and where. Of course there must be reliable verification, including international verification, of the destruction or conversion of weapons.
9. The Soviet Union favours effective and adequate verification, even to the extent of establishing general international verification, with the complete and general elimination of nuclear weapons in accordance with its proposed programme, the final stage of which would be marked by the signing of a universal agreement that such weapons would never again come into being.
10. The problem of verification to prevent the extension of the arms race into outer space also calls for an effective solution. If an agreement is reached to prohibit the introduction of weapons into outer space, the Soviet Union is prepared to open up its laboratories, on a reciprocal basis, for verification of such an agreement.
11. The problem of verification for the establishment of a moratorium on nuclear explosions is no obstacle. If the United States agrees to the discontinuance on a reciprocal basis of all nuclear explosions proper verification of the observance of the moratorium will be fully ensured by national technical means as well as with the help of international procedures, including, where necessary, on-site inspections. The Soviet Union has expressed its readiness to accept the offer of the six States signatories to the Delhi Declaration (A/40/114-S/16921, annex) to assist in the verification of a discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests. A proposal that experts of the two countries, the USSR and the United States, should meet to discuss the problems of verification of a discontinuance of nuclear explosions has been forwarded to the United States Government.

12. The Soviet Union is in favour of the speediest possible complete elimination of chemical weapons and of the industrial base for their manufacture, to be implemented under strict verification, including international on-site verification, and of the systematic international verification of the destruction of chemical-weapon stockpiles and the production of highly toxic lethal chemicals for permitted purposes. At the Geneva Disarmament Conference in April 1986, the USSR introduced far-reaching additional proposals to secure effective verification of the destruction and the dismantling of chemical weapon production units, and also proposed systematic on-site verification of these units. The operation of each chemical weapons production unit would be discontinued through strict verification, including systematic international inspections.

13. Thus the Soviet Union's position is that systematic international on-site verifications should become the basic form of international verification of the fulfilment of the key provisions of a future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

14. The possible agreement on the reduction of Soviet and United States military forces and the subsequent freezing of the level of armed forces of the groupings opposed to each other in central Europe will, of course, require judicious verification. The Soviet Union is prepared to agree to this. As for fulfilling the obligations concerning a freeze on numbers of troops, it has stated its readiness to establish permanent check points for verifying the exit from and entry into the reduction zone of any military contingents whatsoever.

15. In April 1986 the Soviet Union put forward a new initiative entailing a significant reduction of all components of the land and tactical forces in the European States as well as of the corresponding United States and Canadian forces stationed in Europe. Reliable verification would be carried out at all stages of this process using both national technical means and international forms of verification, including on-site inspection if necessary.

16. The Soviet Union's verification proposals clearly demonstrate its willingness to solve constructively and without delay the urgent problems of limiting the arms race in all its forms, reducing the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war and strengthening security throughout the world. Underlying the Soviet approach to the problems of verification is a readiness to accept any reasonable measures that will facilitate arms limitation. This approach, i.e., to limit and reduce all forms of arms, will result in the establishment of security guarantees for all States participating in the process and, in the last analysis, to the establishment of an all-embracing system of international security. It exposes the groundlessness of the attempts by certain Governments to make the problem of verification a pretext for introducing artificial obstacles to negotiations on arms limitation and delaying the achievement of mutually acceptable agreements concerning them.

17. Underlying the deliberate complication of the problems of verification and the references to the difficulty of implementing it is the clear reluctance of these States to tie their hands with any limitations that might hinder the build-up and improvement of their weapons. It is significant that, while they appear from their words to be the most active proponents of verification, they are at the same time

accelerating the development of weapons systems and methods of deployment that are less and less open to verification. If they were seriously concerned about verification, instead of delaying negotiations on arms limitation they would work for a speedy achievement of agreements, for rapid and thorough-going changes are taking place in the development of military technology as a result of the arms race and new types of weapons are being developed that will make verification, and hence agreed limitation, extremely difficult and ultimately impossible. Discussion of the inadequacies of verification, attempts to strengthen it, and consideration of its many technical aspects, citing incessantly advanced scientific and technical achievements could go on forever, but that would not make it absolutely perfect. The arms race would continue during this time with increasing force. Such an approach is alien to the Soviet Union.

18. Experience in negotiations on arms limitation, including the Soviet-American talks, shows that when there is a genuine wish to agree, verification is not an obstacle. When there is interest in, and political will for, the conclusion of agreements, then the demand for super-reliable, "150 per cent" verification is not put forward.

19. In the Soviet view, the legal obligation of a State that has concluded an agreement is in itself a guarantee that it will take measures to prevent violations of the agreement. It does not enter into an agreement in order to violate it at the first suitable opportunity. Hence the issue here is not verification of the fulfilment of an obligation but the wish or reluctance to accept and fulfil such an obligation, the political will for disarmament.

20. The Soviet Union, for its part, has demonstrated this will. There is no type of armament it would not be ready to limit or prohibit, on a reciprocal basis, and with the most effective verification.

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