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REVIEW AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT OF THE TWELFTH SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY: CESSATION OF NUCLEAR-ARMS FACE AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

Implementation of General Assembly resolution 38/73 E on a nuclear-arms freeze

Note by the Secretary-General

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INTRODUCTION

In connection with paragraph 2 of General Assembly resolution 38/73 E of 15 December 1983, the Secretary-General has received a communication dated 24 October 1984 from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the text of which is reproduced below.

II. INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM GOVERNMENTS

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

[Original: Russian]

[24 October 1984]

- 1. In the view of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the main task of international relations is to prevent nuclear war and curb the nuclear-arms race. A major step in this direction would be a nuclear-arms freeze. The world has crossed the borderline beyond which the further accumulation and improvement of these weapons is not only dangerous, but senseless.
- 2. The most recent sessions of the General Assembly have shown that, for all the differences of approach, the overwhelming majority of States agree with the idea of a nuclear freeze, which is advocated by extremely broad sectors of society throughout the world. As a nuclear Power which is aware of its responsibility for the fate of the world as a whole, the Soviet Union has not only supported the idea of a nuclear freeze, but has itself put forward a concrete programme in this respect. This position is a manifestation of the Soviet Union's consistent policy aimed at halting the nuclear-arms race in both quantitative and qualitative terms and preventing a nuclear war. From the Soviet side, it has more than once been emphasized at the highest level that the USSR will not develop a nuclear first-strike potential, will not seek military supremacy, and is doing and will do nothing which might destroy the existing military balance.
- 3. The adherence of the Soviet Union to the idea of a freeze stems from the policy it pursues, as a matter of principle, of maintaining the strategic military parity existing between the USSR and the United States of America and between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO in general.
- 4. In response to the call to that effect by the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session, in June 1983 the Soviet Union addressed to the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, France and China a proposal that all the nuclear Powers should simultaneously freeze all nuclear weapons in their possession both in quantitative and qualitative terms. As is well known, the countries to which it was addressed reacted negatively to this proposal. At the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly, the Soviet Union again drew the attention of States to this issue. At its initiative, the General Assembly adopted resolution 38/76, in which it urged

all nuclear-weapon States to proceed to freeze, under appropriate verification, all nuclear weapons in their possession both in quantitative and qualitative terms. This freeze would include the cessation of the buildup of all components of nuclear arsenals, including all kinds of nuclear-weapon delivery systems and all kinds of nuclear weapons, an undertaking not to deploy nuclear weapons of new kinds and types, a moratorium on all tests of nuclear weapons and also on tests of new kinds and types of their delivery systems, and the halting of the production of fissionable materials for the purpose of creating nuclear weapons.

- 5. In the view of the USSR, all the nuclear Powers should take part in the nuclear freeze; this is dictated by the need to stop the nuclear-arms race once and for all. The USSR is, however, also ready for the obligation to freeze nuclear weapons to enter into force in the first place for the USSR and the United States. Here the Soviet Union is proceeding on the assumption that the other nuclear-weapon States will follow the example of the USSR and the United States and freeze their own nuclear arsenals in turn.
- 6. The same line of thought is also reflected in the ideas put forward in the Joint Declaration by the heads of State and Government of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and the United Republic of Tanzania, addressed by them in the summer of this year to all the nuclear Powers. Central to the Declaration, which received a positive response on the part of the Soviet Union, is an appeal for a halt in the further buildup of nuclear weapons and a freeze in nuclear arsenals, to be immediately followed by substantial reductions in these arsenals. This is yet another confirmation of the fact that the need for such measures has become imperative.
- 7. The necessary basis exists for a nuclear freeze at the present time, in the form of the military balance between the USSR and the United States, which is recognized by the General Assembly. General Assembly resolutions 37/100 B and 38/73 E clearly state that the USSR and the United States "are now equivalent in nuclear military power" and that there exists between them "an overall rough parity". It is obvious that, given the current approximate equality of nuclear and conventional capabilities, agreement on stopping the improvement and increase of nuclear arms could not prejudice anyone's security. Compliance with the obligations of the freeze could, as many qualified nuclear arms specialists and high-ranking politicians in various countries have pointed out, be effectively verified using national techniques.
- 8. Furthermore, the Soviet Union is prepared, if necessary, to work out a number of additional verification measures in that area, based on co-operation and taking into account previous arms limitation negotiations.
- 9. Aware that the threat of nuclear war exists even with arsenals at their present level, the Soviet Union does not, of course, consider a nuclear-arms freeze to be an end in itself. It is only a step towards their reduction. It is well known that the Soviet Union has introduced far-reaching practical proposals for a radical reduction in nuclear arms, both on a world-wide scale and in Europe, in strict accordance with the principle of equality and equal security. The USSR consistently advocates the preparation of a programme of nuclear disarmament, the effect of which would be to free the world from nuclear arms forever.

- 10. In addition, a nuclear freeze would also be in itself a major contribution to the cause of ensuring international security. It would demonstrate the renunciation of plans to achieve military supremacy, and would put an end to the further increase and improvement of nuclear weaponry. As a result, the danger of nuclear conflict would be reduced. The level of confidence among nuclear-weapon States would rise accordingly, there would be a turn towards a healthier overall climate in the world, and the necessary conditions for progress in nuclear disarmament would appear.
- 11. A nuclear-arms freeze is comparatively easy to implement while being an effective step towards stopping the nuclear-arms race.
- 12. The reason that, contrary to the will of the overwhelming majority of States in the world, agreement on a freeze has not been achieved lies solely in the negative attitude of the United States and some other Powers, which refuse to proceed to such a measure. The fact of the matter is that those who oppose a freeze are, in essence, giving a green light to the increase and improvement of nuclear arsenals and are increasing the threat of a nuclear catastrophe in the futile pursuit of military supremacy.
- 13. In the view of the Soviet Union, given the dangerous military-political confrontation, which has now become more acute, it is exceptionally important not to let slip the opportunity, and to reach agreement on a nuclear-arms freeze. For its part, the USSR will continue to be ready to proceed to such a measure on a reciprocal basis. The thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly could give a fresh impetus to efforts in that direction.