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GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT: MEASURES TO PROVIDE
OBJECTIVE INFORMATION ON MILITARY CAPABILITIES

Report of the Secretary-General

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. On 13 December 1982, the General Assembly adopted resolution 37/99 G, the operative part of which read as follows:

"The General Assembly,

"...

"1. Calls upon all States, in particular nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, to consider additional measures to facilitate the provision of objective information on, and objective assessments of, military capabilities;

"2. Invites all States to communicate to the Secretary-General their views and proposals concerning such measures;

"3. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session a report containing, first, the replies of Member States called for under paragraph 2 above, and, secondly, on the basis of these replies, a preliminary analysis of the possible role of the United Nations in the context of measures to facilitate the provision of objective information on, and objective assessments of, military capabilities."

2. Pursuant to paragraph 2 of the above resolution, the Secretary-General submits herewith the 14 replies received from Member States. Eight of these replies, including that of the Federal Republic of Germany, on behalf of the 10 member States of the European Community, referred to the role that could be assumed by the existing United Nations machinery and the benefit that could be drawn from United Nations experience in the relevant field for achieving the objectives of the resolution. Three States felt that it would not be useful to take special measures and involve the United Nations in this respect. One State referred to the ongoing studies in the United Nations which would, in its view, provide means and measures to facilitate the assessment of objective information on military capabilities. The rest of the replies did not express specific views on the matter.

3. In the light of the complexity of the subject-matter, the Secretary-General believes that a greater number of replies would be needed to undertake an analysis of the possible role of the United Nations in the context of measures to facilitate the provision of objective information on, and objective assessments of, military capabilities under the terms of paragraph 3 of the above resolution.

II. REPLIES RECEIVED FROM GOVERNMENTS

AUSTRIA

[Original: English]

[26 April 1983]

1. Austria is convinced that inadequate information on the military strength of States is a major cause of mistrust, fear and tension permeating today's international relations and a significant factor in the continuation of the arms build-up and the stagnation of disarmament efforts.
2. The measures taken by a State to ensure its security against foreign military attack and the resources devoted to this purpose depend to a large extent on the assessment of the military potential and the intentions of other States. Given the climate of mistrust and the lack of reliable information, Governments tend to overestimate the military strength of potential adversaries and to undertake arms programmes on the basis of "worst case" estimates. If the same syndrome of inadequate information, insecurity and fear determines also the behaviour of the other side, a vicious circle of rising tensions and increased arms build-up is set in motion.
3. Throughout history, the misperception and misinterpretation of military intentions and capabilities have triggered competition among actual or potential adversaries in building up their respective armed strength. Today's situation is no exception. In the relationship between the two major military alliance systems as well as in various regional contexts armament programmes are often justified by subjective assessments of the opponent's military potential. Austria is convinced that the discrepancies between estimates of the military strengths of States are often caused by misunderstandings of actual situations due to lack of reliable data combined with fear resulting from uncertainty about the intentions and capabilities of the adversary.
4. It is universally acknowledged today that militarily significant agreements on the limitation or reduction of weapons and military forces require an understanding of the actual state of the armaments and forces concerned. But it is still a matter of dispute whether military data should be exchanged exclusively in the framework of disarmament negotiations or whether the availability of reliable information constitutes a precondition for the beginning of meaningful negotiations. Austria believes that this question must be resolved pragmatically in each particular case according to the specific requirements of the arms limitation measures under discussion. Experience with previous arms limitation efforts, however, clearly suggests that the lack of reliable information has been a serious obstacle to disarmament. Disarmament negotiations can only be successful if there exists a minimum of confidence and mutual trust. Confidence and trust in turn depend on a better mutual understanding of each other's positions and interests, including security interests. The most important arms limitation effort of the past decades - the SALT-process - has taken place in an area where national means (i.e., satellites) can provide highly accurate and reliable data. Where such

conditions do not exist, States have been reluctant to enter into disarmament talks. When they did so nevertheless, protracted negotiations without tangible results have generally ensued.

5. The adequate verification of disarmament agreements also requires reliable information on military forces. The establishment of co-operative verification procedures naturally encounters enormous political difficulties when a climate of mistrust and secrecy about military matters prevails. The sharing of military data on a regular basis and the elaboration of criteria for their definition and comparison could thus greatly facilitate agreement on the monitoring of compliance with disarmament treaties.

6. In the age of nuclear weapons the security of all peoples is interdependent. In recognition of this fact, the General Assembly in paragraph 28 of the Final Document of its first special session devoted to disarmament (resolution S-10/2) declared that all States have the duty to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament and the right to participate in disarmament negotiations. This statement, no matter how well it responds to the universality of the nuclear threat, will remain unfulfilled as long as the capacity of States to form their own independent judgements on disarmament matters is hampered by an inadequate flow of relevant information. At present only a few military Powers possess the means independently to collect basic facts whereby to assess the distribution of military strength. Particularly for smaller States outside the information networks of the major military alliance systems it is difficult to follow developments in the area of military security and to take positions on them. If the responsibility of all States to contribute to disarmament efforts, as proclaimed in the Final Document, is to be meaningful, the need of all States to have access to more objective information has to be recognized as its necessary corollary.

7. The crucial role of public opinion in the promotion of disarmament has become increasingly apparent in recent years. In launching the World Disarmament Campaign in June 1982 the General Assembly, at its second special session devoted to disarmament, initiated concerted action to generate public understanding and support for disarmament. To inform has been rightly recognized as one of the primary purposes of the Campaign. It is only through free discussion and debate on the basis of balanced and objective information that the public can exercise a positive influence on the attainment of disarmament objectives. The success of the World Disarmament Campaign as well as of other efforts to promote public support for disarmament will be directly commensurate to the amount and quality of available information on security-related issues and on the various aspects of disarmament.

8. For all these reasons Austria believes that efforts to improve the flow of military information and to enhance the reliability thereof are needed. While such efforts should under no circumstances be regarded as a substitute for disarmament agreements, they can greatly facilitate the process of disarmament negotiations. It is to be hoped that growing awareness of the enormously favourable impact the possession of objective information on security-related matters would have for the establishment of greater mutual confidence, for détente and for disarmament will motivate Governments to overcome the mistrust they have of each other and to adopt

more open and predictable policies in the military area. Measures to enhance the quantity and quality of information should be developed on the national, regional and the global level. Since the different purposes of information (security policy, disarmament negotiations, verification, public information, etc.) require different types of data, a wide variety of measures is needed. The great potential of modern techniques for gathering, dissemination and evaluation of data needs to be fully utilized. In addition to the follow-up action on initiatives already existent in this area, new ideas and proposals should be encouraged, explored and wherever possible implemented. The United Nations should play a leading role in this regard.

9. Some of the most significant achievements in the area of information on military matters have been made in the wider context of confidence-building measures. Efforts to make military activities more open and predictable have been at the very heart of confidence-building ever since the emergence of this concept in the 1950s. The United Nations Comprehensive Study on Confidence-Building Measures 1/ not only recognizes this fact but also contains a list of concrete measures that could usefully be taken. It is to be hoped that the study will lead to an intensification of endeavours to promote confidence-building in regions where this process is already under way as well as in other parts of the world. Continued in-depth discussion in the United Nations Disarmament Commission and in the General Assembly of the issue of confidence-building could further contribute to this goal.

10. The introduction of an international system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures constitutes another important approach to the objective of reliable information on military matters. If this system were to be further developed and widely implemented it could lead to a considerable increase in the data available with respect to the resources devoted by States to military purposes and it could thereby eliminate a major source of misconception and mistrust. The ongoing work on methods to make reported data comparable will certainly enhance the effectiveness of the system. But the most serious obstacle to its usefulness has until now been the relatively small number of participating States. The decision by Governments from different geographic regions and representing different budgeting systems to report annually on their military expenditures to the Secretary-General using the reporting instrument would require only minor expenditures but would have important beneficial consequences for confidence-building, détente and disarmament.

11. The proposal for the establishment of an International Satellite Monitoring Agency also has great potential as a measure to provide objective information on security-related matters. Apart from its functions in the verification of compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements such an agency could monitor military activities of States in areas of tension and thereby contribute to the settlement of international crises. It could also be entrusted with other missions designed to build confidence through the dissemination of reliable and objective information. Austria hopes that the General Assembly will actively pursue its consideration of this proposal.

12. Dissemination of information to Governments and to the general public has long been one of the primary functions of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. A part of this process of dissemination takes place in the framework of the studies made in the area of disarmament under the auspices of the United Nations. Such studies have proved to be a useful tool in clarifying specific aspects of the arms race and of disarmament, in strengthening public support for disarmament measures and in paving the way for negotiations to this end. Experience has shown that the value of studies depends greatly on the availability of relevant information and more particularly on the co-operation of Member States in supplying such data. Although the record so far has not been unsatisfactory, there can be no doubt that the authority of the studies, their public impact and their usefulness for disarmament negotiations could be greatly enhanced if all Governments would be prepared to provide detailed information on the subjects concerned.

13. Apart from studies, the United Nations Secretariat implements a variety of programmes for the dissemination of information on disarmament. Much of this work, for instance the United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, focuses on the relevant activities of the Organization itself. In so far as facts and data on aspects of the arms race are presented, these usually stem from various governmental or non-governmental sources. Austria supports these activities and believes that they should be further developed and strengthened. But it also feels that the United Nations - as is the case in many other fields - should itself become a source of objective data on security-related issues. As a focal point for the sharing and exchange of military information, the Organization could perform an invaluable service to Governments, to the public and to the disarmament negotiating process. Austria therefore believes that further measures should be taken in the framework of the United Nations to institutionalize the systematic collection, compilation and publication of data on military matters. The desirability of such measures has already been recognized in the context of the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Review of the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Disarmament issued in 1976. ^{2/} The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research has also been involved in related work. In addition to military expenditures, where initial steps have already been taken, such an information system could encompass, inter alia, the compilation of data on armed forces and armaments, military production, military research and development, arms transfer and foreign military aid. Such an information system could, at an appropriate point, be complemented by the elaboration of mechanisms for the comparison and evaluation of data with a view to facilitating the objective assessment of military strength. The implementation of this proposal would require agreement on the criteria for and the definitions of the data to be collected and would demand the elaboration of generally acceptable procedures for collection, evaluation and dissemination. These conditions could only be fulfilled gradually and with great effort. However, in Austria's view, the benefits of the availability of objective military information to the pursuit of disarmament justify determined endeavours towards the step-by-step establishment of such an information system in the United Nations.

BYELORUSSIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC

[Original: Russian]

[21 June 1983]

1. The Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic abstained in the vote on General Assembly resolution 37/99 G, "Measures to provide objective information on military capabilities". Despite the fact that the resolution contains a number of provisions that merit support (deep concern about the continuing escalation of the arms race, in particular the nuclear-arms race, its exceptionally harmful effects, the interrelationship between disarmament, the relaxation of international tensions, respect for the right of self-determination and national independence, the peaceful settlement of disputes and the strengthening of international peace and security, and other such provisions), the conclusions which it draws are based on some questionable assumptions.

2. The initial premise, that misperceptions of military capabilities, which could be caused, inter alia, by lack of objective information, could induce States to undertake armaments programmes, does not, in our view, correspond to reality. There is no doubt that the stepping-up of the arms race, the constant attempts to extend it to new spheres and areas and the heightening of international tensions result from the eagerness of imperialist circles, the United States first among them, to attain military superiority over the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the socialist community as a whole. A number of statements in recent years by highly placed representatives of the American administration testify unambiguously to that fact.

3. The assertion in the resolution that objective information on military capabilities could contribute to the building of confidence among States and to the conclusion of concrete disarmament agreements cannot be given unqualified support either. No flows or amounts of information on military capabilities will create a climate of trust among States and prompt the containment of the arms race and the achievement of disarmament until States display the requisite political will to conclude agreements on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security. The States of the socialist community are consistently displaying such political will, as demonstrated by their numerous constructive foreign policy initiatives on containing the arms race, bringing about disarmament and strengthening international security and, in particular, the proposals in the Political Declaration of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty dated 5 January 1983. In addition, it is well known that the USSR, in a show of good will, has repeatedly taken substantial unilateral steps to decrease military confrontation and strengthen international security. Its unilateral commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons is of historic importance. It is now up to the Western States to move.

4. An exchange of military information is necessary and useful, but as part of the process of disarmament and in the framework of the relevant agreements. Such exchanges have taken place and are taking place, as the implementation of current disarmament agreements and negotiations on the subject show.

5. But isolating the question of exchanges of military information from the real process of containing the arms race and bringing about disarmament, turning it into an end in itself and a prior condition for any concrete moves on disarmament does not, in our view, make for real progress in this area. Posing the question in the form in which it appears in resolution 37/99 G can only divert attention from the truly pressing and difficult problems of disarmament and serve as a distraction from the concrete formulation of effective agreements to contain the arms race and bring about disarmament. This is also confirmed by the fact that circles hostile to détente and disarmament use the argument that information on military capabilities is "inadequate" to excuse their pursuit of an unbridled arms race towards military superiority, and resort to outright distortion of well-established data on armaments, which, in some cases, have been enshrined in international documents. This is principally true of attempts by the United States to deny the existence of a military balance between the USSR and the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bloc and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Actions of this kind conflict with paragraph 105 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which condemns States' dissemination of false and tendentious information concerning armaments.

6. In the light of the above, we see little value in the idea of taking special measures within the United Nations on the exchange of military information as a subject in isolation, unrelated to the real process of disarmament.

7. What is needed are concrete and practical steps to contain the arms race and bring about disarmament. The Byelorussian SSR will continue to take an active part in joint efforts by States to attain these goals.

CANADA

[Original: English]

[25 August 1983]

1. The Canadian Government voted for General Assembly resolution 37/99 G, which called upon all States, in particular nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, to consider additional measures to facilitate objective information on, as well as objective assessments of, military capabilities. Canadian support has been consistent for any measure which might serve to increase confidence among States. Objective information on, and objective assessments of, military capabilities would, in Canada's view, contribute to dispelling distrust and promoting confidence.

2. The idea of increased information in the military sphere is hardly a new one, yet little has resulted from past urgings and recommendations. For example, the United Nations Study on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, 3/ stated: "The steady reduction of secrecy about military efforts and their economic and social effects and the gradual elimination of the arms race are both necessary to break the vicious circle in which the arms race and unreasonable and excessive secrecy tend to reinforce each other". The same paragraph, in the Study's third

recommendation, concluded: "In order to fill the above-mentioned major gaps in the existing data, the Group therefore recommends a fuller and more systematic compilation and dissemination by Governments of data on the military use of human and material resources and military transfers ...".

3. The Canadian reply (A/S-12/13), in part, was as follows:

"The Canadian Government whole-heartedly supports the spirit and the letter of recommendation 3, and can point to concrete action on its part as proof of this support. Each year, detailed information is published concerning Canada's military expenditures. It would be difficult for any country to use the low degree of secrecy which exists in the Canadian defence budgetary area as a pretext for its own arms build-up."

4. After describing the efforts Canada has made to co-operate with the United Nations efforts to compile budgetary data, the reply continued:

"However, the Canadian Government has been disappointed, although not surprised, that not one country from the Warsaw Pact has apparently made any effort to shed more light on its military accounts for international examination. In the light of past calls from the Soviet Union to reduce military budgets, it is therefore difficult to view these calls as anything more than empty gestures for propaganda effect. These calls appear all the more hypocritical when judged against estimates of Soviet expenditures by recognized neutral and objective organizations such as the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), estimates which show a steady increase in military expenditures during the 1970s, whereas some significant Western States' defence budgets actually decreased. The Warsaw Pact States' total military spending is estimated as having increased, from 1971 to 1980, by 16.3 per cent, whereas, over an equivalent period, the total military spending of the member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) increased by 3.6 per cent."

5. It is clear that relative levels of military expenditures cannot be said to equate directly to corresponding relative levels of military capabilities. Thus, objective information on military capabilities would likely paint a clearer picture of relative military strengths of States than would military budgetary information. But, in view of the lack of co-operation by the Warsaw Pact States in reporting on military budgets, what are the possibilities of a positive reply to the present proposal?

6. Canada stands ready to forward detailed information on its own military capabilities, which is already published by its Department of National Defence, but, unless the co-operation of the Warsaw Pact countries is obtained, there appears to be limited value to expending the United Nations valuable resources on such a task.

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

[Original: French]

[22 June 1983]

1. In the face of the unbridled pursuit of excessive quantities of arms, particularly the most sophisticated weapons of mass destruction, and the great danger this creates for mankind, disarmament has become a vital necessity, a major imperative. The world wants peace and sincerely and legitimately aspires to it. The popular demonstrations that have taken place against the arms race in various places and the growing number of voices that are being raised here and there to condemn it are not, despite the suggestion that they are political and propagandistic, mere accident. They bear witness to a genuine and meaningful awakening to the apocalyptic danger of the arms race, especially the nuclear and thermonuclear arms race. Such demonstrations are a cry of alarm to the leaders of the two major super-Powers and to all peace-loving, justice-loving and freedom-loving countries to abandon their apocalyptic plans so as to save mankind from irretrievable disaster.
2. Everywhere we are helplessly witnessing the growing desire of States to acquire nuclear weapons and constantly to build up their military potential in order to ensure their defence capacity, which places a considerable strain on national budgets. Serious and reliable statistics indicate that between \$4 billion and \$6 billion is spent each day on the acquisition of these increasingly sophisticated weapons. At this time of serious recession in the world, which is the result of a persistent world-wide economic crisis, the arms industries are the most prosperous, and they are operating at full tilt.
3. The determination of States to pursue an excessive arms build-up will come to an end only when political leaders responsible for leading their peoples towards progress become genuinely aware of the real danger which the world faces, and mankind's vulnerability is clearly perceived to mean that no country, no matter what its military capacity or nuclear might, can survive a conflagration. This danger must be removed if the human species is to be saved.
4. The peace that exists at present, based not on a profound sense of security, which is what the world needs most, but on a theory of deterrence that relies primarily on a balance of forces, is entirely temporary and fragile. It will last so long as the two major super-Powers do not lose sight of the spectre of an apocalyptic conflagration. If they do, the balance will be suddenly upset and the peace jeopardized.
5. The polemic being carried on at present between the two great Powers concerning nuclear arms limitation and the recent decision taken by one of those Powers to develop a new system for destroying missiles in space are of significance in this respect. Polemic is certainly not conducive to calm. Quite the contrary. The political and one-upmanship, whether for domestic or external consumption, in which the two super-Powers are engaging in their effort to bolster the doctrine of strategic deterrence in order to impose their will is indicative of their hidden intention not to achieve general and complete disarmament, which is so fervently called for by all mankind.

6. Disarmament is more than a mere passing concern: it is an absolute necessity for the protection of the human species. As a determining factor for peace, which, in turn, is a factor for economic and social advancement, disarmament is necessary, indeed indispensable.

7. The Government of the Central African Republic notes the astounding and unacceptable paradox of today's world: while military budgets continue to increase, poverty with its corollaries, hunger, sickness and illiteracy, is worsening everywhere, especially in the developing countries and in the ghettos around the major industrial cities. Inadequate diet and malnutrition are widespread, and millions of children and adults die each day of malnutrition. At the same time, there is incredible waste in the rich countries. Such a situation is intolerable from the point of view of ethics and fairness; it shocks the human conscience, for it is the most brutal form of the violation of the human right to life, to the basic necessities, to satisfy one's hunger.

8. Obviously, general and complete disarmament, which the international community is so fervently calling for and which the United Nations is tirelessly working to bring about, would be an effective contribution to peace. If achieved, disarmament would release large sums of money from military budgets, which could be put to good use for development. It is absolutely correct to consider peace as a determining factor for development, and disarmament a determining factor for peace.

9. The Central African Republic, a developing country that is among the least developed and is facing enormous difficulties of every kind in its efforts to promote its advancement, perceives disarmament to be a vital necessity.

10. For that reason, the Government of the Central African Republic will firmly support every initiative taken by the United Nations to achieve disarmament and will join in every effort, wherever it may originate, undertaken towards that end.

COLOMBIA

[Original: Spanish]

[24 June 1983]

1. In analysing the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (resolution S-10/2) and especially paragraphs 39 and 103, referred to in resolution 37/99 J, entitled "Military research and development", and also paragraph 105, quoted in resolution 37/99 G, entitled "Measures to provide objective information on military capabilities", the following should be stressed:

(a) Our country is aware of the importance of qualitative and quantitative measures to achieve disarmament and to halt the arms race;

(b) The Colombian nation does not possess any weapons of mass destruction and is not involved in the development of any new means of warfare.

2. The results of the disarmament research that was to be promoted by the United Nations Centre for Disarmament and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization have not been received.

FINLAND

[Original: English]

[4 August 1983]

1. The Government of Finland shares the notion in the preamble of resolution 37/99 G that "misperceptions of the military capabilities and the intentions of potential adversaries, which could be caused, inter alia, by lack of objective information, could induce States to undertake armaments programmes leading to the acceleration of the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race". Because the acquisition of objective information on military capabilities could, most likely, contribute to curbing the acceleration of the arms race, Finland supports the idea of acquiring such information.

2. To achieve the purposes of such an exercise, the information should be collected in as objective, comprehensive and balanced a manner as possible. It is for this reason that the acquisition and evaluation of the information should be carried out on a permanent basis. The newly established Department for Disarmament Affairs and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) should have a central role in this respect.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF*

[Original: English]

[19 April 1983]

The Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and with reference to General Assembly resolution 37/99 G, "Measures to provide objective information on military capabilities", communicates the following on behalf of the 10 member States of the European Community:

1. The member States of the European Community voted for resolution 37/99 G, "Measures to provide objective information on military capabilities", and three of them co-sponsored it. The Ten regard the resolution as an important contribution to the efforts towards lowering the level of armaments in the world and hence the expenditure on them while ensuring undiminished security for all States.

* On behalf of the States members of the European Community.

2. In the opinion of the Ten, the availability of objective and verifiable information on the military strength of States is one of the prerequisites for the proper assessment of their military capabilities and of possible intentions to be derived from them. Greater openness and transparency can prevent misperceptions in this field and can increase the prospects of reducing mutual distrust with regard to possible military conduct. Measures for securing objective information should be among the first steps in any agreement on concrete and verifiable confidence-building measures in the military sector, as examined in the United Nations study on this subject. 1/

3. The Ten hold the view that it would be easier to achieve concrete results in negotiations on balanced and verifiable arms control and disarmament agreements if greater transparency and calculability existed with regard to the military strength of States. Moreover, the indispensable prerequisite for verifying compliance with such agreements is that mutually accepted data on the subject-matter in question are available.

4. The resolution rightly proceeds from the assumption that the efforts for obtaining objective and reliable information on the military strength of States must not start from scratch. It would therefore be expedient to take stock of the information already openly available in this field. For their part, the members of the European Community can cite the extensive openness existing in their countries, which is reflected particularly in the detailed information provided for their own parliaments and the public at large. The results of independent research are an important source of objective information and the Ten dispose of scientific instructions that enjoy international esteem by dint of their research for security purposes. In the United Nations context, the instrument for the international reporting of military expenditures should be regarded as an important contribution towards the same objective. To make this instrument really useful and valuable, the Ten consider it necessary that all States co-operate by reporting their military expenditures.

5. In the quest for additional measures to enlarge the information already available, the principle of a balanced approach must not, in the opinion of the Ten, be ignored. The goals referred to at the outset can be attained only if more objective and verifiable information on military strength is also provided by those States that have been very reticent until now. Security analyses are rendered less valuable if, with regard to some States, they are based on precise and detailed information whilst, with regard to others, on estimates alone.

6. The Ten are greatly encouraged by the large number of Member States of the United Nations that voted in favour of the resolution. They are willing to participate in the efforts to follow up this initiative. In so doing, they are mindful of the experience gained with United Nations initiatives by member of the Ten on similar subjects, such as confidence-building, verification and institutional questions. The Ten believe that the United Nations can play an important part in implementing measures aimed at securing improved information on military strength and in facilitating the objective assessment of military capabilities.

JAPAN

[Original: English]

[19 August 1983]

1. In view of the present international situation, we feel that international efforts for the prevention of an endless escalation of the arms race and the promotion of disarmament should be further strengthened.
2. It should be pointed out that one of the factors behind such an arms race is the sense of insecurity due to the inadequate amount of information available concerning the military strength of States. This was pointed out in General Assembly resolution 37/99 G.
3. We consider that in order to end this dangerous situation and to successfully conclude effective agreements on arms control and disarmament, greater openness in the military field and more objective evaluation of data and information are urgently needed as a part of confidence-building measures.
4. In this connection, we would like to draw attention to the address given by the Japanese Ambassador at the meeting of the First Committee of the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session. In that address, the Ambassador clearly stated that a proper understanding and perception of disarmament issues can play a positive role in promoting disarmament. Objective information and a wide variety of views as well as knowledge and data on disarmament issues including military matters must be freely and broadly disseminated and made freely accessible to the people in all countries regardless of their political, economic and social systems.
5. With regard to the purpose described in the paragraph 1 of resolution 37/99 G, the following two points should be noted:
 - (a) First and foremost, it should be pointed out that a comprehensive study on confidence-building measures was completed by the United Nations expert group in 1981 and concrete efforts are now expected to be made for the follow-up of this study through discussions within the framework of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. Therefore, adequate consideration should be given to the relationship between the new proposal put forward by the said resolution and the follow-up process of the United Nations study. 1/
 - (b) Secondly, it is necessary to establish certain criteria and definitions on the military data to be collected and evaluated so as to make this new proposal feasible and practical. Furthermore, it is preferable that a certain formula be worked out in order to evaluate the collected military data objectively. With regard to this, the standardized reporting instrument on military expenditures developed by the group of experts nominated by the Secretary-General of the United Nations would provide a good example.
6. Although it is not an easy task to find a new formula acceptable to all States as a concrete basis for objective assessment, it is desirable for the international community to continue its efforts in the search for such a device by utilizing the experience gained by the said reporting instrument.

NORWAY

[Original: English]

[22 June 1983]

1. The Norwegian Government has traditionally attached great importance to the need to provide objective information on military capabilities. This is of significance both as a means to promote disarmament efforts by constituting an indispensable basis for adequate verification and as a means to promote confidence-building by removing misperception and mistrust. Hence, the need for improved data in this respect is of direct relevance to the search for security by all States. While the existence of relevant data will not by itself alter fundamentally existing differences among States in the political field, easier availability of relevant information may assist in lessening tensions that may exist.
2. In the view of the Norwegian Government, the United Nations has an important role to play in efforts to improve the data base as regards military capabilities. Norway has for a number of years actively supported efforts undertaken within the framework of the United Nations in this field. Of particular importance in this respect has been the development of an international system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures.
3. The experience gathered so far in the use of this reporting instrument seems to suggest that, while working for new ways to increase United Nations involvement in the collection and dissemination of militarily relevant data, efforts must also be made to achieve wider use of the instruments and procedures that actually are in place.
4. Parallel with such efforts, however, attention could usefully be directed at ways to further strengthen the role of the United Nations in this field including ways in which the United Nations might generate data of its own as suggested in the study on the implications of establishing an international satellite monitoring agency (A/AC.206/14).
5. It seems that the establishment of a separate Department for Disarmament Affairs within the United Nations will greatly facilitate continued efforts in this respect, both in terms of data collection and analysis thereof. As regards the future role of the United Nations in this field, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research might also play a most useful role.
6. In order to promote these general objectives it would seem important that the necessary resources be made available within the United Nations budget in order to ensure that the possibilities offered by the United Nations by providing relevant and objective information in the military field be fully explored.

PORTUGAL

[Original: French]

[8 July 1983]

1. The absence of objective information on the military capabilities of States, particularly nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, introduces an element of uncertainty into international relations which, by increasing mistrust between States, may cause the decision-making centres responsible for defence to exaggerate the vulnerability levels of their respective countries. The perception, real or imagined, of vulnerability levels that exceed the maximum tolerance limits set by each country tends to give rise to actions that are aimed at realigning these levels with the acceptable limits and generally take the form of quantitative and qualitative increases in military power.
2. Such actions, however, breed mistrust in other States, which, unaware of the true nature of the intentions, tend to interpret them as a threat to their own security and generally set in motion a process identical to the one described above in order to remedy what they perceive as deficiencies in their own defence.
3. Thus, mutual mistrust, based on the uncertainty resulting from an inadequate knowledge of the real military power of other States and ignorance of their intentions, is one of the main causes of the arms race.
4. The Portuguese Government considers that actions to promote or facilitate the flow of objective information on the military capabilities and intentions of States make a genuine contribution to the efforts of the international community to build greater confidence, thereby helping not only to relieve tensions in relations but also to facilitate negotiations on disarmament and arms control. It recognizes, however, that the initiative provided for in General Assembly resolution 37/99 G, which it supported, gives rise to a number of difficulties, the most serious of which concern the impact of that initiative on the security of States.
5. Thus, in order to ensure the success of the initiative, it will be necessary to find a compromise solution that achieves a balance between the need for greater transparency with respect to military capabilities and intentions, on the one hand, and the legitimate right to security, on the other, so that no State perceives the initiative as diminishing its security.
6. Technological innovations in the field of information research, analysis, dissemination and evaluation should be of great benefit in bringing about more openness in military matters. Nevertheless, in order to ensure that the right of States to security is not impaired by this initiative, it will be necessary to define with the utmost precision the objectives set, the field of application, the categories in the field of application that are essential to the objectives set, and the criteria for analysing and evaluating the information obtained, together with the rights and duties of States.

7. The United Nations must play a central role in making the necessary arrangements for the achievement of the objectives proposed by the international community in the above-mentioned resolution. In particular, existing institutions concerned with disarmament and arms control must be called upon to contribute in the area of their responsibilities. Accordingly, careful consideration should be given to the possibilities offered by the international satellite monitoring agency in verifying compliance with disarmament and arms control agreements, by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and by the Department for Disarmament affairs; and ways of responding to requests addressed to them should be found.

8. In view of the extremely sensitive nature of this subject, it would be desirable to undertake, at the appropriate time, a practical experiment designed to evaluate difficulties and find ways of solving them.

9. In the meantime, the adoption of confidence-building measures, even those that are most simple and easy to implement, could represent an important first step towards making military matters more transparent. An advantage of such measures, moreover, is that they can be negotiated at the regional level, which is in keeping with the fact that most of the tensions affecting international life have a weighty regional component.

10. Furthermore, a study on confidence-building measures was carried out in accordance with a decision of the General Assembly; that study, issued in document A/36/474, 1/ could constitute a fruitful source of inspiration for the negotiations.

SWEDEN

[Original: English]

[10 May 1983]

In the view of the Swedish Government, much valuable information on military capabilities is already available in material furnished by States as a result of the United Nations work carried out within the context of earlier and ongoing studies on military expenditures. Further information will become available in the forthcoming United Nations study on military research and development. As pointed out in the Swedish Government's communications on these two studies, the Swedish Government attaches great importance to their results as they provide means and measures to facilitate objective assessments of, and objective information on, military capabilities.

UKRAINIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC

[Original: Russian]

[9 June 1983]

1. The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic fully shares the General Assembly's deep concern, expressed in that resolution, about the continuing escalation of the

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arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security and the waste of human and material resources for military purposes.

2. As a result of the intensified activity of reactionary militaristic forces in the Western countries, especially the United States of America, the development of the international situation has become extremely dangerous. The United States of America and its allies have recently opted for the acquisition of military superiority over the socialist countries and proceeded to tighten the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race, by one more turn, fraught with extremely dangerous consequences.

3. It is this policy of whipping up the arms race, designed to ensure military advantages for the West, that is responsible for the lack of progress in solving such urgent and vital problems as the averting of a nuclear catastrophe, the limitation and reduction of strategic weapons, the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe, the prohibition of chemical weapons, the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and other problems relating to disarmament and to the strengthening of world peace. At all negotiations that are in any way connected with curbing the arms race, the position of the United States is unconstructive and obstructionistic.

4. The Ukrainian SSR believes that the acceleration of the arms race and the exacerbation of international tension are brought on not by any lack of information concerning military capabilities but by a lack of political will on the part of the United States and other NATO countries to achieve a reduction of armaments on the basis of equality and equal security and by the militaristic policy of those States. Moreover, the invented pretext of an inadequacy of military information is being used by the initiators of the arms race for unseemly manoeuvres aimed at misrepresenting known and universally recognized facts, distorting the true situation and, ultimately, blocking the current disarmament negotiations, which is contrary, inter alia, to paragraph 105 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (resolution S-10/2).

5. For these reasons, the Ukrainian SSR considers it inadvisable to take any special measures aimed at expanding the volume of military information and involving the United Nations in this process.

6. The exchange of appropriate military information can be useful and necessary in the process of disarmament only if it is determined by the specific needs of individual agreements and measures of real disarmament and not proposed as a general precondition.

7. The strengthening of confidence between States and the reduction of the military confrontation can be facilitated by specific and real measures - for example, the broad programme for the cessation of the arms race, the easing of tension and the establishment of a favourable political situation that was advanced in the Prague political declaration of the States members of the Warsaw Treaty, or in the most recent proposals of the Soviet Union. The easing of international tension and the creation of a climate of confidence are also facilitated by many unilateral actions taken by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, including

especially the Soviet Union's undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. The peaceful initiatives of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries indicate the true way to remove the danger hanging over mankind.

8. The Ukrainian SSR declares its readiness to co-operate with all those who truly strive for the strengthening of peace and the preservation and deepening of international détente.

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

[Original: Russian]

[24 May 1983]

1. The resolution emphasizes inter alia the harmful effects of the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race and the need for taking measures to strengthen peace and build confidence among States. Those views are similar to the position held by the Soviet Union.
2. Today there is not and cannot be any problem more important than the taking of prompt and urgent measures to halt mankind's slide towards the nuclear abyss, put an end to the arms race and make the transition to genuine arms-reduction measures. At the same time, curbing the arms race and normalizing the international situation provide the most important way to build confidence among States, without which it is impossible even to reduce the threat of war.
3. This is the purpose of the specific initiatives taken by the Soviet Union. A broad programme of measures aimed at the halting of the arms race and the elimination of weapons, especially nuclear weapons, was proposed in the Political Declaration of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty adopted at Prague on 5 January 1983. As a demonstration of good will, the USSR has also repeatedly taken important steps unilaterally with a view to reducing military confrontation and strengthening the atmosphere of confidence. Of special importance among these steps is the Soviet Union's undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.
4. The exchange of information on armaments and armed forces referred to in General Assembly resolution 37/99 G not only is not excluded from the process of disarmament but may in fact be a desirable and feasible thing which will help to strengthen international confidence. This is demonstrated, in particular, by the experience of the preparation and implementation of previously concluded arms-limitation agreements. All that is necessary is that such an exchange of information should be inextricably linked with specific disarmament measures and should not be undertaken as some kind of isolated preliminary step.
5. However, in recent years the leading Western countries, especially the United States, have begun an unprecedented build-up of armaments in an effort to destroy the existing military balance and gain superiority over the socialist States. This fact, not a lack of information on military capabilities, is the reason why the negotiations on many specific problems of arms limitation and disarmament have

generally been broken off and why the negotiations now in progress are, for practical purposes, merely marking time. This applies both to the Soviet-United States negotiations on strategic weapons and those concerning medium-range weapons in Europe. The success of those negotiations, which affects the security interests of all States, would do much to reduce the nuclear danger.

6. The lack of political will to halt the arms race and the unwillingness to seek mutually acceptable agreements based on equality and equal security which are being displayed by the United States and the NATO countries cannot be compensated for by any flow of information on armaments and armed forces, by any investigations of the comparability of military information or the like.

7. As the facts show, bringing up the question of an expansion of the exchange of military information in isolation from specific disarmament measures is a tactic which those who oppose halting the arms race use in order that they may continue to avoid considering the substance of the relevant problems and searching for mutually acceptable solutions. Moreover, it is they who, in order to find some justification for their militaristic course, talk of an inadequacy of military information and resort to a deliberate distortion of the true ratio of military forces, including the situation in spheres in which the facts about the relevant armaments are well known and universally recognized. This is true, in particular, of United States attempts to deny the existence of a balance between the Soviet Union and the United States in the field of strategic weapons, which was carefully adjusted as a result of almost seven years of negotiations between the parties in preparation for the Salt II Treaty and was confirmed by the Heads of State upon signing the Treaty. Such attempts to misrepresent the facts are clearly contrary to paragraph 105 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in which States are called upon to avoid disseminating information concerning armaments and armed forces which they know to be false and tendentious.

8. In the light of this, it is impossible to agree that lack of information on the military capabilities of States is what stimulates the arms race. Furthermore, since the United States and some other NATO States have refused to engage in constructive negotiations on arms limitation and have incessantly tried to gain military superiority over the socialist countries, any expansion of the exchange of information of this kind not only would not help to strengthen mutual confidence but could lead to directly opposite results.

9. For these reasons, the Soviet Union does not regard it as a useful idea to take special steps to expand the exchange of military information and to involve the United Nations in this matter.

10. The Soviet Union, for its part, will continue to stand firmly for concrete measures to limit armaments and strengthen international security and continue to participate as actively as possible in the collective efforts of States in this sphere.

ZAMBIA

[Original: English]

[23 June 1983]

As per resolution 37/99 G, no views could be communicated solely because Zambia is a militarily insignificant country.

Notes

- 1/ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.82.IX.3.
- 2/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-first Session, Supplement No. 36 (A/31/36).
- 3/ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.82.IX.1.
