

REPORT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
OFFICIAL RECORDS: THIRTY-SEVENTH SESSION
SUPPLEMENT No. 27 (A/37/27)



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NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

[6 October 1982]

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Committee on Disarmament submits to the thirty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly its annual report on its 1982 session, together with the pertinent documents and records. This report also includes an account of the organization of the Committee (Part II) and of the Committee's work based on the agenda adopted for 1982 (Part III).

II. ORGANIZATION OF WORK OF THE COMMITTEE

A. 1982 Session of the Committee

2. The Committee was in session from 2 February to 23 April and from 3 August to 17 September 1982. During this period, the Committee held 39 formal plenary meetings at which member States as well as non-member States invited to participate in the discussions set forth their views and recommendations on the various questions before the Committee.

3. The Committee also held 35 informal meetings on its agenda, programme of work, organization and procedures, as well as on items of its agenda and other matters.

4. In accordance with rule 9 of the Rules of Procedure, the following member States assumed the Chairmanship of the Committee: Iran for February, Italy for March, Japan for April and the recess between the first and second parts of the 1982 session of the Committee, Kenya for August and Mexico for September and the recess until the 1983 session of the Committee.

B. Participants in the Work of the Committee

5. Representatives of the following member States participated in the work of the Committee: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zaire. The consolidated list of participants in the first and second parts of the session is included as Appendix I to the report.

C. Agenda for the 1982 Session and Programme of Work for the First and Second Parts of the Session

6. At the 156th plenary meeting on 18 February 1982, the Chairman submitted a proposal on the Committee's provisional agenda for the 1982 session and the programme of work for the first part of the session, in conformity with rule 29 of the rules of procedure. In submitting that proposal, the Chairman made the following statement (CD/PV.156):

"In connection with the adoption of the agenda for 1982 and the programme of work for the first part of the session, it is understood that the question of the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present can be considered under item 2 of the agenda, as was done last year.

Taking into account the views expressed, the Committee will decide to hold informal meetings at an appropriate time to consider item 7 of the agenda during the first part of the session. The further treatment of this item during the second part of the session will be decided in the light of the situation then prevailing. In considering this item the recommendations contained in General Assembly resolutions 36/97 C and 36/99 will be duly taken into account."

7. At the same plenary meeting, the Committee adopted its agenda and programme of work. Some delegations made statements in that connection. The text of the agenda and programme of work for the first part of the session (document CD/242) reads as follows:

"The Committee on Disarmament, as the multilateral negotiating forum, shall promote the attainment of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

"The Committee, taking into account inter alia the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, will deal with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures in the following areas:

- I. Nuclear weapons in all aspects;
- II. Chemical weapons;
- III. Other weapons of mass destruction;
- IV. Conventional weapons;
- V. Reduction of military budgets;
- VI. Reduction of armed forces;
- VII. Disarmament and development;
- VIII. Disarmament and international security;
- IX. Collateral measures; confidence-building measures; effective verification methods in relation to appropriate disarmament measures, acceptable to all parties concerned;
- X. Comprehensive programme of disarmament leading to general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

"Within the above framework, the Committee on Disarmament adopts the following agenda for 1982 which includes items that, in conformity with the provisions of section VIII of its rules of procedure, would be considered by the Committee:

1. Nuclear test ban.
2. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.
3. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapons States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
4. Chemical weapons.
5. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons.
6. Comprehensive programme of disarmament.
7. Prevention of an arms race in outer space.
8. Consideration and adoption of:
 - (a) the special report to the second special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament; and
 - (b) the annual report to the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly.

"The Committee will conduct its work bearing in mind the contribution that it should make to the success of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

PROGRAMME OF WORK

"In compliance with rule 28 of its rules of procedure, the Committee also adopts the following programme of work for the first part of its 1982 session:

2 - 16 February	Statements in the plenary. Consideration of the agenda and programme of work as well as of the establishment of subsidiary bodies on items of the agenda. ^{2/}
17 - 23 February	Nuclear test ban.
24 February - 5 March	Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.
8 - 12 March	Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
15 - 19 March	New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons.
22 - 26 March	Chemical weapons.
29 March - 6 April	Comprehensive programme of disarmament.
7 - 23 April	Consideration of the reports of the subsidiary bodies; ^{3/} consideration and adoption of the special report to the second special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament. ^{4/}

"Informal meetings of the Committee will be held at an appropriate time during the first part of the session to consider item 7 of the agenda.

"Informal meetings of the Committee will also be held early during the session to continue consideration of the modalities of the review of its membership, including proposals submitted by members for the improved and effective functioning of the Committee."

^{2/} These questions will continue to be considered subsequently, if necessary, at informal meetings of the Committee.

^{3/} Reports of subsidiary bodies that are ready may be considered earlier.

^{4/} In accordance with rule 44 of the rules of procedure the draft report shall be made available to all member States of the Committee for consideration at least two weeks before the scheduled date for its adoption.

8. At its 174th plenary meeting, the Committee decided to close the first part of the 1982 session on 23 April and to begin the second part of the session on 3 August 1982.

9. During the second part of the 1982 session of the Committee, the Chairman submitted, at the 176th plenary meeting on 5 August 1982, a proposal on the programme of work for the second part of the session. At the same meeting, the Committee adopted the programme of work proposed by the Chairman (CD/304). It reads as follows:

"In compliance with rule 28 of its rules of procedure, the Committee on Disarmament adopts the following programme of work for the second part of its 1982 session:^{5/}

3 - 6 August

Statements in plenary meetings. Consideration of the programme of work for the second part of the 1982 session, as well as of the establishment of additional subsidiary bodies.

9 - 13 August

Chemical weapons.

16 - 20 August

Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

23 - 27 August

Nuclear test ban.

30 August - 1 September

Prevention of an arms race in outer space.

2 - 3 September

Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

6 - 7 September

New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons.^{6/}

8 - 9 September

Comprehensive programme of disarmament.

10 - 14 September

Consideration of the reports of subsidiary bodies.

Consideration and adoption of the annual report to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

^{5/} The Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons began its work on 20 July.

^{6/} Informal meetings of the Committee shall be held during this week under item 5 of the agenda "New Types of Weapons of Mass Destruction and New Systems of Such Weapons", with a view to examining proposals and suggestions pertaining to this issue. Participation of experts will be welcome in these proceedings. The informal meetings will be open to States not members of the Committee and to their respective experts.

"Plenary meetings shall be scheduled on a weekly basis, keeping in mind the workload of the Committee and its subsidiary bodies.

"In accordance with previous decisions of the Committee (CD/292, para. 17) informal meetings shall be held during the second part of the session on ways and means of enhancing the effectiveness of the Committee's operations.

"Meetings of the ad hoc working groups will be convened after consultations between the Chairman of the Committee and the Chairmen of the ad hoc working groups according to the circumstances and needs of the various groups.

"As decided by the Committee at its 167th plenary meeting, the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events shall meet from 9 to 20 August.

"The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons will hold consultations with delegations on technical questions from 2 to 6 August.

"In adopting its programme of work, the Committee has kept in mind the provisions of rules 30 and 31 of its Rules of Procedure."

10. At its 187th plenary meeting, on 16 September 1982, the Committee decided to close its 1982 session on 17 September.

D. Participation by States not Members of the Committee

11. In conformity with rule 32 of the Rules of Procedure, the following States not members of the Committee attended plenary meetings of the Committee: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Holy See, Ireland, Madagascar, Norway, Portugal, Senegal, Spain, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey and Viet Nam.

12. The Committee received and considered requests to participate in its work from States not members of the Committee. In accordance with the Rules of Procedure, the Committee invited:

(a) the representatives of Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Norway, Senegal and Spain to participate during 1982 in the discussions on the substantive items on the agenda at plenary and informal meetings of the Committee, as well as in the meetings of Ad Hoc Working Groups established for the 1982 session;

(b) the representative of Turkey to participate during 1982 in the discussions on the substantive items on the agenda at plenary and informal meetings of the Committee, as well as in the meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament;

(c) the representative of Tunisia to participate during 1982 in the meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament and the Ad Hoc Working Group on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons; and

(d) the representative of Switzerland to participate during 1982 in the discussions on chemical weapons at plenary and informal meetings of the Committee, as well as in the meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Group established on that item.

E. Proposal for an Addition to Rule 25 of the Rules of Procedure

13. On 13 September 1982, the Group of 21 ^{7/} submitted a working paper entitled "Establishment of subsidiary organs" (CD/330), for possible consideration at the 1983 session of the Committee.

F. Consideration of the Modalities of the Review of the Membership of the Committee and Related Matters

14. In accordance with the programme of work adopted for the first part of the 1982 session, the Committee held a number of informal meetings for the consideration of that question, including proposals for the improved and effective functioning of the Committee.

15. The Substantive account of the discussions on the subject since 1980, including the first part of the 1982 session, is contained in paragraphs 14-22 of the Special Report of the Committee on Disarmament to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (CD/292 and Corr.1-3).^{8/}

16. This subject was also dealt with in paragraphs 55, 56 and 62 of the Concluding Document of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament,^{9/} which are of direct relevance to the subject under consideration by the Committee.

17. At the second part of its 1982 session, the Committee held a number of informal meetings and consultations for the consideration of the modalities of the review of its membership including as requested by the General Assembly the question of an expansion, consistent with the need to enhance its effectiveness. At those meetings the Committee also considered the question of its improved and effective functioning.

18. The Committee took into account the views expressed in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament to the effect that "for maximum effectiveness ... the negotiating body for the sake of convenience should have a relatively small membership", and that there is a "continuing requirement for a

^{7/} Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire.

^{8/} Also issued as Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Special Session, Supplement No. 2 (A/S-12/2).

^{9/} A/S-12/32.

single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of limited size taking decisions on the basis of consensus". At the same time the interest shown by a number of States seeking to become full members of the Committee, in particular Austria, Bangladesh, Finland, Ireland, Norway, Senegal, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey and Viet Nam who addressed formal applications to the Committee on Disarmament on this issue, was welcomed. The Committee recognizes the legitimate concern of non-member States in the success of disarmament negotiations and their right to participate in multilateral negotiations.

19. No objection in principle was raised to a limited expansion of the membership, but there are differences of opinion over how best to deal with it in practice and in conformity with the views expressed in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament mentioned in the preceding paragraph. Paragraph 20 of the Committee's special report to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament indicates the different views held on this matter.

20. The Committee is conscious of the fact that requests for membership will be made from time to time. It is examining ways and means of dealing with the present as well as future requests. In this connection proposals were made on the question of criteria and procedures for limited expansion, as well as on a possible revision of the organizational structure of the negotiating forum, etc. The Committee intends to continue its examination of these matters during the 1983 session and will report on the results to the thirty-eighth regular session of the United Nations General Assembly.

21. The Committee also has before it several proposals concerning its improved and effective functioning (CD/200, CD/204, CD/330, CD/PV.150, CD/PV.186 and Working Paper No. 45). They embrace a variety of matters including procedure, organization, duration of sessions, representation, rationalization of work programmes, fuller participation of non-member States, strengthening of the secretariat, etc. The Committee intends to continue to give active consideration during its 1983 session to these proposals as well as others that may be made, and will proceed to implement those that obtain consensus. It is fully aware of the need to examine periodically its work procedures and organization with a view to improving its performance as the sole multilateral negotiating body for disarmament measures.

22. Meanwhile, the Committee appreciates the participation of interested non-members and will do everything possible under its rules of procedure to facilitate their fuller participation in its work and that of its subsidiary bodies.

G. Communications from Non-Governmental Organizations

23. In accordance with rule 42 of the Rules of Procedure, lists of all communications from non-governmental organizations and persons were circulated to the Committee (documents CD/NGC. 5 and 6).

III. SUBSTANTIVE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE DURING ITS 1982 SESSION

24. The substantive work of the Committee during its 1982 session was based on its agenda and programme of work adopted for the year. The list of documents issued by the Committee, as well as the texts of those documents, are included as Appendix II to the report. An index of the verbatim records by country and subject, listing the statements made by delegations during 1982, and the verbatim records of the meetings of the Committee are attached as Appendix III to the report.

25. The Committee had before it a letter dated 1 February 1982 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations (CD/231) transmitting all the resolutions on disarmament adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session in 1981, in particular those entrusting specific responsibilities to the Committee on Disarmament:

- 36/84 "Cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons"
- 36/85 "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 35/145 B"
- 36/89 "Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons"
- 36/92 E "Nuclear weapons in all aspects"
- 36/92 F "Report of the Committee on Disarmament"
- 36/92 K "Prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon"
- 36/92 M "Implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session"
- 36/94 "Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons"
- 36/95 "Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons"
- 36/96 A "Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons"
- 36/96 B "Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons"
- 36/97 B "Conclusion of an international convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons"
- 36/97 C "Prevention of an arms race in outer space"

- 36/97 E "Non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present"
- 36/97 G "Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes"
- 36/97 J "Report of the Committee on Disarmament"
- 36/99 "Conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space"

26. In the same letter, the Secretary-General drew attention, in particular, to the following provisions of those resolutions:

(1) In resolution 36/84, operative paragraph 4 urges all States members of the Committee on Disarmament: (a) to bear in mind that the consensus rule should not be used in such a manner as to prevent the establishment of subsidiary bodies for the effective discharge of the functions of the Committee; (b) to support the creation by the Committee, as from the beginning of its session in 1982, of an ad hoc working group which should begin the multilateral negotiation of a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests; (c) to exert their best endeavours in order that the Committee may transmit to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament the multilaterally negotiated text of such a treaty.

(2) In resolution 36/85, operative paragraph 5 reiterates the conviction of the General Assembly that the Committee on Disarmament has an indispensable role in the negotiation of a treaty prohibiting nuclear testing; operative paragraph 6 requests the Committee on Disarmament to take the necessary steps, including the establishment of a working group, to initiate substantive negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty as a matter of the highest priority at the beginning of its session to be held in 1982; operative paragraph 7 also requests the Committee on Disarmament to determine, in the context of its negotiations on such a treaty, the institutional and administrative arrangements necessary for establishing, testing and operating an international seismic monitoring network and an effective verification system; operative paragraph 8 further requests the Committee on Disarmament to exert all efforts in order that the draft of such a treaty may be submitted to the General Assembly at the earliest possible date; operative paragraph 9 urges all members of the

Committee on Disarmament, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to co-operate with the Committee in fulfilling its mandate; and operative paragraph 10 calls upon the Committee on Disarmament to report on progress to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament and at its thirty-seventh session.

(3) In resolution 36/89, operative paragraph 1 requests the Committee on Disarmament, in the light of its existing priorities, to intensify negotiations, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, with a view to preparing a draft comprehensive agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, and to draft possible agreements on particular types of such weapons; and operative paragraph 5 requests the Committee on Disarmament to submit a report on the results achieved to the General Assembly for consideration at its thirty-seventh session.

(4) In resolution 36/92 E, operative paragraph 2 notes the decision of the Committee on Disarmament to resume intensive consideration, at its session to be held in 1982, of the item on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament; operative paragraph 3 calls upon the Committee on Disarmament, as a matter of priority and for the purpose of an early commencement of the negotiations on the substance of the problem, to continue consultations in which to consider, inter alia, the establishment of an ad hoc working group on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and on nuclear disarmament with a clearly defined mandate; operative paragraph 4 deems it appropriate, as envisaged in paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, that the Committee on Disarmament should proceed, as the first step, to the consideration of stages of nuclear disarmament and their tentative content, inter alia, the content of the first stage; operative paragraph 5 also deems it appropriate to consider, within the framework of the discussion on the content of measures to be carried out during the first stage, the question of the cessation of the development and deployment of new types and systems of nuclear weapons; and operative paragraph 6 requests the Committee on Disarmament to report on the results of those negotiations to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session.

(5) In resolution 36/92 F, operative paragraph 1 urges the Committee on Disarmament to continue or undertake, during its session to be held in 1982, substantive negotiations on the priority questions of disarmament on its agenda, in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and the other relevant resolutions of the Assembly on these questions and, in order to reach that goal, to provide the existing ad hoc working groups with appropriate negotiating mandates and to establish, as a matter of urgency, ad hoc working groups on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament and on the prohibition of all nuclear-weapons tests; operative paragraph 2 requests the Committee on Disarmament to complete, during the first part of its session in 1982, the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament and to submit the programme in time for consideration and adoption by the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament, to be held from 7 June to 9 July 1982; operative paragraph 3 also requests the Committee on Disarmament to intensify its negotiations on priority questions of disarmament, so that it may be in a position to contribute, through concrete accomplishments, to the success of the second special session devoted to disarmament; and operative paragraph 5 further requests the Committee on Disarmament to submit to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament a special report on the state of negotiations on the various questions under consideration by the Committee and also to submit a report on its work to the Assembly at its thirty-seventh session.

(6) In resolution 36/92 K, operative paragraph 1 requests the Committee on Disarmament to start without delay negotiations in an appropriate organizational framework with a view to concluding a convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons; and operative paragraph 3 requests the Committee on Disarmament to submit a report on this question to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session.

(7) In resolution 36/92 M, operative paragraph 4 recommends that the Committee on Disarmament should concentrate its work on the substantive and priority items on its agenda with a view to achieving tangible results in order

to contribute to the success of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and to the accomplishment of the tasks set forth in the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade.

(8) In resolution 36/94, operative paragraph 2 notes with satisfaction that in the Committee on Disarmament there is once again no objection, in principle, to the idea of an international convention on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; operative paragraph 3 requests the Committee on Disarmament to continue the negotiations on the question of strengthening the security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States during its session in 1982, and operative paragraph 4 calls upon all States participating in these negotiations to make efforts for the elaboration and conclusion of an international convention on this matter.

(9) In resolution 36/95, operative paragraph 2 notes with satisfaction that in the Committee on Disarmament there is no objection, in principle, to the idea of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, although the difficulties as regards evolving a common approach acceptable to all have also been pointed out; operative paragraph 4 recommends that further intensive efforts should be devoted to the search for a "common approach" or "common formula" and that the various alternative approaches, including in particular those considered during the session of the Committee on Disarmament held in 1981, should be further explored in order to overcome the difficulties; and operative paragraph 5 recommends that the Committee on Disarmament should actively continue negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement and concluding effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, taking into account the widespread support for the conclusion of an international convention and giving consideration to any other proposals designed to secure the same objective.

(10) In resolution 36/96 A, operative paragraph 5 urges the Committee on Disarmament to continue, as from the beginning of its session to be held in 1982, negotiations on a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical

weapons and on their destruction as a matter of high priority, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives, and in particular to re-establish its Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons with an appropriately revised mandate enabling the Committee to achieve agreement on a chemical weapons convention at the earliest date; and operative paragraph 4 requests the Committee on Disarmament to report on the results of its negotiations to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament, to be held in 1982, and at its thirty-seventh session.

(11) In resolution 36/96 B, operative paragraph 3 urges the Committee on Disarmament to continue, as from the beginning of its session to be held in 1982, negotiations on a multilateral convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction as a matter of high priority, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives, and in particular to re-establish its Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, with an appropriately revised mandate enabling the Committee to achieve agreement on a chemical weapons convention at the earliest date.

(12) In resolution 36/97 B, operative paragraph 1 calls upon the Committee on Disarmament to continue negotiations with a view to an early conclusion of the elaboration of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons, in order that it may be submitted if possible to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament, to be held in 1982; and operative paragraph 2 takes note, in this connexion, of the recommendation of the Ad Hoc Working Group, in the report adopted by the Committee on Disarmament, to set up at the beginning of its session to be held in 1982 a further ad hoc working group, under an appropriate mandate to be determined at that time, to continue negotiations on the elaboration of a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons.

(13) In resolution 36/97 C, operative paragraph 3 requests the Committee on Disarmament to consider, as from the beginning of its session in 1982, the question of negotiating effective and verifiable agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space, taking into account all existing and future proposals designed to meet this objective; operative paragraph 4 requests the

Committee on Disarmament to consider as a matter of priority the question of negotiating an effective and verifiable agreement to prohibit anti-satellite systems, as an important step towards the fulfilment of the objectives set out in paragraph 3 above; and operative paragraph 5 requests the Committee on Disarmament to report on its consideration of this subject to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session.

(14) In resolution 36/97 E, operative paragraph 1 requests once again the Committee on Disarmament to proceed without delay to talks with a view to elaborating an international agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present; and operative paragraph 4 requests the Committee on Disarmament to submit a report on the question to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session.

(15) In resolution 36/97 G, the operative paragraph requests the Committee on Disarmament, at an appropriate stage of its work on the item entitled "Nuclear weapons in all aspects", to pursue its consideration of the question of adequately verified cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and to keep the General Assembly informed of the progress of that consideration.

(16) In resolution 36/97 J, operative paragraph 2 recommends that the first review of the membership of the Committee on Disarmament should be completed, following appropriate consultation among Member States, during the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament; and operative paragraph 3 reaffirms that States not members of the Committee on Disarmament should, upon their request, continue to be invited by it to participate in the work of the Committee.

(17) In resolution 36/99, operative paragraph 2 requests the Committee on Disarmament to embark on negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on the text of an appropriate international treaty, to prevent the spread of the arms race to outer space.

27. By the same letter and in compliance with paragraph 7 of resolution 36/92 G and paragraph 5 of resolution 36/97 D, the Secretary-General transmitted to the Committee the study on the relationship between disarmament and development, as contained in document A/36/356 and Corr.1, and the study of the institutional

arrangements relating to the process of disarmament, as contained in document A/36/392. In accordance with General Assembly resolutions 36/89, 36/92 K, 36/97 B, 36/97 C and 36/97 E, the Secretary-General also transmitted to the Committee all documents relevant to the subjects considered by those resolutions.

28. At the 150th plenary meeting of the Committee on 2 February 1982, the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General and Secretary of the Committee conveyed to the Committee a message from the Secretary-General at the opening of the 1982 session (CD/234).

29. The Committee also had before it a letter dated 3 August 1982 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament (CD/300) in connection with those paragraphs of the Concluding Document of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament which are of direct relevance to the work of the Committee.

30. In addition to the documents listed under specific agenda items, the Committee received the following documents:

(a) Document CD/235, dated 4 February 1982, submitted by the delegation of Romania, entitled "Messages from the President of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Nicolae Ceausescu, addressed to Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and to Ronald Reagan, President of the United States of America, concerning the Geneva negotiations on the halting of the deployment in Europe and the withdrawal from that continent of medium-range missiles".

(b) Document CD/236, dated 4 February 1982, submitted by the delegation of Romania, entitled "Appeal of the Romanian Parliament to the Parliaments, the Governments and the peoples of the European countries, the United States of America and Canada".

(c) Document CD/237, dated 4 February 1982, submitted by the delegation of Romania, entitled "Appeal by the people of Romania, to the peoples and forward-looking democratic forces of the world, for disarmament and peace, security, independence and progress".

(d) Document CD/240, dated 10 February 1982, submitted by the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics entitled "Excerpts from the report on the reception by L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, of representatives of the Advisory Council of the Socialist International on Disarmament".

(e) Document CD/241, dated 17 February 1982, submitted by a group of socialist States^{10/} entitled "Considerations relating to the organization of work of the Committee on Disarmament in the course of its 1982 session".

(f) Document CD/262, dated 17 March 1982, submitted by the delegation of Romania, entitled "Scientists and Disarmament".

(g) Document CD/267, dated 24 March 1982, submitted by the delegation of Yugoslavia, entitled "A Statement issued by the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia".

(h) Document CD/297, dated 28 July 1982, submitted by the delegation of Romania, entitled "Appeal of the Romanian people to the United Nations General Assembly at its special session devoted to disarmament: for disarmament, for a Europe without nuclear weapons, for a world of peace!".

(i) Document CD/315, dated 19 August 1982, submitted by the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entitled "Averting the growing nuclear threat and curbing the arms race: Memorandum of the USSR".

A. Nuclear Test Ban

31. The item on the agenda entitled "Nuclear Test Ban" was considered by the Committee, in accordance with its programme of work, during the periods from 17 to 23 February and from 23 to 27 August.

32. The Committee had before it the progress reports on the thirteenth and fourteenth sessions of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, as contained in documents CD/260 and CD/318. The Ad Hoc Group met from 1 to 12 March and from 9 to 20 August 1982.

33. In addition, the following new documents were presented to the Committee in connection with the item:

^{10/} Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

(a) Document CD/257, dated 8 March 1982, submitted by the delegation of Sweden, entitled "An International System for the Detection of Airborne Radio-activity from Nuclear Explosions".

(b) Document CD/259, dated 12 March 1982, submitted by the delegation of the German Democratic Republic, entitled "Draft mandates for ad hoc working groups on a nuclear test ban, and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament".

(c) Document CD/287, dated 20 April 1982, submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entitled "Proposal for the establishment of an ad hoc working group under Item 1 of the agenda entitled 'Nuclear Test Ban'."

(d) Document CD/310, dated 11 August 1982, submitted by Norway, entitled "Working paper on a prototype system for international exchange of seismological data under a comprehensive test ban treaty".

(e) Document CD/312 and Corr.1, dated 11 August 1982, submitted by the delegation of the Netherlands, entitled "Nuclear test ban".

(f) Document CD/319, dated 23 August 1982, submitted by the delegation of Japan, entitled "WMO Co-operation in International Seismic Data Exchange".

34. The Committee also had before it the relevant parts of document CD/293 and Corr.1 of 1 June 1982, entitled "Tabulation of proposals concerning nuclear disarmament made between the establishment of the United Nations and the convening of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament", which was prepared by the Secretariat at the request of the Chairman of the Committee (CD/PV.116).

35. At its 167th and 183rd plenary meetings on 30 March and 31 August 1982, the Committee adopted the recommendations contained in the progress reports on the Thirteenth and the Fourteenth Sessions of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. A number of delegations commented on those reports.

36. Upon the decision taken by the Committee on 31 August 1982, the Chairman of the Committee addressed a letter to the Secretary-General of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) requesting the latter to take steps to make necessary arrangements to enable the Ad Hoc Group to continue to utilize the GTS on a regular basis for the transmission of seismic data in order to detect and identify seismic events. In response to this request, the Deputy Secretary-General of the WMO addressed a letter to the Chairman of the Committee, dated 6 September 1982,

stating that the question would be submitted to the Eighth Session of the WMO Commission for Basic Systems, meeting in Geneva in January 1983, and to the ninth WMO Congress, to be held in Geneva in May 1983, for consideration, and that the Chairman of the Committee would be informed of the decisions taken by the appropriate WMO bodies.

37. An account of the consideration of the agenda item since 1979, including the first part of the 1982 session, was contained in paragraphs 25-40 of the Special Report of the Committee on Disarmament to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. (CD/292 and Corr.1-3)

38. In accordance with its programme of work for the period of 2-16 February dealing with the consideration of the question of the establishment of subsidiary bodies on items on the agenda, the Committee held, at the beginning of the first part of its session and subsequently, a number of informal meetings on the establishment of an ad hoc working group on item 1, "Nuclear Test Ban".

39. Various proposals for a mandate were considered, as well as suggestions made by the Secretary of the Committee and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General. At its 173rd plenary meeting on 21 April 1982, the Committee decided to establish an ad hoc working group with the following mandate (CD/291):

"In the exercise of its responsibilities as the multilateral disarmament negotiating forum in accordance with paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Committee on Disarmament decides to establish an ad hoc working group under item 1 of its agenda entitled 'Nuclear Test Ban'.

"Considering that discussion of specific issues in the first instance may facilitate progress toward negotiation of a nuclear test ban, the Committee requests the ad hoc working group to discuss and define, through substantive examination, issues relating to verification and compliance with a view to making further progress toward a nuclear test ban.

"The ad hoc working group will take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives, and will report to the Committee on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1982 session. The Committee will thereafter take a decision on subsequent courses of action with a view to fulfilling its responsibilities in this regard."

40. At its 178th plenary meeting on 12 August 1982, the Committee decided to nominate the representative of Sweden as Chairman of the Working Group.

41. The Ad Hoc Working Group held 10 meetings between 13 August and 13 September 1982, and the Chairman also conducted informal consultations during that period. As a result of its deliberations, the ad hoc Working Group submitted a report to the Committee (CD/332).

42. At its 188th plenary meeting on 17 September 1982, the Committee adopted the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group, which is an integral part of this report and reads as follows:

"I. INTRODUCTION

"1. At its 173rd plenary meeting, on 21 April 1982, the Committee on Disarmament adopted the following decision relative to item 1 of its agenda:

'In the exercise of its responsibilities as the multilateral disarmament negotiating forum in accordance with paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Committee on Disarmament decides to establish an ad hoc working group under item 1 of its agenda entitled 'Nuclear Test Ban'.

Considering that discussion of specific issues in the first instance may facilitate progress toward negotiation of a nuclear test ban, the Committee requests the ad hoc working group to discuss and define, through substantive examination, issues relating to verification and compliance with a view to making further progress toward a nuclear test ban.

The ad hoc working group will take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives, and will report to the Committee on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1982 session. The Committee will thereafter take a decision on subsequent courses of action with a view to fulfilling its responsibilities in this regard.' (CD/291)

"II. ORGANIZATION OF WORK AND DOCUMENTATION

"2. At its 178th plenary meeting, on 12 August 1982, the Committee on Disarmament appointed Ambassador Curt Lidgard (Sweden) as Chairman of the ad hoc Working Group. In the absence of Ambassador Lidgard, Mr. Carl-Magnus Hyltenius, Deputy Head of the Delegation of Sweden, acted as Chairman of the Working Group. Miss Aida Luisa Levin, United Nations Centre for Disarmament, served as Secretary of the Working Group.

3. At the 178th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament, on 12 August 1982, the delegations of two nuclear-weapon States announced their decision not to participate in the Ad Hoc Working Group. A number of delegations regretted that decision and expressed the hope that it would be reconsidered at an early date.

"4. At their request, the Committee on Disarmament decided to invite the representatives of the following States not members of the Committee to participate in the meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Group: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Norway, Senegal and Spain.

"5. The Working Group held 10 meetings between 13 August and 13 September 1982.

"6. In addition to the official documents of the Committee on Disarmament circulated under item 1 of its agenda, other documents were submitted to the Ad Hoc Working Group during the 1982 session. These documents included the following:

Working paper entitled 'Nuclear Test Ban', submitted by the Netherlands (CD/NTB/WP.1 and Corr.1)

Working paper on international verification systems for a nuclear test ban, submitted by Sweden (CD/NTB/WP.2)

In addition, the Secretariat prepared a list of documents relating to the question of a nuclear test ban, submitted to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and the Committee on Disarmament (CD/NTB/INF.1).

"7. On 17 August 1982, the delegation of Norway demonstrated for members of the Ad Hoc Working Group a prototype system for an international seismic data exchange under a comprehensive test ban, using a low-cost micro-processor based system.

"III. SUBSTANTIVE WORK DURING THE 1982 SESSION

"8. In carrying out its mandate, the Ad Hoc Working Group bore in mind that, in accordance with the decision of the Committee on Disarmament referred to in paragraph 42.1 above, the Working Group should take account of all existing proposals and future initiatives.

"9. It was generally recognized that in the examination of issues relating to verification and compliance, consideration should be given to all relevant aspects of a nuclear test ban. In this connection, a number of delegations argued, on the basis of paragraph 31 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, that a meaningful examination of issues relating to verification and compliance would only be possible after agreement had been

reached on the scope of a nuclear test ban treaty. Other delegations argued that it was not necessary to reach agreement on scope; work could proceed on the basis of certain broad assumptions. Different views were expressed on various fundamental aspects of a nuclear test ban. Some delegations were of the view that the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group should be based on the understanding that issues relating to verification and compliance should be examined as applied to a treaty which would prohibit all test explosions of nuclear weapons in any environment, would be of unlimited duration, would provide for a solution, acceptable to all parties, of the problem of underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and would include among its participants all nuclear-weapon States. Other delegations, calling attention to the preamble of the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, considered that a treaty on a nuclear test ban should aim at the general and complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests by all States in all environments for all time. In their view, such a treaty should be equitable and non-discriminatory so as to attract universal adherence and should include a verification system that guaranteed equal access to all States. Still other delegations held that any nuclear test ban must necessarily cover both nuclear-weapon tests and nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, and that issues of verification of and compliance with such a ban should be examined as applied to a future treaty which would ban all such explosions. Certain delegations considered that this ban should apply to all nuclear explosions in all environments for all time. In this connection, the view was also expressed that the importance of peaceful nuclear explosions should not be underestimated. Some delegations suggested that it was necessary to give consideration to all possible methods for the testing and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, such as laboratory tests and simulation techniques. Other delegations recalled the report of the Secretary-General on a comprehensive nuclear test ban (CD/36) in which it was stated that 'it can be contended that a comprehensive test ban could not cover laboratory tests because they are contained and not verifiable'. The view was however expressed that more recent technological advances, especially in simulation techniques, have added a new dimension to nuclear testing and qualitative improvement of nuclear arsenals. Laboratory tests, especially since these are not verifiable, provide an advantageous edge to some States.

"10. It was not possible for the Ad Hoc Working Group to reach agreement on a work programme. A number of delegations strongly regretted this and pointed out that the lack of a work programme had only permitted the Working Group to have a general and largely unstructured exchange of views on the subject matter entrusted to it under

its mandate. During the first part of the Working Group's proceedings, efforts were made to reach agreement on a programme of work based on the Chairman's proposal and those from delegations. At the same time, there was also a general exchange of views on basic questions relating to a nuclear test ban. In light of the absence of a work programme, the Working Group followed the oral suggestion of the Chairman and devoted its last three substantive meetings to a continuation of the exchange of views and focused on general aspects of the question of verification and compliance, including the purposes, general requirements and effectiveness of verification, and on various specific aspects, such as, international seismic monitoring, the question of the need to consider atmospheric detection methods, the role of national technical means, the role of on-site inspection, committees of experts and procedures and mechanisms for consultation and co-operation. A number of delegations stated that their acceptance of this method of work was only a temporary measure to allow the Working Group to proceed during this session. A number of other delegations were of the view that, in spite of the absence of a formal work programme, the Working Group had been able, under the guidance of the Chairman, to have a fruitful and streamlined consideration of issues of verification of and compliance with a comprehensive test ban in the exercise of its mandate.

"11. It was felt that in discharging its task, the Ad Hoc Working Group should draw on the knowledge and experience that had been accumulated over the years in the consideration of a comprehensive test ban in the successive multilateral negotiating bodies and in the trilateral negotiations.

"12. The examination of issues relating to verification and compliance covered general aspects of the subject. Some delegations stated that the majority of countries were convinced that the means of verification presently available were sufficient to provide reasonable assurance of compliance with a nuclear test ban treaty. In this connection, they made reference to the statement of the United Nations Secretary-General to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on 29 February 1972, relating to a comprehensive test ban, in which the Secretary-General had, inter alia, stated the following:

'I believe that all the technical and scientific aspects of the problem have been so fully explored that only a political decision is now necessary in order to achieve final agreement.

When one takes into account the existing means of verification by seismic and other methods, and the possibilities provided by international procedures of verification such as consultation, inquiry and what has come to be known as 'verification by challenge' or 'inspection by invitation', it is difficult to understand further delay in achieving agreement on an underground test ban.

In the light of all these considerations, I share the inescapable conclusion that the potential risks of continuing underground nuclear weapon tests would far outweigh any possible risks from ending such tests.' (CCD/PV.545, 29 February 1972)

Other delegations stated that the adequacy of verification was not simply a question of yield or detection level nor was it something that could be defined collectively. Rather it is based on a combination of factors and is determined by each State individually based on its national interests.

"13. Some delegations, while recognizing that it was important to clarify technical problems connected with verification of a nuclear test ban treaty, held that at some point a political decision should be taken, for, otherwise, there would be a danger that, as in the past, the question of verification would be used as a smoke-screen to cover up the lack of political will and delay indefinitely the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty.

"14. Some delegations held that those delegations which felt that there were still obstacles to be surmounted should point out what those obstacles were. Certain specific queries were addressed to the nuclear-weapon States that had been engaged in the trilateral negotiations relating to the existing means of verification and those proposed under an international seismic data exchange system, in particular the specific technical parameters of what, in their view, would constitute adequate verification. The three nuclear-weapon States were also asked to specify what were the 'important areas where substantial work [had] still to be done', as stated in paragraph 23 of the 'Tripartite Report to the Committee on Disarmament' (CD/130).

"15. One of the parties to the trilateral negotiations noted that it shared the conviction that the existing means of verification were adequate to assure compliance with a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. It explained that, as far as verification on a multilateral basis was concerned, agreement had been reached in the trilateral negotiations and that the outstanding questions were those mentioned in paragraphs 12 and 22 of the Tripartite Report.

"16. The other two participants in the trilateral negotiations reiterated the statement contained in paragraph 23 of the Report. They also pointed out that it could not be presumed that all technical problems had been solved. In their view, conclusions relating to the capabilities of the verification system could only be reached when the characteristics of the system were known, but, as yet, there was no agreement on the precise parameters of such a system nor was such a system in existence. Beyond

that, they noted that the conduct of nuclear explosions, regardless of yield or ostensible purpose, could provide weapons-related benefits. They, therefore, argued that the question of adequacy could not be looked at as a question of merely establishing an 'adequate' detection level in terms of yield of nuclear explosions. In their opinion, a determination of adequacy involved a whole complex of issues and was a matter for political decision by each Government in light of its national requirements and the circumstances prevailing at the time the decision was called for.

"17. In connection with the above comments, some delegations made the following observations. First, it was said that it could not be argued that the characteristics of the verification system were, as yet, unknown for they had already been specified in great detail in the first two reports of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events (CCD/558 and Corr.1, CCD/558/Add.1 and Corr.1 and CD/43 and Add.1). Secondly, it was pointed out that the question of what would constitute an 'adequate' detection level in terms of yield of nuclear explosions, had been raised because those two nuclear-weapon States had consistently held in the past that that question was crucial to the conclusion of a nuclear test ban treaty. Thirdly, the two nuclear-weapon States were asked to explain what was the whole complex of issues involved in a determination of adequacy. Finally, it was pointed out that the required political decision had to be taken on the basis of certain objective and mutually accepted norms and it should be the task of the Working Group to develop such norms.

"18. Other delegations reiterated that the system proposed by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts was not in operation. In response to this observation, it was argued that since the specific characteristics of the proposed system were already known it was not necessary to await its being put into operation in order to determine its capabilities.

"19. Some delegations, referring to the purposes and general requirements of verification, held that any verification system should provide confidence that the Parties observed their treaty obligations, deter them from conducting clandestine activities contrary to the treaty and counteract unfounded suspicion about naturally occurring events. These delegations further considered that technical and political requirements to satisfy those three tasks might be quite different and that although some technical capabilities of a verification system could be agreed upon, it was difficult to assess the overall capabilities and the adequacy of any verification system without knowing the political requirements of individual countries. These

delegations, therefore, suggested that it was neither possible nor necessary to make a general assessment of the adequacy of verification systems and that such assessment should be made on a national basis in light of national political requirements. The need to demonstrate the political will and firm commitment necessary for the fulfilment of treaty obligations was, however, stressed.

"20. Some delegations pointed out that, due to a variety of factors, different countries had different possibilities to monitor compliance with a nuclear test ban by national technical means alone and that an international verification system should serve to even out such differences. Other delegations deemed that a combination of national technical means, international exchange of seismic data and other measures of international co-operation, such as, procedures for consultation and co-operation and on-site inspection 'by challenge' in case of suspicious events, would provide adequate means of verification. As noted earlier, some delegations felt that the verification system of a nuclear test ban treaty should apply equally to all States and provide equal access to all. In that connection, it was suggested that clarification should be provided to the points raised in document CD/181 and in the synthesis, prepared by the Secretariat, of the discussions in the Committee on Disarmament on agenda items 1 and 2 during the informal meetings devoted to those items in March and April 1981 (CD/UN.SUMM/1).

"21. The discussion also covered specific aspects of the question of verification and compliance, as set forth below.

"22. Reference was made to the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events. Mention was also made of the co-operative seismic monitoring measures envisaged in the trilateral negotiations, as outlined in the Tripartite Report, including the establishment of an international exchange of seismic data and the setting up of a committee of experts. Some delegations were of the view that the establishment of an international system for the exchange of seismic data was a task of the highest priority. In their view, such a system should be in place before a comprehensive test ban treaty entered into force. Other delegations considered that the system should be set up in connection with a comprehensive test ban treaty and after such a treaty had entered into force. Some delegations felt that in the implementation of the system account should be taken of advanced available scientific and technological developments. They pointed out that, otherwise, those countries that would have to depend on the services of the international seismic data exchange system, would not have equal access to all the available information. Other delegations

argued that for the system to be accessible to all parties it should be based on widely used technology which all parties could afford. In addition, some delegations maintained that there was a close relationship between political negotiations on a nuclear test ban treaty and technical work on a verification system and that the latter should not be carried out as if it were an open-ended exercise that could go on indefinitely so as to take account of every scientific and technological advance. Furthermore, these delegations felt that, as noted earlier, the basic elements of an international system for the exchange of seismic data were already contained in the first two reports of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts. A number of delegations suggested that consideration should be given to the institutional aspects of an international seismic monitoring system and attention was drawn to the illustrative list of subjects contained in document CD/95. In the opinion of various other delegations, it would not be appropriate for the Working Group to undertake the consideration of such subjects at this time.

"23. Different views were expressed concerning the need to examine methods for the detection of airborne radioactivity. Some delegations held that a nuclear test ban should include an integrated international monitoring system, comprising atmospheric as well as seismic detection methods. In that connection, it was suggested that the mandate of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts should be broadened to include the examination of atmospheric detection methods. Other delegations felt that there was no need to revise the mandate of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts. In this view, it was unnecessary to devote attention to verification issues relating to tests within the scope of the prohibitions contained in the Partial Test Ban Treaty, since compliance with that Treaty had not given rise to problems in the nearly 20 years it had been in force.

"24. A suggestion was made that under a new and broader mandate, the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts should be subordinated to the Ad Hoc Working Group established under item 1 of the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament. Some delegations stated that the current link between the Committee on Disarmament and the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts should be maintained.

"25. With respect to national technical means, some delegations referred to the relevant sections of the Tripartite Report. In their opinion, national seismic stations would actually be the basis of the whole verification system, since these stations would provide the data on which judgments as to whether or not a ban was being observed by the parties would be made. In addition to this, an international exchange of seismic data as well as other international co-operative measures would

give all parties ample opportunities to take part in the verification process. Other delegations held that national technical means alone were not adequate for the effective verification of a nuclear test ban and that, as noted earlier, given the differences in the national technical capabilities of States to monitor compliance with such a ban, an international verification system that provided equal access to all parties was needed to help reduce asymmetries or technical inequalities, thus creating the requisite confidence that the ban was being complied with by all parties.

"26. Concerning on-site inspections, some delegations were of the view that provision for such inspections could be made on a voluntary basis along the lines of the procedure set forth in the Tripartite Report. At the same time, these Delegations stressed that such inspections would not add much to the capability of the verification system. Other delegations emphasized the importance of on-site inspection to clarify the nature of ambiguous events and contended that provision for on-site inspection on a voluntary basis only would be insufficient to build confidence and to develop an effective verification system.

"27. With respect to procedures for consultation and co-operation, some delegations pointed to the procedures envisaged in the trilateral negotiations as outlined in the Tripartite Report. A suggestion was made that, in addition to arrangements for bilateral and multilateral consultations among Parties, provision should be made in a nuclear test ban treaty for the establishment of two committees. One would be a technical body entrusted with the task, inter alia, of overseeing the operation of the international verification system and of solving any technical problem that might arise in the operation of that system. The other would be a consultative committee which would serve as a forum for political discussions of issues related to the implementation of the treaty, including its verification. Another view was expressed to the effect that experience regarding the implementation of existing multilateral treaties in the field of arms limitation and disarmament indicated that it was not necessary to set up two committees. According to this view, in the case of a nuclear test ban treaty a committee of experts, as envisaged in the trilateral negotiations, would suffice.

"28. Some delegations expressed the view that the possibility of bringing complaints to the Security Council would provide an additional guarantee of compliance with a nuclear test ban treaty. Other delegations, referring to the experience with certain multilateral disarmament agreements, dwelt on the shortcomings of a complaints procedure that was limited to recourse to the Security Council.

"29. Some delegations drew attention to the possible relevance of arrangements between two or more parties to a nuclear test ban treaty and commented that such arrangements could provide additional assurance of compliance and serve as a confidence-building measure.

"30. Delegations also expressed views on the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group. Some delegations held that the mandate was inadequate in that it did not provide for negotiations leading to the conclusion of a nuclear test ban treaty. In the view of these delegations, the Working Group should use the time available to it in 1982 so as to enable the Committee on Disarmament to give it a broader mandate as envisaged in the Committee's decision on the establishment of the Working Group. Other delegations disagreed with this view and believed that the Working Group should proceed with substantive discussions based on its mandate without prejudice to any future decision regarding the mandate of the Working Group. Some delegations observed that, while the mandate was unsatisfactory, it provided an opportunity for making a start towards the resolution of verification problems in preparation for future negotiations. Still other delegations expressed the view that the mandate did not preclude negotiations leading to the conclusion of a nuclear test ban treaty especially since the mandate directed the Working Group to take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives. It was pointed out by one delegation that, although it was not prepared to negotiate a comprehensive test ban treaty at this time, it desired to undertake substantive discussions on verification and compliance issues. Some delegations regretted that in the opinion of this delegation the time was not propitious for negotiations on a nuclear test ban and felt that the Working Group should not be used as a cover for the unwillingness to conclude a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. The attention of that particular delegation was drawn by other delegations to the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, in whose preamble it is stated 'seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end, and desiring to put an end to the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances', and they expressed the view that this constituted a legal commitment. That delegation was asked how it reconciled being a party to that Treaty with the position it had now taken. That delegation stated that it did not accept the

assertion that it had violated legal treaty commitments. It, therefore, stated its intention to respond fully to that assertion. Some delegations held the view that the Working Group had completed the substantive examination of issues relating to verification and compliance and that, therefore, the Committee should revise without delay the mandate of the Working Group with a view to enabling it to negotiate on a treaty prohibiting all nuclear-weapon tests, having in mind that this is a question of the highest priority and taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives. In the view of other delegations, a revision of the mandate was not called for under present circumstances; considerable work still remained to be done in resolving various issues relating to verification and compliance because, inter alia, the Working Group had not been able to work on the basis of a structured programme. Several delegations pointed out that they had accepted the terms of the present mandate only because they were persuaded that the explicit reference to the need to take into account existing proposals and future initiatives and to the adoption of a decision by the Committee on Disarmament on subsequent courses of action, should necessarily be interpreted as meaning that the Group's mandate should be broadened, as required by those proposals and initiatives, not in the indefinite future but at a very early date."

B. Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament

43. The item on the agenda entitled "Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament" was considered by the Committee, in accordance with its programme of work, during the periods from 24 February to 5 March and from 16 to 20 August.

44. The following documents were submitted to the Committee in connection with the item during the 1982 session:

(a) Document CD/238, dated 4 February 1982, submitted by the delegation of Venezuela, entitled "Statement on the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons".

(b) Document CD/256, dated 5 March 1982, submitted by the delegations of the German Democratic Republic and Hungary, entitled "Working Paper: Non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present".

(c) Document CD/259, dated 12 March 1982, submitted by the delegation of the German Democratic Republic, entitled "Draft mandates for ad hoc working groups on a nuclear test ban, and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament".

(d) Document CD/268, dated 26 March 1982, submitted by the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entitled "Part of the statement by Mr. L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, to the seventeenth Congress of Trade Unions of the USSR.

(e) Document CD/269, dated 29 March 1982, submitted by the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany, entitled "Text of a decision taken by the Federal German Government on 17 March, on the present state of the INF negotiations and General Secretary Brezhnev's proposals".

(f) Document CD/273, dated 6 April 1982, submitted by the delegation of India, entitled "Note of the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations in New York to the Secretary-General of the United Nations in response to General Assembly resolutions 36/81 A and B pertaining to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament".

(g) Document CD/282, dated 19 April 1982, submitted by the delegation of Mexico, entitled "Working paper containing the text of the opinion of the Government of Mexico on the prevention of nuclear war, transmitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations in accordance with the invitation extended by the General Assembly in its resolution 36/81 B of 9 December 1981".

(h) Document CD/293 and Corr.1, dated 1 June 1982, prepared by the secretariat at the request of the Chairman of the Committee (CD/PV.116), entitled "Tabulation of proposals concerning nuclear disarmament made between the establishment of the United Nations and the convening of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament".

(i) Document CD/295, dated 23 July 1982, submitted by the delegation of India, entitled "Draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons".

(j) Document CD/309, dated 11 August 1982, submitted by the delegation of India, entitled "Draft mandate for Ad Hoc Working Group on Prevention of Nuclear War, under item 2 of the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament".

(k) Document CD/314, dated 19 August 1982, submitted by the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entitled "Message from L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament".

(l) Document CD/327, dated 8 September 1982, submitted by the delegation of the Polish People's Republic, entitled "The Dangers of Nuclear War: Declaration of the Pugwash Movement and 97 Nobel Laureates, issued at the 32nd Pugwash Conference held in Warsaw, Poland, from 26 to 31 August 1982".

45. In accordance with its programme of work for the period of 2-16 February, which included the consideration of the question of the establishment of subsidiary bodies on agenda items, the Committee held, early in the first part of the session and subsequently, some informal meetings on the establishment of an ad hoc working group under agenda item 2, "Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament", as well as proposals submitted under this item.
46. An account of the Committee's consideration of the agenda item since 1979, including the first part of the 1982 session, was contained in paragraphs 41-50 of the Special Report of the Committee on Disarmament to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. (CD/292 and Corr.1-3)
47. In accordance with the programme of work for the second part of the 1982 session, the Committee considered the establishment of various subsidiary bodies under item 2 of the agenda between 3 and 6 August, as well as subsequently. Those proposals before the Committee for consideration were contained in documents CD/180 tabled by the Group of 21, CD/219 submitted by a group of socialist countries, CD/259 tabled by the German Democratic Republic, and CD/309 submitted by India.
48. The Committee considered the above-mentioned proposals and reached the conclusion that there was no consensus at present for the establishment of ad hoc working groups for the purpose of undertaking multilateral negotiations in conformity with the specific proposals presented by their sponsors. However, possibilities will continue to be explored for reaching agreement on a negotiating role for the Committee, bearing in mind the high priority accorded by the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament to "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament".
49. There have been continued exchanges of views on the pre-requisites and elements for multilateral negotiations under this item as well as on related issues and concepts concerning nuclear weapons, and it is expected that these exchanges will be continued further. The question of prevention of nuclear war has been the subject of earnest and intensive discussion, and its importance and urgency are readily acknowledged. No consensus was reached on a proposal to set up an Ad Hoc Working Group on Prevention of Nuclear War (CD/309) under item 2 of the Committee's agenda. The Committee agreed to hold further informal consultations on this topic.

50. A number of delegations made proposals for the commencement of multilateral negotiations on the cessation of nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and proposed the establishment of a corresponding ad hoc working group. They proposed to elaborate and adopt a stage-by-stage nuclear disarmament programme. In this connection they underlined that the idea of mutual freeze on nuclear arsenals, as a first step towards their reduction and, eventually, their complete elimination, was close to their point of view. They advocated an approach according to which efforts leading to nuclear disarmament should be exerted in several areas at once. Thus they argued in favour of holding multilateral negotiations in addition to the bilateral talks such as the negotiations now taking place between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms and on the limitation and reduction of nuclear arms in Europe. They emphasized their readiness to agree to the total elimination of all nuclear weapons - strategic, medium-range and tactical - provided, of course, that all the nuclear Powers participate. These States, including one nuclear-weapon State, drew the attention of the Committee to the unilateral pledge made by that nuclear-weapon State not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, reiterated the high priority of measures to prevent nuclear war, and supported a proposal to establish an Ad Hoc Working Group to undertake negotiations on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war. In this connection an appeal was addressed to those nuclear-weapon States which have not yet done so to seriously consider the possibility of pledging not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. These States expressed their concern over dangerous concepts such as first strike, limited or protracted nuclear war, etc., and pointed out that a nuclear war could mean the destruction of human civilization and of life on earth. In that connection they expressed their support for prohibition of the use of the nuclear weapon as well as for banning the nuclear neutron weapon and for non-deployment of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present.

51. It was considered by a number of delegations that the non-first-use declaration made by one nuclear-weapon State at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, together with the similar declaration which was made by another nuclear-weapon State nearly two decades ago and

reiterated at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, offer an avenue to decrease the danger of nuclear war. They also believed that the goal of an agreement on the non-first-use of nuclear weapons should actively be pursued.

52. A number of delegations reaffirmed the position of their States that none of their weapons, nuclear or conventional, will ever be used except in response to armed attack. It was considered by some delegations that the goal of an agreement on the non-first-use of nuclear weapons could only be effectively pursued in connection with measures to eliminate the prevailing imbalance in conventional weapons between the East and the West.

53. The Group of 21 reiterated their well-known position that nuclear weapons should never be used nor the threat of use of nuclear weapons be held against non-nuclear-weapon States.

54. While recognizing their special responsibility for nuclear disarmament, some nuclear-weapon States are of the opinion that suitable conditions do not exist at present for undertaking multilateral negotiations in the Committee as a whole on nuclear disarmament. They shared the concerns, voiced by many delegations, regarding the dangers of nuclear war. They drew attention to their replies to the Secretary-General in response to resolution 36/81 B of the General Assembly and reiterated their view that the prevention of nuclear war cannot be separated from the general question of nuclear disarmament; nor can it be separated from consideration of the prevention of all wars and the requirements of security. In their view an appropriate degree of mutual trust and confidence among the nuclear-weapon States is essential for the success of negotiations on nuclear disarmament. To that end they believe that in the first instance negotiations on nuclear arms limitation and reduction should be undertaken by nuclear-weapon States and they drew attention to the importance of the bilateral talks now taking place between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on intermediate range nuclear forces and strategic arms reduction. They also consider that nuclear disarmament should be an integral part of a general process of disarmament, including conventional weapons and armed forces.

55. One of those nuclear-weapon States added that it could only take part in the negotiations when the reduction of arsenals of the two main powers, the qualitative and quantitative limitation of the defensive strategic systems that could one day neutralize nuclear deterrence, and significant progress in the reduction of conventional imbalances in Europe have created the appropriate conditions.

56. A number of delegations, while generally endorsing the point of view stated in paragraph 54, also stressed the urgency of their preoccupation with the question of appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war. They pointed out that the subject had to be placed in the general context of war prevention. While they expressed their preparedness to discuss the issue further, they also underlined that substantive additional clarification, inter alia concerning the agenda item to which it would pertain, was necessary to define the subject matter in a suitable manner. In response to this request for clarification it was stated that the proposal for undertaking negotiations on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war was not projected as a substitute for multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament, but rather as a means to adopt certain immediate and urgent measures to reduce the risk of nuclear war which would place in jeopardy the very survival of mankind.

57. One nuclear weapon State reaffirmed the view that the two States with the largest nuclear arsenals should immediately halt their nuclear arms race, cease the qualitative improvement and substantially reduce the quantity of their nuclear arsenals so as to create appropriate conditions, in which the other nuclear weapon States could undertake obligations for the reduction of their own nuclear weapons. It endorsed the view that the use of nuclear weapons should be prohibited pending nuclear disarmament and reiterated its position that it would, at no time and under no circumstances, be the first to use nuclear weapons and that it unconditionally undertook not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States. It supported the proposal for the setting up of an ad hoc working group under item 2.

58. The Group of 21 is of the view that multilateral negotiations on the Committee, in addition to the bilateral and regional negotiating process, are essential, as cessation of the nuclear arms race and the prevention of nuclear war are of vital concern for the security of all States and the survival of mankind. Their position is without prejudice to the special responsibility borne by nuclear weapon States for bringing about nuclear disarmament. The group also considers that multilateral negotiations could make a positive contribution to the relaxation of international tensions. While acknowledging the usefulness of negotiations among nuclear weapon States, in its opinion all States have the right to participate in negotiations on nuclear disarmament in order to reduce and remove the danger of any war in which nuclear weapons might be used, since its consequences would be global and irremediable. The Group of 21 renewed its proposal on the establishment of an ad hoc working group of the Committee to undertake multilateral negotiations on the elaboration of the stages of nuclear disarmament envisaged in paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, but its proposal did not obtain the consensus of the Committee. The Group of 21

emphasized its position that the mandate for the Working Group on item 2 proposed by the Group in document CD/180 was in no way prejudicial to the position of any of the nuclear-weapon States and hence the opposition of certain nuclear powers to the establishment of the Working Group was not justified at all. It has also strongly supported the proposal (CD/309) for a working group to undertake negotiations on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war, since its consideration would enable the Committee to reach agreement on concrete and urgent measures in the context of nuclear disarmament.

C. Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons

59. The item on the agenda entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" was considered by the Committee, in accordance with its programme of work, during the periods from 8 to 12 March and from 2 to 3 September.

60. The Committee had before it the following new documents in connection with the item:

(a) Document CD/278, dated 7 April 1982, submitted by the delegation of China, entitled "Working Paper on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons".

(b) Document CD/280, dated 14 April 1982, entitled "Statement of the Group of 21 on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

(c) Document CD/321, dated 27 August 1982, submitted by the delegation of France, entitled "Working Paper on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" (presentation of the new position of the French Government on the question of negative security assurances).

61. In accordance with the Committee's decision at its 156th plenary meeting on 18 February 1982, as contained in document CD/243, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons was re-established on the basis of its former mandate, to continue to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the

use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Committee further decided that the Ad Hoc Working Group would report to the Committee on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the first part of the 1982 session, in view of the convening of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament.

62. At its 157th plenary meeting on 23 February 1982, the Committee decided to nominate the representative of Pakistan as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group.

63. As a result of its deliberations, the Ad Hoc Working Group submitted a special report to the Committee (document CD/285), which contains an account of the substantive negotiations during the 1979, 1980 and 1981 sessions, as well as the first part of the 1982 session of the Committee. The statement made by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the occasion of the submission of the report is contained in document CD/290. At its 175rd plenary meeting on

21 April 1982 the Committee adopted the special report of the Ad Hoc Working Group, which is an integral part of the Special Report of the Committee on Disarmament to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

64. At the commencement of the second part of the 1982 session, the representative of Pakistan, who is Chairman of the Working Group, recalled in a statement before the plenary that the Group of 21 in document CD/280 had inter alia expressed the view "that further negotiations in the Ad Hoc Working Group on this item are unlikely to be fruitful so long as the nuclear-weapon States do not exhibit a genuine political will to reach a satisfactory agreement". The Group of 21 had "therefore, urge" the nuclear-weapon States concerned to review their policies and to present revised positions on the subject to the second Special Session". He stated that "at the special session there was no response at all to these concerns of the Group of 21 from two of the nuclear-weapon States concerned, and that the work on this item had reached an impasse".

65. Having taken note of the above-mentioned assessment of the state of negotiations, it was generally understood that the Working Group would not hold any meetings during the second half of 1982.

66. One delegation disagreed with the assessment of the state of negotiations expressed in CD/280 and with the views expressed by the representative of Pakistan, and stated it had been prepared to resume work on the issue.

D. Chemical Weapons

67. The item on the agenda entitled "Chemical Weapons" was considered by the Committee, in accordance with its programme of work, during the periods from 22 to 26 March and from 9 to 13 August.

68. The Committee had before it the following new documents submitted during its 1982 session in connection with the item:

(a) Document CD/244, dated 18 February 1982, submitted by the delegation of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, entitled "Working Paper on Verification and the Monitoring of Compliance in a Chemical Weapons Convention".

(b) Document CD/253, dated 25 February 1982, submitted by the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entitled "Tass statement of 19 February 1982".

(c) Document CD/258 and Corr.1, dated 9 March 1982, submitted by the delegations of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entitled "Working Paper: Binary weapons and the problem of effective prohibition of chemical weapons".

(d) Document CD/263, dated 22 March 1982, submitted by Finland, entitled "Working Paper on the Relation of Verification to the Scope of a Ban on Chemical Warfare Agents".

(e) Document CD/264, dated 23 March 1982, submitted by the delegation of the United States of America, entitled "The United States Programme to Deter Chemical Warfare".

(f) Document CD/265, dated 24 March 1982, submitted by the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany, entitled "Working Paper on Principles and Rules for Verifying Compliance with a Chemical Weapons Convention".

(g) Document CD/266, dated 24 March 1982, submitted by the delegation of Yugoslavia, entitled "Working Paper: Binary weapons and the problem of their definition and verification".

(h) Document CD/270, dated 31 March 1982, submitted by the delegations of Indonesia and the Netherlands, entitled "Destruction of about 45 tons of mustard agent at Batujajar, West-Java, Indonesia".

(i) Document CD/271, dated 1 April 1982, submitted by the delegations of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and Australia, entitled "**Technical** evaluation of 'recover' techniques for CW verification".

(j) Document CD/277, dated 7 April 1982, submitted by the delegation of Sweden, entitled "Working Paper: The concept 'precursor' and a suggestion for definition for the purpose of a Chemical Weapons Convention".

(k) Document CD/279, dated 14 April 1982, submitted by the delegation of Sweden, entitled "Working Paper: Suggestions for measures to enhance confidence between the Parties negotiating a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons".

(l) Document CD/294, dated 21 July 1982, entitled "Basic provisions of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction - proposal of the USSR".

(m) Document CD/298, dated 26 July 1982, submitted by the delegation of Yugoslavia, entitled "Working Paper: Some aspects of verification in a chemical weapons convention".

(n) Document CD/299, dated 29 July 1982, submitted by Finland, entitled "Systematic Identification of Chemical Warfare Agents Identification of Non-Phosphorus Warfare Agents".

(o) Document CD/301, dated 4 August 1982, submitted by the delegation of Belgium, entitled "Memorandum on monitoring of the prohibition of the use in combat of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons".

(p) Document CD/306, dated 10 August 1982, submitted by the delegation of the Netherlands, entitled "Working paper concerning the verification of the presence of nerve agents, their decomposition products or starting materials downstream of chemical production plants".

(q) Document CD/307, dated 10 August 1982, submitted by the delegation of the Netherlands, entitled "Working paper concerning the verification of the presence of nerve agents, their decomposition products or starting materials downstream of chemical production plants".

(r) Document CD/308, dated 10 August 1982, submitted by the delegations of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands, entitled "Preliminary questions concerning CD/294 submitted by the Soviet Union 'Basic Provisions of a Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction'".

(s) Document CD/311, dated 11 August 1982, submitted by Norway, entitled "Working paper on verification of a chemical weapons convention - sampling and analysis of chemical warfare agents under winter conditions".

(t) Document CD/313, dated 16 August 1982, submitted by the delegation of Canada, entitled "A proposed verification organization for a chemical weapons convention".

(u) Document CD/316, dated 19 August 1982, submitted by the delegation of France, entitled "Working Paper: Monitoring of the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons".

(v) Document CD/324, dated 6 September 1982, submitted by the delegation of Sweden, entitled "Working paper on toxicity criteria for 'Key CW precursors'".

(w) Document CD/325, dated 6 September 1982, submitted by the delegation of Sweden, entitled "Working paper on monitoring destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons and chemical warfare agents".

(x) Document CD/326, dated 6 September 1982, submitted by the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany, entitled "Working Paper: Proposals on 'Declaration', 'Verification' and the 'Consultative Committee'".

(y) Document CD/333, dated 14 September 1982, entitled "Views of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons on possible compromise wordings of the elements of a future convention".

69. In accordance with the Committee's decision concerning subsidiary bodies at its 156th plenary meeting on 18 February 1982, as contained in document CD/243, an Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons was established to elaborate a convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives, with the view to enabling the Committee to achieve agreement at the earliest date. The Committee further decided that the Ad Hoc Working Group would report to the Committee on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the first part of its 1982 session, in view of the convening of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

70. At its 157th plenary meeting on 25 February 1982, the Committee decided to nominate the representative of Poland as the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group.

71. At its 163rd plenary meeting on 16 March 1982, the Committee decided, in response to a request of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group, to invite the Director-General of the World Health Organization and the Director of the Regional Office for Europe of the United Nations Environment Programme, to nominate representatives to attend certain meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, for the purpose of providing technical information, when it was deemed necessary, in respect of establishing toxicities of chemicals and the international register of potentially toxic chemicals.

72. As a result of its deliberations during the first part of the 1982 session the Ad Hoc Working Group submitted a special report to the Committee (document CD/281/Rev.1) which contains an account of its consideration of the item during the 1980 and 1981

sessions as well as the first part of the 1982 session. The statement made by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the occasion of the submission of the report is contained in document CD/288. At its 173rd plenary meeting on 21 April 1982, the Committee adopted the special report of the Ad Hoc Working Group, which is an integral part of the Special Report of the Committee on Disarmament to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. (CD/292 and Corr.1-3)

73. In accordance with the decision of the Committee at its 174th plenary meeting on 23 April 1982, the Ad Hoc Working Group resumed its work on 20 July 1982. During the period 2-6 August, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group held consultations with delegations on technical questions. A number of experts from delegations participated in those consultations.

74. During the 1982 session, the Ad Hoc Working Group held 42 meetings between 24 February and 15 September 1982 and the Chairman also conducted informal consultations during that period. As a result of its deliberations, the Ad Hoc Working Group submitted a report to the Committee, as contained in document CD/334.

75. At its 188th plenary meeting on 17 September 1982, the Committee adopted the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group, which is an integral part of this report and reads as follows:

I. INTRODUCTION

"1. A review of the work of the Committee on Disarmament on the question of chemical weapons during the first part of its 1982 session is contained in the special report presented to the Second Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (document CD/292), which also covers the work of the Committee on Disarmament on this subject since 1979.

II. ORGANIZATION OF WORK AND DOCUMENTATION

"2. In accordance with the decision taken by the Committee on Disarmament at its 174th plenary meeting held on 23 April 1982, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons resumed its work on 20 July 1982 under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Bogumil Sujka of Poland. Mr. A. Bunsmaill, Senior Political Affairs Officer, United Nations Centre for Disarmament, served as Secretary of the Ad Hoc Working Group.

"3. It should be recalled that the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons was re-established for 1982 at the 156th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament held on 18 February 1982, with the following mandate:

'... In discharging its responsibility for the negotiation and elaboration as a matter of high priority, of a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction, the Committee on Disarmament decides to establish, for the duration of its 1982 session, an ad hoc working group of the Committee to elaborate such a convention, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives with a view to enabling the Committee to achieve agreement at the earliest date. ...'.

"4. The Ad Hoc Working Group held 26 meetings from 20 July to 15 September 1982. In addition, the Chairman held a number of informal consultations with delegations.

"5. At the 177th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament, the Chairman reported on the progress of work of the Ad Hoc Working Group.

"6. The representatives of the following States not members of the Committee on Disarmament participated in the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Norway, Spain and Switzerland.

"7. During the second part of its 1982 session the following official documents dealing with Chemical Weapons were presented to the Committee on Disarmament:

- Document CD/294, dated 21 July 1982, submitted by the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entitled 'Basic provisions of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction'

- Document CD/298, dated 26 July 1982, submitted by Yugoslavia, entitled 'Working paper on some aspects of verification in a chemical weapons convention'

- Document CD/299, dated 29 July 1982, submitted by Finland, entitled 'Letter dated 27 July 1982, addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Finland, transmitting a document entitled "Systematic identification of chemical warfare agents; identification of non-phosphorus warfare agents"'

- Document CD/301, dated 4 August 1982, submitted by Belgium, entitled 'Memorandum on monitoring of the prohibition of the use in combat of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons'

- Document CD/306, dated 10 August 1982, submitted by the Netherlands, entitled 'Working paper concerning the verification of the presence of nerve agents, their decomposition products or starting materials downstream of chemical production plants'

- Document CD/307, dated 10 August 1982, submitted by the Netherlands, entitled 'Working paper concerning the verification of the presence of nerve agents, their decomposition products or starting materials downstream of chemical production plants'

- Document CD/308, dated 10 August 1982, submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, entitled 'Letter dated 9 August 1982 from the Heads of the Delegations of the Federal Republic of Germany and of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting a document containing preliminary questions concerning CD/294'

- Document CD/311, dated 11 August 1982, submitted by Norway, entitled, 'Working paper on verification of a chemical weapons convention - sampling and analysis of chemical warfare agents under winter conditions'

- Document CD/313, dated 16 August 1982, submitted by Canada, entitled 'A proposed verification organization for a chemical weapons convention'

- Document CD/316, dated 19 August 1982, submitted by France, entitled 'Working paper on the monitoring of the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons'

- Document CD/324, dated 6 September 1982, submitted by Sweden, entitled 'Working paper on toxicity criteria for "key CW precursors"'

- Document CD/325, dated 6 September 1982, submitted by Sweden, entitled 'Working paper on monitoring destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons and chemical warfare agents'

- Document CD/326, dated 6 September 1982, submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany, entitled 'Chemical Weapons - Working paper: Proposals on "Declaration", "Verification", and the "Consultative Committee"'

- Document CD/333, dated 14 September 1982, submitted by Poland, entitled 'Views of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons on possible compromise wordings of the elements of a future convention'

8. During the second part of its 1982 session, the following working papers were circulated to the Working Group:

- CD/CW/WP.35 submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entitled 'Basic provisions of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction' (also issued as CD/294)

- CD/CW/WP.36 entitled 'Consultations with delegations, assisted by experts, by the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons'

- CD/CW/WP.33/Corr.1 entitled 'Corrigendum to the Compilation of revised Elements and Comments thereto (CD/220), proposed new texts and alternative wordings as well as comments on new texts'

- CD/CW/WP.37 submitted by Yugoslavia, entitled 'Working paper on some aspects of verification in a chemical weapons convention' (also issued as CD/298)

- CD/CW/WP.38 submitted by Yugoslavia, entitled 'Suggested alternative definition of Chemical Weapons'

- CD/CW/WP.39 submitted by Belgium, entitled 'Memorandum on monitoring of the prohibition of the use in combat of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons' (also issued as CD/301)

- CD/CW/WP.40 submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, entitled 'Letter dated 9 August from the Heads of the Delegations of the Federal Republic of Germany and of the Kingdom of the Netherlands addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting a document containing preliminary questions concerning CD/294' (also issued as CD/308)

- CD/CW/WP.41 and Corr.1 entitled 'Report of the Chairman to the Working Group on Chemical Weapons on the consultations held with experts on technical issues'

- CD/CW/WP.42 submitted by France, entitled 'Working paper on the Monitoring of the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons' (also issued as CD/316)

- CD/CW/WP.43 entitled 'Draft Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons to the Committee on Disarmament'

- CD/CW/WP.44 submitted by Poland, entitled 'Views of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on possible compromise wordings of the elements of a future convention' (also issued as CD/333)

"9. The following Conference Room Papers were also submitted to the Working Group during the second part of its 1982 session:

- CD/CW/CRP.60 entitled 'Summary by the Chairman of initial comments made with respect to the suggested wording for Annex IV: recommendations and guidelines concerning the functions and organization of the national verification system CD/CW/CRP.42'

- CD/CW/CRP.61 entitled 'Opening statement by the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons' on 20 July 1982'

- CD/CW/CRP.62 submitted by China, entitled 'Suggested alternative wording for Element II and Annex I'

- CD/CW/CRP.63 submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany, entitled 'List of questions addressed to the delegation of the USSR on 22 July 1982 by the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany with respect to document CD/294 (CD/CW/WP.35)'

- CD/CW/CRP.64 entitled 'Timetable for the Chairman's consultations with experts on technical issues as presented in document CD/CW/WP.36 on 23 July 1982, to be held 2-6 August 1982'

- CD/CW/CRP.65 submitted by China, entitled 'Suggested alternative wording for Element IX, 2(a) and (d)'

"III. CHAIRMAN'S CONSULTATIONS WITH DELEGATIONS ON TECHNICAL ISSUES

"10. Following the practice introduced in 1981 by the Chairman to hold consultations on certain technical questions relevant to the future Convention, the Chairman, during the second part of the 1982 session of the Group, convened consultations with delegations on issues recommended for further examination and in his previous report contained in document CD/CW/WP.30 of 22 March 1982. These consultations were held from 2 to 6 August 1982 and dealt specifically with the following issues:

(a) With regard to scope, possible standardized physical, chemical or biological methods enabling determination of the toxicity of "other harmful chemicals" and products formed in different kinds of production processes (including the binary technique) for chemical warfare agents, particularly those belonging to super-toxic lethal chemicals;

(b) With regard to verification, possible technical methods to monitor destruction of chemical weapons, inter alia, by means of specialized information gathering "black boxes", including the means for transmission and processing of such information.

"11. At its 6th meeting, held on 11 August 1982, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group presented the report on his consultations as contained in document CD/CW/WP.41 and Corr.1. The Working Group devoted its 8th meeting to an in-depth discussion of this report. The Group took note of this report. While the usefulness of these consultations was unanimously recognized, the need to structure them according to the requirements of the future convention was emphasized, bearing in mind the close link between its technical and political aspects.

It was felt that the consultations with delegations on technical issues should be clearly relevant to the work of the Working Group. It was agreed that in the future the report should duly reflect the differing views expressed in these consultations. Some delegations emphasized that Chairman's consultations with delegations on technical issues can play a useful role only when they can contribute to the clarification of technical issues for such provisions of the future convention on which agreement in principle has been achieved. Other delegations held the view that these consultations could also help to provide a concrete basis for the consideration of key issues on which no agreement has yet been reached.

"12. It was agreed that the next Chairman's consultations on technical issues should focus on the questions listed below. It was further agreed that during the time devoted to these consultations, between six and eight meetings should be devoted to each item, two meetings to the presentation of other technical issues of direct relevance to the work of the Working Group, aimed at facilitating the negotiating process, and four meetings for discussion of the report on the consultations.

Topics to be discussed:

A. On the basis of the working hypothesis on the definition of chemical weapons (see Annex, pages 3-10) including the concepts of precursors and key precursors, it is suggested that the following questions may be directed to the technical expertise of delegations:

- (a) what are the views on the "working hypothesis" on definition of these concepts?
- (b) to what extent - and by which method - would it be possible to compose lists of key precursors?

B. With respect to destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons, verification procedures should

- (i) verify the types and quantities of chemicals to be destroyed;
- (ii) ensure that they have been destroyed.

In this connection technical experts of delegations may be asked to address the following questions:

- (a) what technical procedures could be suggested in order to monitor destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons?
- (b) what specific elements need to be included in declarations made by State Parties, in order to meet the requirements mentioned above?
- (c) do methods of destruction of stockpiles need to be specified, and in what detail, in order to assure State Parties that stocks have been destroyed and are not capable of being diverted again to use as chemical weapons?

IV. SUBSTANTIVE CONSIDERATIONS DURING THE SECOND PART OF THE 1982 SESSION

"13. During the second part of its 1982 session, the Group at the suggestion of the Chairman, proceeded to another detailed examination of the Revised Elements and of the Comments Thereto, contained in document CD/CW/WP.33 and Corr.1 with a view to elaborating the provisions of the future convention.

"14. As a result of the consideration of the Revised Elements and of the Comments Thereto, and after extensive informal consultations in the Working Group, the Working Group accepted the Chairman's suggestion to establish nine open-ended contact groups in order to advance the process of elaboration of the convention. These informal contact groups, which are listed below, dealt with the following spheres of the convention:

- (a) Element I: scope of the chemical weapons convention;
(Co-ordinator: Mr. T. Melescanu, Romania)
- (b) Element II: definitions;
(Co-ordinator: Dr. J. Lundin, Sweden)
- (c) Element IV: declarations;
(Co-ordinator: Mr. T. Altaf, Pakistan)
- (d) Element V: destruction, diversion, dismantling and conversion;
(Co-ordinator: Mr. S. Duarte, Brazil)
- (e) Element IX: general provisions on verification;
(Co-ordinator: Mr. G. Skinner, Canada)
- (f) Preamble and Final Clauses of the future chemical weapons convention;
(Co-ordinator: Mr. R. Steele, Australia)
- (g) Element X: national implementation measures
(Co-ordinator: Dr. H. Thielicke, German Democratic Republic)
- (h) Element XI: national technical means of verification
(Co-ordinator: Dr. H. Thielicke, German Democratic Republic)
- (i) Elements XII and XIII: consultation and co-operation;
consultative committee.
(Co-ordinator: Miss N. Nascimbene, Argentina)

"15. The results of the work of these Contact Groups were reflected in the reports of the Co-ordinators which were discussed in-depth in the Working Group and subsequently revised by the co-ordinators. These reports are attached in-extenso in the Annex. The method of work adopted by the Working Group in the second part of its 1982 session, and in particular the functioning of open-ended contact groups, was recognised by all delegations as fully appropriate for the present stage. Delegations paid tribute to the Chairman, Ambassador Sujka, for his imaginative proposals in this regard.

16. The Chairman, having taken into account:

- the views expressed by different delegations at the plenary meetings of the Committee devoted to Chemical Weapons;
- the extensive discussions during the meetings of the Working Group;
- the equally extensive discussion in the contact groups,
- the thorough examination of and discussion on the report of each of the contact groups;
- .. and the consultations with numerous delegations,

presented his views on possible compromise wordings of the elements of the future convention. These views are contained in document CD/333(CD/CW/WP.44). The Working Group appreciated the Chairman's contribution and recommended to take it into consideration along with the reports of the contact groups in its deliberations during 1983.

17. The Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons has agreed to recommend to the Committee on Disarmament that the Group should continue its work under the present Chairman between 17 and 28 January 1983, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives. During this period the Group will continue the work carried out in 1982, including through meetings of the contact groups established in 1982, and through the Chairman's consultations on technical issues envisaged in paragraph 75.12 above. It also agreed to recommend that the consultations on technical issues should continue to the end of the first week of the Committee's 1983 session, and that the 1982 Chairman of the Working Group should prepare a report on the basis of his consultations. It was further agreed that the work of the Working Group itself during the period 17-28 January should be reported as part of the 1983 report.

REPORT OF THE CO-ORDINATOR OF THE CONTACT GROUP ON THE SCOPE OF THE
CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

I. Basic positions:

1. Text without a prohibition of use:

'Each State Party to this Convention undertakes, under no circumstances, to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer chemical weapons, and to destroy or dispose for permitted purposes of existing stocks of such weapons, and also to destroy or dismantle facilities and means of production of such weapons.'

2. Direct inclusion of a prohibition of the use of chemical weapons in Element I:

'Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain, transfer or use chemical weapons and to destroy or otherwise dispose of existing stocks of chemical weapons and means of production of such weapons.'

II. Proposals for optional alternatives concerning the reaffirmation of the 'non-use' regime provided for in the 1925 Geneva Protocol, and its reinforcement through one or more of the following:

- (a) a preambular provision recalling the 1925 Geneva Protocol and reaffirming the prohibition of use;
- (b) a specific provision prohibiting use in situations not covered by the 1925 Geneva Protocol;
- (c) a provision stating that CW convention should not be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by any State under the Geneva Protocol of 1925 (along the lines of existing Element VII);
- (d) a specific article in the body of the future convention recognizing that any use of chemical weapons will constitute a violation of the chemical weapons convention and stipulating that as a consequence the provisions on verification included in CW convention will apply to such situations as well;
- (e) a specific provision should be included in the section dealing with the 'complaints procedure' of the future Convention. Such a provision should recognize that any use of chemical weapons by a State Party or with the assistance of a State Party would indicate a violation of one or more of the obligations assumed under the scope of the Convention. The competence of the Consultative Committee would consequently be extended to the allegations of use.

(f) provisions for the verification in CW Convention will include methods and mechanisms for the verification of the prohibition to use chemical weapons.

(g) separate mechanism for investigating suspected use of chemical weapons and biological weapons in combat;

(h) including the prohibition of use in the definitions of the chemical weapons convention;

(i) in the interests of enhancing the effectiveness of the Convention, the States Parties shall agree in due form to prevent any actions aimed at deliberately falsifying the actual state of affairs with regard to compliance with the Convention by other States Parties.

"III. Co-ordinator's proposals for 'a working hypothesis' :

"In the event that consensus is reached that Element I of the future convention may not include a reference to the prohibition of use, this question could be handled as follows:

In the preamble of the Convention, a paragraph will recall the 1925 Geneva Protocol and reaffirm the prohibition to use chemical weapons; Element VII will also contain a reference to the Geneva Protocol stating that the Convention should not be interpreted in any way as limiting or affecting the obligations assumed by States on the basis of the 1925 Protocol;

In addition, a new article will be included in the Convention recognizing that any use of chemical weapons will ipso jure constitute an evidence of a violation of the CW Convention and, accordingly, the provisions on verification included in CW Convention will apply to such situations as well.

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"Prohibition of the planning, organization and training in chemical warfare capability

"In the last meeting of the Group, a short exchange of views on the possible inclusion of the prohibition of the planning, organization and training into a CW convention took place. It appeared that the basic positions expressed on this subject remain the same. It was consequently agreed to postpone a discussion on this item till after further discussions on other problems like verification or non-use.

REPORT OF THE CO-ORDINATOR OF THE CONTACT GROUP ON DEFINITIONS

- "1. The Contact Group has considered basic definitions for the purpose of the convention of 'chemical weapons', 'precursors' and toxicity criteria, and of 'permitted purposes'. Discussions have also been held on the possible meaning of expressions concerning other aspects of the convention as 'production capability/capacity' and 'destruction'.
- "2. In its work, the Contact Group has recognized that the possible outcome of its deliberation could not be perceived as in any way binding for the delegations, who took part, or for any other delegations. The basic positions of delegations still are those reflected in CD/220 and WP.33, both in the 'elements' and in the comments to them, and also in CD/294.
- "3. The co-ordinator feels, however, that he was supported by the Contact Group in his endeavours to present 'working hypothesis' regarding the possible content of the definitions mentioned, at the same time accounting for the main divergent or optional views on the suggested content. The report, therefore, presents such working hypothesis and comments on them, and, when necessary, preceded by an introduction to the subject. The introduction contains points of view which were offered by delegations as explanations for suggested parts of definitions.
- "4. Even if it is the hope that the working hypotheses might serve delegations in their work to narrow differences of views on definitions, they should be considered to be only basic approaches. Thus they are not intended to reflect all the controversial issues which are discussed to be included in the scope, even if occasionally some reference may be made to that.
- "5. Before starting the work on definitions, the Contact Group discussed the 'purpose criterion'. It was agreed that this concept need not be defined for the purpose of the convention. However, the following tentative description seemed to be generally acceptable:
- (1) It allows a State to determine what it is allowed to do and what it must not do.
 - (2) It provides a guideline for one State to evaluate another State's activities.
 - (3) It provides, together with the quantity criterion, a starting point for elaborating more specific criteria (e.g. toxicity, lists). Such criteria can serve as a guide to selection and application of specific verification measures.

"6. Working hypothesis regarding a basic definition of chemical weapons.

(a) The definition should comprise only such concepts which are necessary for the purpose of the convention.

(b) The definition should express the typical effects of chemical weapons, i.e. that their effects are due to the utilization of the toxic properties of chemicals to cause death or other harm.

Comments:

Weapons utilizing other properties of chemicals, e.g. radioactivity or their content of energy, are not to be considered as chemical weapons even if such chemicals happen to be more or less toxic.

It may be a question of presentation where in the definition this idea should be expressed, whether in an introductory part of the definition or in the body of the definition.

Suggestions have been made that reference has to be made to the use in war, armed conflict or combat in this connection.

The formulation suggested about toxic properties of chemicals could imply a reference to toxic effects of chemical weapons to all living organisms.

(c) The term 'chemical weapons' should be applied to each of three different categories of items:

(i) Toxic chemicals which meet certain criteria, and their precursors.

(ii) Munitions and devices which meet certain criteria. This category includes binary and other multi-component munitions or devices.

(iii) Equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of such munitions or devices.

Comments:

The above mentioned part of the definition that chemical weapons utilize the toxic properties of chemicals could as well appear in the body,

(i)-(iii), of the definition.

Another approach might be to define 'chemical warfare agent' and apply the criteria referred to under (a) to such chemical warfare agents.

(d) The general undertakings in an Article I of a future convention shall not apply to chemicals, which can be shown to be produced etc. for certain permitted purposes in quantities appropriate for such purposes. However, such chemicals may have to be subject to certain clarification procedures concerning the provisions in article I, as may be expressed in appropriate future articles on verification.

Comments:

The way to express this in the convention is not agreed upon yet.

(e) The criteria for placing chemicals in toxicity categories as super-toxic lethal chemicals; other lethal chemicals, and other harmful chemicals, could be expressed as follows:

- (i) A 'super-toxic lethal chemical' is any toxic chemical with a median lethal dose which is less than or equal to 0.5 mg/kg (subcutaneous administration) or 2,000 mg-min/m³ (by inhalation), when measured by the methods set forth in
- (ii) Any 'other lethal chemical' is any toxic chemical with a median lethal dose which is greater than 0.5 mg/kg (subcutaneous administration) or 2,000 mg-min/m³ (by inhalation) and which is less than or equal to 10 mg/kg (subcutaneous administration) or 20,000 mg-min/m³ (by inhalation) when measured by the methods set forth in
- (iii) Any 'other harmful chemical' is any toxic chemical with a median lethal dose which is greater than 10 mg/kg (subcutaneous administration) or 20,000 mg-min/m³ (by inhalation) when measured by the methods set forth in

Comments:

Preliminary agreed protocols for toxicity determinations by subcutaneous administrations and by inhalation have been worked out during technical consultations.

The category 'other harmful chemical' might be subdivided into categories, which referred to other toxic effects than lethal effects. This would presume agreements on methods to measure such other harmful effects as sensory irritant effects, mentally and physically incapacitating effects, skin lesion effects etc.

No attempts have been made as yet to evaluate the possible coverage of a definition as expressed in the present Working Hypothesis with regard to toxins and tear gases. Only the possibility that it may cover herbicides was pointed to in the last comment under (b) above.

"7. Working hypothesis regarding a basic definition of 'permitted purposes'.

(a) Permitted purposes would consist of two main elements

(i) non-hostile purposes, and

(ii) military purposes not related to the use of chemical weapons.

(b) Non-hostile purposes would include research, industrial, agricultural, medical or other peaceful purposes, law enforcement purposes, purposes directly connected to protection against chemical weapons.

"8. Working hypothesis of a basic definition of 'precursor'.

(a) Introductory remarks

For the purpose of a chemical weapons convention there seems to be a need

(a) to ensure a ban on production, etc. of any chemical used for production of chemicals to which the term chemical weapon might be applied and (b) to determine which of these chemicals, which may require particular attention from the standpoint of verification.

The former chemicals may be identified in a general way in the convention as 'precursors' to fall under the provisions in article I, prohibiting development, production and stockpiling chemical weapons, in order to preclude the theoretical possibility that the convention might be interpreted as allowing production etc. of these precursors for chemical weapons purpose.

In order to meet the requirement under (b) it would probably be necessary to identify the particular chemicals among the precursors, which are in some way critical for the production of chemical weapons, e.g. by determining the main type of compound formed, and which may not have any peaceful use. These precursors might be singled out in the convention, e.g. as 'key precursors'. Key precursor stockpiles may have to be declared and destroyed, and these activities be subject to verification measures, which might also apply to their future non-production. These measures would not apply to precursors in general, because these would under the future ban only be produced etc. for permitted purposes according to the purpose criterion.

(b) For the purpose of the convention a general and broad definition of 'precursor' could contain the following:

- (i) Precursors as mentioned in _____, are chemicals, which, when made to react chemically form chemicals as are mentioned in (reference to the place where super-toxic lethal, other lethal, and other harmful chemicals first are mentioned in the definition of chemical weapons).

Comment:

An alternative formulation might be:

'Precursor' means any chemical, which may be used as a reactant in production of a super-toxic lethal chemical, other lethal chemical, or other harmful chemical.

- (ii) It would be prohibited under the convention to develop, produce, stockpile, otherwise acquire, retain or transfer precursors as defined above other than for permitted purposes.
- (c) A definition of 'key precursor' could contain the following:
- (i) A key precursor would be the reactant(s) in one or in a few consecutive chemical syntheses leading to the formation of a super-toxic lethal, other lethal, or other harmful chemical, which determines the class of chemical (expressed in the chemical structure) of the toxic chemical(s) formed when the reaction(s) is taking place
- in a production facility producing super-toxic lethal, other lethal or other harmful chemicals,
 - in a chemical weapon warhead or other disseminating device for chemical weapons, before the dissemination of the intended final, toxic product(s); or outside the dissemination device during or after dissemination.
- (ii) Key precursors would have to be destroyed i.e. transformed into chemicals without significance themselves for production of toxic chemicals. Such destruction as well as non-production of key precursors should be subject to verification as set out in

Comments:

A definition of key precursors thus could contain the following characteristics:

The key precursor would

- be a precursor in the final stages of the production process,

- be particularly important in determining the end product,
- be of relatively little use for non-hostile purposes,
- pose a serious risk from the standpoint of an effective ban and therefore require particular attention with respect to verification.

A definition of key precursor may also serve State Parties to a convention as a guide for evaluation of future developments with respect to key precursors which have not previously been generally known or were discovered in the future.

For the latter purpose, alleged key precursors, and for which data proving this were lacking, could be related to any of the three types of toxic chemicals by means of toxicity determinations on their end products formed in their reactions with other precursors. The existence of the definition would also serve as a guideline when chemicals falling under the general definition of precursors above may not need to be destroyed or could be diverted or produced for permitted purposes.

Optional to having an explicit definition of key precursors, it might be possible to have only a list of key precursors. Such a list could be established and revised as necessary by the Consultative Committee on the basis of agreed criteria similar to those discussed above. This might make it possible to have a simple definition like e.g.:

'Key precursor' means a precursor which has been identified by the Consultative Committee, on the basis of agreed criteria, as requiring particular attention from the point of view of destruction.

A list of key precursors could also be made up in addition to a definition of key precursors.

The question of lists of key precursors was not thoroughly discussed during the consultations but seems to be favourable to most delegations. Nor was it discussed as to which extent they might be revised.

9. A preliminary discussion was held with respect to possibly needed definitions, for the purpose of the convention, of 'production facility', 'production capacity' and of 'destruction'. The background material presented as a basis for the discussions by the co-ordinator are presented below, amended in accordance with the few points of view there was time to obtain on these matters during the consultations.

(a) 'Production facility' could mean the plant or part of plant, where chemical weapons be produced.

(b) 'Production capacity' could mean the amount of chemical weapons that might be produced during a given period of time under agreed assumption, and/or

the number of production facilities, which might produce chemical weapons and their combined output during one year under agreed assumptions.

Comment:

Instead of their combined output, the output of each production facility might be given.

(c) 'Destruction' could mean one or more of the following activities to eliminate chemical weapons and production facilities.

(i) With regard to chemical weapons

Chemicals:

Change of the chemical into degradation products, which may be uneconomical to utilize for repeated production of the same chemical. The process should be performed in a way that is not detrimental to the environment.

This might include utilization of the chemical directly in a (irreversible) production process leading to other chemicals, which could not economically be utilized for production of the same chemical or facilitate production of such chemicals. Such a change of the chemical may be referred to as diversion or conversion instead of destruction, and would have to be declared and performed according to agreed procedures, and be subject to particular verification measures.

Munitions and devices:

Make such munitions or devices unserviceable for chemical weapons purposes, preferably by crushing them into pieces.

Specifically designed equipment:

Make such equipment unserviceable and removed from weapons systems etc.

(ii) With regard to production facilities

- physically take apart or disintegrate the facility and remove all parts in an unserviceable state from the facility, leaving the site empty,
- dismantle and disperse for other purposes some or all of the parts of a production facility. Removed parts and the purposes of their utilization should be declared and verified.

APPENDIX

Reference material:

Document CD/112, 7 July 1980, p. 2-3, entitled

'Letter dated 7 July 1980 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the representatives of the USSR and the United States to the Committee on Disarmament.'

Document CD/220, 17 August 1981, entitled

'Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons to the Committee on Disarmament.'

Document WP.33, 28 April 1982, p. 5-11, entitled

'Compilation of revised Elements and Comments thereto (CD/220), proposed new texts and alternative wordings as well as comments on new texts.'

Document CD/266, 24 March 1982, submitted by Yugoslavia, entitled

'Working paper, Binary weapons and the problem of their definition and verification.'

Document CD/294, 21 July 1982, submitted by the USSR, entitled.

'Basic provisions of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction, Proposal of the USSR.'

Document CD/CW/CRP.62, 26 July 1982, submitted by China, entitled

'Suggested alternative wording for Element II and Annex I.'

Document CD/CW/WP.30, 22 March 1982, Annexes III and IV, entitled

'Report of the Chairman to the Working Group on Chemical Weapons on the consultations held on issues relating to toxicity determinations.'

Document CD/CW/WP.38, 28 July 1982, submitted by Yugoslavia, entitled

'Suggested alternative definitions of Chemical Weapons.'

Document CD/CW/CRP.31, CD/CW/CTC/13, 19 March 1982, submitted by United States of America, entitled

'Precursors.'

Document CD/CW/CTC/15, 26 July 1982, submitted by Sweden, entitled

'Chairman's Consultations on Toxicity Criteria.'

Document CD/CW/CTC/19, 5 August 1982, submitted by China, entitled

'Chairman's Consultations on Toxicity Criteria.'

Document CD/CW/CTC/21, 9 August 1982, submitted by USSR, entitled

'Some problems associated with the prohibition of binary weapons and the verification of compliance with such prohibition.'

A number of written suggestions from delegations, as well as many earlier contributions to the Working Group, have not been listed here.

"REPORT OF THE CO-ORDINATOR OF THE CONTACT GROUP ON ELEMENT IV (DECLARATIONS)

"1. POSSESSION OR NON-POSSESSION

Possession or non-possession of 'Chemical Weapons' (as defined in the relevant element of CW Convention including all components) and production facilities in use or inoperative whether on State's own property or abroad or belonging to other State(s) on one's own property including those whose ownership is not well defined.

Timings: Not later than 30 days after the Convention's entry into force or the State Party's adherence to it.

(A) Chemical Weapons Stocks

(a) Agents: Description by weight in metric tons including quantities in bulk and filled into munitions and

Alternative I Description by toxicity category:

- Supertoxic lethal nerve gases (G-gases, V-gases);
- Supertoxic lethal blister gases (H-gases);
- Other supertoxic lethal chemicals,
- Other lethal chemicals;
- Other harmful chemicals including incapacitants, psychotropic chemicals, Convulsants and disabling chemicals; irritants including those meant for law enforcement purposes.

Alternative II Description by toxicity category (supertoxic lethal, other lethal and other harmful) and by chemical names.

(b) Precursors:

Alternative I Precursors including those of binary type and individual chemicals in accordance with the categories mentioned in (a) Alternative I above.

Alternative II Description by weight in metric tons filled and unfilled and by chemical names.

(c) Munitions and devices

Alternative I As described through toxicity categories quantities of agents and precursors.

Alternative II (i) Types, weight and number of unfilled.

(ii) Types, weight and number of filled.

(d) 'Equipment specifically designed for use in CW'

Alternative I As described through toxicity categories quantities of agents and precursors.

Alternative II Types and number including of auxiliary filling equipment.

Location:

Alternative I No declarations.

Alternative II Exact description of location by precise geographic co-ordinates,

Timing: Not later than 30 days after the convention's entry into force or the State Party's adherence to it.

(B) Production Facilities:

(a) Type

Alternative I Declaration for purposes of destruction

(i) Agent production and key precursor production facilities including types of products.

(ii) Filling facilities.

(iii) Key precursor production facilities.

Alternative II Declaration for purposes of destruction as well as Confidence Building Measures

(i) Agent production and key precursor production facilities including types of products.

(ii) Filling facilities.

(iii) Key precursor production facilities.

(iv) Munitions and devices production facilities which are exclusively or partially designed or used for this purpose.

(b) Capacity of Production Facilities

Alternative I Types, weight and/or quantity in terms of time as follows:

(i) Capacities for production of chemicals are declared directly in units of chemicals weight.

(ii) Capacities for filling of munitions are declared in units of chemical weights.

(iii) Capacities for production of filled munitions of binary or multicomponent charges are declared in units of chemicals' weight as applied to the chemicals of a specific type which could be formed in combat use.

(iv) Capacities for production of unfilled munition of binary or multicomponent charges are declared in units of weight of the chemicals which could be formed after filling the munitions.

Alternative II

Types, weight and/or quantity in terms of time.

Location:

Exact geographical location of facilities will be declared in degrees, minutes and seconds.

Declarations will also include description of following types of facilities:

- (i) Existing facilities: Last date of operation.
- (ii) Converted, present use, last date used for CW.
- (iii) Dual purpose facilities:

Alternative I

No declaration of dual purpose facilities.

Alternative II

Dual purpose facilities which are specifically designed or used in part for production of any chemical which is primarily used for CW.

Alternative III

Dual purpose facilities which are capable of conversion to proper CW facilities.

Alternative IV

The number and location of all industrial facilities for the production of organophosphorous substances.

Timings:

Alternative I

- (i) Possession of facilities 30 days after the Convention's entry into force or the State Party's adherence to it.
- (ii) Capacity of facilities not later than 30 days after the Convention's entry into force or the State Party's adherence to it.

Location:

Not later than one year before destruction.

Alternative II

All declarations regarding possession, capacity and location of facilities be made not later than 30 days after the Convention's entry into force or the State Party's adherence to it.

Stocks and production facilities belonging to other States

- (a) Total quantity [in units of weight] according to each type of chemical [super-toxic lethal, other lethal and other harmful chemicals];
- (b) Facilities for the production of chemical weapons or any of their elements, controlled by any other State, group of States, organization or private individual [indication of capacity of such facilities].

Possible need for declaration of findings of old stocks

of chemical weapons, which were not known to a Party itself, when the convention entered into force, and of plans for the destruction of such stocks.

2. PLANS FOR DESTRUCTION OF STOCKS

Declarations regarding plans and time frames for destruction of stocks will cover Chemical Weapons as defined in the relevant element of the Convention.

Description of destruction process will cover the following:

- (i) Type of operation.
- (ii) Time schedule including percentage quantities planned for destruction in specific time frames.
- (iii) What is being destroyed and at what location.
- (iv) Aimed at end production.

Alternative I Not later than 30 days after the Convention's entry into force or the State Party's adherence to it.

Alternative II Within 90 days after the Convention's entry into force or the State Party's adherence to it.

Alternative III Within six months after the Convention's entry into force or the State Party's adherence to it.

3. PLANS FOR ELIMINATION OF PRODUCTION FACILITIES

Declarations regarding plans and time frames for elimination of production facilities will cover the following:

- (i) Location of facilities.
- (ii) Plans for (a) dismantling; and (b) destruction.
- (iii) Time frames for completion of separate stages of elimination (if necessary)

Description of destruction process will cover the following:

- (i) Type of operation.
- (ii) Time schedule.
- (iii) What is being destroyed and at what location.
- (iv) Aimed at end product (if any including description of equipment elements for peaceful purposes).

Timings:

Alternative I Within 30 days after the Convention's entry into force or the State Party's adherence to it.

Alternative II Within six months after the Convention's entry into force or the State Party's adherence to it.

Alternative III Within seven years after the Convention's entry into force or the State Party's adherence to it.

"4. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLANS FOR DESTRUCTION OF STOCKS

- (i) Progress report of stocks destroyed during last year/period including details of types, quantities and destruction methods.
- (ii) Plans for destruction during next year/period including details of types, quantities and destruction methods.

"5. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLANS FOR DISMANTLING/DESTRUCTION OF PRODUCTION FACILITIES

- (i) Progress report of facilities dismantled/destroyed during last year/period including type and location and elimination method.
- (ii) Plans for dismantling/destruction of facilities during next year period including location, type and elimination method.

Timings: Annual/Periodical.

"6. COMPLETION OF ELIMINATION ACTIVITIES

Declaration of completion of elimination activities of all 'Chemical Weapons' and production facilities.

Timings: Not later than 10 years.

7. STOCKS OF SUPER-TOXIC LETHAL CHEMICALS FOR PERMITTED PURPOSES AND THE FACILITIES FOR PRODUCTION OF SUCH CHEMICALS

- (a) Super-toxic lethal chemicals produced, diverted from stocks, acquired or used:

Alternative I (i) For purposes directly connected with protection against chemical weapons;

(ii) For industrial, agricultural, research, medical or other peaceful purposes and for military purposes not connected with the use of chemical weapons.

Alternative II (i) For purposes directly connected with protection against chemical weapons.

- (b) Location and capacity of the specialized facility for the production of super-toxic lethal chemical for protective/permitted purposes.

Timings: Within 30 days - (for stocks held at entry into force)
Annual/Periodic - (subsequently).

8. Alternative I Production and use of other lethal chemicals for permitted purposes.

Alternative II Production and use of commercial chemicals which pose a special risk.

Alternative III Production of organophosphorous substances.

Other lethal chemicals and precursors produced, acquired retained or used for permitted purposes including their quantities, total production, chemical names, uses and location and capacity of facilities where produced.

Timings: (i) Within 30 days - (for stocks held)
(ii) Annual/Periodic - (subsequently).

9. TRANSFERS

Alternative I (i) Volume of transfers since 1 January 1946.
(a) Quantities of chemicals transferred/super-toxic, lethal, other lethal and other harmful chemicals.
(b) Quantities of transferred munitions and other means of combat use/weight of the chemicals filled in those munitions;
(c) Technological equipment for the production of chemical weapons and corresponding technical documentation/in units of weight of the chemicals which could have been produced as a result of such transfers.
(ii) Declare type and quantity of super-toxic lethal chemicals transferred for permitted purposes and names of recipient State(s).

Alternative II Declare type and quantity of super-toxic lethal chemicals transferred for protective purposes and names of recipient State(s).

Timings: For Alternative I (i)
Not later than 30 days after the Convention's entry into force or the State Party's adherence to it.
For Alternative I (ii) and Alternative II
30 days in advance of transfer.

"10. DIVERSION OF STOCKS

Details of types, quantity and intended use.

Timings: Alternative I

Along with/as part of the declaration of plans for
destruction of the stocks.

Alternative II

Along with/as part of the declaration of implementation
of destruction of stocks.

" 11. CONVERSION OF PRODUCTION FACILITIES TO DESTRUCTION FACILITIES

Details including location, type, capacity.

Timings: Alternative I

Along with/as part of plans for elimination of facilities.

Alternative II

At the time of declaration of plans for destruction of stocks.

" 12. CESSATION OF ACTIVITIES RELATED TO POSSIBLE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

- (a) Issue an open general order to the effect that planning, organization and training intended to enable the utilization of toxic properties of chemicals as weapon in combat should not take place;
- (b) Ascertain that all organization charts, plans, manuals etc. containing provisions intended to enable the utilization of toxic properties of chemicals as weapon in combat, are withdrawn or revised;
- (c) Declare the composition of equipment intended to protect against chemical weapons.

Timings: Not later than 10 years.

OPTION: No such declaration.

SUBMISSION OF DECLARATIONS

All declarations will be submitted to the Consultative Committee who will inform all States Parties.

REPORT OF THE CO-ORDINATOR OF THE CONTACT GROUP ON ELEMENT V
(DESTRUCTION, DIVERSION, DISMANTLING AND CONVERSION)

A -- DESTRUCTION OF STOCKS:

I .. ARTICLE: Agreed sub-elements to be included

- (a) general obligation to destroy all existing stocks of chemical weapons;^{*/}
- (b) possibility of diversion of stocks for peaceful purposes, subject to conditions and circumstances set forth in the Annex;
- (c) obligation to utilize safe methods of destruction that will avoid harm to the environment and to populations,^{**/}
- (d) provision on international co-operation to facilitate implementation of the Convention,^{***/} including the possibility of transfer of chemical weapons to another State Party for the purpose of destruction;
- (e) indication of the over-all duration of the process of destruction, to be counted from the time the Convention enters into force for each State Party (suggestion: 10 years):
 - time of start of actual destruction (alternatives):
 - (i) not later than six months after the Convention enters into force for each State Party;
 - (ii) not later than two years after the Convention enters into force for each State Party.

Other sub-elements proposed by some Delegations:

- (a) obligation to destroy precursors that may be used for binary weapons;^{*/}
- (b) placement of all stocks under international supervision at the time the Convention enters into force for each State Party;
- (c) obligation to utilize methods of destruction that permit adequate verification.

^{*/} Suggested addition: "This includes all items defined as 'chemical weapons', including all types of precursors". If under the Element "Definitions", all precursors fall within the definition of "chemical weapons", this addition would render unnecessary the proposed sub-element (a) for the Article.

^{**/} This obligation could be stated in a separate Article applying to the destruction of both stocks and facilities.

^{***/} This provision could be stated in an appropriate place so as to apply both to the destruction of stocks and of facilities.

"II - ANNEX: Agreed sub-elements to be included:

- (a) conditions and circumstances for permitted diversion of stocks for peaceful purposes (to be further elaborated);^{*/}
- (b) procedures and operations to be accomplished during the over-all period of destruction:
 - initial stage (from the time the Convention enters into force for each State Party to the time of start of actual destruction):
 - submission of plans for destruction of stocks; such plans should include:
 - + quantities and types of agents to be destroyed;
 - + time scheduled for the process of destruction;
 - + description, in general terms, of method(s) to be employed for destruction;
 - + indication of place(s) of facility(ies) used for destruction.
 - destruction stage (from the start of actual destruction to the end of over-all period of destruction):
 - + (to be seen in connection with the declarations required from Parties relating to destruction of stocks).

Other sub-elements proposed by some Delegations:

- (a) provisions for ensuring adequate balance during destruction stage so as to avoid the acquisition of military advantage by one State Party over another (p.ex., agreed rates of destruction);
- (b) provisions for ensuring minimization of economic damage and for avoiding unnecessary or burdensome interference with peaceful chemical industry.

^{*/} Suggested conditions and circumstances: (a) list of agents the diversion of which would be permitted; (b) international supervision of diversion; (c) diversion to be carried out in an irreversible manner, so as to prevent the re-utilization of component agents as weapons.

"B - DESTRUCTION OF FACILITIES

"I - ARTICLE: Agreed sub-elements to be included:

- (a) general obligation to destroy and dismantle facilities,^{*/} and not to construct new ones;
- (b) obligation to close down such facilities at the time the Convention enters into force for each State Party, and to cease production of chemical weapons at that time;
- (c) provision for temporary conversion of production facilities into facilities for the purpose of destruction of stocks;
- (d) obligation not to reconvert such converted facilities, and to destroy or dismantle them as soon as they are no longer needed for the purpose of destruction of stocks;
- (e) indication of over-all maximum duration of the process of destruction, to be counted from the time the Convention enters into force for each State Party (suggestion: 10 years)

- time of start of actual destruction:

(alternative suggestions)

(i) six months after the Convention enters into force for each State Party;

(ii) not later than eight years after the Convention enters into force for each State Party.

Other sub-elements proposed by some Delegations:

- (a) provision for the possibility of building special facilities for the purpose of destruction of stocks;
- (b) provision for the possibility of re-utilization in peaceful industry of certain types and categories of equipment, according to specification to be set forth in the Annex.
- (c) obligation to utilize methods of destruction that permit adequate verification.

^{*/} The term 'facility' should be understood as defined in Element II. The following definition was suggested by some Delegations: 'Facilities and/or equipment designed or used for the production of any chemical which is primarily useful for chemical weapons purposes, or for filling chemical munitions'.

"II - ANNEX: Agreed sub-elements to be included:

(a) elaboration of procedures and operations to be accomplished during the over-all period of destruction:

(i) initial stage (from the time the Convention enters into force for each State Party to the time of the start of actual destruction)

- immediate cessation of production and closing down of facilities;
- submission of detailed plans for destruction of facilities, such plans should include:
 - + location of facility(ies);
 - + description of method(s) to be employed for destruction;
 - + indication of facility to be temporarily converted for destruction of stocks;
 - + plans for destruction of such converted facility.

(ii) destruction stage (from the start of actual destruction to the end of the over-all period):

(to be seen in connection with the declarations required from Parties relating to the destruction of facilities).

Other sub-elements proposed by some Delegations:

- (a) specification of types and categories of equipment that could be reused in peaceful industry;
- (b) provisions for ensuring adequate balance during the destruction stage, so as to avoid the acquisition of military advantage by one State Party over another (p.ex., agreed rates of destruction).

" C - QUESTIONS BEARING ON ELEMENT V THAT SHOULD BE DEALT WITH ELSEWHERE IN THE CONVENTION

(a) issues pertaining to 'Definitions':

- definition of weapons and agents prohibited under the Convention and which should thus be destroyed (see Section A on 'Destruction of Stocks' and note to agreed sub-element (a) of the Article and to proposed sub-element (a));
- definition of facilities and/or equipment for the production of chemical weapons, which should thus be destroyed (see Section B on 'Destruction of Facilities' and note to agreed sub-element (a) of the Article);
- definition of the concept of destruction/dismantling, both with regard to stocks and with regard to facilities.

(b) issues pertaining to 'Declaration':

- specification of all declarations to be required from States Parties relating to the process of destruction/dismantling, both of stocks and facilities, including periodical declarations (suggestion: annual declarations during the destruction stage);
- specification of the authority to which plans for destruction of stocks and facilities should be submitted (suggestion: the Consultative Committee);

(c) issues pertaining to 'Verification':

- adequate procedures for the verification of compliance with the obligations set forth in Element V.

(d) issues pertaining to the prohibition of transfer of chemical weapons:

- exception to the obligation not to transfer chemical weapons, so as to permit the transfer of stocks for destruction purposes as set forth in the Article on stocks (see Section A, 'Destruction of Stocks', sub-element (d) of the Article).

"REPORT OF THE CO-ORDINATOR OF THE CONTACT GROUP ON ELEMENT IX
(GENERAL PROVISIONS ON VERIFICATION)

"ELEMENT IX - MIGHT CONTAIN THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

- "1. Purpose of verification: to provide assurance of compliance with the provisions of the Convention (CD 220).
- "2. Scope of verification: appropriate and agreed verification measures should be applied on the basis of the principle of reciprocity to, inter alia:
 - (a) Elements I-IV, concerning prohibition of development, production, other acquisition, stockpiling, retention and transfer of chemical weapons;
 - (b) Elements I and V, concerning destruction or otherwise disposal of existing stocks of chemical weapons and their means of production; over an agreed period of time;
 - (c) Element VI concerning super-toxic lethal chemicals for non-hostile military purposes;
 - (d) Enquiry into facts, including on-site verification on an agreed basis, on questions related to alleged contravention of the terms of the convention.
- "3. Means of verification:
 - (a) Technical means of verification: Element IX could indicate that agreed techniques of verification appropriate to the task required are identified under each substantive head (now contained in Elements II-VI);
 - (b) Organizational means of Verification: Element IX could provide for the establishment of a Consultative Committee to act as a permanent body for the monitoring of the implementation of and compliance with the terms of the Convention.

SECTION A: CONCEPTS AND OPTIONS

"PREAMBLE

Concepts

- (i) Bringing about general and complete disarmament
- (ii) CW ban as a necessary disarmament step
- (iii) Determination to exclude possibility of use; CW use repugnant to the conscience of mankind
- (iv) Strengthening peaceful co-operation in scientific fields
- (v) EW Convention undertaking on CW negotiations
- (vi) Recognizing significance of 1925 Protocol and EW Convention
- (vii) Charter of the United Nations
- (viii) CW convention important for social and economic development

Options

- inclusion of prohibition of use in first preambular paragraph
- chemistry for the benefit of mankind
- principle of non-diminished security (at lower levels of armaments)

"PREAMBLE**(i) Disarmament**

Reaffirming their adherence to the objectives of general and complete disarmament, including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction;

(ii) CW

Convinced that the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction represent a necessary step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control;

(ii) Use

Determined, for the sake of all mankind to exclude completely the possibility of chemical agents being used as weapons; convinced that such use would be repugnant to the conscience of mankind and that no effort should be spared to minimize this risk;

(iv) Peaceful co-operation

Considering that peaceful co-operation among States should strengthen international co-operation in scientific fields, especially in that of chemistry;

Alternative Considering that the achievements in the field of chemistry should be used exclusively for the benefit of mankind

(v) BW Convention

In conformity with the undertaking contained in the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction;

(vi) 1925 Protocol

Recognizing the important significance of the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925 and also of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, in force since 26 March 1975, and calling upon all States to comply strictly with the said agreements;

(vii) United Nations Charter

Desiring also to contribute to the realization of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations;

(viii) Social and Economic Development

Recognizing the important contribution that the Convention can make through its implementation to the social and economic development of States, especially developing countries.

Option

Guided by the principle of non-diminished security of any State or group of States.

"ELEMENT VII - RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER TREATIES

No limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed under 1925 Protocol or any other international treaties.

Options

- specific reference to obligations under Biological Weapons Convention
- specific reference obligations under ENMOD
- possibility of linking CW convention to 1925 Protocol.

"ELEMENT VII - RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER TREATIES

Draft Element

Nothing in this Convention should be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by States Parties to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, or any other international treaty or any existing rules of international law governing armed conflicts.

Reference to BW

Nothing in this Convention should be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by States Parties to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, or under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened for signature on 10 April 1972, or any other international treaty or any existing rules of international law governing armed conflicts.

Reference to ENMOD

Nothing in this Convention should be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by States Parties to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, or under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened for signature on 10 April 1972, and the Convention on Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD), or any other international treaty or any existing rules of international law governing armed conflicts.

***ELEMENT VIII - INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION**

Concepts

- (i) Avoidance of hampering international co-operation in peaceful and protective chemical activities;
- (ii) Undertaking to facilitate, promote and participate in exchange of materials and information
- (iii) Undertaking to allocate any savings as a result of CW convention.

Options

- facilitate international co-operation in peaceful chemical activities
- participate in fullest possible exchange (including co-operation on training and equipping with protective measures)
- undertaking to assist other Parties on request.

***ELEMENT XIV - AMENDMENTS**

- (i) Amendments proposed by any Party; submitted to Depositary; circulated to other Parties;
- (ii) Entry into force of amendments for each Party accepting amendments upon acceptance by majority of Parties; thereafter for each remaining Party on date of acceptance by it.

Options

- Amendments considered at Review Conference
- Party after entry into force, failing expression of a different intention, considered as party to treaty as amended.

" ELEMENT VIII - INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION

Draft Element

- (1) This Convention should be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of States Parties to the Convention or international co-operation in the field of peaceful and protective chemical activities, including the international exchange of chemicals and equipment for production, processing or use of chemical agents for peaceful and protective purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Convention.
- (2) Each State Party to this Convention should undertake to facilitate, promote and participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of chemicals for peaceful and protective purposes consonant with the aims of this Convention.
- (3) Each State Party to this Convention should undertake to allocate a substantial part of possible savings in military expenditures as a result of disarmament measures agreed upon in this Convention to economic and social development, particularly of the developing countries.

Fullest possible exchange

Each State Party to this Convention should undertake to facilitate, promote and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of chemicals for peaceful purposes consonant with the aims of this Convention. Where appropriate such exchange should extend to co-operation on protective measures.

Assistance to Parties

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to provide or support assistance, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, to any Party to the Convention which so requests, if the Security Council decides that such Party has been exposed to danger as a result of violation of the Convention.

" ELEMENT XV - REVIEW CONFERENCE

Concepts

- (i) Review after five years if majority of Parties agree
- (ii) Five year intervals.

"ELEMENT XVI - DURATION AND WITHDRAWALS

Concepts

- (i) Unlimited duration;
- (ii) Right of withdrawal: three months notice to Depositary; statement of extraordinary events jeopardizing supreme interests;
- (iii) Notification to Security Council.

"ELEMENT XIV - AMENDMENTS

Draft Element

- (1) Any State Party to this Convention may propose amendments to the Convention. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary, who shall promptly circulate it to all States Parties.
- (2) An amendment shall enter into force for all States Parties to this Convention which have accepted it, upon the deposit with the Depositary of instruments of acceptance by a majority of States Parties. Thereafter it shall enter into force for any remaining States Party on the date of deposit of its instrument of acceptance.

"ELEMENT XV - REVIEW/ CONFERENCE

Draft Element

- (1) Five years after the entry into force of this Convention, or earlier if it is requested by a majority of Parties to the Convention by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary, a conference of States Parties to the Convention should be held at Geneva, Switzerland, to review the operation of the Convention, with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Convention are being realized. Such review should take into account any new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention.
- (2) Further review conferences should be held at intervals of five years thereafter, and at other times if requested by a majority of the States Parties to this Convention.

"ELEMENT XVI - DURATION AND WITHDRAWALS

Draft Element

- (1) This Convention should be of unlimited duration.
- (2) Each State Party to this Convention should in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Convention, if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Convention, have jeopardized its supreme interests. It should give notice of such withdrawal to the Depositary three months in advance. Such notice should include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

- (3) The Depositary on its part should immediately inform the Security Council of the United Nations of the submission of a notice of withdrawal from a State Party to the Convention.

"ELEMENT XVII - SIGNATURE, RATIFICATION, ACCESSION"

Draft Element

- (1) This Convention should be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Convention before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Element could accede to it at any time.
- (2) This Convention should be subject to ratification by signator States. Instruments of ratification or accession should be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
- (3) This Convention should enter into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by ... Governments, in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Element.
- (4) For those States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited after the entry into force of this Convention, it should enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.
- (5) The Depositary should promptly inform all signatory States and States Parties of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession and the date of the entry into force of this Convention and of any amendments thereto, as well as of the receipt of other notices.
- (6) This Convention should be registered by the Depositary in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
- (7) Annexes of the Convention should be considered an integral part of this Convention.

"ELEMENT XVII - SIGNATURE, RATIFICATION, ACCESSION"

Concepts

- (i) Open to all States; accession at any time
- (ii) Subject to ratification; deposited with United Nations Secretary-General
- (iii) Entry into force with specified number of ratifications
- (iv) Entry into force for late accession
- (v) Depositary to notify all Parties of each signature, ratification or accession
- (vi) Registered in accordance with United Nations Charter
- (vii) Annexes of convention integral.

Options

- twenty ratifications for entry into force
- entry into force requires ratification by all permanent members of Security Council.

"ELEMENT XVIII - DISTRIBUTION OF THE CONVENTION"

Texts, in all United Nations languages, distributed by Depositary.

Options

Twenty Ratifications

This Convention should enter into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by 20 Governments, in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Element.

All Security Council members

This Convention shall enter into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by ... Governments, including the Governments of the States permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.

"ELEMENT XVIII - DISTRIBUTION OF THE CONVENTION"

Draft Element

This Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, should be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who should send duly certified copies thereof to the Governments of States members of the United Nations and its specialized agencies.

" REPORT OF THE CO-ORDINATOR OF THE CONTACT GROUP ON ELEMENT X
"(NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION MEASURES)"

1. Article on national measures

Working hypothesis:

Each State Party should take any measures it considers necessary in accordance with its constitutional processes to implement the Convention, and in particular to prohibit and prevent any activity in violation of the Convention anywhere under its jurisdiction or control.

Each State Party would also inform the Consultative Committee of what legislative and administrative measures it had taken with respect to the implementation of the Convention.

"2. Possible article on national body

Options:

- Each State Party would designate a central authority and point of contact having responsibility with regard to overseeing the implementation of the Convention and to co-operating with the Consultative Committee and the central authorities of other States Parties. Guidelines concerning the functions of this central authority could be set out in Annex
- Each State Party would identify its point of contact being responsible for the co-operation with the Consultative Committee.
- No special reference to national body, since this question could be regarded as covered by the article on national measures.

"3. Possible Annex containing guidelines concerning the functions of the national body

In case there will be agreement on the first option in paragraph 2 such an Annex could be necessary. The contents of this Annex should be further discussed. The following ideas with regard to possible guidelines are quoted from different Working papers and serve only illustrative purposes:

(a) The central authority to be designated by each State Party under Article should be organized and employed by each State Party in accordance with its own legislation.

(b) 'national aspect':

- to oversee the implementation of the obligations concerning
 - prohibition of development, production, other acquisition, stockpiling, retention and transfer of chemical weapons;
 - destruction of stocks of chemical weapons;
 - destruction or dismantling of means of production of chemical weapons;
 - temporary conversion of means of production of chemical weapons for the purpose of destroying stocks of such weapons;
 - super-toxic lethal chemicals for non-hostile military purposes;
(This list would be specified in accordance with the final agreement on the scope of prohibition.)
- to oversee the implementation of the above mentioned obligations the central authority should be in a position
 - to get the relevant information from the corresponding executive organs, agencies and enterprises to investigate the actual state of affairs concerning compliance with the Convention;
 - to examine reports on development activities as well as the productive and commercial activities of enterprises of the chemical industry and related fields, including productive commercial documentations of the enterprises of industrial firms engaged in the manufacture of chemical and other products which could be related to the scope of the Convention;
 - to visit enterprises producing supertoxic lethal chemicals, harmful chemicals and precursors, which fall under the scope of the Convention;
 - to visit enterprises being dismantled or already dismantled, or converted to the production of the above mentioned chemicals for permitted purposes;
 - to sample probes of waste gases, waste water and soil;
 - to install in the above mentioned enterprises sensing devices and make the necessary measurements;
 - to get the financial means necessary for the implementation of its functions;
 - to submit to the government concerned reports on its activities which would be publicized.

(c) 'international co-operative aspect':

- to provide the Consultative Committee with all data necessary to the execution of the task of the Committee with respect to verification of compliance with the Convention;
- to extend in case of international inspections all assistance requested including technical assistance and the provision of data;
- to have access to a selection of inspection personnel both technical and non-technical;
- to be prepared to maintain documentation of the type required to satisfy international verification requirements;
- to co-operate in providing expertise to the Consultative Committee;
- to co-operate with the central authorities of other States Parties and with corresponding international organizations concerning issues connected with the implementation of the Convention.

"REPORT OF THE CO-ORDINATOR OF THE CONTACT GROUP ON ELEMENT XI
"(NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION)

"1. Paragraph on the compatibility of the use of NTM with international law

Options:

- Any use of national technical means of verification for the purpose of monitoring compliance by other States with the provisions of the Convention must be consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.
- Each State Party to the Convention may use national technical means of verification at its disposal for the purpose of monitoring compliance with the provisions of the Convention in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

"2. Paragraph on assistance and the provision of information

Options:

- Verification pursuant to paragraph 1 of this article may be undertaken by any State Party using its own national technical means of verification, or with the full or partial assistance of any other State Party.
- Any State Party which possesses national technical means of verification may, where necessary, place at the disposal of other Parties information which it has obtained through those means and which is important for the purposes of the Convention.
- Any information so obtained should be confidential to the State Party which carried out monitoring, unless or until evidence was sufficient to suggest non-compliance by another State Party. In this case the Consultative Committee should be informed.
- All States parties to the Convention should have access to information gathered by the use of national technical means of verification through the Consultative Committee, at which disposal States Parties possessing such information would place it.

"3. Paragraph on non-interference with NTM

Working hypothesis:

Each State Party to the convention should undertake not to impede, including through the use of deliberate concealment measures or in any other manner, the national technical means of verification of other States Parties operating in accordance with paragraph 1.

(In the view of some delegations provision on non-interference with NIM should depend on a paragraph on the provision of information along the lines of the fourth option in paragraph 2. The question of non-concealment should be further clarified.)

Alternative to Element XI on the lines of Article III, paragraph 5 of the Sea-bed Treaty:

'Verification pursuant to this article may be undertaken by any State Party using its own means, or with the full or partial assistance of any other State Party, or through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter'.

- (Note: - first part may be regarded as covered by the first option in paragraph 2 of this paper;
- second part may be regarded as covered by Element XIII).

"REPORT OF THE CO-ORDINATOR OF THE CONTACT GROUP ON ELEMENTS XII AND XIII
(CONSULTATION AND CO-OPERATION : CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE)

"ELEMENT XII: Consultation and co-operation

"I. It was generally agreed that the Convention should include a provision regarding normal consultations and co-operation according to the following lines:

- (a) Commitment by States parties to consult and co-operate.
- (b) Consultations and co-operation may be undertaken:
 - directly between two or more parties;
 - through appropriate international procedures including the services of appropriate international organizations and of the Consultative Committee. (It was generally agreed to include a specific reference to the Consultative Committee underscoring its special role).
- (c) Substance of consultations and co-operation: any matter in relation to the objectives of, or in the application of, the provisions of the Convention.

For further consideration:

- Specific reference to the United Nations General Assembly and/or Security Council.

"II. Fact-finding procedures concerning alleged ambiguities in or violations of the compliance with the Convention

- (a) General formulation encouraging States parties to hold bilateral contacts.
- (b) Right for every State party (challenging or challenged) to request the Consultative Committee to carry out a fact-finding procedure, including its right to request a specific activity to be carried out by the Consultative Committee (e.g. on-site inspections).
- (c) Such request must be substantiated.
- (d) Obligation to co-operate in the fact-finding procedure.
- (e) Appropriate explanations must be provided in case of a refusal to an on-site inspection.
- (f) Obligation of the Consultative Committee to inform States parties about the results of its procedures.
- (g) General reference to the right of every State to resort to the mechanisms provided by the Charter of the United Nations.

For further consideration:

- Decision by the Consultative Committee on the merits of a request and on the appropriate activity to be carried out for a fact-finding procedure concerning alleged ambiguities in or violations of the compliance with the Convention.
- Provision containing a strong commitment by States parties to co-operate with the Consultative Committee in its investigations.
- Action the Consultative Committee might take after a refusal by a State party to an on-site inspection:
 - request further information
 - request a reconsideration of the decision.
- Provision of assistance to a State party in case of a breach of the Convention:
 - subsumed in the general reference to the United Charter
 - or formulated in specific terms
- Question of falsifying the actual state of affairs with regard to compliance with the Convention by other States parties.

"ELEMENT XIII: Consultative Committee

"A. ORGANIZATIONAL QUESTIONS

"1. CHAPEAU

It was agreed that there should be a general formulation stating the purposes of the Consultative Committee, i.e.:

- to carry out broader international consultation and co-operation
- to ensure the availability of international data
- to provide expert advice
- to oversee the implementation of the Convention
- to promote the verification of the continued compliance with the provisions of the Convention

"2. TIMING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT

- Consultative Committee: shortly, e.g. 30 days, after entry into force of the Convention.
- It was generally agreed that some preparatory work before the establishment of the Consultative Committee would be needed.

For further consideration:

Preparatory Committee

- temporary body
- established after X number of signatures of the Convention

- open to every signatory
- functions: to carry out preparatory technical work; make recommendations to the Consultative Committee

"3. COMPOSITION

- 1 representative by each State party
- advisers by each State party

For further consideration:

- President.-Options:
 - Depositary (United Nations Secretary-General or his personal representative)
 - elected by the States parties
 - rotative presidency
 - collective presidency
- Right or obligation of every State party to become members of the Consultative Committee

"4. SUBORDINATE BODIES

It was generally agreed that the Consultative Committee would have:

- A technical secretariat
- A sub-organ or sub-organs of a reduced membership to operate on a permanent basis

For further consideration:

- Membership of the sub-organ(s). It was suggested:
 - equitable geographical distribution
 - renewed every X years
 - some permanent members
- Functions

Suggested additions:

- Fact-finding panel: operational body composed of political representatives with appropriate technical support of a reduced number of States parties to carry out, at the request of a State party, a fact-finding procedure concerning alleged ambiguities in or violations of the compliance with the Convention
- Expert study groups: to be created on an ad hoc basis to elaborate specific studies on matters of importance for the implementation of the Convention
- Verification teams: for carrying out systematic on-site inspections under the aegis of the technical secretariat.

"5. MEETINGS

- Extraordinary meetings.- Options:
 - at the request of one State party
 - at the request of an X number of States parties
 - at the request of the sub-organ(s)
 - at the request of the depositary

For further consideration:

- Regular meetings.- Options:
 - every year
 - at longer intervals, e.g. depending on the need to appoint members of the secretariat or of the sub-organ(s)

"6. RULES OF PROCEDURE

- On questions of substance: no voting. If the Committee is unable to provide for a unanimous report it shall present the different views involved.

For further consideration:

- On questions relative to the organization of its work.
 - It was suggested that the Committee should work where possible by consensus but otherwise by a majority of votes
- Decision on a request by a State party for a fact-finding procedure concerning alleged ambiguities in or violation of the compliance with the Convention

"7. CO-OPERATION OF STATES PARTIES WITH THE CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE

For further consideration:

- "8. EXPENSES.- It was suggested: - borne by States parties
- "9. Specific provision stating the right of the Consultative Committee to REQUEST ASSISTANCE OR INFORMATION TO APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Note: The final placement of the sub-elements listed above in an article or in an annex will depend on the decision to be taken with regard to the general structure of the Convention.

"B. FUNCTIONS OF THE CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE

Generally agreed functions:

- "1. To carry out broader international consultation closely co-operate with the States parties [authorities responsible for National Verification/Implementation] provide the States parties with the necessary technical assistance.
- "2. To receive, request and distribute data relevant to the provisions of the Convention which may be available by States parties [authorities responsible for National Verification/Implementation] and to analyse such information.
- "3. To elaborate technical questions relevant to the implementation of the Convention, e.g. drawing up and revising lists of precursors, agreed technical procedures.
- "4. To carry out and/or participate in systematic on-site inspections in order to:
 - monitor destruction of CW stockpiles
 - monitor the single facility for small-scale production of super-toxic lethal chemicals [for non-hostile military purposes] [for permitted purposes].

Suggested additions:

- monitor the inactive status of CW production and filling facilities
- monitor destruction/dismantling of CW production and filling facilities
- monitor production of certain commercial chemicals which are agreed to pose a special risk
- monitor the inactive status of CW stockpiles

For further consideration:

- The role of the Consultative Committee in the systematic on-site inspections:
 - sole responsibility
 - shared responsibility, e.g. with the State party concerned
- The characteristics of the systematic on-site inspections (permanent basis-periodicity-random selection - agreed procedures).

- "5. To receive a request of a State party for a fact-finding procedure in case of alleged ambiguities in or violations of the compliance with the Convention
- To request further information as appropriate
 - To carry out and/or participate in a challenge on-site inspection
- Suggested addition:
- to carry out a challenge on-site inspection concerning allegations of use of chemical weapons by or with the assistance of a State party
- "6. To present an annual/periodic report of all its activities prepared, if appropriate, by the secretariat or by the sub-organ(s).

" APPENDIX

It was generally agreed that it should be elaborated in an annex containing:

"I. Technical procedures for systematic and challenge on-site inspections

- Rights and functions of the inspectors
- Rights and functions of the host-State personnel
- General kinds of inspection procedures
- General kinds of equipment to be utilized in the inspections and who provides it.

For further consideration:

- Sources of inspection personnel.

"II. General framework for the activities to be carried out during the inspections to be performed, e.g.

- for the regular monitoring of the destruction of CW stockpiles
- for the regular monitoring of the single facility for small-scale production of super-toxic lethal chemicals
- in the course of fact-finding procedures."

Note: The elements listed above could be separated in two different annexes depending on the final decision to be taken with regard to the general structure of the Convention.

E. New Types of Weapons of Mass Destruction and New Systems of Such Weapons: Radiological Weapons

76. The item on the agenda entitled "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons" was considered by the Committee, in accordance with its programme of work, during the periods from 15 to 19 March and from 6 to 7 September.
77. The Committee had before it the following documents submitted during its 1982 session in connection with the item:
- (a) Document CD/261, dated 15 March 1982, submitted by the delegation of Hungary, entitled "Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons";
 - (b) Document CD/323 and Corr.1 dated 13 September 1982, submitted by the delegation of Japan, entitled "Working Paper - Prohibition of Attacks against Nuclear Facilities".
 - (c) Document CD/331, dated 13 September 1982, submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany, entitled "Working Paper - Issues relating to a prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities in the framework of a Radiological Weapons Treaty".
78. In accordance with the Committee's decision concerning subsidiary bodies at its 156th plenary meeting on 18 February 1982, as contained in document CD/243, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons was re-established on the basis of its former mandate, with a view to reaching agreement on a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons. The Committee further decided that the Ad Hoc Working Group would report to the Committee on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the first part of its 1982 session, in view of the convening of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.
79. At its 157th plenary meeting on 25 February 1982, the Committee decided to nominate the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany as the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group.
80. During the 1982 session, the Ad Hoc Working Group held 14 meetings between 20 February to 21 April and between 2 to 8 September 1982, and the Chairman also conducted informal consultations during that period.
81. As a result of its deliberations during the first part of 1982 session, the Ad Hoc Working Group submitted a report to the Committee (document CD/284/Rev.1), which contains an account of its work during the 1980 and 1981 sessions as well as the first part of 1982 session. The statement made by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the occasion of the submission of the report is contained in document CD/289. At its 173rd plenary meeting on 21 April 1982 the Committee

adopted the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group, which is an integral part of the Special Report of the Committee on Disarmament to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (CD/292 and Corr.1-3).

82. In addition, the Ad Hoc Working Group submitted an annual report to the Committee, as contained in document CD/328.

83. At its 188th plenary meeting on 17 September 1982, the Committee adopted the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group, which is an integral part of this report and reads as follows:

"I. INTRODUCTION

"1. At its 156th plenary meeting on 18 February 1982, the Committee on Disarmament decided to re-establish the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons on the basis of its former mandate, with a view to reaching agreement on a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons. The Committee further decided that the Ad Hoc Working Group would report to the Committee on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the first part of its 1982 session, in view of the convening of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and that the Ad Hoc Working Group would also report to the Committee before the conclusion of the second part of its 1982 session.

"II. ORGANIZATION OF WORK AND DOCUMENTATION

"2. At its 157th plenary meeting on 23 February 1982, the Committee on Disarmament appointed Ambassador Dr. Henning Wegener, representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group. Mr. Guennady Efimov and Dr. Lin Kuo-Chung of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament served as Secretary of the Working Group during the first and second parts of the 1982 session respectively.

"3. The Ad Hoc Working Group held 14 meetings between 20 February and 21 April and between 2 and 8 September 1982.

"4. At their request, representatives of the following States, not members of the Committee on Disarmament, were invited to participate in the meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Group during the 1982 session: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Norway, Senegal and Spain.

"5. In carrying out its mandate, the Ad Hoc Working Group took into account paragraph 76 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It also took into consideration the relevant recommendations of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, in particular those adopted in connection with the Second Disarmament Decade in 1980. In addition to various resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on the subject at its previous sessions, the Working Group further took into account resolution 36/97 B of the General Assembly, by which the Committee on Disarmament was called upon 'to continue negotiations with a view to an early conclusion of the elaboration of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons, in order that it may be submitted if possible to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament, to be held in 1982.'

"6. During the 1982 session, the Ad Hoc Working Group had before it the following additional documents for consideration:

- (1) CD/RW/WP.25 - Chairman's Statement (9 March 1982)
- (2) CD/RW/WP.25/Add.1 and Add.1/Rev.1 - Chairman's Amended Proposal for the organization of work during the opening session (adopted by the Working Group on 15 March 1982)
- (3) CD/RW/WP.26 - Chairman's Working Paper: Positive formulations of an RW Definition (Synopsis) (10 March 1982)
- (4) CD/RW/WP.27 - Tentative Programme of Work (Suggested by the Chairman) (15 March 1982)
- (5) CD/RW/WP.28 - Chairman's Working Paper: Suggested formulation of the provision on scope of the Radiological Weapons Treaty (15 March 1982)
- (6) CD/RW/WP.29 - Chairman's Working Paper: Suggested formulations of the provisions on peaceful uses (22 March 1982)
- (7) CD/RW/WP.30 - Yugoslavia: Definition of Radiological Weapons - Article II (18 March 1982)
- (8) CD/RW/WP.31 and Add.1 - Australia: Proposal on Definition and Scope of Prohibition (giving two alternative texts) (19 March and 2 April 1982)
- (9) CD/RW/WP.32 - Chairman's Working Paper: Suggested mechanism of compliance and verification (following on Document CD/RW/WP.20) (22 March 1982)
- (10) CD/RW/WP.33 - Chairman's Summary of suggested issues of initial relevance relating to protection of nuclear facilities for discussion during Working Group meetings on 26 March and 2 April 1982 (30 March 1982)
- (11) CD/RW/WP.34 - Sweden: Memorandum on certain aspects of a convention prohibiting radiological warfare (5 April 1982)
- (12) CD/RW/WP.35 - Draft Report to the Committee on Disarmament in view of the Second Special Session devoted to Disarmament: submitted by the Chairman (Introduction) (Parts A and C) (13 April 1982)
- (13) CD/RW/WP.35/Add.1 - Discussions on the provisions of the Draft Treaty on Radiological Weapons ("traditional" RW subject-matter): submitted by the Chairman (Part B) (16 April 1982)
- (14) CD/RW/WP.36 - Group of 21: Text proposed for an Article in the Draft Treaty on Radiological Weapons (14 April 1982)

- (15) CD/RW/WP.37 and Corr.1 - Japan: Proposal on Prohibition of Attacks Against Nuclear Facilities (1 September 1982)
- (16) CD/RW/WP.38 - Chairman's Statement (6 September 1982)
- (17) CD/RW/WP.39 - Chairman's Working Paper: Compilation of Radiological Weapons Treaty Provisions
- (18) CD/RW/WP.40 - Federal Republic of Germany: Issues Relating to a Prohibition of Attacks Against Nuclear Facilities in the framework of a Radiological Weapons Treaty

"III. SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS

"A. First Part of 1982 Session

"7. Pursuant to the appeal contained in the General Assembly resolution 36/97 B, the Ad Hoc Working Group, in addition to informal consultations and informal meetings of a drafting group, held 12 meetings during the first part of the 1982 session with a view to submitting a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

"8. The Ad Hoc Working Group submitted a special report to the Committee on Disarmament, as contained in Document CD/284/Rev.1, which contains a summary account of the negotiations during the 1980 and 1981 sessions as well as the first part of the 1982 session. At its 173rd plenary meeting on 21 April 1982 the Committee adopted the special report of the Ad Hoc Working Group, which is an integral part of the Special Report of the Committee on Disarmament to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (Document CD/292 and Corr. 1-3). */

"B. Second Part of 1982 Session

"9. In view of the difficulties encountered in the first part of the 1982 session and taking into account the fact that the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament had not taken action in this field, the Chairman of the Working Group took the initiative to exchange views with delegations through a letter and attached questionnaire with a view to facilitating the future work of the Working Group. The questionnaire concentrated on the relationship between the 'traditional' radiological weapons subject-matter and the problems inherent in the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities, which, inter alia, had threatened to bring the negotiations in the Working Group to a deadlock at an earlier point.

"10. At the 1st meeting of the Working Group during the second part of the 1982 session, held on 2 September 1982, the Chairman reported on the replies to his letter and questionnaire as well as various views expressed by delegations during his informal consultations. A summary account of those replies and views is contained

*/ It was also issued as Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Special Session, Supplement No. 2 (A/S-12/2).

in the Chairman's statement (Document CD/RW/WP.38). In the presentation of his Statement the Chairman emphasized that his reading of the replies received was necessarily of a personal and synthetic nature, and was designed to bring out the common ground he could discern among the various views offered by delegations.

"11. At the same meeting, confirming developments to which the Chairman had drawn attention in his statement, a certain flexibility of positions of some delegations was revealed in connection with the organization of the future work of the Ad Hoc Working Group and the subjects addressed in the Chairman's questionnaire. However, it appeared from the discussions that the consultations initiated by the Chairman, especially those to which reference is made in paragraph 83.10 above, and the new positions of certain delegations had not yet succeeded in eliminating the difficulties encountered in the Working Group regarding the issue. Also, several delegations felt it necessary to restate the views of their governments as to a certain number of other issues of a substantive nature under negotiation in the Working Group, which had not been considered in detail in the second part of the 1982 session.

"12. During the same meeting the representatives of Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany introduced working papers as contained in CD/RW/WP.37 and Corr.1 and CD/RW/WP.40, respectively.

"13. In spite of differences of opinion, there was a general recognition that negotiations on an international convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons within the framework of the Committee on Disarmament should be continued with a view to attaining rapid progress, taking also into account the consultations and discussions held during the second part of the 1982 session. Several delegations expressed the view that progress on the 'traditional' radiological weapons subject-matter might be facilitated by basing future negotiations in this respect on the Compilation of Radiological Weapons Treaty Provisions submitted by the Chairman as contained in document CD/RW/WP.39. Certain delegations expressed the view that this issue should be negotiated simultaneously with the question of prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities. Other delegations had reserved their position on this subject.

"14. The Ad Hoc Working Group agreed to recommend to the Committee on Disarmament that an ad hoc working group should be established at the beginning of its 1983 session to continue negotiations on the prohibition of radiological weapons."

84. At the initiative of the delegation of Hungary and in accordance with its programme of work for the second part of its 1982 session, the Committee held two informal meetings under item 5 of the agenda "New Types of Weapons of Mass Destruction and New Systems of Such Weapons", with a view to examining proposals and suggestions pertaining to this issue.

85. The Committee considered this question at plenary and informal meetings, with the participation of experts from some member States, during its 1982 session. A summary of the treatment previously given to this item is available in paragraphs 70-75 of the Special Report of the Committee to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (CD/292 and Corr.1-3). There continues to be two main approaches to the prevention of the emergency of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction.

86. Some delegations prefer a general agreement prohibiting the development and production of all new types of weapons of mass destruction, to be exemplified in an attached list, and which would also enable separate agreements to be concluded for banning specific weapons. As a first step, in their view, the permanent members of the Security Council and other militarily significant States should make identical declarations pledging not to develop any new weapons of mass destruction. They have also proposed the establishment by the Committee of an ad hoc group of qualified governmental experts in order to elaborate a draft general agreement as well as separate agreements for banning particular weapons. In this connection, they have drawn attention to the danger that may stem from a variety of weapons possibilities based on scientific cum technological developments.

87. A view was expressed that those governmental experts could be assigned with the task of preparing a study on the subject matter.

88. Some other delegations stated that in their view it would be more appropriate to negotiate agreements to ban potential new weapons of mass destruction only on a case by case basis as such weapons may be identified. They pointed out that no such weapon has been identified so far. A general prohibitory agreement would be too ambiguous to be useful in concrete situations and would not permit the definition and implementation of the appropriate verification measures. For the present, they consider that the practice followed up to now - periodic informal meetings with the participation of experts - allow the Committee to follow this question in an appropriate manner and adequately to identify any cases which might require particular consideration and which would justify the opening of specific negotiations.

89. The view was also expressed that scientists could be associated to the work of the Committee, for example by the creation of an ad hoc group of scientific experts, in order to contribute to the adoption of concrete measures for preventing the use of scientific and technological achievements for military purposes.

F. Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament

90. The item on the agenda entitled "Comprehensive programme of disarmament" was considered by the Committee, in accordance with its programme of work, during the periods from 29 March to 6 April and from 8 to 9 September.

91. The Committee had before it the following new documents submitted during its 1982 session in connection with the item:

(a) Document CD/229, dated 27 January 1982, submitted by the Group of 21, entitled "Working paper on the chapter entitled 'Objectives' of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament".

(b) Document CD/230, dated 27 January 1982, submitted by the Group of 21, entitled "Working paper on the chapter entitled 'Priorities' of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament".

(c) Document CD/232, dated 29 January 1982, submitted by the delegations of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entitled "Working paper on the chapter entitled 'Objectives' of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament".

(d) Document CD/233, dated 29 January 1982, submitted by the delegations of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entitled "Working paper on the chapter entitled 'Priorities' of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament".

(e) Document CD/239, dated 8 February 1982, submitted by the delegations of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entitled "Working paper on the chapter entitled 'Principles' of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament".

(f) Document CD/245, dated 19 February 1982, submitted by the delegations of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entitled "Working paper on the agenda item entitled 'Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament'".

(g) Document CD/255, dated 3 March 1982, submitted by the Group of 21, entitled "Working paper on the chapter entitled 'Machinery and Procedures' of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament".

(h) Document CD/296, dated 28 July 1982, submitted by the delegation of Romania, entitled "Considerations of the Grand National Assembly, of the President of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Nicolae Ceausescu, presented to the second special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament".

92. In accordance with the Committee's decision at its 69th plenary meeting on 17 March 1980, the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament was established to initiate negotiations on the comprehensive programme of disarmament, envisaged in paragraph 109 of the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament with a view to completing its elaboration before the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Accordingly, the Ad Hoc Working Group met during the second part of the 1980 session and during the whole 1981 session. In pursuance of the Committee's decision at its 148th plenary meeting on 20 August 1981, the Ad Hoc Working Group resumed its work on 11 January 1982.
93. As a result of its deliberations, the Ad Hoc Working Group submitted a report to the Committee as contained in document CD/283. The statement made by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the occasion of the submission of the report is contained in document CD/286. At its 173rd plenary meeting on 21 April 1982, the Committee adopted the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group which is an integral part of the Special Report of the Committee on Disarmament to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (CD/292 and Corr.1-3).
94. By paragraph 63 of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session, the General Assembly referred back to the Committee on Disarmament the draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, together with the views expressed and the progress achieved on the subject at the special session. In addition, the General Assembly requested the Committee to submit a revised draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament at the Assembly's thirty-eighth session.
95. At its 176th plenary meeting, on 5 August 1982, the Committee decided to re-establish the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, envisaged in paragraph 109 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, with a view to submitting a revised draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session, "taking into account the views expressed and the progress achieved on the subject at the second special session" of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It was understood that the Ad Hoc Working Group would not conduct formal meetings during the remainder of the session, but that informal consultations or meetings of an exploratory character would be held.
96. At the same meeting, the Committee re-appointed the representative of Mexico as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group.

G. Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space

97. The item on the agenda entitled "Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space" was considered by the Committee, in accordance with its programme of work, during the period from 30 August to 1 September. The Committee also held informal meetings on the subject on 30 March and 7 April.

98. The Committee had before it the following documents submitted during its 1982 session in connection with the item:

(a) Document CD/272, dated 5 April 1982, submitted by the delegation of Mongolia, entitled "Working paper on the prevention of an arms race in outer space".

(b) Document CD/274, dated 7 April 1982, submitted by the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entitled "Draft treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space".

(c) Document CD/320, dated 26 August 1982, submitted by the delegation of Canada, entitled "Arms Control and Outer Space".

(d) Document CD/322, dated 1 September 1982, submitted by the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entitled "Message of greetings from L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to the Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space".

(e) Document CD/329, dated 13 September 1982, submitted by the Group of 21, entitled "Draft Mandate for Ad Hoc Working Group on Item 7 of the Agenda of the Committee on Disarmament entitled 'Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space'".

99. An account of the consideration of the subject since 1979, including the first part of the 1982 session, was contained in paragraphs 80-83 of the Special Report of the Committee on Disarmament to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (CD/292 and Corr.1-3).

100. During the second part of its 1982 session, the Committee held a number of informal meetings to consider proposals for the establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group under the agenda item.

101. The Committee has three proposals before it. One concerning the question of negotiating an effective and verifiable agreement to prohibit anti-satellite systems in the context of agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space. According to this approach the negotiation of an agreement of general character could not effectively deal with specific questions like the prohibition of anti-satellite systems, which in the opinion of the proponents of this approach is the most urgent task to undertake. Another proposal was on the negotiation of a treaty prohibiting

the stationing in outer space of weapons of any kind. Under this approach the question of anti-satellite systems would be considered within the context of other measures aiming to achieve the same goals. Still another proposal, submitted by the Group of 21, stated that the aim of the negotiations should be to conclude an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects.

102. In the course of the Committee's consideration of this item, the creation of an ad hoc working group was proposed for negotiations on the text of an international treaty on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives (CD/272). Several members supported this proposal and drew attention to General Assembly resolution 36/99. Other delegations suggested that a Working Group should be established under an appropriate mandate clearly identifying the scope of negotiations, in accordance with the content of General Assembly resolution 36/97 C. Several members supported this proposal. The Group of 21 proposed a draft mandate for an ad hoc working group "reaffirming the principle that outer space -- the common heritage of mankind -- should be preserved exclusively for peaceful purposes", which would undertake negotiations, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives, in order to prevent the extension of an arms race to outer space and prohibit its use for hostile purposes (CD/329).

103. China, subscribing generally to the position of the Group of 21 as stated above, advocated also the setting up of an ad hoc working group under this item.

104. The immense value to all States of the peaceful uses of outer space in a variety of areas, such as telecommunications, meteorology, navigation, remote sensing of natural resources, verification of arms limitation and disarmament measures, peace-keeping and confidence building measures, etc. was widely stressed in the Committee. Several delegations agree that all possible steps should be taken to ensure that outer space is preserved exclusively for peaceful purposes, especially in view of the possibilities of using outer space also for hostile purposes.

105. Some delegations referred to existing multilateral and bilateral agreements concerning outer space which they regarded as containing significant arms control provisions. They suggested that the Committee should review the existing body of international law in further considering the question of negotiating additional arms control measures for outer space. But some other delegations are of the opinion that the existing international instruments are capable of divergent interpretations and that technological evolution has revealed in them some deficiencies and loopholes. Some delegations consider it necessary therefore to conclude agreements banning all kinds of weapons in outer space, and not only to exclude activities or devices of an

aggressive or offensive character, such as anti-satellite systems. Some other delegations consider it necessary to establish priorities and suggest that, as a first step, the Committee should consider the question of negotiating an effective and verifiable agreement prohibiting anti-satellite systems.

106. The proposal to setup a working group has not secured the consensus of the Committee at present. Some delegations feel that the Committee should continue its further discussion of the proposals before it, as well as any future proposals, so as to sharpen its focus before taking a decision regarding the establishment of a working group and its mandate. Other delegations consider that a working group might be established without further delay for commencing negotiations as proposed in CD/272. Still other delegations feel that General Assembly resolution 36/97 C should be taken as a basis to formulate an appropriate mandate for a working group to be established under item 7. The Group of 21 also maintains that a working group should be set up soon to undertake the negotiations recommended in CD/329.

H. Consideration of Other Areas Dealing with the Cessation of the Arms Race and Disarmament and Other Relevant Measures

107. During its 1982 session, the Committee had before it another document which dealt with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures in other areas:

Document CD/275, dated 7 April 1982, submitted by the delegation of Canada, entitled "Compendium of Arms Control Verification Proposals -- Second Edition".

108. One delegation recalled that the First Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof recognized the need to keep major technological developments which affect the operation of the Treaty under continuing review and invited the CCD, in consultation with the States Parties to the Treaty, to consider establishing an ad hoc expert group under its auspices for this purpose. It was stated by the Review Conference that such a group might contribute to the orderly preparation of the next Review Conference. In view of this, the aforementioned delegation suggested that the Committee, when preparing its agenda and work programme at the beginning of next year's session, should take the proper measures in order to fulfil the said request.

I. Consideration and Adoption of the Annual Report of the Committee and any other Report as appropriate to the United Nations General Assembly

(a) Consideration and Adoption of the Special Report of the Committee to the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament

109. The item on the agenda entitled "Consideration and adoption of the Special Report to the Second Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations Devoted to Disarmament" was considered by the Committee, in accordance with its programme of work, from 7 to 12 April 1982.

110. At its 173rd plenary meeting on 21 April 1982, the Committee adopted the Special Report to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, as contained in document CD/292 and Corr.1-3.

(b) Consideration and Adoption of the Annual Report to the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly of the United Nations

111. In accordance with the Committee's programme of work for the second part of its 1982 session, the item on the agenda entitled "Consideration and adoption of the annual report to the General Assembly of the United Nations" was considered by the Committee from 10 to 14 September 1982.

112. The present report is transmitted by the Chairman on behalf of the Committee on Disarmament.

(Signed)

Alfonso Garcia Robles
Mexico
Chairman of the Committee

APPENDIX I

CONSOLIDATED LIST OF PARTICIPANTS IN THE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE
(1982 Session)

<u>Chairman of the Committee for February:</u>	Ambassador Mohammad Jafar Mahallati (Iran)
<u>Chairman of the Committee for March:</u>	Ambassador Mario Alessi (Italy)
<u>Chairman of the Committee for April and the in-session recess:</u>	Ambassador Yoshio Okawa (Japan)
<u>Chairman of the Committee for August:</u>	Ambassador Charles Gatere Maina (Kenya)
<u>Chairman of the Committee for September and the intersessional recess:</u>	Ambassador Alfonso García Robles (Mexico)
<u>Secretary of the Committee and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General:</u>	Mr. Rikhi Jaipal
<u>Deputy Secretary of the Committee:</u>	Mr. Vicente Berasategui

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*Mr. Anisse Salah-Bey	Ambassador Permanent Representative to the United Nations Office at Geneva Head of Delegation
*Mr. Messaoud Mati	Counsellor Permanent Mission of Algeria to the United Nations Office at Geneva
*Mr. Abdelkader Taffar	Counsellor Permanent Mission of Algeria to the United Nations Office at Geneva
*Mr. Mohamed Maachi	Ministry of National Defence
*Mr. Mohamed Medkour	Ministry of National Defence

* Spouse present.

Delegation of Argentina

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Mr. Santos N. Martinez	Minister Plenipotentiary Permanent Mission of Argentina to the United Nations Office at Geneva Alternate Representative
Mr. Victor E. Beauge	Minister Plenipotentiary Permanent Mission of Argentina to the United Nations Office at Geneva Alternate Representative
Mr. Vicente Espeche Gil	Counsellor Permanent Mission of Argentina to the United Nations in New York Alternate Representative
Mr. Roberto García Moritan	First Secretary Permanent Mission of Argentina to the United Nations Office at Geneva Alternate Representative
Miss Norma Nascimbene	Second Secretary Permanent Mission of Argentina to the United Nations Office at Geneva Alternate Representative

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*Mr. David Sadleir	Ambassador Permanent Representative to the United Nations Office at Geneva Head of Delegation
*Mr. Rory Steele	Counsellor Permanent Mission of Australia to the United Nations Office at Geneva Deputy Head of Delegation
Miss Sue Boyd	First Secretary Permanent Mission of Australia to the United Nations, New York
Mr. Trevor Findlay	Second Secretary Permanent Mission of Australia to the United Nations Office at Geneva Alternate Representative
Mr. Peter McGregor	Expert (Seismic) Bureau of Mineral Resources Australia

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Mr. A. Onkelinx	Ambassador Permanent Representative of Belgium to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Mr. J. Raeymaeckers	Ambassador at large for disarmament questions
Mr. Ch. Raulier	Minister Plenipotentiary Director of Disarmament Service Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Brussels
Mr. J.M. Noirfalisse	First Secretary Permanent Mission of Belgium to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Miss de Clerq	Attaché Permanent Mission of Belgium to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Captain H. de Bisschop	Expert (Chemical Weapons)
Mr. J.M. Van Gils	Chief, Seismological Service of the Royal Observatory of Belgium

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*Mr. Ivan Sotirov	First Secretary Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of Bulgaria to the United Nations Office at Geneva
*Mr. Radoslav Deyanov	Third Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sofia
Mr. Peter Popchev	Third Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sofia
*Mr. Kliment Pramov	Third Secretary Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of Bulgaria to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Lieutenant-Colonel Nikola Mikhailov	Expert (Chemical Weapons) Ministry of National Defence Sofia
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*U Tin Kyaw Hlaing	Deputy Permanent Representative Permanent Mission of Burma to the United Nations Office at Geneva
U Ngwe Win	Deputy Permanent Representative Permanent Mission of Burma to the United Nations Office at Geneva
*U Aung Than	Second Secretary Permanent Mission of Burma to the United Nations Office at Geneva
*U Zaw Min	Second Secretary Permanent Mission of Burma to the United Nations Office at Geneva
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