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CONTENTS

President: Mr. Ismat T. KITTANI (Iraq).

AGENDA ITEM 14

Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency:
(*a*) Report of the Agency;
(*b*) United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy: report of the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

1. The PRESIDENT: I now invite, on behalf of the Assembly, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mr. Sigvard Eklund, to present the report of the Agency for the year 1980.[1]

2. Mr. EKLUND (Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency): For 20 years I have had the privilege of presenting the annual report of IAEA to the General Assembly. As I do so today for the last time, I should like to trace briefly the evolution of the international nuclear scene during these two decades and to express some personal thoughts about the future.

3. In 1961, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy were just beginning to show their promise with a few small nuclear power plants operating in a few countries. At the end of last year, 253 nuclear power reactors were in operation in 22 member States of IAEA, generating 8 per cent of the world's electricity. It is possible to forecast with a high degree of probability that this figure will rise to 17 per cent by 1985. This corresponds to what could be produced by burning the whole annual production of oil from Saudi Arabia as known at present. Thus, it is evident that nuclear energy is making a significant impact in reducing the need to burn fossil fuels. Nuclear energy is helping to take the pressure off oil supplies.

4. During these two decades a comparable maturity has also been achieved in the use of other nuclear techniques in the fields of agriculture, medicine and industry. In addition, several countries have mastered the technical problems of the fast breeder reactor which could make the potential supply of nuclear energy virtually unlimited. The first full-scale breeder is expected to be in operation within two years.

5. We are also beginning to see renewed interest in the use of nuclear reactors as sources of district and space heating, which absorb almost half the energy consumption in countries with cold climates.

6. Nuclear power plants depend on fuel-cycle services to provide them with fuel and to process spent fuel and waste. In 1961, only some nuclear-weapon States had the capability to enrich uranium. This technology was a closely guarded secret, and at that time enriched uranium was provided to the nuclear power industry by only one of those countries. Today, some 10 countries have developed or are developing various technologies for enrichment, and commercial supplies are already available from several of them.

7. In 1961, only the four nuclear-weapon States were operating plants for reprocessing spent fuel. This was chiefly in order to obtain plutonium for nuclear weapons. Today, pilot-scale or commercial reprocessing is already being undertaken or will shortly be undertaken in more than 10 countries to meet fuel-cycle requirements for peaceful nuclear programmes.

8. Here it is worth recalling that this process of evolution has been achieved without the loss of a single life from the operation of the nuclear components of the power plants for civil use and without a single serious emission of radiation to the public, even in the worst accident that has so far been witnessed.

9. But, as you all know, in recent years the long-term future of nuclear energy has become uncertain in some countries. In the United States, for example, which did so much to pioneer nuclear power, no new nuclear power plant has been ordered during the last four years, many have been cancelled, and no new orders are in prospect. Several other industrial countries are facing similar situations, with new orders falling off and many existing orders being deferred or cancelled. It is paradoxical that this turn should have taken place at a time when the energy scene had worsened and the need for alternatives to oil had clearly become more and more acute. To a major degree, the nuclear decline could be ascribed to the slower-than-foreseen growth in electricity demand and to high interest rates adversely affecting capital-intensive construction projects. But at the same time, one cannot deny that public resistance has played some role in the rejection of the nuclear option by some countries and in the long delays being experienced in others. The time needed to build a new nuclear plant in the United States, for example, has now stretched out to some 12 to 14 years, as compared with half that period in France and Japan. In these circumstances, it is not surprising that nuclear electricity costs half as much as coal-generated power in France but that the balance is sometimes tipped the other way in the United States. To illustrate, let me refer to the director of the French electricity commission, who recently said that on some days in the summer the country runs only on nuclear and water power—in other

words, all of France's electricity is now sometimes produced only by nuclear plants and hydroelectric stations.

10. It is also relevant to mention that the decline in nuclear power plant orders was accompanied in the late 1970s by the application of restrictive export policies by a number of advanced countries, which led to the partial collapse of the structure of supply arrangements. However, there are now some hopeful indications that the restrictive nuclear export policies of the late 1970s may gradually be liberalized.

11. Nowhere is the impact of the energy crisis felt more strongly than in the developing countries, where the high cost of oil and coal has often reversed the trend of economic growth. For instance, the bulk of the total export earnings of countries like Brazil and India goes towards meeting the mounting costs of their oil imports. It has been estimated that by the year 2010 the developing countries' need for oil, if growth targets are to be met, could exceed the present total world demand as brought out at the United Nations Conference on New and Renewable Sources of Energy, held at Nairobi this year from 10 to 20 August.

12. Nuclear power has so far done little to mitigate this problem. Last year it contributed only 1 per cent of the electricity production in the developing world. At present only four developing member States of the Agency are operating nuclear power plants, and by 1990 this number may increase to a maximum of 10. The prospects for the introduction of nuclear power in developing countries would improve, however, if smaller nuclear power plants were on the market. The Agency has been encouraging such a development, and renewed interest in the nuclear industry concerning the design of such plants is visible. Meanwhile, as I have mentioned on several occasions, an expansion of nuclear power in the industrial countries could help relieve the pressure on oil demand and oil prices, thus indirectly helping the oil-poor developing countries. The easing of pressure on oil demand and costs would help the developing countries to build up their own conventional generating systems to the size and maturity which would justify the introduction of nuclear power.

13. Another related matter is the safety of nuclear power plants. In this sphere the Agency is now well advanced in a programme to provide internationally agreed guidelines on the design, construction and operation of nuclear power plants. IAEA is also expanding its field activities and its ability to assist member States in the event of nuclear emergencies.

14. I would also rank the International Nuclear Information System [*INIS*], established in 1969, as a major Agency contribution. INIS is the first truly international and fully computerized system for the prompt and continuous exchange of information in various branches of nuclear science and technology. By the end of 1980 some 570,000 reference items were stored in the INIS file. The current rate of inputs to INIS is over 75,000 references per year. Sixty-four countries and 13 international organizations are now taking part in it. The INIS example has inspired FAO to set up a similar system for the agricultural sciences, which the Agency is operating on FAO's behalf.

15. Technical assistance, or, as we now call it, technical co-operation, is one of the main functions of IAEA, and the Agency has had notable success in helping the developing countries to introduce a wide range of nuclear techniques in the fields of agriculture, medicine, hydrology and industry. The recent growth of the Agency's technical assistance programme, the outlay of which will nearly double—in 1980 the target was $10.5 million, and for 1983 it is $19 million—is particularly gratifying. Recent developments in IAEA have shown that the developing countries are now becoming increasingly conscious of the contribution that nuclear science and technology can make to their economic and social progress. Many of our member States from the developing areas of the world have come of age in the nuclear field and now wish to have a bigger voice within the Agency.

16. May I now turn to another main area of the Agency's work, namely safeguards. The Agency's responsibility in this sphere results from both its statute and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*]. A few years ago it seemed that the number of parties to the Treaty had reached its ceiling. However, there have recently been encouraging additions, particularly from the developing world. Notable additions include Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Turkey and, this spring, Egypt. As several of those countries are located in regions of tension, their willingness to accept the Treaty is of considerable significance. It goes without saying that it is of the utmost importance that the Treaty or full-scope safeguards be universally accepted by all the nations of the world.

17. The Agency is now applying its safeguards at all nuclear installations in the non-nuclear-weapon States that are parties to the Treaty, as well as at all nuclear facilities of which the Agency is aware in the seven non-Treaty countries. As a result more than 95 per cent of all nuclear material outside the nuclear-weapon States is now under IAEA safeguards. In addition three nuclear-weapon States—the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and France—have also, under their voluntary offer, placed some selected civilian nuclear facilities under the Agency's safeguards.

18. For the past five years the Agency has been making a detailed statistical analysis and evaluation of the effectiveness of its safeguards operations, and in no case has the Agency detected any discrepancy which would indicate the diversion of a significant amount of safeguarded material. It has thus concluded that all such material has remained in peaceful nuclear activities or has been otherwise adequately accounted for.

19. However, I should like to refer to my report to the Agency's Board of Governors in September. I stated that, with regard to on-loan refuelled nuclear power reactors, the Agency would in a few cases not be in a position to give the requisite assurances of independent verification until certain necessary technical measures had been implemented. I should make it clear that I was not, I repeat not, reporting any diversion or any act of non-compliance; rather I was referring to technical problems that the Agency was still encountering in fully discharging its responsibility for verification in those few cases. The Agency is in continuous communication with the countries concerned and has been stressing the need to strengthen the safeguards arrangements at those reactors so as to rectify the situation as soon as possible.

20. I should like to note that of the group of countries which have not yet acceded to the Treaty, there are a few which are engaged in significant nuclear activities with existing or potential capability to produce nuclear explo-

sive material. Those activities are not subject to IAEA safeguard. This is cause for serious concern.

21. Mr. President, as President of the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, held at Geneva from 11 August to 4 September 1980, you are aware that a final declaration was not agreed upon. This is a regrettable fact. However, I should like to recall that there was general support for and appreciation of the Agency's safeguards activities from all sides. Nevertheless, the Treaty, and by extension the Agency's safeguards régime, suffered a blow in June of this year when a non-Treaty country, Israel, carried out a military attack against the research reactor in Iraq, a party to the Treaty and thus subject to IAEA safeguards on all its nuclear activities. I have expressed my deep concern over this development in the Security Council as well as to the Board of Governors and in the General Conference of the Agency. You are also no doubt aware of the resolution adopted by the General Conference of the Agency on 26 September in this connection.[2] The General Assembly will be considering this matter in the next few days under a separate item.

22. The members of the Assembly may be interested to know that, according to information I have just received from the Iraqi authorities, it now seems reasonably safe to approach the Tamuz reactor site, and the Iraqi authorities are accordingly prepared to receive the Agency's inspectors at any time the Agency desires to send them. The Agency will send an inspection team to Baghdad very shortly.

23. May I now turn to another issue—the problem of the spread of nuclear weapons. Twenty years ago, in 1961, there were four nuclear-weapon States. In 1964 they were joined by a fifth. Since then that number has remained unchanged. In 1974 one other country demonstrated that it had mastered the technology of a nuclear explosive device. To keep the matter in perspective one must remember that the five nuclear-weapon States have carried out more than 400 tests of nuclear weapons since that solitary explosion in 1974 by another State.

24. We must conclude that international efforts to limit proliferation of nuclear weapons to the five nuclear-weapon States have so far—and I emphasize, so far—been remarkably successful, considering that during this period some 20 or more countries have increased their industrial nuclear potential considerably. In broad perspective, it may be said that this achievement has been caused chiefly by a favourable international political climate. In 1961 East-West relations were strained and cold war tensions marked the debates in the Agency and inhibited the initial development of an international safeguards system. Fortunately, with emerging détente and growing mutual understanding, a major step forward was made possible with the conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which entered into force in 1970.

25. Here, I believe it is timely to recall the fundamental importance of co-operation among the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, not only for a viable non-proliferation régime but also for the fulfilment of the nuclear arms control commitments under article VI of the Treaty. In a broader sense, a spirit of co-operation on all sides is indispensable for successfully overcoming any proliferation problems that may arise in future and for the efficient conduct of the Agency's task, under the Treaty, of verifying the absence of diversion or detecting any diversion that may take place. I might add that the Treaty should truly be regarded as based and nourished on mutual trust between the nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States and as the fulcrum of international co-operation aimed at sustaining and strengthening the non-proliferation régime.

26. I should also like to point out that, to the extent that the Agency has been successful in meeting challenges it has faced during the last 20 years, that has been the result, in part, of the fact that it has focused attention essentially on the pursuit of the objectives enshrined in its statute, particularly the technical aspects of its programmes. The Agency has been relatively free, so far, of excessive involvement in some of the deeply divisive political and economic issues which, though of undoubted international concern, have little direct bearing on the Agency's sphere of competence and responsibilities. I hope very much that the Agency can continue on this path.

27. The greatest challenges to be met in the nuclear field in the years ahead lie in three directions. First, there is the future of nuclear energy itself. If the present trend continues, a time may come when the overwhelming relevance of nuclear energy in some countries may only be in terms of military uses. I trust that will not happen. As I stated at the Agency's General Conference last September, as a member of the scientific community I believe that in the long term logic and reason must prevail. Those who are truly concerned about protecting the environment and safeguarding our health and safety will come to perceive that amongst the energy options available to us today, the nuclear path is the one likely to be the least damaging to the environment and the only one that does not carry the risk of long-term climatic changes. I therefore feel that when one takes the long view, the disadvantages of the alternatives, as well as the imperative need for adequate energy supplies, are perceived not only by the political leaders who at recent summit meetings have repeatedly reaffirmed the importance they attach to nuclear power, but also by the general public, whose fears have been played upon and which has been offered the illusion that there are "soft" paths out of the prevailing energy difficulties.

28. This question is also crucial for the second main challenge, that of bringing nuclear technology within the reach of more developing countries and helping those that have already introduced it in their national programmes. Their problems are essentially those of finance, infrastructure and trained manpower, rather than those of coping with environmentalist opposition. Our success in meeting this challenge will depend to a large extent on whether or not there is a healthy nuclear industry in the developed industrial countries and foresight to share new technological developments with the developing countries.

29. The Agency has been engaged in promoting international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy ever since its establishment 24 years ago, and that is indeed its primary responsibility. On 5 December 1980 the General Assembly, by its resolution 35/112, decided to convene in 1983 the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. In paragraph 5 of that resolution, the Agency is invited to fulfil its appropriate role within the scope of its responsibilities in the preparatory work and during the Conference itself, including the provision of necessary technical data and documentation, particularly in relation to the progress of the work of the Com-

mittee on Assurances of Supply, and by participating in the secretariat of the Conference.

30. In response to that invitation, I have conveyed to the United Nations Secretary-General the Agency's readiness to provide the necessary assistance and services in connection with the Conference. Meanwhile, the Committee on Assurances of Supply, which was established in 1980, has commenced substantive work. It has held three sessions so far, and the fourth has just started. I should also like to mention that in September 1982 the Agency will convene a conference on nuclear power experience of the past three decades, which could provide a useful technical input to the 1983 United Nations Conference. I earnestly hope that the United Nations Conference will prove fruitful as a step forward in accelerating the process of intensifying international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which, as I have already mentioned, is a primary responsibility of the Agency and falls directly within the sphere of its activities.

31. The third main challenge is one I have already touched upon: the support and extension of a viable non-proliferation régime. Of all the services that IAEA can render to the international community, this, in my view, is the most important. Let us not forget the dangers of proliferation. In the long term, they would be second only to the danger of a nuclear war. Whether or not proliferation is effectively discouraged will depend chiefly on the actions and policies of the most powerful nations. The ideal would be the full and universal application of the non-proliferation régime, in spirit as well as in letter, either by universal acceptance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, full-scope safeguards or full application of regional agreements like the Tlatelolco Treaty.[3] The nuclear policies of the countries that are today operating unsafeguarded facilities capable of producing weapons material are imbedded in acute political tensions of their regions. The arms control and disarmament measures foreseen in the Non-Proliferation Treaty are unrealized. In particular, we seem to be no nearer to the crucial step of a comprehensive test ban, which, because of its non-discriminatory feature, will attract wider adherence and thereby strengthen the non-proliferation régime.

32. Recently there have also been some disturbing reports on the possible use of a new technology for transforming plutonium produced by civil reactors into weapons-grade material. Most commercial nuclear power plants today are of a type which, for technical reasons, make it virtually impossible for most countries to use their spent fuel as a source of explosive plutonium. It would greatly hamper the Agency's task of safeguarding these reactors and would tend to undermine international confidence in the Non-Proliferation Treaty régime if reprocessed plutonium from these reactors were to be refined for use in nuclear weapons. I profoundly hope that this technological option, which is in direct conflict with the objectives of the Treaty, will not be taken up. I am relieved to learn now that there are already second thoughts about taking this course.

33. We also have to bear in mind that the day may come when one or more non-nuclear-weapon States may feel inclined, for whatever reason, to test nuclear explosives. It is to be hoped that countries that are or may soon be producing unsafeguarded nuclear explosive material understand that such a course would detract from, instead of adding to, their national security: in other words, one must hope that wisdom and restraint will prevail.

34. Looking ahead, we have to be realistic and not close our eyes to the possibility of some unwelcome eventuality in connection with the nuclear industry. For instance, even with all available precautionary means, the possibility of a significant nuclear accident cannot be totally ruled out. We accept the fact that a tanker may sink, that methane gas in some coal mine may catch fire or explode and that an aircraft may crash. The public at large must learn to take in stride the possibility of nuclear accidents also, just as it accepts other industrial accidents.

35. We should also bear in mind the grim possibility of an armed conflict involving civilian nuclear installations. From recent experience it is evident that, unless effective precautionary measures are adopted at the international level, certain nuclear installations could become the target of hostilities and therefore radiological warfare could be, in effect, initiated by the use of conventional weapons. One shudders to think of the consequences of military attacks on any of the 260 existing nuclear power reactors or the 300 research reactors. One preventive measure that the international community could take now would be to enlarge the scope of the Additional Protocol of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. In its present form, the Protocol prohibits military attacks against nuclear power plants but is silent on the subject of, for instance, attacks on nuclear research reactors. All nuclear establishments should surely be brought within the scope of that Convention, so that the rules of international law forbidding such attacks could be strengthened at least to that extent.

36. Permit me now to include a few words from my own perspective as a nuclear scientist who has been involved in the design and development of nuclear power plants.

37. In the contemporary world, modern science and technology have deeply and irreversibly altered the pattern of our lives. In stimulating change and innovation, in promoting the birth of new industries and the launching of vast new projects, science and technology have brought unprecedented prosperity to part of the globe and, for the first time in history, have raised hopes in the less fortunate and more populous part of the world that it may also aspire to a tolerable standard of human life. It is my firm belief that nuclear science and technology can play some part in meeting that aspiration.

38. At the same time, as we all know, nuclear science and technology have also given us the means of destroying ourselves. Tens of thousands of nuclear warheads which are today believed to be aimed at every major city in the northern part of the world are also the creation of nuclear scientists and technologists, and, if nuclear proliferation and the current arms race are not checked, we might soon face the spectacle of the rest of the world being exposed to the same peril. Already, in the course of just 25 years, the explosive power of the nuclear arsenals has grown more than a thousandfold and represents an explosive power corresponding to some three tons of conventional explosives for every man, woman and child on this globe. Military expenditure—which annually already exceeds $500 billion world-wide—continues to grow at an annual rate far exceeding $20 billion, wastefully consuming valuable material and human resources so desperately needed for the improvement of the conditions of human life in the greater part of the world.

39. Undoubtedly, science and technology offer us unlimited opportunities—for good and evil—but in the ulti-

mate analysis it is surely up to us, the people, to make the moral and political choices, and, since the threat to humanity is the work of human beings, it is up to man to save himself from himself.

40. Over long years much has been said on the subject of nuclear arms control, but little has been done in reality. The task is no doubt formidable, but there is none before us that deserves a higher priority. The Secretary-General, Mr. Waldheim, has pointed out in his report on the work of the Organization that "disarmament, in a nuclear age, is a matter of survival" [*A/36/1, sect. VI*]. We must have confidence that we can begin to unmake what we have made. It is also clear that there is no nation, great or small, whose record is so unblemished that it can be trusted with a weapon capable of wiping us all out. In a world in which nations are often moved by passion rather than reason, divided by culture, race or ideology and deep mistrust of one another, the existence of great nuclear arsenals is surely not compatible with survival. As pointed out in the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly, the first session to be devoted to disarmament, in 1978:

> "Enduring international peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry by military alliances nor sustained by a precarious balance of deterrence or doctrines of strategic superiority." [*Resolution S-10/2, sect. II, para. 13.*]

41. The world today stands on the brink of an abyss. Never before has mankind been in such grave peril. A nuclear war would mean the end of civilization and could lead to the extinction of the human race. It is thus evident that the highest priority of international diplomacy should be to ensure that we do not, through our own folly, go over the edge.

42. Here I should like to recall the Russell-Einstein Manifesto of 1955. The idea that the scientific community should be actively concerned about the dangers to humanity which arose largely through the work of scientists themselves was conceived by Bertrand Russell and was immediately endorsed by Albert Einstein—in fact his signature to the Manifesto was one of the last acts of his life. While specifically calling upon scientists to assemble in a conference to discuss the means of averting the danger, the Manifesto urged Governments to realize that mankind had entered a new phase in which disputes must be settled by peaceful means because there would be no victors in a nuclear war. The Manifesto also contained a powerful and moving appeal to the general public in the following words:

> "We are speaking on this occasion, not as members of this or that nation, continent, or creed, but as human beings, members of the species man, whose continued existence is in doubt. . . .
>
> "We shall try to say no single word which should appeal to one group rather than to another. All, equally, are in peril, and, if the peril is understood, there is hope that they may collectively avert it."

43. Our future, our civilization, our lives, are at stake. If we had a Bertrand Russell or an Albert Einstein today, they would certainly have felt compelled to issue a new manifesto, a new appeal to the conscience of the world, in far sterner terms. I am pleased to note that there are many institutions in the world today seized of this problem, and their activities should be supported. The fact is that there must be an end to the madness of the nuclear arms race, a halt on the slippery path to annihilation. This is my deepest conviction, and I should like to conclude my last address to the Assembly with an earnest appeal to representatives and to the Governments they represent, in their own interest, to subordinate all other aims to that of bringing the nuclear arms race under control before it is too late.

44. Lastly, I wish to express my deep sense of gratitude to all Member States of the United Nations for the understanding, consideration and unfailing courtesy shown to me in all the 20 years during which I have had the honour of addressing the General Assembly. I am sure they will extend the same consideration and courtesy to my compatriot and successor, Mr. Hans Blix.

45. As I now take leave of you, you have all my best wishes for success in your collective endeavours to preserve and strengthen world peace and security and to promote international amity, understanding and goodwill, and equally in your efforts in the cause of urgently needed economic and social progress in the developing world.

46. The PRESIDENT: I wish to thank the Director General of IAEA for the excellent report he has just submitted to the General Assembly. The contents of the report and its eloquence demonstrate clearly the important, indeed central, role which IAEA has come to play in connection with the utilization of one of the most powerful forces of modern times—the power of the atom. Mr. Eklund has made a unique contribution to the world community in that field during the past 20 years of his stewardship of the Agency. The utilization of atomic power, despite recent setbacks, has increased to a remarkable degree during this period. Yet so will the vastness of its destructive capacity if not brought under effective control.

47. Mr. Eklund's firm hand and wise guidance have served as an example of the benefits that strong leadership can provide in the field of international organization. From personal experience over many years in inter-agency affairs, I know at first hand the invaluable contribution that Mr. Eklund has made to the Agency's work and to the enhancement of true international civil service.

48. It is a great tribute to him and a consolation to us all that IAEA has taken the unique step of naming Mr. Eklund Director General Emeritus. Not only IAEA but the entire United Nations family can count on his continued active advice and involvement in this area, whose full potential is yet to be realized and whose effective control is so critical for the future of mankind.

49. I cannot but conclude on a personal note—personal to Mr. Eklund. We have gone to the moon and back. We have, as Mr. Eklund has just reminded us in his eloquent statement, created a nuclear arsenal with the equivalent of three tons of TNT explosive power for every man, woman and child on this earth. But we are far from finding a cure for or preventing the common cold, from which Mr. Eklund is suffering but which has not prevented him from speaking to us this morning. Perhaps there is a lesson there for the international community.

50. I now call on the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

51. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: First, I wish to join the President in thanking Mr. Sigvard Eklund for his excellent report which we have just heard.

52. I should like to take this opportunity to pay a well-deserved special tribute to Mr. Eklund for the vision and unremitting dedication with which he has guided the work of IAEA for the past 20 years. Mr. Eklund's outstanding service to the Agency and indeed to the international community as a whole has been fittingly recognized by the decision of the Agency's General Conference to confer upon him the title of Director General Emeritus. The President has rightly referred to that well-deserved recognition of Mr. Eklund's work.

53. I am very glad that Mr. Eklund will therefore continue to be associated with the Agency's work in the years to come and that we shall not lose the benefit of his great expertise and wise advice.

54. The Agency's General Conference also adopted a resolution[4] which eloquently expressed the member States' appreciation for Mr. Eklund's major contribution to the promotion of the peaceful uses of atomic energy. During his stewardship the Agency's membership has more than doubled, and nuclear power has played a growing part in meeting the energy needs of the world community.

55. The Agency has also been assigned an increasingly significant role, especially in the context of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in developing an internationally accepted safeguards system to allay anxieties that the spread of nuclear technology and *matériel* might open the door to possible military capabilities.

56. We all owe a particular debt of gratitude to Mr. Eklund for his strong personal commitment to those aims and for his tireless endeavours to make them a reality. The solid foundations he has established will, I am sure, enable the Agency to make further advances in this vitally important sphere in the years to come.

57. I have deeply appreciated the close co-operation and warm personal association and friendship I have had with Sigvard Eklund over these past years. I know that I speak for all of us in wishing him every happiness and success in the future.

58. The PRESIDENT: I now invite the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy to introduce the report of the Committee [*A/36/48*].

59. Mr. PRIBICEVIC (Chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy): I have the honour of submitting to the Assembly the report of the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy on its first session, held at Vienna from 3 to 7 August 1981. The Preparatory Committee unanimously decided to entrust me as its Chairman with this responsible duty, reflecting our common desire to inform the highest forum of the United Nations about our deliberations in a most direct and comprehensive manner.

60. The report of the Preparatory Committee, which I am submitting for the Assembly's consideration, was also unanimously adopted, and I believe that it truly reflects all that we were able to achieve during five days of intensive work in the capital of the Republic of Austria, which extended to all of us a very warm and hospitable reception.

61. The General Assembly, in its resolution 35/112, while deciding to establish the Preparatory Committee, also decided that its first session should be of an organizational nature, primarily for the purpose of preparing its programme of work. In the same resolution, the Assembly decided that the Committee should be composed of 70 Member States and, on an equal footing, other Member States which might express their interest in participating in its work, and requested the President of the General Assembly to appoint the members in accordance with the principle of equitable geographical representation.

62. The General Assembly decision regarding the composition of the Preparatory Committee was not, and I say this with regret, fully implemented, and before our first session in June of this year the President of the General Assembly was able to nominate only 54 Member States, of which 45 participated in the first meeting of the Committee. In addition, nine Member States attended the Vienna meeting in the capacity of observers.

63. Bearing in mind the crucial importance so widely attributed to this very vital field of international co-operation, as well as the expectations I believe we all share that the decisions of the 1983 Conference will represent a decisive and far-ranging step in the dynamic promotion of the broadest international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the Conference must consider with due attention the dangers of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Bearing in mind the importance of these issues, one cannot but hope that at the next session of the Preparatory Committee the number of participating countries will not only reach but preferably exceed the target of 70. That would undoubtedly enhance the whole preparatory process and ensure that the work of the Preparatory Committee reflects the interests and views of the largest possible number of countries interested in facilitating international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the interest of the whole international community and, particularly, in meeting the growing needs of the developing countries.

64. As described in the report, at the beginning of its first session the Preparatory Committee elected a Bureau consisting of the Chairman, eight Vice-Chairmen and a Rapporteur. At the same time, the Committee decided that the Bureau should perform its duties with the same composition throughout the period of preparations leading to the opening of the Conference. I believe that the composition of the Bureau, based as it is on wide geographical representation, and the dedication of its members as manifested at the beginning of its work, give ample justification for confidence that it will continue its important and delicate task to the satisfaction of all participating countries.

65. At the beginning of its deliberations, the Committee expressed its readiness to exert all possible efforts to adopt decisions by consensus. The report now under consideration was indeed agreed upon by all the delegations participating in the first meeting of the Preparatory Committee. That, of course, does not mean that a number of participating countries would not have preferred a different approach to one or other aspect of the subjects we considered. In the continuation of its work the Committee will be faced with very complex and sometimes controversial issues of substantive character. It is certainly my intention in carrying out the responsible duty entrusted to me—as it is, I believe, the prevailing intention of all the participants—to continue to exert all possible efforts to reach conclusions acceptable to all the participants. I ex-

pect that the rules of procedure that will have to be prepared for the second meeting of the Committee will facilitate and stimulate such endeavours.

66. The Preparatory Committee reached agreement regarding the date, venue and duration of the Conference. The Committee also accepted a compromise formula on the number, duration and venue of its future sessions. In my view, we shall need all the time that can possibly be made available to enable the Committee to complete its work in a manner which will best prepare the ground for a successful United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy.

67. In the report to be considered, it is clear that a number of the delegations participating in the Committee's first session felt that it would be useful to begin consideration at that session of substantive matters determining the very character and aims of the Conference. Other participants thought it premature to approach matters of substance at the first and primarily organizational session. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that at its next meeting the Preparatory Committee will have to face substantive issues in all their complexity, also deciding, among other matters, on the preliminary agenda for the 1983 Conference and the documentation indispensable to its success. In this context, I believe it is of the greatest importance for the further activity of the Preparatory Committee that all member countries that feel in a position to do so act in accordance with General Assembly resolution 35/112 and submit to the Secretary-General of the United Nations their views concerning the agenda and other relevant matters concerning the functioning of the future Conference.

68. It would, of course, be of the greatest value to the whole preparatory activity for the Secretary-General to establish as soon as possible a conference secretariat headed by a secretary-general. In accordance with the provisions of resolution 35/112, IAEA should fulfil its appropriate role at all stages of preparation of the Conference, including participation in the secretariat of the Conference.

69. Finally, allow me to express my hope that the report of the Preparatory Committee will be considered with the attention this important field of international co-operation deserves. The decisions and documents that will result from the 1983 Conference will undoubtedly have a strong and lasting impact on the conditions of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It is certainly a matter that has very broad implications for the development programmes of all countries. Therefore, the guidance and decisions of the General Assembly will be of indispensable value for the future work of the Preparatory Committee, and I am convinced that we shall be able to implement creatively the decisions adopted for the final success of an initiative which emerged as a unanimous expression of the determination of all Members of the United Nations.

70. The PRESIDENT: I now call upon the representative of Japan to introduce the draft resolution on the report of IAEA [*A/36/L.10*].

71. Mr. OKAWA (Japan): On behalf of Czechoslovakia and Indonesia, which provide the Vice-Chairmen of the Board of Governors of IAEA, and on behalf of my own country, Japan, which is providing the current Chairman of the Board of Governors, I have the honour of submitting to the General Assembly draft resolution A/36/L.10 on the report of IAEA for the year 1980.

72. A few minutes ago we listened with great interest to the statement of the Director General of the Agency, and we wish to thank him for presenting the Agency's report to us and for drawing our attention to the most important issues now confronting the Agency and to the challenges the international community will have to face in the nuclear field in the years ahead.

73. As Mr. Eklund himself has stated, this is the last time he addresses the General Assembly in his capacity as Director General of IAEA, and we cannot but look back with deep gratitude to the great service he has rendered to the Agency and consequently to the world community over the past 20 years. His brief summary of the evolution of the international nuclear scene during those two decades was all the more poignant because it is Mr. Eklund himself who has been at the centre of the stage as the top international civil servant in the field. I am sure I express the sentiments of the entire membership of this Assembly in thanking Mr. Eklund for his very distinguished services "in guiding and directing the successful evolution of the International Atomic Energy Agency during the last 20 years", to quote from one paragraph of the draft resolution I am presenting to you. We also extend our congratulations to Mr. Hans Blix, who succeeds Mr. Eklund from the beginning of next month.

74. In the draft resolution I am presenting, the General Assembly also notes with satisfaction, *inter alia*, the work of the Agency in promoting the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in particular in the field of technical assistance to the developing countries, and the steady improvement of the Agency's safeguards system. It welcomes the conclusion that in 1980, as in previous years, nuclear material under Agency safeguards remained in peaceful nuclear activities or was otherwise adequately accounted for.

75. A new element in this year's draft resolution is the reference to the work of the Committee on Assurances of Supply, which, it is hoped, will contribute to the success of the 1983 United Nations Conference on the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, as well as to the role of the Agency in the preparations for that Conference and during the Conference itself.

76. In concluding this brief statement, may I express the hope that draft resolution A/36/L.10 can be adopted by consensus, as has been the case in previous years.

Mr. Naik (Pakistan), Vice-President, took the Chair.

77. The PRESIDENT: I now call on the representative of Yugoslavia to introduce draft resolution A/36/L.11.

78. Mr. ŠILOVIĆ (Yugoslavia): It is a well-known fact that the continuous growth of the world economy and the faster development of developing countries depend on the sufficiency of energy resources. Significant efforts are being made at national and international levels to meet growing energy requirements. However, all countries are not in the same situation. Some are endowed with both energy potential and technological and financial resources. Others have abundant energy resources but do not have the technology and necessary skill fully to utilize the potential of their resources. But we are particularly concerned with those who have neither. The international

community should focus on their needs. They need all-round assistance in order to maintain the minimum level of development. Considering that a great number of developing countries are deficient in energy resources, the most appropriate course of action would be for them to apply technological achievements in the production of energy. That is the reason why these countries are embarking on the development of nuclear energy. In these endeavours they are facing many problems that the international community is called upon to resolve.

79. However, the promotion of the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes has so far constantly been confronted with monopolistic tendencies and the emergence of policy and groups defending their own positions of privilege. They persistently maintain such forms of international co-operation as enable them to control the development of nuclear technology in those States which do not possess nuclear weapons. This is being justified as an effort to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. None the less, we cannot accept the conclusion that the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes automatically leads to the spreading of nuclear weapons. There is no doubt that such danger does exist, but it should be eliminated by appropriate internationally agreed and beneficial policies, including the generally acceptable guarantees and safeguards system of IAEA.

80. In this connection, the most urgent task is the elimination of obstacles in the field of co-operation among States in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Therefore, we attach great importance to the forthcoming United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, which should consider all political and economic aspects of the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the world. We believe that it will adopt long-term guidelines and agreed solutions for future undisturbed international co-operation, which is, for the above-mentioned reasons, indispensable.

81. In the report of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference, which had its first session in August this year, we have noted with satisfaction that the Committee has decided to recommend to the General Assembly that the Conference be held at Geneva from 29 August to 9 September 1983. We support this recommendation and expect that it will be confirmed by the General Assembly.

82. In the light of the importance of the issues to be considered at the Conference, we are of the view that the Preparatory Committee, in its further work, should start substantive preparations for the Conference. One of the most essential prerequisites for this is undoubtedly the finalization of the appointment of its members, which we believe should be accomplished in due time in order to enable the new members to participate actively in the work of the next session of the Committee.

83. The guidelines for the work of the Committee on the substantive preparations for the Conference should be the principles of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, particularly those contained in General Assembly resolution 32/50. Proceeding from these, the Committee should first of all adopt a decision concerning the draft agenda of the Conference. Our view is that the agenda should cover consideration of the importance of the development and use of nuclear energy for economic and social advancement, particularly in developing countries, as well as the adoption of measures for international co-operation in this field.

84. We also consider that the substantive preparations which the Committee is to carry out should include the preparation of the draft final documents to be adopted by the Conference. In our view these should be: first, a declaration containing the assessment of the situation in the development and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as well as principles and goals of international co-operation in this field; and secondly, a programme of action which would incorporate an elaborated system of measures and actions for all aspects of the application of nuclear energy, reflecting a new international consensus in this field.

85. If that concept proves acceptable, and we believe that there should be no objections to it, the Preparatory Committee is to carry out a very important task. Therefore, the Committee should be provided with the necessary time frame and with the required political goodwill and support. We feel that the recommendations of the Committee with regard to the duration of its future sessions do not correspond to the work that it is called upon to carry out. Therefore, it is necessary to provide for longer sessions of the Committee next year. The Committee should also be able to organize its work in the way it finds necessary, including the setting up of working groups which could hold even intersessional meetings, if that is required for the fulfilment of its task.

86. It is a widely accepted view that one of the two proposed meetings for next year should be held in New York. The reason for that is that for the greatest number of developing countries it is most convenient to hold such meetings at United Nations Headquarters. Furthermore, a number of countries have difficulties in attending meetings in venues where they do not have permanent diplomatic missions. Besides, the holding of meetings in New York results in considerable savings.

87. The Preparatory Committee recommended that the Secretary-General of the United Nations establish as soon as possible a small conference secretariat headed by the Secretary-General of the Conference. From the experience of preparing other United Nations conferences, it is obvious that timely establishment of a secretariat would contribute considerably to the successful preparations of this Conference. It seems most appropriate to set it up from the staff of the Natural Resources and Energy Division in the United Nations Secretariat, with corresponding co-operation of the IAEA Secretariat. Therefore, it would be necessary to consider as soon as possible the appointment of an appropriate person as Secretary-General of the Conference.

88. We support the conclusion of the Preparatory Committee that IAEA should play an active role in all stages of the preparations for the Conference, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 35/112. In that sense, we hope that those activities will find a place in the Agency's programme for 1982 and 1983.

89. Owing to the importance of the preparations for the Conference, my delegation considers it very important that consideration of the report of the Preparatory Committee be included as a separate item in the agenda of next year's General Assembly session.

90. A group of developing countries, among them my own, has submitted to the General Assembly, in consultation with a wider number of countries that do not appear as sponsors, draft resolution A/36/L.11, which includes the positions I have just expressed and which I have the honour to introduce on behalf of its 14 sponsors, which

have been joined by Mali, Mexico, Nigeria and Venezuela.

91. We consider that the implementation of the main thrust of those views would ensure successful preparations for, and thus to a great extent the fruitful outcome of, the Conference itself. To that end, it would be desirable that the draft resolution be adopted by consensus, as has been the case in previous years. In order to achieve that goal, we are ready to make a sincere effort in the consultations that lie ahead. We expect the same from others.

92. Mr. KLESTIL (Austria): At the outset I should like to present to Mr. Eklund our sincere thanks for his clear and comprehensive introduction of the report of IAEA for the calendar year 1980. We are particularly grateful for his most interesting assessment of the international energy situation and for the valuable information he supplied on the events of the current year.

93. As in previous years, I should like to take this opportunity to reaffirm that the Austrian Government extends its full support to IAEA. Today, more than ever, we are convinced that the Agency has a crucial role to play in international relations and that its manifold activities should be further developed and strengthened. In its future efforts the Agency should maintain a fair and equitable balance between its function as a source of technical assistance to developing countries and the implementation of its responsibilities for non-proliferation.

94. It is a cause for satisfaction to note that, helped by geographical proximity, close relations and an extensive exchange of information in a variety of fields have developed between the Agency's laboratories and Austrian research and scientific institutions. That co-operation includes research on the application of isotopes and radiation in the fields of agriculture, medicine and ecology.

95. If we look at the Agency's efforts to strengthen its activities in the field of technical assistance to developing countries, we can be encouraged by the fact that the total resources available rose to $21.7 million in 1980. Austria is particularly satisfied to see that this trend is continuing. Austria has increased its voluntary contributions to the Technical Assistance Fund for the year 1982 by 20 per cent to $115,200.

96. The prevention of a further spread of nuclear weapons remains one of the most urgent items on the international agenda. Austria attaches utmost importance to that problem and therefore strongly supports the work of the Agency in the area of safeguards. At this point, I should like to emphasize that the Austrian Government has condemned in strong terms the Israeli attack against the Iraqi nuclear reactor. That action constituted not only a grave violation of the basic principles of the Charter but also an assault against the IAEA safeguards system. We are firmly convinced that any unilateral military action to prevent nuclear activities of another nation is unjustified and counterproductive, as it might well increase the risk it is designed to eliminate. The Austrian Government has full trust in the reliability of the IAEA nuclear control system and believes that any technical shortcomings can and will be overcome. Indeed, we feel that, in view of its excellent record, the coverage of the safeguards system should be extended. The Austrian delegation supports the concept of "full-scope safeguards" and the proposal to require, as a pre-condition of all future nuclear supply commitments to States not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the application of safeguards to all sources of special fissionable material. A truly universal safeguards system would go a long way towards diminishing the danger of future proliferation of nuclear weapons.

97. The Austrian delegation notes with satisfaction that the Committee on Assurances of Supply has taken up its substantive work. We hope that the negotiations between supplier and receiving countries will lead to results which will do justice to its twofold objective: to satisfy the legitimate desire for more predictable and long-term arrangements for supplies of nuclear material, equipment, technology and fuel cycle services and to preclude the misuse of nuclear technology for military purposes.

98. I should like to turn now to the issue of nuclear safety, another important element in the mandate of the Agency. It has become more and more apparent in the past years that the future of nuclear power as a major energy source depends largely on the ability to deal satisfactorily with the safety issues of nuclear power plants and on the development of adequate arrangements for the disposal of nuclear wastes. Since solutions to these problems can be found only through international co-operation, my delegation attaches great importance to the relevant programmes of the Agency.

99. Since 1979 the Austrian delegation has been pursuing an initiative to facilitate the co-operation between neighbouring countries concerning trans-frontier aspects of nuclear-power stations. Our proposal is based on the conviction that it is in the interest of every State that its neighbours apply agreed safety standards for the construction and operation of nuclear power stations such as would minimize the risk of accidents and exclude effects on the biosphere of the neighbouring country. In view of its vast experience in this area, we believe that IAEA is the proper body to deal with this problem. We have therefore proposed that a technical working group should be set up within the framework of the Agency to discuss the question of safety criteria for nuclear power stations in the vicinity of international frontiers and to elaborate a catalogue of minimum standards which could be applied in negotiations between neighbouring States.

100. I should like to reaffirm that Austria is well aware of its special responsibilities as the host country of the Agency. We trust that at its headquarters, the Vienna International Centre, the Agency enjoys working conditions that facilitate the accomplishment of its task and allow it to maintain its high standards of excellence and efficiency. In 1981, two legal instruments between the Agency and my Government have entered into force: the agreement regarding the headquarters of IAEA[5] at the Vienna International Centre, and the agreement regarding the establishment and administration of a common fund for financing major repairs and replacements at the Vienna International Centre. As representative of the host country, I am pleased to note that the establishment of the Agency at the Vienna International Centre has thus been cast in an appropriate legal form and that the question of how to finance future repairs and replacements has found a mutually acceptable and satisfactory solution. We are confident that all questions arising from the Agency's headquarters at Vienna will continue to be settled in the same spirit of mutual understanding and co-operation.

101. In conclusion, I wish to pay a tribute to Mr. Sigvard Eklund, whose term of office as Director General of IAEA is approaching its end. During his 20 years as the head of that organization, Mr. Eklund has contributed im-

mensely to its successful evolution. With his diplomatic skill, administrative capabilities and outstanding personal qualities, Mr. Eklund has put his personal stamp on the Agency. The Austrian delegation has noted with satisfaction that the General Conference of IAEA has decided to confer upon Mr. Eklund the title of "Director General Emeritus" and hopes that the Agency will continue to benefit from his valuable advice. I also wish to express our sincere appreciation for the warm and strong relations the Austrian Government has enjoyed with the Director General. We thank him for his excellent co-operation and assistance in innumerable instances over the years. Beyond an excellent professional relationship, Mr. Eklund has formed strong ties of personal friendship with many leading Austrian personalities, who highly value his wise counsel and support. Allow me to express my personal gratitude to Mr. Eklund and my best wishes for his future well-being.

102. I also wish to express our sincere congratulations and best wishes to Mr. Hans Blix, who has been appointed to succeed Mr. Eklund in the post of Director General. We are happy that IAEA has chosen such a distinguished and experienced statesman as its new head, and we look forward to our co-operation with him.

103. Mr. PASTINEN (Finland): The President of the General Assembly and the Secretary-General of the Organization paid, a moment ago, an eloquent tribute to the Director General of IAEA, Mr. Eklund. Let me, on behalf of the Government of Finland, join them in paying a tribute to the Director General for his exceptional performance at the head of the Agency, spanning a period of 20 years. In that capacity, he has indeed rendered outstanding service to the international community as a whole. During his tenure, the successes of the Agency have been largely due to his leadership, and under his leadership the Agency has adapted itself successfully to the changing needs of the international community in the field of the peaceful atom. His successor, Mr. Blix of Sweden, has our best wishes for his exacting task.

104. Once again, Mr. Eklund's introduction and the annual report of the Agency underline the indispensable role of the Agency in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The performance of the Agency has been creditable. Among the obvious successes of IAEA, we note that no illicit diversion of safeguarded material has been detected. Also, new safeguards agreements have been concluded and several new States have joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Yet, the continued existence of unsafeguarded facilities in a number of countries is a constant reminder of why the fear of proliferation of nuclear weapons is real and justified.

105. Despite the multitude of problems and restraints the fact remains that nuclear technology will for the foreseeable future provide an important energy source in an increasing number of countries. Finland, for example, is among those countries for which nuclear technology already plays a significant role in energy production. This year the share of nuclear energy has risen to one third of total electricity production in my country. We therefore have a vested interest in the promotion of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

106. Overriding the problems related to nuclear energy is the question of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, or, as Mr. Eklund has just put it in his opening statement, in the long term the dangers of proliferation would be second only to the danger of nuclear war. We, for our part, continue to believe that there is nothing inherently contradictory between broader co-operation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy and a more effective non-proliferation régime. On the contrary, we believe that those goals are interlinked and can be pursued only in conjunction with each other.

107. Behind most of the difficulties experienced in international nuclear co-operation is the fear of proliferation. That fear exists because some non-nuclear-weapon States have declined to give the international community a non-proliferation commitment by joining the Non-Proliferation Treaty or at least accepting safeguards on all their nuclear activities.

108. One of those States, Israel, in June attacked a facility under Agency safeguards in Iraq, a State party to the Treaty. That act, which represents a new form of international violence, stands condemned by the Security Council, by IAEA and by the international community as a whole. We are assured that despite the Israeli attack the credibility of the Agency and the credibility of its safeguards remain intact.

109. In years to come IAEA will have to meet challenges in all its fields of activity. In that regard we are pleased to see the rapid increase in the funds allocated to the Agency's technical assistance. We also welcome the Agency's continuing work on nuclear safety and the work on an international plutonium-storage system.

110. The availability of adequate supplies and services on an assured and predictable basis is of legitimate interest to those countries that have accepted effective non-proliferation restraints. We therefore support the work of the Committee on Assurances of Supply and the pragmatic approach it has taken.

111. We see the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, scheduled for 1983, as closely connected with related questions under discussion within IAEA. The Committee on Assurances of Supply is particularly important in that respect. The Preparatory Committee for the Conference should therefore be adequately informed of the work of that Committee in order that it may be taken into account with regard to the convening of and preparations for the Conference, in accordance with the relevant General Assembly resolution.

112. In our view substantial progress in the work of the Committee on Assurances of Supply is essential to the achievement of the objectives of the Conference. As a member of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference, Finland is prepared to work constructively with others towards its successful outcome.

113. Mr. GONZÁLEZ de LEÓN (Mexico) (*interpretation from Spanish*): The statute of IAEA, in its article II, stipulates that the raison d'être of the Agency is to "seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world". That same article adds that "it shall ensure, so far as it is able, that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose".

114. In order that those objectives may be achieved, the statute of the Agency, in its article III, gives it the following functions: "to encourage and assist research on, and development and practical application of, atomic energy

for peaceful uses throughout the world; and, if requested to do so, to act as an intermediary for the purposes of securing the performance of services or the supplying of materials, equipment, or facilities by one member of the Agency for another; and to perform any operation or service useful in research on, or development or practical application of, atomic energy for peaceful purposes". In the same article the Agency is also authorized "to make provision . . . for materials, services, equipment, and facilities to meet the needs of research on, and development and practical application of, atomic energy for peaceful purposes", "to foster the exchange of scientific and technical information", and "to encourage the exchange and training of scientists and experts". Only in fifth place among its functions does the statute authorize the Agency "to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities, and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose" and, upon request, to apply such safeguards to bilateral or multilateral arrangements involving activities of States in the field of atomic energy. The statute then lists a series of activities in pursuance of the above-mentioned functions.

115. I have quoted that part of the statute of the Agency, which was adopted by the international community in October 1956 and which entered into force in July 1957, because it constitutes the heart of the objectives and functions of the Vienna Agency. I have done so also because, on the basis of supervening highly political considerations, there has been an attempt—and, it must be said, a largely successful attempt—to adulterate and to distort the role of a mechanism of the United Nations system that was, as we have seen, created first and foremost to foster international co-operation for the peaceful development of nuclear energy. Those who on the basis of only one of the various functions of the Agency claim that the entity has as its principal and almost sole raison d'être to serve as an international police force to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, conceal, for reasons that need not be cited here, the fundamental objective of the Agency, which is, I repeat, to "accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world". What has politicized, as is now said, the Agency has been not the legitimate demands of the developing countries, which want to see that function of fostering fully carried out, but the intention to limit its role to the increasing application of more and more restrictions under the banner of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

116. First of all, under the 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and subsequently the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Agency at Vienna was assigned specific support functions in promoting an end to the military nuclear option. Under the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons the Agency was considered to be an effective tool to help stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons, albeit horizontally, since those two treaties could do nothing about vertical proliferation, as we have sadly seen day after day. But neither of those instruments—one, regional; the other, world-wide—was intended by its authors to erode, much less negate, the central role of the Agency in promoting, fostering and guiding increased activities in the nuclear field for the benefit of all mankind.

117. The danger of politicizing the Agency through an increase in its activity in the safeguards field has none the less proved to be much greater than was foreseen by those who dedicated their best efforts to the elaboration of the two treaties. In fact, when both those instruments were negotiated, Latin America, in the case of the one, and the international community in the case of the other, simply sought to use available instruments to reduce the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It was perfectly clear to my Government, since it played a significant role in negotiating both the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Non-Proliferation Treaty, that at no time, in seeking to achieve the politically, economically and even morally unassailable goal of eliminating the danger of the military uses of nuclear energy, was it ever considered that recourse to the means available to the Agency at Vienna to ensure that the peaceful uses of atomic energy would never be diverted to military purposes might serve as a basis—or, indeed, as a pretext—for coercing, limiting, conditioning or eliminating the possibility of nuclear development for eminently civilian purposes, such as the generation of electric energy and the many uses of the atom for agriculture, industry or medicine. Moreover, the promotion of general economic development, which is justifiable only in so far as it creates and strengthens genuine social well-being, is inconceivable at the end of the twentieth century without recourse to the richest source of energy—perhaps the safest if adequate security measures are taken, but certainly the most immediate, because it is right here within reach—as a first choice in what we envisage as a transition from dependence on traditional sources of energy to other, richer and more versatile sources.

118. For reasons too numerous to consider here, nuclear energy has been subjected to a hostile campaign: many seek to exaggerate the dangers of proliferation that results not from the dissemination of related know-how or from access to nuclear development for peaceful purposes, but exclusively from the political decision of whoever might opt for the military use of the atom. To those dangers must be added ideas often based on legitimate concerns, such as preservation of the environment, which have alarmingly delayed the development of energy and, therefore, the economic development of many countries. The distortion becomes even more serious when there is an attempt to claim—as was the case just a few days ago in the mass media—that the raison d'être of the Agency at Vienna is to avoid proliferation and that only peripherally is it to provide any assistance to the development of the developing countries. Actually, the opposite is the case: the Agency at Vienna was created to promote the well-being of mankind through wider access to very rich source of energy, and only peripherally to prevent, to the extent possible, the diversion of that energy from civilian, that is, peaceful, purposes.

119. The Director General of IAEA, Mr. Sigvard Eklund, has just addressed the General Assembly for the last time in that capacity. As he pointed out, he has had the satisfaction—and this does not happen very often—of addressing us every year for two decades. He did so today, as always, in an open-hearted, sincere way and, on this occasion in particular, in a way that makes us regret his departure all the more. The Mexican Government is grateful to Mr. Eklund for his competence, his keen mind and for his human qualities. We are certain that his successor, Mr. Hans Blix, a compatriot of his and one equally devoted to peace, will continue on the course already set. By that I do not mean that the Agency should become fixed in its vision of the world or that it should not seek out innovations; I mean that the quality of the work accomplished, the prestige given to the Agency by Mr. Eklund in his 20 years as its head, has necessarily, to

the good fortune of the international community, pointed out the course to be followed. Mr. Blix has vast experience in the field of disarmament, and this guarantees that he will be concerned about non-proliferation. But Mr. Eklund's endeavours to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should not be relegated to second place. I repeat: the fundamental mission of the Agency is the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

120. Let me take this opportunity to renew the gratitude of my Government for the work done by Mr. Sigvard Eklund, now Director General Emeritus of IAEA, as well as the appreciation of the Mexican people for his human qualities. We feel certain that the Agency will not alter its course but, rather, that it will be further enriched as it moves in the same direction.

121. Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): The Soviet delegation has studied the report of IAEA and has heard the statement made by its Director General. We note with satisfaction that both the contents of the IAEA report and the statement made by Mr. Eklund testify to the considerable work done over the past year by the Agency. The Soviet delegation fully approves the important role of the Agency in fostering co-operation among States in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social advancement and development, as well as for the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation régime and the exercise of effective international control over the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and nuclear technology. Over the years of its existence the Agency has shown its ability to be an important instrument in the struggle for the maintenance of peace and the strengthening of international co-operation.

122. Much personal credit for this goes to the Director General, Mr. Eklund. We should like to avail ourselves of this opportunity to express on behalf of the Soviet delegation our deep appreciation and gratitude to Mr. Eklund for his long years of fruitful efforts in the post of Director General of IAEA. We wish him good health and success in the future.

123. We should like also to congratulate Mr. Blix on his unanimous appointment at the twenty-fifty session of the IAEA General Conference to the post of Director General of that authoritative international organ. We express the hope that he will be a worthy successor to his compatriot in that important and responsible post.

124. One of the most important international tasks facing the world community today is the establishment of a strong bulwark against the proliferation of nuclear weapons throughout the world. The opinion is gaining ground in the world that the spreading of nuclear weapons from country to country does not increase their security but only multiplies the danger of a nuclear holocaust. Ensuring the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is, then, an important integral part of the system of measures for preventing a nuclear war. Quite obviously, this complex task requires the joint efforts of both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States.

125. As far as the Soviet Unit is concerned, it has resolutely striven and continues to strive to put an end to the nuclear arms race and to eliminate the proliferation of nuclear weapons from our planet. That was stated once again from the high rostrum of the twenty-sixth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. That is precisely the objective of the proposal made by the Soviet Union at the current session of the General Assembly for the prevention of a nuclear catastrophe [*A/36/241*]. Approval of that proposal would no doubt be an important step in building trust among all States throughout the world and would diminish the existing concern over possible use of nuclear weapons, thereby objectively promoting the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation régime.

126. A cornerstone for such a régime, in the opinion of the Soviet Union, has been and continues to be the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which for more than a decade has been a good basis for international co-operation in the field of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

127. At present our task is to see to it that we promote in all ways possible the strengthening of the existing non-proliferation régime. This purpose could be served by a further increase in the number of States parties to the Treaty, primarily States which have the material and technical basis for the production of nuclear weapons and nuclear-explosive devices. There are still States with considerable nuclear potential which are not parties to the Treaty. By stubbornly refusing to become parties to the Treaty and undertake the international IAEA safeguards with regard to their nuclear activities, these countries are arousing the legitimate concern of the world community.

128. The strengthening of the non-proliferation régime would also help in achieving strict compliance by countries which have placed their nuclear installations under international safeguards with the obligations they have undertaken, and it would also help to enhance the effectiveness of the Agency's control.

129. On the basis of the experience accumulated, we can assert that the Treaty and the international safeguards arising from it, as implemented by IAEA, effectively serve the interests of all countries in the world, both developed and developing, nuclear and non-nuclear.

130. The Agency is making substantial efforts to enhance the effectiveness of international control, constantly expanding and intensifying its activities in that sphere. We fully support the IAEA policy as regards further improvement of the safeguards machinery established in accordance with the statute of the Agency and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

131. Similarly, the Soviet delegation is against any attempts to cast doubt on the effectiveness or reliability of IAEA safeguards. That is all the more reason why we resolutely reject the claims of some—for example, Israel—to arrogate to themselves the role of self-styled judge in this matter. Such activities are especially unwarranted if they are undertaken by those who subbornly refuse to place their nuclear installations under IAEA safeguards.

132. We note with satisfaction the conclusion to be found in the Agency's report that in 1980 there was no detection of

> " . . . any anomaly which would indicate the diversion of a significant amount of safeguarded nuclear material—or the misuses of facilities or equipment under certain agreements—for the manufacture of any nuclear weapon, or to further any other military purpose, or for the manufacture of any other nuclear explosive device."[6]

133. Naturally, it would not be right to rest on one's laurels. Therefore the Agency has the urgent task of speedily elaborating a complete set of methods and procedures for safeguards for all types of nuclear installations, first and foremost for the "sensitive" stages of the nuclear fuel cycle, and also of further strengthening the material and technical basis for safeguards. For its part, the Soviet Union has been carrying out broad scientific studies to enhance the effectiveness of the IAEA safeguards system. Our programme of technical support for the Agency has been formulated, and it is being carried out by the leading scientific and research organizations of the Soviet Union. To ensure its realization by the end of 1982, the Soviet Government has allocated more than one million roubles.

134. An important element in warding off the potential danger of the unlawful seizure and use of nuclear material is the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, drafted under the aegis of the Agency. The early entry into force of that Convention with a large number of parties would help in strengthening the non-proliferation régime.

135. An ever larger number of countries are embarking on the path of developing their own nuclear potential. In many developing countries broad programmes are under way for the training of national specialists in that field, and atomic research and training centres are being established.

136. We take note of the substantial steps taken by the Agency in promoting the development of world atomic energy as a whole, as well as in providing technical assistance to developing countries, taking into account their national interests and needs. Every year the IAEA Technical Assistance Fund grows; it is based primarily on voluntary contributions from members of the Agency.

137. On the basis of its policy of principle in providing technical assistance to developing countries that are members of IAEA, the Soviet Government has taken a decision to increase the voluntary contribution of the USSR to the Technical Assistance Fund to the amount of 1,400,000 roubles, which exceeds the Secretariat's estimated figure. Those resources can be spent by the Agency in the Soviet Union to purchase equipment, instruments and installations; for obtaining in the USSR heat-producing elements for research reactors, and for study in IAEA courses in the Soviet Union by specialists from developing countries.

138. Moreover, in terms of additional resources, the Soviet Union earmarks more than the aforementioned sum for organizational and technical measures for the training in the Soviet Union of specialists from developing countries.

139. Over the 27 years that have elapsed since the establishment of the world's first nuclear power plant in the USSR, nuclear energy has become part and parcel of world energy balance, which by the end of the year 1980 totalled more than 2,000 reactor years. In this regard, great credit undoubtedly must go to IAEA.

140. A great achievement of the Agency is the successful functioning for more than 10 years now of INIS, which conducts an effective international exchange of scientific and technical information in all spheres of the peaceful use of atomic energy and gives developing countries, virtually free of charge, all the scientific and technological information that has been gathered primarily by the developed countries.

141. We should also like to point out the considerable work done by the Agency on disseminating information and exchanging experiences on safety in the work of nuclear power plants, on the improvement of nuclear safety and on the protection of the environment.

142. We are confident that IAEA will organize and carry out the International Conference on Nuclear Power Experience in September 1982 in an exemplary manner and that it will take a most active part in the preparation and holding of the 1983 United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. That Conference, in our view, should play an important role in fostering such co-operation, and it can do this if in considering the peaceful uses of atomic energy due attention is given to the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation régime.

143. The geographical spread of atomic energy, the rate and scope of its development, the increase of the unit capacity of energy and the installation of nuclear power plants in areas of high population density have all caused a number of serious problems which at earlier stages of development drew less attention from specialists and public opinion as a whole. First and foremost, this means ensuring the safe functioning of nuclear power plants and measures involving the fuel cycle, as well as such matters as the impact on the environment, the storage of highly radioactive waste, and so on.

144. We note with satisfaction the Agency's great contribution to the solution of those problems. In particular, nuclear safety guidelines prepared by the IAEA secretariat are highly valued by specialists from many countries.

145. We have great hopes for meeting world requirements for energy in connection with the solution of the problem of controlled thermonuclear fusion, as the basic principles of the problem have been, or soon will be, resolved. In 1978 the Soviet Union took the initiative in developing and producing on an international basis the pilot tokamak reactor. That proposal received support from the IAEA International Fusion Research Council and the Director General. An international group of scientists and specialists from the Soviet Union, the United States, Japan and Europe drew up in a short period of time a draft international programme for thermonuclear fusion (INTOR),[7] which in August 1981 was approved by IFRC and issued. By the beginning of 1983 recommendations on the transition to the technical and practical planning phase should be prepared. We continue to be convinced that co-operation among scientists from various countries within the framework of INTOR will undoubtedly help speed up the solution of the problems of nuclear energy on the basis of the use of controlled thermonuclear fusion and that this will serve the interests of all countries.

146. In developing atomic energy and the relevant scientific research studies, the Soviet Union maintains broad international scientific and technical co-operation on a bilateral basis and with international organizations and shares its achievements with many countries, in particular the developing countries.

147. The Soviet Union fully understands the desire of many countries to establish their own source of atomic

energy, so we have assisted in the speedy development of a network of nuclear power plants in socialist countries. Many countries use our services for uranium enrichment. We support the work of the Committee on Assurances of Supply and feel that its recommendations on the supply of nuclear materials, equipment, technology and services for the fuel cycle can be of great assistance to many, first and foremost the developing countries, by ensuring their national interests in the development of atomic energy. Quite naturally, in this regard we must bear in mind the existing agreements on regulating nuclear exports and further strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation régime.

148. In conclusion, the Soviet delegation would like to state that it joins with other speakers in approving the annual report of the Agency for 1980 which has been submitted to us.

149. We trust that the Agency will in the future be a reliable instrument for developing international co-operation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy and will strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation régime and international security as a whole.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.

NOTES

[1] International Atomic Energy Agency, *The Annual Report for 1980* (Austria, July 1981); transmitted to the members of the General Assembly by a note of the Secretary-General (A/36/424).

[2] See International Atomic Energy Agency, *Resolutions and Other Decisions of the General Conference, Twenty-fifth Regular Session*, GC(XXV)/RES/381.

[3] Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America; see United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 634, No. 9068, p. 326.

[4] See International Atomic Energy Agency, *Resolutions and Other Decisions of the General Conference, Twenty-fifth Regular Session*, GC(XXV)/RES/392.

[5] United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 556, No. 4849, p. 172.

[6] See International Atomic Energy Agency, *The Annual Report for 1980*, GC(XXV)/642 and Corr.1 and 2, para. 174.

[7] International Tokamak Reactor.