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*President:* Mr. Hamilton Shirley AMERASINGHE  
(Sri Lanka).

**AGENDA ITEM 14**

**Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency  
(concluded)**

1. Mr. LINDENBERG SETTE (Brazil): We listened with attention to the statement by Mr. Sigvard Eklund, Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] [59th meeting], introducing the report of the Agency covering the calendar year 1975<sup>1</sup> and giving an account of developments during the present year.

2. The twentieth session of the General Conference of the Agency was held in Rio de Janeiro in September of this year. For the Brazilian Government and people it constituted a great honour and a source of deep satisfaction to have had the opportunity to serve as hosts for the annual Conference. Our initiative in providing the venue for the meeting is an expression of the importance we attach to the work of IAEA, and of our commitment to the objectives of the Agency.

3. In this connexion it would be appropriate to quote from the statement delivered at the opening of the twentieth session of the Conference in Rio de Janeiro by the Vice-President of Brazil, Mr. Adalberto Pereira dos Santos. He said:

“We attach great significance to the work which the Agency is carrying out for the promotion of the peaceful uses of the atom, as attested to by the efforts which our delegates have always put forth and the contributions which Brazil has made to various programmes, including the General Fund”.

<sup>1</sup> International Atomic Energy Agency, *Annual Report for 1975* (Vienna, July 1976); transmitted to the members of the General Assembly by a note of the Secretary-General (A/31/171).

He went on to say:

“I note with satisfaction that IAEA has made great efforts, in its specific field, to fulfil the justified hopes placed in it by the developing countries. It will be appropriate in this context to stress the positive results being obtained by the Agency’s technical assistance programme, although still greater stimulus and support in favour of the expansion of this programme are yet required”.

4. Brazil and many other countries have on a number of occasions emphasized the need for increased dedication by the Agency to the goal of promoting the dissemination of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, in particular among developing countries. It is our hope that the Agency will not fail to accord to this objective the very high priority accorded to it by its members, especially by the developing countries, which have become acutely aware of the vital role to be played by nuclear technology in the process of economic development.

5. We therefore remain confident that IAEA will accomplish its goals to the satisfaction of all its members, both developed and developing. We find encouragement in the steps that have already been taken in that direction, and we are optimistic about the future of the Agency in a field that is to assume ever greater importance in the years to come.

6. It is in that spirit that the Brazilian delegation will support draft resolution A/31/L.16, which was submitted by the delegations of India, Poland and Senegal.

7. Mr. HARRY (Australia): We have before us the report of IAEA for the calendar year 1975. As usual, the report provides a comprehensive account of the work of the Agency over the year under review, and we thank Mr. Eklund for his comprehensive and comprehensible introduction of it. He and the staff of the Agency have again earned the admiration and gratitude of the international community.

8. There are several areas of the current work of IAEA which are of particular interest to the Australian Government. They are, first, the work of the Scientific Advisory Committee concerned, *inter alia*, with the study of regional fuel reprocessing, waste disposal and the transport of nuclear material; secondly, the work of the *Ad Hoc* Advisory Group on Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, whose chairman is, in fact, Mr. Alan Wilson of the Australian Atomic Energy Commission; thirdly, the study by the Standing Advisory Group on safeguards implementation of means by which the IAEA secretariat can report to member States on the implementation and effectiveness of safeguards. Then there is the preparation of a new model

agreement for the application of safeguards over the full fuel cycle, the provision of training for the development and improvement of national systems of nuclear materials accounting and control, and the continued provision of other technical assistance to developing countries.

9. Australia continues to attach considerable importance to the work of the IAEA and particularly to those of its activities which are directed towards the peaceful application of nuclear energy and the strengthening of restraints on nuclear proliferation. It is making a significant contribution to the goal through studies of concepts such as an international service on peaceful nuclear explosions and regional fuel centres and by pursuing its essential ongoing function of implementation of international safeguards arrangements and establishing models and standards for protecting and safeguarding nuclear material and facilities. The Agency gives critical support to efforts to tighten restraints on proliferation.

10. We must not lose sight of the fact that the Agency is an international organization which can do no more than what its member States as a whole direct. The ultimate responsibility for ensuring that nuclear energy is developed for peaceful purposes in a manner which minimizes the risk inherent in the direction of that technology to hostile uses and, if possible, eliminates that risk, lies with Governments. But, within the terms of the mandate the Agency enjoys, my delegation considers it very important that IAEA should contribute to the international nuclear debate. Through wider dissemination of information it can make a great and responsible public contribution on most of the complex issues involved.

11. My delegation takes pleasure in announcing its support for the adoption by consensus of draft resolution A/31/L.16, though we share the regrets expressed this morning [60th meeting] by the representatives of the United Kingdom and Austria that the work of the *Ad Hoc* Advisory Group on Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes was not given the same prominence it enjoyed in the resolution adopted under this item at the thirtieth session of the General Assembly [resolution 3386 (XXX)]. The work of that Group is no less important than it was last year. In addition to the positive contributions the Group may make to the question of establishing an international service on peaceful nuclear explosions, the Group has an important task of advising the Board of Governors of IAEA on the structure and content of agreements necessary under article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [resolution 2373 (XXII), annex].

12. My delegation is highly appreciative of the contribution made each year by the delegations of States holding the positions of Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Board of Governors in preparing the draft resolution which makes possible the annual adoption by this Assembly of the report of IAEA. Given the diversity of opinion on issues which obtains within the Board of Governors as much as anywhere else, it is not an easy task to attempt to formulate a draft resolution which is entirely satisfactory to everybody. We have seen an increase in the difficulty over the past two or three years and to my delegation it would seem that the time may have come when the burden assumed each year by three members of the Board should

be lightened and that all members of the Board could assume some of the responsibility. Specifically, we have in mind that in future years consideration might be given to the adoption of a practice whereby informal meetings of all delegations which are members of the Board of Governors might be convened early during the proceedings of the General Assembly to formulate a draft resolution enjoying consensus support from participating delegations for submission to the Assembly by the Member States which provide the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Board of Governors.

13. Meanwhile, however, we have before us draft resolution A/31/L.16, introduced yesterday by the leader of the Indian delegation representing the bureau of the Board of Governors, and the Australian delegation hopes that it will be adopted by consensus.

14. Mr. KRIVOKAPIĆ (Yugoslavia): May I, on behalf of the Yugoslav delegation, welcome the Director-General of IAEA, Mr. Eklund. The report he has submitted to us portrays—realistically, in our view—the situation in the Agency as well as its activities and programmes of work for next year and the period 1977-1982.

15. Yugoslavia has repeatedly expressed its satisfaction over its co-operation with IAEA, and this applies also to co-operation in the past year. Within the limits of its financial possibilities, IAEA has carried out several useful programmes. However, we believe that the Agency should be even more effective in its work in expanding assistance to developing countries with regard to a rapid transfer of nuclear techniques and technology for peaceful purposes, primarily in the field of power production under the conditions laid down by the existing régime of safeguards.

16. Representatives of developed nuclear countries have often expressed the fear that an intensive transfer of nuclear techniques and technology to the developing countries is fraught with the danger of the possible use of nuclear techniques for the production of nuclear weapons. The question arises as to why many peaceful countries should not obtain nuclear installations to develop their power resources when contracts have been concluded for the sale of such installations to countries like South Africa, which has not adhered to the non-proliferation Treaty and which, owing to its financial and material capabilities and its reserves of uranium, could very soon become a nuclear-weapon Power, thus posing an even greater threat to the security of African countries. We therefore feel that there is no justification whatsoever for making the granting of assistance subject to demands for the strengthening of the existing system of safeguards of IAEA.

17. I should like to point to some negative developments which have taken place during the past one or two years. I have in mind the establishment of the so-called “London nuclear club” of highly developed nuclear countries members of IAEA. The results of the talks of its members have not been published so far, although that “club” has held several meetings. We must note, however, that such actions are bound to raise justified doubts. We do not see any reason for the highly developed nuclear countries to meet separately when there is IAEA, in which every question of common interest can be discussed.

18. It is precisely the inadequate assistance in transferring nuclear techniques and technology from the developed to the developing countries, attempts at imposing even stricter measures of control or safeguards on the developing countries, and the separate activities of highly developed nuclear countries that have compelled the developing countries to orient themselves, by relying on their own forces, towards mutual assistance and the search for other solutions with a view to accelerating the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

19. There is a danger that these processes might weaken IAEA and jeopardize its existence, and that, as a result of the behaviour of nuclear Powers, the developing countries might lose interest in that organization, which would be a great loss to the international community.

20. For this reason we believe that the proposals of the Yugoslav delegation submitted to the twentieth session of the General Conference of IAEA deserve to be considered with attention, as they are aimed at strengthening the Agency.

21. Our initiatives are aimed, first, at ensuring a comprehensive analysis of the development and situation of IAEA and of its organs, in particular for the purpose of adapting and orienting the Agency, in the light of existing conditions and increased needs for nuclear energy in the world, towards concentrating its attention on the most important tasks.

22. Secondly, we have proposed the establishment of an international pool which would have the function of merging the forces and resources of interested members of the Agency in the fields of material and financial resources, raw materials and know-how.

23. By establishing such a body within its framework and under its auspices the activities of the Agency would acquire a new, expanded dimension. Every member of the Agency has its needs, possibilities or advantages, which can be used for a more rapid introduction of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Some of them have vast quantities of raw materials; others have financial resources; yet others possess experience in the building of nuclear installations; the developed countries possess the necessary techniques, and so on. If the resources necessary for development were merged, it would be possible, in our opinion, to attain the basic objective of IAEA—namely, the accelerated use and development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

24. In connexion with this issue, my country is following with interest the work on the Agency's study on the nuclear fuel cycle, as well as the proposals for the establishment of regional fuel centres, including reprocessing plants. Yugoslavia is ready to take part, together with other members of the Agency, both nuclear and non-nuclear, in the further work in connexion with these initiatives, convinced that in this way it will be possible to contribute to the expansion of useful co-operation, to the bridging of the existing gap between developed and developing countries and, above all, to an accelerated transfer of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and primarily for power production.

25. The Yugoslav delegation supports draft resolution A/31/L.16. We believe that this draft reflects the possibilities open to the Agency at this moment. However, it is our wish that the Agency should exert fresh efforts towards building a better relationship between the developed nuclear Powers and developing countries, on the basis of mutual benefit and increased assistance to the developing countries.

26. Mr. MOHAJER (Iran): Twenty years ago, in September, the statute of IAEA was signed. We take this opportunity to congratulate IAEA on its uninterrupted progress and continuous efforts in fulfilling its task over the past two decades. The able Director-General of the Agency, and his staff can justly take pride in the impressive record of achievement that they have registered to their credit and in the wealth of very valuable experience which they have accumulated during this period. The ever expanding responsibility entrusted to the Agency is a tribute to the growing technical capabilities of IAEA and a recognition of its political credibility in the international arena.

27. Turning now to the report of IAEA, we note with satisfaction that a principal objective of the Agency's work has remained in 1975, as in past years, to help the member States with their nuclear power programmes and to provide technical assistance in this connexion. My delegation has a special reason to appreciate the priority given to this area, since Iran has a wide nuclear development programme for peaceful purposes which we consider to be a very important contribution to the solution of our energy problem in coming decades.

28. Despite the valuable technical assistance that we have received from IAEA, for which we are grateful to the Agency, the advent of a nuclear programme in Iran, as in many other countries, has not been devoid of serious constraints and deep concerns at the international level. The most disturbing development in this domain of nuclear energy is the increasing diversion of our thoughts and policies from the letter and spirit of the statute of IAEA and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. There is a growing tendency among the suppliers of nuclear technology to impose ever more stringent terms for the transfer of this important technology. We wish to see that the higher ideals of the IAEA statute and the non-proliferation Treaty are not utilized to preserve and promote a technological monopoly; rather they should, as they were intended to, serve the just goals of an orderly and constructive transfer of nuclear technology.

29. I should like to conclude my brief intervention by reiterating our support for the activities of the IAEA and expressing the hope that the Agency will be able to make further progress in fulfilling its vital and constructive role in the field of the peaceful development and utilization of nuclear energy.

30. The PRESIDENT: As there is no request for a vote on draft resolution A/31/L.16, may I take it that the General Assembly decides to adopt the draft resolution without a vote?

*The draft resolution was adopted (resolution 31/11).*

## AGENDA ITEM 118

Question of Cyprus (*continued*)\*

31. The PRESIDENT: As members are aware, the General Assembly decided at its 57th plenary meeting to invite the Special Political Committee to meet for the purpose of hearing the views of the representatives of the Cypriot communities. I call on the Rapporteur of the Special Political Committee, Mr. Percy Haynes of Guyana, to present the Committee's report.

32. Mr. HAYNES (Guyana), Rapporteur of the Special Political Committee: I have the honour to present to the General Assembly the report of the Special Political Committee on agenda item 118 [A/31/322].

33. As indicated in the report, in accordance with the decision taken by the General Assembly at its 57th plenary meeting, the Special Political Committee held a meeting on Tuesday, 9 November, for the purpose of hearing the views of representatives of the Cypriot communities. The verbatim record of the meeting held on this subject by the Special Political Committee is contained in document A/SPC/31/PV.16.

34. The PRESIDENT: I take it that the General Assembly takes note of the report of the Special Political Committee [A/31/322].

*It was so decided (decision 31/403).*

35. Mr. MURRAY (United Kingdom): I do not hesitate to say that the delivery of my delegation's statement on the question of Cyprus is not a task that I undertake with satisfaction. In preparing it I was inevitably and forcibly reminded of previous debates and previous resolutions which reflected the proper concern of the United Nations for the situation in Cyprus but which also reflected the problem's horrid intractability.

36. In his statement in the general debate on 13 October [30th meeting], the Foreign Minister of Cyprus reminded us that since the crisis of July 1974 a total of 16 resolutions on Cyprus have been adopted by the United Nations. It is difficult to pretend, as we engage in the discussions which will lead to the adoption of the seventeenth, that there has been any significant improvement in the situation during that period.

37. This Organization, therefore, and in particular those Members of it such as the United Kingdom to whom the peace and prosperity of the Republic of Cyprus is a matter of deep concern, can scarcely regard with satisfaction this lack of progress. They are bound to ask themselves how the parties to the dispute can break the deadlock in the negotiations between the representatives of the two communities and what the United Nations can now do to end the deplorable stagnation which affects the situation in the island.

38. Let us consider first the role of our Organization, and in particular that of the General Assembly. In its resolu-

tions 3212 (XXIX) and 3395 (XXX), the General Assembly established the framework within which it considered that a settlement is to be reached. The United Kingdom voted for both those resolutions. We are committed to them as providing some of the essential prerequisites for a settlement of the Cyprus question. At the same time, we regard it as fundamental that a solution of the problem can only be lasting, and tension can only be finally removed, if the solution is acceptable to both communities in Cyprus as well as to those countries which have a legitimate interest in the problem. This means that the solution has to be worked out primarily by those directly concerned. This is their right and their responsibility.

39. We believe, therefore, that while the General Assembly may prescribe—even though one or the other party may not necessarily agree with the prescription—it should not attempt to coerce the parties into agreement. This consideration should, in my delegation's view, exclude from the resolution which we shall adopt language which attempts to influence the attitude of the Security Council, as the organ of the United Nations primarily responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, in its separate consideration of the Cyprus issue.

40. In saying this I am not belittling the role of the General Assembly. As I have already said, my delegation regards the General Assembly's two resolutions—3212 (XXIX) and 3395 (XXX)—as having provided the framework within which a settlement should be sought. The important task of this Assembly is to confirm the provisions of these resolutions, and also to express its concern that, so far, the voice of international opinion as represented by the General Assembly has gone unheeded. Both because of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices in Cyprus and because of the presence of a United Nations force there, my delegation believes that the Assembly has both the right and the duty to tell the parties frankly of our serious concern at the failure to make progress in the implementation of the United Nations resolutions which deal with Cyprus. We do not consider that the *status quo* is satisfactory nor that it should be allowed to persist.

41. I turn now to the role of the parties. It is clear from what I have said already that my delegation regards the intercommunal talks as representing the best and the proper forum for the attainment of a political settlement. We were therefore encouraged by the statements of the Foreign Ministers of Turkey [8th meeting] and of Cyprus [30th meeting] in the general debate. Mr. Çağlayangil referred to the agreement that he had reached with the Foreign Minister of Greece last December on a new basis for the resumption of the dialogue. Mr. Christophides, for his part, said that well-meaning dialogue could bridge opposing views and settle differences, and that no problem was impossible to solve if substantive talks were conducted with goodwill.

42. But, as the report of the Secretary-General issued on 30 October<sup>2</sup> makes clear, those protestations of good

<sup>2</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-first Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1976*, document S/12222.

\* Resumed from the 57th meeting.

intent have not been reflected in progress in the intercommunal talks this year. As recently as September, the intercommunal negotiators, Mr. Papadopoulos and Mr. Onan, came to New York for consultations with the Secretary-General. While, as the Secretary-General's report states, Mr. Papadopoulos and Mr. Onan reacted positively to a suggestion by the Secretary-General intended to break the procedural deadlock which has prevented the resumption of the talks, both did so with reservations so substantial that in practice no break-through could be achieved.

43. My delegation has repeatedly outlined what, in its view, would constitute the elements of an agreement to which the intercommunal talks should lead. I do not propose to repeat those elements now. However, I must make clear my delegation's view that, if negotiations are to be resumed and have some hope of progress, both sides must be more constructive in their approach. The Turkish Cypriot side should indicate its willingness to agree to rectification that would ensure a fairer division of territory between the two communities; the Greek Cypriot side should be prepared to agree to a reordering of the constitution that would ensure the equal constitutional rights of both communities. My Government views with deep disappointment the apparent inability of the two negotiators to surmount the procedural difficulties which inevitably appear to outside observers as a cause for unnecessary delay in adopting a new approach to their problems of substance.

44. My delegation would also like to record its full endorsement of Mr. Kissinger's statement in the general debate on 30 September [11th meeting] in which he outlined a set of principles which might help the parties to resume negotiations. Together with our partners in the European Communities and with the United States, my Government is actively working for a resumption of the intercommunal talks on a substantive basis. We believe that the acceptance of concepts such as those indicated by Mr. Kissinger would help to restore momentum to the negotiating process. Therefore we were encouraged to hear Mr. Christophides in his statement on 13 October say with respect to Mr. Kissinger's remarks that the Government of Cyprus had always expressed readiness to examine any proposal for a solution to the Cyprus problem in the light of the provisions of the relevant United Nations resolutions.

45. I have painted a generally gloomy picture. But there is one component in the Cyprus situation which lightens that picture. I have in mind the Secretary-General's representatives and the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus, to whom the maintenance of a fragile peace can deservedly be ascribed. My delegation regularly pays a tribute to these men; but this tribute is not perfunctory or a mere courtesy. Whatever progress has been possible on the political side has been made in large measure because the Secretary-General has been represented in Cyprus by men with skill and tenacity of purpose such as Ambassador Pérez de Cuéllar. Whatever security has been achieved on the ground exists because, on the military side, General Prem Chand and the resolute men of the contingents of the United Nations Force have time and again ensured that incidents which might have led to outbreaks of fighting have not been allowed to get out of hand.

46. I know that those who contribute men and money to the United Nations Force regard their contributions as a burden from which the parties to the dispute should, by agreeing to a solution to their differences, long ago have freed them. My Government, as the largest contributor, holds this view strongly. We believe that the role of the peace-keeper should essentially be a temporary one. However, I earnestly hope that, before any contributors conclude that the interests of economy require a reduction in assistance, they will consider the possible consequences of such action. It would be lamentable if, as a result of their economies, the capability of the Force were so reduced before progress towards a settlement had been made that the Force was unable to carry out its present tasks.

47. I would not wish to conclude this mention of the United Nations Force without referring, as my delegation has referred elsewhere, to the responsibility of the parties towards the Force. The Force operates in Cyprus because the parties concerned have concurred in the recommendation of the Secretary-General that the Security Council maintain it there. The granting of such concurrence must entail co-operation with the Force if it is not to be an entirely cynical gesture. My delegation has been concerned by reports which indicate that such co-operation has not always been forthcoming. This general debate on the Cyprus question is not, perhaps, the most appropriate moment to go into details on this question; but I am bound to say that my delegation regards co-operation with the United Nations Force by the parties as a serious responsibility, the dereliction of which can only reflect very badly on those concerned.

*Mr. Dessande (Chad), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.*

48. Seventeen years ago, when Cyprus became independent, the President of the Republic, Archbishop Makarios, said:

"This is a great day in that the positiveness of unity and co-operation has prevailed over the negativeness of division and strife. . . . It is my firm belief that with sincere understanding and mutual confidence we can work together in a way that will leave no room for dissension. . . . I am sure that all past differences will be completely forgotten."

President Makarios would, I have no doubt, be the first to admit that the hopes he voiced on that day in 1959 have not been fulfilled. Yet it should not be forgotten that for more than 100 years the people of Cyprus lived together in friendship. It is my delegation's conviction that they can do so again. I hope that when the Cyprus item is discussed at the thirty-second session of the General Assembly it will be possible for my delegation to address itself to the subject less critically and with some grounds for optimism that the day when Greek and Turkish Cypriots can again live together in friendship has drawn closer than it is today.

49. The representative of the Netherlands will be making a statement later in the debate setting out the common position of the nine members of the European Communities concerning Cyprus, and I take this opportunity to associate my delegation in advance with what he will have to say.

50. Mr. NEAGU (Romania): We are called upon to discuss once again the situation in Cyprus. Unfortunately, it is one more occasion to express our disappointment at the lack of significant progress towards the settlement of the fundamental aspects of a conflict which, while causing untold suffering to the Cypriot people, maintains a hotbed of tension in the area and in the whole world.

51. The resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council are far from having been implemented. Moreover, in spite of General Assembly resolution 3395 (XXX) of 20 November 1975, some unilateral measures have been taken which have led to a still deeper demographic and political division and separation of the two communities. As is also stressed by the Secretary-General in the introduction to his report on the work of the Organization [*see A/31/1/Add.1, sect. III*], this state of affairs continues “to cause grave anxiety” throughout the world and has a prominent place on the agenda of the General Assembly.

52. As a Balkan country, Romania is deeply concerned with the situation in Cyprus and considers that measures have to be taken to find a solution to the conflict before it is too late. Within the framework of the endeavours aimed at building European security, we attach particular attention to the establishment of new co-operative and good-neighbourly relations between the Balkan countries, in order to transform that area—as well as other areas in Europe and other continents—into a region of peace and fruitful co-operation. As recently pointed out by President Nicolae Ceauşescu.

“We firmly declare for a political settlement of the situation in Cyprus in a way that would preserve the sovereignty of this State and allow a peaceful coexistence of the two communities”.

53. Taking as its point of departure its friendly, developing relations with the Republic of Cyprus, with other directly interested countries and with all the States in that area, Romania has consistently emphasized the necessity of solving the Cypriot problem by political and peaceful means, through negotiations between the two communities, without any foreign interference, under the aegis and with the active participation, of the United Nations.

54. It is our firm belief that the Cypriot people, whose struggle for freedom and independence has always been backed by the Romanian people, is the only one entitled to solve its constitutional and social problems and further its fundamental interests within the framework of the peaceful coexistence of the two communities.

55. It is obvious that the constitutional régime and the State organization of the Republic of Cyprus are issues within the sphere of competence of the Cypriot people of the Greek and Turkish communities. We therefore declare in favour of the resumption of the intercommunal negotiations on territorial questions, the problem of refugees and other pending problems. Those negotiations should be carried out in a spirit of equality and mutual respect and with due consideration for the basic and legitimate interests of each community as well as for the interests of the Cypriot State and people as a whole. In our view, all the

parties involved should lend their support to these efforts aimed at resolving the different aspects of the situation in Cyprus and should refrain from whatever action might aggravate the situation and further delay the settlement of the conflict.

56. As concerns the essence of the problem, the Romanian delegation considers that the main objective on which all efforts should be focused is the preservation of the independence and sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus. To that end, any solution to be adopted should require, as clearly mentioned in previous resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, the withdrawal of all foreign military forces and personnel and the cessation of all outside interference in that State's affairs.

57. We share and competely support the position taken by the Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries in Colombo: “. . . that the United Nations should take effective measures to ensure the implementation of its resolutions with regard to Cyprus. [*See A/31/197, annex I, para. 88.*]

58. In this connexion, we appreciate highly the efforts made by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Kurt Waldheim, his assistants and his Special Representative, Ambassador Pérez de Cuéllar, to ensure the translation into action of United Nations resolutions and recommendations regarding Cyprus, and we consider that the endeavours of the United Nations to secure a settlement of the situation in Cyprus should be continued.

59. We think that the Secretary-General should continue to lend his good offices in stimulating the intercommunal negotiations in order that a mutually acceptable solution may be reached. It seems necessary that the Secretary-General, in agreement with the parties involved, should find ways of continuing the talks and establishing appropriate time-tables and negotiating stages so that all relevant aspects may be discussed and an over-all solution of the Cypriot problem may take shape as soon as possible.

60. Romania, for its part, is ready to support in future, too, any sincere effort and any initiative designed to solve the Cypriot problem, to ensure the free and untroubled development of the whole Cypriot population, Greek and Turkish, and to eliminate that hotbed of tension, so that all the States in that area may develop friendly and mutually profitable relations.

61. It is imperative that the United Nations and all its Member States do their utmost to promote negotiations between the two communities and to protect the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus, a small country which gained its independence by fighting for freedom and self-determination. Only thus will the United Nations be able to fulfil its duty to ensure the peace and security of all States, big and small, without exception, and thereby the peace and security of the world.

62. Mr. FARD (Iran): Once again this Assembly is considering the problem of Cyprus, a problem which has in fact been in existence for many years but has become a dangerous, and in many respects tragic, situation after the

developments of the last few years. It was a dangerous situation because it held elements of conflict which, had they been aggravated, would have seriously imperilled peace and stability in that sensitive region of the Mediterranean. It was also, and still remains, a tragic situation because of all the hardship and suffering that it has caused the people of Cyprus. And now, after three years, it is a matter of deep concern and, indeed, sorrow that the situation has not returned to normal and we are still seized of this problem.

63. However, some comfort is derived from the fact that the parties involved in this question and the international community have recognized certain fundamental principles on the basis of which a solution to this problem should be found. The two most fundamental of those principles are, first, that the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus, as well as the rights of both the Turkish and Greek communities of the island, should be guaranteed; and, secondly, that the best, and indeed the only, way to achieve this is through negotiations between the two communities of the island and the countries directly involved in this issue.

64. My Government was among the first to speak in support of such principles and we are still firm believers in their value and validity. What gives us real pleasure is that the two parties directly involved, namely the Greek and Turkish Governments, also approve and accept the above-mentioned principles.

65. It is also widely accepted that an equitable solution must be found for the remaining problems concerning the displaced persons. Needless to say, those problems can best be solved within the context of an over-all settlement.

66. However, we also believe that the United Nations and the international community have a duty to do all they can to facilitate the establishment of a meaningful dialogue between the two ethnic communities whenever possible and at whatever level. Here, the efforts made by the Secretary-General of the United Nations precisely in facilitating the conduct of a dialogue between the two communities deserve our deepest gratitude. It is unfortunate that all his efforts have not yet borne the fruit for which we all wish.

67. I have referred to the importance of establishing and maintaining a dialogue between the two ethnic communities in Cyprus, but we think that it is equally important to establish a dialogue between those communities at the international level also.

68. The best way to do this, as has been proved in many other similar cases, could be by allowing the spokesmen for those communities to voice their grievances at the rostrum of the United Nations General Assembly. That procedure has been adopted in the case of liberation movements and has proved to be beneficial. There does not seem to be any apparent reason why it should not be so in this particular case. In fact, this question has been discussed and studied among different groups, in particular during the recent meeting of the Islamic Conference,<sup>3</sup> where it was agreed that the representative of the Turkish Cypriot community

should be allowed to address the plenary meeting of the General Assembly. It is evident that the decision adopted in this respect by the General Assembly [4th meeting, para. 63] has been a real disappointment to the members of the Islamic Conference.

69. The situation in Cyprus is caused by different factors which have their roots in the historical, social, economic and cultural make-up of the country. Many of us who are not thoroughly familiar with those factors might have difficulty in comprehending them and in appreciating their importance and significance. In these circumstances, we believe we have to be extremely cautious in making any judgement or attributing any responsibility to either of the parties involved for the failure to find a solution for this problem. Rather we should do all we can to bring the parties involved closer together and make a speedy resumption of negotiations possible.

70. Therefore, at the end of our deliberations, when pronouncing ourselves on this matter, we should bear in mind that it will serve absolutely no purpose to put the blame on either of the parties involved in the inter-communal negotiations for the lack of success thus far. On the contrary, such an attitude on our part would most probably exacerbate the feelings on both sides and make the achievement of the very objective we are striving for more difficult if not impossible.

71. We think the best way we can contribute to the solving of this problem is by adopting a fair and balanced attitude which could gain the approval of both communities. We should urge them to resume their negotiations as soon as possible. We should also ask the Secretary-General of the United Nations to lend his assistance to the parties in the conduct of their negotiations.

72. We, for our part, hope that a speedy resumption of talks will be possible and that this time they will be crowned with success.

73. Mr. TÜRKMEN (Turkey): This debate on the Cyprus question is revealing once more the enormous complexity of the problem, and bringing into focus the great challenge that the Secretary-General is facing in endeavouring to discharge the mission entrusted to him by the Security Council. I wish to reiterate, on behalf of my Government, our heartfelt gratitude to Mr. Kurt Waldheim for his untiring and dedicated efforts in the search for a peaceful solution. His diplomatic skill, his immense patience and his resourceful approach have prevented the negotiating process between the two communities from collapsing irretrievably. We nurture the hope that the debate will not take a course that will render impossible the continuation of his task and that he will be able to renew his efforts.

74. The United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus has been fulfilling an important task on the island since 1964. I should like to express our appreciation to the officers and men of this Force, and to renew our thanks to the member countries that have contributed to it. There is no doubt that in the field of peace-keeping operations the United Nations is able to play a significant role in the containment of conflicts and the enlargement of opportunities for peaceful solutions.

<sup>3</sup> Seventh Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, held at Istanbul from 12 to 15 May 1976.

75. I should like also to pay a tribute to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus, Ambassador Pérez de Cuéllar, who is carrying out his arduous and delicate assignment with remarkable competence and distinction. Let me, finally, convey our warmest thanks to Under-Secretaries-General Mr. Roberto Guyer and Mr. Brian Urquhart, who have for so many years been involved in the most difficult problems with which the United Nations has had to deal.

76. The Cyprus dispute is a tragedy, not only for the two communities on the island, but for Turkey and Greece as well. After a bitter period of hostility, struggle and war, the two countries finally achieved in the early 1930s what they then considered to be a final reconciliation. The names of two outstanding statesmen, Atatürk and Venizelos, are linked with that historic compromise. In the following years, not only were the Governments able to inaugurate fruitful bilateral co-operation in all fields, but the peoples of both countries were gradually discarding their reciprocal prejudices; they were bent on perceiving, not what had divided them in the past, but what could unite them from then on; they were learning to trust each other and to value the human bonds forged in centuries of coexistence.

77. In the early 1950s the emergence of the Cyprus conflict dealt a heavy blow to the hopes for a continuing *entente* between Turkey and Greece.

78. The irresponsible and dangerous attitudes of certain political leaders then in power in Greece led to the official espousal of the policy of *enosis*, the annexation of Cyprus to Greece. The lingering *megali* idea, the ideology of Greek imperialism and expansionism, was resurrected, and today the two countries and the two communities in Cyprus are suffering as a consequence of those policies.

79. Another important factor in the unfolding drama of Cyprus is, of course, Archbishop Makarios, whose election to the presidency of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960 has been an unmitigated disaster. There is no doubt that Archbishop Makarios's insatiable and far-reaching political ambition was fed by his fanatical championship of the cause of *enosis*. His racist antagonism against the Turks lent frightening proportions to those ambitions. This is what the Archbishop said in a speech at his home village Panayia on 4 September 1962, while still President of a bicomunal State:

“Until this small community that forms part of the Turkish race and has been the terrible enemy of Hellenism is expelled, the duty of the heroes of EOKA<sup>4</sup> cannot be considered as terminated.”

80. It is hard to recall a more reckless and more cynical utterance by any head of State. Can we consider what the consequences would be if in any of our countries heads of State made such remarks? Can the Turkish community ever be expected to trust this man who has sworn to annihilate it?

81. Pretending to ignore the role that Greece has played for more than 20 years in the Cyprus issue and the grim

consequences of Archbishop Makarios's interminable intrigues and relentless pursuit of self-glorification, Mr. Christophides, the Foreign Minister of Cyprus, would like us to believe that everything in Cyprus started in 1974 with what he calls the Turkish invasion. If we listen to him, Cyprus until 1974 was a happy island where the two communities were coexisting harmoniously under the inspired and humane leadership of His Beatitude. Then, suddenly, Turkey decided to invade Cyprus and misfortune befell the island. If, therefore, Turkey withdraws its forces from Cyprus, the island would easily revert to its previous happy days. The Turkish Cypriot refugees will probably be gently moved back into the enclaves where they lived before 1974 and Archbishop Makarios will lavish upon them his kindness and love. The Cyprus problem is, according to Mr. Christophides, as simple as that. The only snag in this scenario is that under the warmth of that embrace the Turkish community might suffocate and disappear. But then, is this not a small price to pay for the total Hellenization of Cyprus and the realization of the long-standing dream of *enosis*?

82. One of the misfortunes of the Greek Cypriot leaders is that they often allow themselves to entertain such dreams. As they are impervious to realities and obsessed by their megalomaniac egocentrism, as they are full of disdain for the rights of people not of their own creed or race, they find it easy to think that they can deceive even the most sophisticated audiences. They can therefore indulge endlessly in such rhetoric and accuse Turkey of aggression, invasion and military occupation. They are confident that the events which obliged Turkey to undertake a lawful intervention in fulfilment of its commitments under international treaties can be glossed over and that the historical evolution of the problem, which is the root-cause of the situation which we face today in Cyprus, can be forgotten. I therefore have no other choice but to remind the General Assembly of the basic developments which brought about the present state of affairs.

83. The essence of the problem of Cyprus is basically a conflict between the Turkish and Greek communities on the rules of coexistence and on the very nature of Cyprus as a State. It also involves Turkey and Greece, because those two countries are parent States and because the future of the island can affect the equilibrium painfully achieved between them as a result of a long historical process.

84. Cyprus became an independent, bicomunal State in 1960. The Constitution of that State was based on the principle of equal partnership between the Turkish and Greek communities. Archbishop Makarios himself expressed this reality in a most convincing manner when he said:

“... the Cyprus Republic is a new State but not a new nation, and it is not the intention of the Cypriot Government to create a national feeling.”

85. But if it was impossible to create a single nation, it was also obvious that, in order to survive, the Cypriot State required not only the safeguarding of the constitutional equilibrium but also dedication on the part of both communities to the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic and to the principle of

<sup>4</sup> Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters).

partnership based on their common interest in maintaining a viable State that would enable both of them to develop and to prosper.

86. Yet, the Republic of Cyprus lasted barely three years. It collapsed in 1963. The reasons for that tragic outcome were twofold. First of all, the political developments in Greece brought to power politicians who were reckless enough to disregard treaty commitments and to proclaim once again their devotion to the goal of *enosis*. Secondly, the Greek Cypriot community had considered from the very beginning that independence was only a transitional phase, to be followed at the first opportunity by *enosis*. The loyalty of the Greek Cypriot community was oriented, not towards independence, intercommunal harmony and partnership, but towards racial prejudice and *enosis*. This is eloquently analysed in a book entitled *The Cyprus Conflict* by none other than a Greek Cypriot author, Mr. Zenon Stavrinides, from which I quote:

“Makarios and his associates put forward a certain view which carried the support of the vast majority of Greek Cypriots. This view was that:

“(a) Greek Cypriots were indeed an integral part of the Greek nation and their heroic struggle to unite their island with Mother Greece has resulted in partial victory. *Enosis* is still to be considered by every ‘true’ Greek as the only ‘desirable’ end.

“(b) Practical realities, however, (for example, foreign pressures) have rendered *enosis* ‘not feasible’ at present, and the setting up of an independent Republic was the second best settlement.

“On this ‘official’ theory then, there was a certain definite discrepancy between a Greek’s conception of his national identity and his conception of the State of which he was a citizen. In fact, the idea of the Cyprus State was, for the passionate believers in *enosis*, the idea of a partly unsuccessful, or unfulfilled, or even betrayed, national struggle; and some felt uneasy when they saw the flag of the Republic flying over public buildings.

“The Turkish Cypriots watched Greek ‘internal’ politics and political wranglings closely and were trying to maintain their unity in the face of their more powerful partners. They could very well see that the Greeks were far from satisfied with the constitutional settlement and that the desire of *enosis* was still in the air, encouraged by ‘official’ Greek policy. Küçük, Denktaş and the other Turkish leaders could not be sure that the Greek side would be prepared to work with them under the rubric of the Constitution even for a period of time. It was a known fact that there were Greeks who had not surrendered their arms after the end of the EOKA struggle and who met regularly in training sessions. So the Turks, while hoping for the best, had to plan for the worst.”

87. It is under these conditions that the tampering with the constitution, which began soon after the proclamation of independence, gradually gained momentum and culminated in a massive and brutal onslaught against the Turkish community in 1963, compelling all the Turks of

Cyprus to live under constant privation, humiliation and relentless oppression and tyranny for 11 long years. During that period, 2,000 Turks were killed, wounded or maimed and nearly 30,000 were ousted from their homes. Their constitutional and human rights were outrageously violated. Their homes were looted and destroyed in a frenzy of hatred. They were discriminated against in every conceivable field. They were prevented from benefiting from the multilateral and bilateral assistance extended to Cyprus, even though the Turkish community was economically underprivileged compared to the Greek community.

88. The economic restrictions, periodic blockades and prohibitions on the importation of the most basic commodities condemned the Turkish Cypriots to live in misery, in degrading, subhuman conditions, and under the imminent threat of starvation. How revolting it is, in the full knowledge of these facts, to hear the representative of the Greek community, Mr. Christophides, proclaim that:

“It is our firm conviction that if the Greek and Turkish Cypriots were left alone without any outside interference in an island with no foreign armies and no refugees, they could once again live amicably together as they have done in the past for so many years”. [57th meeting, para. 107.]

Does Mr. Christophides really believe that the Turkish community has forgotten the nightmare of the years 1963 to 1974?

89. It was again during that period, and as early as 1964, that the *enosis*-oriented Government of Greece openly violated the independence of Cyprus and dispatched 20,000 troops to the island, and thus established military supremacy. True, *enosis* was not officially proclaimed and the fiction of an independent State of Cyprus was maintained. But Archbishop Makarios, while on the one hand posing as a champion of the independence of Cyprus in non-aligned conferences, was on the other hand actively and aggressively asserting his support for the cause of *enosis*. Here is an extract, among many others, from the interview he gave to the *Washington Post* in 1963: “I want something higher than being a temporary President of Cyprus. My ambition is to connect my name with history as the architect of *enosis*”.

90. The Greek Cypriot House of Representatives passed unanimously, on 26 June 1967, the following resolution, which has not so far been revoked:

“Interpreting the age-long aspirations of the Greeks of Cyprus, the House declares that despite any adverse circumstances it will not suspend the struggle conducted with the support of all Greeks until this struggle succeeds in uniting the whole and undivided Cyprus with the motherland, without any intermediary stages”.

91. The reaction of the Turkish community to Greek Cypriot policies has been best analysed, again, by Mr. Zenon Stavrinides, the Greek Cypriot scholar to whom I referred earlier. I shall read a few excerpts from his book:

“It is impossible to resist the conclusion that Makarios and the other Greek leaders never honestly intended to

co-operate with the Turkish leaders under a bicomunal type of Constitution, let alone be satisfied with a mere 13 amendments of the 1960 Constitution. As the Akritas Plan makes clear, the demand for 'reasonable' amendments would be only the first step towards reducing the Turkish community to the status of a mere minority, unable effectively to control the will of the Greek majority. Once this was achieved, and the Treaty of Guarantee nullified, there would be nothing to stop the Greek leadership from appealing to the principle of self-determination, which means in the context of Cyprus that a monolithic majority of Greeks can decide for a monolithic minority of Turks too and proclaim *enosis*. Further, the Greeks believed that the objective of *enosis* justified, if necessary, the use of violent means".

92. I should like to quote further from the analysis by the Greek Cypriot author:

"These considerations have influenced the shape of the Turkish position in the following ways:

"(i) Any new agreements that may be reached with the Greeks must definitely and unequivocally exclude *enosis*. . . .

"(ii) A Reconstituted Republic of Cyprus which the Turks can agree to become a part of should be a bicomunal State, . . . . As Mr. Denktash put it: The Greeks by themselves cannot be the masters of the destiny of a bicomunal independent Republic of Cyprus, because that would mean no protection at all for the Turks in Cyprus, and Cyprus would ultimately be united with Greece. . . . Thus, Turkish nationalism means, among other things, a perception of the Turkish community as one of the constituents of the Cypriot population, and a belief in the necessity for the community's representatives to be partners in the Government of Cyprus.

"(iii) A more specific doctrine of Turkish-Cypriot nationalism is that, since the 'functional federation' of 1960-1963 was a failure, any new settlement must provide for a geographically based federation. The Greek concept of a unitary State, under a Greek-dominated Government, was unacceptable. . . .

"(iv) From the beginnings of the Greek-Cypriot nationalist movement, the Greeks spoke of Cyprus as 'their island', and claimed that she belongs to the glorious Greek people and that the existence of the Turkish community is a regrettable aberration of history. The Turks could point to many statements made by Greek leaders, even during the 'partnership' years, which implied that the Turkish presence mars the purity of the Greek island. In response to such Greek attitudes, Turkish nationalism asserts the dignity of the Turkish community and the rights and values of the Turks of Cyprus. This sentiment has been expressed by Mr. Denktash in [the following words]: 'We are part of Cyprus. You can't throw us out. So accommodate us. Let's accommodate ourselves. We don't want much. But we don't want to be "not wanted". That is the difficulty. For years we have been told by words and by actions that we are not wanted in Cyprus, that Cyprus is not ours. And that makes any community very angry and makes any

community entitled, at least in their own conscience, to take all steps in order to prove that a land where they have lived for centuries is theirs and that they intend to keep it as such. Turkish-Cypriot separatism, then, can only be understood as a nationalist effort to resist the absorption of the Turkish community by a Greek State or a Greek-dominated Cypriot State'."

93. Those observations are all the more revealing as they come not from a representative of Turkey or the Turkish community, or even an ethnic Turk, but from a Greek Cypriot scholar.

94. The year 1967 marked another turning-point in the recent history of Cyprus. As an outcome of the events in that year, intercommunal negotiations were undertaken in 1968. These talks went on for six years, but failed to produce an agreement. As to why these intercommunal talks proved to be a failure between 1968 and 1974, I should like to refer again to Mr. Stavrinides:

"A fuller study of the Cyprus conflict may be able to show that the personality of Archbishop Makarios, which commanded Greek-Cypriot affairs for a quarter century, was as much of a power-source of the Greek nationalist movements as a representative. Had he left the presidency in 1973 and a more moderate leader such as Mr. Glafkos Clerides taken over, it is quite probable that the Greek and Turkish communities would have achieved reunification under a bicomunal Republican State."

95. In an interview with the newspaper *Agon*, Mr. Clerides himself had this to say on the subject:

"One of the reasons we have failed was that the Greek Government was not sincere. While publicly declaring that they desired an agreement through the intercommunal talks, they in fact had other aims and objectives . . . ."

96. Thus the same phenomenon which produced the collapse of the constitutional order in 1963, the collusion between the Greek Government and Archbishop Makarios, continued until 1974 effectively to prevent a settlement between the two communities.

97. I now come to what happened in July 1974, the date which Mr. Christophides considers the only relevant date in this debate. What happened in 1974 was not aggression or invasion by Turkey but aggression and invasion by Greece, and on this we ought to refer to no one else but Archbishop Makarios himself. This is what he said in the Security Council on 19 July 1974:

"The military régime of Greece has callously violated the independence of Cyprus. Without trace of respect for the . . . independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, the Greek junta has extended its dictatorship to Cyprus."<sup>5</sup>

In the same statement Archbishop Makarios pointed out:

"The coup did not come about under such circumstances as to be considered an internal matter of the Greek

<sup>5</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, Thirtieth Year, 1780th meeting.*

Cypriots. It is clearly an invasion from outside, in flagrant violation of the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus.”<sup>5</sup>

He further stated:

“... the events in Cyprus do not constitute an internal matter of the Greeks of Cyprus. The Turks of Cyprus are also affected. The coup of the Greek junta is an invasion, and from its consequences the whole people of Cyprus suffers, both Greeks and Turks.”<sup>5</sup>

98. In an interview with the newspaper *Agon*, Mr. Clerides has said:

“In my view the coup was carried out because the Greek military Government, known as the junta, believed that it could be possible after the coup to proclaim *enosis*.”

99. Those words eloquently underline the justification for the intervention Turkey was compelled to undertake. That intervention was in conformity with the obligation of Turkey under the Treaty of Guarantee,<sup>6</sup> of which Greece is also a signatory. The Turkish forces which are now in Cyprus are not forces of occupation. They have been sent there to stop the invasion of Greece, to remove the threat to the independence of Cyprus, to pave the way for a new constitutional order and to protect the Turkish community.

100. As I have already pointed out, in all the stages of the Cyprus drama after 1963 the Greek Government and Archbishop Makarios were following co-ordinated and complementary policies designed to achieve the common goal of the union of Cyprus with Greece. It might therefore at first sight seem paradoxical that the final assault against the independence of Cyprus by Greece in 1974 also had the goal of eliminating Makarios. Yet there is no contradiction. Behind the common goal of *enosis*, a dark and sinister struggle for power had also developed. This was a struggle about how and when *enosis* could be achieved and whose aspirations it would be tailored to serve. In 1974 the Greek junta thought it could outsmart Makarios. In the process it committed an enormous blunder and miscalculation which led in the end to its own demise, paving the way for the return of democracy in Greece, an outcome which was welcomed by all democratic countries, Turkey being among the first.

101. I do not think I should address myself in detail to the cascade of unfounded allegations made by the representative of the Greek Cypriot community. Most of the points he made call for a reply from the representative of the Turkish community. Much as Mr. Christophides would like to ignore it, the only political administration in north Cyprus is in fact the Federated Turkish State of Cyprus. But the Turkish community, in its moderation and genuine desire to keep all avenues open for a reconciliation and for the re-creation of an independent and sovereign Republic of Cyprus, has hitherto refrained from claiming external sovereignty. The Greek Cypriot community continues grossly to abuse this restraint by pouring out in every

international forum a plethora of vilification and by strenuously endeavouring to exclude the Turkish community from the proceedings. It is difficult to see what the Greek Cypriots stand to gain from the humiliation and frustration they try to impose on the Turkish community. Do they really believe that these tactics enhance the possibility of an early settlement? I am so puzzled by the twisted reasoning and incredible contradictions in the statement of Mr. Christophides that I can think of no possible progress in the efforts to promote a solution, unless the Greek Cypriots first clarify their own minds.

102. In his statement the representative of the Greek community has again expressed a deeply touching solicitude for the Turkish Cypriots. He had no qualms in stating that as a result of the Turkish intervention the Turks in Cyprus suffer as much as the Greeks. It is of course clear that such a claim is put forward in order to give some credibility to his pretence of representing Cyprus as a whole. Yet there should be a limit to cynicism. It is really an affront to human intelligence to assert that the Turkish Cypriots, who have lived through the agonizing experience of the monopolization of power by the Greek Cypriots, are masochistic enough to feel nostalgia for oppression and tyranny.

103. But there is no doubt that the Turkish Cypriots look forward to the day when the situation on the island will be normalized, when they no longer need the protection of the Turkish forces. As far as the Turkish Government is concerned, we also are looking forward to that day when we shall be relieved of that heavy responsibility.

104. On the one hand, Mr. Christophides complains about the establishment of a State structure, and, on the other, he pretends that the Turkish community is a pawn in the control of Ankara. It should be obvious to him by now that the Turkish community has achieved the setting up of a democratic society with all its processes and institutions. He has himself referred to some criticism in the Turkish Cypriot press against the Turkish Cypriot leadership and Turkey. He should know that in a free and democratic society criticism is a way of life and that it is impossible for puppets to govern such a society.

105. President Denktaş, who presides over the Turkish Cypriot leadership, was elected by a 76.61 per cent majority in free elections in which four candidates were contestants on 20 June 1976. The freely elected leadership of the Turkish Cypriot community carries out the policies which have been overwhelmingly supported by the Turkish Cypriot people in accordance with the mandate it has been given. The Turkish Cypriot leadership is only authorized by and responsible to its people, as is the case in democratic societies. The Greek Cypriot leadership would, therefore, be better advised to accept that its counterpart on the island is exclusively the Turkish community. In this connexion I should like emphatically to reaffirm on behalf of the Government of Turkey that any solution acceptable to the Turkish community is unquestionably and *ipso facto* acceptable to Turkey.

106. Certain questions which the representative of the Greek Cypriot community raised in connexion with missing or displaced persons, the situation of the Greek

<sup>6</sup> Signed at Nicosia on 16 August 1960. See United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 382, (No. 5475), p. 4.

Cypriots in the north, colonization, and so forth, fall within the competence of the Federated Turkish State of Cyprus, which is the sole authority in northern Cyprus. Therefore I cannot presume to address myself to these issues. Had the Turkish community been accorded equal, or at least fair, participation in this debate, I am sure those points would have been sufficiently elucidated.

107. Yet, I wish to make a brief comment on the so-called issue of colonization, since Turkey is accused of pursuing such a policy. There is no sinister design to colonize the island, for the simple reason that the Turkish Government does not entertain even the remotest notion of annexation or partition. The largest number of people who have come to Cyprus since August 1974 is made up of Turkish Cypriots who had emigrated to Turkey, the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries over the past years under political, administrative, social and economic pressures from the Greek Cypriot Administration and are now being given the opportunity to return to their homeland and lead a normal life, in conditions of security, in accordance with the constitution and the relevant citizenship laws of the Republic of Cyprus.

108. As for the skilled technicians and workers who in the past were imported from Turkey on a temporary basis to meet the immediate economic needs, most of them have returned, since the transitional function they had to perform is no longer necessary. I can state in no uncertain terms that such movement ceased several months ago.

109. The question of refugees, to which Mr. Christophides, as usual, has referred with great emphasis, is again one of those issues to which the representatives of the Turkish community can give the best reply. However, since this question is so extensively exploited for propaganda purposes, I thought I should try to set the record clear.

110. The Turkish community has suffered from the refugee problem for the past two decades. In 1963, as a result of the Greek Cypriot attacks and oppression, 26,000 Turkish Cypriots were uprooted, some of them for the second time because they had already been uprooted back in 1957. In 1974 more than one half of the Turkish Cypriot community, some 60,000 people, were uprooted from the south and had to flee to the north for safety.

111. We do not know the number of Greek Cypriots who chose to go to the south during the military operations in 1974. The Greek Cypriot Attorney General, in his book entitled *Legal Aspects of the Refugee Problem in Cyprus*, asserts that there cannot possibly be more than 120,000 refugees in Cyprus.

112. That the Greek Cypriot side is blowing up the refugee problem out of all proportion is becoming more and more evident. In an article which appeared in the Chicago daily *News* on 27 January 1976, Mr. Bruce Love wrote the following:

“Hardly a week goes by without a visit by representatives of Congress and various charitable organizations. They are dutifully shown the 14,000 ‘tent refugees’. They interview the same heart-breaking cases. Needless to say, they are not told that the refugees could be housed in

some of the solid houses vacated by British troops. The truth is that Makarios wants at least some refugees under tents. As it is, the authorities have a hard time keeping the 14,000 from ‘defecting’ to more comfortable shelter.”

113. It is common knowledge that the number of refugees living in temporary dwellings has dwindled considerably since then.

114. Furthermore, one misconception has to be corrected. The refugee question, so often invoked as a source of misery for the Greek Cypriots, is no longer an economic predicament for them. The exchange of population which has taken place has caused serious problems and economic hardships for both regions. But as far as the Greek Cypriot region is concerned the exchange of population has not hampered economic growth and well-being. What has happened is that new patterns of economic activity and trade have appeared. Steven Roberts, in his article in *The New York Times* just two days ago, on 8 November, reported:

“Across the so-called green line, the truce line monitored by the United Nations peace force, the ethnic Greeks boast about their economic recovery. Air-passenger traffic is running double that of last year and freight traffic has tripled. Unemployment has dropped from 35 per cent to 15 per cent, and foreign-currency reserves are as high as before the war. Merchants and traders find that the war has forced them to find new markets and new products.”

115. Moreover, the scope of the problem has undergone a fundamental change. An agreement has been reached in the intercommunal talks on a further voluntary—I repeat, voluntary—exchange of population. As a result of this agreement, all the Turkish Cypriots who were living in the south of the island under the jurisdiction of the Greek Cypriot Administration have moved to the north, to the area under the jurisdiction of the Turkish Cypriot Administration.

116. The settlement of the remaining aspects of the question—if there are any—is, therefore, intimately linked to the over-all settlement of the Cyprus issue.

117. Equally, it is not incumbent upon me to comment on what the representative of the Greek Cypriot community had to say in connexion with the intercommunal talks. The negotiating party is the Turkish community, and it is only the representatives of the Turkish community who could present the other side of the story. Turkey is not involved in this negotiating process.

118. Yet, there is ample evidence that what Mr. Christophides has said in this connexion is not even shared by some among the Greek Cypriot leadership. He contradicts no less a personality than Mr. Clerides, who had been the Greek Cypriot negotiator in the intercommunal talks for eight years until he resigned last spring. Mr. Clerides, who sits today in this Assembly with the Greek Cypriot delegation, stated on 14 July 1976 in the Greek Cypriot House of Representatives :

“Soon the people will understand that many opportunities for the settlement of the Cyprus problem were

missed as a result of the exploitation of nationalism, fear of shouldering responsibilities, petty political interests and demagoguery.”

119. It is Mr. Clerides again who states that the Greek Cypriot policy pursued in the intercommunal talks is wrong. It is Mr. Clerides who says that it has been a mistake to resort to international forums, casting aside the negotiating process. It is Mr. Clerides who has argued that the long-term struggle policy will be detrimental to the interest of the Greek Cypriots.

120. How can it be denied that the Greek Cypriot Administration has adopted a very intransigent attitude during the negotiations? As a matter of fact, the statements of the Greek Cypriots here and in the Special Political Committee, each wearing a different hat, have made clear that they would like the negotiating process to proceed according to a pre-charted course of their own choice. They want to determine the time when the Turkish community is to submit proposals and they want to be the sole judges of whether or not those proposals are substantial.

121. At each stage of the negotiating process the Greek Cypriot leadership would like to be able to interrupt it and proceed to denounce its negotiating partner as being unreasonable and uncompromising. Anyway, more than half of the year is consumed by activities not connected with, and even detrimental to, negotiations—by preparations for the General Assembly, by the session itself and by third-party efforts to dispel the loaded atmosphere of its aftermath.

122. The Turkish community has time and again indicated its willingness to negotiate seriously and confidentially on all aspects of the question of Cyprus with the Greek Cypriots. The Greek Cypriot leadership has hitherto failed to take advantage of this often-repeated proposal.

123. If one is to take literally the statement of the Greek Cypriot side, the inevitable conclusion to be drawn would be that it has decided to bring to an end the intercommunal talks, for it has emphasized that the question of Cyprus is not a question between the two communities. However, it would, perhaps, be wiser not to take seriously the rhetoric of the Greek Cypriot leadership designed to achieve propaganda purposes. But in engaging once again in such a sterile propaganda exercise, the representative of the Greek community has carried himself to the point where he compared the Turkish community with a dissident group or tribe. If this is the Greek community's conception of the Turkish community, it will certainly live with the consequences of its own aberration.

124. At the end of my statement I should like to reiterate that the Turkish Government is deeply committed to a peaceful and just solution of the Cyprus problem. Such a solution will only be beneficial to both the Turkish community and Turkey. It will, furthermore, remove a dangerous irritant in Turkish-Greek relations and enable the two countries to pursue policies that will serve their best interests. This is the challenge that confronts us. The Turkish Government is prepared to meet such a challenge. As my Foreign Minister stated in the general debate:

“Turkey in no way intends to maintain its forces in Cyprus. It has already reduced its troops on the island by

12,000. Turkey has no wish to impose a solution and has no interest in Cyprus beyond the independence of the island and the prosperity and security of the Turkish community. Turkey wants Cyprus to remain outside any strategic arrangements and does not want it to become a pawn in the power politics of the major Powers. And along these lines I would like once again to stress that the Turkish community has committed itself to a policy of non-alignment for Cyprus. For those reasons, any solution acceptable to the Turkish community is also and without reservations acceptable to Turkey. As soon as a solution is found, Turkey will without delay withdraw its military forces, which it was compelled to send to Cyprus in conformity with its contractual obligations.

“I would like to repeat that in its Cyprus policy Turkey will continue to be guided only by one concern: to encourage by all means a just and well-balanced solution which will contribute to peace and security and to harmonious co-operation in our region”. [8th meeting, paras. 218 and 219.]

125. At the very outset, this debate has taken a regrettable course. The fact that an adequate arrangement could not be agreed upon on the question of the wider participation of the Turkish community in the proceedings has been unfortunate. The Greek Cypriot representatives have escalated their aggressiveness. They convey the impression of being imprisoned in their own verbiage, and thus unable to approach the problem in a reasonable and constructive spirit. Moreover, one can see that they are split and that the hard-liners have at present gained the upper hand. As for the Turkish community, it is frustrated as its legitimate and justified demand for participation in the debate has been rejected. It is resentful of the condescending tone used by its Greek Cypriot counterparts. It is, therefore, incumbent upon the Assembly to channel this debate towards a conclusion that will at least not severely circumscribe the prospects for the resumption of negotiations in the near future. If the negotiating process is allowed to crumble, it will only be to the detriment of the two communities.

126. Mr. FLORIN (German Democratic Republic) (*interpretation from Russian*): As before, the crisis in Cyprus has not been solved, and again the General Assembly of the United Nations is forced to deal with the sequels of an intervention which was directed against a Member of this Organization, the Republic of Cyprus, even though there are decisions of the Security Council and of the General Assembly taken on the subject at earlier sessions that are entirely in keeping with the spirit and purposes of the United Nations Charter.

127. The crisis in Cyprus was assessed as a threat to international peace and security, and to this date it remains, in fact, such a threat. The United Nations resolutions demand that this crisis be immediately resolved peacefully through negotiations in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations and of its Charter. Several fundamental provisions have been formulated, and their implementation would have led to the elimination of this hotbed of conflict. Those provisions call for, above all, respect for the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus, the withdrawal of all foreign troops, an end to a military

presence on that island and an end to any interference in the domestic affairs of the Republic.

128. The settlement of the constitutional structure of the Republic of Cyprus, as was quite normal, was regarded as a task that concerned the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities; in other words, a task that had to be tackled by the whole Cypriot people. All participating parties were called upon to refrain from any unilateral actions in contravention of resolution 3212 (XXIX), including, in particular, changes in the demographic structure of the island Republic. All the refugees should return to their homes in safety. Provision was made for further negotiations between representatives of the two communities in Cyprus with the help of the good offices of the Secretary-General, with a view to reaching a mutually acceptable political settlement of the internal structure of the Republic. It can be pointed out that last year the Secretary-General again made every effort to carry out the very complex task that was entrusted to him, and he certainly deserves our thanks. The Government of the Republic of Cyprus for its part has done a great deal to comply with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly. It has tried to normalize life on the island and in particular to alleviate the plight of the refugees.

129. It cannot be denied that the implementation of the resolutions of the main organs of this Organization would have put an end long ago to the great suffering of the Cypriot people and would have led to a peaceful, just and durable political solution.

130. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic in his statement at the thirty-first session of the General Assembly [15th meeting] called for the implementation of the resolutions of the United Nations in regard to Cyprus so as finally to ensure the sovereignty of Cyprus and peace in that non-aligned State.

131. What is the present situation in Cyprus and around Cyprus, more than two years after the aggression perpetrated by certain circles of NATO, an aggression against the sovereignty, the territorial integrity and the non-aligned status of the Republic of Cyprus? The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus has provided very detailed information in this forum. The picture is not a happy one; in fact it justifies alarm.

132. As a result of the continued and recently increased foreign intervention by certain States in the domestic affairs of the island republic, the situation in Cyprus has not yet returned to normal. As before, it gives rise to concern and is fraught with the risk of explosion, because it represents a continual threat to peace, particularly in the eastern part of the Mediterranean. To this day thousands of refugees live in conditions of hardship in refugee camps and temporary shelters.

133. In addition, further steps are being taken to change the demographic structure of the country in that part of the island which is now under occupation by foreign troops.

134. Efforts have been made and continue to be made aiming at the partitioning of Cyprus and at eliminating in

fact the lawful unified State of Cyprus. We are witnessing such attempts even here in the United Nations. Attempts are being made to achieve international recognition for some kind of formation created by outside forces as a second State on that island; but the United Nations recognizes as a Member only the Republic of Cyprus, a single, sovereign island State. The internal structure of that State—for example, whether it should be a federation—is something to be decided by the people of Cyprus. Unfortunately, however, the talks between the representatives of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities have yielded almost no results at all and now they have come to a standstill, while the foreign troops are still the masters of a large part of the territory of that island. Thus a situation has arisen which certainly cannot be regarded as normal.

135. The responsibility for this abnormal condition must be borne by those circles which, by playing on nationalist prejudice, have been exacerbating the problems which have been in existence for many decades and which have divided Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and are artificially creating new problems. These are the NATO circles that do not find the non-aligned policy of the Republic of Cyprus to their liking and that have not given up their intention to turn that island, which is in fact a key strategic point, into an unsinkable aircraft-carrier of their own.

136. We want to express our deep concern over the character of the activities of those circles. They remind us that to this day there are certain forces at work which not only ignore the clear expression of the will of the United Nations and also the principles and agreements reached at Helsinki but, through their policies, attempt to destroy the atmosphere of détente by exacerbating tension and creating obstacles to the peaceful interrelationship of peoples.

137. The German Democratic Republic, which for a long time has had very friendly relations with the Republic of Cyprus, from the outset sharply condemned those responsible for the conflict in Cyprus as well as the policy of continuous interference by NATO, and on repeated occasions in this forum we have stated our position on the questions related to the settlement of that conflict.

138. The delegation of the German Democratic Republic, as before, believes that the only settlement that would be acceptable is one which would really ensure the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-aligned status of the Republic of Cyprus.

139. It is only through a political settlement of the problem of Cyprus that one can hope to resolve also the manifold humanitarian, economic and other problems which are still casting their shadow on the life of the people of Cyprus and the elimination of which, despite world solidarity, will require considerable efforts and many sacrifices.

140. By their decisions the General Assembly and the Security Council have created a realistic, or in other words, a constructive, basis for a reasonable settlement. That is why, in our view, what is now involved is mainly the problem of implementing both the letter and the spirit of the existing decisions of the United Nations.

141. The question of what the States Members of the United Nations can still do is answered by the well-known proposal of the Soviet Union to convene a representative international conference in regard to Cyprus under the aegis of the United Nations. This proposal is meeting with broader and broader support from the international community. The Minister of Foreign Affairs for Cyprus in his statement during the thirty-first session of the General Assembly gave the Soviet initiative his approval.

142. More and more States are becoming convinced that such a conference would contribute considerably to the settlement of the conflict in Cyprus and the creating of an effective international system of guarantees for Cyprus. The facts prove that, to ensure the independence and the integrity of its territory, Cyprus needs genuine, lasting guarantees, which, unfortunately, so far do not exist.

143. The German Democratic Republic, as before, is prepared to support to the best of its ability all the initiatives and measures which are likely to lead to a decision acceptable to the people of Cyprus.

144. The sufferings and hardships endured by the Cypriot people, both Greek and Turkish, should be not exacerbated but ended.

145. Mr. GAUCI (Malta): At the end of the debate on this item last year,<sup>7</sup> I said that, after listening carefully to all parties to the dispute and with my delegation's best attempt at understanding the matter, I could not see that the arguments put forward constituted a sufficient reason for delaying progress in negotiations and for not removing the obvious obstacles to peace. While I regret that this year procedural issues may inhibit a full and frank debate, and in fact appear to have been utilised for delaying and divisive tactics, my conviction remains unchanged. Nevertheless, the reports that one reads on the evolving situation in Cyprus are becoming increasingly perplexing and disheartening with the passage of time, taken against the background of the unanimously adopted General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), whose main provisions were given mandatory force by Security Council resolution 365 (1974).

146. I shall quote only two passages that I have retained from the most revealing articles, originating from independent sources.

147. In the weekly *Guardian* of 26 September 1976, under the headline "Cyprus—*de facto* partition and long-term hopes", Jean Gueyras writes:

"It is two years since Turkey landed troops in Cyprus, and the 'Attila Line' dividing the island into Greek and Turkish zones is more impermeable than ever. The only link between the two sectors is the long, tree-shaded Ledra Street with its picturesque Ledra Palace which has become the headquarters of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force. The deathly silence is disturbed only by birds . . . and the occasional car shuttling foreign correspondents and Nicosia-based diplomats, who alone are authorized to use this 'forgotten' thoroughfare. The only

time the street loses its joyless apathy is when United Nations convoys rumble through, transporting Greek-Cypriot refugees to the south."

148. In *The New York Times* of 8 November 1976, under the headline "Cypriots Build High White Walls to Enforce Their Estrangement"—which was quoted today—there is also the following:

"For all practical purposes the sovereign and independent State of Cyprus has ceased to exist. Cyprus is two nations now, one controlled by ethnic Greeks, the other by ethnic Turks.

"It is almost impossible even to make a telephone call between the sectors. A Greek and a Turk, old friends who both live in Nicosia, met for the first time in years recently—at a trade fair in [the Federal Republic of] Germany.

"More than two years after Turkish troops invaded and split the island, the two nations present some striking contrasts. On the Turkish side, which consists of 20 per cent of the population of 700,000 and 40 per cent of the territory, the economy is almost stagnant and the government is broke, but the people seem relieved and even hopeful."

149. The Secretary-General reported to the Security Council only recently that little progress had been made as regards the difference between the two sides in the Cyprus dispute.

150. That, then, is the present situation, a grim transformation of the life on the island and one more bitter episode in the course of its turbulent history.

151. And yet an influential, independent person who knows Cyprus well and who needs no introduction in this hall gives a much more encouraging picture of the situation as it should be. In his letter to the *Guardian* dated 23 May 1976 Lord Caradon writes:

"John Fielding of Thames Television has done us all an outstanding service by reporting on a shameful situation; his vivid report is the answer to those who would have us forget and turn away from the continuing tragedy. I hope that what he reported will make us all, including our Government—and perhaps even the United States Government too—turn to an endeavour to save the beautiful island from further misery and disgrace.

"In spite of all that has happened in recent decades, I am convinced that Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots could again live together in peace, if they were allowed to do so. Indeed, the disastrous mistakes of the past will, I believe, make them not less but more ready to live and work together again. Now they see more clearly their past faults and failures on both sides. The Greek Cypriots no longer wish to force *enosis*: the Turkish Cypriots are, I am credibly informed, dissatisfied with the barren military occupation of the north of the island. I believe that they both long for the end of the present ugly impasse."

I believe that to be the correct approach: an end to the present ugly impasse.

<sup>7</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirtieth Session, Plenary Meetings, 2407th meeting.*

152. The nature of the facts cannot be obscured. Stated briefly, a small, practically defenceless island was dealt a heavy blow in an overreaction by an outside Power through armed intervention, and is still suffering grave injury as a result. The results cannot be allowed to prevail, no matter what justification may be advanced for past actions.

153. This is now the third time that the General Assembly finds itself seized of the question of Cyprus arising from the regrettable incidents that took place in July 1974—ironically enough, while the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe was in process. But my delegation is not here to impute blame; on the contrary, particularly on this question which adversely affects the peace so essential, so fundamental, to our well-being, our clear duty is to point the way to solutions, especially since we consider that in the midst of apparent divergencies of opinion so much common ground exists as to make agreement, in our view, not only possible but in the best interests of all parties to the dispute and of the region. It is to the future, not to the past, that we must look.

154. In present circumstances there is probably no shorter way, in trying to find a remedy, than to remind ourselves of the basic essentials, particularly since all the elements are still relevant to the situation that is confronting us today. In my statement last year I pointed out that in order to effect a speedy and peaceful solution of the question of Cyprus three essential steps had to be taken. It was imperative, first, that all refugees be allowed to return to their homes; secondly, that there should be a withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of the Republic of Cyprus; and thirdly, that serious negotiations between the two communities, designed to protect the interests of all the Cypriot people and free from any foreign constraint or interference, should take place. There is nothing new here. These requirements were and still are self-evident; they are at the basis of resolution 3212 (XXIX), a resolution subscribed to by, and therefore binding on and not subject to unilateral interpretation by, the front-line States involved in the dispute. Indeed, listening to the most recent statements by the countries directly involved it is my impression that none contradicted the basic tenets contained in resolution 3212 (XXIX). The common ground for agreement therefore exists; as a basis for progress we must re-confirm that common ground and, most important of all, start putting it into practice. A generous first step may produce an immense dividend in the acceleration of progress.

155. My delegation does not wish to give the impression that it has overlooked the series of events that has taken place since 1974, which unfortunately only complicated the problem and which necessitated the new elements that went into resolution 3395 (XXX). But in comparing those resolutions, I find that the basic tenets, with which we all agree, are common to both; only the emphasis is different. With the hindsight and perspective afforded us by two years of unsuccessful contacts, we might perhaps be able to chart a better course for next year. It is here that the role of our Secretary-General assumes outstanding importance.

156. The resolutions of the General Assembly on this question place a heavy responsibility on the Secretary-General of encouraging a negotiated settlement through his

good offices. In his introduction to the report on the work of the Organization for this year, the Secretary-General, referring to both the Middle East and the Cyprus situations, stated:

“Both of these problems have implications far outside the immediate areas concerned and involve the delicate balance of relations between a number of other States as well as geopolitical factors of major importance. It is for that reason that they occupy such a prominent place on the agenda of the world Organization and that the effort to find peaceful solutions must be persisted in at all costs.” [A/31/1/Add.1, sect. III.]

157. In these words we see again three major elements that renew the necessity for our immediate action at this session. First, the Secretary-General once again stresses the ominous fact that the question of Cyprus is not simply a local, domestic issue. It is impeded by international complications which could escalate and get out of hand. Secondly, the comments of the Secretary-General denote the frustrations and danger of delay in progress. Thirdly, the Secretary-General is telling us that a solution needs to be found, and it is here that we need to search for the proper means of achieving results.

158. As I said before, we believe that the basics for agreement exist and, that being so, it is conceivable that our inability to achieve the desired results lies either in the time element or in the procedures that have been adopted so far. Certainly there is no denying that the general outlines of the solution have been clearly defined within this Organization and have been stressed also in meetings of the Council of Europe, as well as in those of the Commonwealth and most recently at the non-aligned ministerial meeting. Certainly there is no denying that the present situation contradicts the principles of the Charter and of the Helsinki Final Act, to which again all parties have subscribed. So it is not a question of principle, but one of modalities or time, probably a combination of both. In this context the Secretary-General himself, who has witnessed and was intimately involved in the negotiating process, has a continuing role to play which needs to be strengthened by a renewed mandate. There is also much scope for quiet diplomacy, for conciliation and for initiatives by friendly countries. The delay in implementation cannot be condoned, but an over-all solution requires time and a flexible approach to procedures. We take this attitude in the conviction that the parties concerned are bound by resolution 3212 (XXIX), to which they have subscribed, and that protection of fundamental human rights can be secured by workable constitutional processes mutually acceptable to both communities. The mandatory nature of Security Council resolution 365 (1974) also cannot be ignored.

159. The decision, therefore, that we take at this session must be one that confirms the basis for progress and stresses the need for achieving positive results. As matters now stand, the plight of refugees and a foreign presence in the territory of the Republic of Cyprus constitute serious obstacles to a solution. Enlightened self-interest translated into effective action is needed. The elements for such action, even if it is carried out in stages, are present. It would be regrettable if we were to fail to find the means to induce and encourage progress.

160. As a small country in the Mediterranean, my country feels very strongly on this problem and is prepared to help in any way it can to achieve a peaceful, long-lasting solution, acceptable to all sides and based on the resolutions I have mentioned. We want prosperity for Cyprus and its people, the friendliest of relations with and between all parties to the dispute, and peace in our area.

161. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The representative of Cyprus has asked to be allowed to speak in exercise of his right of reply. I should like to remind him that at its 4th meeting the General Assembly decided that statements made in exercise of the right of reply should be limited to 10 minutes. On that understanding I call on the representative of Cyprus.

162. Mr. CHRISTOPHIDES (Cyprus): I shall not this evening at this late hour take much of the time of the Assembly to reply in detail to the whole conglomeration of half-truths, distortions and misrepresentations with which Mr. Türkmen saw fit to attempt to cover up the brutal aggression which his country carried out and is still continuing, with grim results for my country. I reserve the right to do so in the course of a subsequent statement.

163. At this point, I shall limit myself to saying that Mr. Türkmen has, for want of better arguments, heavily relied on and quoted extensively from a pamphlet written by a certain Mr. Zenon Stavrinides, as if this were the ultimate truth concerning events in Cyprus. What Mr. Türkmen failed to say was that this Mr. Stavrinides is a disgruntled young boy in his early 20s with an axe to grind who has issued this pamphlet in a mood of personal frustration and animosity against the President of the Republic. This publication is the subject of legal action by the Attorney-General of Cyprus and has been withdrawn from circulation both in Cyprus and abroad.

164. It would be laughable, if it were not pathetic, that the representative of Turkey should have built much of his case before this august body around this yellow pamphlet, but it also shows his evident lack of a real case for a reply to the concrete and cogent picture of what is really happening today in Cyprus. These are, I suggest, tactics unworthy of the gravity of the issue which we are considering and unworthy of the dignity and decorum of the General Assembly.

165. Mr. Türkmen was at pains to capitalize on past statements regarding the issue of *enosis* and stated that the Greek Cypriot community considered from the very beginning of the establishment of the Republic that independence was only a transitional stage. On this very point I should like to quote from a secret document, dated September 1963—that is, three months before the inter-communal troubles in Cyprus—bearing the signatures of the Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus, Mr. Kuchuk, and of Mr. Denktaş, as President of the Turkish Communal Chamber:

“We accepted the Zurich and London Agreements as a temporary state, and it was for this reason that we signed them. If they were not a temporary state but a final solution, we would not have accepted them. We would have prolonged for a further period the disputes between

the two communities and we would have asked the United Nations for partition. The Turkish community interspersed throughout the island will be forcibly concentrated into an area which it will be obliged to defend. The site of this area will depend on the strategic plan prepared by the experts. Before the fighting breaks out, the Turkish community must have the necessary supplies, ample food stocks and detailed plans for the strengthening of its ties with the mother country.”

166. In any case, irrespective of what has been said on the subject of *enosis* in the past, in so far as the Greek Cypriot side is concerned, it has been made abundantly clear in its proposals, dated April 1976, on the solution of the Cyprus problem that *enosis* should be excluded:

“On the fundamental assumption that the territory of the Republic of Cyprus shall be one and indivisible and that the integral or partial union of Cyprus with any other State or any separatism, independence or partition are excluded . . .”.

That was the basis of our proposals for the solution of the Cyprus problem.

167. Although it is not for me to speak on behalf of Greece, I should like, for the sake of presenting the full picture, to quote what the Permanent Representative of Greece stated at the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly in the Special Political Committee on 29 October 1974: “For *enosis* to come about, Greece has to accept it, and Greece’s answer to this is no.”<sup>8</sup>

168. Thus the Turkish side may rest assured that *enosis* is not the aim of Greece or of the Greek Cypriots, and that the Turkish attempt to blow up the subject beyond all reasonable proportion on the basis of statements of the past is simply intended to cover up Turkey’s designs of partition in the present.

169. A lot was said by Mr. Türkmen, concerning the position of the President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, and an attempt was made to portray him as intransigent and as an obstacle to a solution of the Cyprus problem. If by this they mean that the Turkish *faits accomplis* and the arrogant demands which the Turks wish to impose by sheer force of arms are resisted by him, they may be right, for he—and, indeed, we—stand against unconditional surrender and capitulation to such demands.

170. But, beyond that, what has the Turkish side ever proposed for a solution to the Cyprus problem which the President of the Republic rejected? We have been waiting for over two years for proposals to be submitted which could form a reasonable basis for negotiations, and the Turkish side has, through dilatory tactics, been systematically avoiding spelling them out.

171. The Turkish representative in his statement before this Assembly declined to reply to my charges concerning the expulsions of the Greek Cypriots and the colonization

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, Twenty-ninth Session, Special Political Committee, 923rd meeting, para. 113.

process. Instead, Mr. Türkmen stated that the Turkish Cypriot side should be here to explain its views on those points.

172. My charges, which were based on facts, were directed against Turkey and not against the Turkish Cypriots. By his silence the Turkish representative cannot escape his country's grave responsibility with regard to the tragedy which Ankara brought upon the people of Cyprus—Greek and Turkish alike—for it is Ankara which has invaded Cyprus and it is its military forces which are in hostile occupation of a large part of the territory of the Republic. It is Ankara which is contemptuously ignoring the United Nations resolutions on Cyprus and flouting the most basic tenets of international law and the Charter. It is in pursuit of Ankara's geopolitical objectives and upon Ankara's directions that the intercommunal talks are stalemated as a result of the Turkish side's procrastination, dilatory tactics and impossible conditions. It is with Ankara's guidance and through its occupying forces that the inhuman expulsions of Greek Cypriots are being carried out; and it is Ankara which is organizing and effecting the colonization of the occupied north of Cyprus by tens of thousands of mainland Turks—and not Turkish Cypriots, as falsely claimed by Mr. Türkmen—who have been sent there to grab the houses and the lands of those expelled in an effort to change the demographic composition of Cyprus and to create so-called new realities.

173. Beyond that, Mr. Türkmen's deliberate silence purports to serve the well-known policy of Ankara falsely to present the Cyprus problem as a dispute between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The fact is that the Cyprus problem is not a difference between the two communities. It is a question of aggression and the occupation of the territory

of Cyprus by Turkey. It is a question of the illegal military presence of Ankara in an independent and sovereign State in violation of the United Nations resolutions on Cyprus and the fundamental principles of the Charter.

174. Mr. Türkmen chose light heartedly to shrug off the tragedy of the 200,000 displaced persons whom he described as "... Greek Cypriots who chose to go to the south during the military operations ... [of July] 1974" [*supra*, para.111]. That was indeed a very wide choice which they were given. Before the turrets of the invading Turkish tanks and the bayonets of the soldiers, the choice was that of fleeing for their lives or dying—as 10,000 of those who chose to remain behind bitterly found out as they died.

175. But since the forceful eviction of those people from their homes and properties is described by Mr. Türkmen as the result of the free choice of those people, since, according to him, they chose to go south, now today that they also choose to return north to their own homes and properties, are the soldiers of Mr. Türkmen's country allowing them that choice to return? If so, they could all return tomorrow, and the problem of refugees would indeed be solved.

176. Mr. Türkmen also said that the Turkish army is there to safeguard the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus as well as the security of the Turkish community. I propose that we invite the United Nations to undertake that task until a solution of the problem is found; I invite the Turkish representative to tell us now whether he accepts that arrangement.

*The meeting rose at 6 p.m.*