

SEP 19 1955

UNITED



NATIONS

**REPORT
OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
TO
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY**

Covering the period from 16 July 1954 to 15 July 1955

**GENERAL ASSEMBLY
OFFICIAL RECORDS : TENTH SESSION
SUPPLEMENT No. 2 (A/2935)**

NEW YORK, 1955

UNITED NATIONS

**REPORT
OF
THE SECURITY COUNCIL
TO
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY**

Covering the period from 16 July 1954 to 15 July 1955



**GENERAL ASSEMBLY
OFFICIAL RECORDS : TENTH SESSION
SUPPLEMENT No. 2 (A/2935)**

New York, 1955

NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | <i>Page</i> |
|---|-------------|
| INTRODUCTION | v |
| PART I | |
| Questions considered by the Security Council under its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security | |
| <i>Chapter</i> | |
| 1. THE PALESTINE QUESTION | 1 |
| 2. LETTER DATED 8 SEPTEMBER 1954 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL | 15 |
| 3. (a) LETTER DATED 28 JANUARY 1955 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF NEW ZEALAND TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF HOSTILITIES IN THE AREA OF CERTAIN ISLANDS OFF THE COAST OF THE MAINLAND OF CHINA. | |
| (b) LETTER DATED 30 JANUARY 1955 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF ACTS OF AGGRESSION BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AGAINST THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN THE AREA OF TAIWAN (FORMOSA) AND OTHER ISLANDS OF CHINA | 18 |
| PART II | |
| Other matters considered by the Council | |
| 4. ELECTION OF MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE | 24 |
| PART III | |
| The Military Staff Committee | |
| 5. WORK OF THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE | 26 |
| PART IV | |
| Matters brought to the attention of the Council but not discussed | |
| 6. COMMUNICATIONS FROM THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES | 27 |
| 7. COMMUNICATIONS RELATING TO THE KOREAN QUESTION | 27 |
| 8. COMMUNICATIONS RELATING TO THE FREE TERRITORY OF TRIESTE | 28 |
| 9. COMMUNICATION RELATING TO THE SITUATION IN ALGERIA | 28 |
| 10. REPORT OF THE COLLECTIVE MEASURES COMMITTEE | 28 |
| 11. REPORTS ON THE TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS | 28 |
| 12. REPORT OF THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION | 29 |
| 13. LETTERS BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL TRANSMITTING THE TEXTS OF CERTAIN RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY | 29 |
| Appendices | |
| I. Representatives and deputy, alternate and acting representatives accredited to the Security Council | 30 |
| II. Presidents of the Security Council | 30 |
| III. Meetings of the Security Council during the period from 16 July 1954 to 15 July 1955 | 31 |
| IV. Representatives, Chairmen and Principal Secretaries of the Military Staff Committee | 31 |

INTRODUCTION

The present¹ report is submitted to the General Assembly by the Security Council in accordance with Article 24, paragraph 3, and Article 15, paragraph 1, of the Charter.

Essentially a summary and guide reflecting the broad lines of the debates, the report is not intended as a substitute for the records of the Security Council, which constitute the only comprehensive and authoritative account of its deliberations.

With respect to the membership of the Security Council during the period covered, it will be recalled

¹This is the tenth annual report of the Security Council to the General Assembly. The previous reports were submitted under the symbols A/93, A/366, A/620, A/945, A/1361, A/1873, A/2167, A/2437 and A/2712.

that the General Assembly, at its 492nd plenary meeting on 6 October 1954, elected Belgium, Iran and Peru as non-permanent members of the Council for a term of two years, beginning 1 January 1955, to replace Colombia, Denmark and Lebanon, the retiring members. The newly-elected members of the Security Council also replaced the retiring members on the Disarmament Commission, which was established under the Security Council by the General Assembly in accordance with its resolution 502 (VI) of 11 January 1952, to carry forward the tasks originally assigned to the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments.

The period covered in the present report is from 16 July 1954 to 15 July 1955. The Council held twenty-two meetings during that period.

PART I

Questions considered by the Security Council under its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security

Chapter 1

THE PALESTINE QUESTION

A. Complaint by Israel against Egypt concerning restrictions imposed by Egypt on the passage through the Suez Canal of ships trading with Israel

1. INCLUSION OF THE ITEM IN THE AGENDA

1. In a letter dated 28 September 1954 (S/3296), the representative of Israel informed the President of the Council that, on that day, the *Bat Galim*, a vessel of 500 tons flying the Israel flag, had arrived at the southern entrance of the Suez Canal bound from Massawa to Haifa in Israel. The vessel was manned by a crew of ten Israelis and carried a mixed cargo consisting of meat, plywood and hides; no fire-arms of any description except the Captain's pistol were on the ship. On reaching the Suez Canal without incident at 5.30 a.m., the *Bat Galim* had identified itself to the authorities. A few hours later, an Egyptian patrol vessel had approached the ship, and wireless communication, which had been maintained until then with the company offices in Haifa, had come to an end. The seizure of the *Bat Galim* was but the latest expression of the Egyptian Government's scorn for the Security Council and its resolutions, especially that of 1 September 1951. Illegal interference by Egypt with commercial shipping bound to or from Israel had proceeded unchecked for over six years. The Government of Israel wished to express the strongest protest against such high-handed and aggressive conduct, and demanded that the ship, its crew and its cargo be released forthwith in order that they might proceed to Haifa without further delay.

2. In a letter dated 29 September 1954 (S/3297 and Corr.1), the permanent representative of Egypt to the United Nations informed the President of the Council that the *Bat Galim* had approached the harbour of Suez at 6 a.m. (GMT) on 28 September 1954. Without any provocation, it had opened fire, using small-arms, on Egyptian fishing boats within Egyptian territorial waters. The authorities had taken the preliminary measures of arresting the crew of the ship and of ordering an immediate inquiry to determine responsibility for the incident.

3. In another letter, dated 4 October 1954 (S/3300), the permanent representative of Israel requested the President to call an early meeting of the Council in order that it might give further consideration to his Government's earlier complaint against Egypt, contained in his letter of 28 January (S/3168), which read: "Complaint by Israel against Egypt concerning (a) Enforcement by Egypt of restrictions on the pas-

sage of ships trading with Israel through the Suez Canal".

4. In a further letter dated 7 October 1954 (S/3302), the permanent representative of Egypt informed the President that on 6 October, the Egyptian delegation to the Mixed Armistice Commission (MAC) had lodged a complaint against Israel in connexion with the action taken by the crew of the *Bat Galim* against two fishing boats in Egyptian territorial waters.

5. At the 682nd meeting (14 October 1954), the Council invited the representatives of Israel and Egypt to participate in the discussion. After statements had been made by the parties, the Council agreed, at the suggestion of the representative of Brazil, to defer consideration of the question pending the receipt of the report of the Egyptian-Israeli MAC.

6. At the 683rd meeting (3 November), the President stated that on 25 October a telegram (S/3309) relating to the *Bat Galim* incident had been received by the Secretary-General from the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization, wherein it had appeared that the Egyptian delegation's decision to consider illegal the emergency meeting of the MAC held on 21 October had prevented that Commission from discharging its duties and had thus given rise to a situation which the Chairman felt compelled to report to the Council. Following that communication, and as a result of the situation which had arisen, the representative of Israel had requested (S/3310) a meeting of the Council. Hence, the purpose of the meeting was, as he saw it, not to consider the substance of the question, but to examine the resulting situation.

7. The representative of Egypt reiterated the suggestion made in a letter dated 29 October addressed to the President (S/3311) to the effect that the MAC should meet daily, if necessary, in order to rule on the important questions before it, including that of the *Bat Galim*.

8. The debate continued at the 684th (3 November) and the 685th (11 November) meetings. At the close of the 685th meeting, the President, after summing up the views expressed by the majority of the members, summarized the position as follows. The Council considered that it was for the Chairman of the MAC to decide the order of importance of the questions before the Commission, and consequently to determine the order in which they should be examined. The Council believed that in making that evaluation the Chairman should bear in mind that the Council had been seized of the *Bat Galim* incident and had decided at its meet-

ing of 14 October to defer consideration of the matter pending receipt of the MAC's report. The Council consequently desired that the Chairman should give consideration of that incident priority over that of less important incidents, and that the Commission should consider the incident with great care and do everything possible to transmit its report to the Council without any unnecessary delay—possibly before the end of the month. The Council appealed to both parties to assist the Chairman of the MAC by conforming to the decision which he would give and to expedite consideration of their dispute by the Commission. The President of the Security Council promised to advise the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization of the foregoing and to see that the records of the last meeting were transmitted to the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission to inform him of the feelings of members of the Council.

2. THE REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF

9. In his report dated 25 November 1954 (S/3323), the Chief of Staff stated that the Egyptian representative had contended before the Egypt-Israel MAC that, on 27 September 1954, an armed Israel vessel, the *Bat Galim*, had entered the Gulf of Suez through Egyptian territorial waters and advanced through the Gulf on its way to Suez. According to its log-book, the ship had arrived at a point six miles from Newport lighthouse at 1 a.m. (local time) on 28 September 1954. Instead of proceeding in a northern direction, the vessel had turned back and anchored at 5.45 a.m. near Green Island, in the area of Port Suez. As proof and only as proof that the *Bat Galim* had been armed between 1 a.m. and 5.45 a.m., he had charged that at 3.30 a.m. the crew of that vessel had attacked two fishing boats with light automatic weapons, in an area 15 miles south of Newport lighthouse. As a result of that attack, two fishermen were missing.

10. In reply, the representative of Israel had stated that the Egyptian complaint had not been lodged until 6 October and no emergency meeting of the MAC had been requested. Also, in the meetings of the Commission held on 21 and 23 October, the representative of Egypt had discussed points of procedure and on 30 October he had addressed a letter to the Chairman stating that he was anxious to discuss the Egyptian complaint as early as possible. However, it had been Israel and not Egypt which had been ready to give precedence to the Egyptian complaint. After reviewing the details of the incident, the representative of Israel had concluded that the alleged incident had never occurred, arguing that even if such an incident had occurred there would be no evidence to connect it with the *Bat Galim*. The representative of Egypt had declared that the Shipping Agreement concluded between Egypt and Israel on 23 July 1953 prevented any ship of either party from entering the territorial waters of the other party, except by *force majeure*. The representative of Israel had contended, however, that the Agreement had not stated that a vessel of either party should not enter the territorial waters of the other. Subsequently, the Egyptian representative had submitted to the MAC a draft resolution by which it would (a) find that during the night of 27/28 September 1954 the Israel vessel *Bat Galim* had entered Egyptian territorial waters; (b) decide that that action was a violation of article II, paragraph 2 of the General Armistice Agreement; (c) decide further that

that action was also a violation of the Shipping Agreement signed by both parties and witnessed by the Chairman of the MAC which was considered as complementary to the Armistice Agreement; and (d) call upon the Israel authorities to prevent such actions in the future.

11. The representative of Israel had noted that the Egyptian draft resolution made no reference to the facts alleged in the complaint, but dealt instead with general questions which did not belong to an examination of such allegations. He had argued that the *Bat Galim* was passing through an international waterway. That fact alone should determine the legality of the *Bat Galim's* entry into the Gulf of Suez, and it was clear that the MAC was not the body to deal with the matter. The Security Council's resolution of 1 September 1951 made it clear that the *Bat Galim's* passage was legal on the basis of the General Armistice Agreement.

12. The Egyptian draft resolution had not been adopted when put to the vote in the MAC; the representative of Israel had voted against it and the Chairman had abstained. The representative of Israel had then submitted a draft resolution which would have had the MAC find that the Egyptian complaint regarding the *Bat Galim* was unfounded, and that no provision of the Armistice Agreement had been violated by Israel. The Israel draft resolution had been adopted, the representative of Israel and the Chairman voting in favour. After the MAC had concluded its consideration of the case, the Egyptian representative had appealed against the Commission's decision to the Special Committee. After discussion, the Special Committee had upheld the MAC's decision with some minor drafting changes.

13. In a letter dated 30 November 1954 (S/3325), the representative of Israel requested the President, in view of the fact that the Chief of Staff's report, with its clear and definite conclusions, had been received, to call a meeting of the Council at an early date.

14. On 4 December, in a letter addressed to the President (S/3326), the representative of Egypt informed him that the Egyptian judicial authorities had set aside, owing to insufficient evidence, the charges of murder, attempted murder and unlawful carrying of weapons, brought against the members of the crew of the *Bat Galim*. The letter further stated that the seamen would be released as soon as the necessary formalities had been concluded and that the Egyptian Government was prepared to release the seized cargo immediately.

3. VIEWS OF THE PARTIES AND THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL

15. At the 686th meeting (7 December), the representative of Israel reviewed his Government's case as explained to the MAC. He said that it was evident from the report of the Chief of Staff that the accusations against the *Bat Galim* and its crew had been so insubstantial that no court of law would have given even *prima facie* consideration to the case. He was sure that the Council would understand why the solution implied in the letter of the Egyptian representative of 4 December (S/3326) was unacceptable to his Government. His Government could not in any way co-operate with a solution which left the journey of the *Bat Galim* from Massawa to Haifa effectively interrupted and blocked. Finally, he listed an accumulation of facts which in his view gave the *Bat Galim* an undisputed right to pur-

sue its northward journey; in September 1951, the Council had: (a) called upon Egypt to terminate its restrictions on the passage of international commercial shipping and goods through the Suez Canal, wherever bound; (b) requested Egypt to cease the practice of interfering with the passage through the Canal of goods destined for Israel; (c) determined that Egypt could not reasonably assert that it was actively a belligerent or found it necessary to exercise the right of visit, search and seizure for any legitimate purpose of self-defence; and (d) determined that interference with shipping destined for Israel through the Canal was inconsistent with the objectives of the Armistice Agreement, an abuse of the exercise of the right of visit, search and seizure, could not be justified on the ground that it was necessary for self-defence, and represented unjustified interference with the right of nations to navigate the seas and to trade freely with one another. In addition, he declared, it appeared from the decision of the MAC that, leaving aside the question whether an armistice violation would occur if an Israel ship entered Egyptian territorial waters, the armistice was not violated when an Israel ship approached or entered the Suez Canal. Furthermore, the MAC had found, and the Special Committee had confirmed, that the *Bat Galim* had committed no violation of the Armistice Agreement on 28 September. Finally, the Chairman of the MAC, who was the agent of the United Nations in the region, had called for the release of the *Bat Galim* and its crew. In conclusion, he reiterated his Government's earnest hope that the Council would uphold the judgment of the MAC, endorse the request of its Chairman, reaffirm the obligation of the parties to abide by the judgments of the MAC and of the Council, call upon Egypt to release the *Bat Galim*, its crew and cargo so that they might complete their journey through the Suez Canal to Haifa, reaffirm its desire to see the 1951 resolution implemented, and again call on Egypt in stronger terms to cease all interference with international commercial shipping passing through the Canal, wherever bound.

16. At the same meeting, the representative of Egypt also reviewed his Government's case before the MAC. He reiterated to the Council the intention of his Government to release the *Bat Galim* and its crew, as announced in his letter of 4 December. He denied that his Government's representative on the MAC had obstructed the proceedings of that Commission as alleged by the Israel representative. He recalled the case of the Egyptian vessel, the *Samir*, which had been detained by Israel authorities in 1953 on the ground that it had penetrated into Israel waters, and whose crew had been released only after they had served a three-month imprisonment term imposed on them by the Israel courts. In the circumstances, he could not understand the Israel representative's indignation when Egypt had seized an Israel vessel in its own territorial waters, for Suez and Port Said were still Egyptian ports. As regards the relations between Israel and Egypt, he reiterated his Government's contention that a state of belligerency existed between Egypt and Israel. The Armistice Agreement, which had not put an end to the conflict and contained no provision concerning the right of visit and inspection, could not prevent Egypt from exercising that right. Also, the exercise of that right was not incompatible with the terms of the Constantinople Convention of 1888. The Council's resolution of September 1951 had concerned the passage through the Canal of neutral merchant vessels for the

purpose of trading with Israel, and had not dealt with the passage of Israel vessels. Moreover, his Government could not allow Israel vessels to pass through the Canal, because Egypt had no assurances that such vessels might not be tempted to scuttle themselves, thereby obstructing the Canal for a considerable period and causing material losses and grave damage to the interests of maritime powers in general; that they might not be tempted to lay mines in Egyptian territorial waters, either before reaching the Canal or in the Canal itself; or that Israel nationals on such vessels would not try to land in Egypt in order to damage the Canal or to commit acts of sabotage in Egyptian territory. Those fears were justified by the atmosphere of Arab-Israel relations. Indeed, Israel's conduct towards the Arab States after the signing of the Armistice Agreement had created an atmosphere which had compelled Egypt to adopt that attitude for reasons of self-defence and in order to safeguard the security of the Arab States, of Egypt, and, hence, of the Suez Canal. In conclusion, he said that Israel, which alleged that Egypt was not implementing the resolution of 1 September 1951, persisted in violating many of the resolutions which the United Nations had adopted on the Palestine question.

17. In a letter dated 20 December (S/3333), the permanent representative of Israel, pointing out that the *Bat Galim*, together with its crew and cargo, had not been released from unlawful detention by Egypt, again requested the President to call a meeting in order that the matter might be considered further.

18. At the 687th meeting (4 January 1955), the representative of Egypt informed the Council that the crew of the *Bat Galim* had been released on 1 January 1955. He reiterated his Government's intention to free the ship and its cargo and suggested that the cargo might be placed aboard a neutral vessel bound for Haifa, and that a sub-committee of the MAC should discuss the arrangements for the ship's release.

19. The representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland said that his Government attached the highest degree of importance to the principle of freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal, as set forth in the Convention of Constantinople. He recalled that the Egyptian Government had repeatedly declared its intention of abiding in the strictest way by that Convention and had maintained that the restrictions which it had imposed on traffic through the Canal with Israel did not conflict with its terms. Unhappily, however, his Government had not felt able to accept the interpretation which Egypt placed on the relevant sections of the Convention in that particular context. Moreover, despite some recent and welcome assurances from the Egyptian representative about restrictions on traffic through the Canal, Egypt had not yet seen its way to complying fully with the Council's resolution of 1951. This fact was regrettable and even dangerous, since the co-operation of the parties with the Council, even on questions where its decisions were unwelcome to one or other of them, was essential to the maintenance of the existing provisional structure of relations based on the armistice agreements.

20. As for the *Bat Galim* incident, the dispatch of that vessel from the Red Sea to the Canal, flying the Israel flag and bound for Israel, might have been intended as a test case. Whether or not it had been expedient to make that test had been a matter for Israel to decide. The Council was only concerned with the results, and his delegation felt that the results had been

unfortunate all around. The only encouraging element in the situation was that the very grave charges brought against the members of the crew had been frankly withdrawn when they could not be substantiated. That action reflected credit on the course of justice in Egypt and on the good faith of the Egyptian Government. He would have hoped that Egypt could thereafter have permitted the ship to proceed on its course through the Canal, under such security restrictions as seemed appropriate in the circumstances. Though it would, of course, have left all the questions of principle untouched, that would at least have settled the adventures of that particular ship in a more or less satisfactory manner. His delegation regretted very much that that course had not been followed. The representative of Egypt had said that his Government would not object to the establishment of a sub-committee of the MAC to consider the question of the ship. His delegation was not clear as to the scope of that suggestion, but it was at least an interesting one and his delegation hoped that something useful could be made of it.

21. The representative of France said that although the crew of the *Bat Galim* had been released and the Egyptian Government had offered to return the cargo and the vessel itself to consignors agreed upon by Israel, such a return seemed to be subject to the condition that the vessel itself should not sail through the Canal. The Egyptian Government therefore still believed that it was entitled to forbid passage through the Suez Canal to any vessel flying the Israel flag and with an Israel crew.

22. The Egyptian representative had based his Government's position on article X of the Constantinople Convention. The French delegation considered that article XI of the same Convention seemed to settle the question in a sense opposed to the Egyptian argument, since that article prescribed that the measures which could be taken in the case provided for by Articles IX and X should not interfere with the free use of the Canal. Thus, it could be concluded that even the warships of a power that was an enemy of Egypt must not be interfered with; therefore, *a priori*, use of the Canal could not be forbidden to an ordinary merchant vessel like the *Bat Galim*. The Council was not competent to impose observance of the Constantinople Convention as such. However, the Council had the paramount right of supervising the application of the armistice agreements negotiated under its auspices between Israel and the neighbouring Arab States. His delegation considered that the exercise by one of the parties, on the high seas, of the right of visit, search and seizure of vessels of the other party would constitute a serious breach of the armistice agreements. In fact that right belonged to a belligerent, and was denied to the parties by the very fact that they had signed the armistice agreements. It would no doubt be said that the Suez Canal could not be considered the high seas; but it had one attribute of the high seas, in that it might be freely used by all. That attribute was the consequence of an international treaty freely signed by Egypt. They thus returned to the 1888 Convention. Therefore, the representative of France considered that the Council was competent to supervise the application of the treaty, in the case, in view of the special situation that had been created between Egypt and Israel under the Armistice Agreement.

23. In its resolution of 1 September 1951 the Council had asked Egypt to terminate restrictions on

the passage of international commercial shipping. His delegation wished to ask Egypt to abide by that resolution. Considerable progress had been made since 1951 in the sense that restrictions on shipping passing through the Canal had been relaxed. Moreover, it appeared from the Egyptian representative's statement that Egypt did not intend to prevent the passage through the Canal of Israel-bound cargoes, provided that they did not constitute contraband of war and that they were carried in neutral bottoms. The French delegation was glad to note that important step towards restoration of a normal situation in that part of the world. However, the Egyptian Government's action in that regard could not be fully commended so long as it stopped half way. His delegation did not believe that Egypt stood to gain any security from the stand it was now taking towards Israel ships alone. The assurances given the Council by the representative of Egypt as to the impartiality of Egyptian justice had been happily borne out when the judicial authorities had decided to release the detained crew, for lack of evidence against it, and the French delegation gladly associated itself with the tribute paid to those authorities by the Lebanese representative. It was certainly the Council's wish that on the international plane Egypt should be guided by the same principles of law and equity and that it would as dispassionately apply the conventions which it had signed, as well as the Security Council's decisions by which all States Members of the United Nations were bound to abide. The hopeful turn events had taken justified the French delegation in expressing its confidence in the wisdom of the Egyptian leaders.

24. The representative of the United States of America said that one had a right to expect that the past seven years would have shown greater progress towards the establishment of the general peace endorsed by the Governments of Egypt and Israel in signing the Armistice Agreement. In the face of the danger of new hostilities, however, a series of resolutions had been adopted which had come to make up United Nations jurisprudence on the Palestine question. Each of those resolutions, together with the armistice agreements, had become an essential link in the slow process of building enduring peaceful relations between the countries of the Near East, and none of them could be disregarded without imperilling the validity and the enforcement of the others. His delegation believed that Egyptian restrictions on ships passing through the Canal, whether bound to or from Israel, or whether flying the Israel or some other flag, were inconsistent with the spirit and intent of the Egyptian-Israel Armistice Agreement, contrary to the Council's resolution of 1 September 1951, and a retrogression from the objectives to which both sides had committed themselves in signing the Armistice Agreement. His delegation could not fail to state, therefore, that it looked to Egypt to give effect to those resolutions and agreements. Account should also be taken of the fact that Egypt had responded in recent months to the views of members of the Council in a positive and constructive manner in a number of important respects. The representative of Egypt had stated in October 1954 that since March of that year, Egypt had refrained from any interference with vessels conveying goods to Israel or coming from Israel ports and passing through the Canal. Egypt had thereby shown a spirit of conciliation that must be commended and encouraged. Further action to give full effect to the decision of 1 September 1951, to allow the passage of

the *Bat Galim* to Israel and to cease interference with Israel shipping, as well as with neutral shipping carrying goods to and from Israel, would confirm respect for Egypt as the legitimate custodian of the Suez Canal, recently reasserted in Egypt's historic agreement with the United Kingdom. Anything less than that would not be consistent with the spirit and the intent of the 1951 resolution. Therefore, his delegation hoped that both Israel and Egypt would take further steps to reduce tensions and to settle their differences in accordance with the spirit and the intent of the decisions of the United Nations, thereby establishing the conditions for a peace that could only be beneficial to both.

25. The representative of Brazil said that his delegation welcomed the release of the *Bat Galim* crew but regretted that the Egyptian Government had not allowed the ship itself to sail to its destination through the Canal with its crew and cargo. It was undeniable that, in the midst of a whole series of incidents which made it more difficult to carry out the terms of the armistice agreements, the Egyptian Government had committed a questionable act, as indeed it had so nobly admitted in public. The Egyptian Government's decision to set aside the charges against the *Bat Galim* crew did not completely make amends for the error committed or for the deprivation of liberty suffered by the members of the crew; nor could it compensate the material damage caused by the seizure of the vessel and its cargo. Thus, the incident was another stumbling-block on the already too rocky road which must be travelled in order to achieve the establishment of a lasting peace between the parties to the armistice agreements. Moreover, the critical nature of the situation had become apparent once more in the breach of the Armistice Agreement, in a gesture incompatible with the Council's resolution of 1 September 1951 and in the breach of the stipulations of the Constantinople Convention. He recalled that in its 1951 resolution, the Council had prohibited the parties from invoking the status of belligerent, the only condition which, in the Brazilian delegation's opinion, might possibly justify the right of visit, search and seizure. His delegation could not acquiesce in a breach of the Constantinople Convention any more than it could pass over in silence the fact that the Security Council's resolution was being ignored. The Egyptian Government had recently displayed moderation and a spirit of conciliation. That attitude encouraged the hope that Egypt would thoroughly weigh the importance to the free nations of the world of a far-reaching gesture, which would not only complement the steps already taken, but would also be consistent with the principle of free navigation in the Canal.

26. At the 688th meeting (13 January), the representative of Belgium said that the Suez Canal was an integral part of Egypt. It was an artificial waterway, and therefore not unreservedly governed by the rules of ordinary international law concerning natural straits. Accordingly, its status had been determined by the Constantinople Convention. He recalled that in a judgment rendered by the International Court, it had been stated that, under the régime of that Convention, belligerent men-of-war and ships carrying contraband had been permitted to pass freely through the Canal. The Court had added, however, that the right of defence was reserved to the riparian State up to a certain point, without explaining what it meant by that expression. Articles IX and X of the Convention provided that Egypt had certain rights to take necessary measures for its defence and the maintenance of public order.

Article XI, however, expressly provided that those measures should not interfere with the free use of the Canal.

27. Having regard to those clear provisions, the Belgian delegation considered that the aim of the Constantinople Convention had been to ensure in all circumstances the free passage of ships of war or of commerce of any nationality through the Canal both in war and in peace. As had been pointed out, the Council was clearly not competent to enforce observance of the 1888 Convention, as such. It might, however, do so through the Charter, in so far as the question involved the application of the Charter and the maintenance of international peace and security. The 1951 resolution had been the outcome of a proper use of the Council's powers and was not *ultra vires*. Moreover, even if that resolution itself was not binding, its contents were, since it reiterated provisions which had been binding since 1888. The Egyptian Government's decision to release the *Bat Galim* crew for lack of evidence had been a significant gesture, a demonstration of good faith and of a desire to avoid arbitrary action and to act in accordance with law. Also, Egypt had officially announced its willingness to release the cargo and the ship, proposing that a sub-committee of the MAC be set up to deal with the matter. His delegation could not but assume that that suggestion was inspired by a desire to facilitate a settlement in conformity with the 1888 Convention.

28. The representative of Peru said that the principles contained in the Constantinople Convention formed a true international statute governing the free status and, by implication, the neutrality of the Canal. The validity of the United Nations Charter established a universal legal situation which excluded the old concept of belligerency. In so far as its organs remained able to act, the legal organization of the United Nations implied that the status of belligerency and neutrality were discarded, and with them the use of force by States or groups of States, except in the case of self-defence as prescribed by Article 51 of the Charter. Whereas the concept of belligerency, the use of force, and individual or collective self-defence were not applicable in general while the United Nations was fully in operation, they were even less applicable, save provisionally and exceptionally, in cases when a conflict had resulted in United Nations intervention and when hostilities had been terminated as a result of a general armistice concluded under United Nations auspices. It was true that some jurists had held the view that a partial or even a general armistice was not incompatible with the exercise of the right to visit and search and that that was not an act of war; other jurists took the opposite view, arguing that the establishment of an armistice presupposed the intention to make peace and constituted a necessary step towards peace. In any case, an armistice concluded under United Nations arrangements established a situation at law which entailed the application of the provisions of the Charter. The concept of belligerency was clearly inapplicable to such an armistice, and indeed the Security Council had taken that view in its resolution of 1951, the substance and effects of which the Peruvian delegation accepted. In view of the foregoing, within the general context of the armistice and in application of the 1951 resolution, his delegation believed it in order for Egypt to take certain steps to protect the security of the Canal in accordance with article X of the Convention and Article 51 of the Charter. It wished to record its satis-

faction at the Egyptian Government's undertaking, in the Cairo Agreement of 1954, to guarantee the free use of the Canal. It was also pleased with the Egyptian Government's decision to release the crew of the *Bat Galim* and to return the ship's cargo to its owners, thereby helping to diminish the existing tension. His delegation trusted that the two countries would avoid any incident or action that might prevent the restoration of a sound and durable peace in the Middle East and that they would co-operate in any measure designed to restore a normal situation. Finally, his delegation suggested that the Chief of Staff should offer his services to the parties in arranging for the delivery of the cargo, the release of the vessel, and any other measures on which the parties might agree.

29. The representative of Iran said that he wished to confine himself to noting with satisfaction the results achieved. The Council had learned that the crew of the *Bat Galim* had been freed and had been restored to their homes in Israel. As to the ship itself, his delegation understood that the Egyptian Government was prepared to discuss with a sub-committee of the MAC the procedure for freeing the ship and its cargo. His delegation believed the Commission was the organ best qualified to settle that case because it would act for the Council and because the parties would be represented on it. For that reason, he considered the Peruvian suggestion both wise and practical and wished to support it.

30. The President, speaking as the representative of New Zealand, said that his delegation noted that the crew of the *Bat Galim* had been released on 1 January 1955, and that the Egyptian Government was prepared to release both the ship and its cargo. His delegation considered that the ship should be released as soon as possible and, equally, that agreement should be reached without delay on the manner of release, in order that the incident might be terminated. He hoped that both parties would approach the question in a spirit of mutual accommodation. As to the question of principle underlying the specific complaints, he said that his Government attached the utmost importance to the maintenance of freedom of navigation in recognized international waterways, specifically in the Suez Canal. His delegation, like others, regarded the Council's resolution of September 1951 as in full force and effect. In that connexion, he recalled that the representative of Egypt had declared, on 14 October 1954, that his Government had refrained from any interference with vessels passing through the Canal which were conveying goods to Israel or coming from Israel ports. The representative of Egypt had added on 7 December 1954 that in practice his Government had never tried to prohibit the passage of ships through the Canal. The New Zealand delegation would have been glad to interpret those statements as reflecting an Egyptian policy of unqualified compliance with the Council's resolution of September 1951, but, it could not overlook the clear implication of the Egyptian representative's statement of 7 December that Egypt did not regard the 1951 resolution as applying to the passage of Israel ships through the Canal. The reason adduced by the representative of Egypt in denying access to Israel ships on the ground of defence of the Canal had, in his delegation's opinion, weakened the Egyptian argument, since for Israel to set out deliberately to damage the Canal would be an act so patently against its own interest as to put such a possibility beyond serious consideration. There was no justification for an Egyptian policy of exclusion of Israel ships desiring

to pass through the Canal, a policy entirely inconsistent with the intent of the 1951 resolution. His delegation trusted that, in the future, all cargoes and all ships, whatever their nationality and wherever they might be bound, would be permitted to pass through the Canal without let or hindrance. It also trusted that a settlement of the *Bat Galim* incident would be reached without delay. The avoidance of violent or provocative action was the equal responsibility of each side. Only by the constant exercise of that responsibility could the objective of the Armistice Agreement, the promotion of a return to permanent peace in Palestine, be brought measurably nearer accomplishment.

31. Speaking as President, he observed that, as the debate on the item appeared to be exhausted and there was no draft resolution before the Council, it might be useful for him to sum up the general trend of the discussion. It was evident that most representatives regarded the 1951 resolution as having continuing validity and effect, and it was in that context, and that of the 1888 Convention, that they had considered the *Bat Galim* case. In so far as Egypt had taken steps towards a settlement, those steps had been welcomed. Hope had been expressed that a continued attitude of conciliation on both sides would speedily bring about an agreement on the arrangements for the release of the ship and the cargo. It had been suggested by the representative of Peru that, if the parties so desired, the Chief of Staff might be prepared to extend his good offices to expedite the conclusion of such arrangements. The President had no doubt that, if requested by the parties, the Chief of Staff would be prepared to do so. On that note of hope and expectation, he proposed to adjourn the meeting.

32. The Council has not devoted any further meetings to discussion of this question.

B. Egyptian and Israel complaints concerning incidents in the Gaza area (S/3367 and S/3368)

1. INCLUSION OF THE ITEMS IN THE AGENDA

33. In a letter dated 1 March 1955 (S/3365), the permanent representative of Egypt informed the President of the Council that on 28 February an Israel armed force had crossed the armistice demarcation line east of Gaza and had attacked an Egyptian military camp. As a result of that attack and of the ambushing of Egyptian reinforcements, thirty-seven members of the Egyptian armed forces and two civilians had been killed and another thirty members of the armed forces and two civilians had been injured. Expressing his Government's grave concern over that obviously premeditated armed attack, the representative of Egypt termed it a brutal act of aggression which constituted a flagrant violation of the Armistice Agreement and surpassed by far all previous aggressions by Israel since the conclusion of the Armistice Agreement. It seriously threatened the peace and security of the area.

34. In another letter dated 2 March 1955 (S/3367), the permanent representative of Egypt requested the President to call a meeting of the Security Council as a matter of urgency to consider the following complaint: "Violent and premeditated aggression committed on 28 February 1955 by Israel armed forces against Egyptian armed forces inside Egyptian-controlled territory near Gaza, causing many casualties, including thirty-nine dead and thirty-two wounded and the de-

struction of certain military installations, in violation of, *inter alia*, article I, paragraph 2 and article II, paragraph 2 of the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement."

35. In a letter dated 3 March 1955 (S/3368), the permanent representative of Israel requested the President to place on the Council's agenda his Government's complaint of continuous violations by Egypt of the Armistice Agreement and of resolutions of the Security Council, to the danger of international peace and security, by means of: (a) attacks by regular and irregular Egyptian armed forces against Israel armed forces; (b) assaults of raiders from Egyptian-controlled territory on lives and property in Israel; (c) failure of the Government of Egypt to adopt and enforce effective measures against such acts of violence; (d) assertion by Egypt of the existence of a state of war and the exercise of active belligerency against Israel, particularly the maintenance and enforcement of blockade measures; (e) warlike propaganda and threats against the territorial integrity and political independence of Israel; and (f) refusal of Egypt to seek agreement by negotiations for an effective transition from the present armistice to peace.

36. At its 692nd meeting (4 March 1955), the Security Council included the two items in the agenda and decided to consider first the item submitted by Egypt. The representatives of Egypt and Israel were invited to take part in the discussion.

37. The representatives of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Iran, Belgium, New Zealand, Brazil, Peru, China and the President, speaking as representative of Turkey, joined in deploring the recent grave incident, in which, according to preliminary reports, Israel armed forces had attacked Egyptian forces in Egypt-controlled territory. The incident was all the more regrettable since the area had been relatively calm. They commended the Egyptian Government's restraint, expressed sympathy with the Egyptian people and Government for their losses and appealed to both parties to refrain from the use of force or retaliation. They also supported the view that the Council should defer discussion of the question pending the receipt of the report of the MAC. On behalf of the Council, the President requested the Secretary-General to inform the Chief of Staff that the Council would appreciate an oral report from him on the question, should his duties allow him to absent himself from the area at the present tense period.

38. At the outset of the 693rd meeting (17 March) the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics made a statement wherein he expressed his sympathy to the Government and the people of Egypt in connexion with the incident in the Gaza area and the casualties suffered. The circumstances of the Gaza incident, he said, showed that the responsibility for it lay with Israel. Such acts by Israel were a serious breach of the Charter, and aggravated the tension in the area. At the same time, he emphasized that the facts showed that the tension in the area resulted from the policy pursued by certain States in the Near and Middle East, a policy not of strengthening peace and cementing friendly relations among the States in that area, but of forging military blocs, which was bound to create a threat to the national independence and security of the countries in that region.

39. At the same meeting, the Chief of Staff presented his report (S/3373) to the Council, stating that,

on 6 March 1955, the Egyptian-Israel MAC had found Israel responsible for the attack on Gaza and had decided that that attack had been a violation of article I, paragraphs 2 and 3, article II, paragraph 2 and article V, paragraph 3 of the Armistice Agreement. In reviewing the general situation along the armistice demarcation line, the Chief of Staff said that the number of casualties prior to the Gaza incident had reflected the comparative tranquillity along the line during the greater part of the period from November 1954 to February 1955. He was of the opinion that, although infiltration from Egyptian-controlled territory had not been the only cause of the current tension, it had undoubtedly been one of its main causes. He recalled that, in an earlier report to the Council (S/3319), he had suggested that, in order to decrease tension along the demarcation line, the two parties should examine in an informal meeting the possibility of agreeing on certain measures. Those measures were: (a) joint patrols along sensitive sections of the demarcation line; (b) negotiation of a local Commander's agreement; (c) erection of a barbed wire obstacle along certain portions of the demarcation line; and (d) manning of all outposts and patrols by regular Egyptian and Israel troops. In conclusion, the Chief of Staff said that he was still of the opinion that if such an agreement were to be made, and if the parties would make an honest attempt to implement it, infiltration could be reduced to an occasional nuisance, a kind of thieving which Israel must probably regard as inevitable so long as there were vast numbers of poverty-stricken refugees on her borders, including more than 200,000 in the Gaza strip alone. Finally, if incidents were reported to the public by publicity media in a manner related to their intrinsic importance, tendencies to demand retaliatory action could be restrained.

2. VIEWS OF THE PARTIES AND OF MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL

40. At the 693rd meeting (17 March), the representative of Egypt explained his Government's case and emphasized the complete responsibility of the armed forces of Israel for the Gaza attack. In conclusion, he said his delegation hoped that, in view of the gravity of the situation created by Israel's aggression, the Council would apply Chapter VII of the Charter. The Council should request the punishment of those responsible for the act and should hold Israel responsible for the loss of human life and material damage it had caused. His Government reserved all its rights with regard to the question of reparations. Despite the Israel aggression, the Egyptian leaders had retained their coolness and self-control. It must not be forgotten, however, that self-control and coolness had their limits.

41. At the 694th meeting (23 March), the Chief of Staff replied to questions put to him by the parties as well as by the representatives of New Zealand and France concerning various decisions adopted by the MAC and its methods of operation. The representative of France in particular asked whether there was any objection to giving some publicity to the decisions of the MAC and to communicating those decisions to members of the Council. Despite their responsibilities, the latter learnt of the action taken and the decisions made only when incidents broke out and the parties themselves referred to them. The Secretary-General replied that he saw no objection to the transmission of such information and that he would study the method of transmission with the Chief of Staff.

42. At the same meeting, the representative of Israel, after describing in some detail Egyptian infiltration and attacks along the armistice demarcation line, stated that the Gaza incident was the result rather than the primary cause of the existing tension. He pointed out that the reports submitted by the Chief of Staff on 16 November 1954 (S/3319) and 17 March 1955 (S/3373) had listed fourteen decisions of the MAC condemning Egypt, twice as many as those recorded against Israel during the periods covered by those reports. That fact was impressive enough in itself; it became all the more significant when it was realized that the few violations ascribed to Israel had arisen mostly from immediate response to Egyptian firing. In the circumstance, it was impossible for Israel to imagine that the Council could fail to condemn the campaign of hostility organized in Gaza, to which Israel had been subjected. The connexion between those events and the Gaza episode was nothing less than the direct and compelling relationship of cause and effect. In conclusion, he said that for the Council to confine its judgment or criticism to the Gaza incident alone would be gravely inequitable. It would certainly be an inappropriate commentary on official reports which showed Egyptian violations to have been more numerous and more generalized than any Israel reactions which had followed them. His delegation, therefore, felt justified in seeking a condemnation by the Council of the Egyptian incursions, murders, demolitions and sabotage activities described by the Chief of Staff's report as a main cause of the present tension.

43. At its 695th meeting (29 March), the Security Council had before it the following draft resolution submitted jointly by France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America (S/3378):

"The Security Council,

"Recalling its resolutions of 15 July 1948, 11 August 1949, 17 November 1950, 18 May 1951 and 25 November 1953;

"Having heard the report of the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization and statements by the representatives of Egypt and Israel;

"Noting that the Egyptian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission on 6 March 1955 determined that 'a prearranged and planned attack ordered by Israeli authorities' was 'committed by Israeli regular army forces against the Egyptian regular army force' in the Gaza Strip on 28 February 1955;

"Condemns this attack as a violation of the cease-fire provisions of the Security Council resolution of 15 July 1948 and as inconsistent with the obligations of the parties under the General Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel and under the Charter;

"Calls again upon Israel to take all necessary measures to prevent such actions;

"Expresses its conviction that the maintenance of the General Armistice Agreement is threatened by any deliberate violation of that Agreement by one of the parties to it, and that no progress towards the return of permanent peace in Palestine can be made unless the parties comply strictly with their obligations under the General Armistice Agreement and the cease-fire provisions of its resolution of 15 July 1948."

44. The representative of the United Kingdom, in commenting upon the joint draft, said that the Israel-

Egypt Mixed Armistice Commission had clearly established that the incident had been a deliberate and planned military operation; his Government viewed the incident with very grave concern. Under the General Armistice Agreement, as well as the Charter, both parties had forsworn the use of force in settling their differences. Yet, in Gaza the Government of Israel had used units of its army to carry out a military operation against the armed forces of the Egyptian Government. That that armed attack should have created a wave of emotion among the refugees in the Gaza area was regrettable, but very understandable. Great credit was due to the Egyptian Government for the restraint which it had shown in circumstances which might have developed into an alarming situation. He had expected to hear from the representative of Israel some expression of regret for the Gaza attack but, instead, an account had been given of conditions along the demarcation line in which the action at Gaza had been depicted as something inevitable and almost natural. His Government did not at all accept that view nor did he believe that the Council would accept it. The Council had rejected, in the context of the Qibya incident, the thesis that retaliatory action was justified. Although the most shocking aspect of the attack of Qibya—the indiscriminate killing of the civilian inhabitants of a village—was certainly absent in the present case, the Council was undeniably faced by a complete disregard of its call to Israel, made after the Qibya incident, to take steps to prevent all retaliatory action in the future. If the Council had then been right in censoring such action, it must surely make quite clear what it thought of it now, in the hope that such an expression of view would be heeded by those responsible for the policy of retaliation. His Government, along with others, looked forward to the day when the present armistice régime would be replaced by a permanent peace. Nor did it at all accept the thesis of the Egyptian Government that it was still entitled to exercise belligerent rights all those years after the Armistice Agreement had been signed. But peace could not be won at the point of the gun. On the contrary, the use of violence not only endangered the Armistice régime, but prejudiced the prospects of getting something better and was, therefore, doubly to be deplored.

45. After pointing out that the Council had before it two draft resolutions which should be considered separately, the representative of France said that, in regard to the first item, he agreed that the action carried out by regular forces of the Israel army at Gaza was contrary both to the decisions of the Council and to the provisions of the Armistice Agreement, as well as to the principles and obligations of international law and morality. It was particularly distressing to all those who felt nothing but sympathy for the people of Israel and its young democracy and who admired its often heroic efforts to carve out for itself its rightful place among the free nations. The Israel representative had tried to justify the attack by relating it to the situation in the region as a legitimate retaliation against the many provocations for which he claimed Egypt was responsible. Even a situation such as that described could not serve as an excuse, and still less as justification for the act of which the Israel authorities were guilty. There was no common denominator either in law or in fact between acts of brigandage, pillage or armed attack committed across the demarcation line by isolated individuals even if such acts enjoyed the tacit complicity of subordinate Egyptian authorities, and a collective

act of reprisal which had been decided upon and ordered at a high level and had been executed by well-equipped units of the regular army; nor was there any balance between the four Israelis killed during the frontier incidents which had taken place between November 1954 and February 1955, and the thirty-eight Egyptian victims of the Israel attack on Gaza. The Council could not allow Israel to seek satisfaction for its grievances against Egypt, even if legitimate, through a policy of reprisals and revenge. If the Gaza incident, coming on top of the Qibya incident, were in line with such a policy, Israel would have to be prepared to bear alone the consequences of the censure of that policy. In conclusion, he said that his delegation had not been unmoved by the words of the Israel representative when he had reaffirmed his Government's peaceful intentions and its desire to establish relations with its neighbours on a basis of mutual respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all parties. It also agreed with him that neither the Armistice Agreement nor the Charter empowered its signatories to invoke and justify rights of active belligerence towards Israel by land and sea.

46. The representative of the United States said that his Government, both inside and outside the United Nations, had consistently sought to follow the objectives laid down by Mr. Dulles upon his return from the Middle East in 1953, and much progress had been made, particularly with the refugee problem and irrigation in the Jordan Valley. There had been good reason to believe that, with such progress, the time was not too distant when the intermittent fighting would have become a thing of the past. In that comparatively hopeful situation and, as General Burns had reported, at a time of comparative tranquillity along the armistice demarcation line, the terrible event at Gaza had taken place. Twice as many Israelis had been lost in Israel's action in the Gaza area as had been lost in the previous four months as a result of border incidents. New and regrettable incidents had occurred since the Gaza attack with additional loss of life, particularly at Patish. He supported the suggestion of General Burns that the parties should seek agreement on joint border controls which offered the prospect of reducing infiltration to an occasional nuisance. He said that the harsh treatment used to repulse infiltrators, whose apparent purposes were sometimes no more criminal than an attempt to gather grass on the other side of the border, was typical of the lack of restraint that had been exercised and which should be overcome at all costs. In that connexion, his delegation was impressed by General Burns' conclusions that if such incidents were presented to the public in a manner related to their intrinsic importance, the unfortunate tendencies to demand retaliatory action could be restrained. The United States delegation, aware that Israel held that there were causes for the attack, not only regretted such incidents but believed also that they should be prevented by all responsible authorities. It believed that, whatever the provocation, there had been no justification for Israel's military action at Gaza. The conclusion his delegation drew from the report of the Chief of Staff and from the statements of the parties was that armed attack, planned and directed as it had been in that case, offered no solution to the problems which rightly concerned and distressed the people of Israel. To increase international tension, to bring the area to the brink of war, and to discourage and frustrate honest and sincere efforts to build a constructive peace could in no way serve their interests.

47. The representative of Belgium commented that the Chief of Staff had gone into the causes of the Gaza incident in his report in order to avoid further incidents rather than to establish the responsibility of the parties. The measures proposed by the Chief of Staff for the purpose of ending infiltration were practical and likely to be effective; they did not prejudge the substance of the question.

48. Pointing out that the MAC had concluded that the attack near Gaza had been prearranged and planned by Israel, he stated that he would support the joint draft resolution (S/3378) which solemnly condemned the action of Israel.

49. The representative of Iran said that the state of tension which undoubtedly existed in the area often provoked attacks that were difficult to prevent, but that fact could never justify a premeditated and organized attack carried out by regular army forces. The joint draft resolution (S/3378) did not entirely satisfy his delegation. While appreciating the efforts of the three sponsors, his delegation would have preferred the Council to go further than was proposed in the draft and recommend effective measures to punish the aggressors and to prevent the recurrence of such acts. Realizing, however, the difficulties which stood in the Council's way and the limits beyond which it could not go, he would support the proposal as it stood.

50. The representative of New Zealand noted that the representative of Israel had not contested the findings of the MAC, but instead had charged Egypt with a campaign of hostility, and concluded that the Gaza episode was the direct consequence of that campaign. That argument should be considered in the light of the Chief of Staff's statement that the number of casualties prior to the Gaza incident reflected the comparative tranquillity along the armistice demarcation line. To claim that the attack at Gaza had been the inevitable result of Egyptian provocation seemed to his delegation to ignore the fact that the incident had been a military operation and could only have occurred as the result of a deliberate decision on the part of the Israel authorities controlling the military units concerned. The representative of Israel had not told the Council that the action had been taken without authority or contrary to orders, or even that there had been an error of judgment. Military retaliation was apparently regarded as a justified policy. The Council could not accept such a position. Reprisals, if unchecked, might well lead to counter-reprisals, and to hostilities on an ever-widening scale. It was true that incidents such as the attack on Gaza pointed to the need for a very serious effort to make a transition towards peace; it was, unfortunately, also true that such incidents created the worst possible conditions for the consideration of such a step.

51. The representative of Brazil maintained that since Israel had made a prearranged and planned attack, the Council should not fail to condemn that action. General Burns had called it the most serious clash in the region since the signature of the Armistice Agreement. The Council must take account of the broader aspects of the situation depicted by the Chief of Staff, particularly the presence of a large number of refugees in Gaza. Perhaps even worse than infiltration and marauding was the lack of determination on both sides of the demarcation line to make an effort to work together to improve the situation. Since the Council could not usefully order Israel and Egypt to co-operate with each other, a new appeal was being made to both Governments to assist General Burns in his mission. Brazil

would have preferred to find Israel and Egypt resolved to seek peace and to avert a new series of incidents which were not, as many seemed to believe, unavoidable.

52. The representative of Peru said that his delegation had, at the meeting of 4 March, joined in condemning the Gaza attack carried out by the regular armed forces of Israel. Nothing had occurred since to alter the seriousness of the incident or the responsibility attached to it, and he would therefore vote in favour of the joint draft resolution (S/3378). Since the measures proposed by the Chief of Staff were in keeping with the powers vested in him under the Armistice Agreement, his delegation agreed with the second joint draft resolution² and with the appeal which the Council was making to the parties to co-operate in giving effect to the measure in question. That co-operation was necessary to ensure not only the practical, but also the legal effectiveness of the measures because the latter proceeded from an authority set up under an international agreement with the participation and under the supervision of the United Nations. The measures were in accordance with the nature and purpose of the Armistice, and therefore presupposed acceptance by the parties. Also, the measures proposed implied no revision of the Armistice Agreement within the meaning of Article XII thereof. His delegation would therefore also vote for them.

53. The representative of China said that since the facts of the attack on 28 February as established by the MAC were not disputed by the representative of Israel, all the material points of the Egyptian complaint had been substantiated and the situation dictated the terms of the joint draft resolution (S/3378), which the Council must adopt. His delegation realized that the condemnation of a sovereign State by the Security Council was a serious matter, but there was no alternative to the terms of the joint draft resolution. His delegation had considerable sympathy for the complaint of Israel that the Arab States refused to proceed to a peace settlement, but an attack of the kind carried out at Gaza could not be expected to promote acceptance of Israel as a member of the Near Eastern community.

54. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the report of the Chief of Staff had fully confirmed the information previously available to the Security Council, that in the Gaza area on 28 February the armed forces of Israel had made a deliberate attack on the Egyptian armed forces, thereby violating the Armistice Agreement. It was impossible to agree with the Israel representative's statement that the attack by the Israel armed forces in the Gaza area could be regarded as a retaliatory operation against Egypt. Such acts constituted a serious violation of the Charter and aggravated tension in the region. Obviously the Council, which bore the principal responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, could not ignore such a serious violation of the Charter and of the Egypt-Israel Armistice Agreement. The Council must censure such action by Israel and take appropriate steps to prevent the recurrence of such incidents. The USSR representative reiterated that he wished once again to draw the attention of members of the Council to the fact that the tension prevailing in the area resulted from the policy being pursued by certain States in the Near and Middle East, a policy aimed not at strengthening peace and friendly relations among the States in that region, but at forging military blocs. That was naturally bound to create a threat both to the

national independence and to the security of the countries in that region. The policy of crude pressure and interference in the internal affairs of certain Near Eastern countries which was being pursued by some States in order to force those countries to join the military blocs which were being forged was leading to the aggravation of international tension, and was creating a serious threat to the national independence of many countries in the area concerned. Such a policy had, and could have, nothing in common with a desire to strengthen the peace and promote good-neighbourly relations among the countries of the region.

55. The President, speaking as the representative of Turkey, said that the report made by the Chief of Staff, as well as the statements of the parties, made it evident that all the efforts of the Council and the Truce Supervision Organization must be co-ordinated in order to urge the parties concerned to observe strictly the terms of the Armistice Agreement and to comply with the decisions of the Council and the principles embodied in the Charter, so that stability and security might be achieved in the interests of all concerned. While concerned with ways and means for the general improvement of the situation in the area, the Council could not overlook the gravity of the Gaza incident, nor could it withhold its blame for the use of force in violation of the Armistice Agreement. The joint draft resolution (S/3378) reflected in a very appropriate way the general concern expressed by the members of the Council, as well as their views on the future course to be adopted by the parties. No matter what argument might be advanced in connexion with the general situation in the frontier area, an attack of that nature should be condemned for the reasons stated in the joint draft resolution. As regards the views expressed by the USSR representative concerning security in the Middle East, his delegation believed that the only reason for the existing tension, not only in the Middle East but in the entire world, was the very extensive bloc formed by the Soviet Union in pursuance of its aim of domination. The propaganda manoeuvre against so-called military blocs was aimed at the disintegration of the common security front erected by the free nations for their self-preservation and for strengthening peace and security by discouraging aggression.

56. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, referring to the statement of the representative of Turkey, said that the peace-loving character of the Soviet Union's foreign policy was universally known and required no further explanations. The Soviet Union neither joined nor formed aggressive blocs.

At the 695th meeting, on 29 March 1955, the Council unanimously adopted the joint draft resolution (S/3378).

57. At the 696th meeting (30 March), the Council dealt exclusively with the following joint draft resolution submitted by France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America (S/3379):

"The Security Council,

"Taking note of those sections of the report by the Chief of Staff of the TSO which deal with the general conditions on the Armistice Demarcation Line between Egypt and Israel, and the causes of the present tension;

"Anxious that all possible steps shall be taken to preserve security in this area, within the framework of the General Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel;

² S/3379, see paragraph 57 of the present report.

"Requests the Chief of Staff to continue his consultations with the Governments of Egypt and Israel with a view to the introduction of practical measures to that end;

"Notes that the Chief of Staff has already made certain concrete proposals to this effect;

"Calls upon the Governments of Egypt and Israel to co-operate with the Chief of Staff with regard to his proposals, bearing in mind that, in the opinion of the Chief of Staff, infiltration can be reduced to an occasional nuisance if an agreement were effected between the parties on the lines he has proposed;

"Requests the Chief of Staff to keep the Council informed of the progress of his discussions."

58. The representative of the United Kingdom, commenting on the joint draft resolution, said that it was the clear duty of the Governments of Egypt and Israel to take effective steps to prevent acts of violence along the demarcation line, even when committed by irresponsible individuals. This was the aim of the draft. He disagreed with the picture which the representative of Israel had drawn of conditions along the demarcation line, particularly because the Chief of Staff had described the situation prior to the Gaza incident as one of comparative tranquillity. But as the recent tragic incident at Patish had shown, conditions on the borders of the Gaza Strip were a matter of real concern; and infiltration, often accompanied by violence, had contributed to the state of insecurity there. The Council would not achieve its ends simply by denouncing and forbidding retaliation; it must try to remove the causes of the tension. His Government looked forward to the day when peace would be established between Israel and its neighbours. Until that time came, it must be the Council's constant concern to ensure that the armistice régime was strictly observed and that the greatest benefits possible were derived from it. The Council was entitled to expect that conditions would progressively improve, and the United Kingdom had learned with particular interest of the proposals which the Chief of Staff had made to both Governments. If the demarcation line in many places was marked only with a ploughed furrow and there was no contact between the authorities on either side, much could be done through practical arrangements to improve the position. His Government therefore hoped that neither party would reject the assistance which General Burns offered them or would fail to co-operate with him to the utmost in trying to work out methods for improving the working of the armistice system. One problem that might usefully be taken up was that of the consequences of the voting procedure in the MAC. That procedure, as General Burns had pointed out, tended to overdramatize incidents which in turn tended to heighten tension.

59. The representative of France recalled that from 1 November 1954 to 24 February 1955, Egypt had lodged thirty-five complaints against Israel with the MAC, four of which had resulted in verdicts condemning Israel. During the same period the MAC had received ninety-nine complaints from Israel, resulting in the condemnation of Egypt on seven occasions. A major responsibility therefore rested on Egypt, so far as the number of those incidents was concerned, and a lesser responsibility, though greater than that of Israel, for serious incidents. In addition, since 28 February thirteen further cases of infiltration had been reported. To those condemnations must be added the incident of 24 March at Patish, the gravity of which accounted for

the emotion which it had created in Israel and for its condemnation by all men of good faith. While his delegation did not fail to appreciate the problem which the presence of 200,000 refugees in the Gaza strip created for the Egyptian authorities, the Council could not ignore the sense of insecurity and anxiety felt by all living in the neighbourhood of the demarcation line as a result of repeated infiltrations. But individual acts of retaliation which initiated chain reactions of incidents could not be placed on the same footing as collective acts of organized reprisal such as the action at Gaza. Nevertheless, the state of tension created by such incidents was a matter of grave concern to the Council, and it was the Council's right and duty to seek to put an end to it. His delegation had been struck by the reasonable and constructive nature of the proposals of the Chief of Staff and of the idea of giving publicity to the decisions of the MAC, as well as to the steps taken and penalties imposed by the Egyptian authorities to prevent and punish any illegal crossing of the demarcation line. He also favoured the suggestion that the procedure of the MAC should be such as to allow its Chairman to play a larger part in drafting its decisions, and hoped that the two parties would comply with any suggestion that the Chief of Staff and his colleagues might make on that point. The Council wished to put an end to all acts of infiltration in violation of the provisions of the Armistice Agreement, or at the very least to reduce the number and seriousness of these acts of infiltration to the point where they would cease to be an element of tension between the peoples.

60. The representative of the United States, explaining that the joint draft resolution (S/3379) was designed to give every possible encouragement and assistance to those concerned in preventing a recurrence of unfortunate events such as those which had so alarmed the Council, said that his delegation believed that the machinery of the Truce Supervision Organization, under the authority of the Council, could reduce border incidents to a minimum if the parties, with whom ultimate responsibility lay, made an earnest endeavour to use that machinery to the full. After the recent incidents, any further reluctance on the part of either party to give the Truce Supervision Organization an honest chance to prevent further disorder would be unthinkable and would call into question its whole attitude towards the problem of border security; such reluctance would be against the interests of the parties and against the interests of peace and security for which the Council was responsible. His delegation did not believe that the Truce Supervision Organization had been given a fair chance to prove that the troubles which had occurred in the past could be prevented, because the parties had not always shown their readiness to take all necessary measures and to co-operate fully with the Chief of Staff and the military observers. The time had come when they must make a far greater effort. The opportunity seemed to exist in the Chief of Staff's proposal and should be the first order of business in the area when Council debate was concluded. The purpose of the proposed draft resolution was to give full support to General Burns' recommendations. Agreement along the lines suggested would have the effect of producing orderly and disciplined co-operation to prevent further incidents and would thus promote a sense of security on both sides, and put the problem of infiltration into proper perspective. There should be no hesitation by either party on getting to work with the Chief of Staff to produce that result.

61. The representative of New Zealand said that the Council's condemnation of Israel for the attack of 28 February did not imply that the tension in the Gaza area was exclusively Israel's responsibility. The Chief of Staff's report made it clear that the Gaza strip presented special problems, since a large majority of its present population consisted not of permanent inhabitants, but of refugees from territory now occupied by Israel. This fact helped to explain the long series of incidents involving, for the most part, infiltration from the Gaza strip into Israel. Less understandable, and most serious, was the wanton violence which all too frequently accompanied those acts of trespass, the Patish killing being a recent and tragic example. In many cases of infiltration, responsibility was difficult to assess. Leaving aside the question of legal responsibility, it would appear that, from a practical viewpoint, primary responsibility for preventing infiltration, and particularly for preventing acts of violence, rested with the parties from whose territory the infiltrators operated, particularly when infiltration was accompanied by acts of sabotage and murder. His delegation subscribed to General Burns' view that effective measures against infiltration required the co-operation of both parties and endorsed the recommendation that Egypt should strictly apply its laws against infiltration. He welcomed the Egyptian representative's assurances in that respect. The institution of extensive patrolling by joint forces would provide the most effective means of preventing infiltration. It was very clear, however, that what was needed above all was a real effort by both sides to co-operate. His delegation was aware that the proposed measures did not in themselves offer more than a partial solution of the problems besetting Israel and its neighbours. A permanent solution would require a revision of fundamental attitudes; namely, abandonment, on the one hand, of a policy of retaliation which the Council had unanimously condemned, and abandonment, on the other hand, of policies based on the right of active belligerency, which, as the Council had declared in 1951, neither party could reasonably assert.

62. The President, speaking as the representative of Turkey, said that, in accordance with the position adopted previously by his delegation, he would vote for the joint draft resolution (S/3379).

63. The representative of China said that before reading the Chief of Staff's report, he had had the impression that incidents between Egypt and Israel had been serious ones involving the armies of those two countries, but the report revealed that a great many were the result of individual expeditions which were neither political nor military, and could not have any national objective. Tension would be eased if both Governments would cease magnifying those incidents. His delegation would support the joint draft resolution because it neither blamed nor condemned anyone, but took a positive approach and called upon the Governments of Egypt and Israel to co-operate with the Chief of Staff.

64. The representative of Israel reviewed his Government's case against Egypt, stressing that Egypt was responsible for the tension in the area of the demarcation line. In so far as the joint draft resolution was directed towards measures to reduce the tension, his Government would co-operate with the Chief of Staff in an effort to bring about improvement. In Israel's view, however, the overriding question was to secure Egyptian co-operation in preventing infiltrations which, according to the Chief of Staff's report, came entirely

from Egyptian-controlled territory into Israel territory. The joint draft resolution should have gone further in defining and criticizing such infiltration, especially after condemnation by the MAC, and in affirming the general applicability of the Charter to Egyptian-Israel relations. He noted that the Government of Egypt had been charged by Council members with responsibility for eliminating tensions in the area. His delegation could only hope that these exhortations, together with the conclusions in the report of the Chief of Staff, would have their effect. The position was grave, as the frequency of incursions had mounted and the toll of Israel casualties had increased. His delegation would withdraw the suggested amendments (S/3381, S/3382 and S/3383) it had submitted to the joint draft resolution. Should, however, the hopes which had been expressed for an improved situation not materialize and especially should the current cycle of intensified attacks, minings, sabotage activities and penetrations into Israel territory continue, his delegation must reserve its right to seize the Council of an appropriate item and to secure condemnation of those incursions.

65. The representative of Egypt said that his country's delegation to the MAC had given, and would continue to give, favourable consideration to any proposals likely to preserve security in the area. He recalled that as early as 12 May 1952, the Egyptian representative on the Commission had proposed that joint patrols should be set up along the demarcation line, and had requested that United Nations observers should patrol the line on the Egyptian side during the day in order to determine who had been responsible for exchanges of fire and which side had fired first. He reiterated that the Egyptian authorities were patrolling the line with a view to preventing infiltration and that a severe law had been promulgated which provided heavy penalties amounting to five-year imprisonment for infiltrators. His Government would do its utmost to co-operate with General Burns so that, in the latter's words, infiltration could be reduced to an occasional nuisance. His delegation regretted the incident at the village of Patish. It had by no means been established, however, that the two armed individuals believed to have committed the crime had come from the Gaza area. Egypt had appealed to the Special Committee against the MAC's decision. In conclusion, he stressed Egypt's intention to continue to observe its Armistice Agreement with Israel.

66. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the general conditions in the area justified the concern voiced by General Burns and by members of the Council. The Council should examine all the causes of that tension in an objective and unbiased manner. In so doing, it should not overlook the USSR delegation's statement to the Council that one of the principal causes of that tension was the policy of forging military blocs which certain States pursued in the Near East. Such a policy led to serious complications, as for example, the fact that pressure on a number of countries in the area not wishing to be drawn into aggressive blocs had assumed such forms and proportions that a direct threat to peace in that region might arise. That was exemplified by the recent concentration of Turkish armed forces at the Syrian-Turkish border, an action directly connected with Turkey's attempts to force Syria to become a party to the Turkish-Iraqi treaty. The primary condition for lessening the tension in the Near East was the abandonment of the policy of forming military blocs and sowing discord among the countries of the region.

67. His delegation approved the proposal that the Chief of Staff should continue his consultations with the Governments concerned with a view to adopting all necessary measures for the preservation of security in the area of the demarcation line. It was the understanding of his delegation that the important considerations which he had just put forward would be taken into account in those consultations. He would support the draft resolution contained in document S/3379, considering that it was basically acceptable to Egypt and Israel, the two parties directly concerned.

68. The President, speaking as the representative of Turkey, replied that the Soviet Union representative's allegations concerning the so-called pressure exerted by Turkey on Syria were mere distortions of the truth. The defence of the Middle East would, exactly like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, further the cause of peace.

At the 696th meeting, on 30 March 1955, the Council unanimously adopted the joint draft resolution contained in document S/3379.

C. Further complaint by Israel

1. INCLUSION OF THE ITEM IN THE AGENDA

69. In a letter dated 4 April 1955 (S/3385) addressed to the President, the representative of Israel requested urgent consideration by the Council of a complaint against Egypt concerning repeated attacks by Egyptian regular and irregular armed forces and by armed marauders from Egyptian-controlled territory against Israel armed forces and civilian lives and property in Israel, with special reference to (a) the armed assault at Patish on 24 March 1955 (S/3376); (b) repeated attacks by mining and gunfire on Israel army units patrolling the Israel-Egyptian border at the Gaza strip between 26 March and 3 April 1955; (c) the attack on an Israel army patrol and on the village of Nahal Oz on 3 April 1955. The letter contained descriptions of fifteen incidents which had occurred since 26 March and stated that Israel was seeking from the Council relief from the intolerable situation created by continued Egyptian aggression.

70. In a letter dated 5 April (S/3386) addressed to the President, the representative of Egypt described the incident of 3 April on the Egyptian-Israel demarcation line and stressed that the nearly eighty Israel troops involved in the attack had used half-track cars and 120 millimetre mortars in violation of Annex III of the General Armistice Agreement.

71. At the 697th meeting (6 April) the Israel complaint was included in the agenda of the Council.

72. The representative of Israel, invoking Article 34 of the Charter, declared that constant Egyptian attacks had created a grave situation, the continuance of which would prejudice international peace and security in the area. Describing a number of serious incidents, he stressed that the ten days between 24 March and 3 April had been one of the most intensively dangerous periods since the armistice had been signed. Overt acts of violence by Egyptian armed forces had replaced infiltration as the main cause of tension between Israel and Egypt. It could hardly be doubted that the Egyptian units were carrying out a policy designed to maintain this tension and cause an explosion. The MAC had condemned Egypt for six of the fifteen recent incidents, while it had only adopted one resolution against Israel.

That was an unusually high ratio. Although Egypt had attempted to minimize the gravity of the situation and to introduce irrelevancies into its explanations, none of those incidents had the remotest connexion with refugees. The attacks invited responsive action from Israel. Since the Egyptian Government did not seem to regard the matter gravely, the importance of a clear statement by the Council could not be over-emphasized.

73. The representative of Egypt expressed surprise that the Council had been convened at the insistence of Israel, since all but six of the questions which the delegation of Israel wished to discuss were still on the agenda of the MAC or of the Special Committee. The Council should not be requested to examine questions still under consideration by these two bodies. Israel was seeking to destroy the effect of the condemnation pronounced against it by the Council the previous week. Egypt too could have submitted a series of similar complaints, since several of the alleged Egyptian attacks had been the subject of complaints by Egypt to the MAC. Moreover, the Egyptian delegation to the MAC had frequently made suggestions for patrol of the demarcation line by United Nations observers. The present state of tension prevailing on the Egyptian-Israel border had succeeded a period of relative calm, as had been noted in the report of the Chief of Staff, and was an understandable consequence of the Israel attack on Gaza.

74. On the proposal of the representative of the United Kingdom, who noted that on the available evidence there was an almost complete discrepancy of views regarding the responsibility for the recent incidents, the Council decided to postpone further discussion of the matter until receipt of the findings of the MAC.

2. REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF

75. On 14 April the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization transmitted his report (S/3390) on the incidents between Egypt and Israel since the Gaza incident of 28 February 1955. He stated that the most important factor contributing to the increased tension had been the mining of tracks used by Israel army vehicles. That new development could well be retaliatory action by certain elements following the Gaza incident. Among the fifteen incidents reviewed in the report, the most serious had been that of 3 April; the resolutions submitted on this incident by the two delegations had both been adopted. The Chairman had made reservations and comments explaining his vote on each resolution. The Chief of Staff held that the most urgent step to be taken to improve the situation in the Gaza area was to institute joint patrols. Egypt was prepared in principle to establish such patrols but the final reply from Israel had not yet been received. Both sides were prepared to meet with a view to effecting a local commander's arrangement and had given oral assurances that only disciplined regular and police forces were being employed near the demarcation line. Israel appeared to favour the erection of an obstacle to help prevent infiltration, and, while the Egyptian authorities saw difficulties in this proposal, they were prepared to consider ways and means of carrying it out. Both sides pointed out that it would be difficult for them to create extensive obstacles unless assisted by outside sources with the supply of materials. On the request of the Egyptian authorities, additional United Nations observers were being posted in positions on the Egyptian side of the demarcation line. Until such effec-

tive measures had been agreed upon, he felt it necessary that commanders of troops in the area be made responsible for preventing any initiation of hostile acts.

76. By a letter dated 18 April (S/3393), the representative of Egypt informed the President of the Council that Egyptian military authorities would shortly begin to construct barbed wire fences within Egyptian-controlled territory along certain essential positions on the demarcation line.

3. VIEWS OF THE PARTIES AND OF MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL

77. At the 698th meeting (19 April), the representative of Egypt reiterated the view that Israel was attempting to nullify the effects of the resolution of 29 March condemning it for the Gaza incident. Since then Egypt had submitted forty-nine complaints to the MAC which had blamed Israel for the use of forbidden arms and vehicles in the incident of 3 April. As for the mine-laying, it had not been established that such acts had been committed by military units or other elements under Egyptian control. Egypt had given tangible proof of its co-operative spirit by accepting in principle all the suggestions presented by the Chief of Staff in order to diminish tension on the demarcation line.

78. The representative of Israel pointed out that the report stated that the mining of the tracks used by Israel was the most important factor contributing to the increased tension in the border area. The mining of roads was certainly not a new development resulting from the Gaza incident, since Egypt had already been condemned for such acts twenty-two times in the preceding nine months. The Council should therefore adopt a resolution precisely and accurately condemning that practice. As for the incident of 3 April, the MAC had held Israel responsible only for "technical violations" of the General Armistice Agreement, in fact, for shooting in self-defence.

79. The representative of the United States said that his Government concurred in the conclusion of the report that the incidents under examination might well be due to emotional tension following the action at Gaza on 28 February. The situation demonstrated a lack of vigilance by local and governmental authorities which had to be corrected. There was no justification, no matter what the cause, for retaliation, official or unofficial, by military or civilian personnel. Therefore if tension was to be reduced as the Council had held it must, it was incumbent on all officials of both parties to exercise the greatest diligence and to enforce preventive action against those under their control who would violate the Demarcation Line. Both governments had to assume full responsibility for local enforcement. Both governments must realize that Council consideration and action would of itself neither remedy the present difficulties between them nor bring about the permanent peace in the Palestine area which they were bound to seek under their armistice agreement. It was gratifying that one of the parties had accepted the establishment of joint patrols along the demarcation line, as proposed by the Chief of Staff. He trusted that the other party would soon convey a similar expression of agreement. It was incumbent upon both sides to co-operate faithfully with the Chief of Staff in carrying out the resolution of 30 March.

80. The representative of France said that the facts described in the report did not call for any further action by the Council since the situation had been covered by the recent resolution. Both infiltration and mine-

laying were matters for which the Egyptian authorities were directly responsible, particularly since mining could not be carried out without some complicity or at least a certain lack of control or supervision on the part of the subordinate authorities. If mine-laying continued at the same rate, it would be necessary to consider what action should be taken. He noted with appreciation that the comments of the Chairman of the MAC accompanied the resolutions it had adopted. He expressed confidence in General Burns' ability to achieve an easing of the tension and urged the parties to lend General Burns their sincere and effective assistance in the task of conciliation and peace entrusted to him by the Council.

81. The representative of the United Kingdom agreed with the Chief of Staff that increased tension along the border might have been due largely to emotions aroused by the Gaza incident. The major share of responsibility for the 3 April incident lay with Egypt. Mine-laying, whether by civilians or by military personnel, was an illegal, provocative and lethal practice, and while there was no evidence to suggest that the Egyptian authorities approved it, it was clearly their responsibility to put a stop to it. It had been suggested that the actions for which Egypt had been condemned might have been due to unofficial retaliations by military or civilian personnel in the Gaza area. But the whole principle of retaliation was wrong and had been already clearly condemned by the Council. He welcomed the Egyptian response to the Chief of Staff's proposals and stated that it would have been helpful to have a similar response from Israel. It was also satisfactory that the Egyptian authorities had requested the posting of additional United Nations observers on the Egyptian side of the demarcation line, but he pointed out that further efforts were still required in order to introduce as soon as possible the practical measures that would help preserve security. The aim must be strict compliance by both parties with the Armistice Agreement and absolute security for the inhabitants on either side of the demarcation line.

82. After analysing the procedures of the MAC, the representative of Belgium expressed the view that while they had not always led to the settlement of a situation, they did ensure elucidation. As long as the demarcation line was not suitably guarded, incidents would very probably continue to occur. It was useless to bring matters before the Council so long as the necessary action had not been taken by the parties. The Council needed from the parties not sacrifices or renunciation, but the minimum effort and co-operation without which it was powerless to help them.

83. The representative of New Zealand agreed with the suggestion of the Chief of Staff that the recent and almost continuous series of border incidents was largely the result of emotional tension following the attack on 28 February. This did not mean that the actions for which Egypt had been held responsible were in any way justified. It was difficult to escape the suspicion that some of those actions were the consequence at least of a lack of zeal on the part of the local Egyptian military authorities. He did not believe that it would be useful or appropriate for the Council to attempt to draw up a balance sheet of the incidents recorded in the report, since the Council was not a review authority to pass on all decisions of the MAC. In any case, no action by the Council could provide a substitute for the active co-operation of the parties with the Chief of Staff. Agreement was urgently necessary on measures for guarding and patrolling the demarcation line.

84. The President, speaking as the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, stated that the recent events which had taken place near the demarcation line had shown that neither of the parties had taken the necessary steps to ensure strict compliance with the Council's resolution. The report of the Chief of Staff showed that there had been no substantial improvement in the situation. At the same time, the Chief of Staff had stated that both sides had expressed their readiness to co-operate in giving effect to the recommendations contained in the Council's resolutions of 29 and 30 March; the letter from the representative of Egypt, dated 18 April (S/3393), indicated such readiness. Speaking as President, he stated that the consensus of opinion was that there existed no need for any new action by the Council on the question under discussion, inasmuch as the facts brought to the Council's notice and the possible measures to avert frontier incidents in the area of the demarcation line were fully covered in the resolutions adopted by the Council in

March. On behalf of the Council he appealed to both sides to co-operate sincerely in order to give full effect to the resolutions of 29 and 30 March aimed at averting frontier incidents.

85. On 7 June 1955 the President of the Security Council addressed a letter (S/3406) to the members of the Council voicing his concern over the situation created by the continued incidents along the Gaza Demarcation Line and the difficulties which were being encountered by the Chief of Staff in carrying out the Council's resolution of March 30, 1955. He stated his hope that the Council resolution would be employed promptly but added that if this hope was not realized, and General Burns did not receive the full co-operation of the parties concerned, it might be necessary to call a meeting of the Council for the specific purpose of considering the status of the implementation of the resolution of March 30 and such further assistance and support to the Chief of Staff as might be necessary.

Chapter 2

LETTER DATED 8 SEPTEMBER 1954 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

86. In a letter dated 8 September 1954 (S/3287), the representative of the United States of America requested the President of the Security Council to call an early meeting of the Council to consider an incident which, in the view of his Government, was of a type which might endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. The letter stated that on 4 September a United States Navy P2V aircraft, on a peaceful mission over international high seas, had been attacked without warning by two MIG-type aircraft with Soviet markings and that, as a result of the attack, the United States Navy aircraft had been destroyed.

87. The letter was placed on the provisional agenda of the 679th meeting of the Security Council (10 September). The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics objected to the inclusion of the question in the agenda. In his view, the letter gave a distorted account of the incident, which had been precipitated for provocative purposes. On 4 September, the frontier of the USSR had been violated by a United States aircraft. Two Soviet fighter aircraft, approaching to inform the United States aircraft that it had penetrated the territory of the USSR and to advise it to withdraw immediately, had been fired on, and as a consequence of this hostile and utterly unjustified act had been compelled to return fire.

88. The representative of the USSR went on to state that the United States claimed that its aircraft had been attacked without warning while engaged in an ostensibly "peaceful" mission over the high seas, but that it had at no time fired on the Soviet aircraft. However, it had subsequently been announced that the United States aircraft had in fact fired on the Soviet fighters. Furthermore, the location specified by the United States as the meeting point of the three aircraft concerned was clearly over the territory of the USSR. There was no doubt that both this violation of Soviet frontiers and others which had taken place had been carried out in execution of specific tasks set by the United States military command, and that they constituted a gross infringement of the elementary rules of international law. Discussion in the Security Council of

such an unfounded accusation would only aggravate the situation in the Far East and increase international tension.

The agenda was adopted by 10 votes to 1 (USSR).

89. The representative of the United States reviewed the circumstances of the incident of 4 September, emphasizing the peaceful nature of the United States aircraft's mission, a routine flight for weather reports and anti-submarine surveillance conducted pursuant to the Security Treaty with Japan of 28 April 1952. Early information on the location of the attack had been in error, but authoritative information subsequently received had confirmed that the United States aircraft had never come closer than forty-three miles from the Siberian coast. Early reports that the United States aircraft had not fired on the Soviet fighter planes had also been in error. However, it had done so only during the second of the three attacks made on it. Indeed, it would be suicidal for a patrol aircraft to open fire on modern jet fighters; that would only be done as a desperate last resort.

90. The gravity of the situation caused by the unprovoked attack was compounded by the fact that it was by no means the first incident resulting in loss of life and property. Similar wanton attacks by USSR aircraft on United States aircraft had occurred on 5 April 1950, 6 and 19 November 1951, 7 October 1952, 15 March and 29 July 1953. In recent times, Soviet aircraft had also attacked aircraft of Sweden, the United Kingdom, France and Belgium. Such incidents constituted clear violations of the obligations assumed by the USSR Government under the United Nations Charter.

91. In meeting those threats to its own security and to the peace of the world, the United States had been faithful to the principles of the Charter requiring all Members to seek peaceful settlement of controversies. In each case, however, the USSR had resorted to inaccurate versions of the incidents and had refused to co-operate in any efforts for settlement.

92. In pressing its diplomatic claims arising from the aircraft incidents, the United States had in mind

ultimate recourse to the International Court of Justice as the correct forum in which a just settlement should be sought. It was prepared to follow the same course in the case of similar claims which the USSR might present. It was the categorical refusal by the Government of the USSR to submit to the Court the case of a United States aircraft forced down in Hungary which had led his Government to bring the present case before the Security Council. The United States believed that discussion of the issue in the Council would focus world opinion on the problem and materially contribute to preventing repetition of such incidents.

93. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics considered that all the facts relating to incidents involving aircraft of the United States and the USSR had not yet been presented, and he recounted in detail the views of his Government regarding the circumstances of those incidents.

94. On several occasions United States aircraft had violated the frontiers of the USSR. In three of these incidents, on 8 April 1950, 6 November 1951 and 7 October 1952, the offending United States aircraft had opened fire on the USSR aeroplanes which had risen to warn them to land or withdraw. On 8 October 1950, the United States aircraft had opened fire on an airfield in the USSR.

95. On 4 September 1950, eleven United States fighter aircraft, without cause or justification, had attacked a USSR military aircraft on a training flight 140 kilometres from the Korean coast, with a resulting loss of the aircraft and its entire crew. In that incident, as in those previously cited, USSR protests had been to no avail.

96. The United States representative had cited an incident of 19 November 1951. Contrary to his account, that incident had taken place in December 1951, and no attack on United States aircraft had been involved; a United States aircraft had appeared over a Hungarian airfield in violation of Hungarian airspace and had been forced to land. Evidence found in the aircraft proved that it had been sent into Hungary for terrorist and subversive activities and, since the offenders had been taken red-handed, Hungary had certainly acted correctly in refusing examination of the case by the International Court of Justice.

97. The United States representative had not mentioned the incident of 27 July 1953, when four United States fighter aircraft had crossed the frontier of the People's Republic of China. They had attacked and destroyed a USSR IL-12 passenger aircraft on its established route over China, 110 kilometres from the Sino-Korean frontier, killing the 15 passengers and 6 members of the crew aboard the aircraft. Although the United States had asserted that the attack had taken place over Korea during the Korean conflict, no argument could justify the destruction of a passenger aircraft of a neutral Power.

98. Instances involving the aircraft of other countries could be cited but the USSR representative believed it would be out of place to deal with such questions which could have no bearing on the 4 September incident under discussion. If other Governments had any cause for dissatisfaction, they could address themselves to the USSR Government which was prepared to discuss the matter with them.

99. In the opinion of the USSR representative, all the incidents which he had cited merely confirmed his Government's view that they resulted from the policy pursued by the United States military authorities and

State Department, a policy having nothing in common with oft-repeated assurances of peaceful intent made by the United States representative. Furthermore, the United States had shown extraordinary haste and carelessness in submitting its version of the 4 September incident. In that version, such important facts as the time and location of the attack, the purpose of the mission of the United States aircraft, even the question of which was the attacking aircraft and which the attacked, remained in doubt. Declarations by the United States Government had been contradicted in the United States Press to such an extent that there remained no reason why credence should be given to the United States version of the incident and no justification for bringing the question before the Security Council. Indeed, it was the United States Press itself which made it clear that "patrol aircraft", such as the one involved in the 4 September incident, were armed and fully equipped with electronic equipment to discover everything possible about the radar installations and reactions of other countries. Obviously, those United States aeroplanes were intended for more than routine flights for the purpose of checking weather conditions.

100. In conclusion, the representative of the USSR emphasized that the facts of the case as presented by his Government proved beyond doubt that the incident had taken place over USSR territory and that full responsibility for it, as well as for the fresh attempts to exploit such incidents with the object of creating international tension, rested squarely on the United States Government.

101. At the Council's 680th meeting (10 September), the provisional agenda included this item and was put to the vote in view of renewed objections by the representative of the USSR.

The agenda was adopted by 10 votes to 1 (USSR).

102. The representative of the United Kingdom expressed his Government's profound regret at the incident of September 4th. He fully supported the action of the United States in seizing the Security Council of the matter and thus alerting world opinion. Although the facts of the particular incident were in dispute he was bound to say that there appeared to be strong *prima facie* evidence that the attack was unprovoked, made without warning and occurred well outside the air space of the USSR. It was, therefore, indefensible. Her Majesty's Government would think it deplorable if the practice came to be accepted of shooting down aircraft, in time of peace, without warning or provocation, merely on the ground that they were in the neighbourhood of the territorial air space of another country. He hoped that the Council's discussion would serve to make it plain that world opinion strongly disapproved of such uncivilized acts and that States should conduct themselves in accordance with the principles of international behaviour which must be the foundation of good relations between countries.

103. The representative of France approved of the initiative taken by the United States Government in bringing before the Council the incident of 4 September. That initiative was actuated by a spirit consistent with that of the Charter. He then commended the United States delegation for its moderation and objectivity in presenting the case and also for proposing that all such incidents should be settled by a process of peaceful negotiations and, should they fail, by recourse to the International Court of Justice.

104. Although the USSR representative had made the most of certain contradictions found in the official

documents and Press reports relating to the incident, the spontaneous acknowledgment of his error by the United States representative constituted a convincing proof of good faith. Moreover, it was inconceivable that a patrol aircraft had opened fire on jet fighters. The problem, however, went far beyond the incident of 4 September.

105. The representative of France believed that the Council should express the view that the constant possibility of navigational errors due to meteorological or technical difficulties should render the use of violence on such occasions unacceptable, even when it was a matter of driving out an aircraft which was off its course. The procedure set forth in the Charter should enable the injured party to obtain satisfaction and should prevent the recurrence of such incidents. The United States had opened the doors for the application of this procedure; it was to be regretted that no response was to be found in the statement by the USSR representative.

106. The representative of Brazil regretted that a fresh incident had occurred to threaten international peace and security. Warning that an atmosphere of mistrust and hostility could not possibly constitute the climate in which the nations of the two hemispheres were to live, he appealed to States to exercise caution and calm to prevent the recurrence of such incidents.

107. The representative of China believed that the effect of the Council's present debate would depend to a large extent on the tone of the discussion. Judging from the moderation of the United States statement and the willingness of the United States Government to accept any means of peaceful settlement prescribed by the Charter, he felt that if any aggravation of the situation in the Far East should result, responsibility would certainly not be borne by the United States. Two diametrically opposed accounts of the incident had been presented. Time would supply the test of the USSR version, as it had in other matters of a similar kind. His delegation believed that the action of the USSR aircraft which had shot down the United States aircraft deserved to be condemned.

108. The representative of Turkey expressed apprehension over the recurrence of serious incidents which might increase the already existing tensions to dangerous proportions. His delegation was prepared to support any decision or recommendation which might lead to a peaceful solution and provide assurances for the prevention of the recurrence of such incidents.

109. The representative of New Zealand was of the opinion that, even if no specific action were contemplated with regard to the grave incident of 4 September, it was appropriate that the Council should be fully acquainted with the facts and that its members should have an opportunity to express their views. He suggested that the possibility of peaceful co-existence could be strengthened by avoiding attacks of the kind under discussion and, in the event of their occurrence, by submitting disputes to international judgment and by accepting that judgment.

110. The representative of Denmark expressed the hope that the two parties would succeed in finding a mutually satisfactory solution. In his view, a policy of avoiding incidents would greatly assist endeavours to safeguard peace. It was also his hope that the great Powers would henceforth find it possible to make their military border relations less tense.

111. The President, speaking as representative of Colombia, stated that he would have favoured, as one

means of solution, an investigation of the incident in accordance with Article 34 of the Charter. Clearly, if one Government accepted an investigation and the other refused, no arguments would prevent public opinion from regarding the latter as the guilty party. Another method might be to draft conventions providing for effective signals to inform the crew of a foreign aircraft that it had strayed over the territory of another country and to direct it to land or withdraw. He agreed with previous speakers that anything done to obviate incidents in frontier areas would contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security. If the Council should in future have the occasion to reopen the present debate and to reach an effective solution, the Colombian delegation would vote for any draft resolution designed to achieve the purposes laid down in Chapter VI of the Charter.

112. In replying to a number of previous statements, the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declared that he had no intention of explaining or justifying his position as if he were an accused person standing trial. He had considered it necessary to give an accurate and objective account of the incident of 4 September, and to draw attention to a number of contradictions, errors and mutually exclusive arguments in the United States position. However, he had opposed and still opposed consideration of this matter by the Council, although his view had not been supported by the other members. That being his position it should not be assumed that he would acquiesce in the desire of certain members that the Council should undertake an even more detailed examination of the question. He could not see how Chapter VI of the Charter, and Article 34 in particular, could have any bearing on the incident. Despite all its regrettable aspects from the humanitarian and political points of view, it could not seriously be considered capable of causing international complications likely to endanger international peace and security. A threat to peace would only be created if the so-called patrol activities over foreign territory were to be continued: that could lead to clashes. He would therefore support any proposals which, independent of the particular case under discussion, were designed to prevent the occurrence of such incidents in the future. He would reject any proposals based on the premise that the present case fell within the Council's jurisdiction.

113. Two versions of the incident on 4 September had been presented. For his part, he found it impossible to place any reliance on the account given by the United States. However, even if the United States version were correct, a number of considerations deriving therefrom deserved close scrutiny. For instance, it was admitted that the incident had taken place at a distance of only forty miles from the frontier of the USSR. The United States Press had admitted that this type of patrolling was espionage and was for the purpose of feeling out the strength of enemy radar installations. Obviously, the Soviet Union was regarded as that "enemy".

114. It had been argued that the United States case was supported by strong evidence, but that assertion made a mockery of the course of justice. Despite testimony given by the United States airmen concerned and statements by the Navy Department, it still was not clear from that evidence who had fired, and when or why they fired. The facts ascertained by the USSR were quite clear on this matter, and credence should certainly be given to the version of the incident which was free from contradictions. Furthermore, the United

States had taken special steps to prove that the incident had taken place over the high seas. Efforts had even been made to draw the USSR representative into a discussion of the location. Such manoeuvres were clearly designed to force discussion of the matter, a course which might be followed by the appointment of a commission of investigation, and even further steps. In other words, an effort was being made to establish the Council's competence in a case in which it had none.

115. He agreed entirely with the hopes expressed by previous speakers that a solution satisfactory to both parties would be found and that everything possible would be done to ensure more normal border relations. The deciding factors in reducing international tension would be respect for the principles of international law and the cessation of efforts to amass an infinite quantity and variety of armaments and to create occasions for putting them to use.

116. The representative of the United States declared that public opinion would inevitably believe that the USSR had opposed the adoption of the present agenda because it had something to hide. He reiterated that the incident of 4 September had taken place forty-

three miles from the Siberian coast and that there was no mystery at all about why United States planes had been in those waters; in accordance with the terms of the treaty with Japan, the United States had the duty and the right to exercise normal activities in that area. In conclusion, he again emphasized the readiness of the United States to bring this case, as well as all others mentioned by the representative of the USSR, before the International Court of Justice.

117. The President stated that the list of speakers was exhausted and that the Council would be reconvened if and when any delegation so requested.

118. The Council has subsequently received the text of diplomatic notes exchanged between the Governments of the United States and of the USSR on various incidents cited in its discussion. The representative of the USSR transmitted the text of notes relating to the incident of 4 September 1954 (S/3288) and to those of 7 October 1952 and 29 July 1953 (S/3308). The representative of the United States transmitted the text of notes relating to the incidents of 7 October 1952 (S/3295), 29 July 1953 (S/3304) and 10 March 1953 (S/3391).

Chapter 3

- (a) **LETTER DATED 28 JANUARY 1955 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF NEW ZEALAND TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF HOSTILITIES IN THE AREA OF CERTAIN ISLANDS OFF THE COAST OF THE MAINLAND OF CHINA.**
- (b) **LETTER DATED 30 JANUARY 1955 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF ACTS OF AGGRESSION BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AGAINST THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN THE AREA OF TAIWAN (FORMOSA) AND OTHER ISLANDS OF CHINA.**

119. By a letter dated 28 January 1955 (S/3354) the representative of New Zealand requested the President of the Council to call an early meeting to consider the question of the occurrence of armed hostilities between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China in the area of certain islands off the coast of the mainland of China. Such hostilities had made it clear that a situation existed, the continuance of which was likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. The Government of New Zealand, in the light of its concern for the maintenance of international peace and security and of its specific and inherent interest in developments affecting the area of the Pacific, wished to bring the matter to the Council's attention.

120. On 30 January 1955, the deputy permanent representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed a letter (S/3355) to the President requesting that the Council be convened at once in order to consider the question of acts of aggression by the United States of America against the People's Republic of China in the area of Taiwan (Formosa) and other islands of China. The letter charged that the intervention of the United States in the internal affairs of China and the recent extension of acts of aggression by the United States against the People's Republic of China in the area of Taiwan were aggravating tension in the Far East and increasing the threat of a new war. In such circumstances, the Council had the duty to take immediate steps to put an end to such aggression by the United States and to its intervention in the in-

ternal affairs of China. He also transmitted the following draft resolution (S/3355):

"Acts of aggression by the United States of America against the People's Republic of China in the area of Taiwan and other islands of China."

"The Security Council,

"Having examined the question of the acts of aggression by the United States of America against the People's Republic of China in the area of the islands of Taiwan, the Pescadores and other islands off the coast of China which it has seized, in the form of unprovoked armed attacks on Chinese towns and coastal areas carried out by armed forces controlled by the United States, the concentration of United States naval and air forces in that area, and official statements by United States Government officials, threatening the use of armed force against the People's Republic of China,

"Considering that these acts on the part of the United States constitute aggression against the People's Republic of China and are clearly in violation of the obligations assumed by the United States under international agreements concerning Taiwan and other Chinese islands, which are an inalienable part of Chinese national territory,

"Noting also that these acts on the part of the United States armed forces in the area of Taiwan and other Chinese islands constitute flagrant intervention in the internal affairs of China, in violation of the basic principles of the United Nations Charter,

and are a source of tension in the Far East and a threat to peace and security in the area,

“Condemns these acts of aggression by the United States of America against the People’s Republic of China,

“Recommends that the United States Government should take immediate steps to put an end to the said acts of aggression and to intervention in the internal affairs of China;

“Recommends that the United States Government should immediately withdraw all its naval, air and land forces from the island of Taiwan and other territories belonging to China;

“Urges that no military action should be permitted in the Taiwan area by either side, so that the evacuation from the islands in this area of all armed forces not controlled by the People’s Republic of China may be facilitated.”

121. By a letter dated 31 January (S/3356) addressed to the President, the deputy permanent representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics transmitted a second draft resolution, reading as follows:

“The Security Council

“Decides to invite a representative of the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China to attend the meetings of the Security Council in order to participate in the discussion of the item ‘United States acts of aggression against the People’s Republic of China in the area of Taiwan and other islands of China.’”

122. At the 689th and 690th meetings of the Security Council (31 January) discussion centred on the question of the adoption of the agenda, which provisionally included both the item submitted by New Zealand and that submitted by the Soviet Union.

123. At the outset of the 689th meeting, the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the Soviet delegation did not recognize the credentials of the representative of the Kuomintang group which was illegally occupying the seat of China in the Security Council and submitted a formal proposal that the Security Council should decide not to admit the Kuomintang representative to participate in the consideration of the items on the Council’s agenda. The USSR representative emphasized that only the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China had the right to represent the interests of the Chinese people in the international forum of the United Nations and in such an important organ of that organization as the Security Council.

124. The Chinese representative told the Council that the motion of the Soviet representative was another instance of Soviet imperialism and aggression against his country. The Chinese representative occupied the seat of the Republic of China in the Security Council by virtue of the Charter and in accordance with the rules of procedure. The communist régime in Peiping was the fruit of Soviet aggression in China. The communist régime was un-Chinese in origin, un-Chinese in character and un-Chinese in purpose. The Chinese people unanimously repudiated the Communists and denied that they in any way represented the people.

125. The representative of the United States moved that the Council decide not to consider any proposals to exclude the representative of the Government of the

Republic of China or to seat representatives of the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China. He also proposed that his motion be voted upon before the USSR proposal.

The Council decided, by 10 votes to one (USSR), to vote first on the United States motion. The United States motion was then adopted by 10 votes to one (USSR). The USSR proposal was consequently not put to the vote.

126. The representative of New Zealand, explaining the reasons which had prompted his Government to bring before the Council the question of hostilities in the area of certain islands off the coast of the mainland of China, said that since September 1954 there had been a sharp increase in military activity in that region, and that one small island had been occupied by Chinese Communist forces. The fighting had caused growing concern, and New Zealand’s objective was to bring it to an end. Any armed conflict in the modern world had potentialities of extension and consequence which could not be ignored. In the present situation two governing authorities were involved, each claiming the same territory and in control of a part of that territory, each disposing of powerful military forces and each in alliance with one of the most powerful countries in the world. It was clear, therefore, that there existed a situation likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, and it was pre-eminently the kind of problem with which the Council was called upon to deal. Once the Council had adopted its agenda, the representative of New Zealand added, he would ask that an invitation be extended to the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, since the proper consideration of the problem by the Council would require the presence of such a representative. He would propose that the Secretary-General be asked to convey this invitation to the Central People’s Government. He hoped that the valuable contact which the Secretary-General had established with the Foreign Minister of that Government would permit him personally to urge its acceptance. If the Council adopted this procedure, said the New Zealand representative, he would propose that it adjourn, in order to allow an adequate time for a reply to be received, before beginning its substantive debate. He urged that all concerned approach the consideration of the problem not only with a sense of its importance and urgency, but also with the utmost deliberation and restraint. There were contentious political issues in regard to China. To inject into the debate issues not embraced within the proposed item could not help and, indeed, would hinder the attainment of its sole object: to stop the fighting and prevent its extension. Successful action by the Council would lessen tension and thus increase the possibility of adjusting other problems in the area peacefully and in accordance with the Charter, rather than by resort to force. The existence of a threat of continued and extended hostilities, on the other hand, would diminish this possibility. This threat could only be removed by ending the fighting, and on this the Council must concentrate its efforts.

127. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stated that because a direct threat to international peace and the threat of the outbreak of a new war had arisen in the area of Taiwan, the Pescadores and other coastal islands belonging to the People’s Republic of China, he had, on the instructions of his Government, submitted a proposal for the considera-

tion by the Council of the question of United States acts of aggression against the People's Republic of China in the area of Taiwan and other islands of China. He charged that those acts of aggression had taken the form of unprovoked attacks against towns and coastal areas of China by armed forces controlled by the United States, of the concentration of United States naval and air forces in that area, and also of official statements by officials of the United States Government containing threats of the use of armed force against the People's Republic of China. In this connexion he drew attention to the fact that, following a request by the President of the United States on 24 January, the Congress had empowered him "to employ the armed force of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores" as well as related positions and territories of that area. The representative of the USSR quoted what he termed specific facts regarding the concentration of United States naval and air forces in the area of the China seas. Since the areas mentioned in the Congressional resolution were all inalienable parts of Chinese territory, it was obvious that it was adopted to clear the way for aggressive action by American armed forces against the territory of continental China and for open interference in the internal affairs of China. Any interference by the United States with action taken by the Chinese people to liberate its territory from the régime of Chiang Kai-shek could only be regarded as an act of aggression against the People's Republic of China. Yet such interference, contrary to the principles of the Charter, was constantly carried on by armed forces of the United States, which systematically violated the air space and territorial waters of China, maintaining a virtual blockade of China's coast. A further aggressive act had been the conclusion of a so-called mutual defence treaty by the United States with the Chiang Kai-shek group which aimed at cutting off Taiwan and the Pescadores from China and at establishing United States domination over those ancient Chinese territories. Moreover, the scope of that treaty could be extended to other territories defined by mutual consent. It was necessary for the Council to consider urgently the USSR draft resolution which recommended that the United States take immediate steps to put an end to its acts of aggression, and he was convinced that in adopting such a decision the Council would not only promote a cease-fire but would also remove the cause of international tension prevailing in that area.

128. The New Zealand item, he considered, sidestepped the vital matter of removing the causes of tension in the Far East and attempted to reduce the whole problem to the question of a cease-fire which would apply only to a small group of Chinese islands off the coast. Instead of attempting to re-establish peace in the Far East, the New Zealand proposal was designed to intervene in the domestic affairs of China and to demand that it relinquish its sovereign right to rid its territory of the Chiang Kai-shek group supported by the United States. For these reasons he opposed inclusion of the New Zealand item in the agenda.

129. At the 690th meeting (31 January), the representative of China declared that, while it was undeniable that the problems of the Far East were serious and basic, and while the concern of the Government and people of New Zealand with them was natural, his

Government had been as consistent and persistent as any other in striving for peace. It was well known that the recent hostilities off the coast of China had been started on 3 September 1954 by the Communists, and it was obvious that they were essentially only a continuation of the aggression against China by international Communism. Accordingly, if the Council were again to take up the problem of peace in the Far East, it should make an effort to get to the root of the problem. The item proposed by New Zealand, however, was superficial in that it limited the discussion to a consideration of the termination of hostilities, leaving no room for consideration of Soviet aggression; therefore it not only doomed the discussion to sterility, but also tended to promote the legalization of the fruits of aggression. Accordingly, he would not be in a position to support its inscription in the Council's agenda. The item proposed by the USSR should not be given a place in the Council's agenda. It referred to "acts of aggression" by the United States, which did not exist. Furthermore, it was likely that any debate would merely repeat many similar ones already held, and the item was practically identical to one discussed a short while before in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee of the General Assembly, when the USSR had felt obliged to withdraw the draft resolution which it had proposed. The USSR item was meant for propaganda and was unworthy of the purpose of the Council.

130. The representative of the United States supported the inclusion of the New Zealand item in the agenda, stating that he concurred in the view that the hostilities in the area of the Chinese off-shore islands had produced a situation which endangered the maintenance of international peace and security. That threatening situation had begun on 3 September 1954, when the Chinese Communists had laid down a heavy artillery barrage on Quemoy followed by intermittent land, sea and air assaults against all the off-shore islands from the Tachens to Quemoy. Recently the island of Ichiang, which theretofore had been under the continuous control of the Government of the Republic of China, had been attacked and over-run. The response of the Government of the Republic of China to all those attacks had been limited to operations of a purely defensive character, designed to reduce the capacity of the Communists to continue their attacks. The danger to peace could be removed only by a cessation of hostilities, and his Government therefore believed that recourse to the Council was desirable. Accordingly it endorsed and commended the initiative taken by the representative of New Zealand.

131. With regard to the USSR item, the United States representative expressed astonishment at the fact that the USSR was telling others not to interfere in the internal affairs of another country. He charged that the USSR always interfered to the maximum extent possible in the internal affairs of all countries, and had interfered and was interfering with deadly effect and to the full extent of its power in the internal affairs of China, while at the same time making a charge of interference against the United States. The United States had never interfered in the internal affairs of China, and the letter and item submitted by the USSR were a preposterous cold-war fraud. Contrary to what had been said by the USSR representative, he declared that the President of the United States in his message to the Congress had not threatened war, as his state-

ment and the subsequent resolution of Congress were purely defensive; moreover, the Mutual Security Treaty with the Republic of China was entirely defensive, having no aggressive or offensive potentialities whatsoever. He charged that the real aggressor in the modern world was Communism, and that if the USSR were to give up its support and control of the international communist movement, the greatest obstacles to organizing peace would disappear. From the statement of the USSR representative, one could clearly see that international Communism would like to take over Formosa, as well as any other place if it could.

132. While considering that the USSR item was a reflection of the standard communist line and appeared to be merely a smoke screen designed to conceal a refusal to agree to a cessation of hostilities, the representative of the United States declared that his delegation would not oppose putting the USSR item on the agenda. In fact, it welcomed the opportunity to demonstrate that the whole effort of the United States Government was for peace, and that the USSR complaint was specious. If in fact the Communists were opposed to war and violence, as they sought to imply, that could easily be demonstrated by their support of a cessation of hostilities.

133. The representative of the United Kingdom said that it must be apparent to all that the last-minute submission of the complaint of the USSR was designed to displace the initiative taken by New Zealand and to get the discussion on an entirely different basis. However, he hoped that he was right in detecting in the Soviet representative's speech an awareness of the dangers of a continuation of the present hostilities, which the New Zealand initiative was designed to bring to an end. The task of statesmanship was to find solutions. He regretted that both the statement and the letter of the USSR representative were far from the realm of reality, and once again consisted of the old charges of aggression against the United States, repeated most recently at the last session of the General Assembly in connexion with a similar USSR item. No impartial observer could impugn the sincerity of the United States objectives in the Far East or doubt that they were essentially pacific and designed to reduce the risk of an extension of the hostilities.

134. The United Kingdom representative considered that the Council should include both of the items in its agenda, but he intended to propose that the New Zealand item should be considered first. His Government warmly supported the initiative taken by New Zealand, as the hostilities had undeniably created a potentially dangerous situation, and there was a grave risk that they might spread. But, if the fighting could be stopped, this would increase the possibility of peaceful rather than violent adjustments of the problems involved. He agreed with the representative of New Zealand that it would be desirable for an invitation to be extended to the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China to participate in the discussion of the item, since a successful and peaceable solution would doubtless require the co-operation of both sides. It was also appropriate that the Secretary-General should be asked to transmit the invitation on behalf of the Council, since he had only recently been engaged in discussions with that Government.

135. The representative of Brazil said that the surprise request for consideration also of a USSR item

seemed to him clearly intended to prevent the New Zealand proposal, if approved, from immediately relaxing the grave tension and leading to a possibility of agreement between the parties. Since a substantially identical USSR proposal had been overwhelmingly rejected by the General Assembly as unreasonable and inconsistent, the purposes of the USSR once again seemed to be purely propagandistic, and aimed at compromising the United States in world public opinion. Despite these views, the Brazilian delegation would agree to the adoption of the item on the condition that it was discussed after the item proposed by New Zealand.

136. The representative of Belgium pointed out that the Council was not at the moment called upon to consider the particularly complex situation which existed along the coast of the Chinese mainland; the matter should first be placed on the agenda. He approved the strictly objective definition of the question in the New Zealand delegation's proposal. By including the question in its agenda in that form the Council would pre-judge nothing.

137. A decision would then have to be taken on the President's proposal regarding an invitation to the Government of the People's Republic of China to be represented. That proposal seemed sound and he reserved the right to support it when the time came.

138. A second item for inclusion in the agenda had been proposed by the Soviet Union. The Soviet proposal was as partial as the New Zealand proposal was objective. It repeated a familiar propaganda line which would doubtless reappear however the agenda item was worded. Thus it was immaterial whether the item proposed by the Soviet Union was included in the Council's agenda or not. In any event, he supported the United Kingdom representative's proposal that the discussion should be so arranged that the Council should not embark on the second item until its examination of the first had been completed.

139. The representatives of Peru, Turkey, Iran and France also supported the inclusion of both items in the agenda, while expressing reservations with regard to the wording of the item proposed by the USSR.

140. A motion was submitted by the representative of the United Kingdom to the effect (a) that the Council should vote first on whether to inscribe the New Zealand item in its agenda; (b) that it should vote second on whether to inscribe the USSR item; and (c) that it should then vote on whether to conclude its consideration of the New Zealand item before taking up the USSR item. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics drew attention to the unusual procedure proposed by the representative of the United Kingdom and proposed that the Security Council should decide which of the questions on its agenda should be examined first and should then go on to examine the substance of that question; i.e., that it should adhere to the normal and customary procedure established in the Security Council. The representative of the United Kingdom pressed for the adoption of the procedure he had proposed. An amendment to the third point was submitted by the representative of the USSR, providing for the Council to decide to include as the first item on its agenda the item proposed by the USSR.

The item submitted by New Zealand was included in the agenda by 9 votes to 1 (USSR), with one abstention (China). The item submitted by the USSR was

included in the agenda by 10 votes to one (China). The proposal to consider first the item proposed by the USSR was rejected by 10 votes to one (USSR). The Council decided to conclude its consideration of the New Zealand item before taking up the USSR item by 10 votes to one (USSR).

141. The President, speaking as representative of New Zealand, formally requested the Council's concurrence in the proposal to invite a representative of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China to participate in the discussion of the New Zealand item and to ask the Secretary-General to convey such an invitation to that Government.

142. In supporting this proposal, the representative of France also commended the initiative taken by New Zealand in bringing to the attention of the Council a situation which was causing concern and which it was the duty of the United Nations to consider in an attempt to avert its inherent dangers. The recent hostilities in the Formosa Strait were a new phase of the conflict in which for over twenty years two factions of the Chinese people had been involved. While it was not for the Council to settle the dispute between the two parties, those hostilities were taking place in an international context which could not be ignored, as they were endangering peace and security throughout the world. The Council could proceed only with due deliberation in its efforts toward the gradual decrease of tension in that troubled area, and should avoid any spectacular enterprise lightly undertaken and necessarily doomed to failure. The only possible objective of the Council at the outset was to arrange the suspension of hostilities by means of a cease-fire.

143. Such a cease-fire would in no way prejudice the rights of either of the two parties or weaken any of their claims. At the present stage, the Council was not called upon to rule on the legitimacy of the positions of the various Powers. Its task was a more modest one: to put an end to hostilities which, if not checked, might result in an extension of the conflict.

144. The representative of France added that a cease-fire could not be proclaimed unilaterally or imposed. It must be effected by agreement and be subject to supervision. Any discussion in the Council would therefore presuppose participation by all parties concerned. Participation by a representative of the People's Republic of China was essential. The Council's invitation would be transmitted to that country by the Secretary-General, who should be the sole judge of the most appropriate means of carrying out the Council's instructions.

145. The representative of China opposed the proposal to invite a representative of the Communist régime, which had been condemned by the United Nations as an aggressor in Korea, since it was in his view morally wrong and politically foolish to invite aggressors to participate in the Council's debates. The Chinese people would be insulted were the Communists considered to be its representative, while the prestige of the Communists in China and in all of Asia would be enhanced by such an invitation.

146. The representative of the United States said that while he believed it would be useful to the efforts to end the armed conflict for the Chinese Communist régime to be present, his support for the invitation had no bearing on United States' opposition to the representation of China in the United Nations by the

Communists, nor did it imply any change in its attitude against recognition of that régime.

The proposal that the Council should invite a representative of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China to participate in the discussion of the New Zealand item, and that the Secretary-General should be requested to convey that invitation to the Central People's Government was adopted by 9 votes to 1 (China), with 1 abstention (USSR).

147. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics explained that since his delegation had opposed the inclusion of the New Zealand item in the agenda, it was not able to support the proposed invitation. It had, however, submitted its own proposal for an invitation to be extended in connexion with the item which it had submitted.

148. An exchange of cables (S/3358) between the Secretary-General and the Prime Minister of the State Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China was circulated to the members of the Council on 4 February. In a cable dated 31 January the Secretary-General had informed the Central People's Government of the Council's decisions. In his reply dated 3 February, the Prime Minister of the State Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China charged that the source of tension in the Far East had all along been the aggression of the United States against the Chinese territory of Taiwan (Formosa), and that that aggression had recently been aggravated by the dispatch of further substantial naval and air forces of the United States to that area. The People's Republic of China fully supported the proposals submitted by the USSR in the Security Council for putting an end to the aggression by the United States and easing the tension in the Far East. Since the liberation of its own territory was a sovereign right of the Chinese people and entirely an internal matter, it was a violation of the Charter to propose, as was done in the New Zealand item, that the Council should consider the question of hostilities in the area of certain islands off the coast of China. The cable further stated that it was particularly intolerable that the People's Republic of China, which represented the six hundred-million-strong nation of China, was still deprived of its legitimate position and rights in the United Nations, while the seat of the representative of China continued to be usurped by a group long since repudiated by the Chinese people. So long as that unjustified situation persisted, it would not be able to send a representative to take part in the discussion of the New Zealand item, and would have to consider all decisions taken by the Council concerning China to be null and void. The People's Republic of China could agree to participate in the deliberations of the Security Council only for the purpose of discussing the resolution proposed by the USSR and only when the representative of the People's Republic attended in the name of China and after the other occupant of China's seat had been expelled.

149. On 14 February (691st meeting) when the Council resumed its consideration of this question, the representatives of New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Turkey, Brazil, France and the United States expressed their regret and disappointment at the response of the Central People's Government to the Council's invitation. All concerned had accepted the

fact that international peace and security were endangered, and accordingly it was clear to these speakers that a cessation of hostilities on and around the off-shore islands would substantially lessen the tension and that acceptance of the Council's invitation would have increased the prospects of a peaceful solution. These representatives considered, however, that in the circumstances the Council should not seek to push matters forward immediately, but should adjourn for the time being its consideration of the matter contained in the New Zealand item; in the meantime, the members of the Council would continue to consult together on possible ways to secure the cessation of hostilities. They were confident that until a solution was reached, all Governments which were concerned to ensure the maintenance of peace in the Pacific area would continue to work actively to that end. It was necessary for the Council to proceed with care and to allow Governments due time for study, consultation and employment of the methods of traditional diplomacy, while of course keeping the problem under the constant and anxious consideration of its members.

150. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics found it difficult to take seriously the expressions of regret voiced by several members of the Security Council; they could hardly have expected to receive a favourable reply to the invitation sent to the People's Republic of China, since the Council's decision to examine the New Zealand proposal before that of the USSR had shown that its members did not intend to discuss the real cause of the tension in that area. As was known, the cause was the fact that the United States, with the help of Chiang Kai-shek, had some years earlier seized Taiwan, and the Pescadores, which belonged to China, together with certain other Chinese islands, and was now, by means of a well-contrived manoeuvre in the form of a cease-fire in that area, attempting to coerce the People's Republic of China into renouncing its sovereign rights to those parts of the national territory of China and to confirm the illegal seizure of the islands by the United States. He was therefore not surprised that the People's Republic of China had interpreted the New Zealand proposal as a flagrant intervention in the internal affairs of China, an attempt to cover up the acts of aggression against China by the United States, and a violation of the fundamental principles of the Charter. The exercise by the Chinese people of their sovereign right to liberate their own territory was entirely a matter of China's internal jurisdiction, which had never caused international tension and could not threaten international peace and security.

151. The USSR representative considered that the continued acts of aggression against the People's Republic made adoption of the USSR proposal even more imperative. By providing that no military action should be permitted by either side, so that the evacuation from the islands in the area of all armed forces not controlled by the People's Republic might be facilitated, the USSR proposal sought to achieve an immediate cease-fire, as well as an end to the aggression and intervention of the United States. It was for this reason that the reply by the People's Republic of China had indicated warm support for the USSR proposals. The USSR representative drew the Council's attention to that fact. The fact that the recent large-scale military operation involving the transfer of Chinese Nationalist armed forces from the Tachen Islands had been carried out under the cover of powerful United States naval and air forces, the USSR representative said, provided a further illustration of the provocative acts which were under consideration in the Council. It had been admitted unequivocally by Chiang Kai-shek that the purpose of the redeployment had been to prepare for the invasion of the Chinese mainland. All those facts showed that the Security Council should not simply remain inactive, as other speakers had proposed. Examination by the Council of the New Zealand item could not produce positive results calculated to eliminate the threat of war in the Far East; he proposed that the Council could immediately proceed to consider the USSR proposal, and should also, after first removing the representative unlawfully occupying the seat of China, invite the People's Republic of China to take its rightful seat.

152. The representative of China expressed astonishment at the mild reception given by the members of the Council to the reply received from the Chinese Communists, a reply he characterized as brutal in substance and barbarous in language, having nothing in common with either the traditions of the Chinese people or the ideals of the United Nations.

153. The representative of the United States denied *in toto* all the charges made against his country, which could not be proved, and pointed out that the statement of the USSR representative had completely disregarded the idea of a cessation of hostilities.

154. The representatives of New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and Peru disagreed with the view of the USSR representative that the Council had completed its consideration of the New Zealand item, which they considered was to be continued

The USSR proposal that the Council examine the next item on its agenda was rejected by 10 votes to 1 (USSR).

PART II

Other matters considered by the Council

Chapter 4

ELECTION OF MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

A. Election of a member of the Court to fill a vacancy caused by the death of Judge Sir Benegal Rau

155. At its 677th meeting (28 July 1954), the Council had before it a note by the Secretary-General (S/3226) stating that by a communication dated 30 November 1953, the Vice-President of the International Court of Justice had informed him of the death of Judge Sir Benegal Narsing Rau. The Council noted that a vacancy had occurred and decided, under Article 14 of the Statute of the Court, that an election to fill the vacancy for the remainder of Judge Rau's term, i.e., until 5 February 1961, should take place at the ninth session of the General Assembly before the regular election to be held at the same session.

156. At its 681st meeting (7 October), the Security Council held a secret ballot on the candidates in the list of nominees circulated by the Secretary-General on 20 July (S/3270, Corrigendum 1 and Addenda 1 and 2). The President announced that Mr. Mohammad Zafrulla Khan had received the required absolute majority of votes.³

B. Election of five members of the Court

157. In a memorandum dated 24 September 1954 (S/3293), the Secretary-General noted that the terms of office of five judges of the Court were due to expire on 5 February 1955, and that it was accordingly necessary for the Council and the General Assembly, at its ninth session, to elect five judges for a term of office of nine years beginning on 6 February 1955.

158. At the 681st meeting (7 October) the Council proceeded to vote on candidates on the list of nominees circulated by the Secretary-General (S/3281 and Addenda 1-4). On the first ballot the following six candidates received the required absolute majority of votes: Mr. Jules Basdevant (France), 10 votes; Mr. Hersch Lauterpacht (United Kingdom), 9 votes; Mr. Roberto Córdova (Mexico), 8 votes; Mr. José G. Guerrero (El Salvador), 7 votes; Mr. Lucio M. Moreno Quintana (Argentina), 7 votes; and Mr. Charles de Visscher (Belgium), 6 votes.

159. The Council then took a second ballot, after the President had stated that members would again be free to cast their five votes for any candidates on the list. As a result of the second ballot, six candidates again received the required majority of votes:

Mr. Basdevant, 10 votes; Mr. Córdova, 8 votes; Mr. Guerrero, 8 votes; Mr. Lauterpacht, 8 votes; Mr. Moreno Quintana, 7 votes; and Mr. de Visscher, 7 votes.

160. A third ballot was then taken, as a result of which once again six candidates received the required majority: Mr. Basdevant received 9 votes; Mr. Córdova 8 votes; Mr. Lauterpacht 8 votes; Mr. Moreno Quintana 7 votes; Mr. de Visscher 7 votes; and Mr. Guerrero 6 votes.

161. As a result of a fourth ballot, the President of the Council announced that the names of four candidates who had received the required majority would be communicated to the President of the General Assembly. Those candidates were: Mr. Basdevant, 9 votes; Mr. Córdova, 9 votes; Mr. Lauterpacht, 8 votes; and Mr. Moreno Quintana, 8 votes. Noting that the General Assembly was voting at the same time, the President said that he was confident that if the same four candidates should also receive the required absolute majority in the Assembly, the President of the General Assembly would declare those four elected.⁴

162. The representative of Colombia expressed some doubts regarding the procedure which had been followed, since under Article 10 of the Statute of the Court, those candidates who obtained an absolute majority of votes in the Council and the Assembly were to be considered elected. It was possible that when six candidates had received the required majority in the Council, five of those candidates might have already secured an absolute majority in the Assembly as well. It was further possible that one of those five candidates, although he had had a majority a short while before in the Council and also in the Assembly, might fail to obtain a majority in a later ballot in the Council. That could create a confusing situation.

163. The President stated that since under Article 8 of the Statute, the Assembly and the Council proceeded to elections independently of one another, the Council could not know what had happened in the General Assembly until it had received a communication from the President of that body. He considered that the Council must continue to vote until it had selected five candidates with the necessary absolute majority.

164. The representative of France, supporting the Presidential interpretation, added that if six candidates

³ Mr. Zafrulla Khan also received the required majority of votes in the General Assembly and was thus elected as a member of the Court.

⁴ Mr. Basdevant, Mr. Córdova, Mr. Lauterpacht and Mr. Moreno Quintana also received the required majority of votes in the General Assembly and were thus elected as members of the Court.

obtained an absolute majority in the Council none of them could be elected, because only five or fewer candidates could be selected.

165. The representative of Colombia, wishing to clarify the issue for future reference, gave the following interpretation. It seemed to him that according to the rules, if any six candidates obtained a majority, it would be quite in order for the Council to communicate that result to the General Assembly. Those candidates could not, however, be considered to have been elected. Election would occur only if five of those six candidates also obtained a majority in the Assembly. He therefore believed that if a situation arose again in the future in which six candidates obtained a majority in the Council, the Council should communicate that result to the Assembly in accordance with Article 10 of the Statute. Consideration should be given to the possibility of asking the Presidents of

the Assembly and of the Council to exchange letters after each ballot.

166. The President stated that since the representative of Colombia did not insist that any new decision should be taken, the Council would proceed with its voting. He pointed out further that the Council's action accorded with the procedure which it had followed in 1951.

167. In the ballot for the one remaining vacancy, Mr. Guerrero received 7 votes, and the President stated that he would inform the President of the General Assembly that Mr. Guerrero had also obtained the necessary majority.⁵

⁵ Mr. Guerrero also received the required majority of votes in the General Assembly and was thus elected as a member of the Court.

PART III

The Military Staff Committee

Chapter 5

WORK OF THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE

A. Status of the Committee's work

168. The Military Staff Committee has been functioning continuously under the draft rules of procedure during the period under review and has held a total of 27 meetings without making further progress on matters of substance.

PART IV

Matters brought to the attention of the Council but not discussed

Chapter 6

COMMUNICATIONS FROM THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES

169. The Chairman of the Council of the Organization of American States (OAS), on 10 January 1955, in accordance with Article 54 of the Charter, addressed a letter (S/3344) to the Secretary-General transmitting for the information of the Security Council a resolution adopted by the Council of the OAS at the request of the Government of Costa Rica, which had stated that it was convinced that an attack was imminent on its frontier with Nicaragua. On 12 January the Chairman transmitted a resolution adopted at a special session of the Council of the OAS on 11 January (S/3345), wherein provision was made for the appointment of a Fact-Finding Committee to investigate the relevant facts on the spot.

170. On 13 January the Chairman of the Council of the OAS transmitted the text of a resolution adopted on 12 January (S/3348) in which the Council, *inter alia*, requested the American Governments to take the necessary measures to prevent the use of their territories for any military action against the Government of another State, and further requested those Governments in a position to do so to place at the disposal of the Fact-Finding Committee aircraft to make pacific observation flights over the affected regions. The letter stated that also planes had been placed at the disposal of the Committee by the Government of the United States.

171. On 15 January the Chairman of the Council of the OAS transmitted to the Secretary-General the texts of four communications received from the Fact-Finding Committee (S/3347), together with a resolution approved on 14 January, in which the Council, *inter alia*, condemned the acts of intervention of which Costa Rica was the victim, appealed expressly to all American Governments to strengthen the measures

they had adopted for dealing with the situation, and directed the Fact-Finding Committee to send observers to all airports in the region as well as to any places which might be used for the transport of armed forces or military elements to Costa Rica, with a view to ascertaining the origin of such forces and material.

172. On 17 January the Chairman of the Council transmitted further communications (S/3349) about the situation from the Fact-Finding Committee and from Governments of member States, as well as two resolutions adopted by the Council on 16 January in which the Council called upon the member States to give prompt consideration to any requests by Costa Rica for the purchase of aircraft, and requested the Fact-Finding Committee, in accordance with the desires of the Governments of Costa Rica and Nicaragua, to proceed with the utmost urgency to negotiate and carry out a plan for the effective supervision of their common frontier.

173. On 18 February the Chairman of the Council of the OAS transmitted for the information of the Secretary-General and of the Security Council the report of the Fact-Finding Committee on its activities, its conclusions and its recommendations (S/3366 and Add.1). On 28 February he transmitted four resolutions approved by the Council on 24 February (S/3395), in which the Council, *inter alia*, expressed its satisfaction that the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and political independence of Costa Rica had been preserved, thanks to the measures adopted by the OAS and accepted by the Governments of Costa Rica and Nicaragua; recommended further measures to re-establish cordial and friendly relations between the two Governments; and after expressing its appreciation of the work of the Fact-Finding Committee, resolved to terminate its activities.

Chapter 7

COMMUNICATIONS RELATING TO THE KOREAN QUESTION

174. During the period covered by the present report, the representative of the United States, in a note dated 7 March 1955 (S/3370), informed the Council that General Maxwell B. Taylor had been appointed to replace General John E. Hull as the Commanding General of the Military Forces which Members of the United Nations had made available to the Unified Command under the United States pursuant to the Council's resolution of 7 July 1950. In another note dated 13 May (S/3402), he informed the Council that General Lyman L. Lemnitzer had been appointed to replace General Taylor.

COMMUNICATIONS RELATING TO THE FREE TERRITORY OF TRIESTE

175. By a letter dated 25 January 1955 (S/3353) addressed to the President of the Council, the representatives of the United Kingdom and of the United States transmitted a report on the administration of the British-United States Zone of the Free Territory of Trieste for the period 1 January to 31 December 1953.

176. By a letter dated 5 October 1954 (S/3301 and Add.1) addressed to the President, the observer of Italy to the United Nations and the representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States and Yugoslavia transmitted for the information of the Council a copy of the Memorandum of Understanding initialled in London on that date by representatives of their four Governments, together with annexes, concerning practical arrangements for the Free Territory of Trieste.

177. In a letter dated 12 October addressed to the President (S/3305), the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, referring to the above-mentioned communication, noted that the agreement concerning the Free Territory of Trieste had been reached as a result of an understanding between Italy

and Yugoslavia, the countries immediately interested, and was acceptable to them. In view of that circumstance and of the fact that the agreement would promote the establishment of normal relations between Italy and Yugoslavia and contribute towards a relaxation of tension in that part of Europe, the Government of the USSR took cognizance of the agreement.

178. In a letter dated 17 January (S/3351), the observer of Italy and the representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States and Yugoslavia reported to the Council that the necessary steps had been taken to carry out the arrangements provided for in the Memorandum of Understanding: the preliminary demarcation of the boundary with the agreed adjustments had been carried out, the United States-United Kingdom Military Government had been terminated in Zone A on 26 October and administration of the area as newly demarcated was relinquished to the civilian Government of Italy; the area administered by Yugoslavia was similarly placed under civilian rather than military administration; and the two Governments had appointed a Boundary Commission to effect a more precise demarcation of the boundary.

Chapter 9

COMMUNICATION RELATING TO THE SITUATION IN ALGERIA

179. In a letter dated 5 January 1955 to the President of the Security Council (S/3341), the representative of Saudi Arabia, on the instructions of his Government, brought to the Council's attention under Article 35, paragraph 1, the grave situation in Algeria, which it considered was likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. He reserved the right of his Government to request that a meeting of the Council be convened to consider the matter and to take the measures required, and transmitted an explanatory memorandum which charged that military operations were being employed to liquidate the nationalist uprising against French colonial rule and oppression in Algeria.

Chapter 10

REPORT OF THE COLLECTIVE MEASURES COMMITTEE

180. On 27 August 1954, in accordance with resolution 703 (VII) of the General Assembly, the Collective Measures Committee forwarded to the Secretary-General for transmission to the Council its third report (S/3283), which contained among other things recommendations on the principles of collective security.

Chapter 11

REPORTS ON THE TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS

181. On 26 July 1954 the Secretary-General transmitted to the Security Council the report of the Trusteeship Council on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands for the period from 22 July 1953 to 16 July 1954 (S/3272), which, in accordance with Article 83 of the Charter and the resolutions adopted by the Security Council on 7 March 1949 and by the Trusteeship Council on 24 March 1949, described the carrying out during the period under review by the Trusteeship Council, on behalf of the Security Council, those functions of the United Nations

relating to the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the Trust Territory, which has been designated a strategic area.

182. On 12 May 1955, the Secretary-General transmitted to the members of the Council the report (S/3400) received from the representative of the United States on the administration of the Trust Territory for the period 1 July 1953 to 30 June 1954.

Chapter 12

REPORT OF THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

183. By a letter dated 29 July 1954 (S/3276), addressed to the Secretary-General, the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission transmitted the fourth report on its work, with the request that it be transmitted to the Council pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 6 of General Assembly resolution 715 (VIII).

Chapter 13

LETTERS BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL TRANSMITTING THE TEXTS OF CERTAIN RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

184. On 8 November 1954 (S/3316), the Secretary-General communicated the texts of resolutions 808 A, B and C (IX) adopted by the General Assembly on 4 November 1954, under the title "Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments: report of the Disarmament Commission; Conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction." In these resolutions the Assembly, *inter alia*, requested the Disarmament Commission to report to the Council, as well as to the General Assembly, as soon as sufficient progress had been made.

185. In another letter dated 8 November (S/3317) the Secretary-General communicated for the information of the members of the Council, the text of resolution 809 (IX), entitled "Methods which might be used to maintain and strengthen international peace and security in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter: report of the Collective Measures Committee", which had been adopted by the General Assembly on 4 November 1954. In this resolution the Collective Measures Committee was re-

quested to report to the Council and to the General Assembly as appropriate.

186. By a letter dated 29 November 1954 (S/3324) the Secretary-General transmitted for the information of the members of the Council the text of resolution 817 (IX) on "Admission of new Members to the United Nations", adopted by the General Assembly on 23 November 1954. By this resolution the Assembly sent back to the Council the pending applications for membership for further consideration and positive recommendations, suggesting that the Council consider the desirability of invoking the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 28 of the Charter to help resolve the problem, and requesting the Council and the Committee of Good Offices to report to the Assembly during the latter's ninth session if possible, and in any event during the tenth session.

187. On 17 December (S/3334) the Secretary-General transmitted resolution 907 (IX) on "Appointment of members of the Peace Observation Commission", which the Assembly had adopted on 11 December 1954.

APPENDICES

I. Representatives and deputy, alternate and acting representatives accredited to the Security Council

The following representatives and deputy, alternate and acting representatives were accredited to the Security Council during the period covered by the present report:

*Belgium*¹

M. Fernand van Langenhove
M. Joseph Nisot

Brazil

Prof. Ernesto Leme
(until 28 Jan. 1955)
Mr. Cyro de Freitas-Valle
(from 28 Jan. 1955)
Mr. Jayme de Barros Gomes

China

Dr. Tingfu F. Tsiang
Dr. Shuhsi Hsu
Mr. Chiping H. C. Kiang

*Colombia*²

Dr. Francisco Urrutia
Sr. Carlos Echeverri Cortés
Sr. Eduardo Carrizosa

*Denmark*²

Mr. William Borberg
Mr. Birger Dons Moeller

France

M. Henri Hoppenot
M. Charles Lucet
M. Pierre Ordonneau

¹ Term of office began on 1 January 1955.

² Term of office ended on 31 December 1954.

*Iran*¹

Mr. Nasrollah Entezam
Dr. Mohammed Ali Massoud-Ansari

*Lebanon*²

Dr. Charles Malik
Mr. Edward Rizk

New Zealand

Sir Leslie Munro
Mr. A. R. Perry

*Peru*¹

Sr. Victor A. Belaúnde
Sr. Carlos Holguín de Lavalle

Turkey

Mr. Selim Sarper
Mr. Adil Derinsu (until 9 February 1955)
Mr. Turgut Menemencioglu (from 9 February 1955)

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Mr. Andrei Vyshinsky (until 22 November 1954)
Mr. Arkady A. Sobolev³
Mr. Semyon K. Tsarapkin (until 16 November 1954)

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Sir Pierson Dixon
Mr. P. M. Crosthwaite

United States of America

Mr. Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.
Mr. James J. Wadsworth
Mr. John C. Ross (until 31 January 1955)

³ Appointed alternate representative on 16 November 1954 and representative on 5 March 1955.

II. Presidents of the Security Council

The following representatives held the office of President of the Security Council during the period covered by the present report:

Brazil

Prof. Ernesto Leme (16 to 31 July 1954)

China

Dr. Tingfu F. Tsiang (1 to 31 August 1954)

Colombia

Dr. Francisco Urrutia (1 to 30 September 1954)

Denmark

Mr. William Borberg (1 to 31 October 1954)

France

M. Henri Hoppenot (1 to 30 November 1954)

Lebanon

Dr. Charles Malik (1 to 31 December 1954)

New Zealand

Sir Leslie Munro (1 to 31 January 1955)

Peru

Sr. Victor A. Belaúnde (1 to 28 February 1955)

Turkey

Mr. Selim Sarper (1 to 31 March 1955)

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Mr. Arkady A. Sobolev (1 to 30 April 1955)

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Sir Pierson Dixon (1 to 31 May 1955)

United States of America

Mr. Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. (1 to 30 June 1955)

Belgium

M. Fernand van Langenhove (1 to 15 July 1955)

III. Meetings of the Security Council during the period from 16 July 1954 to 15 July 1955

| Meeting | Subject | Date | Meeting | Subject | Date |
|-----------------|---|----------------|---------|--|---------------------|
| | | July 1954 | | | |
| 677th | The date of election to fill a vacancy in the International Court of Justice | 28 | | cerning the question of hostilities in the area of certain islands off the coast of the mainland of China (S/3354) | |
| | | August 1954 | | 2. Letter dated 30 January 1955 from the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the President of the Security Council concerning the question of acts of aggression by the United States of America against the People's Republic of China in the area of Taiwan and other islands of China (S/3355) | |
| 678th (private) | Report of the Security Council to the General Assembly | 18 | | | |
| | | September 1954 | | | |
| 679th | Letter dated 8 September 1954 from the representative of the United States of America addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/3287) | 10 | | | |
| 680th | Letter dated 8 September 1954 from the representative of the United States of America addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/3287) | 10 | | | |
| | | October 1954 | | | |
| 681st | Election of a member of the International Court of Justice Election of five members of the International Court of Justice | 7 | | | |
| 682nd | The Palestine question | 14 | | | |
| | | November 1954 | | | |
| 683rd | The Palestine question | 3 | | | |
| 684th | The Palestine question | 3 | | | |
| 685th | The Palestine question | 11 | | | |
| | | December 1954 | | | |
| 686th | The Palestine question | 7 | | | |
| | | January 1955 | | | |
| 687th | The Palestine question | 4 | 691st | 1. Letter from the representative of New Zealand dated 28 January 1955 to the President of the Security Council concerning the question of hostilities in the area of certain islands off the coast of the mainland of China (S/3354) | February 1955 14 |
| 688th | The Palestine question | 13 | | 2. Letter dated 30 January 1955 from the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the President of the Security Council concerning the question of acts of aggression by the United States of America against the People's Republic of China in the area of Taiwan and other islands of China (S/3355) | |
| 689th | Adoption of the agenda | 31 | | | |
| 690th | 1. Letter from the representative of New Zealand dated 28 January 1955 to the President of the Security Council con- | 31 | | | |
| | | | 692nd | The Palestine question | March 1955 4 |
| | | | 693rd | The Palestine question | 17 |
| | | | 694th | The Palestine question | 23 |
| | | | 695th | The Palestine question | 29 |
| | | | 696th | The Palestine question | 30 |
| | | | | | April 1955 |
| | | | 697th | The Palestine question | 6 |
| | | | 698th | The Palestine question | 19 |

IV. Representatives, Chairmen and Principal Secretaries of the Military Staff Committee

(16 July 1954 to 15 July 1955)

A. REPRESENTATIVES OF EACH SERVICE

| Delegation of | Period of service |
|---|--------------------------------|
| <i>Delegation of China</i> | |
| Lt.-General Ho Shai-lai, CA | 16 July 1954 to present time |
| Commander Chen Tsai-ho, CN | 16 July 1954 to present time |
| <i>Delegation of France</i> | |
| Général de Brigade M. Pénette, French Army | 16 July 1954 to present time |
| Capitaine de Frégate M. Sanoner, French Navy | 16 July 1954 to present time |
| <i>Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</i> | |
| Major-General I. M. Saraiev, Soviet Army | 16 July 1954 to present time |
| Captain 2nd Grade B. F. Gladkov, USSR Navy | 16 July 1954 to present time |
| <i>Delegation of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland</i> | |
| Vice-Admiral C. C. Hughes-Hallett, R.N. | 16 July 1954 to 17 August 1954 |
| Vice-Admiral G. Barnard, R.N. | 18 August 1954 to present time |
| Air Vice-Marshal R. L. R. Atcherly, RAF | 16 July 1954 to present time |
| Major-General G. E. Prior-Palmer, British Army | 16 July 1954 to present time |

A. REPRESENTATIVES OF EACH SERVICE (continued)

Period of service

Delegation of the United States of America

| | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Vice-Admiral A. D. Struble, USN | 16 July 1954 to present time |
| Lt. General L. W. Johnson, USAF | 16 July 1954 to present time |
| Lt. General W. A. Burress, USA | 16 July 1954 to 30 November 1954 |
| Lt. General T. W. Herren, USA | 1 December 1954 to present time |

B. LIST OF CHAIRMEN

(16 July 1954 to 15 July 1955)

| Meeting | Date | Chairman | Delegation |
|---------|--------------|--|-------------------------------------|
| 238th | 22 July 1954 | Vice-Admiral A. D. Struble, USN | United States of America |
| 239th | 5 Aug. 1954 | Lt. General Ho Shai-lai, Chinese Army | China |
| 240th | 19 Aug. 1954 | Lt. General Ho Shai-lai, Chinese Army | China |
| 241st | 2 Sep. 1954 | Général de Brigade M. Pénette, French Army | France |
| 242nd | 16 Sep. 1954 | Capitaine de Frégate M. Sanoner, French Navy | France |
| 243rd | 30 Sep. 1954 | Général de Brigade M. Pénette, French Army | France |
| 244th | 14 Oct. 1954 | Major-General I. M. Saraiev, Soviet Army | Union of Soviet Socialist Republics |
| 245th | 28 Oct. 1954 | Major-General I. M. Saraiev, Soviet Army | Union of Soviet Socialist Republics |
| 246th | 12 Nov. 1954 | Major-General G. E. Prior-Palmer, British Army | United Kingdom |
| 247th | 24 Nov. 1954 | Vice-Admiral G. Barnard, R.N. | United Kingdom |
| 248th | 9 Dec. 1954 | Vice-Admiral A. D. Struble, USN | United States of America |
| 249th | 23 Dec. 1954 | Lt. General L. W. Johnson, USAF | United States of America |
| 250th | 6 Jan. 1955 | Lt. General Ho Shai-lai, Chinese Army | China |
| 251st | 20 Jan. 1955 | Lt. General Ho Shai-lai, Chinese Army | China |
| 252nd | 3 Feb. 1955 | Général de Brigade M. Pénette, French Army | France |
| 253rd | 17 Feb. 1955 | Capitaine de Frégate M. Sanoner, French Navy | France |
| 254th | 3 Mar. 1955 | Major-General I. M. Saraiev, Soviet Army | Union of Soviet Socialist Republics |
| 255th | 17 Mar. 1955 | Major-General I. M. Saraiev, Soviet Army | Union of Soviet Socialist Republics |
| 256th | 31 Mar. 1955 | Major-General I. M. Saraiev, Soviet Army | Union of Soviet Socialist Republics |
| 257th | 14 Apr. 1955 | Vice-Admiral G. Barnard, R.N. | United Kingdom |
| 258th | 28 Apr. 1955 | Major-General G. E. Prior-Palmer, British Army | United Kingdom |
| 259th | 12 May 1955 | Vice-Admiral A. D. Struble, USN | United States of America |
| 260th | 26 May 1955 | Vice-Admiral A. D. Struble, USN | United States of America |
| 261st | 9 June 1955 | Lt. General Ho Shai-lai, Chinese Army | China |
| 262nd | 23 June 1955 | Lt. General Ho Shai-lai, Chinese Army | China |
| 263rd | 7 July 1955 | Capitaine de Frégate M. Sanoner, French Navy | France |
| 264th | 12 July 1955 | Capitaine de Frégate M. Sanoner, French Navy | France |

C. LIST OF PRINCIPAL SECRETARIES

(16 July 1954 to 15 July 1955)

| Meeting | Date | Principal Secretary | Delegation |
|---------|--------------|---|-------------------------------------|
| 238th | 22 July 1954 | Commander P. A. Lilly, USN | United States of America |
| 239th | 5 Aug. 1954 | Major Shaw Ming-kaio, Chinese Army | China |
| 240th | 19 Aug. 1954 | Major Shaw Ming-kaio, Chinese Army | China |
| 241st | 2 Sep. 1954 | Chef d'Escadron G. Buchet, French Army | France |
| 242nd | 16 Sep. 1954 | Chef d'Escadron G. Buchet, French Army | France |
| 243rd | 30 Sep. 1954 | Chef d'Escadron G. Buchet, French Army | France |
| 244th | 14 Oct. 1954 | Major I. E. Prihodko, Soviet Army | Union of Soviet Socialist Republics |
| 245th | 28 Oct. 1954 | Major I. E. Prihodko, Soviet Army | Union of Soviet Socialist Republics |
| 246th | 12 Nov. 1954 | Commander W. A. Juniper, R.N. | United Kingdom |
| 247th | 24 Nov. 1954 | Commander W. A. Juniper, R.N. | United Kingdom |
| 248th | 9 Dec. 1954 | Commander P. A. Lilly, USN | United States of America |
| 249th | 23 Dec. 1954 | Commander P. A. Lilly, USN | United States of America |
| 250th | 6 Jan. 1955 | Lt. Colonel Lu Ngo-ming, Chinese Army | China |
| 251st | 20 Jan. 1955 | Lt. Colonel Lu Ngo-ming, Chinese Army | China |
| 252nd | 3 Feb. 1955 | Chef d'Escadron G. Buchet, French Army | France |
| 253rd | 17 Feb. 1955 | Chef d'Escadron G. Buchet, French Army | France |
| 254th | 3 Mar. 1955 | Lt. Colonel D. F. Polyakov, Soviet Army | Union of Soviet Socialist Republics |
| 255th | 17 Mar. 1955 | Lt. Colonel D. F. Polyakov, Soviet Army | Union of Soviet Socialist Republics |
| 256th | 31 Mar. 1955 | Lt. Colonel D. F. Polyakov, Soviet Army | Union of Soviet Socialist Republics |
| 257th | 14 Apr. 1955 | Commander W. A. Juniper, R.N. | United Kingdom |

C. LIST OF PRINCIPAL SECRETARIES (continued)

| <i>Meeting</i> | <i>Date</i> | <i>Principal Secretary</i> | <i>Delegation</i> |
|----------------|--------------|--|--------------------------|
| 258th | 28 Apr. 1955 | Commander W. A. Juniper, R.N. | United Kingdom |
| 259th | 12 May 1955 | Commander B. J. Lauff, USN | United States of America |
| 260th | 26 May 1955 | Commander B. J. Lauff, USN | United States of America |
| 261st | 9 June 1955 | Lt. Colonel Lu Ngo-ming, Chinese Army | China |
| 262nd | 23 June 1955 | Lt. Colonel Lu Ngo-ming, Chinese Army | China |
| 263rd | 7 July 1955 | Chef d'Escadron G. Buchet, French Army | France |
| 264th | 12 July 1955 | Chef d'Escadron G. Buchet, French Army | France |

SALES AGENTS FOR UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS

ARGENTINA

Editorial Sudamericana S.A., Alsina 500, Buenos Aires.

AUSTRALIA

H. A. Goddard, 255a George St., Sydney, and 90 Queen St., Melbourne.
Melbourne University Press, Carlton N.3, Victoria.

AUSTRIA (see below)

BELGIUM

Agence et Messageries de la Presse S.A., 14-22 rue du Persil, Bruxelles.
W. H. Smith & Son, 71-75, boulevard Adolphe-Max, Bruxelles.

BOLIVIA

Libreria Selecciones, Casilla 972, La Paz.

BRAZIL

Livraria Agir, Rte de Janeiro, São Paulo and Belo Horizonte.

CANADA

Ryerson Press, 799 Queen St. West, Toronto.
Periodica, Inc., 5112 Ave. Papineau, Montreal.

CEYLON

Lake House Bookshop, The Associated Newspapers of Ceylon Ltd., P.O. Box 244, Colombo.

CHILE

Libreria Ivens, Moneda 822, Santiago.
Editorial del Pacifico, Ahumada 57, Santiago.

CHINA

The World Book Co. Ltd., 99 Chung King Road, 1st Section, Taipei, Taiwan.
The Commercial Press Ltd., 170 Liu Li Chang, Peking.

COLOMBIA

Libreria América, Medellín.
Libreria Nacional Ltda., Barranquilla.
Libreria Buchholz Galeria, Av. Jimenez de Quesada 8-40, Bogotá.

COSTA RICA

Trejos Hermanos, Apartado 1313, San José.

CUBA

La Casa Belga, O'Reilly 455, La Habana.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Ceskoslovensky Spisovatel, Národní Trida 9, Praha 1.

DENMARK

Einar Munksgaard, Ltd., Nørregade 6, København, K.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Libreria Dominicana, Mercedes 49, Ciudad Trujillo.

ECUADOR

Libreria Cientifica, Guayaquil and Quito.

EGYPT

Librairie "La Renaissance d'Egypte," 9 Sh. Adly Pasha, Cairo.

EL SALVADOR

Manuel Navas y Cia., 1a. Avenida sur 37, San Salvador.

FINLAND

Akateeminen Kirjakauppa, 2 Keskuskatu, Helsinki.

FRANCE

Editions A. Pedone, 13, rue Soufflot, Paris V.

GERMANY (see below)

GREECE

"Eleftheroudakis," Place de la Constitution, Athènes.

GUATEMALA

Goubaud & Cia. Ltda., 5a. Avenida sur 28, Guatemala.

HAITI

Librairie "A la Caravelle," Boîte postale 111-B, Port-au-Prince.

HONDURAS

Libreria Panamericana, Tegucigalpa.

HONG KONG

The Swindon Book Co., 25 Nathan Road, Kowloon.

ICELAND

Bokaverzlun Sigfusar Eymondssonar H. F., Austurstraeti 18, Reykjavik.

INDIA

Oxford Book & Stationery Co., Scindia House, New Delhi, and 17 Park Street, Calcutta.
P. Varadachary & Co., 8 Linghi Chetty St., Madras 1.

INDONESIA

Pembangunan, Ltd., Gunung Sahari 84, Djakarta.

IRAN

Ketab-Khaneh Danesh, 293 Saadi Avenue, Tehran.

IRAQ

Mackenzie's Bookshop, Baghdad.

ISRAEL

Blumstein's Bookstores Ltd., 35 Allenby Road, Tel-Aviv.

ITALY

Libreria Commissionaria Sansoni, Via Gina Capponi 26, Firenze.

JAPAN (see below)

LEBANON

Librairie Universelle, Beyrouth.

LIBERIA

J. Momolu Kamara, Monrovia.
Albert Gemayel, Monrovia.

LUXEMBOURG

Librairie J. Schummer, Luxembourg.

MEXICO

Editorial Hermes S.A., Ignacio Mariscal 41, México, D.F.

NETHERLANDS

N.V. Martinus Nijhoff, Lange Voorhout 9, 's-Gravenhage.

NEW ZEALAND

United Nations Association of New Zealand, C.P.O. 1011, Wellington.

NORWAY

Johan Grundt Tanum Forlag, Kr. Augustsgt. 7A, Oslo.

PAKISTAN

Thomas & Thomas, Fort Mansion, Frere Road, Karachi, 3.

Publishers United Ltd., 176 Anarkali, Lahore.
The Pakistan Cooperative Book Society, Chittagong and Dacca (East Pakistan).

PANAMA

José Menéndez, Plaza de Arango, Panamá.

PARAGUAY

Moreno Hermanos, Asunción.

PERU

Libreria Internacional del Perú, S.A., Lima and Arequipa.

PHILIPPINES

Alemar's Book Store, 749 Rizal Avenue, Manila.

PORTUGAL

Livraria Rodrigues, 186 Rua Aurea, Lisboa.

SINGAPORE

The City Book Store, Ltd., Winchester House, Collyer Quay.

SPAIN (see below)

SWEDEN

C. E. Fritze's Kungl. Hovbokhandel A-B, Fredsgatan 2, Stockholm.

SWITZERLAND

Librairie Payot S.A., Lausanne, Genève.
Hans Raunhardt, Kirchgasse 17, Zurich 1.

SYRIA

Librairie Universelle, Damas.

THAILAND

Pramuan Mit Ltd., 55 Chakrawat Road, Wat Tuk, Bangkok.

TURKEY

Librairie Hachette, 469 Istiklal Caddesi, Beyoglu, Istanbul.

UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

Van Schaik's Bookstore (Pty.), Ltd., Box 724, Pretoria.

UNITED KINGDOM

H. M. Stationery Office, P.O. Box 569, London, S.E. 1 (and at H.M.S.O. Shops).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Int'l Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y.

URUGUAY

Representación de Editoriales, Prof. H. D'Elia, Av. 18 de Julio 133, Montevideo.

VENEZUELA

Libreria del Este, Edificio Gallipán, Ave. F. Miranda No. 52, Caracas.

VIET-NAM

Papeterie-Librairie Nouvelle Albert Portal, Boîte postale 283, Saigon.

YUGOSLAVIA

Drzavno Produzete, Jugoslovenska Knjiga, Terazije 27-11, Beograd.

United Nations publications can also be obtained from the following firms:

AUSTRIA

B. Wüllerstorff, Waagplatz, 4, Salzburg.
Gerold & Co., Graben 31, Wien 1.

GERMANY

Elwert & Meurer, Hauptstrasse 101, Berlin-Schöneberg.

W. E. Saarbach, Gereonstrasse 25-29, Köln (22c).

Alex. Horn, Spiegelgasse 9, Wiesbaden.

JAPAN

Maruzen Company, Ltd., 6 Tori-Nichome, Nihonbashi, Tokyo.

SPAIN

Libreria Bosch, 11 Ronda Universidad, Barcelona.

Orders and inquiries from countries where sales agents have not yet been appointed may be sent to: Sales and Circulation Section, United Nations, New York, U.S.A.; or Sales Section, United Nations Office, Palais des Nations, Geneva, Switzerland.