

**Совет Безопасности**

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**Письмо Группы экспертов по Йемену от 25 января 2022 года  
на имя Председателя Совета Безопасности**

Члены Группы экспертов по Йемену имеют честь настоящим препроводить заключительный доклад Группы, подготовленный согласно пункту 10 резолюции [2564 \(2021\)](#).

Этот доклад был представлен Комитету Совета Безопасности, учрежденному резолюцией [2140 \(2014\)](#), 23 декабря 2021 года и рассмотрен Комитетом 21 января 2022 года.

Будем признательны за представление настоящего письма и доклада для сведения членов Совета Безопасности и опубликование их в качестве документа Совета.

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## Заключительный доклад Группы экспертов по Йемену, учрежденной резолюцией 2140 (2014) Совета Безопасности

### *Резюме*

В течение отчетного периода стороны конфликта продолжали борьбу за укрепление контроля над территориями и населением. В сентябре и октябре 2021 года силы хуситов в быстрой последовательности захватили несколько районов вокруг города Мариб, а также в Эль-Бейде и Шабве. В ноябре вывод Объединенных сил на Западном побережье привел к установлению хуситами контроля над значительными территориями в мухафазе Эль-Ходейда.

В течение отчетного периода были предприняты шаги, приведшие к подрыву Стокгольмского и Эр-Риядского соглашений. Ни Коалиция в поддержку законности в Йемене, ни Объединенные силы не проинформировали ни Координационный комитет по передислокации, ни Миссию Организации Объединенных Наций по поддержке осуществления Соглашения по Ходейде (МООНСХ), созданную в соответствии со Стокгольмским соглашением, о своем намерении вывести войска из ряда районов в Эль-Ходейде. Кроме того, хуситы препятствовали выполнению мандата МООНСХ. Южный переходный совет в одностороннем порядке назначил нескольких военных руководителей и сотрудников служб безопасности, а правительство Йемена — ряд гражданских служащих, что привело к подрыву Эр-Риядского соглашения. Прогресс в реализации военно-политических положений Соглашения также был ограниченным.

Правительство Йемена не оказало адекватной военной поддержки бойцам племен в Марибе, в результате чего хуситы получили контроль над стратегическими районами вокруг этого города. Как Южный переходный совет, так и правительство Йемена столкнулись с трудностями при попытке получить необходимые ресурсы для обеспечения предоставления основных услуг, смягчения текущего экономического кризиса и регулярной выплаты заработной платы, что привело к массовым демонстрациям в районах, находящихся под их контролем. Во второй половине 2021 года внутренние распри между силами, связанными с Южным переходным советом, и несколько серьезных инцидентов в сфере безопасности поставили под сомнение способность Совета поддерживать порядок в подконтрольных ему районах.

Что касается районов, контролируемых хуситами, то там ситуация с безопасностью остается относительно стабильной, и серьезных вызовов их политической власти отмечено не было. Хуситы продолжали систематическую кампанию по распространению своей идеологии среди населения и по обеспечению поддержки своего дела и конфликта со стороны народа, в частности организацию летних лагерей и культурных программ как для взрослых, так и для детей. Кроме того, они по-прежнему проводили политику сексуального насилия и репрессий в отношении политически и профессионально активных женщин, в том числе после того, как в феврале 2021 года Совет Безопасности включил в санкционный перечень Султана Салеха Аиду Забина (YЕi.006).

На военном фронте хуситы продолжали совершать воздушные и морские атаки на Саудовскую Аравию. Цели, расположенные вблизи границы, по-прежнему подвергались наибольшему риску и обычно атаковались при помощи комбинации беспилотных летательных аппаратов и артиллерийских ракет малой дальности. Хуситы также продолжали наносить удары в глубине территории Саудовской Аравии, используя беспилотные летательные аппараты большего

радиуса действия, а также крылатые и баллистические ракеты. В Красном море плавучие самодельные взрывные устройства использовались для нападения на коммерческие суда, стоящие на якоре в портах Саудовской Аравии, в некоторых случаях на расстоянии более 1000 км от берегов Йемена. Цель этих атак была в первую очередь политическая, т.е. хуситы пытались таким образом подтолкнуть Эр-Рияд к согласию на выгодные для них условия политического урегулирования. Это резко контрастирует с использованием ракет и беспилотных летательных аппаратов в самом Йемене, где зачастую целью является максимальное число жертв.

Сборка большинства типов беспилотных летательных аппаратов, плавучих самодельных взрывных устройств и ракет малой дальности осуществляется в районах, контролируемых хуситами, с использованием местных материалов, а также имеющихся в продаже компонентов, таких как двигатели и электроника, которые ввозятся из-за рубежа через сложную сеть посредников в Европе, на Ближнем Востоке и в Азии.

В феврале и мае 2021 года ВМС Соединенных Штатов Америки изъяли с дау в Аравийском море два груза оружия. Изъятые грузы включали значительное количество единиц стрелкового оружия и легких вооружений; противотанковые ракеты для комплексов контейнерного типа с проводным наведением; а также сопутствующее оборудование, такое как оптические прицелы. Произведенный Группой осмотр изъятого оружия показал, что оно имеет маркировку и технические характеристики, соответствующие оружию, задокументированному Группой при предыдущих изъятиях, что указывает на единую схему поставок с использованием дау в Аравийском море.

Конфликт разрушил экономику Йемена. В связи с высокой зависимостью страны от импорта предметов первой необходимости и продуктов питания быстрое падение курса йеменского риала в районах, не находящихся под контролем хуситов, привело к серьезному инфляционному давлению на розничные цены. Это сделало продукты питания еще менее доступными для значительной части населения. В условиях существования параллельных систем власти в стране происходит систематическая фрагментация экономической системы и институтов. Это, в свою очередь, привело к дальнейшему развалу экономики и ухудшению условий жизни населения. Такое массовое обнищание создало волатильную ситуацию, которую некоторые используют для достижения своих политических целей, что иногда приводит к гражданским беспорядкам по всему Йемену и тем самым создает серьезную угрозу миру, безопасности и стабильности в этой стране.

Хуситы используют различные методы для обогащения и финансового обеспечения своей деятельности, в частности насилие и угрозы насилием, а также принудительные методы регулирования. К таковым относятся сбор незаконных пошлин и налогов с высокодоходных секторов экономики, таких как нефтяной и телекоммуникационный, а также конфискация активов и денежных средств физических и юридических лиц. Нисходящее влияние разрозненности политических, регуляторных и финансовых институтов создало принудительную и трудную среду для экономики. Если не будут предприняты решительные шаги для улучшения макроэкономической ситуации, политические варианты решения конфликта будут только усложняться, делая перспективу достижения мира в регионе еще более отдаленной.

Продолжающееся наступление хуситов на Мариб тяжело сказывается на гражданском населении, особенно на внутренне перемещенных лицах. В течение отчетного периода было совершено несколько нападений на лагеря для внутренне перемещенных лиц, что принесло их и без того уязвимым жителям страх,

ранения и смерть, а также стало причиной новых перемещений. Кроме того, неоднократные обстрелы густонаселенных городов Мариб и Таиз привели к жертвам среди гражданского населения.

Неизбирательное использование хуситами наземных мин, в частности на западном побережье, представляет собой постоянную угрозу для гражданского населения, приводя к трагическим последствиям для жизни, безопасности и здоровья людей, что непременно негативно скажется на долгосрочных перспективах страны, если для устранения этой угрозы не будут приняты меры.

Безнаказанность за нарушения международного гуманитарного права и международного права прав человека является скорее нормой, чем исключением. Такие нарушения, как произвольные аресты и задержания, насильственные исчезновения, пытки и жестокое обращение носят повсеместный характер и совершаются всеми сторонами. Мигранты по-прежнему особенно часто становятся жертвами ущемлений и нарушений международного права прав человека. В районах, контролируемых хуситами, пенитенциарная и судебная системы используются для подавления любой оппозиции или предполагаемого инакомыслия, особенно среди журналистов, женщин и религиозных меньшинств. В районах, не подконтрольных хуситам, судебная система остается слабой, нефункциональной и в основном игнорируется силами безопасности. Авиаудары Коалиции также продолжают приводить к гибели гражданских лиц.

Людам, пострадавшим от нарушений международного гуманитарного права и международного права прав человека, не предоставляется почти никакой поддержки. Нередко те, кто произвольно содержался под стражей в течение многих лет, после освобождения остаются ни с чем, потеряв свои дома и работу. Это особенно касается женщин, которым, помимо полученной травмы, приходится жить с социальной стигмой, связанной с их тюремным заключением. Кроме того, после многих лет произвольных арестов и задержаний и насильственных исчезновений многие йеменцы числятся пропавшими без вести. Их семьи были оставлены на произвол судьбы, и ни одна из сторон не оказала им почти никакого содействия в выяснении судьбы их родственников.

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\* Приложения распространяются только на том языке, на котором они были представлены, и без официального редактирования.

## I. Введение

1. Настоящий доклад, представленный Совету Безопасности в соответствии с пунктом 10 резолюции [2564 \(2021\)](#), охватывает период с 6 декабря 2020 года по 5 декабря 2021 года и включает обновленные выводы по результатам исследований, которые представлены в заключительном докладе Группы от 25 января 2021 года ([S/2021/79](#)).
2. Группа руководствовалась положениями пункта 14 резолюции [2564 \(2021\)](#), в котором говорится о передовой практике и методах, рекомендованных Неофициальной рабочей группой Совета Безопасности по общим вопросам, касающимся санкций (см. [S/2006/997](#)). Группа уделила особое внимание соблюдению стандартов, касающихся транспарентности, объективности и источников, документальных доказательств, подтверждения достоверности выводов с привлечением независимых и поддающихся проверке источников и предоставления возможности для ответа<sup>1</sup>. В соответствии с пунктом 11 резолюции [2564 \(2021\)](#) Группа сотрудничала с Группой по аналитической поддержке и наблюдению за санкциями и Группой экспертов по Сомали.
3. В своем предыдущем заключительном докладе Группа сообщила о реализации механизма депозитного вклада Саудовской Аравии. С учетом дополнительной информации, полученной после публикации ее предыдущего доклада, Группа провела полный обзор раздела IX.B, приложения 28 и относящегося к нему текста в таблице 1, а также рекомендации, содержащейся в пункте 161 этого доклада. Выводы, содержащиеся в настоящем докладе, обновляют и заменяют выводы вышеупомянутых частей предыдущего доклада.
4. В отчетный период Группа побывала в Германии, Египте, Ираке, Объединенных Арабских Эмиратах и Саудовской Аравии, а также в Адене и в ряде мест на западном побережье Йемена<sup>2</sup>. Группа провела инспекции изъятого оружия и обломков ракет, беспилотных летательных аппаратов и плавучих самодельных взрывных устройств в нескольких странах региона.
5. Пандемия коронавирусного заболевания (COVID-19) продолжала влиять на способность Группы совершать поездки и расследовать дела. Группа отмечает, что некоторые физические и юридические лица готовы делиться конфиденциальной информацией только при личном общении. Ограничения, связанные с пандемией, вынудили Группу составлять проект доклада дистанционно, что негативно сказалось на процессе. 31 июля 2021 года ушел в отставку региональный эксперт Группы, и на момент подготовки доклада эта должность оставалась незанятой.
6. Группа встретила с высокопоставленными членами правительства Йемена, включая вице-президента и премьер-министра, а также с лидерами Южного переходного совета, в том числе с его председателем. Поездка Группы на западное побережье предоставила ее членам возможность встретиться с представителями местных властей, старшими руководителями Сил национального сопротивления и бригад Амалика и руководством Тихамы. Группа также встретила с высокопоставленными чиновниками Саудовской Аравии и Объединенных Арабских Эмиратов.

<sup>1</sup> Дополнительная информация о методах работы Группы и предоставлении возможности для ответа приведена в приложении 1.

<sup>2</sup> Написание названий основных населенных пунктов в Йемене соответствует написанию, используемому на карте географической информационной системы Организации Объединенных Наций в приложении 2.

7. Группа направила 147 официальных писем, из которых 94 были адресованы 21 государству-члену, а 53 письма были направлены 36 организациям, учреждениям и компаниям, при этом по состоянию на 17 декабря 2021 года на 68 писем ответов получено не было (см. приложение 3).

## **II. События, влияющие на мир, безопасность и стабильность**

8. Конфликт в Йемене невозможно понять без анализа его роли в региональном контексте, в частности угроз для безопасности Саудовской Аравии и всего региона, создаваемых военными действиями хуситов, а также региональных политических событий, влияющих на поиск мирного решения.

9. Учитывая протяженную и с трудом поддающуюся контролю границу, тесные социальные и экономические связи, а также стратегическое значение Баб-эль-Мандебского пролива, для Саудовской Аравии конфликт в Йемене — это в равной мере вопрос сдерживания внешней угрозы и восстановления власти законного правительства в интересах двусторонних отношений. Правительство Абд Раббо Мансура Хади нуждается в постоянной военной, финансовой и политической поддержке Эр-Рияда. Однако Саудовская Аравия все более активно ищет выход из войны, в частности из-за ее высокой стоимости и непопулярности среди собственного населения.

10. В отличие от Саудовской Аравии, роль, которую играют в Йемене Объединенные Арабские Эмираты, понять сложнее. Объединенные Арабские Эмираты не имеют общей границы с Йеменом, и между этими двумя странами не существует столь тесных экономических и социальных связей. Эмираты возглавляли военные операции против хуситов на западном побережье до подписания Стокгольмского соглашения в 2018 году, но в 2019 году официально вывели большую часть своих войск, оставшись при этом членом Коалиции, а также продолжая проводить контртеррористические операции. Тем не менее их политическая роль в Йемене остается очень значительной, в основном за счет оказания политической, финансовой и военной помощи Объединенным силам на Западном побережье, а также за счет политической поддержки Южного переходного совета.

11. Что касается внешней поддержки хуситов, то тут ситуация менее ясна. Исламская Республика Иран является политическим союзником движения по крайней мере с 2015 года и имеет «посла» в Сане. Это одно из немногих государств — членов Организации Объединенных Наций, которые признают хуситов в качестве законного правительства Йемена.

12. Другой страной региона, сохраняющей официальные каналы связи с хуситами, является Оман, имеющий с Йеменом общую границу. Между населением двух стран существуют тесные социальные и экономические связи. Султанат сохраняет нейтральную позицию по отношению к конфликту и принимает у себя высокопоставленных переговорщиков хуситов. Сухопутные коммерческие перевозки остаются оживленными. Хотя пункты пересечения границы находятся под контролем правительства Йемена, имеются свидетельства того, что компоненты для используемых хуситами систем вооружений (пп. 69 и 70), а также другая военная техника (п. 67) продолжают поставляться силам хуситов по суше физическими и юридическими лицами, базирующимися в Омане.

13. В отчетный период в Йемене имело место дальнейшее ухудшение политической, военной, экономической и гуманитарной ситуации, а также ситуации в области безопасности. Правительство единства, в состав которого входят представители Южного переходного совета и правительства Хади, было приведено

к присяге 26 декабря 2020 года. Это правительство, сформированное после многомесячных переговоров, стало самым значительным достижением Эр-Риядского соглашения. Однако правительство единства не смогло выполнить все свои задачи, а именно вывод из Адена войск, связанных с Южным переходным советом, организация совместного противостояния хуситам, стабилизация валюты и увеличение доходов правительства<sup>3</sup>. Так, правительство Йемена и Совет расходятся во мнениях относительно того, вывел ли Совет все свои военные подразделения из Адена (см. приложение 6); хуситы значительно расширили подконтрольную им территорию; а курс йеменского риала к доллару США, который на дату объявления составлял 720, продолжал ухудшаться и в начале декабря 2021 года пересек отметку 1700.

14. В отчетный период обеими сторонами, подписавшими Эр-Риядское соглашение, были предприняты шаги, подрывающие его осуществление (пп. 15 и 34)<sup>4</sup>. Спустя всего три месяца после формирования правительства единства премьер-министр и некоторые высокопоставленные правительственные чиновники были вынуждены покинуть Аден, после того как протестующие ворвались во дворец Машик, резиденцию премьер-министра<sup>5</sup>. После этого инцидента в середине 2021 года были сформированы переговорные группы от правительства Йемена и Южного переходного совета в попытке реанимировать Эр-Риядское соглашение и дать возможность премьер-министру и его кабинету вернуться в Аден. В отсутствие премьер-министра и после возвращения в Аден в мае 2021 года председателя Южного переходного совета Айдаруса аз-Зубайди<sup>6</sup> Совет принял дополнительные меры для установления своего контроля над различными учреждениями. В июне 2021 года Совет сообщил Группе, что с помощью Коалиции взял под свой контроль остров Маюн/Перим<sup>7</sup>. 28 сентября 2021 года после длительных переговоров, проведенных Саудовской Аравией, премьер-министр вернулся в Аден.

15. Политические отношения между Южным переходным советом и правительством остаются натянутыми, причем правительство обвиняет Совет в эскалации и без того ощутимой напряженности своей воинственной риторикой. Совет обвиняет правительство в ведении «войны услуг» через отказ населению, находящемуся под контролем Совета, в доступе к государственным услугам<sup>8</sup>. В июне 2021 года Саудовская Аравия заявила, что политическая и медийная эскалация и последующие решения о политических и военных назначениях, принятые Советом, не соответствуют тому, что было согласовано двумя сторонами<sup>9</sup>. Публичная критика одной конкретной партии нетипична для Саудовской Аравии.

16. Группа отмечает, что и Стокгольмское, и Эр-Риядское соглашения были согласованы в условиях дефицита времени во время кризисных ситуаций, а именно наступления Объединенных сил на город Ходейда в 2018 году и открытых боевых действий между Южным переходным советом и правительством Йемена в 2019 году. Оба соглашения содержат широкие формулировки, которые

<sup>3</sup> URL: [www.arabnews.com/node/1783251/middle-east](http://www.arabnews.com/node/1783251/middle-east).

<sup>4</sup> Совещания «за круглым столом» с участием переговорщиков Южного переходного совета и правительства Йемена, состоявшиеся в Эр-Рияде в июне и октябре 2021 года.

<sup>5</sup> Хотя правительство Йемена обвинило Южный переходный совет в организации этих протестов, участие Совета было менее заметным, чем в августе 2019 года, когда заместитель председателя Совета Хани Али Салем Бинбрек публично призвал к штурму президентского дворца (см. S/2020/326, п. 29).

<sup>6</sup> URL: <https://en.smanews.org/south-arabia/president-al-zubaidi-returns-to-aden-the-capital/>.

<sup>7</sup> Встреча с переговорной группой Южного переходного совета в июне 2021 года в Эр-Рияде. Маюн, также известный как Перим, — крошечный остров в Баб-эль-Мандебском проливе.

<sup>8</sup> Обсуждения с делегацией Совета в Эр-Рияде, 2021 год.

<sup>9</sup> URL: <https://twitter.com/SPAregions/status/1410734209367363592?s=19>.


оставляют широкий простор для интерпретации сторонами конфликта. Таким образом, соглашения как таковые являются лишь отправной точкой для дальнейших переговоров по их реализации, которые зашли в тупик. Отвод войск Объединенных сил в мухафазе Эль-Ходейда в ноябре 2021 года подорвал и без того ослабленное Соглашение по Ходейде. Хотя Эр-Риядское соглашение принесло определенные результаты, такие как введение локальных режимов прекращения огня в Абьяне в 2021 году, другие его задачи остаются незавершенными.

### III. Деятельность вооруженных групп, угрожающая миру, безопасности и стабильности Йемена

17. В течение отчетного периода хуситы и правительственные войска Йемена, поддерживаемые Коалицией, продолжали сражаться за контроль над городом Мариб. В сентябре и октябре хуситы в быстрой последовательности захватили несколько районов в мухафазах Эль-Бейда, Шабва и Мариб, стремясь окружить город (см. карту 1 и приложение 4). Когда перспектива падения города стало реальной, антихуситские силы начали перегруппировку и формирование новых стратегических союзов (см. п. 31 и приложение 4 и 5). В октябре и ноябре имели место беспрецедентные по масштабам передислокации и отступления как со стороны Коалиции, так и со стороны Объединенных сил (см. пп. 18–20).

Карта 1

Территориальные приобретения хуситов, сентябрь-октябрь 2021 года



## А. Отход войск Объединенных сил на Западном побережье из Ходейды в ноябре 2021 года

18. Примерно 10–11 ноября 2021 года бригады Объединенных сил начали отход со своих позиций на северо-западной прибрежной полосе Ходейды. Согласно Коалиции и Объединенным силам, эта операция была заранее спланированной и являлась частью национальной военной стратегии<sup>10</sup>, направленной на укрепление фронтов в Шабве и Марибе<sup>11</sup>. 12 и 13 ноября силы хуситов установили контроль над освободившимися районами (см. карту 2)<sup>12</sup>. Около 14 ноября Коалиция нанесла авиаудары для предотвращения дальнейшего продвижения хуситов, что, по сообщениям, стало ее первым военным вмешательством в этом районе с момента подписания Стокгольмского соглашения<sup>13</sup>.

19. Отвод войск имел негативные последствия для гуманитарного положения гражданского населения. Гражданские и военные власти были проинформированы об отступлении за 24 часа, из-за чего у них не было достаточно времени для эвакуации уязвимого населения из соответствующих районов<sup>14</sup>. Правительство Йемена проинформировало Группу о 54 предполагаемых нарушениях международного гуманитарного права, совершенных бойцами хуситов после установления контроля над освободившимися районами; наибольшее количество нарушений было совершено 12 ноября 2021 года<sup>15</sup>. К 14 ноября, согласно сообщениям Организации Объединенных Наций, в результате отвода войск было перемещено более 800 семей<sup>16</sup>. Движение за мирную Тихаму и Сопrotивление Тихамы осудили отвод войск (см. приложение 5). По крайней мере одна бригада отказалась покинуть свою позицию до тех пор, пока семьи бойцов не будут эвакуированы в безопасное место. Группа считает, что Объединенным силам и Коалиции следовало принять адекватные меры для обеспечения безопасности гражданского населения и раненых бойцов, в частности обеспечить своевременную эвакуацию гражданских лиц, которые могут подвергнуться репрессиям со стороны хуситов.

20. Объединенные силы указали, что отход войск происходил в соответствии с планом передислокации, предусмотренным Стокгольмским соглашением (см. приложение 5)<sup>17</sup>. Однако порядок отхода не был согласован с правительством Йемена<sup>18</sup> и Координационным комитетом по передислокации, который,

<sup>10</sup> Заявления см. в приложении 5.

<sup>11</sup> Конфиденциальные источники.

<sup>12</sup> Как сообщается, хуситы, застигнутые врасплох, изначально не имели достаточного количества войск, чтобы занять эти районы.

<sup>13</sup> URL: [www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/15/un-calls-for-new-talks-on-yemens-hodeidah-as-frontlines-shift](http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/15/un-calls-for-new-talks-on-yemens-hodeidah-as-frontlines-shift).

<sup>14</sup> По сообщениям, возникли трудности с перегруппировкой соответствующих подразделений. Некоторые бойцы Объединенных сил были убиты.

<sup>15</sup> Группа также получила информацию из нескольких источников, но пока не смогла провести расследование.

<sup>16</sup> URL: [https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Yemen%20Situation%20Update\\_Humanitarian%20Impact%20in%20Al%20Hodeidah%20and%20Red%20Sea%20Coast\\_20211114-final.pdf](https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Yemen%20Situation%20Update_Humanitarian%20Impact%20in%20Al%20Hodeidah%20and%20Red%20Sea%20Coast_20211114-final.pdf).

<sup>17</sup> Представитель Объединенных сил сообщил Группе, что хуситы планировали после захвата города Мариб начать наступление на Эль-Фаззах в мухафазе Эль-Ходейда. Захват этой узкой полосы земли, контролируемой Объединенными силами, позволит хуситам перекрыть снабжение 13 бригад, дислоцированных к северу от Эль-Фаззаха.

<sup>18</sup> Представитель Объединенных сил заявил, что ни Миссия Организации Объединенных Наций по поддержке осуществления Соглашения по Ходейде (МООНСХ), ни правительство Йемена не были проинформированы из-за опасений утечки информации, т.е. во избежание того, чтобы об отводе войск узнали хуситы.

согласно Соглашению, должен осуществлять надзор за передислокацией<sup>19</sup>. МООНСХ, в чьи обязанности входит содействие выполнению Соглашения, также не была проинформирована об отходе войск<sup>20</sup>, равно как и Специальный посланник Генерального секретаря по Йемену, который 10 ноября посетил Моху.

21. Стокгольмское соглашение, заключенное при посредничестве предыдущего Специального посланника, непопулярно среди членов Объединенных сил. Так, Силы национального сопротивления считают, что оно помешало их победе в Ходейде. И они, и Сопротивление Тихамы недовольны тем, что Соглашение было подписано без их участия<sup>21</sup>. Это разочарование еще больше усиливается неспособностью Организации Объединенных Наций достичь соглашения в Марибе, которое могло бы остановить продвижение хуситов, подобно тому как Стокгольмское соглашение остановило дальнейшее продвижение Объединенных сил в Эль-Ходейде в 2018–2019 годах<sup>22</sup>.

22. Соглашение по Ходейде не обеспечило достижения некоторых важных целей: так, имели место многочисленные нарушения режима прекращения огня; попытки обеспечить вывод войск из портов натолкнулись на сопротивление; хуситы, несмотря на принятые обязательства, в одностороннем порядке использовали поступления из Центрального банка Йемена в Ходейде<sup>23</sup>. Кроме того, хуситы препятствовали полному выполнению мандата МООНСХ, в том числе посредством контроля за передвижением наблюдателей Миссии. Наконец, хуситы манипулировали Соглашением в своих целях, используя его для защиты важных военных объектов (см. п. 49 и приложение 36). Делегация правительства Йемена в Координационном комитете по передислокации прекратила свое участие в совместном механизме Комитета в марте 2020 года, после того как хуситы якобы убили связанного с правительством Йемена офицера связи Комитета<sup>24</sup>.

23. После отступлений на западном побережье Объединенные силы отвоевали у хуситов некоторые районы в мухафазе Эль-Ходейда и на западе мухафазы Таиз (см. приложение 4). Коалиция поддерживала некоторые из этих операций посредством воздушных ударов<sup>25</sup>.

<sup>19</sup> URL: [www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/yemeni-gov-t-denies-role-in-withdrawal-of-allied-forces-from-hudaydah/2419837](http://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/yemeni-gov-t-denies-role-in-withdrawal-of-allied-forces-from-hudaydah/2419837). Правительство Йемена подтвердило эту информацию. Лидеры Объединенных сил являются членами делегации правительства Йемена в Координационном комитете по передислокации.

<sup>20</sup> URL: [https://twitter.com/UN\\_Hudaydah/status/1459262407759609860](https://twitter.com/UN_Hudaydah/status/1459262407759609860).

<sup>21</sup> URL: <https://2dec.net/news47583.html>, <https://alamalika.net/site/2021/11/12/-بيان-صادر-عن-القوات-المشتركة-في-الساحل-2>.

<sup>22</sup> Совещания «за круглым столом», с участием представителей Объединенных сил правительства Йемена и жителей Мариба. URL: <https://alamalika.net/site/2021/11/12/-بيان-صادر-عن-القوات-المشتركة-في-الساحل-2>.

<sup>23</sup> Обсуждения с лидерами правительства Йемена, Объединенных сил и Тихамы. URL: <https://republicanyemen.net/archives/27167>, <https://almahriah.net/video/6536>.

<sup>24</sup> Группа Координационного комитета по передислокации, связанная с правительством Йемена, потребовала от МООНСХ провести расследование убийства и попросила Миссию перенести свои служебные помещения на нейтральную территорию, поскольку они находились на территории, контролируемой хуситами. Правительство Йемена проинформировало Группу о том, что оно продолжает встречаться с представителями МООНСХ в одностороннем порядке; последняя такая встреча состоялась 7 июня 2021 года (см. S/2021/79, п. 12).

<sup>25</sup> URL: <https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/3305871/arab-coalition-says-supporting-yemeni-forces-west-coast-outside-areas-stockholm>.

24. Некоторые бригады Амалика также передислоцировались в Аден и Абьян, предположительно с целью укрепления позиций в Шабве (см. приложения 4 и 5). Войска Объединенных сил не были перебросены в Мариб<sup>26</sup>.

Карта 2

Изменения зон контроля по состоянию на 1 декабря 2021 года



Источник: правительство Йемена.

Примечание: насыщенным красным цветом обозначены районы, которые, как утверждается, были заняты хуситами после событий ноября 2021 года.

25. Создается впечатление, что у правительства Йемена нет общенациональной военной стратегии борьбы с хуситами. Защита линий фронта на западном побережье и в южном Йемене от хуситов в основном предоставлена Объединенным силам и Южному переходному совету. Именно Коалиция, а не правительство Йемена координирует военные действия различных антихуситских группировок. Например, в 2021 году и Совет, и Объединенные силы сообщили Группе,

<sup>26</sup> Представители Объединенных сил. Члены 3-й бригады Амалика сражаются в Марибе, но, согласно правительству Йемена, делают это в личном качестве (см. п. 38).

что совместные военные операции с правительством Йемена координируются либо Объединенными Арабскими Эмиратами, либо Коалицией (см. приложение 5)<sup>27</sup> и что они не получают инструкций ни от правительства Йемена, ни от Министерства обороны<sup>28</sup>.

26. Неясно, в какой степени правительство может независимо от Коалиции принимать военные решения. Среди членов Коалиции также имеет место конкуренция приоритетов, что очевидно влияет на военно-политический ландшафт в Йемене (см. S/2021/79, п. 28). Коалиция, некоторые официальные должностные лица в правительстве Йемена и лидеры некоторых племен выразили обеспокоенность тем, что коррупция в Министерстве обороны Йемена или влияние партии «Йеменское единение за реформу» на военных и высокопоставленных чиновников сказывается на поддержке и эффективности национальной армии и аффилированных с ней племенных вооруженных формирований<sup>29</sup>.

## **В. Вооруженные группы на западном побережье**

27. С 2019 года Объединенные силы в основном занимают в противостоянии с хуситами оборонительные позиции. В отчетный период они позиционировали себя как значимого игрока за пределами западного побережья, предложив вступить в борьбу в Марибе и направить бригады в Шабву (см. приложение 5). В ноябре 2021 года они провели наступательные операции в Эль-Ходейде и западной части Таиза<sup>30</sup>. В то время как силы, связанные с Южным переходным советом, в отчетный период подверглись определенному уровню дезинтеграции (см. п. 35), столкновения внутри Объединенных сил были немногочисленными и непродолжительными и имели ограниченное воздействие на гражданское население<sup>31</sup>. Поскольку в отчетный период разочарование Коалиции в правительстве Йемена и Совете стало более очевидным, в частности из-за их неспособности выполнить Эр-Риядское соглашение, место наиболее надежного партнера Коалиции заняли Объединенные силы, о чем свидетельствует скоординированный Коалицией отход Объединенных сил в ноябре 2021 года<sup>32</sup>. Правительство Йемена и Объединенные силы также связывают взаимовыгодные отношения, в рамках которых войска Объединенных сил защищают западное побережье от хуситов и получают определенную степень легитимности в качестве союзника правительства.

28. В конце 2020 года все вооруженные группы на западном побережье были реорганизованы под двойным руководством Тарека Салеха из Сил национального сопротивления и Абу Зары аль-Махрами из бригад Амалика<sup>33</sup>. В марте

<sup>27</sup> В октябре 2021 года Объединенные Арабские Эмираты заявили, что не имеют оперативного контроля над руководителями Южного переходного совета и Объединенных сил и что деятельность этих сил напрямую связана с их лидерами.

<sup>28</sup> Совещания «за круглым столом» с участием военных руководителей в Адене и на западном побережье, август 2021 года. См. также интервью с главой Кабинета президента, URL: <https://sanaacenter.org/publications/news/14136>.

<sup>29</sup> Встреча в Эр-Рияде в октябре 2021 года. Партия «Йеменское единение за реформу» отрицает какой-либо контроль со своей стороны над правительством Йемена и военными.

<sup>30</sup> Военные должностные лица Таиза и Объединенные силы. URL: <https://2dec.net/news47596.html> and <https://twitter.com/SDwaid/status/1461714995516002314>.

<sup>31</sup> Наиболее значительными были столкновения между 3-й бригадой Амалика и Абу Зарой аль-Махрами из-за решения последнего сменить лидера бригады (см. п. 38).

<sup>32</sup> Отвод войск в ноябре 2021 года был самой крупной военной операцией, за которую Коалиция взяла на себя ответственность и о которой не было проинформировано правительство Йемена. Информацию о Южном переходном совете см. в п. 15.

<sup>33</sup> В отличие от 2019 года, когда командиры различных сил были на равных друг с другом. См. [www.iremnews.com/news/arab-world/yemen/1883139](http://www.iremnews.com/news/arab-world/yemen/1883139) и добавление 4 приложения 5.

2021 года Салех создал политическое бюро Сил национального сопротивления (см. приложение 5). Влияние Салеха на местные органы власти было заметно во время визита Группы в Эль-Хауху и Моху в августе 2021 года<sup>34</sup>. Салех предоставляет местным властям финансовые стимулы, гуманитарную помощь и помощь в области развития, а также гарантирует их безопасность<sup>35</sup>. Это стало возможным благодаря поддержке, получаемой Салехом со стороны Объединенных Арабских Эмиратов<sup>36</sup>, что позволило ему заменить отсутствующее центральное правительство. Деятельность Салеха в этом отношении еще больше подорвала авторитет правительства Йемена на западном побережье.

29. Некоторые лидеры Тихамы считают Силы национального сопротивления и бригады Амалика чужаками в своем регионе<sup>37</sup>. Они недовольны включением вооруженных сил Тихамы в состав этих двух организаций, что, по их словам, было сделано Салехом и Объединенными Арабскими Эмиратами для ослабления военного руководства Тихамы<sup>38</sup>. Отвод войск в ноябре 2021 года еще больше усилил напряженность, поскольку хуситы получили контроль над еще большей частью территории, принадлежавшей Тихаме, и в процессе установления контроля над ней совершили зверства в отношении местного населения (см. приложение 5). Некоторые военные и политические лидеры Тихамы на встречах с Группой в течение отчетного периода отмечали, что они не исключают вариант применения силы, если их продолжают отстранять от принятия местных политических и военных решений, приведя в пример применение силы Южным переходным советом в Адене<sup>39</sup>.

30. Во время визита Группы на западное побережье в августе 2021 года местные лидеры заявили, что основными причинами, подрывающими их власть и мешающими им осуществлять деятельность в области развития, являются незаконный сбор налогов Объединенными силами и продолжающаяся оккупация общественных зданий бригадами Амалика. Так, налоги, собранные Объединенными силами в Мохе, не были депонированы в Центральном банке Йемена<sup>40</sup>. Аль-Махрами из бригад Амалика и Ахмед аль-Каукабани, бывший командир 1-й бригады Тихамы, сообщили Группе, что они занимают некоторые общественные здания для того, чтобы обеспечить их охрану или предоставить временные базы своим войскам в ожидании получения от Коалиции альтернативных мест дислокации. Ряд жителей западного побережья также высказал мнение, что неспособность Объединенных сил остановить контрабанду стрелкового оружия, удобрений и топлива в контролируемые хуситами районы через территорию западного побережья еще больше подорвала авторитет местных институтов, к разочарованию местного населения и бойцов.

<sup>34</sup> Это влияние не всегда описывалось положительно, в частности теми, кто опасался репрессий за совершение действий, неугодных Салеху.

<sup>35</sup> Встреча с властями Мохи на западном побережье. URL: <https://2dec.net/news47897.html>.

<sup>36</sup> Конфиденциальные беседы с местными властями. См. также информацию о поставке ОАЭ 80 000 доз вакцины против COVID-19 через Силы национального сопротивления, URL: <https://2dec.net/last47928.html> and <https://2dec.net/last47939.html>. Объединенные Арабские Эмираты сообщили Группе, что они оказывают помощь в области развития и гуманитарную помощь на западном побережье.

<sup>37</sup> Встречи с военными и политическими лидерами Египта, Саудовской Аравии и Йемена в 2021 году. URL: <https://www.mei.edu/publications/century-old-grievances-continue-fester-yemens-tihama-region>.

<sup>38</sup> Там же; см. также <https://almahriah.net/local/5952>.

<sup>39</sup> Встречи, состоявшиеся до ноября 2021 года.

<sup>40</sup> Конфиденциальные источники. Бригады Амалика сообщили Группе, что сбор налогов осуществляется на основании соглашения с властями и что собранные средства направляются на цели развития.

Рисунок I  
**Квитанции об оплате «ввозной пошлины» за топливо, выданные  
 Объединенными силами на Западном побережье на контрольно-пропускном  
 пункте Аль-Дубаб**



Источник: конфиденциально (редакция Группы).

### С. Отношения между Объединенными силами на Западном побережье и Южным переходным советом

31. Южный переходный совет и Силы национального сопротивления в августе 2021 года сообщили Группе, что между ними нет существенного военного сотрудничества<sup>41</sup>. Однако, ввиду возможности попадания Мариба в руки хуситов, в октябре 2021 года обе стороны заявили о своей готовности выступить против хуситов единым фронтом (см. приложения 1 и 5)<sup>42</sup>.

32. Некоторые подразделения бригад Амалика, напротив, сражались вместе с Южным переходным советом против сил правительства Йемена в 2019 году<sup>43</sup>. В 2021 году бригады Амалика использовали объекты, контролируемые Южным переходным советом, и имели военный лагерь в Адене (см. п. 38). В рамках Коалиции Объединенные Арабские Эмираты продолжают сохранять значительное влияние на Салеха, Аль-Махрами и Аз-Зубайди. Это влияние до сих пор предотвращало серьезные столкновения между разными силами<sup>44</sup>.

<sup>41</sup> Например, в сентябре 2021 года Группа посетила лагерь для раненых бойцов Сил национального сопротивления в Адене, где бойцы сообщили, что чувствовали себя небезопасно среди членов Южного переходного совета, так как большинство раненых были с севера.

<sup>42</sup> URL: <https://2dec.net/news46965.html> and <https://stcaden.com/news/15986#.YXrXgYHNXw0.twitter>.

<sup>43</sup> В беседах с членами Группы Аль-Махрами заявил, что его силы стремятся сохранять нейтралитет и не хотят участвовать в столкновениях между правительством Йемена и Южным переходным советом.

<sup>44</sup> Объединенные Арабские Эмираты сообщили Группе, что у них «хорошие отношения с вышеупомянутыми сторонами, но их влияние на эти стороны ограничено и сосредоточено на продвижении мирного процесса» и что они «работают над смягчением любых вооруженных эскалаций, вызванных различиями во мнениях».

## D. Вооруженные группы, связанные с Южным переходным советом

33. Во время поездки, совершенной Группой в августе 2021 года, было очевидно, что правительство Йемена не имеет значительного военного присутствия или существенного числа сотрудников сил безопасности в Адене. Мухафазу контролировали Южный переходный совет и связанные с ним силы. Так, встречи Группы с местными властями проходили в присутствии представителей Совета. Совет заявил, что он поддерживает нормальное функционирование мухафазы, несмотря на отсутствие старших чиновников правительственного аппарата и ограниченную финансовую поддержку.

34. Совет заявил, что в 2021 году все его воинские формирования и подразделения сил безопасности были интегрированы в состав правительственных войск<sup>45</sup>, однако правительство Йемена отрицает это<sup>46</sup>. Аз-Зубайди полагается на продолжающееся существование вооруженных сил Совета как на инструмент реализации своих политических амбиций по созданию независимого Юга<sup>47</sup>. Это, скорее всего, помешает полной интеграции данных сил, предусмотренной Эр-Риядским соглашением. Совет заявил, что правительство Йемена нарушило Соглашение в 2021 году, в одностороннем порядке назначив ряд государственных служащих<sup>48</sup>. На это правительство Йемена ответило, что в соответствии с Соглашением требование о проведении консультаций с Советом ограничивается случаями назначения губернаторов и руководителей служб безопасности конкретных мухафаз. Таким образом, хотя Соглашение, возможно, и предотвратило военную эскалацию между правительством Йемена и Советом<sup>49</sup>, оно не является устойчивым решением политического кризиса в южной части страны.

35. Авторитет Совета значительно ослабел с тех пор, как он взял под контроль Аден в 2019 году. Военные столкновения и серьезные инциденты в сфере безопасности, произошедшие в течение отчетного периода, поставили под сомнение способность Совета обеспечить безопасность в районах, находящихся под его контролем. Например, с июня 2021 года имели место три крупных взрыва самодельных взрывных устройств, а также столкновения между бойцами Совета, которые привели к жертвам среди гражданского населения<sup>50</sup>. Совет

<sup>45</sup> См. приложение 6.

<sup>46</sup> Вместе с тем обе стороны приписывают себе контроль над элитными подразделениями Шабвани и Хадрами. Обсуждения с правительством Йемена и Советом в августе и ноябре 2021 года.

<sup>47</sup> Например, в марте 2021 года Аз-Зубайди заявил следующее: «Падение Мариба ... может ускорить процесс запуска созванных на международном уровне переговоров между Севером и Югом. Это может привести к тому, что Южный переходный совет будет в основном контролировать юг страны, а хуситы — большую часть севера. В таком случае имеет смысл провести прямые переговоры между контролирующими сторонами». URL: [www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/01/biden-can-help-end-yemen-civil-war-by-backing-referendum-say-separatists](http://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/01/biden-can-help-end-yemen-civil-war-by-backing-referendum-say-separatists). Он также продолжает выступать за отделение Юга (URL: [www.youtube.com/watch?v=XcoCwFrwr58](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XcoCwFrwr58)).

<sup>48</sup> URL: <https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/2746991/yemen's-hadi-appoints-new-head-shura-council-attorney-general-cabinet-secretary>.

<sup>49</sup> До сих пор оно позволяло предотвратить крупные столкновения в Абьяне, Адене и Шабве. Например, после того как в октябре 2021 года ОАЭ покинули лагерь Эль-Алам, в Шабве произошли локальные столкновения между связанными с Южным переходным советом элитными подразделениями Шабвани и войсками правительства Йемена.

<sup>50</sup> С помощью самодельных взрывных устройств были совершены покушения на губернатора и двух журналистов, а одно самодельное взрывное устройство было заложено возле здания международного аэропорта Адена. Некоторые приписывают ответственность за эти инциденты хуситам. URL: [www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/10/10/yemen-aden-car-bomb-several-killed](http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/10/10/yemen-aden-car-bomb-several-killed); [www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/11/yemeni-journalist-and-child-killed-in-car](http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/11/yemeni-journalist-and-child-killed-in-car).

продолжал бороться за получение ресурсов, необходимых для предоставления основных услуг, смягчения экономического кризиса и обеспечения регулярной выплаты заработной платы своим бойцам. Поддержка контролируемых Советом районов со стороны Объединенных Арабских Эмиратов заметно сократилась с 2019 года, в то время как Саудовская Аравия продолжает оказывать финансовую поддержку в основном через правительство Йемена.

## **Е. Развитие событий в районах, контролируемых хуситами**

### **1. События в военной сфере**

36. В течение отчетного периода хуситы продолжали управлять своими территориями, не встречая какой-либо серьезной политической или военной оппозиции, и добились значительных успехов в военной сфере. Хуситы установили полный контроль над Эль-Бейдой и продвинулись в ряд районов в Эль-Ходейде, Марибе и Шабве (см. приложение 4). Положение в области безопасности в районах, контролируемых хуситами, было стабильным по сравнению с ситуацией в других частях Йемена (см. п. 35). Хуситы извлекали выгоду из нестабильности в неподконтрольных им районах, а иногда и способствовали ей (см. пп. 37–40)<sup>51</sup>. Кроме того, они продолжали осуществлять действия, направленные на подрыв стратегических позиций своих противников.

37. За отчетный период Группа зафиксировала четыре случая нападений с использованием ракет и беспилотных летательных аппаратов на западном побережье и на юге страны, причем эти нападения были направлены на подрыв важных политических инициатив или на сеяние хаоса среди антихуситских сил<sup>52</sup>. 30 декабря 2020 года международный аэропорт Адена подвергся ракетному обстрелу как раз в тот момент, когда в нем совершил посадку самолет, перевозивший недавно сформированное правительство единства (см. приложение 7). Формирование этого правительства было самым важным достижением Эр-Риядского соглашения, и если бы вылет не задержался, то вполне вероятно, что среди представителей правительства было бы больше жертв, что подорвало бы результаты многомесячных переговоров. Время нападения также было символическим, поскольку возвращение правительства после двух лет борьбы между Южным переходным советом и правительством Йемена вселило надежду в местных жителей. 11 сентября 2021 года порт Моха был атакован пятью беспилотными летательными аппаратами и двумя ракетами. Во время нападения в порту находилась делегация правительственного комитета, прибывшая для наблюдения за переоборудованием порта под гражданские нужды после долгих лет военной оккупации. Это преобразование стало бы важной вехой в нормализации отношений между Объединенными силами и правительством, одновременно открыв на западном побережье дополнительный порт для приема гражданских импортных грузов (см. приложение 8). 10 ноября, в день, когда Специальный посланник по Йемену должен был совершить свою первую поездку на западное побережье, ракеты ударили по некоторым военным базам в Мохе (см. карту 3 и приложение 8).


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[bombing-in-aden](#); и [www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20211030-at-least-12-killed-in-blast-near-yemen-s-aden-airport](http://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20211030-at-least-12-killed-in-blast-near-yemen-s-aden-airport).

<sup>51</sup> Южный переходный совет заявил, что совершение хуситами «анонимных» нападений дает почву для домыслов в отношении того, кто может быть ответственен за них, и тем самым подстегивает недоверие среди антихуситских сил.

<sup>52</sup> Другие нападения хуситов, приведшие к жертвам среди гражданского населения в Таизе и Марибе, задокументированы в пп. 114–117 и приложении 35.

### Карта 3 Нападение на порт Моха



38. 29 августа лагерь Эль-Анад в Лахдже был атакован ракетами и одним беспилотным летательным аппаратом<sup>53</sup>. По имеющимся данным, это привело к потере около 90 человек из состава 3-й бригады Амалика<sup>54</sup>. Эта бригада, которая обычно базируется на западном побережье, прибыла в Эль-Анад для проведения учений после возникновения разногласий с Абу Зарой аль-Махрами, лидером бригад Амалика. Нападение, мишенью которого была избрана 3-я бригада, вызвало подозрения в сговоре между Аль-Махрами и хуситами<sup>55</sup>, однако сам Аль-Махрами отрицает это<sup>56</sup>. После нападения некоторые члены 3-й бригады вышли из ее состава, так как, по их словам, они больше не доверяли Аль-Махрами.

39. За исключением нападения 10 ноября, хуситы не взяли на себя ответственность ни за одно из нападений, о которых говорится в пунктах 37 и 38 (см. приложения 7 и 8)<sup>57</sup>. Маловероятно, что другие вооруженные группы в Йемене обладают необходимым потенциалом или мотивацией для совершения этих нападений. Важно отметить, что во всех четырех случаях ракеты, по сообщениям, были пущены с территории Таиза, контролируемого хуситами<sup>58</sup>. По меньшей мере в отношении двух нападений Группа была проинформирована о том, что Коалиция получила ранние предупреждения от военной администрации Таиза, связанной с правительством Йемена. Во время нападения 29 августа над

<sup>53</sup> Источники см. в приложении 5.

<sup>54</sup> URL: [www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/29/several-killed-in-houthi-attack-on-yemens-largest-base](http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/29/several-killed-in-houthi-attack-on-yemens-largest-base).

<sup>55</sup> Групповые обсуждения с членами 3-й бригады в 2021 году.

<sup>56</sup> Переписка с Группой, декабрь 2021 года

<sup>57</sup> Что касается нападения 10 ноября, то хуситы заявили, что они пустили ракеты в этом направлении (см. приложение 8). Хуситы взяли на себя ответственность за еще одно нападение на базу в Эль-Анаде в 2019 году (URL: <https://apnews.com/article/yemen-ap-top-news-houthis-international-news-jamal-khashoggi-92f491d2794440afaf53967fceb0c1b9>).

<sup>58</sup> См. приложения 7 и 8. Военное руководство Таиза предоставило информацию о нападениях в августе и ноябре 2021 года.

районом перед атакой были замечены разведывательные беспилотные летательные аппараты, в связи с чем это нападение не было неожиданным<sup>59</sup>.

40. Группе сообщили также, что в течение 2021 года разведывательные беспилотные летательные аппараты были замечены над ключевыми объектами, такими как международный аэропорт Адена и порт Моха. Антихуситские силы в Йемене не имеют возможности предотвратить проникновение беспилотных летательных аппаратов или ракет в свое воздушное пространство. Южный переходный совет и Объединенные силы, которые контролируют территории, избранные мишенью во время вышеупомянутых четырех нападений, заявили, что после того как силы Объединенных Арабских Эмиратов покинули подконтрольные им районы, у них больше нет эффективных систем противовоздушной обороны — жалобы, которые Группа слышала также в Марибе в октябре 2020 года. Один из членов Коалиции сообщил Группе, что не может отправить свои системы ПВО в Йемен, поскольку это было бы нарушением соглашений с конечным пользователем. При наличии этих систем жертв среди гражданского населения, вероятно, было бы меньше, а инфраструктуре был бы нанесен меньший ущерб (см. пп. 114–117).

## 2. События в политической и культурной сферах

41. Хуситы продолжали систематическую кампанию по распространению среди населения своей идеологии и по обеспечению поддержки своего дела и конфликта со стороны народа. При этом они целенаправленно избирали мишенями уязвимые группы населения. Например, Группа задокументировала девять новых случаев, в ходе которых хуситы задерживали, пытали, калечили, подвергали сексуальному насилию или репрессиям политически или профессионально активных женщин, которые выступали против идеологии хуситов. В этих и других случаях хуситы продолжали использовать обвинения в «проституции» в качестве предлога для того, чтобы: а) уменьшить общественную поддержку и признание бывших заключенных; б) предотвратить их дальнейшее активное участие в жизни общества; и с) обеспечить, чтобы они не угрожали режиму хуситов (см. приложение 9). С этой целью хуситы делают и хранят компрометирующие видеозаписи сексуального характера, которые они продолжают использовать в качестве средства подавления любого противодействия со стороны этих женщин. Подобные меры оказывают сдерживающее воздействие и на других женщин-лидеров. Ужесточение репрессий в отношении женщин за выражение ими политических взглядов влияет на их способность принимать участие в принятии решений, связанных с урегулированием конфликта, и тем самым представляет собой угрозу миру, безопасности и стабильности в Йемене (см. S/2020/326, п. 21 и приложение 5)<sup>60</sup>. Меры по оказанию психосоциальной и экономической поддержки бывшим заключенным-женщинам, с которыми беседовали члены Группы, и по предоставлению им защиты были ограничены, в результате чего

<sup>59</sup> Группа опросила бойцов, которые находились в лагере во время инцидента и видели беспилотные летательные аппараты. Они заявили, что, несмотря на неоднократные обращения к Коалиции, никаких мер по эвакуации сил или перехвату транспортных средств принято не было. Военный командир Южного переходного совета Абу Тахир подтвердил Группе, что с их стороны также были направлены предупреждения, однако у них не было возможности оказать противодействие транспортным средствам. Бойцы заявили, что, несмотря на опасность, им было приказано оставаться в лагере. Руководство бригад Амалика отрицало, что ему было заранее известно о подходе транспортных средств или о коммюнике, полученном от военного руководства Таиза.

<sup>60</sup> См. также резолюцию 2467 (2019) Совета Безопасности.


некоторым из них пришлось вернуться к своим семьям в контролируемые хуситами районы (см. приложение 9)<sup>61</sup>.

42. Летние лагеря и культурные программы для детей и взрослых являются частью стратегии хуситов по завоеванию поддержки своей идеологии, побуждению людей к участию в боевых действиях и мотивации войск (см. приложение 10). В то время как некоторые взрослые присоединяются к этим культурным программам потому, что они согласны с идеологическими взглядами хуситов, другие участвуют в них лишь с целью не потерять выплаты и льготы, связанные с трудоустройством, или доступ к гуманитарной помощи, либо из страха подвергнуться репрессиям за неучастие. Например, две женщины, отказавшиеся участвовать в этих программах, были арестованы и изнасилованы (см. приложение 10).

43. Группа изучила ряд устроенных в школах летних лагерей и одну мечеть, которые использовались хуситами для распространения своей идеологии среди детей, призыва их к борьбе, предоставления им базовой военной подготовки или их вербовки для участия в боевых действиях (см. рис. II и III). В этих летних лагерях поощряется использование языка ненависти и насилия в отношении конкретных групп. Детей учат скандировать хуситский лозунг «смерть Америке, смерть Израилю, проклятие евреям, победа исламу». В одном из лагерей детей в возрасте от 7 лет учили чистить оружие и уклоняться от ракет (см. приложения 10 и 11). Группа также задокументировала один случай совершения сексуального насилия в отношении ребенка, проходившего военную подготовку. Группа получила информацию о 10 случаях, когда детей под предлогом зачисления на культурные курсы на самом деле отправляли участвовать в боевых действиях или когда их увозили с таких курсов на поле боя. Она также задокументировала девять случаев предоставления или отказа в предоставлении гуманитарной помощи семьям только на основании того, участвовали ли их дети в боевых действиях, и учителям на основании того, вели ли они преподавание по одобренной хуситами программе. Эти факты подробно описаны в приложении 10.

Рисунок II

**Учебные материалы, используемые в летних лагерях (слева), и учащиеся в летнем лагере, читающие книги (справа)**



Источник: «Аль-Масира» (слева) и конфиденциально полученная информация (справа) (URL: [www.youtube.com/watch?v=2opF11zkY88](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2opF11zkY88)).

<sup>61</sup> По вопросу о поддержке жертв гендерного насилия см. резолюцию 2467 (2019), особенно пп. 14, 16 а) и 16 д).

Рисунок III  
 Дети и гости на церемонии окончания летней школы, август 2019 года



Источник: «Аль-Масира» (слева) (URL: [www.youtube.com/watch?v=2opF11zkY88](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2opF11zkY88)).

Примечание: в числе приглашенных были премьер-министр Абдул Азиз бин Хабтор; Мухаммед Али аль-Хуси; и министр здравоохранения Таха Мутавакель.

44. Генерал-майор Мухаммед Насер аль-Атифи (см. рис. V), как министр обороны, несет ответственность за то, чтобы дети не вербовались в ряды вооруженных сил хуситов. Яхья аль-Хуси (см. рис. IV), как министр образования, также несет ответственность за то, чтобы школы и летние лагеря не использовались для пропаганды насилия и ненависти или для радикализации, а также для вербовки детей. Дополнительная информация об этих лицах представлена в приложениях 10 и 11.

Рисунок IV  
 Яхья аль-Хуси во время посещения летнего лагеря



Источник: [www.youtube.com/watch?v=2opF11zkY88](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2opF11zkY88).

Рисунок V  
Генерал-майор Мухаммед Насер аль-Атифи (второй справа)




Источник: [https://hodhodyemennews.net/en\\_US/2021/01/18/yemens-defence-minister-yemen-is-rapidly-developing-new-weapons-of-deterrence](https://hodhodyemennews.net/en_US/2021/01/18/yemens-defence-minister-yemen-is-rapidly-developing-new-weapons-of-deterrence).

#### IV. Безопасность на море

45. С декабря 2020 года Группа зафиксировала пять нападений на коммерческие суда, а также несколько подозрительных приближений<sup>62</sup> и один случай, когда на борту малых судов в водах вокруг Йемена были замечены вооруженные люди (см. карту 4). По сравнению с предыдущим отчетным периодом, когда три коммерческих судна подверглись нападению в Аденском заливе, акцент вновь сместился на Красное море, где произошло четыре нападения.

<sup>62</sup> По крайней мере в двух случаях подозрительные приближения оказались контрольными маневрами береговой охраны Йемена, которые не были проведены в соответствии с международными стандартами.

Карта 4  
**Инциденты в сфере безопасности на море, произошедшие с декабря 2020 года**



46. Ситуация в Красном море характеризовалась увеличением числа нападений с использованием плавучих самодельных взрывных устройств. Успешные нападения с использованием таких устройств были направлены не на движущиеся суда, а на корабли, пришвартованные у морских нефтяных платформ в Саудовской Аравии, некоторые из которых находились более чем в 1000 км от Йемена. В некоторых случаях было отмечено применение нового, более крупного типа устройства, снабженного двумя подвесными двигателями и потому имеющего значительно больший расход топлива, чем предыдущее поколение устройств типа “blowfish” с одним двигателем. Учитывая указанное ранее расстояние до цели, почти нет сомнений в том, что эти устройства были запущены с «материнского корабля», который должен был буксировать их на протяжении большей части пути.

47. Первое нападение произошло 14 декабря 2020 года, когда три плавучих самодельных взрывных устройства были использованы для нападения на порт Джидды. Два таких устройства атаковали военно-морскую базу, повредив саудовский военный корабль, а еще одно поразило танкер *BW Rhine* (ИМО: 9341940) под флагом Сингапура, стоявший в морском терминале «Сауди Арамко» (см. рис. VI). Удар и последующий взрыв пробили корпус судна по ватерлинии. Они также вызвали пожар, который продолжался около часа. Хотя пострадавших не было, был нанесен значительный материальный и вытекающий из этого экономический ущерб (см. приложение 12).

Рисунок VI  
Пожар на танкере *BW Rhine*



Источник: конфиденциально.

48. Схожее нападение с использованием двух плавучих самодельных взрывных устройств произошло 27 апреля 2021 года недалеко от терминала Ясреф в Янбу, где был пришвартован танкер *Torm Hermia* (ИМО: 9797993) под флагом Сингапура (см. рис. VII). Экипаж судна подтвердил, что ВМС Саудовской Аравии перехватили одно устройство примерно в 1,4 морской мили от танкера. Саудовская Аравия подтвердила факт нападения. Второе устройство было обнаружено примерно в 30 морских милях к югу от порта Янбу (см. приложение 13). Группа считает, что расстояние между побережьем Йемена и Янбу слишком велико для того, чтобы плавучие самодельные взрывные устройства могли действовать автономно, поэтому вполне вероятно, что в операции был задействован «материнский корабль».

Рисунок VII  
Плавучее самодельное взрывное устройство, использованное во время нападения 27 апреля 2021 года



Источник: конфиденциально.

49. Частота запусков таких устройств непосредственно с территорий, контролируемых хуситами, значительно возросла за отчетный период. Многочисленные источники сообщили Группе, что устройства были собраны в портах Ходейда и Салиф и пущены с их территории. Коалиции, как правило, удается перехватить такие устройства, и она обычно отвечает воздушными ударами по местам сборки устройств в районах, контролируемых хуситами, что побудило МООНСХ в июле 2021 года призвать обе стороны к сдержанности, поскольку «[угрозы] операциям в жизненно важных пунктах доставки помощи» являются «нарушением Соглашения по Ходейде»<sup>63</sup>. В настоящее время Группа выясняет, используются ли районы, на которые распространяется действие Соглашения, для пуска этих устройств, в связи с чем она запросила дополнительную информацию у Коалиции и МООНСХ. По данным Коалиции, по состоянию на 31 октября 2021 года хуситами с начала конфликта было запущено 92 таких устройства.

50. Группа также задокументировала нападения на коммерческие суда с использованием беспилотных летательных аппаратов. 30 июля 2021 года танкер *Alberta* (ИМО: 9486922) под флагом Багамских Островов получил повреждения в порту Джизан (см. приложение 14). Над носовой частью судна взорвался беспилотный летательный аппарат. Обломки стеклопластика, извлеченные из палубы, имеют технические характеристики, соответствующие беспилотным летательным аппаратам среднего радиуса действия типа Qasef, которые часто используются хуситами для нападения на цели на юге Саудовской Аравии. Сообщений о пострадавших не поступало, а ущерб был относительно незначительным. Однако этот инцидент показывает, что суда на стоянке остаются уязвимыми для атак, особенно в портах вблизи Йемена.

51. Еще одно нападение с применением беспилотного летательного аппарата было совершено в Оманском заливе с избранием в качестве мишени танкера *Mercer Street* (ИМО: 9539585) под флагом Либерии. Первый раз судно было атаковано утром 29 июля 2021 года, когда капитан сообщил о двух «нападениях с использованием дронов» с промежутком в 30 минут, однако судно не было задето. Вечером того же дня танкер подвергся еще одной атаке, когда третий беспилотный летательный аппарат ударил в крышу мостика, что привело к значительным повреждениям, а также к гибели двух человек, включая капитана (см. приложение 15).

52. По первоначальным сообщениям, источником нападения мог быть Йемен<sup>64</sup>. В связи с этим Группа изучила имеющуюся в открытом доступе информацию и получила конфиденциальные сведения от нескольких государств-членов касательно этого инцидента. Используемые беспилотные летательные аппараты, по-видимому, являются усовершенствованными версиями беспилотного летательного аппарата с дельтовидным крылом, применение которого было задокументировано Группой ранее (см. S/2020/326, п. 57 и приложение 15). Учитывая расстояние в более чем 1700 км между районами, контролируемые хуситами, и местом атаки, для успешного нападения на корабль, движущийся с крейсерской скоростью, вероятно, потребовалась бы система ретрансляторов воздушного и морского базирования. Таким образом, весьма вероятно, что ответственность за данное нападение несет другой субъект, поскольку Группе не известно о том, чтобы у хуситов был доступ к таким системам. Тем не менее это нападение показывает, как быстро развивается технология беспилотных летательных аппаратов, которая, судя по всему, доступна также и хуситам (см. п. 60),

<sup>63</sup> URL: [https://twitter.com/UN\\_Hudaydah/status/1412009048862568450](https://twitter.com/UN_Hudaydah/status/1412009048862568450).

<sup>64</sup> URL: <https://english.alarabiya.net/News/gulf/2021/08/10/Senior-Pentagon-official-says-Iran-backed-Mercer-Street-attack-came-from-Yemen>.

что указывает на возможность нанесения подобных ударов в водах, окружающих Йемен.

53. Второе нападение в международных водах в непосредственной близости от Йемена поразило предназначенное для перевозки тарных и штучных грузов судно *Saviz* (ИМО: 9167253) под флагом Исламской Республики Иран, на котором 6 апреля 2021 года произошел взрыв во время стоянки на якоре в южной части Красного моря, примерно в 115 морских милях к северо-западу от побережья Йемена. По данным информационного агентства Исламской Республики Иран «Тасним», судно было повреждено магнитными минами, которые были прикреплены к его корпусу водолазами<sup>65</sup>. Судно *Saviz* стояло на якоре в одном и том же месте по крайней мере с 2017 года, в результате чего начали звучать обвинения в том, что оно якобы обеспечивает поддержку военных операций в регионе<sup>66</sup>. Исламская Республика Иран сообщила Группе, что задача судна заключалась в борьбе с морским пиратством и что нападение не было связано с йеменским конфликтом.

54. Группа продолжает получать сообщения о морских минах, установленных хуситами в южной части Красного моря вблизи различных островов к востоку от трех портов, находящихся под их контролем, а также о дрейфующих морских минах вблизи границы с Саудовской Аравией. По данным Коалиции, с начала конфликта по 31 октября 2021 года было обнаружено и уничтожено 205 морских мин. Группа расследует утверждения о том, что мины хранятся в определенных местах в Ходейде, Салифе и Рас-Исе, из которых они вывозятся для установки, что является нарушением Стокгольмского соглашения.

## V. Оружие и осуществление адресного оружейного эмбарго


55. В соответствии с пунктами 14–17 резолюции 2216 (2015) Группа продолжала уделять пристальное внимание различным мероприятиям по наблюдению и проведению расследований для установления того, имели ли место какие-либо нарушения адресного оружейного эмбарго, связанные с прямой или косвенной поставкой, продажей или передачей оружия физическим и юридическим лицам, включенным в санкционный перечень Комитетом и Советом Безопасности, или в интересах этих лиц. По оценке Группы, под это определение попадают все военные силы и военизированные формирования, лояльные властям, базирующимся в Сане.

56. В течение отчетного периода хуситы продолжали наносить воздушные удары по Саудовской Аравии (см. карту 5). Цели, расположенные вблизи границы между Йеменом и Саудовской Аравией, подвергались наибольшему риску и обычно атаковались при помощи комбинации беспилотных летательных аппаратов среднего радиуса действия типа Qasef-2K и артиллерийских ракет типа Badr. Хуситы также продолжали наносить удары в глубине территории Саудовской Аравии, используя беспилотные летательные аппараты большого радиуса действия типа Samad, крылатые ракеты типа Quds и баллистические ракеты Zulfiqar.

<sup>65</sup> URL: [www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2021/04/07/2480410/iranian-ship-attacked-in-red-sea-sources](http://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2021/04/07/2480410/iranian-ship-attacked-in-red-sea-sources).

<sup>66</sup> URL: <https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2021/04/07/-Mother-ship-command-center-The-Iranian-ship-Saviz-attacked-in-Red-Sea>.

Карта 5  
Удары с применением ракет и беспилотных летательных аппаратов,  
нанесенные с 30 декабря 2020 года



57. Нападения в приграничных районах происходили с частотой несколько раз в неделю. Операции на большие расстояния проводились реже и часто происходили волнообразно, т. е. силы хуситов запускали несколько беспилотных летательных аппаратов и ракет по множественным целям в рамках одной операции. Для совершения большей части нападений использовались беспилотные летательные аппараты местного производства и ракеты Badr. Частота нападений показывает, что хуситы легко могут получать компоненты для этого оружия из-за рубежа.

58. Группе известно об одном нападении с использованием крылатой ракеты и о трех подтвержденных нападениях с использованием баллистических ракет дальнего действия за отчетный период. Эти цифры не сильно отличаются от предыдущих лет, из чего можно заключить, что хуситы продолжают испытывать трудности с получением высокотехнологичных ракетных систем из-за рубежа. По данным Коалиции, с начала конфликта по 31 октября 2021 года для атаки на цели в Саудовской Аравии были использованы в общей сложности 781 беспилотный летательный аппарат и 409 баллистических ракет.

59. В отчетный период хуситы среди прочего избирали мишенями объекты гражданской инфраструктуры, например балкерный терминал компании «Сауди Арамко» в Джидде (см. приложение 16) и международный аэропорт Абхи (см. приложение 17). Цель этих атак в первую очередь политическая — таким образом хуситы хотят побудить Эр-Рияд согласиться на выгодные для них условия политического урегулирования. Это резко контрастирует с использованием ракет и беспилотных летательных аппаратов на территории самого Йемена, где, как об этом свидетельствует нападение на международный аэропорт Адена 30 декабря 2020 года (см. приложение 7), целью является максимальное число

человеческих жертв, чему способствует отсутствие у правительства Йемена эффективных средств противовоздушной обороны.

## A. Новые системы вооружений, используемые хуситами

60. 11 марта 2021 года хуситы продемонстрировали средства массовой информации новые системы вооружений (см. приложение 18)<sup>67</sup>. На выставке был представлен новый беспилотный летательный аппарат Samad-4, переносящий две ракеты и, как заявлено, имеющий дальность действия 2000 км, а также гексакоптер малого радиуса действия Rujum. Последний, по-видимому, является китайским YD6-1000S, приспособленным для выброса шести малых минометных снарядов. Кроме того, был продемонстрирован беспилотный летательный аппарат с дельтовидным крылом Waed, который, по-видимому, является усовершенствованной версией модели, задокументированной в 2019 году (см. рис. VIII)<sup>68</sup>. Судя по всему, он имеет больший размах крыла и, вероятно, большую дальность полета. Визуально наиболее очевидным конструктивным отличием является форма вертикальных стабилизаторов. В сентябре 2020 года в социальных сетях были опубликованы снимки объекта, напоминающего поврежденный аппарат Waed в зоне базы «Эль-Алам» в Марибе<sup>69</sup>. Предположительно, Waed может нести усовершенствованные сенсорные системы, позволяющие осуществлять дистанционное управление на расстоянии в несколько сотен километров с помощью системы ретрансляции данных, что значительно повышает угрозу для движущихся целей (см. п. 52 и приложение 15)<sup>70</sup>.

Рисунок VIII

**Беспилотный летательный аппарат Waed на выставке (слева) и возможно поврежденный Waed близ Мариба (справа)**



Источники: Almasirah.net (слева) и <https://twitter.com/almasdaronline/status/1308769942007943168> (справа).

<sup>67</sup> URL: [www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1399/12/21/2468309/](http://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1399/12/21/2468309/) - *یمن - رونمایی از دستاوردهای جدید در حوزه - دفاعی - از پهپاد های جدید تا - موشک های - سعیر - قاصم 2 - و - قدس 2 - فیلم*.

<sup>68</sup> См. S/2020/326, п. 57 и приложение 15.

<sup>69</sup> URL: <https://twitter.com/almasdaronline/status/1308769942007943168>.

<sup>70</sup> Другие используемые хуситами системы беспилотных летательных аппаратов, имеющие большую дальность действия, используют для поиска целей заранее заданные координаты по Глобальной позиционной системе (GPS), так как возможность радиуправления ограничена линией видимости. Это означает, что маршрут этих аппаратов после запуска не может быть скорректирован.

61. Кроме того, как сообщается, в зоне боевых действий в Марибе в июле 2021 года впервые была применена зенитная ракета «358»<sup>71</sup>, использованная для перехвата разведывательного беспилотного летательного аппарата (см. рис. IX)<sup>72</sup>. Из-за своей сравнительно низкой скорости она не представляет значительной угрозы для военных самолетов, но может быть эффективна против более медленных летательных аппаратов.

Рисунок IX

**Обломки ракеты «358» класса «поверхность-воздух», предположительно найденные вблизи Мариба**



Источник: <https://almasdaronline.com/articles/239284>.

## **В. Изъятия**

62. 10 февраля 2021 года в 17 ч 01 мин экипаж корабля ВМС США «Уинстон Черчилль» стал свидетелем попыток осуществить переброску груза между двумя дау примерно в 70 морских милях к востоку от побережья Сомали (см. рис. X и карту 6). Первое судно, дау типа «шуай», было задержано 11 февраля 2021 года в 11 ч 05 мин, но оказалось, что его грузовой отсек пуст, и через пять часов дау было отпущено. Второе судно, более крупное дау типа «джелбут», было задержано примерно в 14 ч 00 мин. На его борту было обнаружено 3752 автомата типа 56-1, 198 пулеметов типа ПКМ общего назначения, компоненты для 82 крупнокалиберных пулеметов ДШК, 50 винтовок AM-50 Saayad (вместе с 50 оптическими прицелами RG-004A1) и 90 гранатометов РПГ-7 (см. приложение 19).

<sup>71</sup> См. S/2021/79, п. 81 и приложение 13.

<sup>72</sup> URL: <https://almasdaronline.com/articles/239284>.

Рисунок X  
 Пытка переброски груза между двумя дау 10 февраля 2021 года



Источник: конфиденциально.

63. Группа получила доказательства того, что экипаж дау состоял из граждан Йемена (см. приложение 21). Согласно заявлению одного из государств-членов, экипаж «джелбута» заявил, что ему было приказано зайти в порт Джаск в Исламской Республике Иран в январе 2021 года, чтобы забрать груз, и это утверждение, по-видимому, подтверждается координатами навигационного устройства, найденного на борту (см. приложение 19, рис. 19.20)<sup>73</sup>. Однако Группа не может независимо проверить эту информацию, а ее эксперты не смогли осмотреть груз, поскольку, по сообщениям, он был уничтожен. Судя по имеющимся изображениям, автоматы и некоторые пулеметы общего назначения имеют технические характеристики и маркировку, соответствующие оружию китайского производства, в то время как винтовки (и прилагающиеся к ним прицелы) и РПГ, скорее всего, происходят из Ирана. Исламская Республика Иран сообщила Группе, что она отрицает любую связь с указанными дау и изъятым оружием. Группа отмечает также, что зеленая пластиковая упаковка, в которую было возвращено оружие, похожа на упаковку, зарегистрированную во время предыдущих изъятий (см. рис. XI и таблицу 1; S/2021/79, приложение 14, рис. 14.6; и S/2019/83, приложение 16, п. 7), что указывает на происхождение изъятого оружия из одного источника.

<sup>73</sup> Группа получила только информацию, показанную на карте в приложении 19, рис. 19.20; однако она отмечает, что более подробная информация о маршруте судна представлена в докладе Глобальной инициативы по борьбе с транснациональной организованной преступностью, озаглавленном «An Iranian fingerprint? Tracing type 56-1 assault rifles in Somalia» («Иранский след? По следам автоматов типа 56-1 в Сомали»), URL: <https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/iran-firearms-somalia>.

Рисунок XI  
Автоматы типа 56-1, завернутые в пластиковую упаковку




Источник: конфиденциально.

64. Второе изъятие оружия произошло примерно в 17 ч 00 мин 6 мая 2021 года, когда корабль ВМС США «Монтеррей» перехватил дау типа «шуай» в Аравийском море примерно в 114 морских милях к югу от побережья Пакистана (см. карту 6). Группа получила доказательства того, что капитан этого дау также находился на борту другого дау типа «шуай», которое было задержано 11 февраля 2021 года (см. приложение 21). Некоторые виды оружия опять-таки были завернуты в зеленую пластиковую упаковку, которая уже регистрировалась Группой в ходе других задержаний (см. таблицу 1; S/2021/79, приложение 14, рис. 14.6; и S/2019/83, приложение 16, п. 7). Группа получила координаты с навигационного прибора, предположительно найденного на борту дау, указывающие на то, что 4 мая 2021 года судно находилось поблизости от порта Джаск (см. приложение 20, рис. 20.44)<sup>74</sup>. Группа не может провести независимую проверку этой информации и отмечает, что координаты на устройстве Глобальной позиционной системы (GPS) сами по себе не являются убедительным доказательством того, что судно находилось в указанном месте.

<sup>74</sup> Группа отмечает, что навигационное устройство, обнаруженное на борту дау *Bahri-2*, которое было задержано с грузом оружия 24 июня 2020 года, также содержало координаты порта Джаск (см. S/2021/79, приложение 15, рис. 15.20).

Карта 6  
**Изыятия стрелкового оружия и легких вооружений, противотанковых управляемых ракет и прицелов, 2018–2021 годы**



65. В августе 2021 года Группа осмотрела груз, состоящий из 2556 автоматов типа 56-1, 192 пулеметов общего назначения типа ПКМ, 100 снайперских винтовок типа 85, 52 винтовок AM-50 Sayyad, 35 автоматов АКС-74У и 194 гранатометов РПГ-7 (см. приложение 20). Автоматы типа 56-1 и снайперские винтовки, а также 19 пулеметов типа ПКМ имеют технические характеристики и маркировку, соответствующие оружию китайского производства. Большинство из них было произведено на оружейном заводе Цзяньшэ (Государственный завод № 26) в период с 2016 по 2017 год. Из оставшихся пулеметов 164 имеют технические характеристики и маркировку, соответствующие оружию, производимому в Исламской Республике Иран, шесть были произведены в Болгарии, а в трех случаях происхождение остается неясным. Автоматы АКС-74У по техническим характеристикам и маркировке соответствуют автоматам, произведенным на Тульском оружейном заводе на территории нынешней Российской Федерации в конце 1980-х годов. Винтовки AM-50 и гранатометы РПГ-7 имеют технические характеристики и маркировку, соответствующие оружию, произведенному в Исламской Республике Иран. Группа задокументировала также несколько оптических прицелов Ghadir, которые по своим характеристикам соответствуют прицелам, произведенным в Исламской Республике Иран, а также телескопические прицелы ПОСП, произведенные в Беларуси. Исламская Республика Иран сообщила Группе, что эти пулеметы и прицелы для винтовок не были изготовлены в Иране и что «на основании одной лишь внешней схожести или сходства маркировки или технических характеристик [такой] техники и

иранской продукции не следует делать выводов относительно ее происхождения». Помимо стрелкового оружия и легких вооружений на борту дау также находились 50 ракет для противотанковых комплексов контейнерного типа с наведением по проводам, технические характеристики которых соответствуют различным версиям ракет 9M111 и 9M113, произведенных в период с 1978 по 1999 год на территории нынешней Российской Федерации. Ракеты были упакованы в пластиковые тубы, подобные которым были зафиксированы Группой во время предыдущих изъятий на море (см. рис. XII и таблицу 1, а также [S/2020/326](#), приложение 20, рис. 20.1), что указывает на их происхождение из одного источника.

Рисунок XII  
**Противотанковые управляемые ракеты в тубах**



Источник: конфиденциально.

66. Группа не получила ответов относительно цепочки поставок изъятого оружия. Российская Федерация заявила, что ее военные структуры не поставляли оружие в Йемен, а Болгария сообщила Группе, что никаких документов, касающихся пулеметов, у нее не имеется; ответ от Китая пока не получен<sup>75</sup>. Исламская Республика Иран заявила, что не продавала, не экспортировала и не передавала оружие Йемену. Что касается прицелов ПОСП, то Беларусь сообщила Группе, что они были экспортированы в Исламскую Республику Иран в период с июня

<sup>75</sup> В предыдущие годы Китай сообщил Группе о том, что изъятые автоматы типа 56-1 не экспортировались в Йемен. Однако это не исключает возможности того, что оружие было экспортировано в третью страну.

2016 года по апрель 2018 года<sup>76</sup> и что эта страна предоставила сертификат конечного пользователя, в котором указано, что они будут использоваться исключительно для нужд Министерства обороны и материально-технического обеспечения вооруженных сил. Исламская Республика Иран сообщила Группе, что прицелы находятся в пользовании ее военных подразделений и не были реэкспортированы, переданы или проданы. За некоторыми заметными исключениями<sup>77</sup> состав изъятых грузов указывает на общую схему поставок (см. таблицу 1), вероятно, из государственных запасов, с использованием дау в Аравийском море, которые доставляют оружие в Йемен и Сомали (см. S/2021/79, пп. 72–76)<sup>78</sup>. Группа продолжает расследование в сотрудничестве с Группой экспертов по Сомали.

67. Группа расследует цепочку поставки семи тепловизионных прицелов RU90/120G, которые были изъятые 22 июня 2021 года на контрольно-пропускном пункте Шан на границе между Оманом и Йеменом (см. рис. XIII и приложение 22). Прицелы производятся компанией Rayan Roshd Afzar, китайско-иранским совместным предприятием<sup>79</sup>, и ранее уже изымались вместе с оружием (см. S/2021/79, п. 88 и приложение 14). Исламская Республика Иран сообщила Группе, что изъятые прицелы не были произведены в этой стране. Этот инцидент показывает, что небольшие партии военной техники продолжают поступать в Йемен также по суше<sup>80</sup>.

Рисунок XIII

**Тепловизионный прицел RU90/120G, изъятый на пограничном пункте Шан**



Источник: конфиденциально.

<sup>76</sup> С 2018 года это уже пятый случай изъятия белорусских оптических прицелов, экспортированных в Исламскую Республику Иран (см. таблицу 1).

<sup>77</sup> Исключение составляют штурмовые винтовки АКС-74У и снайперские винтовки типа 85.

<sup>78</sup> Роль сомалийских преступных сетей в этой сети поставок остается неясной. Существует множество доказательств того, что перевалка оружия происходит у берегов Сомали и что часть оружия из таких грузов попадает на сомалийский черный рынок. Однако остается неясным, поставляется ли оружие сначала в Йемен, а затем переправляется обратно на Африканский Рог, или же часть оружия выгружается прямо с дау на сомалийские берега.

<sup>79</sup> URL: [www.thedailybeast.com/the-chinese-company-selling-iranian-sniper-gear-around-the-world](http://www.thedailybeast.com/the-chinese-company-selling-iranian-sniper-gear-around-the-world).

<sup>80</sup> Последнее известное изъятие такого рода на контрольно-пропускном пункте Шан произошло 20 марта 2019 года, при этом были изъятые боеприпасы для стрелкового оружия и легких вооружений, а также запалы для минометных гранат.

Таблица 1

**Изъятые стрелковое оружие и легкие вооружения, противотанковые управляемые ракеты и прицелы, задокументированные Группой с 2018 года**

	Автоматы типа 56-1	Гранато- меты РПГ-7	Вин- товки АМ-50	Пулеметы типа ПКМ	Пулеметы ДШК	Оптиче- ские при- целы из Бе- ларуси	Прицелы для винто- вок Ghadir	Прицелы производ- ства Rayan Roshd Afzar	Противотан- ковые управля- емые ракеты (различные типы)
Аденский залив, 28 июня 2018 года	X <sup>a</sup>								
Аден, 10 декабря 2018 года	X	X				X			
Аденский залив, 25 но- ября 2019 года									X <sup>a</sup>
Аденский залив, 9 фев- раля 2020 года						X		X	X <sup>a</sup>
Аденский залив, 17 ап- реля 2020 года	X <sup>a</sup>		X	X		X	X	X	
Аденский залив, 24 июня 2020 года	X <sup>a</sup>	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Аденский залив, 11 фев- раля 2021 года	X <sup>a, b</sup>	X <sup>b</sup>	X <sup>b</sup>	X <sup>b</sup>	X <sup>b</sup>		X <sup>b</sup>		
Оманский залив, 6 мая 2021 года	X <sup>a</sup>	X	X	X		X	X		X <sup>a</sup>
Контрольно-пропускной пункт Шан <sup>c</sup> , 22 июня 2021 года								X <sup>b</sup>	

Источник: Группа, государства-члены.

<sup>a</sup> Изделия имели аналогичную упаковку.


<sup>b</sup> Изделия не были осмотрены Группой.

<sup>c</sup> Контрольно-пропускной пункт Шан является основным пунктом пересечения границы между Оманом и Йеменом (см. карту 6).

### С. Расследование цепочки поставок

68. Хуситы продолжают получать ключевые компоненты для своих систем вооружений от европейских и азиатских компаний, используя сложную сеть посредников для сокрытия цепочки поставок (см. карту 7). Четыре случая, описанные ниже, иллюстрируют эту картину в соответствии с положениями пункта 8 резолюции 2511 (2020). Государства-члены неоднократно информировали Группу о том, что эти компоненты не являются ни оружием, ни предметами двойного назначения в соответствии с национальным законодательством. Однако Группа считает, что, поскольку эти компоненты могут быть использованы в военных целях, службы экспортного контроля и таможенные органы должны проявлять особую бдительность для предотвращения нарушений адресного оружейного эмбарго.

Карта 7  
Сети поставок, используемые хуситами



69. Группа расследовала цепочку поставки преобразователя давления ПОО 30.600G, изготовленного компанией BD Sensors в Германии, который был частью крылатой ракеты типа Quds, использованной при нападении на Джидду 23 ноября 2020 года (см. приложение 16). Аналогичные преобразователи давления были задокументированы Группой как компоненты ранее использованных ракет и были отслежены вплоть до Исламской Республики Иран и Турции (см. S/2021/79, пп. 79–80). Датчик, о котором идет речь, был приобретен компанией, базирующейся в Омане, которая импортировала его через Китай в июле 2020 года, за четыре месяца до нападения. Оманская компания ввезла его от имени физического лица, утверждавшего, что оно представляет компанию, базирующуюся в Йемене (см. приложение 23). Группа пока не смогла установить, действительно ли преобразователи давления были экспортированы из Омана в Йемен (что означало бы, что крылатая ракета типа Quds была произведена хуситами), или же они были ввезены в другую страну и лишь потом оказались в Йемене. Это уже второй случай за последние годы, когда компоненты, используемые в системах вооружений хуситов, были прослежены от поставщиков в Китае до коммерческих фирм в Омане (см. S/2021/79, п. 77)<sup>81</sup>.

70. Группа также расследовала цепочку поставки шести подвесных двигателей E75BEHD, произведенных компанией «Ямаха» в Японии, которые она

<sup>81</sup> Власти Омана пока не представили ответа на вопрос относительно цепочки хранения и передачи груза, состоявшего из компонентов для беспилотных летательных аппаратов, после его прибытия в Салалу 2 декабря 2018 года.

задокументировала среди обломков трех плавучих самодельных взрывных устройств, использованных во время нападения на порт Джидды 14 декабря 2020 года (см. приложение 12). Группа смогла установить, что двигатели были переданы компании Dawood Trading, генеральному дилеру «Ямаха» в Йемене, 9 марта 2020 года через другую коммерческую компанию в Омане. Группа запросила у Dawood Trading информацию о цепочке хранения и передачи этих двигателей, но пока не получила ответа.

71. Группа изучила цепочку поставки двухцилиндрового роторного двигателя 3W-110i B2, изготовленного компанией 3W-Modellmotoren в Германии, который она осмотрела в октябре 2020 года среди обломков хуситского беспилотного летательного аппарата в Марибе (см. рис. XIV). Группа получила доказательства (см. приложение 24), свидетельствующие о том, что этот двигатель был заказан физическим лицом в Китае через платформу электронной коммерции Taobao.com 25 января 2018 года. Выполняя этот заказ, компания в Германии заказала двигатель у производителя через другого посредника — розничного продавца моделей самолетов в Германии — и, как сообщается, экспортировала его в Китай в марте 2018 года. Группа обратилась к Китаю с просьбой предоставить информацию о личности покупателя и цепочке хранения и передачи двигателя, но пока не получила ответа.

Рисунок XIV  
Двигатель 3W-110i B2, осмотренный в Марибе



Источник: Группа.

72. Группа изучила также цепочку поставки газотурбинных двигателей Titan производства AMT Netherlands, которые она задокументировала в 2020 году в качестве компонентов зенитных ракет «358» (см. S/2021/79, п. 81 и приложение 13). Они были экспортированы в Гонконг, Китай, 10 марта 2017 года и 6 июня 2019 года. Согласно сертификатам конечного пользователя, полученным Группой, двигатели были закуплены авиационной компанией, которая, по словам Китая, прекратила свою деятельность в 2014 году и поэтому не могла импортировать двигатели. Группа обнаружила, что сертификаты конечного

пользователя были представлены компанией HSJ Electronic (HK), базирующейся в Гонконге, Китай, которая была грузополучателем двигателя с серийным номером #7023, в то время как другие три двигателя были поставлены другой компанией, Vista Automation & Communication, также базирующейся в Гонконге, Китай. Согласно общедоступным документам, и HSJ Electronic (HK), и Vista Automation & Communication принадлежали одному и тому же лицу (см. приложение 25). Ответ Китая касательно цепочки хранения и передачи двигателей все еще ожидается.

## **VI. Финансовые и экономические вопросы**

### **A. Экономические вопросы**

#### **1. Общий обзор**

73. Группа рассмотрела различные проблемы йеменской экономики, которые представляют угрозу миру, безопасности и стабильности этой страны. Вот уже более семи лет Йемен охвачен конфликтом, который разрушает его экономику. В районах, не контролируемых хуситами, йеменский риал быстро обесценивается по отношению к доллару США, что ведет к росту цен на продовольствие и ввергает все больше людей в крайнюю нищету<sup>82</sup>. Поскольку около 90 процентов предметов первой необходимости в стране импортируется, инфляционное давление, вызванное в первую очередь ростом цен на импортные товары, оставалось сильным. По данным Центрального банка Йемена, средний уровень продовольственной инфляции в 2020 году превысил 30 процентов<sup>83</sup>. В 2020 году реальный валовой внутренний продукт сократился примерно на 8,5 процента, и Всемирный банк ожидает, что в 2021 году общая инфляция продолжит стремительно ускоряться и достигнет примерно 45 процентов по сравнению с 35 процентами в 2020 году<sup>84</sup>.

#### **2. Экономические проблемы, представляющие потенциальную угрозу миру, безопасности и стабильности**

74. Ухудшение экономической ситуации привело к разочарованию, лишениям и недовольству населения в районах, не контролируемых хуситами, что является благодатной почвой для дальнейших социальных волнений и конфликтов. Терпение простых людей истощается, о чем свидетельствуют участвовавшие случаи массовых протестов, демонстраций и волнений в этих районах<sup>85</sup>, когда люди выходят на улицы, протестуя против стремительного роста валютного курса, повышения цен на продукты питания, невыплаты зарплат, перебоев в электроснабжении и повсеместной бедности. Некоторые политические группы пытались воспользоваться этой ситуацией.

75. Экономический комитет Южного переходного совета под руководством Айдаруса аз-Зубайди провел ряд встреч с Южной ассоциацией по обмену валют

<sup>82</sup> URL: [www.worldbank.org/en/country/yemen/publication/economic-update-october-2021](http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/yemen/publication/economic-update-october-2021).

<sup>83</sup> Central Bank of Yemen, *Quarterly Bulletin: Economic and Monetary Developments*, No. 4 (September 2021). Годовой уровень инфляции в 2020 году оценивается примерно в 25 процентов, по сравнению с предполагаемым средним уровнем в 10 процентов в 2019 году.

<sup>84</sup> URL: [www.worldbank.org/en/country/yemen/overview#1](http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/yemen/overview#1).

<sup>85</sup> По данным агентства «Интелайз», переданным по состоянию на 27 сентября 2021 года, в этом месяце в Адене, Шабве, Абьяне, Сокотре, Лахдже и Хадрамауте было зарегистрировано 54 демонстрации. URL: <https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-key-message-update-protests-intensify-south-due-further-sharp-depreciation>.

без участия Центрального банка Йемена или других структур правительства Йемена, обсудив меры по смягчению экономических проблем, возникающих из-за нестабильности обменного курса<sup>86</sup>. Такие действия Совета рассматриваются критиками как попытка оспорить право Центрального банка и правительства Йемена регулировать деятельность банков и компаний, занимающихся обменом валют, как часть более широкой продолжающейся борьбы за власть между правительством Йемена и Советом<sup>87</sup>.

76. Хрупкие политическая система и экономика Йемена по-прежнему находятся под угрозой, что в свою очередь ставит под угрозу мир, безопасность и стабильность в стране. Сознательная и систематическая фрагментация экономической системы и институтов Йемена, осуществляемая как правительством Йемена, так и хуситами, привела к появлению в двух регионах параллельных центральных банков, таможенных и налоговых органов, подразделений финансовой разведки и агентств телекоммуникаций, а также собственных экономических, торговых, банковских, тарифных и налоговых законов и политики (см. приложение 2б).

77. Международное сообщество должно обратить внимание на серьезность этого экономического кризиса и принять конкретные меры для предотвращения дальнейшего раскола в Йемене, который может иметь необратимые последствия. В отсутствие быстрого улучшения политической ситуации и ситуации в области безопасности вырисовываются безрадостные экономические перспективы, что усугубляет общую нестабильность в стране<sup>88</sup>.

## **В. Контроль над финансовыми ресурсами, осуществляемый внесенными в санкционный перечень лицами и их сетями**

78. Группа расследовала денежные средства, другие финансовые активы и экономические ресурсы, которые находятся, прямо или косвенно, в собственности или под контролем лиц, на которых распространяется санкционный режим, введенный резолюцией 2140 (2014) Совета Безопасности, или физических или юридических лиц, действующих от их имени или по их указанию, либо юридических лиц, которые находятся в их собственности или под их контролем, в нарушение резолюции 2140 (2014). Как сообщается, для финансирования своей деятельности такие лица используют следующие методы:

- a) конфискация активов и денежных средств физических и юридических лиц;
- b) получение денежных средств из иностранных источников;
- c) участие в торговле на черном рынке и взимание незаконных пошлин за импорт топлива, а также обложение незаконными сборами других видов предпринимательской деятельности;

<sup>86</sup> URL: [www.aden-tm.net/NDetails.aspx?contid=179225](http://www.aden-tm.net/NDetails.aspx?contid=179225). Во время встречи Группы с Экономическим комитетом Южного переходного совета представитель Комитета заявил, что эти встречи были проведены для улучшения ситуации.

<sup>87</sup> Во время встречи Группы с Экономическим комитетом 21 августа 2021 года в Адене представитель Комитета пояснил, что, поскольку правительство Йемена и Центральный банк Йемена не выполнили свою задачу должным образом, что привело к обвалу йеменского риала и росту цен на основные товары, они были вынуждены вмешаться.

<sup>88</sup> URL: [www.worldbank.org/en/country/yemen/publication/economic-update-october-2021](http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/yemen/publication/economic-update-october-2021).

- d) подделка, контрабанда и незаконный оборот наркотических средств, наркотиков и психотропных веществ, денежных купюр, антиквариата и предметов старины;
- e) сбор неналоговых доходов и закята;
- f) взыскание таможенных пошлин и налогов.

79. Подробный анализ некоторых из этих источников финансирования представлен ниже.

## 1. Конфискация средств Абд Раббо Мансура Хади и других лиц

80. 27 июня 2021 года председатель специального уголовного суда Аль-Амана в Сане направил банку «Тадамон» меморандум, в котором сообщил, что замороженные средства на трех обозначенных в меморандуме счетах, открытых в банке на имя Абд Раббо Мансура Хади, были конфискованы судом после того, как Хади был осужден по обвинению, в частности, в «подрыве независимости Йеменской Республики»<sup>89</sup>.

81. Далее суд обязал банк «Тадамон» перевести эти средства на конкретные счета в центральном банке Йемена в Сане, надзор за движением средств по которым осуществляет общественный прокурор. Банк сообщил Группе, что считает такой перевод средств нарушением резолюции 2140 (2014). В связи с этим он сообщил управляющему центрального банка Йемена в Сане и главе специальной уголовной прокуратуры, что не сможет перевести эти средства. Группа получила информацию о том, что по состоянию на 17 ноября 2021 года средства не были переведены банком «Тадамон» в центральный банк Йемена в Сане. Замораживание этих счетов и конфискация хранящихся на них средств рассматривается Группой как потенциальное нарушение прав человека и международного гуманитарного права<sup>90</sup>.

82. Расследования Группы также показали, что, помимо этого, судами было предписано перевести денежные средства и активы определенных организаций, хранящиеся в банке, на указанные счета в центральном банке Йемена в Сане, однако соответствующий банк не совершил перевод этих средств и активов. Группа продолжает расследование этого вопроса (см. приложение 27).

## 2. Конфискация средств банка «Тадамон»

83. Центральный банк Йемена в Сане издал циркуляр от 28 июня 2021 года — в тот же день, когда банк «Тадамон» сообщил центральному банку, что не может перевести конфискованные средства Абд Раббо Мансура Хади, — предписывающий всем учреждениям и обменным компаниям, действующим на подконтрольной хуситам территории, заморозить все депонированные у них средства и активы банка «Тадамон» и немедленно перевести их в центральный банк Йемена в Сане (см. приложение 28). Банк «Тадамон» сообщил, что не имеет счетов ни в одной обменной компании или учреждении. Группа считает, что такие репрессии со стороны центрального банка Йемена в Сане, как отдача

<sup>89</sup> Группа считает, что, учитывая политический характер этого дела, специальный уголовный суд Аль-Амана в Сане действовал под контролем или руководством Абдулмалика аль-Хуси (YЕi.004).

<sup>90</sup> См. Всеобщую декларацию прав человека, ст. 17; Арабскую хартию прав человека 2004 года, ст. 31 (URL: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/551368?ln=en>); Дополнительный протокол к Женевским конвенциям от 12 августа 1949 года, касающийся защиты жертв вооруженных конфликтов немеждународного характера (Протокол II), ст. 4 (2) g); и базу данных по обычному международному гуманитарному праву Международного комитета Красного Креста (МККК), нормы 50 и 52.

распоряжений о конфискации средств и активов банков, работающих в районах, находящихся под его контролем, оказывают негативное влияние на бесперебойное функционирование банковского сектора, а также на экономику и стабильность Йемена.

### 3. Доход от телекоммуникационного сектора

84. Несмотря на продолжающийся конфликт, телекоммуникационная отрасль в Йемене продолжает активно расти и является основным источником дохода для хуситских властей. Компании, работающие в районах, находящихся под контролем хуситов, страдают от политической неопределенности, незаконных сборов, вымогательства и конфискации активов. Лицензии намеренно выдаются на короткий срок, чтобы лишить компании определенности в отношении будущей деятельности<sup>91</sup>. Группа расследует степень контроля, осуществляемого хуситами над основными телекоммуникационными компаниями, а именно MTN, Sabafon, TeleYemen и Y Telecom (см. приложение 29). Компания TeleYemen, базирующаяся в Сане, отрицает захват контроля над собой со стороны хуситов и заявляет, что его руководство было назначено до начала нынешнего конфликта. Однако правительство Йемена утверждает, что оно перенесло головной офис TeleYemen в Аден и сохранило компанию под своим контролем. Руководство TeleYemen в Сане сообщило, что о переносе не сообщалось официально, и потому оно считает его не соответствующим корпоративным правилам. Восемьдесят процентов акционеров компании Sabafon приняли решение перенести головной офис компании в Аден в 2020 году. Абдулла Месфер аш-Шаер, близкий соратник Абдулмалика аль-Хуси (YEi.004), сыграл важную роль в получении контроля над управлением Sabafon<sup>92</sup>.

85. Группа расследует вопрос о том, добились ли хуситы эффективного контроля над национальным доменом верхнего уровня «.ye» и используют ли они «систему управления полосой пропускания», приобретенную компанией TeleYemen в Сане. Контроль над доменом и незаконное использование телекоммуникационных средств потенциально дадут хуситам возможность контролировать и блокировать трафик, цензурировать контент, отключать Интернет, запрещать сайты социальных сетей и службы обмена личными сообщениями, просматривать частную переписку оппонентов и блокировать домены во всех частях страны. Утверждается, что хуситы используют такое оборудование для отслеживания данных, сообщений, текстового, голосового и видео трафика своих противников. Представитель TeleYemen в Сане пояснил Группе экспертов, что «законы Йемена требуют [от интернет-провайдеров] фильтровать определенный контент, который противоречит закону и исламским ценностям», и что они нацелены на «защиту детей от любого неподобающего контента, и никаких противоречащих закону целей при этом не преследуется»<sup>93</sup>.

86. Группа расследует случай изъятия йеменскими таможенными органами в Эль-Махаре телекоммуникационного оборудования, которой было импортировано базирующейся в Сане телекоммуникационной компанией без лицензии или

<sup>91</sup> Группа получила из конфиденциальных источников информацию о том, что министерство телекоммуникаций собрало с телекоммуникационных компаний в Сане 13,2 млн долл. США в виде сборов за продление годовых контрактов и что с учетом сборов за пользование радиочастотами и комиссий за управление общая сумма поступлений, полученных хуситами от MTN и Sabafon, за год составила около 22 млн долл. США.

<sup>92</sup> Письмо правительства Йемена на имя Группы и конфиденциальные источники. 29 июля 2019 года Абдулла Месфер аш-Шаер (брат Салеха Месфера Салеха аш-Шаера (YEi.007)) был назначен управляющим директором компании Sabafon в Сане (см. [S/2020/326](#), приложение 26).

<sup>93</sup> Письмо TeleYemen в Сане на имя Группы от 17 декабря 2021 года.

разрешения от Министерства телекоммуникаций и информационных технологий правительства Йемена.

87. Правительство Йемена сообщило Группе, что оно изъяло много партий телекоммуникационного оборудования и что десятки таких поставок попадают к хуситам через контрабандные сети. Группа продолжает расследование по этому вопросу. Доступ к телекоммуникационным услугам имеет важное значение для гражданского населения, и любые меры, принимаемые в отношении этого сектора, не должны приводить к каким-либо негативным последствиям для гражданских лиц (см. приложение 29).

#### 4. Черный рынок и незаконные пошлины, взимаемые при ввозе топлива

88. До июня 2020 года через порт Ходейда ввозилась значительная часть импортного топлива для Йемена (48 процентов); с тех пор в структуре такого импорта произошли значительные изменения. В апреле и мае 2021 года доля импортного топлива, ввозимого через порт Ходейда, снизилась до 8 процентов<sup>94</sup> (см. приложение 31). По данным правительства Йемена<sup>95</sup>, в апреле и мае 2021 года в контролируемые хуситами районы по сухопутному маршруту поставилось около 10 000 тонн топлива в день, что составляло около 65 процентов от общего объема топлива, ввозимого в Йемен, в отличие от 6000 тонн в период с января по март 2021 года<sup>96</sup>, что свидетельствует о повышательной тенденции. Согласно различным источникам, хуситы создают искусственный дефицит топлива, чтобы заставить торговцев продавать его на контролируемом ими черном рынке и взимать незаконные сборы с продаж. Согласно информации, предоставленной правительством Йемена, сумма официальных сборов, полученных хуситами от импорта топлива (т.е. сумма таможенных сборов и других налогов, взимаемых при ввозе топлива через порт Ходейда), составила более 70 млрд йеменских риалов<sup>97</sup>.

89. Группа получила информацию о том, что, хотя таможенные пошлины взимаются в первом порту ввоза в районах, не контролируемых хуситами, хуситы незаконно взимают дополнительные сборы и пошлины с торговцев на своих таможенных пунктах, расположенных на наземных маршрутах перевозки импорта<sup>98</sup>. Бизнес по поставке топлива в районы, контролируемые хуситами, очень прибылен для многих, кроме расплачивающихся за эту выгоду конечных потребителей. Так, правительство Йемена увеличило свои таможенные поступления от импорта через порты, находящиеся под его контролем; Южный переходный совет, по сообщениям, также взимает с импортеров плату в размере около 12 йеменских риалов за литр топлива, ввозимого через порт Аден<sup>99</sup>; в свою очередь, импортеры и торговцы пользуются этой возможностью, чтобы обогатиться (см. приложение 31). Группе сообщили, что повышение цен на топливо оказывает

<sup>94</sup> См. пресс-релиз правительства Йемена, URL: [www.mofa-ye.org/Pages/13405](http://www.mofa-ye.org/Pages/13405).

<sup>95</sup> Там же.

<sup>96</sup> URL: <https://twitter.com/SECYemen1/status/1378097160252751875>.

<sup>97</sup> URL: [www.mofa-ye.org/Pages/13405](http://www.mofa-ye.org/Pages/13405).

<sup>98</sup> Так, один из импортеров сообщил, что с февраля 2021 года хуситы собирают по 37 йеменских риалов с литра.

<sup>99</sup> Один из импортеров сообщил Группе, что ранее в соответствии с требованием Южного переходного совета он платил 7 йеменских риалов за литр, но с апреля 2021 года этот сбор увеличился до 12 йеменских риалов за литр, причем собранные средства поступают на один специально выделенный счет, зарегистрированный на обменную компанию в Адене. (По соображениям безопасности в настоящем докладе опущены подробности.) Однако во время встречи Группы с Экономическим комитетом Совета 21 августа 2021 года в Адене Комитет уточнил, что эта сумма представляет собой местные налоги.

негативное воздействие на партнеров-исполнителей международных гуманитарных организаций.

#### **5. Подделка денежных знаков**

90. В пунктах 142–144 и приложении 53 своего доклада от 26 января 2018 года (S/2018/594) и пункте 125 своего доклада от 25 января 2019 года (S/2019/83) Группа упомянула захват 25 мая 2017 года в контролируемом правительством районе Джауф грузовика с векселями номиналом 5000 йеменских риалов на сумму 35 млрд йеменских риалов (140 млн долл. США), напечатанными за пределами Йемена. Этот случай был приведен Группой для иллюстрации того, как хуситы пытались решить проблему нехватки наличности, печатая и ввозя в Йемен векселя для использования в качестве законного платежного средства.

91. Региональный суд Франкфурта-на-Майне, Германия, в марте 2018 года осудил Резу Хейдари, гражданина Ирана, проживающего в Германии, назначив ему наказание в виде лишения свободы сроком на семь лет. В 2021 году Группа получила дополнительную информацию и доказательства по этому делу, а также копию апелляционного решения от 15 мая 2020 года, которое подтвердило приговор о лишении свободы сроком на пять лет за его участие в этом деле. Группа продолжает расследование по этому делу.

### **С. Саудовский депозит**

92. В своем предыдущем заключительном докладе Группа сообщила о реализации механизма депозитного вклада Саудовской Аравии. Информация, полученная после публикации этого доклада, пролила новый свет на представленные в нем данные. С учетом этой информации Группа внесла коррективы в данный доклад, указав, что его раздел IX.B, приложение 28 и относящийся к нему текст в таблице 1, а также рекомендацию, содержащуюся в пункте 161, следует игнорировать до получения результатов окончательной оценки. В соответствии с этим Группа провела обзор, полный текст которого приводится в приложении 32.

93. В ходе своего обзора Группа взаимодействовала со всеми соответствующими заинтересованными сторонами и рассмотрела полученную от них обновленную информацию, включая информацию о сделках, совершенных после представления предыдущего заключительного доклада Группы. Обзор, проведенный Группой, показал, что импортеры, воспользовавшиеся преимуществами саудовского депозита, получили значительные выгоды на общую сумму 370,27 млн долл. США за счет разницы между рыночными ставками и ставками покрытия по аккредитиву, принятыми Центральным банком Йемена применительно к реализации механизма саудовского депозита. Обзор Группы продемонстрировал недостатки в реализации механизма, которые потенциально могли позволить импортерам сохранять предоставленную им выгоду, не передавая ее потребителям.

94. В ходе окончательного обзора, проведенного на основе предоставленной ей информации и доказательств, подробно изложенных в приложении 32, Группа не выявила неопровержимых доказательств, подтверждающих обвинения в коррупции, отмывании денег или элитном накоплении.

## **D. Мониторинг осуществления мер по запрету на поездки и замораживанию активов**

95. 25 февраля 2021 года Султан Салех Аида Забин (YЕi.006), директор отдела уголовных расследований в Сане, был включен Советом Безопасности в санкционный перечень путем принятия резолюции 2564 (2021). Согласно сообщению, появившемуся в средствах массовой информации, 5 апреля 2021 года министерство внутренних дел объявило о смерти Забина от неизлечимой болезни<sup>100</sup>. Группа пока не получила никаких свидетельств, подтверждающих его смерть.

## **VII. Нарушения норм международного гуманитарного права и международного права прав человека**

96. Все стороны в йеменском конфликте продолжают безнаказанно и в широких масштабах совершать нарушения и ущемления норм международного гуманитарного права и международного права прав человека. Судебная система слаба, и в тех немногих случаях произвольного ареста и/или задержания, по которым она выносит постановления или решения, такие постановления в основном игнорируются властями и силами безопасности<sup>101</sup>. Таким образом, судебная система не в состоянии выполнять свои превентивные и защитные функции в отношении нарушений прав человека<sup>102</sup>.

97. В течение отчетного периода были по-прежнему широко распространены произвольные аресты и задержания журналистов и правозащитников, а также угрозы в их адрес, что негативно сказывалось на их способности документировать нарушения и сообщать о них (см. приложение 34)<sup>103</sup>.

98. Жертвы не только почти не имеют в своем распоряжении каких-либо средств правовой защиты, но и практически лишены возможности получить помощь; те, кто был произвольно задержан и/или подвергся пыткам и/или стал жертвой разграбления имущества, часто остаются ни с чем. Большинство не могут вернуться в свои дома из-за постоянных угроз. То же самое касается семей, чей главный кормилец пропал без вести или был задержан. В обоих случаях женщины особенно уязвимы (см. п. 41).

99. Продолжающийся конфликт замедляет процесс создания механизмов правосудия и возмещения ущерба. Обеспечение защиты тех, кто документирует нарушения, и сохранение их архивов имеет решающее значение.

<sup>100</sup> URL: [www.yagency.net/354210](http://www.yagency.net/354210).

<sup>101</sup> Группа задокументировала три случая, когда постановления, требующие освобождения задержанных, были проигнорированы властями. (О нападениях на сотрудников судебных органов см. S/2021/79, пп. 130–131). В течение текущего отчетного периода Группа расследовала еще три таких случая.

<sup>102</sup> См. Всеобщую декларацию прав человека, ст. 8; и Международный пакт о гражданских и политических правах, ст. 2.

<sup>103</sup> См. также S/2021/79, разд. XI.E.

## **А. Действия и инциденты, ответственность за которые возлагается на Коалицию**

### **1. Авиаудары Коалиции**

100. Группа расследовала шесть авиаударов, нанесенных Коалицией в 2021 году: а) 16 января в Махлии, Мариб; б) 28 февраля в Хаваке, Ходейда; с) 7 марта в Тавре, Сана; д) 10 мая в Раде, Эль-Бейда; е) 21 марта в Салифе, Ходейда; и ф) 18 сентября в Марка эль-Улья, Шабва. В результате этих инцидентов погибли 12 гражданских лиц, включая двух детей и одну женщину, и 13 человек, включая трех детей и трех женщин, получили ранения. Группа завершила расследование дел, связанных с авиаударами, нанесенными 16 января и 28 февраля (см. приложение 33).

101. В 2020 и 2021 годах Саудовская Аравия предоставила Группе подробную информацию<sup>104</sup> о выплате компенсаций жертвам 10 расследованных Группой инцидентов, включая нападение на больницу в Хадже 15 августа 2016 года<sup>105</sup>.

### **2. Задержания, совершенные Объединенными Арабскими Эмиратами**

102. Группа расследовала случаи произвольных арестов и задержаний, насильственных исчезновений и пыток, к которым причастны силы Объединенных Арабских Эмиратов в Йемене. Группа получила доказательства того, что в период с 2018 по 2021 год три человека содержались под стражей на следующих объектах, контролируемых силами Объединенных Арабских Эмиратов: Балхаф, Шабва; аэропорт Эр-Райян, Эль-Мукалла; нефтепорт Дубба и Эш-Шир, Хадрамаут; и порт Моха, Таиз (см. приложение 34). В письме на имя Группы Объединенные Арабские Эмираты отрицали обвинения в совершении их военнослужащими нарушений международного гуманитарного права и международного права прав человека в контексте содержания под стражей.

103. Объединенные Арабские Эмираты сообщили Группе, что обвинения в нарушениях международного гуманитарного права и международного права прав человека в контексте содержания под стражей были переданы в Совместную группу по расследованию инцидентов<sup>106</sup>. Группа подтвердила, что, хотя в марте 2018 года она расследовала дело, связанное с задержанием шести рыболовческих судов и около 90 рыбаков, контртеррористическая деятельность не входит в круг ее ведения.

104. Кроме того, Объединенные Арабские Эмираты заявили, что в соответствии с решением правительства Йемена, принятым в конце 2015 года, они с декабря 2015 года по июль 2020 года сотрудничали с директором службы безопасности

<sup>104</sup> Группа пока не смогла проверить эту информацию.

<sup>105</sup> См. S/2018/193, приложение 49, добавление С. Другие инциденты произошли 2 мая, 2 и 11 июля, 30 августа и 9 сентября 2015 года, 10 сентября 2016 года, 19 декабря 2017 года, 21 мая 2019 года и 6 августа 2020 года.

<sup>106</sup> Группа расследовала несколько случаев нарушения международного гуманитарного права и международного права прав человека, совершенных должностными лицами Объединенных Арабских Эмиратов в Йемене. См. S/2021/79, п. 127; S/2020/326, пп. 100–101; S/2019/83, п. 142; S/2018/594, пп. 166–172; и S/2018/193, пп. 132–134. В декабре 2018 года в письме на имя Группы Объединенные Арабские Эмираты отрицали свою причастность к подобным нарушениям в Йемене и заявили, что ни в одном из их военных лагерей в Йемене нет ни тюрем, ни задержанных. Они также сообщили Группе, что все операции по аресту и последующие процедуры в то время проводились правительством Йемена. В июле 2021 года Объединенные Арабские Эмираты сообщили Группе, что содержание этого письма по-прежнему актуально.

Адена генерал-майором Шаллалом Али аш-Шайе<sup>107</sup> в контексте контртеррористических операций Коалиции. За вышеупомянутый период Группа задокументировала несколько случаев нарушений международного гуманитарного права и международного права прав человека, приписываемых ему или находящимся в его подчинении силам<sup>108</sup>.

## **В. Задержания, совершенные правительством Йемена**

105. Группа расследовала 18 случаев произвольного ареста и задержания правительственными силами в Хадрамауте, Марибе, Шабве и Таизе; в одном случае была задержана женщина (см. приложение 34). В Таизе к двум случаям, в том числе к одному случаю смерти гражданского лица в заключении<sup>109</sup>, была причастна 170-я бригада, а к одному случаю — 22-я бригада «Мика». В Шабве большинство произвольных арестов и задержаний, по-видимому, были политически мотивированными, поскольку пять из семи задокументированных случаев касались членов или сторонников Южного переходного совета, включая одного несовершеннолетнего.

## **С. Задержания на территориях, подконтрольных Южному переходному совету**

106. За отчетный период Группа расследовала 16 случаев произвольного ареста и задержания вооруженными группами, связанными с Южным переходным советом, в Адене, Лахдже и Сокотре, в том числе задержания двух журналистов (см. приложение 34).

107. Три случая связаны с обвинениями в содержании под стражей в неофициальной тюрьме на территории комплекса Совета в Адене под надзором сотрудников контртеррористического подразделения<sup>110</sup>.

108. Особую обеспокоенность вызывают два случая гибели людей, застреленных на контрольно-пропускных пунктах, находящихся в ведении 9-й бригады, в районе Тавр аль-Баха, Лахдж.

109. В Адене в настоящее время ведется судебное разбирательство в отношении 14 человек, обвиняемых в участии в нападениях на мечети и священнослужителей. Группа получила доказательства того, что по крайней мере 10 из них подвергались пыткам во время содержания под стражей и что их силой заставили подписать признательные показания; соответствующие доказательства были проигнорированы председательствующим судьей.

110. Группа получила также доказательства того, что трое мужчин из Адена, числящихся пропавшими без вести с 2016 года, одно время содержались в

<sup>107</sup> Генерал-майор Аш-Шайе отсутствовал в Адене с марта по декабрь 2020 года. Объединенные Арабские Эмираты заявили, что не имели с ним дел с тех пор, как он покинул свой пост директора службы безопасности Адена.

<sup>108</sup> См. S/2021/79, п. 132 и приложение 32; S/2020/326, пп. 100–101 и 105–108 и приложение 28; S/2019/83, п. 158 и приложение 41; и S/2018/594, пп. 180–181 и приложение 65.

<sup>109</sup> Группа получила доказательства того, что в него стреляли и что на его теле присутствовали следы насилия.

<sup>110</sup> 12°46'32.1" С, 44°59'18.9" В.

тюрьме Мансура, после чего были переданы тюремными властями контртеррористическим органам<sup>111</sup>.

111. В феврале 2021 года сотрудники судебной системы начали забастовку на юге Йемена в знак протеста против обвинений в коррупции в судебном совете. В августе Группе сообщили, что из-за забастовки не были освобождены несколько заключенных и что судебные органы согласились возобновить работу по графику два раза в неделю. Однако этого будет недостаточно для того, чтобы устранить отставание в рассмотрении дел. Следовательно, многие задержанные будут по-прежнему оставаться под стражей, а судебные разбирательства по их делам будут откладываться.

112. В Сокотре три задокументированных случая касались гражданских лиц, которые высказывали критику в адрес Южного переходного совета. Они были задержаны на короткие сроки, и ни одному из них не было предъявлено официальное обвинение (см. приложение 34).

## **D. Задержания, совершенные Объединенными силами на Западном побережье**

113. Группа расследовала шесть случаев нарушения международного гуманитарного права и международного права прав человека, имевших место в Хайсе, Эль-Хаухе и Мохе. В четырех случаях были замешаны Силы национального сопротивления, а в двух — военнослужащие 1-й и 7-й бригад Амалика (см. приложение 34). Один случай касался несовершеннолетнего, который находился под стражей почти два года. Ни в одном из этих случаев, в ходе которых задержанные находились под стражей от 4 до 23 месяцев, пострадавшие не предстали перед судебным или другим беспристрастным органом. Силы национального сопротивления сообщили Группе, что трибуналы в Хайсе не функционируют из-за боевых действий.

## **E. Действия и инциденты, ответственность за которые возлагается на хуситов**

### **1. Применение оружия взрывного действия против гражданского населения**

#### **а) Обстрелы**

114. Группа расследовала восемь случаев неизбирательного применения хуситами оружия взрывного действия в населенных районах в Марибе и Таизе, в результате чего, как утверждается, погибли 33 человека, включая 8 детей, и 51 человек, включая 11 детей, получили ранения (см. приложение 36)<sup>112</sup>.

115. Интенсивные бои вокруг Мариба с начала 2021 года привели к серьезным последствиям для гражданского населения. Несколько нападений с использованием взрывоопасных боеприпасов, таких как артиллерийские снаряды, были совершены на лагерь для внутренне перемещенных лиц, что привело к гибели и ранению проживающих в них гражданских беженцев, а также к разрушению гражданских объектов. Кроме того, это привело к перемещению множества людей, которые ранее уже несколько раз были вынуждены покинуть места

<sup>111</sup> Группа изучила переписку между директором тюрьмы Мансура и директором службы безопасности Адена за ноябрь 2020 года и январь 2021 года. Дата передачи задержанных не была указана.

<sup>112</sup> В некоторых случаях Группа не смогла установить точное число жертв, несмотря на то что она получила информацию из нескольких источников.

проживания, что увеличило их потребности и уязвимость. В период с 8 по 17 февраля лагерь Заур подвергся нападению по меньшей мере дважды, причем хуситы, совершив налет на лагерь, устанавливали наземные мины; в период с 19 по 21 февраля лагеря Савабин и Хайлан подверглись нападению по меньшей мере дважды; в период с 16 марта по 4 апреля лагерь Эль-Мильх был атакован пять раз, лагерь Тавасул дважды, лагерь Эль-Хаир дважды, лагерь Дхат ар-Ра один раз и лагерь Эс-Сувайда один раз<sup>113</sup>.

116. Эти случаи свидетельствуют о вопиющем игнорировании силами хуситов принципа избирательности и защиты гражданского населения. Группа отмечает, что по крайней мере в одном инциденте в Марибе использовался беспилотный летательный аппарат (см. рис. XV). Согласно анализу Группы, беспилотные летательные аппараты хуситов обладают высокой точностью.

117. Систематические нападения на жилые районы в Таизе и Марибе, расположенные на расстоянии от активных линий фронта, можно рассматривать как действия, направленные на сеяние ужаса среди гражданского населения, что запрещено международным гуманитарным правом (см. приложение 36)<sup>114</sup>.

Рисунок XV

**Обломки беспилотного летательного аппарата, использованного при нападении на Мариб**



*Источник: конфиденциально.*

<sup>113</sup> Группа получила доклады властей Мариба и правительства Йемена, провела беседы и получила видео, фотографии и информационные сводки от местных источников, имеющих прямой доступ к лагерям. Группа приняла к сведению письмо Постоянного представителя Йемена при Организации Объединенных Наций от 26 апреля 2021 года на имя Председателя Совета Безопасности (S/2021/405).

<sup>114</sup> См. Дополнительный протокол II к Женевским конвенциям от 1949 года, ст. 13 (2); и базу данных МККК по обычному международному гуманитарному праву, норма 2.

**b) Наземные мины, самодельные взрывные устройства и неразорвавшиеся боеприпасы**

118. Неизбирательное использование наземных мин и самодельных взрывных устройств хуситами носит повсеместный и систематический характер. Группа документирует его разрушительное воздействие на гражданское население с 2016 года (см. S/2021/79, пп. 140–142; S/2020/326, пп. 115–117; и S/2018/193, приложения 43 и 44).

119. В течение отчетного периода Группа собрала существенный объем доказательств по этому вопросу, особенно во время совершенной в августе поездки на западное побережье — один из наиболее пострадавших регионов. Выводы Группы приводятся в приложении 35.

**2. Содержание под стражей**

120. Группа расследовала 17 случаев, касающихся 50 жертв нарушений международного гуманитарного права или международного права прав человека в контексте содержания под стражей, включая случаи применения властями хуситов сексуального насилия и пыток<sup>115</sup>. Среди жертв было 6 журналистов и 11 женщин (см. приложение 34)<sup>116</sup>.

121. С 2019 года Группа расследовала аресты 10 человек<sup>117</sup>, включая одного несовершеннолетнего, в связи с убийством Салеха ас-Самада, председателя высшего политического совета хуситов, в апреле 2018 года. Задержанные были арестованы в период с сентября по октябрь 2018 года и содержались в засекреченной тюрьме. Их семьи ничего не знали об их местонахождении до тех пор, пока они не появились на телевидении 17 апреля 2019 года, когда над ними начался суд под председательством судьи Амина Али Ахмеда Забары<sup>118</sup>. Группа получила доказательства того, что они подвергались пыткам и что их принудили подписать признательные показания. Хотя об этом говорилось во время судебных слушаний, никаких мер принято не было. Один из задержанных умер в заключении 7 августа 2019 года, предположительно от пыток. Группа получила также доказательства многочисленных нарушений судебных гарантий задержанных: помимо того, что их признания были получены под пытками и использованы в качестве улики против них, судебный процесс начался без предоставления им доступа к адвокату. Затем их адвокатам пришлось сделать несколько запросов, чтобы получить доступ к доказательствам по делу. В нескольких случаях обвиняемых лишили возможности встретиться со своими адвокатами до начала судебных заседаний. Адвокаты получали уведомления о судебных заседаниях за предельно короткий срок, что оставляло им мало времени на подготовку. 24 августа 2020 года все задержанные были приговорены к смертной казни, после обжалования приговор был оставлен в силе<sup>119</sup>. Все девять были публично казнены. Их семьи были уведомлены об этом за день до казни. Поскольку многие эти семьи живут в Ходейде, они не смогли вовремя добраться до Саны.

<sup>115</sup> См., среди прочего, Женевские конвенции, общая статья 3; Дополнительный протокол II к Женевским конвенциям от 1949 года, ст. 4–6; и базу данных МККК по обычному международному гуманитарному праву, нормы 90, 93, 98, 100, 123 и 125.

<sup>116</sup> См. S/2020/326, пп. 22 и 118; и S/2021/79, п. 137.

<sup>117</sup> Доказательства включают записи бесед, отчеты и судебные документы, полученные как минимум из шести различных источников, включая родственников жертв.

<sup>118</sup> URL: [www.almanar.com.lb/5135682](http://www.almanar.com.lb/5135682).

<sup>119</sup> Согласно информации, полученной Группой, судьями апелляционной инстанции были судьи Абдул Хафиз Абдул Раззак аль-Махбаши, Хаммуд Ахмед аль-Кулайси и Мухаммед Лотф аз-Зубайри.

122. Группа продолжает расследовать дело четырех журналистов, приговоренных к смертной казни и до сих пор содержащихся под стражей в Сане<sup>120</sup>. Согласно полученной информации, в течение отчетного периода обсуждался вопрос о включении их в программу обмена заключенными, но это не принесло результатов.

### 3. Вербовка детей

123. Группа получила список 1406 завербованных хуситами детей, погибших на поле боя в 2020 году. Группа также получила список 562 завербованных хуситами детей, погибших на поле боя в период с января по май 2021 года<sup>121</sup>. Их возраст составлял от 10 до 17 лет. Значительное число этих детей было убито в Амране, Дамаре, Хадже, Эль-Ходейде, Иббе, Сааде и Сане (см. приложение 10).

### 4. Преследования и дискриминация по религиозным мотивам

124. Группа задокументировала систематические преследования евреев в районах, контролируемых хуситами. Большая часть еврейского населения покинула Йемен после нескольких лет преследований, которые начались при бывшем президенте Али Абдалле Салехе, но усилились под властью хуситов. Группе известно о семи евреях, которые все еще находятся в Йемене, включая одного, который остается под стражей, несмотря на приказ о его освобождении, изданный в июле 2019 года. Группа задокументировала также два случая задержания хуситами христиан по причине их религии (см. приложение 34).

125. Судебные разбирательства в отношении нескольких последователей бехаизма продолжаются, несмотря на то что многие из них были изгнаны из Йемена<sup>122</sup>; при этом одной из целей является арест всех их активов и имущества. В своей речи, произнесенной в марте 2021 года, Абдулмалик аль-Хуси (YЕi.004) обвинил «американцев в стремлении укоренить в Йемене бехаизм, ахмадие и атеизм, чтобы подорвать ислам»<sup>123</sup>, продемонстрировав поддержку этой политики систематического преследования<sup>124</sup>.

### 5. Нападения на гражданских лиц

126. Группа расследовала нападения хуситов на гражданских лиц, совершенные в нескольких деревнях в районе Хима, Таиз, в январе 2021 года. Согласно полученной информации, сообщениям и свидетельским показаниям<sup>125</sup>, в результате этих нападений погибли 13 человек, включая одного ребенка, 47 человек, в том числе семь детей и семь женщин, получили ранения, 257 человек, включая 14 детей, были арестованы и около 150 семей были перемещены. По меньшей мере три школы были захвачены и использовались хуситами в военных целях и в качестве мест содержания под стражей. Район Хима подвергался нападениям и ранее, в декабре 2017 года и апреле 2019 года.

127. В конце сентября 2021 года хуситы окружили район Абдия в Марибе и заблокировали доступ к дорогам. В течение нескольких недель гражданское

<sup>120</sup> См. S/2021/79, п. 147.

<sup>121</sup> Эти списки были составлены конфиденциальным источником и правительством Йемена на основании официальных объявлений в средствах массовой информации, сделанных хуситами. Группа также получила отчет, в котором содержались имена 640 детей. Группа готова предоставить эти списки Комитету.

<sup>122</sup> См. S/2021/79, п. 139.

<sup>123</sup> URL: <https://web.archive.org/web/20210310212347/https://www.almasirah.net/post/181849>.

<sup>124</sup> См. S/2021/79, п. 139; S/2019/83, п. 154; и S/2018/193, п. 149.

<sup>125</sup> Группа получила от местных источников и неправительственных организаций информацию, которая включала фотографии, отчеты и видеоматериалы.

население испытывало нехватку продовольствия и медикаментов<sup>126</sup>. Группа получила информацию об аресте хуситами в этот период 59 мужчин<sup>127</sup>, а также свидетельские показания о разрушении вышки связи, что сильно затруднило получение информации об обстановке.

## **Ф. Действия, приписываемые «Аль-Каиде» на Аравийском полуострове**

128. 14 июня 2021 года пять следователей правительства Йемена были похищены «Аль-Каидой» на Аравийском полуострове в Куре, Шабва, недалеко от границы с Эль-Бейдой — в местности, находящейся под контролем этой организации. Организация опубликовала видеозапись задержанных и предложила правительству Йемена обменять их на членов «Аль-Каиды» на Аравийском полуострове. Задержанные были освобождены 5 июля 2021 года.

## **Г. Земельные споры**

129. Споры по поводу земли и имущества являются давней проблемой в Йемене. Однако годы конфликта ослабили системы разрешения конфликтов, особенно судебную систему и аппарат безопасности, и усилили власть вооруженных групп и банд, вовлеченных в споры. Кроме того, за последние несколько лет цены на землю выросли. Как следствие, обострилось насилие, связанное с земельными спорами, а гражданские лица становятся все более уязвимыми, поскольку их земли и дома захватываются вооруженными группами.

130. Группа исследовала один случай, иллюстрирующий эту проблему. 10 августа 2021 года в Бир аль-Баша, Таиз, произошел спор из-за участка земли, принадлежащего семье Аль-Харк и занятого группой под руководством Маджид аль-Араджа, связанной с 145-й бригадой правительства Йемена. В результате спора были убиты Маджид аль-Арадж, один из его людей и четверо мужчин из семьи Аль-Харк, а также ранен еще один человек. Впоследствии группа, связанная с Аль-Аражем, совершила налет на дом семьи Аль-Харк, где находились женщины и дети. Трое членов семьи Аль-Харк были арестованы: двое несовершеннолетних и один молодой человек, причем последний умер в заключении. Военные Таиза сообщили Группе, что данная операция имела целью обеспечение безопасности района и что двое подозреваемых, оказавших сопротивление при аресте, были убиты, а девять других задержаны.

## **Н. Мигранты**

131. 7 марта 2021 года в следственном изоляторе Управления иммиграции и натурализации в Сане произошел инцидент, в результате которого погибли около 45 мигрантов и 202 человека получили ранения<sup>128</sup>.

<sup>126</sup> Это произошло в основном из-за блокировки поставок коммерческих товаров. Согласно информации, полученной Группой, раздача продуктовых наборов приблизительно 15 000 человек, организованная Всемирной продовольственной программой, состоялась в начале сентября и в конце октября, как и планировалось изначально.

<sup>127</sup> Согласно сообщениям новостных служб, 4 ноября были освобождены 52 человека.  
URL: <https://www.saba.ye/ar/news3162733.htm>; <https://twitter.com/abdulqadermord/status/1456239360844632068>.

<sup>128</sup> Группа получила из многочисленных источников информацию о том, что примерно 28 человек скончались от полученных травм после того, как были госпитализированы. По данным Национальной комиссии по расследованию предполагаемых нарушений прав

132. Согласно полученной информации, после ссоры между охранниками и мигрантами, которые объявили голодовку из-за плохих условий содержания, в дело вмешались сотрудники сил безопасности, которые бросили баллоны со слезоточивым газом в ангар, в котором заперлись мигранты. В результате в переполненном и плохо вентилируемом строении, имевшем только одну дверь, начался пожар<sup>129</sup>. По данным властей хуситов, в тот день на объекте находились 862 мигранта, а в ангаре во время инцидента было 358 человек<sup>130</sup>. Согласно полученной информации, власти хуситов конфисковали мобильные телефоны пострадавших, в том числе тех, что были госпитализированы, в попытке помешать им рассказать об инциденте.

133. Хуситы публично обвинили в случившемся Международную организацию по миграции, заявив, что она не смогла своевременно организовать репатриацию, что и привело к концентрации на объекте слишком большого числа людей<sup>131</sup>. При этом, согласно полученной информации, заявление, опубликованное после инцидента группой мигрантов, в котором указывалось, что пожар произошел в результате потасовки между мигрантами<sup>132</sup>, было обнародовано после того, как хуситские власти оказали давление на лидеров мигрантов.

134. Местные СМИ сообщили, что хуситские власти начали расследование, в результате которого были арестованы 11 человек<sup>133</sup>. Группа получила доказательства того, что после инцидента были помещены под стражу четыре человека. Примерно через четыре месяца они были освобождены после того, как следствие пришло к выводу, что пожар был несчастным случаем и они не совершили никакого преступления<sup>134</sup>.

135. В период с июля по сентябрь 2021 года хуситы провели в Эль-Джауфе «кампанию по обеспечению безопасности», арестовав более 700 мигрантов, некоторые из которых были принудительно высланы из контролируемых хуситами районов, а другие были помещены под стражу.

## VIII. Препятствование доставке и распределению гуманитарной помощи

136. С конца 2020 года был отмечен некоторый прогресс в плане обеспечения гуманитарного доступа и предоставления гуманитарным организациям возможности проводить оценки программ в районах, контролируемых хуситами. После долгого препятствования со стороны властей в Сане была возобновлена реализация проекта Всемирной продовольственной программы по внедрению биометрической системы контроля за распределением гуманитарной помощи. Также было налажено регулярное гуманитарное воздушное сообщение с Марибом<sup>135</sup>.

137. Однако на пути эффективного оказания гуманитарной помощи на территориях, контролируемых хуситами, сохраняются многочисленные препятствия: задержки в утверждении дополнительных соглашений, просьбы предоставить подробные списки бенефициаров, давление с целью повлиять на выбор

человека в Йемене, число жертв составило 400 человек (URL: [www.nciye.org/reports/NineReport/NINE-en.pdf](http://www.nciye.org/reports/NineReport/NINE-en.pdf)).

<sup>129</sup> Группа получила информацию от международных гуманитарных организаций, местных неправительственных организаций и частных лиц.

<sup>130</sup> URL: [www.ansarollah.com/archives/421005](http://www.ansarollah.com/archives/421005).

<sup>131</sup> URL: [www.smc.gov.ye/archives/14212](http://www.smc.gov.ye/archives/14212).

<sup>132</sup> Группа получила копию заявления.

<sup>133</sup> URL: [www.ansarollah.com/archives/421005](http://www.ansarollah.com/archives/421005).

<sup>134</sup> Группа располагает копиями соответствующих документов.

<sup>135</sup> См. также S/2021/79, разд. III.

партнеров-исполнителей или разработку программ, ограничения доступа и отказ в перемещении, включая произвольное введение требования об обязательном сопровождении махрамом применительно к персоналу женского пола<sup>136</sup>, а также преследования гуманитарных работников. Местные власти часто пытаются навязать собственные требования, блокируя грузовики на контрольно-пропускных пунктах или угрожая сотрудникам гуманитарных организаций. Группа зафиксировала также случаи, когда семьям угрожали исключением из списка получателей помощи, если они отказывались позволить своим детям вступить в ряды хуситов (см. приложение 10).

138. Группа получила доказательства злоупотреблений, притеснений и постоянных препятствий, чинимых хуситами в отношении конкретной гуманитарной организации с целью заставить ее изменить свою политику. Злоупотребления включали физическое насилие, произвольные аресты и задержания, отказ в визе или въезде, высылку старших сотрудников, ограничения на передвижение персонала и грузов, а также вмешательство в деятельность и процесс отбора поставщиков услуг (см. приложение 37).

139. Помимо двух сотрудников Организации Объединенных Наций, арестованных в ноябре 2021 года<sup>137</sup>, Группа документально подтвердила арест и задержание властями хуситов еще трех сотрудников гуманитарных организаций.

140. В СМИ продолжается кампания, направленная против Организации Объединенных Наций. Это не только наносит ущерб гуманитарной деятельности, но и создает дополнительные риски для безопасности (см. S/2021/79, п. 48 и приложения 7 и 8).

141. В южном Йемене слабость государственных органов позволяет местным субъектам навязывать собственные требования. Риски для безопасности сотрудников гуманитарных организаций также возрастают: Группа задокументировала пять случаев задержки гуманитарного персонала или грузов на контрольно-пропускных пунктах и три случая, когда автомобили гуманитарных организаций были угнаны неизвестными в Абьяне и Таизе.

142. В апреле 2020 года на юге Йемена деятельность одной гуманитарной организации была приостановлена на несколько месяцев из-за разногласий по поводу стимулов для некоторых правительственных сотрудников.

## IX. Рекомендации

143. Группа рекомендует Совету Безопасности в его следующей резолюции:

а) призвать Южный переходный совет и правительство Йемена воздержаться от действий, подрывающих Эр-Риядское соглашение, и заявить о своей готовности ввести санкции против тех, кто участвует в этих действиях;

б) призвать хуситов, правительство Йемена, Объединенные силы и Коалицию воздержаться от действий, подрывающих Стокгольмское соглашение, и заявить о своей готовности ввести санкции против тех, кто участвует в этих действиях;

<sup>136</sup> Это правило запрещает женщинам путешествовать без сопровождения родственника-мужчины. Оно ограничивает возможность выполнения сотрудницами гуманитарных организаций своих обязанностей и в случае несоблюдения приводит к их аресту и помещению под стражу.

<sup>137</sup> URL: <https://apnews.com/article/science-middle-east-saudi-arabia-united-nations-yemen-fl38d377483ac1e1d106b131c9676286>.

с) призвать стороны конфликта воздерживаться от использования образовательных, религиозных и общественных учреждений для разжигания ненависти или совершения актов насилия в отношении любой группы или национальности и заявить о своей готовности ввести санкции против тех, кто участвует в этих действиях;

д) призвать стороны конфликта воздерживаться от использования школ, летних лагерей и мечетей для вербовки детей и заявить о своей готовности ввести санкции против тех, кто участвует в этих действиях;

е) призвать государства-члены активизировать усилия по борьбе с контрабандой оружия и его компонентов по суше и морю, с тем чтобы обеспечить выполнение адресного оружейного эмбарго;

ф) призвать государства-члены усилить меры должной осмотрительности, применимые к экспорту коммерчески доступных компонентов, которые были задокументированы Группой как входящие в состав систем вооружений, используемых в интересах включенных в санкционный перечень лиц (см. [S/2021/79](#), приложения 19 и 20), и доложить об этом Комитету;

г) призвать стороны конфликта принять меры по предотвращению дальнейшей фрагментации экономики Йемена, включая банковские и финансовые учреждения, и заявить о своей готовности ввести санкции против тех, кто участвует в действиях, усиливающих такую фрагментацию;

h) призвать стороны конфликта обеспечить ответственность за нарушения международного гуманитарного права и международного права прав человека, совершенные подчиненными им силами, и незамедлительно предоставить возмещение и поддержку жертвам;

и) призвать государства-члены, стороны конфликта и другие соответствующие заинтересованные стороны рассмотреть вопрос о создании механизмов правосудия переходного периода для Йемена;

j) сослаться на резолюцию [2474 \(2019\)](#) и призвать стороны конфликта принять все надлежащие меры для активного поиска лиц, которые числятся пропавшими без вести, наладить соответствующие каналы для связи с семьями таких лиц и рассмотреть возможность создания надлежащих механизмов для оказания этим семьям поддержки;

к) призвать силы хуситов принять меры для прекращения неизбирательного использования наземных мин, создания карт их размещения и удаления существующих наземных мин из гражданских районов, находящихся под их контролем.

144. Группа рекомендует Совету Безопасности включить в повестку дня ежемесячного заседания по Йемену обсуждение следующих конкретных вопросов:

а) проблемы, с которыми сталкиваются женщины-заключенные в Йемене, на основе информации, содержащейся в приложении 9, и вопрос о вовлечении этих женщин в будущие инициативы в области правосудия переходного периода; при этом следует рассмотреть возможность привлечения к этому обсуждению представителей правительства Йемена и других соответствующих йеменских заинтересованных сторон;

б) использование образовательных, религиозных и общественных учреждений для культивирования языка ненависти, поощрения насилия и вербовки детей; при этом следует рассмотреть возможность привлечения к этому обсуждению представителей правительства Йемена и других соответствующих йеменских заинтересованных сторон.

145. Группа рекомендует Комитету рассмотреть следующие шаги:

а) обсуждение с государствами-членами возможности создания специального фонда для жертв сексуального насилия, в том числе в Йемене, как это предусмотрено в пункте 17 резолюции [2467 \(2019\)](#);

б) взаимодействие с механизмом Вассенаарских договоренностей по экспортному контролю за обычными вооружениями, товарами и технологиями двойного назначения с целью содействия включению в их список товаров и технологий двойного назначения коммерчески доступных деталей, используемых в ракетах, беспилотных летательных аппаратах и плавучих самодельных взрывных устройствах хуситов;

в) обращение к сторонам конфликта и другим соответствующим заинтересованным сторонам, включая международных посредников, с призывом включить в мирный процесс меры по предотвращению дальнейшей фрагментации экономики Йемена, включая банковские и финансовые учреждения;

г) обращение к государствам-членам с призывом поддержать Национальную комиссию по расследованию предполагаемых нарушений прав человека в Йемене, особенно посредством содействия Комиссии в обеспечении сохранности ее архивов, в том числе путем создания офшорного резервного хранилища цифровой информации, и обращение к сторонам конфликта с призывом сотрудничать с Комиссией;

д) взаимодействие со сторонами конфликта и международными посредниками с целью включения в мирный процесс мер по обеспечению подотчетности, правосудия и возмещения ущерба;

е) обращение к государствам-членам с призывом усилить поддержку деятельности по разминированию, в том числе путем проведения учений для работников служб разминирования в Йемене.

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## **Annex 1 Methodology**

1. The Panel used satellite imagery of Yemen procured by the United Nations from private providers to support investigations. It also used commercial databases recording maritime and aviation data and mobile phone records. Public statements by officials through their official media channels were accepted as factual unless contrary facts were established. While it has been as transparent as possible, in situations in which identifying sources would have exposed these sources or others to unacceptable safety risks, the Panel does not include identifying information.
2. The Panel reviewed social media, but no information gathered was used as evidence unless it could be corroborated using multiple independent or technical sources, including eyewitnesses, to appropriately meet the highest achievable standard of proof.
3. The spelling of toponyms within Yemen often depends on the ethnicity of the source or the quality of transliteration. The Panel has adopted a consistent approach in the present update.
4. The Panel has placed importance on the rule of consensus among the Panel members and agreed that, if differences and/or reservations arise during the development of reports, it would only adopt the text, conclusions and recommendations by a majority of four out of the five members. In the event of a recommendation for designation of an individual or a group, such recommendation would be done based on unanimity.
5. The Panel has offered the opportunity to reply to Member States, entities and individuals involved in most incidents that are covered in this report. Their response has been taken into consideration in the Panel's findings. The methodology for this is provided in appendix A.

## Appendix A 'The opportunity to reply' methodology used by the Panel

1. Although sanctions are meant to be preventative not punitive, it should be recognized that the mere naming of an individual or entity<sup>1</sup> in a Panel's public report, could have adverse effects on the individual. As such, where possible, individuals concerned should be provided with an opportunity to provide their account of events and to provide concrete and specific information/material in support. Through this interaction, the individual is given the opportunity to demonstrate that their alleged conduct does not fall within the relevant listing criteria. This is called the 'opportunity to reply'.
2. The Panel's methodology on the opportunity to reply is as follows:
  - (a) Providing an individual with an 'opportunity to reply' should be the norm.
  - (b) The Panel may decide not to offer an opportunity of reply if there is credible evidence that it would unduly prejudice its investigations, including if it would:
    - (i) Result in the individual moving assets if they get warning of a possible recommendation for designation.
    - (ii) Restrict further access of the Panel to vital sources.
    - (iii) Endanger Panel sources or their relatives or Panel members.
    - (iv) Adversely and gravely impact humanitarian access for humanitarian actors in the field.
    - (v) For any other reason that can be clearly demonstrated as reasonable and justifiable in the prevailing circumstances.
3. If the circumstances set forth in 2 (b) do not apply, then the Panel should be able to provide an individual an opportunity to reply.
4. The individual should be able to communicate directly with the Panel to convey their personal determination as to the level and nature of their interaction with the Panel.
5. Interactions between the Panel and the individual should be direct, unless in exceptional circumstances.
6. In no circumstances can third parties, without the knowledge of the individual, determine for the individual its level of interaction with the Panel.
7. The individual, on the other hand, in making their determination of the level and nature of interaction with the Panel, may consult third parties or allow third parties (for example, legal representative or their government) to communicate on their behalf on subsequent interactions with the Panel.

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<sup>1</sup> Hereinafter just the term individual will be used to reflect both individuals and entities.

## **Appendix B      Investigations methodology on violations relating to IHL, IHRL, and acts that constitute human rights abuses**

1. The Panel adopted the following stringent methodology to ensure that its investigations met the highest possible evidentiary standards, despite it being prevented from visiting places in Yemen. In doing so it has paid particular attention to the “Informal Working Group on General Issues of Sanctions Reports”, [S/2006/997](#), on best practices and methods, including paragraphs 21, 22 and 23, as per paragraph 14 of resolution [2564 \(2021\)](#).

2. The Panel’s methodology, in relation to its investigations concerning alleged IHL, IHRL and human rights abuses, is as set out below:

- (a) All Panel investigations are initiated based on verifiable information being made available to the Panel, either directly from sources or from media reports.
- (b) In carrying out its investigations on the use of explosive ordnance, the Panel relies on at least three or more of the following sources of information:
  - (i) At least two eyewitnesses or victims.
  - (ii) At least one individual or organization (either local or international) that has also independently investigated the incident.
  - (iii) If there are casualties associated with the incident, and if the casualties are less than ten in number, the Panel will endeavor to obtain copies of death certificates and medical certificates. In incidents relating to mass casualties, the Panel relies on published information from the United Nations and other organizations.
  - (iv) Technical evidence, which includes imagery of the impact damage, blast effects, and recovered fragmentation. In all cases, the Panel collects imagery from at least two different and unrelated sources. In the rare cases where the Panel has had to rely on open source imagery, the Panel verifies that imagery by referring it to eyewitnesses or by checking for pixilation distortion:
    - a. In relation to air strikes, the Panel often identifies the responsible party through crater analysis or by the identification of components from imagery of fragmentation; and
    - b. The Panel also analyses imagery of the ground splatter pattern at the point of impact from mortar, artillery, or free flight rocket fire to identify the direction from which the incoming ordnance originated. This is one indicator to assist in the identification of the perpetrator for ground fire when combined with other sources of information.
  - (v) The utilization of open source or purchased satellite imagery wherever possible, to identify the exact location of an incident, and to support analysis of the type and extent of destruction. Such imagery may also assist in the confirmation of timelines of the incident.
  - (vi) Access to investigation reports and other documentation of local and

- 
- international organizations that have independently investigated the incident.
- (vii) Other documentation that supports the narrative of sources, for example, factory manuals that may prove that the said factory is technically incapable of producing weapons of the type it is alleged to have produced.
  - (viii) In rare instances where the Panel has doubt as to the veracity of available facts from other sources, local sources are relied on to collect specific and verifiable information from the ground, for example, if the Panel wished to confirm the presence of an armed group in a particular area.
  - (ix) Statements issued by or on behalf of a party to the conflict responsible for the incident.
  - (x) Open source information to identify other collaborative or contradictory information regarding the Panel's findings.
- (c) In carrying out its investigations on deprivation of liberty and associated violations the Panel relies on the following sources of information:
- (i) The victims, where they are able and willing to speak to the Panel, and where medical and security conditions are conducive to such an interview.
  - (ii) The relatives of victims and others who had access to the victims while in custody. This is particularly relevant in instances where the victim dies in custody.
  - (iii) Interviews with at least one individual or organization (either local or international) that has also independently investigated the incident.
  - (iv) Medical documentation and, where applicable, death certificates.
  - (v) Documentation issued by prison authorities.
  - (vi) Interviews with medical personnel who treated the victim, wherever possible.
  - (vii) Investigation and other documentation from local and international organizations that have independently investigated the incident. The Panel may also seek access to court documents if the detainee is on trial or other documentation that proves or disproves the narrative of the victim.
  - (viii) Where relevant, the Panel uses local sources to collect specific and verifiable information from the ground, for example, medical certificates.
  - (ix) Statements issued by the party to the conflict responsible for the incident.
  - (xx) Open-source information to identify other collaborative or contradictory information regarding the Panel's findings.
  - (xxi) Detainees do not have always access to medical care, nor is it always possible to obtain medical reports, especially in cases of prolonged detention. Therefore, the Panel accepts testimonies received from

- detainees alleging that violence was used against them during detention by the detaining parties as prima facie evidence of torture.
- (xxii) For the same reasons, medical and police reports are not required by the Panel to conclude that rape or sexual violence took place.
- (d) In carrying out its investigations on other violations, including forced displacement human rights violations and abuses against migrants, or threats against medical workers, the Panel relies on information that includes:
- (i) Interviews with victims, eyewitnesses, and direct reports where they are able and willing to speak to the Panel, and where conditions are conducive to such an interview.
  - (ii) Interviews with at least one individual or organization (either local or international) that has also independently investigated the incident.
  - (iii) Documentation relevant to verify information obtained.
  - (iv) Statements issued by the party to the conflict responsible for the incident.
  - (v) Open-source information to identify other collaborative or contradictory information regarding the Panel's findings.
- (e) In carrying out its investigation in respect to the recruitment of children by parties to the conflict, the Panel is particularly mindful of the risk posed by its investigations for the children and their family. The Panel also refrains from interviewing directly the victim unless it is sure that this will not have a negative impact on them. Therefore, the Panel often relies on sources such as:
- (i) Investigations and other documentation from local and international organizations that have independently investigated the incident.
  - (ii) Interviews with people and organizations providing assistance to these children.
  - (i) Interviews with other people with knowledge of the violations such as family members, community leaders, teachers, and social workers.
- (f) The standard of proof is met when the Panel has reasonable grounds to believe that the incidents had occurred as described and, based on multiple corroboratory sources, that the responsibility for the incident lies with the identified perpetrator. The standard of proof is "beyond a reasonable doubt".
- (f) Upon completion of its investigation, wherever possible, the Panel provides those responsible with an opportunity to respond to the Panel's findings in so far as it relates to the attribution of responsibility. This is undertaken in accordance with the Panel's standard methodology on the opportunity to reply. Generally, the Panel would provide detailed information in any opportunity to respond, including geo-locations. However, detailed information on incidents are not provided when there is a credible threat that it would threaten Panel sources, for example, in violations related to deprivation of liberty, violations associated with ground strikes on a civilian

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home, or in violations associated with children.

- (g) If a party does not provide the Panel with the information requested, the Panel will consider whether this is of sufficient gravity to be considered as non-compliance with paragraph 12 of resolution [2564 \(2021\)](#) and thus consideration for reporting to the Committee.
- 3. The Panel will not include information in its reports that may identify or endanger its sources. Where it is necessary to bring such information to the attention of the Council or the Committee, the Panel will deposit such information in the custody of the Secretariat for viewing by members of the Committee.
- 4. The Panel will not divulge any information that may lead to the identification of victims, witnesses, and other particularly vulnerable Panel sources, except: 1) with the specific permission of the sources; and 2) where the Panel is, based on its own assessment, certain that these individuals would not suffer any danger as a result. The Panel stands ready to provide the Council or the Committee, on request, with any additional imagery and documentation to supports the Panel's findings beyond that included in its reports. Appropriate precautions will be taken though to protect the anonymity of its sources.

# Annex 2 UN Geographic Information Systems (GIS) map



### Annex 3 Summary of Panel correspondence

**Table 3.1**

Correspondence with Member States

<i>Member State</i>	<i>Number of letters sent by the Panel</i>	<i>Number of unanswered letters by Member State</i>	<i>Number of letters where the deadline is after 17 December/Comments</i>
Belarus	2		
Bulgaria	1		
People's Republic of China	4	4	
Canada	1	1	
France	2	1	
Gabon	1		
Germany	1		
Greece	1		
India	1		
Islamic Republic of Iran	8		
Japan	1		
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia	23	8	
Oman	7	5	
Russian Federation	2		
Somalia	1	1	
Sweden	1	1	
Syria	1		
Turkey	1	1	
United Arab Emirates	3	1	One was a partial response.
United Kingdom	1	1	Engagement ongoing in respect of response.
United States of America	8		
Yemen	23	15	One was a partial response.
<b>Total (21)</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>39</b>	

**Table 3.2**

Correspondence with armed groups and other non-governmental entities

<i>Entity</i>	<i>Number of letters sent by the Panel</i>	<i>Number of unanswered letters by entity</i>	<i>Number of letters where the deadline is after 17 December</i>
Sana'a based ministry of foreign affairs	5	5	1
Sana'a based central bank of yemen	1	1	1
Southern Transitional Council	2	1	1
National Resistance Forces Guards of the Republic	5	2	1
Puntland	1	1	
<b>Total (5)</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>10</b>	

**Table 3.3**

Correspondence with international and regional organizations

<i>Entity</i>	<i>Number of letters sent by the Panel</i>	<i>Number of unanswered letters by entity</i>
World Food Programme	1	
United Nations High Commission for Refugees	1	
International Organization for Migration	1	
United Nations Children's Fund	1	
World Health Organization	1	1
UN Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement	1	
<b>Total (6)</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>1</b>

**Table 3.4**

Correspondence with commercial companies/government entities


<i>Commercial company</i>	<i>Number of letters sent by the Panel</i>	<i>Number of unanswered letters</i>
Aurum Ship Management FZC	1	1
Al Mantab Logistics Company (SFZ) LLC	1	
Al Talib Shipping Company LLC	1	1
BCD & ME GmbH	1	1
Dawood Group of Companies, Sana'a	1	1
Hayel Saeed Group	3	
Carl Walther GmbH	1	
Central Bank Yemen (Aden)	4	
International Smart Digital Interface Company LLC	2	
Lonca Paz. Mak. San. Tic. A.S.	1	1
MTN Group	1	1
OHI Marine LLC	1	
Sabafon, Aden	1	1
Sabafon, Sana'a	1	1
Stamos Steam Ship Co	1	
Swaid & Sons for Exchange Co	1	1
Tadhamon Bank	2	
Tele Yemen, Sana'a	2	
Tele Yemen, Aden	1	1
TORM A/S	1	
Walbro LLC	1	
Zodiac Maritime Ltd	1	
Al Yah Satellite Communications Company P.T.S.C (Yahsat)	1	
Y Telecom	1	1
Yemen Net	1	1
<b>Total (25)</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>12</b>

## Annex 4 Battle for Ma'rib and Shabwah in 2021

1. The hostilities which escalated in the first half of 2020 have continued throughout 2021.<sup>2</sup> The Houthis made significant territorial gains, including in areas in the Governorates of Al Baydah, Shabwah, Ma'rib, and Al Hudaydah. While the Government of Yemen, the Coalition air forces, and the West Coast Joint Forces (WCJF) have engaged in both offensive and defensive operations<sup>3</sup> (see map 4.1 and table 4.1), the Southern Transitional Council (STC) has mostly been defensive in its battles against the Houthis.

Map 4.1

### Houthi military gains in September-October 2021 around Ma'rib City



Source: Panel

2. Despite support from the Coalition and some local tribes, the Government of Yemen has not been able to maintain all its front lines against the Houthis (Table 4.1). Like in 2020, the Houthis largely focused on increasing hostilities on the Ma'rib frontlines, despite significant human casualties, in 2021. They have been conducting a war of attrition by continuously sending reinforcements to the multiple battle fronts; targeting civilian and military infrastructure with short-range missiles and UAVs; as well as targeting government-allied tribes, for example, in the encirclement in Al Abdiya.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>2</sup> In 2019, the Panel reported that the frontlines remained relatively stable (paragraph 11, S/2020/326).

<sup>3</sup> For example, this includes areas in Maqbanah, Hays and Al Ain and Hess Junction, Ta'izz. Information from military sources.

<sup>4</sup> The encirclement started around 23 September 2021, after the Houthis successfully cut the last supply line, when it took over Harib in Ma'rib. The encirclement lasted until approximately mid-October 2021 and had significant negative consequences for the civilians affected and for the overall conflict. Some individuals fighting in the Jebel Murad area stated that this had an impact also on the fighting in Jabal Murad, as the tribal fighters wanted to prevent a similar encirclement in their areas.

3. With the unexpected fall of Al Juba, bordering Ma'rib city, and Jebel Murad in late October 2021, there was some significant repositioning of the conflict parties. At the time of writing, Ma'rib city is one of the last strongholds of the Government after the STC took control of Aden in 2019.<sup>5</sup> In Al Hudaydah and in Ta'izz, the West Coast Forces and Government Forces are concerned that should Ma'rib fall, they would be the next target.<sup>6</sup> For the STC, if Shabwah falls, their potential source of financial revenue from petroleum resources and their ambitions of self-governance would be adversely affected. Additionally, the Houthis would have better access to Southern areas of Yemen through Shabwah. The Houthis would also be in a stronger negotiating position. Thus, for all members of the anti-Houthi forces, the possible fall of Ma'rib and Shabwah presents an existential threat.

4. Therefore, in response to this threat, the Coalition and the WCJF began significant political and military repositioning from September to November 2021, focusing primarily on curbing Houthi advances into their territories, as shown in Table 4.1 for Yemeni forces and Table 4.2 for Coalition forces. The Coalition confirmed that their movements were necessitated by operational and tactical assessments.<sup>7</sup> The Government informed the Panel that they were not given advanced notice of the movements of the WCJF.

Table 4.1

**Main areas of battles between the Government of Yemen, WCJF, and the Houthis**

<i>Location</i>	<i>Timing</i>	<i>Outcome</i>	<i>Comments</i>
Al Bayda	23 September 2021	The Houthis announce that they took full control of Al Bayda. <sup>8</sup>	The Houthis justified the takeover as a move to combat AQAP. <sup>9</sup> The capture of Al Bayda enabled the Houthis to intensify its efforts on the Ma'rib frontlines.
Ma'rib	September 2021 – 15 November 2021	Houthis have reportedly taken control of eight of the 14 districts of Ma'rib Governorate, with four districts under their partial control. <sup>10</sup> Both sides are sending reinforcements for fighting around Jebel Al Balaq, which borders the heavily populated and government-controlled city of Ma'rib. The fall of areas in Harib, <sup>11</sup> Jebel Murad <sup>12</sup> and Al Juba <sup>13</sup> were significant defeats for the Government in this period.	The defeats in Ma'rib are attributed to tribal divisions within the Murad tribe, inadequate provision of weapons to tribal allies, and the need to avoid a catastrophic situation such as Al Abdiya. <sup>14</sup> Through the movements in Al Hudaydah and Ta'izz (see below), some anti-Houthi forces are attempting to consolidate their positions to reinforce and fight Houthis in Ma'rib and Shabwah. Tareq Saleh and the Government of Yemen on the one hand; and the STC and Tareq Saleh on the other hand, seem willing to temporarily set aside their differences, and to consolidate their efforts to fight the

<sup>5</sup> <https://english.alaraby.co.uk/news/dam-will-break-if-houthi-rebels-take-marib-yemeni-official>.

<sup>6</sup> Discussions with representatives of the WCJF and Ta'izz military forces.

<sup>7</sup> [https://twitter.com/EKH\\_brk/status/1458503049421500425?t=xT2K1FbGEmpkTzmPBpc60A&s=08](https://twitter.com/EKH_brk/status/1458503049421500425?t=xT2K1FbGEmpkTzmPBpc60A&s=08); <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-led-coalition-says-troops-redeploying-yemen-not-withdrawing-2021-11-10/>.

<sup>8</sup> [https://arabic.rt.com/middle\\_east/1276104-سيطره-البيضاء-استكمال-يعلنون-الحوثيون](https://arabic.rt.com/middle_east/1276104-سيطره-البيضاء-استكمال-يعلنون-الحوثيون).

<sup>9</sup> [https://arabic.rt.com/middle\\_east/1276104-سيطره-البيضاء-استكمال-يعلنون-الحوثيون](https://arabic.rt.com/middle_east/1276104-سيطره-البيضاء-استكمال-يعلنون-الحوثيون).

<sup>10</sup> According to some sources, 8 of the 14 districts in Ma'rib are under Houthi control and 4 partially (Serwah, Madghel, Raghwan, and Al-Joubah). Marib city and Alwadi are under the control of the Government of Yemen and affiliated forces. Information updated as at 15 November 2021.

<sup>11</sup> Around 22 September 2021. The attack reportedly came from Shabwah's Al Ain district.

<sup>12</sup> Around 26 October 2021.

<sup>13</sup> Around 25 October 2021, the capital of the district fell to the Houthis, but as of 15 November 2021 the fighting is still ongoing.

<sup>14</sup> Discussions with Murad and other civilian, military and tribal figures in Ma'rib.

			Houthis. <sup>15</sup> However, the STC may be using the circumstances to push the Government for more political concessions. <sup>16</sup>
Shabwah	September 2021 – 15 November 2021	In September, the Houthis took control of areas in Bayhan, Ain and Usaylan in Shabwah.	The battle for these areas in Shabwah was won by the Houthis, with minimal resistance from the Government of Yemen. This had led to the fear that should Houthis decide to advance to Shabwah's oil rich areas, they would be able to do so with relative ease. There were attempts by some units of the Giants brigades to reinforce Shabwah through Abyan. <sup>17</sup> A united front of anti-Houthi forces in Shabwah is adversely affected by: 1) The current political infighting in Shabwah; <sup>18</sup> 2) the unpopularity of the pro-Islah Governor with the STC, UAE, and consequently some West Coast armed groups, <sup>19</sup> and 3) the fact that for the STC, control of Shabwah remains an important element in the fulfilment of their aspirations.
Al Hudaydah	September 2021 – 15 November 2021	In September 2021, there was an exchange of control of territories between the Giants brigades and the National Resistance. Around	These movements appear to be linked to the military setbacks in Ma'rib. <sup>23</sup> WCJF and the Coalition came under criticism for the November 2021 withdrawal. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia stated that

<sup>15</sup> Statements made by the Political Bureau of the National Resistance (PBNR) on 28 October 2021 (see <https://2dec.net/news46965.html>); and STC statement stating that they will fight alongside the National Resistance forces to fight the Houthis (see <https://stcaden.com/news/15986#.YXrXgYHNXw0.twitter>). In the PBNR, which Saleh chaired, it was stated "the political bureau renewed its call for all political components and national forces to unite in the defense arenas of the republic, for the parties to open a new page in their relations with each other, and for all to direct their weapons and political and media discourse against houthi militias." The spokesperson of STC said "we welcome any efforts in the STC to unite to confront houthi militias along the frontlines in the south and Yemen, and we express our readiness to partner with the national resistance and support it... and keep its threat away from our country and the region, while affirming our commitment to our southern national objectives." PBNR informed the Panel that Saleh also offered to fight with GoY in Ma'rib, this was confirmed by GoY to the Panel. Additionally, see interview with Saleh at <https://sanaacenter.org/publications/main-publications/14185> and the Director of the Office of President Hadi confirming the offer made by Saleh at <https://sanaacenter.org/publications/news/14136>.

<sup>16</sup> For example, STC's President has stated his willingness to enter into direct negotiations with the Houthis should Ma'rib fall: In an interview published in March 2021, he stated that "The fall in Marib would have serious consequences, not just at humanitarian level but it might accelerate the process towards internationally convened talks between the North and the South. It could lead to a situation where the STC are largely in control of the South and the Houthis control most of the North. In that case, it would make sense to have direct talks between the parties that are in control." (<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/01/biden-can-help-end-yemen-civil-war-by-backing-referendum-say-separatists>). On 9 November 2021, the STC also threatened withdrawal from the Riyadh Agreement, unless their demands were met from the Government side. <https://south24.net/news/newse.php?nid=2206>.

<sup>17</sup> Reportedly, the 1<sup>st</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> Brigades were deployed to Abyan. Confidential military sources and officials of the Government of Yemen.

<sup>18</sup> In November 2021, Sheikh Awad Mohammed bin al-Wazir al-Awlaki held meetings in Shabwah calling, amongst others, for the dismissal of the Governor Mohammed Saleh Bin Adio. The former, reportedly a well-respected GPC member, appears to be challenging the authority of the Governor, reportedly an Islah party member. He returned to Shabwah in November 2021, after reportedly living 6 years in the UAE (<https://sanaacenter.org/publications/the-yemen-review/15894#Shabwa>). His return comes in the backdrop of the escalating tensions between the Governor and GPC, Governor and the STC and some tribes, as well as the Governor and the UAE (see paragraph 59, S/2021/79). The Governor in 2021, continued his calls on the UAE personnel to vacate Belhaf (see paragraph 59, S/2021/79). In October 2021, after a discussion involving Saudi Arabia, both Saudi Arabia and the UAE left Ataq airport and Al Alam camp, but UAE personnel are reportedly still present in Belhaf (table 4.2). According to local sources, there were reported clashes in Al Alam after the departure of the Coalition forces, between the STC-affiliated Shabwani Elite Forces and the Government of Yemen forces affiliated to the Governor.

<sup>19</sup> Local confidential sources, See tweet from Governor at <https://twitter.com/Mbinadeow/status/1430157247439687694>, See also <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/yemen-war-uae-balhaf-seaport-clash-government> and <https://debriefer.net/en/news-26767.html>.

<sup>23</sup> Panel discussions with military sources.

		11 November 2021, <sup>20</sup> the WCJF reportedly moved 13 brigades <sup>21</sup> from 14 locations <sup>22</sup> along the coastal line. Around 12 November 2021, the Houthis occupied these areas and opened the Sana'a-Al Hudaydah road.	“the military redeployment and repositioning of its military forces” is in line with its military strategy to support the Yemeni government in its national battle on all fronts. <sup>24</sup> Yet, the Yemeni Government stated that they did not have advance notice of this withdrawal. <sup>25</sup>
Ta'izz	September 2021 – 20 November 2021	On 19 November 2021, the WCJF confirmed having captured the Al Adin-Hess junction, which connects Ibb with the Al Hudaydah supply route for the Houthis, <sup>26</sup> as well as other locations in Western Ta'izz.	This was an important victory for the WCJF who had suffered significant reputational damage for the 11 November 2021 withdrawal. Unlike in Shawbah, in Ta'izz, the WCJF and the Ta'izz Military Axis, as well as the political leadership have at times set aside their differences to meet and discuss joint strategies <sup>27</sup> .

*Sources:* Panel based on various sources.<sup>28</sup>

4. The Coalition also undertook redeployments during this period at Table 4.2, which according to them were also necessitated by operational and tactical assessments.<sup>29</sup>

Table 4.2

**Significant Coalition movements in October and November 2021**

<i>Date</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Comments</i>
9 November 2021	Al Bureika Base in Aden	Significant troop reductions reported. <sup>30</sup>
31 October 2021	Ataq Airport in Shabwah	Complete withdrawal of Coalition forces reported. <sup>31</sup>
26 October 2021	Al Alam Camp in Shabwah	Complete withdrawal of Coalition forces. Clashes between the STC-affiliated Shabwani Elite Forces and pro-Government forces followed, which resulted in the latter taking control of the camp. <sup>32</sup>
October and November 2021	Several small military camps in Mahra	Redeployment and consolidation of Coalition forces at Al Ghaydah airport. <sup>33</sup>

<sup>20</sup> The Panel notes that different dates between 10 – 12 November are referred to as dates when the withdrawal began, by different interlocutors.

<sup>21</sup> Source: representatives of the WCJF.

<sup>22</sup> Source: representatives of the Government of Yemen.

<sup>24</sup> <https://www.spa.gov.sa/viewfullstory.php?lang=en&newsid=2304419#2304419>.

<sup>25</sup> See paragraph 20 of the main report.

<sup>26</sup> <https://almasdaronline.com/articles/241049>, <https://twitter.com/SDwaid/status/1461714995516002314>. Confirmed by military sources.

<sup>27</sup> The last meeting was in October 2021, according to military sources.

<sup>28</sup> Discussions with Government of Yemen and military sources, local authorities, and civil society from Al Baydah, Ma'rib, Shawbah, al Hudaydah, and Ta'izz.

<sup>29</sup> [https://twitter.com/EKH\\_brk/status/1458503049421500425?t=xT2K1FbGEmpkTzmPBpc60A&s=08](https://twitter.com/EKH_brk/status/1458503049421500425?t=xT2K1FbGEmpkTzmPBpc60A&s=08); <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-led-coalition-says-troops-redeploying-yemen-not-withdrawing-2021-11-10/>.

<sup>30</sup> Government of Yemen sources.

<sup>31</sup> Confidential sources.

<sup>32</sup> Confidential sources.

<sup>33</sup> Government of Yemen sources.

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16 November 2021

Khalidiyah Camp in Hadramawt Complete withdrawal of Coalition forces reported.<sup>34</sup>

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**Source:** Panel, based on various sources.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> <https://almasdaronline.com/articles/240827>.

<sup>35</sup> The Panel has requested KSA for more information on its withdrawals, a response is pending.

## Annex 5 Developments on the West Coast

### I. Developments relating to Tareq Saleh<sup>36</sup>

1. In 2021, Tareq Saleh was one of the most powerful Yemeni military leaders on the non-Houthi controlled West Coast, and his brother, Ammar Saleh, the most powerful security and intelligence figure in the same area.<sup>37</sup> On 25 March 2021, Tareq Saleh announced the establishment of a “Political Bureau of the National Resistance” (PBNR).<sup>38</sup> This is the political wing of the existing military entity under Saleh, which is also known as the Guards of the Republic. According to information received by the Panel from individuals close to Tareq Saleh, he resented the fact that he was effectively excluded from the negotiations leading up to the Stockholm Agreement. This situation may have been a contributing factor in the formation of the PBNR.<sup>39</sup>
2. Tareq Saleh’s ascension into political and military power have been largely facilitated by:
  - a. The lack of authority exercised by the central Government on the West Coast, which has failed to integrate all the various armed groups on the West Coast into the National Army, except for some Giant Brigades (paragraph 6).
  - b. The inability of the Government of Yemen to provide adequate health care to the wounded fighters, or to pay regular salaries to local West Coast civil service, security, and military officials, letting them to seek this support elsewhere.
  - c. Direct humanitarian and reconstruction support by the UAE that comes through the National Resistance for communities on the West Coast, rather than to the central Government, (paragraph 4 and 10).
  - d. The reliance of local authorities and civilians on ‘humanitarian assistance’<sup>40</sup> provided by the National Resistance humanitarian unit, which further increases the dependence of local authorities on Tareq Saleh to provide for populations in their localities (figure 5.1).
  - e. Access to wide-reaching intelligence networks of Ammar Saleh, which allows Tareq Saleh to counter security threats in the area. This has created a space in which it has become difficult for individuals to criticize Tareq Saleh or the National Resistance openly.<sup>41</sup>
3. Tareq Saleh is also providing financial incentives to local authorities, as well as security support.<sup>42</sup> The Panel noted that the same Government leaders that spoke out against Tareq Saleh

<sup>36</sup> In this annex, in order to prevent reprisals against individuals, the Panel will not indicate the sources of information, where such may have a potentially negative impact on those sources. Sources for this section include members of the Government of Yemen and its armed and security forces, the Yemeni Coast Guard on the West Coast, Political Bureau of the National Resistance, Tihama Resistance, Tihama political leaders, Tihama Peaceful Movement/Hiraq, Tihama National Council, and other Tihama and West Coast human rights activists, National Resistance Forces, Giant Brigades, civil society, and local authorities in Ta’izz and Hudaydah Governorates.

<sup>37</sup> Ammar Saleh used to be the Deputy of the National Security Bureau under Ali Abdullah Saleh effectively from 2002 to 2012.

<sup>38</sup> <https://t.co/BK0o6B9Kij> / Twitter.

<sup>39</sup> Tareq Saleh was excluded from various peace initiatives, including the Stockholm Agreement and the Riyadh Agreement, and the formation of the Unity Government in December 2020. In an interview, Saleh said, “(t)he political office was created as a result of the ongoing political situation in Yemen and the developments that have occurred. We, on the West Coast, need a political entity that represents us in any upcoming negotiations, for it to be another voice that represents the Yemeni people outside of any religious political parties.” See <https://sanaa-center.org/publications/main-publications/14185>.

<sup>40</sup> The Panel cannot confirm if assistance provided by the National Resistance is intended or distributed in an impartial, indiscriminate, or neutral manner and without pre-conditions.

<sup>41</sup> Multiple confidential sources who received threats.

<sup>42</sup> As incentives, unlike salary payments, are not regular and depends on maintaining favor with the paying authority, some individuals informed the Panel that they could not act independently to carry out their functions, when these actions were inconsistent with what was required by the WCJF.

in 2019 and 2020, adopted a more submissive attitude in 2021, as they adjusted to the realities on the ground.

Figure 5.1

### National Resistance's humanitarian unit providing support on the West Coast



**Source:** <https://2dec.net/news47950.html> (right) (showing mobile clinics on the West Coast, note the ambulance has the name of the national resistance); <https://2dec.net/news47897.html> (left) (showing a convoy of humanitarian assistance, including reportedly 3000 food baskets to the newly liberated areas in Hays. It also contains a video of the Governor of Hudaydah thanking the National Resistance for the food baskets.)

4. The Government of Yemen informed the Panel that neither the salaries paid to Tareq Saleh's fighters, nor the financial incentives that he distributes, came from the Government.<sup>43</sup> According to some fighters, their salaries or incentive payments are made by the UAE, through Tareq Saleh, mostly in Saudi Riyals.<sup>44</sup> The UAE stated that it provides "a substantial amount of financial support through the Coalition to support legitimacy in Yemen to the Government of Yemen to pay the salaries of West Coast forces."<sup>45</sup> The Government of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have been requested to confirm the UAE's statement; the Panel has not yet received a response.

5. In 2021, the relationship between the Government of Yemen and Tareq Saleh remained complex, but cordial.<sup>46</sup> The Government cannot maintain the new frontlines with the Houthis in the Hudaydah Governorate and in West Ta'izz without the WCJF. At the same time, it cannot provide salaries or other support to maintain the loyalty of those forces to the Government. According to some, the establishment of the Political Bureau by Tareq Saleh is part of a plan to further consolidate his political position in the West Coast and in Yemen (see paragraph 7).<sup>47</sup> Indeed, since its establishment, Saleh has engaged in high-level meetings with foreign interlocutors, articulating his vision for Yemen.

6. The establishment of the PBNR and Tareq Saleh's engagement with the international community has created significant unease and tensions, especially amongst some communities

<sup>43</sup> Multiple sources from the Government of Yemen.

<sup>44</sup> Discussions in April, June, August and September 2021 with the Giant Brigades, leaders from Tihama, and Government of Yemen security and military forces. Some of these individuals were receiving incentives that they said came from the UAE. The STC negotiating team in Riyadh informed the Panel that while they were being supported by the Coalition, Tareq Saleh was supported bilaterally by the UAE.

<sup>45</sup> Communication to the Panel in November 2021.

<sup>46</sup> The Panel requested the Government of Yemen to provide a clarification on the nature of its current relationship with Tareq Saleh, the Panel is awaiting a response.

<sup>47</sup> Discussions with Government of Yemen officials, Tihama community leaders, and some leaders in the Tihama National Council.

in Tihama.<sup>48</sup> They have expressed concerns that Tareq Saleh, an outsider to, and a guest of, the Tihama region is positioning himself as the *de facto* ruler of the region. Barely two weeks after the formation of the PBNR, there were clashes reported between the National Resistance forces and some local communities, with three reported deaths.<sup>49</sup> The withdrawal in November 2021, have further escalated tensions between Saleh and some Tihama political leaders (paragraph 29 of the main report and appendix 3).

7. The establishment of the PBNR has also created some tensions within the General People's Congress (GPC) because Saleh's primary support base comes from the GPC. This move has further weakened the already fragmented GPC. For example, representatives of the Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEI 005)-led GPC faction informed the Panel that it did not support the formation of the Political Bureau, even if they continue to work together on some matters with Saleh.<sup>50</sup> While Saleh states publicly that the PBNR is not an alternative for the GPC, and that the PBNR represents the Joint Forces on the West Coast, it is likely that his ambitions are not limited to the West Coast.<sup>51</sup> Saleh's PBNR representatives indicated to the Panel that the Political Bureau's ambitions and reach were national, and not merely regional.<sup>52</sup>

## II. Developments relating to the Giant Brigades

8. The Giant Brigades have acted as a "neutral force" in maintaining peace between different anti-Houthi forces. Within the Giants, there are units that are aligned with the Government of Yemen, while some others are more aligned with the United Arab Emirates. The Giants have successfully maintained a ceasefire in Abyan, following clashes between the Southern Transitional Council and the Government of Yemen (see S/2021/79, paragraph 40).<sup>53</sup> In the June 2021 negotiations around the Riyadh Agreement, the possibility of deploying units of the Giants Brigade as a neutral force to protect the Yemeni Prime Minister and other Government officials in Aden was discussed.<sup>54</sup>

9. The Giants Brigade, in a communication with the Panel, informed that its present leader, Abu Zara al Mahrami, was appointed by President Hadi.<sup>55</sup> Around June 2020, al Mahrami returned to Aden from the UAE and then travelled onwards to the West Coast. He was reappointed as the commander of the different Giant brigades, as well as some Tihama brigades.<sup>56</sup> In 2021, there have been frictions and clashes between some components of the Giant Brigade. For example, tensions arose

<sup>48</sup> Discussions with representatives of the Tihama community including civil society, the Tihama National Council and the Tihama resistance forces.

<sup>49</sup> These clashes reportedly began after Tareq Saleh forces forcefully entered the house of a local prominent General People's Congress (GPC) leader in Mukha Zaid al Kharj. Tareq Saleh forces justified this to the Panel as a security operation. Others say the clashes was linked to the PBNR's formation.

<sup>50</sup> Conversations between the Panel and the GPC, June 2021.

<sup>51</sup> Conversations between the Panel and the PBNR, June and August 2021. In an interview Saleh said, "The GPC is the umbrella that we are all under, but unfortunately, it was fragmented between those inside Yemen and those outside. This major political party was not given the opportunity to play its role in the Yemeni political arena, whether in foreign representation or internally. Inside Yemen, it is under pressure by the Houthis and the GPC in Sana'a has become very marginalized in its political role. Outside of the country, it is divided into a number of different factions. We hope the GPC can play a very important role. We're obviously never going to be an alternative to the GPC and the role it has played. But the political office of the National Resistance represents the Joint Forces here on the West Coast, and it also represents the political arm of all of these forces here in the Yemeni political arena."

See, <https://sanaacenter.org/publications/main-publications/14185>.

<sup>52</sup> Conversations between the Panel and the PBNR, June and August 2021.

<sup>53</sup> The Panel understands that a unit under the leadership of the Giants, is in Abyan, maintaining a buffer zone and facilitating movement and communication between the two forces belonging to the Government of Yemen and the Southern Transitional Council. Discussions with individuals from the Giant Brigades, the 1<sup>st</sup> Presidential Protection Brigade, based in Abyan, and the Coalition. According to the 1<sup>st</sup> Presidential Brigade, the unit is under Hamdi Shukri.

<sup>54</sup> Panel discussions with both STC and Government negotiating teams.

<sup>55</sup> December 2021.

<sup>56</sup> This includes the 1st Tihama and the 1st Zaraniq brigade. Zaraniq is a tribe in Tihama.

when Al Mahrami ordered to change the leaders of

the 1st and 11th Tihama Brigades and the 3rd Giants Brigade. (see also appendix 3). In two cases, there were affiliations between these units and the Government of Yemen. The 3<sup>rd</sup> Giants Brigade was also the 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade under the Government of Yemen. In May 2021, the 1<sup>st</sup> Tihama Brigade Commander was also named as the Commander of the 8<sup>th</sup> Presidential Brigade.<sup>57</sup> Subsequently, he was ordered by Al Mahrami to step down and was replaced by another senior commander of the 1<sup>st</sup> Tihama Brigade.<sup>58</sup> In the case of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Brigade, it saw two leadership changes<sup>59</sup> and clashes in 2021 when Al Mahrami attempted to change, the second leader, Abu Ayesha, and replace him with a third individual, who was not a member of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Giants Brigade.<sup>60</sup> The Giants Brigade in its communication with the Panel in December 2021, justified the changes of Abu Ayesha because of, amongst others, his links to Islah party. The Panel received allegations against all the leaders mentioned in this paragraph relating to financial mismanagement of military resources.

### III. Developments relating to Tihama Fighters

10. In late 2020, all armed groups on the West Coast were reorganized under the dual leadership of Tareq Saleh of the National Resistance<sup>61</sup> and Abu Zara Al Mahrami of the Giant Brigades.<sup>62</sup> Some Tihama leaders viewed this as an attempt by the UAE and Tareq Saleh to reduce the Tihama influence on the West Coast, for example, by dividing their military forces under the command of two leaders who are not originally from the Tihama and preventing them, the Tihama people, from making autonomous military decisions (see also paragraphs 50 – 52 and annex 5 of S/2021/79). In discussions with the Panel, Tihama military and political leaders complained of persistent marginalization by different Yemeni leaders and the Government of Yemen, and lack of basic services for the local population. Both the Tihama and WCJF representatives acknowledged that because most of the Tihama fighters were only receiving their salaries through the Giants Brigade and National Resistance leaderships, they are compelled to fight with WCJF to ensure their and their families' survival.

11. The Tihama political leadership appeared to be divided; sometimes the Panel received conflicting political messages from them. The leadership includes those within the Tihama National Council, the Tihami Peaceful Movement/Hiraq, and Tihama leaders who are also members of the GPC. Some informed the Panel that if the 'occupation' of their lands continued by Tareq Saleh, they would have no choice but to use force to assert autonomy like the STC. Other Tihami leaders, some of whom were loyal to Saleh, expressed the need for a peaceful political solution based on equitable access to the resources on the West Coast. The Peaceful Tihama Movement, a political wing in the West Coast, and the Tihama Resistance, condemned the withdrawals of the WCJF in November 2021, particularly in view of the subsequent atrocities committed by the Houthis over the Tihama population (appendix 3).

<sup>57</sup> The appointment letter is with the Panel. Source: Government of Yemen.

<sup>58</sup> In discussions with the Panel, it was mentioned that the Giant Force leadership only removed him from his position as the Commander of the Tihama, but that his appointment by President Hadi remains unchanged.

<sup>59</sup> The first change was of Abdul Rahman al Lahji. The Giant Brigade informed the Panel in a communication in December 2021 that he was also appointed as the leader of the 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade by the Government. The second leader was Abu Ayesha.

<sup>60</sup> According to information received by the Panel from the 3rd Giants Brigade and other sources, Abu Zara al Mahrami, sought to replace the Brigade leadership with a Yemeni individual who had returned from fighting in Libya.

<sup>61</sup> For example, the 4<sup>th</sup> Tihama Brigade joined Tareq Saleh in 2020 due to largely non-payment of salaries by the Government of Yemen.

<sup>62</sup> As opposed to 2019 when different force commanders were on an equal footing. See <https://www.ernnews.com/news/arab-world/yemen/1883139> where a spokesperson for the West Coast said "this council includes members of all joint forces and has no president, deputy, secretary and the like, all under the leadership and supervision of the Arab alliance, and the council includes a selection of forces participating in the west coast front" and see appendix 4.

#### IV. UAE and the Coalition's role in the West Coast

10. The current role of the UAE on the West Coast remains opaque. The UAE has acknowledged to provides support to the WCJF and to the West Coast on humanitarian and development matters (figure 5.2 and 5.3).<sup>63</sup> However, the UAE has not been clear on the nature of its current military support to the WCJF; in July 2021, the UAE denied that it had provided any military support to Tareq Saleh or his forces. In October 2021, in contrast, the UAE stated that it had provided such support in 2019<sup>64</sup> In July 2021, the UAE stated that it had no troops permanently present on the West Coast.<sup>65</sup> According to sources on the ground, the UAE continues to have some presence on the West Coast,<sup>66</sup> even if it is not at the same scale before mid-2019. The UAE informed the Panel that “(t)he UAE does not exercise any direct or indirect authority over the leaders or their security and military operations” in the WCJF, and that “Tareq Saleh and Abu Zara (al Mahrami) are part of the joint forces, whose tasks include confronting the Houthis and managing operations in the west coast. The Coalition’s joint command deals with any problems they face”.<sup>67</sup> The Panel notes that in an interview with Saleh, he said that “the UAE formed the Joint Operations Command, and there are representatives from the Giants Brigades, from the National Resistance and from the Tihama Resistance.” (appendix 4).<sup>68</sup>

<sup>63</sup> UAE informed the Panel that “(t)he UAE has provided a substantial amount of humanitarian support to the West Coast prior to June 2019 (building schools, hospitals, reconstruction, including of Mocha port); and it continues to provide support to maintain the infrastructure that it has rehabilitated.” UAE communication to the Panel, November 2021.

<sup>64</sup> The UAE in its communication with the Panel in November 2021, informed the Panel that prior to 2019 “(t)he UAE as a part of the Coalition to support legitimacy in Yemen worked with these forces (West Coast armed groups and STC) to ensure that they are trained and equipped as a part of the capacity building measures that was undertaken by the Coalition to support legitimacy in Yemen. The UAE’s support was in the interest of ensuring that these forces were able to prevent and respond to Houthi and AQAP security threats, including after the departure of the UAE. This support was given with knowledge of the Government of Yemen.” The Panel received videos showing military vehicles coming into the Mocha port; the National Resistance in August 2021 stated that they arrived prior to the UAE’s redeployment around mid-2019, as the UAE wanted to provide new military equipment and vehicles to the armed groups in the West Coast prior to their movement.

<sup>65</sup> Discussions between the Panel and the UAE, July 2021.

<sup>66</sup> Individuals from the armed groups on the West Coast.

<sup>67</sup> Communication from the UAE, October 2021.

<sup>68</sup> <https://sanaacenter.org/publications/main-publications/14185>. The extracts are as follows:

*Saleh: Even before the withdrawal of the Emirati forces, they formed the Joint Command and a joint operations room between the National Resistance and the Giants Brigades... So the UAE formed the Joint Operations Command, and there are representatives from the Giants Brigades, from the National Resistance and from the Tihama Resistance. Decisions are made all through consensus and consultations, through meetings between the leadership and representatives of all these parties.”*

*“Sana’a Center: ...What is the current state of your relationship with the UAE?”*

*Saleh: It is a partnership. We and the UAE have put in place principles for this coalition, for this alliance, this is our cause and our interest. The UAE are part of this coalition and we need support to fight against the Houthis. We welcome their support on the condition that we are partners to liberate Yemen and to restore the state. These are our main objectives, to restore the state and ensure the return of state institutions and the legitimate government. This is the agreement that we had for our partnership with the UAE and they have adhered to this. There are no other interests or agendas outside of the liberation of Yemen from the coup,”*

Figure 5.2

### UAE support to the West Coast (Tweet from spokesperson of the National resistance)



Source: <https://twitter.com/SDwaid/status/1464884661226770435> (right). (Spokesperson of the National Resistance tweet on of the arrival of eighty thousand doses of COVID-19 vaccines provided by the UAE to the joint forces and civilians in the districts of the West Coast) and <https://2dec.net/news47970.html> (left) on the “west coast department of the national resistance medical forces” launching the first phase of the vaccination campaign for citizens and military personnel.

Figure 5.3

### UAE support to the West Coast (tweet from Tareq Saleh)



Source: <https://twitter.com/tarikyemen/status/1466290740401741826>. (reportedly a completed apartment construction project in Mukha by the UAE to commemorate Ali Abdullah Saleh YEi.003)<sup>69</sup>

11. The Panel finds that, within the Coalition, the UAE continues to retain significant influence over the West Coast forces. In at least two documented incidents, the UAE has, according to individuals present at the meetings, been involved in trying to contain tensions and infighting amongst WCJF and between WCJF and Tai'zz military.<sup>70</sup> The Tihama leaders allege that the UAE, as well as Tareq Saleh, was instrumental in the reorganization of the West Coast armed groups in late 2020, that resulted in all

<sup>69</sup> Confirmed by a representative of the National Resistance.

<sup>70</sup> The UAE informed the Panel that “(t)he UAE has good relations with the above-mentioned parties, but its influence on those parties is limited and focused on advancing the peace process. In light of its relationships, the UAE is working on reducing any armed escalations resulting from conflicting opinions, since the escalation took place before the Riyadh Agreement, in order to advance the peace process.”

Tihama forces falling under the dual leadership of Abu Zara al Mahrami and Tareq Saleh (appendices 3 and 4).

12. For most part of 2021, the KSA appeared to keep its focus on Ma'rib, while the Government continued to allow the UAE, through the Coalition's Joint Forces Command established by the Coalition, to take the lead on the West Coast.<sup>71</sup> In November 2021, the Coalition clarified its own role in the withdrawals in Hudaydah and stated that "The joint forces in the West Coast carried out the redeployment and the reposition of its military forces under commands of the Joint Forces Command of the Coalition" (appendix 1). It is the first time, that the Panel is aware of, that the Coalition acknowledged its role in a significant military operation in Yemen, without the prior knowledge of the Government.<sup>72</sup> The WCJF in its statement did not refer to the role of the Coalition (appendix 2), however, its representatives bilaterally acknowledged the leadership of the Coalition in this operation, to the exclusion of the Government.

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<sup>71</sup> Representatives of the Government informed the Panel that the UAE continues to have control or influence over the West Coast forces, even after their redeployment in mid-2019.

<sup>72</sup> The Panel has provided Saudi Arabia an opportunity to clarify if it informed the Government in advance of this movement, a response is pending.

## Appendix 1 Media article on the statement by the Coalition Spokesperson on the redeployments of Coalition forces and withdrawals of the WCJF

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Joint Forces Command of the Coalition to Restore Legitimacy in Yemen: Repositioning and Redeployment of the Joint Forces in the West Coast Is a Military Decision Taken by The Joint Forces Command of the Coalition to be Aligned with its Military Strategy in Yemen

Monday 1443/4/10 - 2021/11/15

Riyadh, Nov. 15, 2021, SPA -- Official Spokesperson of the Coalition to Restore Legitimacy in Yemen Brigadier General Turki Al-Malki issued the following statement:

"The redeployment and repositioning of Coalition military forces and Yemeni government forces in the area of operations falls under military strategies carried out by the Joint Forces Command of the Coalition to be aligned with its military strategy to support the Yemeni government in its national battle on all fronts.

The Joint Forces in the West Coast carried out the military redeployment and repositioning of its military forces under commands of the Joint Forces Command of the Coalition. The repositioning and redeployment operation was carried out with discipline and flexibility as planned, which falls in line with future plans of the Coalition forces.

We commend the discipline of all Coalition Countries' military forces, as well as the Yemeni National Army and the Joint Forces in the West Coast during their military redeployment and repositioning operation.

The Joint Forces in the West Coast has achieved numerous victories, which culminated in the (Stockholm) Agreement following the terrorist, Iran-backed Houthi militia's intransigence towards sitting at the negotiating table. Following almost (3) years of holding defensive positions, and the disruption of the implementation of the (Stockholm) Agreement by the terrorist, Iran-backed Houthi militia, whose violations have exceeded (30,000) breaches of the Agreement's provisions, the Joint Forces Command of the Coalition deemed it important that these forces be redeployed and repositioned in order to become more effective and operationally flexible to contribute in the national battle of the Yemeni Army in a manner that guarantees its maneuverability and security in the area of operations; in a time where the Houthi militia still controls the three main ports on the Red Sea (Hodeida Port, Saleef Port and Ras Isa Port), and their disruption of the United Nations' supervision for the implementation of the Agreement.

We conclude by calling on the UN and UNMHA to play its part in implementing the (Stockholm) Agreement, as well as the international community to pressure the terrorist Houthi militia into full commitment and implementation of the Agreement's provisions."

--SPA

20:30 LOCAL TIME 17:30 GMT

0032

www.spa.gov.sa/2304419

Source: <https://www.spa.gov.sa/viewfullstory.php?lang=en&newsid=2304419#2304419>.

# Appendix 2 Media Report on the statement by the WCJF



- الأشهر**

هندسة القوات المشتركة تنزع عشرات العوات المتاسعة زرعتها مليشيات الحوثي تحت الجسور في حبس 4 يونيو 2021

إصابة مسيرين الذين يتطابقا فذرية أطلقها مليشيات الحوثي على منزلها شرق حبس 4 يونيو 2021

الفرق الهندسية للقوات المشتركة تظهر الخوف الزاغبة شمال حبس من الأتغام الحوية 3 يونيو 2021

القوات المشتركة لتقدم في منطقة الدين جنوب غرب الجرحي وتسيطر على مواقع المليشيات 2 يونيو 2021

الفرق الهندسية للقوات المشتركة تفكك عشرات الأتغام الحوية زرعتها المليشيات في المزارع بحديرية حبس 2 يونيو 2021



الرئيسية | الأخبار | بيان صادر عن القوات المشتركة في الساحل الغربي

## بيان صادر عن القوات المشتركة في الساحل الغربي

المركز الإعلامي لألوية العمالقعة

12 نوفمبر 2021



تتابع القوات المشتركة في الساحل الغربي تطورات الأحداث المتتالية عقب تنفيذها قرار إخلاء المناطق المحكومة بالفاق (السويد)، لكون تلك المناطق محكومة بالفاق دولي ببقائها مناطق منزوعة السلاح وأمنة للدينين الذين وقع الفاق (السويد) بحجة حمايتهم وتأمينهم.

وإذنا، فإننا في القوات المشتركة، بوّجذ وثيقة راسخة وقوية بالمر - إن شاء الله - أن قرار إعادة الانتشار جزء من المعركة الوطنية التي بدأناها وبداها فيها الفائي والتفيس لمواجهة المخاطر التي تهدد أمن الوطن والمواطن اليمني حيوياً، وأتامن القومي العربي عموماً.

وإن قيادة القوات المشتركة، بوّجذ أنها اتخذت هذا القرار في ضوء خطة إعادة الانتشار المحددة في الفاق (ستوكهولم) التي تتسمت الحكومة الشرعية بتنفيذها بالرغم من انتهاكات مليشيات الحوثي الفاق من اليوم التالي لتوقيدهم، وما زالت المليشيات مستمرة في نسف الفاق حتى اليوم.

ولم تحط القوات المشتركة الضوء الأظفر لتحرير مدينة الحديدة، وجرمانها من تحقيق هدف استراتيجي لليمن وأتامن القومي العربي، كان من شأنه أن يسرع من إنهاء المليشيات الدولية، وإننا نرى واجبنا الديني والوطني يدفعنا للدفاع عن جهات ذات أهمية أخرى قد يستغلها العدو عند عدم وجود دفاعات كافية، وعدم وجود الفاق دولي يردع الحوثي عن تقدمه، كما حصل مع فوانينا في (الحديدة).

وأنها قررت ذلك في سياق متابعتها التطورات التي تشهدها جهات البلاد كلها، التي تفرض على كل جرد قادر أن يقدم الدعم والوعون بالوسائل المختلفة لجهات الدفاع عن اليمن واليمنيين في مواجهة أدوات (إيران) التي تعيث خراباً في (البيضاء والويف)، وإسقاط ثلاث مديريات من محافظة شبوة وغيرها، ثم الوصول إلى مشارف مدينة (مارب).

لقد رأت القوات المشتركة خطأ بالثأر محاصرة في مناس دفعات منع عليها الحرب، بقرار دولي، فيما الجهات المختلفة تتطلب دعماً بكل الأشكال؛ ومنها فتح جهات أخرى توقف الحوثيين عند حددهم، وبوّجذ للمواطن اليمني والعربي، الذي يعيش معنا معاركنا القومية، أن اليمنيين لن يحدروا جهداً في إعادة ترتيب صومهم ومعاركهم للقتال (صفاً واحداً كاليمنيين المرصوصين) في كل جهة والجاه.

وعليه، فقد بدأت تنفيذ خطتنا التي تحدد خطوات دفاعية، بوّجذ معركة الساحل وبشقي (تهامة) على أهبة الاستعداد لأي تطورات قد تطرأ في جهات القتال ضد الحوثي.

ومن المؤسف له، أن هذه الخطة فويت بتعميل إعلامي، يستهدف ضرب الثقة الصلبة لمنتسبي القوات المشتركة في إطار الاستهداف المعلن الذي تعرّض له فوانينا؛ بالطريقة والأدوات نفسها التي استخدمت في إضعاف دور الشرعية وفاعليتها في المعركة الوطنية.

إن أبطال القوات المشتركة في الوحدات والتنظيمات العسكرية جميعها ملتزمون بمعركتهم في كل شبر في مواجهة الأوتة الدولية، وسنحارب جهاتنا صلبة تحيق مليشيات إيران الهزائم المدانة.

وإننا ندعو الجميع إلى استعمار الواجب، ورش الصفوف، وتصدح النبات، والتزام الأهداف، حتى يقضي الله أمرًا كان مفعولاً، وإن نعر الله لتربى.

Source: <https://alamalika.net/site/2021/11/12/2-الساحل-في-المشتركة-عن-القوات-المشتركة-في-الساحل-2>

**Unofficial translation (confirmed as accurate by a representative of the WCJF):**

The Joint Forces at the West Coast are monitoring the developments of the successive events following their implementation of the decision to evacuate the areas governed (according to Stockholm agreement). The reason is that those areas are governed by an international agreement that keeps them demilitarized and safe for civilians under the pretext of their protection and security.

To begin with, we, in the joint forces, affirm with firm and strong confidence in victory - God willing - that the redeployment decision is part of the national battle that we have begun and made priceless and precious efforts to address the threats targeting the security of our homeland and the Yemeni citizen in particular, and Arab national security in general.

The Joint Forces command confirms that it made this decision in the light of the redeployment plan outlined in the Stockholm agreement, which the Government is keen to implement, despite violations committed by Houthi militias from the next day after the agreement was signed, as Houthi militias continue to violate that agreement till this day.

The Joint Forces did not give the green light to liberate Hudaydah city, and by doing so a strategic goal for Yemen and Arab national security was deprived from being achieved. If Hudaydah city is liberated, the end of Houthi militias would have been accelerated.

We see it as our religious and patriotic duty that motivates us to defend other fronts of other importance, which the enemy may exploit when there are insufficient defenses as well as when there is an absence of an international agreement efficiently deterring the Houthi militias from their progress like what happened with our forces in (Hudaydah).

The Joint Forces decided that decision in the context of following the recent events and developments at the fronts of the whole country. Those developments of events impose on every free person - to his ability - to provide support and aid by various means to the fronts of defense of Yemen and Yemenis in the face of the tools/hands of (Iran); which is wreaking havoc in (Al-Bayda and Al-Jawf), and which brought down three districts from and through Shabwa governorate, reaching the outskirts of (Ma'rib) city.

The Joint Forces had noted the mistake of remaining besieged in defensive barricades and being prohibited by an international decision from fighting, while the various fronts require support in all forms; an example of such support is to open other fronts that would stop the Houthi militias, and by that assure to the Yemeni and Arab citizens; who are living with us our national battles, that the Yemenis will spare no effort in rearranging their rows and their battles to fight (as one row like a solid structure); In every front and direction.

Accordingly, The Joint Forces has begun implementing its plan, which defines defensive lines, secures the battle of the coast and keeps (Tihama) ready for any developments of events that may occur at the fronts of fighting against the Houthis.

Unfortunately, this plan was met with media misinformation and was misleading; that aims to target and strike the solid confidence of The Joint Forces' members as usual; In the same way and tools that were used to weaken the role and effectiveness of the legitimate government in the national battle.

The heroes of The Joint Forces in all military units and formations are committed to their battle in every inch in the face of the Houthi tumor. Our fronts will remain solid, subjecting Iran's militias to humiliating defeats. We call on everyone to feel the duty, rearrange the rows, charge their well, and adhere to aimed goals until God decide on the matter and God's victory is nearby.

## Appendix 3 Statement of Tihama

<p>بتاريخ: ٩ / ٤ / ١٤٤٣ هـ الموافق: ١٤ / ١١ / ٢٠٢١ م</p>		<p>إقليم تهامة الحراك التهامي السلمي المقاومة التهامية</p>
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بيان الحراك التهامي السلمي والمقاومة التهامية رقم ( ٤ ) لسنة ٢٠٢١ م

بشأن انسحاب القوات المشتركة من طرف واحد في مناطق سيطرتها على الساحل التهامي :

لقد فوجئ الحراك التهامي والمقاومة التهامية في يوم الخميس الموافق ١١ نوفمبر ٢٠٢١ م بإنسحاب مفاجئ للقوات المشتركة من مناطق سيطرتهم في كل من مديرية الحوك ومديرية الحالي ومديرية الدريهمي ومديرية التحيتا والخظ الساحلي بما يعادل ٩٠ كيلو متراً بدعوى تنفيذ اتفاق استوكهولم من طرف واحد؛ لتتقدم مليشيا الحوثي العنصرية الإرهابية لمحاولة السيطرة على مناطق الانسحاب.

ورغم أن أبناء تهامة لم يكونوا طرفاً في اتفاق استوكهولم؛ إلا أن تنفيذ الاتفاق تحت أي دعوى كان يقتضي أن يكون الانسحاب من الطرفين في مناطق محددة، بما في ذلك إخلاء المليشيا الحوثية لموانئ الحديد والصلب ورأس عيسى.

ومهما كانت الدواعي السياسية أو العسكرية لهذا الانسحاب؛ إلا أن عدم وضع اعتبارات لنتائج على الحالة الإنسانية لأبناء تهامة في المناطق التي أخلت منها القوات وأعادت مليشيا الحوثي اجتياحها؛ مؤشر انتكاسة ترافقت مع ذعر الأهالي من عودة الاجتياح الحوثي وملاحقته وتصفياته والفوضى التي رافقت النزوح الجماعي مما يفترض أنها مناطق محررة وأمنة من بطش المليشيات.

إننا في الحراك والمقاومة التهامية ندين ما حدث من انسحاب؛ أيًا كانت دواعيه وضروراته؛ نتيجة عدم أخذه لتداعياته الإنسانية في تهامة بعين الاعتبار؛ ونظراً لكون الميزرات والدوافع السياسية والعسكرية لهذا الانسحاب غامضة وغير مبررة؛ تطالب التحالف العربي باتخاذ موقف حازم تجاه ما حدث؛ وفتح تحقيق فيما جرى ويجري لأبناء تهامة؛ وإعادة تصويب الوضع بما يضمن إعادة السيطرة على المناطق التي تم الانسحاب منها وتطمين أبناء تهامة أن سلامتهم وسلامة أراضيهم مصانة وكرامتهم محفوظة.

كما نحمل المجتمع الدولي في مقدمتهم الأمم المتحدة ومبعوثها الأممي كل المسؤولية الإنسانية عن التداعيات الإنسانية الكارثية التي حصلت وتحصل نتيجة غض النظر عن هذا الانتهاك الأرعن لجماعة الحوثي الإرهابية ومن يقف وراءها ونحملهم المسؤولية الكاملة تجاه الأهالي والمواطنين النازحين من أبناء تهامة والقيام بواجبهم في ضمان فتح كل الممرات الإنسانية لأهلنا في الداخل؛ وضمان وقف الانتهاكات الحوثية بحقهم والجرائم الانتقامية؛ بما في ذلك أي محاولات قسرية لعسكرتهم وعسكرة الحياة المدنية ووضع حد لجرائم الاتجار بالبشر.

لا يخفى على كل متابع ما تعرض له أبناء هذا المنطقة الجغرافية الهامة في جغرافية اليمن والإقليم من محاولات إستبعادهم وتهميشهم من صنع القرار حتى بعد كل التوضيحات التي قدموها في سبيل منحهم حقهم في الشراكة العادلة في أرضهم، حيث تتابعت مسلسللات التآمر عليهم كمكون وطني أصيل ابتداء من تقبيل وتشتيت قوات تهامية نوعية



Source: Confidential, Tihama political leadership

## **Unofficial translation of the Statement of Tihama**

**In The Name of Allah the Merciful  
Tahamah Region  
Peacefull Tahami Movement/Hirak  
2021 A  
Tahami Resistance**

**Date: 9 / 4 / 1443 H  
Corresponding to 14 / 11 /**

### **The Statement of Peacefull Tahami Movement/Hirak and Tahami Resistance No. (4) of the Year 2021**

In regard to the unilateral withdrawal of the joint forces from their areas of control at the Tihami coast:

Tihami Movement/Hirak and Tihami Resistance were surprised on the Thursday of 11<sup>th</sup> of November 2021 by the sudden unilateral withdrawal of the joint forces from their areas of control at Al-Hawk district, Al-Hali district, Al-duraihemi district, Al-Tuhaita district and the costal line, and that was from about 90 kilometres under the pretext of implementing the Stockholm Agreement, for the racist terrorist Houthi militia to advance to try to control the withdrawal areas.

The sons of Tihama were not a party in the Stockholm Agreement; However, the implementation of the agreement required that the withdrawal should be by both parties in limited areas, this included the Houthi militia's evacuation of the ports of Hodeidah, Salif and Ras Issa.

Whatever the political or military reasons for this withdrawal, the failure to consider its consequences on the humanitarian situation of the people of Tihama in the areas from which the forces were evacuated and the Houthi militia re-invaded; is considered to be a setback, resulting in the people's fear of the return of the Houthi invasion and its pursuits and assassinations, and the chaos that accompanied the mass displacement from what are supposed to be liberated and safe areas from the violence of the militias.

We in the Tihami movement/Hirak and the Tihami resistance condemn the withdrawal that took place; whatever its reasons and necessities, because it did not take the Tihama's humanitarian repercussions into consideration. Given that the justifications and political and military motives for this withdrawal are vague and unjustified, we demand the Arab coalition to take a firm stand towards what happened and to open an investigation on what happened and is happening to the sons of Tihama, changing the situation to ensure the restoration of control over the areas from which the withdrawal occurred and to reassure the people of Tihama of their safety and that the integrity of their lands are protected and their dignity is preserved.

We also hold the international community, led by the United Nations and its UN envoy, responsible for the catastrophic humanitarian repercussions that have occurred and are occurring as a result of turning a blind eye to this reckless violation of the terrorist Houthi group and those behind it.

We hold them fully responsible towards the families and displaced citizens of Tihama and call them to carry out their duty to ensure the opening of all humanitarian safe passages for our people inside; as

well as the responsibility of ensuring the cessation of Houthi violations against them (Tihama people) and the (cessation of) Houthi retaliatory crimes. This includes any coercive attempts to militarize them (Tihama people) and militarization of civilian life, as well as putting an end to human trafficking crimes.

It is no secret to the followers of the event; the attempts to exclude and marginalize the people of this important geographical area of Yemen and the region from decision-making, even after all the sacrifices they made in order to obtain their right to a just partnership in their land, the series of plots against them as an authentic national element continued, starting with the fragmentation and dispersal of the Tihama forces such as the (Tihama) Elite, the Third Brigade and the Eleventh Brigade, targeting the leadership of the Tihama Resistance First Brigade, and targeting the rest of the brigades, which were and are considered qualitative additions to Tihama and Yemen in general.

And now, after all the conspiracies to break up this Tihami force that is most eager to liberate its Yemeni land in the Tihami coast, we see those who fail them again, believing that they (Tihama people) will face their fate and that they are in a state of weakness.

We in the Tihami movement/Hirak and the Tihami resistance demand the legitimate government to announce the fall of the Stockholm Agreement as a result of the Houthi practices (Houthi advances) that accompanied the unjustified unilateral withdrawal; Issue a clear political position that considers the Stockholm Agreement as if it were nothing after this major setback, which prompted the Houthi militia to persist in recklessness. We also call on all the sons of Tihama and their free brothers from across Yemen to stand firm and line up, and we say to them: You are the ones who have resisted and liberated these areas, and you can recover them and defeat the Houthi terrorist militia. We also tell them rejoice, then rejoice, then rejoice, for aid and support will come to you very soon; Strengthen your vows, unite your words, unify your opinions, be on the heart of one man, leave differences aside, and make your goal the liberation of Tihama; So, persevere and be patient, and victory is your ally, by the will of God.

And just as victory swept you in the past, it will ally you recently and forever, because you are defending the right and defending your land, your religion and your faith, and on your hands, the myth of these militias has been broken and will end forever.

There is no place for traitorous climbers in the land of proud Tihama  
Mercy and forgiveness to the martyrs and a speedy recovery to the wounded.  
Long live proud Tihama freely.  
Issued by the Peaceful Tihami movement/Hirak  
On 11/14/2021AD

## Appendix 4 West Coast Joint Operations Room Command in 2019

**Table 9.1:**

Leaders of the Joint forces of the West Coast (established in June 2019 and information as of December 2019). Note: In 2021, the Panel understands that all of these brigades or leaders came under the National Resistance or the Giant Brigade.

Rank	Name	Forces	Comments
Major General	Haytham Qasm Taher	20 <sup>th</sup> Brigade	Former Minister of Defense (1990–1994).
Brigadier General	Ali Salem Al- Hassani	Amalika Forces	General Supervisor of the Amalika Forces.
Brigadier General	Ra'ed al Habhy	Amalika Forces	Commander, 1 <sup>st</sup> Brigade, Amalika Forces
Brigadier General	Hamdy Shukry	Amalika Forces	Commander, 2 <sup>nd</sup> Brigade, Amalika Forces
Brigadier General	Abdallahman al Lahjy	Amalika Forces	Commander of the 3 <sup>rd</sup> Brigade. From Lahj.
Brigadier General	Tareq Saleh	Guards of the Republic/National Re- sistance	Commander of the Guards of the Republic.
Brigadier General	Ahmed al Kawkabany	Tihama Forces	Commander of the 1 <sup>st</sup> Tihama Brigade.
Brigadier General	Sadq Duwid	Guards of the Republic/National Re- sistance	Spokesperson for the Guards of the Republic
Brigadier General	Suleyman Mansour al Zaranwqy	Tihama Forces	Commander, Zaraniq Brigades
Brigadier General	Ali al Kuniny	Amalika Forces	Commander, 7 <sup>th</sup> Brigade
Brigadier General	Bassam al Mehdar	3 <sup>rd</sup> Infantry Brigade	Commander, Facilities/Logistics Brigade.

*Source:* Various sources in 2019

## Annex 6 STC statements on military and security appointments

Figure 6.1

## Appointment of three leaders of the Security Belt Forces

13:02:58 2021-12-11 من نحن

بحث بحث

المجلس الانتقالي الجنوبي  
SOUTHERN TRANSITIONAL COUNCIL  
الموقو الرسمي

الرئيسية | اخبار المجلس | تقارير | حوارات | أخبار الجنوب | البيانات | تقارير حقوقية | تعار | English

الرئيسية / اخبار المجلس / الرئيس القائد عيدروس الزبيدي يصدر قراراً بشأن تعيين قيادة لقوات الحزام الأمني وعملها ضمن وزارة الداخلية

## اخبار المجلس

### الرئيس القائد عيدروس الزبيدي يصدر قراراً بشأن تعيين قيادة لقوات الحزام الأمني وعملها ضمن وزارة الداخلية

الجمعة ٢٥ يونيو ٢٠٢١ الساعة ٩:٠٠ مساءً

الأكثر قراءة

الرئيس القائد عيدروس الزبيدي يعزي بوفاه العميد حيدرة لهطل

فيديو

أصدر الرئيس القائد عيدروس فاسم الزبيدي رئيس المجلس الانتقالي الجنوبي، القائد الأعلى للقوات المسلحة الجنوبية، القرار رقم ٢٤ لعام ٢٠٢١، تم بشأن تعيين قيادة لقوات الحزام الأمني وعملها ضمن وزارة الداخلية.

وتضمن القرار المواد التالية:

ماد (١): تعيين العميد / محسن عبدالله الوالي، قائداً لقوات الحزام الأمني.

ماد (٢): تعيين العميد / مختار علي مثنى النومي، نائباً لقائد قوات الحزام الأمني.

ماد (٣): تعيين العميد / عبيد مثنى فاسم لعزم، ركن عمليات قوات الحزام الأمني.

ماد (٤): تقوم قوات الحزام الأمني بالمهام الأمنية والشرطةية وتعمل ضمن قوام وزارة الداخلية.

ماد (٥): ينظم عمل قوات الحزام الأمني وفق نظم وقوانين وزارة الداخلية.

ماد (٦): يعمل بهذا القرار من تاريخ صدوره، ويبلغ المعنيين.

كلمة الأستاذ فضل الجعدي نائب الأمين العام للأمانة العامة لهيئة رئاسة المجلس الانتقالي الجنوبي في تدشين الورشة التدريبية الثانية لبناء قدرات منتسبي الحزام الأمني والبحث الجنائي في "حقوق الإنسان وحقوق المحتجزين"

Source: <https://twitter.com/STCSouthArabia/status/1408487032297504774?s=08>.

## **Translation provided by the STC**

President Al-Zubaidi issues decision appointing leadership for Security Belt Forces and to work within Ministry of Interior

The President of the Southern Transitional Council, Supreme Commander of the Southern Armed Forces, President Aidarous Qassem Al-Zubaidi, issued Resolution No. 14 of 2021 regarding the appointment of a leadership for the Security Belt Forces and their work within the Ministry of Interior.

The decision included the following articles:

Article (1): Appointing Brigadier General Mohsen Abdullah Al-Wali as Commander of the Security Belt Forces.

Article (2): Appointing Brigadier General Mukhtar Ali Muthanna Al-Nubi as Deputy Commander of the Security Belt Forces.

Article (3): Appointing Brigadier General Obaid Muthanna Qassem La'ram – Operations Staff officer of the Security Belt Forces.

Article (4): The Security Belt Forces to carry out security and police tasks and work within the framework of the Ministry of Interior.

Article (5): The work of the Security Belt Forces is regulated in accordance with the regulations and laws of the Ministry of Interior.

Article (6): This decision shall be effective from the date of its issuance, and the concerned parties shall be notified.

Figure 6.2

## Appointment of three leaders of the Support and Attribution Forces

من نحن | 13-16-57 2021-12-11

الرئيسية | أخبار المجلس | تقارير | حوارات | أخبار الجنوب | البيانات | تقارير حقوقية | تعازي | English

الرئيسية / أخبار المجلس / الرئيس القائد عيدروس الزبيدي يصدر قراراً بشأن تعيين قيادة الألوية الإسناد والدعم وضما للقوات البرية الجنوبية

## أخبار المجلس

### الرئيس القائد عيدروس الزبيدي يصدر قراراً بشأن تعيين قيادة لألوية الإسناد والدعم وضما للقوات البرية الجنوبية

الجمعة ٢٥ يونيو ٢٠٢١ الساعة ٩:٠٠ مساءً



الأكثر قراءة

الرئيس القائد عيدروس الزبيدي يعزى بوفاته العميد حيدرة لعطل

فيديو



كلمة الأستاذ فضل الجعدي نائب الأمين العام لأمانة العامة لهيئة رئاسة المجلس الانتقالي الجنوبي في تدشين الورشة التدريبية الثانية لبناء قدرات منتسبي الحزام الأمني والبحث الجنائي في "حقوق الإنسان وحقوق المحتجزين"




أصدر الرئيس القائد عيدروس فاسم الزبيدي رئيس المجلس الانتقالي الجنوبي، القائد الأعلى للقوات المسلحة الجنوبية، القرار رقم ٣٣ لعام ٢٠٢١، تم بشأن تعيين قيادة ألوية الإسناد والدعم وضما للقوات البرية الجنوبية. وتضمن القرار المواد التالية:

ماد (١): تعيين اللواء / صالح ناصر محمد السيد، قائداً لألوية الإسناد والدعم.

ماد (٢): تعيين العميد / علي ناصر منفي المعكر، أركان حرب ألوية الإسناد والدعم.

ماد (٣): تعيين العميد / عبدالسلام زين علي اليحياي، ركن عمليات ألوية الإسناد والدعم.

ماد (٤): يتم نقل مقر القيادة وألوية الإسناد والدعم إلى خارج محافظة عدن ويتم ضمها ضمن الألوية البرية للقوات المسلحة الجنوبية.

ماد (٥): تخضع ألوية الإسناد والدعم لقيادة القوات البرية التي تخضع لوزارة الدفاع.

ماد (٦): ينظم عمل وعهام ألوية الإسناد والدعم وفق نظم وفوائن وزارة الدفاع.

ماد (٧): يعمل بهذا القرار من تاريخ صدوره، ويبلغ المعنيين.

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WhatsApp Telegram Twitter Facebook

Source: <https://twitter.com/STCSouthArabia/status/1408485644603695109?s=08>.

### **Translation provided by the STC**

The President of the Southern Transitional Council, Supreme Commander of the Southern Armed Forces, President Aidarous Qassem Al-Zubaidi, issued Resolution No. 13 for the year 2021, regarding the appointment of a command for the Backup and Support brigades and their inclusion within the southern ground forces.

The decision included the following articles:

Article (1): Appointing Major General Saleh Ahmed Mohammad Al-Sayed as commander of the the Backup and Support brigades.

Article (2): Appointing Brigadier General Ali Nasser Muthanna Al-Muaker – War Staff Officer for Support Brigades.

Article (3): Appointing Brigadier General Abdul Salam Zain Ali Al-Bayhani - Operations Staff Officer of the Support Brigades.

Article (4): The headquarters and brigades of Backup and Support shall be transferred outside Aden governorate and shall be included within the land brigades of the Southern Armed Forces.

Article (5): Backup and Support brigades are subject to the command of the land forces, which are subject to the Ministry of Defense.

Article (6): The work and tasks of the Backup and Support brigades shall be regulated in accordance with the regulations and laws of the Ministry of Defense.

Article (7): This decision shall be effective from the date of its issuance, and the concerned parties shall be notified.

Note: The STC informed the Panel in December 2021 that there are no more military forces in Aden, and that they “fulfilled the Riyadh Agreement in this aspect from one side.” These military forces left to different fronts immediately after the issuance of the decree. The Government of Yemen denies that any movement of these forces outside of Aden.

## **Annex 7 Aden International Airport attack on 30 December 2020**

1. The Panel investigated the attack at Aden International Airport, which took place at approximately 1325 hours on 30 December 2020 shortly after a plane carrying the Ministers of the newly formed ‘unity’ government had arrived from Riyadh. The attack claimed the lives of 20 civilians, including Deputy Minister Yasmin al-Awadhi of the Ministry of Public Works and Urban Development and three staff members of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Over 100 people were hospitalized as a result of injuries sustained during the incident. The Panel investigated whether the attack constituted a threat to peace and security in Yemen, as well as a violation of international humanitarian law (IHL).

2. Following an invitation by the Government of Yemen, the Panel visited Aden from 3 to 6 February 2021, where it had access to the impact locations at Aden International Airport as well as to the debris of the missiles used in the attack. The Panel also held meetings with representatives of the Government of Yemen and the National Commission for Inquiry, which were both conducting their own investigations into the incident. In Aden, the Panel interviewed victims and witnesses of the airport attack. It has also conducted remote interviews with a number of other individuals, including people who claim to have witnessed the launch of two missiles at the time of the attack from Tai’zz Airport. The Panel has also communicated on the attack with Houthis, journalists, independent analysts as well as international and local organisations.

3. The Panel had access to information provided by several Member States regarding the attack, including high-resolution satellite imagery of Tai’zz Airport from 30 December 2020. The Panel has requested permission to reproduce the imagery for this report, but so far the Member State which provided the imagery has not granted the Panel permission to do so.

### **I. Description of the incident**

4. On 30 December 2020, a Yemen Airways (Yemenia) Airbus A320-200 operating as flight IY535 left King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh at 1010 hours, carrying Yemeni Prime Minister Maeen Abdulmalik Saeed, members of his cabinet, other officials, as well as the Saudi Ambassador to Yemen. The new ‘unity’ cabinet had been sworn in just four days earlier after long negotiations between the Hadi government and representatives of the Southern Transitional Council (STC). The cabinet’s return to Aden was seen as a crucial step in the implementation of the Riyadh Agreement. The arrival of the plane was awaited by a crowd of people, who had gained access to the airport’s apron. It was also broadcast live on Yemeni television (see figure 7.1 below). Despite the high-profile nature of the event, security around the airport on 30 December 2020 seems to have been relatively light, even though the Government has informed the Panel that it had received some intelligence information in the early morning hours of 30 December about a possible attack.

Figure 7.1  
The scene at Aden airport immediately before the attack



Source: <https://twitter.com/Alsakaniali/status/1344431245481160704>

5. The Panel was informed that the plane arrived at Aden International Airport at approximately 1317 hours, about 90 minutes later than originally expected. Just minutes before its arrival, the airport authorities decided to change the incoming airliner's parking position from line 1 (the closest position to the terminal) to line 2, which is approximately 50 metres further away from the terminal. It is also clear from the presence of a red carpet visible in some of the video footage that the plane was originally supposed to park closer to the terminal.<sup>73</sup> According to airport officials interviewed by the Panel, the decision to change the parking position was taken to increase the distance between the waiting crowds and the plane. Following the plane's arrival, there was an additional delay as Major-General Shallal Ali Shaya, former Director-General of Security in Aden, disembarked first to greet his supporters on the apron. Only after Shallal Ali Shaya had boarded a vehicle to leave the airport, the rest of the passengers, including the members of the cabinet, began to leave the plane.

6. According to the time stamp on the closed-circuit television (CCTV) tapes of the airport, the first explosion occurred at 13:24:35 hours, when the VIP lounge in the terminal building was hit by a missile (see figure 7.2), which penetrated the concrete wall and caused a crater with a diameter of approximately two meters. Based on the damage to the terminal wall (see figure 7.3), the Panel assesses that the first missile was launched from a northerly direction. According to witnesses interviewed by the Panel, the Government had been planning to hold a press conference at this location after the arrival of the Prime Minister and the other cabinet members from Riyadh. It is likely that only the delay described in the previous paragraph prevented members of the Government from being harmed by this missile, which instead killed and injured a number of passengers, all civilians, waiting in the departure hall for the departure of Yemen Airways flight no. IY612 to Cairo.

<sup>73</sup> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2c0WXcyvTQ0>.

Figure 7.2  
CCTV footage showing the impact of the first missile  
30-12-2020 Wed 13:24:35



Source: Government of Yemen

Figure 7.3

Damage to the outer wall of the terminal building, showing the angle of impact



*Source:* Panel

7. The second explosion occurred seconds later at 13:25:09 local time (based on the time stamp of the airport's CCTV footage), when a missile hit the airport apron (see figure 7.4), causing a crater with a diameter of approximately 75 centimetres with a depth of about 32 centimetres. The orientation of the crater shows that this missile impacted from approximately  $315^\circ$  from the North, i.e. from a north-westerly direction (see figure 7.21 in appendix 1). Given the dimensions of the crater, which are significantly smaller than in the case of the other two missiles, it is possible that the second missile carried a smaller quantity of explosives. Nevertheless, the missile impacted directly on lane 1 (see figure 7.5), where the Yemenia Airbus was supposed to park after its arrival from Riyadh. Had the plane's landing position not been changed at the last moment, it seems very likely that the plane would have suffered a direct hit, causing even greater loss of life and destruction.

Figure 7.4  
CCTV footage showing the impact of the second missile on the apron



Source: Government of Yemen

Figure 7.5  
Impact point of the second missile on the runway



*Source:* Panel

8. At 13:25:33 local time, a third missile hit at a low earth wall close to the terminal building, approximately 15 metres away from the impact point of the first missile. The impact created a crater with a diameter of approximately 3 metres and a depth of 1.3 metres. Unfortunately, at the time of the Panel's visit to Aden International Airport, about four weeks after the attack, the crater had already partially been re-filled with earth, which made precise measurements impossible. However, the orientation of the crater, as well as the imagery from the CCTV cameras clearly shows that this missile came from a northerly direction.

Figure 7.6  
CCTV footage showing the impact of the third missile on the low earth wall  
30-12-2020 Wed 13:25:33



Source: Government of Yemen

Figure 7.7

**Impact point of the third missile on the low earth wall**

*Source:* Panel

9. In the immediate aftermath of the attack, a number of witnesses interviewed by the Panel reported shots being fired. Gunfire can also be heard on some of the videos taken by journalists during the incident. Despite speculation that there was a simultaneous ground attack, the Panel has been informed by the authorities that those shots were fired by members of the Yemeni and Saudi security forces in the confusion following the explosions. With regard to the human toll of the attack, the Panel has received information from three different sources – the Government of Yemen, National Commission of Inquiry and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in Aden – stating that a total of 20 people,<sup>74</sup> including three staff members of the ICRC perished as a result of the attack,<sup>75</sup> and that between 104 and 114 people were injured.<sup>76</sup> The difference in figures is due to the fact that the Government only listed people who were hospitalized, while OHCHR also included those injured but not hospitalized as a result of the attack. Among the injured were four children, nine women, ten journalists and 12 members of the military.<sup>77</sup>

10. The Panel has noted media reports that about four hours after the attack the Maasheeq palace, which is the seat of the government in Aden, was attacked by “an explosive-laden drone”, which was allegedly intercepted.<sup>78</sup> The Panel requested more information about this incident, and stands ready to conduct an inspection of the debris of the uncrewed aerial vehicle (UAV).

<sup>74</sup> This number includes three people who died from their injuries in hospital.

<sup>75</sup> <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/yemen-2-icrc-staff-members-killed-1-unaccounted-after-airport-blast>.

<sup>76</sup> The list with the names of the casualties received by the Panel from the Government of Yemen is reproduced in annex 4.

<sup>77</sup> According to information provided by OHCHR this number includes five foreign soldiers.

<sup>78</sup> <https://english.alarabiya.net/News/gulf/2020/12/30/Yemeni-military-intercepts-explosive-laden-drone-near-Aden-s-presidential-palace>.

11. Immediately after the attack, the Government of Yemen attributed responsibility to the Houthis.<sup>79</sup> The Panel has taken note of statements by senior Houthi officials, including by the deputy foreign minister Hussein al-Ezzi<sup>80</sup> as well as by the ministry of human rights in Sana'a, who condemned the attack and stated that "the Saudi aggression coalition planned and directly supported terrorist groups to target Aden airport and civilians".<sup>81</sup> The Panel has not been able to find any evidence supporting the claim against Saudi Arabia. The Panel also notes that Abdulwahab al-Mahbashi, a member of the political office of the Houthis, when asked about the Aden airport attack, neither denied nor confirmed Houthi involvement in the incident, but rather stated in general that the Houthis have a right of self-defense.<sup>82</sup> In line with its methodology, the Panel has written to the leadership of the Houthi movement with detailed questions regarding the attack; a response is still pending.

## II. Possible launch sites of the attack on the Airport

12. The Panel is investigating different locations from which the missiles could have been launched on 30 December 2020. It has interviewed a number of witnesses, who claimed to have observed the launches, and has analyzed images and videos posted on social media in the aftermath of the attack. It has also reviewed satellite images obtained from different sources, including confidential images provided by a Member State. The Panel has also obtained the angle and direction of the impact craters and has cross-referenced this information with the CCTV footage, both of which imply that the missiles were launched from a northerly (in the case of the first and third missile) and a north-westerly (in the case of the second missile) direction. This suggests different launch sites.

13. Shortly after the attack, a number of videos were posted on social media which appear to show the launch of two solid-propellant<sup>83</sup> missiles in the vicinity of Tai'zz Airport. The four geo-located four videos (figure 7.21 in appendix 1) show, using the angles and shadows of the sun, that they were taken shortly after 1300 hours.<sup>84</sup> The Panel also had access to a confidential, high-resolution satellite image provided by a Member State, which was taken on 30 December 2020 over Tai'zz Airport (13°41'08.88'' N, 044°08'21.12'' E). The satellite image appears to show two Transport-Erector-Launchers (TELs) positioned at a distance of several hundred metres apart towards the West of the airport's main runway. The TELs were oriented South-East, in the direction of Aden. According to the same Member State, the TELs were no longer visible on 31 December 2020. The Panel has requested a copy of the satellite image; a response is pending. The Panel has attempted to obtain high-resolution satellite images from other providers showing the same location at the same time but without success.

<sup>79</sup> [https://twitter.com/ERYANIM/status/1344246809116475392?ref\\_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1344246809116475392%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Esl\\_&ref\\_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.bbc.com%2Fnews%2Fworld-middle-east-55484436](https://twitter.com/ERYANIM/status/1344246809116475392?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1344246809116475392%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Esl_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.bbc.com%2Fnews%2Fworld-middle-east-55484436).

<sup>80</sup> <https://english.almasirah.net/post/16883/Deputy-Minister-of-Foreign-Condemns-Targeting-Civilians-in-Aden-Airport>.

<sup>81</sup> <https://english.almasirah.net/post/16918/Ministry-of-Human-Rights-Saudi-Aggression-Coalition-Plans%2C-Directly-Supported-Terrorist-to-Target-Aden-Airport%2C%A0>.

<sup>82</sup> [https://twitter.com/South24\\_net/status/1349077026691538945?s=20](https://twitter.com/South24_net/status/1349077026691538945?s=20).

<sup>83</sup> The smoke trails of the two missiles in the videos show a distinctive white smoke, which is characteristic of so-called "composite solid-propellant", a combination of Hydroxyl-terminated polybutadiene (HTPB), ammonium perchlorate, aluminum particles and other additives.

<sup>84</sup> <https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2021/02/09/rockets-over-yemen-inside-the-houthis-botched-attack-on-aden-airport/>. Although the information was initially published on the internet by a third party, the Panel has been able to verify the methodology used for the geo-location and the timings of the videos.

Figure 7.8

Footage from different social media sources (“Video #2”, left) showing two missiles launched from Tai’zz Airport on 30 December 2020



Source: <https://twitter.com/Alsakaniali/status/1344283130824372224> (left), Government of Yemen (right)

Figure 7.9

Approximate locations of the two TELs at Tai'zz Airport on 30 December 2020 based on confidential information provided by a Member State



Source: Panel

14. It appears clear from the videos posted on social media on 30 December 2020 that one of the missiles launched from Tai'zz Airport malfunctioned and crashed shortly after take-off. A number of witnesses interviewed by the Panel stated that it crashed near the Al-Hashdi soap factory in the Al-Jund valley south of the airport. The distance from Tai'zz Airport to Aden Airport is approximately 135 kilometers, which would imply the use of a short-range ballistic missile system. Images posted on social media, which were allegedly taken at the location shortly after the launch, are showing the remnants of the guidance and control section of a missile with control-surfaces which are characteristic for a guided weapon (see figure 7.10). The witnesses also stated that the area was cordoned off by Houthi fighters immediately after the crash and that local citizens were forced to delete any images taken on their

phones. Yemeni media also mentioned a number of arrests made by the Houthi forces of local people, who had taken videos and images of the launch.<sup>85</sup>

Figure 7.10

Images posted on social media showing the remnants of a guided missile, which allegedly crashed near the Al-Hashdi factory on 30 December 2020



Source: [https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story\\_fbid=445103409846459&id=100030404109248](https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=445103409846459&id=100030404109248).

15. In addition to the videos and images posted from Tai'zz, a number of videos were also posted on social media by users in Dhamar City on 30 December 2020, which appear to show the launch of two additional missiles. Three videos, which were geo-located (see figure 7.21 in appendix 1) show, with slightly lower confidence than in the case of Tai'zz, that these were also taken shortly after 1300 hours.<sup>86</sup> The launch most likely occurred from a military police training center in the Al-Qarn area (14°30'41.4'' N, 044°25'00.84'' E) in the south of Dhamar City.<sup>87</sup> The Panel has been informed that the Government is in touch with a number of witnesses from Dhamar City, who have confirmed the launches. Unlike in

<sup>85</sup> <https://newsbeezzer.com/egypteng/after-divulging-evidence-of-his-involvement-in-the-attack-on-aden-airport-al-houthi-launched-an-arrest-campaign/>.

<sup>86</sup> Although the information was initially published on the internet by a third party, the Panel has been able to verify the methodology used for the geo-location and the timings of the videos.

<sup>87</sup> <https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2021/02/09/rockets-over-yemen-inside-the-houthis-botched-attack-on-aden-airport/>.

the case of Tai'zz, the Panel has not been able to interview those witnesses. The Panel has tried to obtain satellite images of the likely launch location from a number of providers, but it seems that no high-resolution imagery was taken on 30 December 2020. The Panel notes that the distance from the police training center in Dhamar City to Aden airport is approximately 200 kilometres.

Figure 7.11

**Footage from social media (“Video 6”) allegedly showing the launch of two missiles from the police training center in Dhamar City**



**Source:** <https://www.facebook.com/100003789151283/videos/2091492734320345/>

### III. Analysis of the weapon system used in the attack

16. The Panel inspected the debris of the three missiles that were used in the attack on Aden airport. It is not clear who had access to the debris or whether pieces are missing, as it seems that entry to the airport was not tightly controlled in the immediate aftermath of the attack. It is also not clear which pieces belong to which of the three missiles as most of the debris was not labelled or packed in a way that would allow for clear attribution. The Panel is aware that pieces of debris are held by both the Government and by the National Commission of Inquiry.

17. The Panel has analyzed the CCTV footage from Aden airport, which for all the explosions clearly shows a missile-shaped form immediately before impact. Comparing the size of the shape with other objects in the frame whose size is known allows for a rough estimate of the missile's length, which is assessed to be between five and 5.5 meters (see figure 7.12 below). In addition, the impact angle points towards a ballistic missile, while the high degree of precision visible in some of the impacts (see for example figure 7.5 above) leads to the conclusion that guided missiles (as opposed to a less precise weapon, such as a rocket or a mortar grenade) were used in the attack. The available evidence points strongly towards the use of solid fuel, short-distance, surface-to-surface, ballistic missiles.

Figure 7.12  
**Calculation of the size of the missile based on the CCTV footage**



**Source:** Government of Yemen

18. The Houthi forces have been using short-range ballistic weapons for several years, both within Yemen and against border towns such as Jizan or Najran in Saudi Arabia. The most common weapon system in this category is the Badr-1, which the Houthis unveiled for the first time in February 2017 and which the Panel has documented several times since mid-2018. In its basic version, the Badr-1 is a solid-fuel, unguided, artillery rocket with a diameter of 300 millimetres, which is commonly launched from one of the twin launch containers mounted on a 6x6 TEL. The Panel believes that the Badr-1 artillery rocket is manufactured locally in Yemen without the need to source components from abroad. On 28 October 2018, the Houthis unveiled a guided version, dubbed the Badr-1P and stated a range of 150 kilometers and an accuracy of three meters, which unlike the basic version, appears to be launched from a rail. The Badr-1P features distinctive control-surface (pivoting fins) mounted in the front of the missile, immediately behind its warhead, and seems to have a length of approximately six meters. While it is possible that the Badr-1P is also domestically manufactured, it is very likely that at least some components of the weapon (such as the servo actuators and the guidance unit) are imported into Yemen.

Figure 7.13  
**Images showing the Badr-1P missile in the Houthi-affiliated media**



**Source:** Jane's Defence Weekly, 30 October 2018

19. The Panel has analyzed the debris of the three missiles collected at Aden airport by both the Government and the National Commission for Inquiry. It also had access to the pieces of debris that were sent to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The Panel notes that the debris has characteristics which are consistent with the debris of a solid-fuel missile with a diameter of approximately 300 millimetres<sup>88</sup> (see figure 7.14). The Panel also notes that the three missiles carried fragmentation warheads, featuring small metal cubes (see figure 7.15), a type of fragmentation which the Panel has previously observed as part of missiles and UAVs used by the Houthi forces.<sup>89</sup> The Panel has not seen any remnants of the guidance and control sections, which would allow for a better identification of the missile, and the only identifiable marking documented on the debris (“18F4”, see figure 7.16 below) has not been observed by the Panel previously. Appendix 2 contains additional images of the debris inspected by the Panel in Aden.

Figure 7.14

**Debris from the missiles used in the attack on Aden airport**



*Source:* Panel

<sup>88</sup> Precise measurements were impossible as the debris was severely bent out of shape as a result of the impact.

<sup>89</sup> See paragraph 7 in annex 15 of the Panel’s Final Report ([S/2020/326](#)).

Figure 7.15  
Metal cubes which were part of the fragmentation warhead of the missile



*Source:* Panel


Figure 7.16  
Markings (“18F4”) documented on the debris of one of the missiles



*Source:* Government of Yemen

20. The Panel notes that the debris inspected in Aden has similar characteristics to debris which the Panel inspected in October 2020 during a visit to Ma'rib, in particular with regard to the diameter (approximately 300 millimeters) of the missile and the small metal cubes, which form part of the fragmentation warhead (see figure 7.17 below). The Government of Yemen commissioned a comparative laboratory analysis of the debris from Aden and Ma'rib, which concluded that the metallurgical content is very similar (see appendix 3). While this is far from conclusive, it does strengthen the probability that the missiles used in Aden and in Ma'rib were of the same type.

Figure 7.16  
Missile debris from Ma'rib inspected by the Panel in October 2020



*Source:* Panel

21. The Panel concluded with regard to the weapons used in the Ma'rib attacks, which are consistently referred to as “ballistic missiles” by both the Houthi forces and the Government of Yemen, that the debris was likely from an unguided artillery rocket (see page 8, [S/2021/79](#)). This assessment was based on (a) the relatively short distance between the frontlines and the impact points, (b) the absence of any debris from the guidance and control sections and (c) the comparatively low precision of the targeting. In contrast, the attacks in Aden were clearly conducted using a short-range guided ballistic missile. It is possible that the weapon system used in Ma'rib was the basic version of the Badr-1, while the weapon system in Aden was a guided version of the Badr-1 missile family. However, the Panel notes that the images of the guidance and control section of the missile which allegedly crashed south of Tai'zz Airport (see figure 17.10 above), do not correspond to the images of the Badr-1P, which were shown in the Houthi-affiliated media (see figure 7.13 above), in particular with regard to the size and form of the control surfaces.<sup>90</sup> While the distance between the airports of Tai'zz and Aden of approximately 135 kilometers would be within the range of 150 kilometers claimed by the Houthi-affiliated media for the Badr-1P, this is not the case for the distance of circa 200 kilometres between Dhamar City and Aden. It is therefore possible that, either (a) the missiles launched from Tai'zz and Dhamar were of different types, or (b) that the range of the Badr-1P missile has been extended, for example through the reduction of the payload (i.e. the amount of explosives carried). The inspection of the debris recovered from the airport in Aden does not give any indication that the type of missiles was different, while the diameter and the fragmentation warhead, as well as the laboratory analysis of the metal strongly points towards an extended-range version of the Badr-1 missile family.<sup>91</sup>

#### IV. Analysis of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) violations

22. Aden International Airport is a civilian airport. Military personnel, including members of the Coalition also use the facility. However, according to information received by the Panel from multiple sources, at the time of the attack no military operations were being carried out from the airport, nor were there any military aircraft at the locations where the three missiles impacted. As discussed above, the missile attack was targeting high-ranking members of the Government of Yemen upon their return

<sup>90</sup> The weapon systems shown on display in the Houthi-affiliated media are likely mock-ups, plus the design of locally assembled weapons are often “tweaked” to enhance performance, so this is far from conclusive. The Panel has never been able to inspect a complete Badr-1P missile.

<sup>91</sup> In addition to the basic Badr-1 rocket and the Badr-1P guided missile, the Houthi-affiliated media also in April 2019 displayed an “air burst” version called the Badr-1F with a claimed range of 160 kilometers. However, this missile appears to have a significantly greater diameter than the other member of the family.

from Riyadh. Government officials, including cabinet members, are civilians under IHL.<sup>92</sup> Although military personnel were present at the airport at the time of the incident, this was also the case for large numbers of civilians, including passengers waiting for their departure, airport personnel and journalists. This is also reflected in the number of casualties – no member of the military was among the 20 people killed in the attack and only 12 members of the military were among the more than 100 people who were hospitalized as a result of injuries. In addition, as mentioned in the previous section, the missiles carried fragmentation warheads containing small metal cubes, which are intended to cause more injuries.

23. Under IHL, parties to a conflict must at all times distinguish between combatants and civilians.<sup>93</sup> Aden International Airport is a civilian airport. At the time of the attack, it was not, by purpose or use, making an effective contribution to military action and its partial or total destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, did not offer a definite military advantage. Therefore, it was not considered as a military objective at the time of the attack.<sup>94</sup> In addition, there was a large number of civilians present, including senior officials of the Government of Yemen, who were clearly targeted as discussed in previous sections. Based on the information and evidence received, the Panel therefore concludes that the principle of distinction between combatants and civilians<sup>95</sup> was not respected by the attackers, nor were the principles of proportionality or of precautions.<sup>96</sup>

## V. Conclusion

24. Based on the analysis of the available evidence, the Panel concludes that the plane carrying senior government officials, including the Prime Minister and members of his cabinet, was the target of the attack on 30 December 2020 and that this attack was carried out in violation of the applicable norms of IHL.<sup>97</sup> The Panel finds that the attack was carried out using a solid-fuel, guided, short-range ballistic missile with a fragmentation warhead, most probably an enhanced-range version of the Badr-1 family, which has been in frequent use by the Houthi forces against both targets in Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The Panel has not yet seen any evidence suggesting that other conflict parties in Yemen have used guided missiles of this kind. While the Panel continues to investigate, the Panel concludes with very high confidence that at least two missiles were launched from Tai'zz Airport towards Aden on 30 December 2020, and that it is likely that two additional missiles were launched from the police training center in Dhamar City. The Panel has been able to confirm that both locations were under the control of the Houthi forces at the time of the launches

<sup>92</sup> The Minister of Defence, who has military status, was not present at the airport.

<sup>93</sup> See article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions, art. 13 APII, and Customary International Humanitarian Law rule 1 (hereafter CIHL). The CIHL rules as well as their interpretation and related practice can be consulted online at: [https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1\\_rul](https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul).

<sup>94</sup> See CIHL rule 8.

<sup>95</sup> See article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions, art. 13 APII, and CIHL rule 1.

<sup>96</sup> See CIHL rules 14 and 15.

<sup>97</sup> As per its methodology the Panel stands ready to revise its findings if contrary evidence is made available to the Panel.

## Appendix 1      Maps

This annex contains a number of maps, which were prepared by UNITAR and UNOSAT on behalf of OHCHR and the National Commission for Inquiry, and they are reproduced here with their permission. The Panel has verified the impact locations and the approximate angle of the incoming missiles during a visit to Aden Airport in February 2021. The geo-locations of the social media videos in Tai'zz and Dhamar City are based on open-source information.

Figure 7.17

### List of geo-locations of social media videos in Tai'zz and Dhamar


Video #1	13°41'19.6080'' N 044°09'40.68'' E	<a href="https://twitter.com/Alsakaniali/status/1344368644072099847">https://twitter.com/Alsakaniali/status/1344368644072099847</a>
Video #2	13°39'14.1480'' N 044°08'12.5520'' E	<a href="https://twitter.com/Alsakaniali/status/1344283130824372224">https://twitter.com/Alsakaniali/status/1344283130824372224</a>
Video #3	Confidential	<a href="https://twitter.com/Mrwanqayd/status/1344311451893325831?s=20">https://twitter.com/Mrwanqayd/status/1344311451893325831?s=20</a>
Video #4	Main road outside of Tai'zz airport	<a href="https://twitter.com/hde999/status/1344705146354360320?s=20">https://twitter.com/hde999/status/1344705146354360320?s=20</a>
Video #5	14°32'17.1060'' N 044°25'52.212'' E	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/100003789151283/videos/2091492734320345">https://www.facebook.com/100003789151283/videos/2091492734320345</a>
Video #6	14°30'51.7932'' N 044°24'33.3144'' E	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/100000681457679/videos/3985229198176423/">https://www.facebook.com/100000681457679/videos/3985229198176423/</a>
Video #7	No precise coordinates	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=734935790753873">https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=734935790753873</a>
Video #8	14°31'46.2'' N 044°24'09.4680'' E	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JL1o-r5fKh0">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JL1o-r5fKh0</a>

**Source:** <https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2021/02/09/rockets-over-yemen-inside-the-houthis-botched-attack-on-aden-airport/>

Figure 7.18  
Satellite image of Aden Airport showing the location of the impact of the first missile



Figure 7.19  
Satellite image of Aden Airport showing the location of the impact of the second missile



112/309 Figure 7.20 Satellite image of Aden Airport showing the location of the impact of the impact of the third missile



Figure 7.21  
Satellite image of Aden Airport showing the direction of the incoming second missile



Figure 7.22  
Possible launch locations of the missiles on 30 December 2020



Source: UNITAR/UNOSAT

**Appendix 2 Additional images of the missile debris inspected by the Panel in Aden**

Figure 7.23  
**Missile debris**



Figure 7.24  
**Missile debris**



Figure 7.25  
**Missile debris**



Figure 7.26  
**Screws from the missile**



Figure 7.27  
**Remnants of solid fuel**



*Source:* Panel

### Appendix 3 Results of the metallurgical analysis undertaken on behalf of the National Commission of Inquiry comparing two pieces of missile debris from Aden and Ma'rib

وزارة الكهرباء والطاقة  
 المؤسسة العامة للكهرباء  
 محطة الصنوبر - صنعاء  
 التاريخ: 2022/01/25

الأخ / رئيس اللجنة الوطنية للتحقيق في ادعاءات انتهاكات حقوق الانسان (عن) المحترم  
 تحية طيبة ، وبعد

الموضوع / التقرير الفني حول مطابقة شظايا الصواريخ التي استهدفت مطار عدن الدولي

في البدء نود بكم تعويضنا المعنوية ، ونتمنى لكم التوفيق والسداد في مهام عملكم الانساني والتبذل للتحقيق في انتهاكات حقوق الانسان ، وادانة ما في الموضوع اعلاه . نطعمم باننا قمنا باجراء الفحص المعنى الغير التالى للشظايا المستلمة للصواريخ التي تم اطلاقها على كل من محافظة مارب و مطار عدن المعنى الدولي في العاصمة المؤقتة عدن بتاريخ 2020/12/30 ، وقد تمت الفحوصات التالية :-

- فحص التحليل الطيفي للعناصر :  
 تبين من خلال تحليل الاشعة الطيفية لتحديد العناصر المكونة لمعدن شظايا الصواريخ باتهما متطابقة في التحليل الكمي والنوعي .
- فحص صلابة معدن الشظايا :-  
 تم التأكد من ان صلابة معدن الشظايا المشتركة لكلا الصاروخين في نطاق متقارب المسماة (3 + 15 ) لقيم صلابة المعدن بـ كروج مقياس الصلابة برينول (HB).

نتائج الفحوصات :

رقم مزم	التفصيل / البيان	صاروخ محافظة مارب	صاروخ مطار عدن الدولي	ملاحظات					
1	قطعة الشظية الاولى	فحص التحليل الطيفي للعناصر							
		المنجنيز Mn	الكروم Cr	المنجنيز Mn	الكروم Cr				
		~ 0.7 - 0.9 %	~ 0.25 %	~ 0.7 - 0.9 %	~ 0.25 %				
		الصلابة (HB)							
	(HB) <sub>1</sub> , (HB) <sub>2</sub> , (HB) <sub>3</sub> , Δ(HB)	(HB) <sub>1</sub> , (HB) <sub>2</sub> , (HB) <sub>3</sub> , Δ(HB)	(HB) <sub>1</sub> , (HB) <sub>2</sub> , (HB) <sub>3</sub> , Δ(HB)						
		132	103	134	122	141	119	114	125
2	قطعة الشظية الثانية	فحص التحليل الطيفي للعناصر							
		المنجنيز Mn	الكروم Cr	المنجنيز Mn	الكروم Cr				
		~ 0.7 - 0.9 %	~ 0.25 %	~ 0.7 - 0.9 %	~ 0.25 %				
		الصلابة (HB)							
	(HB) <sub>1</sub> , (HB) <sub>2</sub> , (HB) <sub>3</sub> , Δ(HB)	(HB) <sub>1</sub> , (HB) <sub>2</sub> , (HB) <sub>3</sub> , Δ(HB)	(HB) <sub>1</sub> , (HB) <sub>2</sub> , (HB) <sub>3</sub> , Δ(HB)						
		206	190	174	190	169	156	200	175

من خلال نتائج الفحوصات التي تمت ، تؤكد لنا تطابق نوعية الصاروخين ومصدرهما

انتهى  
 2022/01/25

Source: Government of Yemen

**Unofficial translation from Arabic**

**Ministry of Electricity and Energy**  
**General Electricity Corporation**  
**Haswah Thermal Power Station (Aden)**

**Date:** 25 January 2021

**To:** Chair of the National Commission to Investigate Alleged Human Rights Violations (Aden)

**Subject:** Technical report on uniformity of fragments from the missiles that struck Aden International Airport Sir,

We send you our sincere greetings and wish you success as you carry out your humanitarian and noble work of investigating human rights violations. With regard to the above-mentioned subject, we should like to inform you that we have conducted non-destructive metallurgical testing of the fragments that we received from the missiles that were fired on 30 December 2020 at Ma'rib Governorate and Aden International Airport in the interim capital of Aden. The following tests were carried out:

**Tomographical analysis of the elements**

Using tomographical analysis, it was determined that the metallic composition of the two missile shards is quantitatively and qualitatively identical.

**Hardness of the metal comprising the shards**

It was determined that the hardness of the metal fragments from both rockets is within the allowable range (-3, +15) on the Brinell hardness scale (HB).

**Test results**

<i>Information/data</i>	<i>Missile fired at Ma'rib Governorate</i>				<i>Missile fired at Aden International Airport</i>				<i>Remarks</i>		
	<i>Tomographical analysis of the elements</i>										
<b>First shard</b>	Manganese (Mn)	Chromium (Cr)	Manganese (Mn)	Chromium (Cr)	Manganese (Mn)	Chromium (Cr)	Manganese (Mn)	Chromium (Cr)			
	~ 0.7-0.9%	~ 0.25%	~ 0.7-0.9%	~ 0.25%	~ 0.7-0.9%	~ 0.25%	~ 0.7-0.9%	~ 0.25%			
	Hardness (HB)										
	$\Delta(\text{HB})$				$(\text{HB})_1(\text{HB})_2(\text{HB})_3$				$\Delta(\text{HB})$		
	125	114	119	141	122	134	103	132			
<b>Second shard</b>	Manganese (Mn)	Chromium (Cr)	Manganese (Mn)	Chromium (Cr)	Manganese (Mn)	Chromium (Cr)	Manganese (Mn)	Chromium (Cr)			
	~ 0.7-0.9%	~ 0.25%	~ 0.7-0.9%	~ 0.25%	~ 0.7-0.9%	~ 0.25%	~ 0.7-0.9%	~ 0.25%			
	Hardness (HB)										
	$\Delta(\text{HB})$				$(\text{HB})_1(\text{HB})_2(\text{HB})_3$				$\Delta(\text{HB})$		
	175	200	156	169	190	174	190	206			

Based on the test results, we confirm that the missiles are of the same type and origin.

(Signed)  
Metallurgical Engineer

## Appendix 4 List of the casualties of the attack on 30 December 2020

Figure 7.27

### List of the people killed during the attack

..... : الرقم

..... : التاريخ

..... : المرفقات



الجمهورية اليمنية  
وزارة الداخلية  
مكتب الوزير

### كشف بشهداء الاستهداف الصاروخي لطار عدن الدولي بتاريخ ٢٠٢٠/١٢/٣٠ م

الجهة التابع لها	المنصب	الاسم الكامل	م
الامن السياسي مطار عدن	نائب مدير الامن السياسي عدن	عقيد / محفوظ محمد محفوظ	١
الامن السياسي مطار عدن	ضابط الامن السياسي عدن	محمد عبد الولي صالح	٢
الامن السياسي مطار عدن	نائب رئيس نوبة الامن السياسي مطار عدن	عقيد / يحيى مثنى قائد النهي	٣
الامن السياسي مطار عدن	ضابط امن سياسي	مساعد / محمد علي قاسم	٤
جوازات مطار عدن	رئيس قسم الأجانب جوازات عدن	رائد/عدنان علي فضل موانس	٥
جوازات مطار عدن	رئيس نوبة جوازات مطار عدن	رائد/علي احمد هادي	٦
امن عدن	مسئول عمليات قوات الطوارئ امن عدن	عقيد/عبد القوي محمد قاسم لخجر	٧
امن عدن	قائد الكتيبة الاولى طواري امن عدن	نقيب/صابر فضل الياضي	٨
امن عدن	احد افراد قوة الطواري	جندي/محمد عبد الرب احمد القاضي	٩
إدارة الإطفاء مطار عدن	سائق عربّة إطفاء - مطار عدن	سمير عباس حاصل	١٠
إدارة التسهيلات مطار عدن	ضابط تسهيلات - مطار عدن	ذويزن حيدر خضر احمد	١١
شركة النفط عدن	مدير إدارة تموين الطائرات	مهندس/بدر سعيد علي	١٢
الصليب الأحمر	موظف الصليب الأحمر ( يمني )	احمد اقبال وزير	١٣
الصليب الأحمر	موظف الصليب الأحمر ( يمني )	حميد شوعي القديمي	١٤
الصليب الأحمر	موظف الصليب الأحمر ( رواندي الجنسية )	سعيد كيرا لچنا	١٥
وزارة الأشغال	وكيل وزارة الأشغال لقطاع الإسكان	ياسمين محمد العواضي	١٦
قناة بلقيس	مراسل قناة بلقيس المضائبة	اديب محمد سنان الجناني	١٧

المرجع

● إدارة امن مطار عدن

Source: Government of Yemen

Figure 7.28

## List of the people who were hospitalized for injuries sustained during the attack

التاريخ: / ٢٠٢١ م  
الموافق: .....  
الرقم: .....  
المرفقات: .....



الجمهورية اليمنية  
وزارة الداخلية  
مكتب الوزير

## كشف تفصيلي عن الجرحى بسبب انفجارات مطار عدن الدولي

م	اسم الجريح	الاصابه	المستشفى	الصفه	ملاحظات	القسم	رقم التلفون
1	ابراهيم عبدالله قاسم	جريح	اطباء بلا حدود		غادر المستشفى		
2	ابوبكر عبدالله عبيد	جريح	مستشفى الجمهورية		غادر المستشفى		
3	ابوبكر عبدالله محمد	شظايا	اطباء بلا حدود		مرقد		
4	احمد علي احمد همدان	اجراءات طوارئ	البريهي	عسكري	غادر المستشفى		
5	احمد علي فضل	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى الجمهورية		غادر المستشفى		
6	احمد محمد ثابت معوضه	نزيف حاد وجروح متهتكه في البطن والركبة اليمنى والكف	البريهي	مدير عام بوزارة الشباب والرياضه	مرقد	غرفة خاصة رقم ١٤	
7	احمد مهدي صالح	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى بلاحدود		غادر المستشفى		
8	ادم محمد محسن ناجي	نزيف حاد وشظايا في القدم الايمن	البريهي	الامانه العامه لمجلس الانتقالي النابره الاعلامية	مرقد	غرفه عامه رقم ٧	
9	اشرف عزام خليفه	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى الجمهورية	ابن عزام خليفة ( مسوون مكتب الرياضه )	غادر المستشفى		
10	الخضر ناصر لصور	جريح	مستوصف السلام	رئيس الجامعه	غادر المستشفى		
11	الهام علي محمد ( طفلة )	شظايا بالرقيه	الاماتى	مواطنه	مرقد		
12	امجد عزام خليفه	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى الجمهورية	ابن عزام خليفة ( مسوون مكتب الرياضه )	غادر المستشفى		
13	امين عبدربه حسين	اجراءات طوارئ	البريهي		غادر المستشفى		
14	ام ن عبدربه مصور	اجراءات طوارئ	البريهي	الامن السياسي	غادر المستشفى		
15	انتصار الزبيدي	جريح	مستوصف بايل		مرقد		
16	ايداد سيف مصلىح	جرح في الظهر	مستشفى البريهي	اجراءات طوارئ	غادر المستشفى		
17	ايمن محمد مساعد الامير	جروح متهتكه في الوجه والمرفق والراس	البريهي	مدير مكتب وكيل وزارة الداخلية	مرقد	غرفة خاصة رقم ٢٠	
18	بدر صالح الصلاحي	جريح	مستوصف بايل				
19	حسن محمد سعيد	اجراءات طوارئ	الاماتى	عسكري	غادر المستشفى		
20	حسين سالم محمد حفيظ	جريح	الامن السياسي	جيده			
21	حسن ن صالح عمر	جروح متهتكه في عظام الفخذ الايمن مع اصابة في العصب	البريهي	الخدمات الطبيه العسكريه	مرقد	غرفة خاصة رقم ١٠	
22	حيدر ه علي سعيد لهطل	نزيف حاد في البطن	البريهي	مسوول الامن القومي	مرقد	جناح خاص ٢١١	
23	خالد احمد علي ناجي الرياشي	جريح	مستوصف بايل	مكافحه الارهاب	مرقد	حرجه	
24	خالد صالح محمد العطاس	شظايا متفرقة	الاماتى	عسكري	مرقد		
25	خالد عبده سلام	اجراءات طوارئ	البريهي		غادر المستشفى		
26	خالد عمر عبدالله الرحم	شظايا في الراس	مستشفى خليج عدن	عقيد/مدير التموين لوزارة الداخلية	مرقد		
27	خالد محسن حسين الدوعاني	اجراءات طوارئ			غادر المستشفى		
28	خليل سعيد عوض بامطرف	شظايا	الوالي	الامن السياسي	مرقد		

م	اسم الجريح	الاصابه	المستشفى	الصفه	ملاحظات	القسم	رقم التلفون
29	رعد مثنى قاسم	شظية بالكف الأيسر	البريهي	الأول مشاة كتبية العمية)سائق المحافظ	مرقد	غرفة عامه رقم ٧	
30	روان بسمام	نزف مهبطي (حامل)	الصادقة		مرقد		
31	ريما علي سعيد الدوبحي	عده جروح وقطوع في الوجه واصابه في احدى العينين	الالاماني	عسكري	مرقد/عنايه	قسم العناية	
32	زكريا عبدالله صالح	شظايا	اطباء بلا حدود		رفود		
33	زكريا محمد صالح عمر	جروح متهتكه بالرأس (تم اجراء له عملية)	البريهي	الامن السياسي	مرقد	غرفة عامه رقم ٦	
34	زكريا باعبيد	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى الجمهورية		غادر المستشفى		
35	سامي عمر سالم باوزير	شظايا بالرجل اليمنى	الالاماني	عسكري	مرقد		
36	سحر شوكت	اصابه	مستوصف بابل		غادر المستشفى		
37	سعيد مثنى الشعيب	اصابه في البطن	مستوصف الشفاء	اعلامي	مرقد		
38	سليمان ناصر الزامكي	شظية باليد والرأس	صابر	لائد الموات الخاصة	غادر المستشفى		
39	سميه الحاصل	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى الجمهورية		غادر المستشفى		
40	سيف سالم قاسم ثابت	اجراءات طوارئ	الامن السياسي		جيده		
41	شوقي شرجبي	اجراءات طوارئ	الوالي	وكيل وزارة الصحة	غادر المستشفى		
42	صابر عبدالرب	اجراءات طوارئ	البريهي		غادر المستشفى		
43	صادق احمد علي الرتيبي	كسور مفتته بعظام القدم الايمن	البريهي	اعلامي	مرقد	غرفة خاصة رقم ١٢	
44	صالح ناصر عاطف الحكمي	جروح متهتكه مع شظية في الفخذ الايسر	البريهي	نائب مدير الجوازات	غادر المستشفى		
45	صالح حمود محمد	اجراءات طوارئ	الالاماني	عسكري	غادر المستشفى		
46	صالح محمود محمد	اجراءات طوارئ	البريهي		غادر المستشفى		
47	صالح ميميل ناجي	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى الجمهورية		غادر المستشفى		
48	صرواح محمد العفيفي	جريح	مستشفى اطباء بلاحدود		غادر المستشفى		
49	صلاح احمد الكثيري	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى خليج عدن	صحفي	غادر المستشفى		
50	صلاح احمد صالح سريب	كسور مفتته في عظام الساق الايسر مع جروح متهتكه في عظام الساق الايمن	البريهي	لائد كتبية السباحه ( القوات الاول مشاة لتفاني)	مرقد	قسم انعاش جراحي	
51	صلاح قاسم محمد عثمان	في العمود واليد	مستوصف الشفاء	الامن السياسي	مرقد	جيده	
52	عبدالحكيم خالد علي	اجراءات طوارئ	البريهي		غادر المستشفى		
53	عبدالرحمن علي عبدالله	شظايا بالوجه وكسر بالرجل اليمنى	الالاماني	عسكري	مرقد		
54	عبدالرزاق يحيى قاسم	جريح	مستوصف بابل		غادر المستشفى		
55	عبدالرفيق صالح علي الشعيب	اجراءات طوارئ	الالاماني	عسكري	غادر المستشفى		
56	عبدالله سالم عبدالله سعيد	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى الجمهورية		غادر المستشفى		
57	عبدالله عدنان	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى الجمهورية		غادر المستشفى		
58	عبدالله محمد	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى خليج عدن	عسكري	غادر المستشفى		
59	عبدالله محمد عبدالله مساعد	كسر بالقدم اليمنى	الالاماني	عسكري	مرقد		
60	عبدالله ناصر عبدالقادر	شظية بالوجه	صابر	القوات الخاصه	مرقد		
61	عبدالملك عدنان محسن الصبيلي	شظايا متفرقه بالمفصل	الالاماني	عسكري	مرقد		
62	عبدالوهاب احمد محمد شران	جريح	مستشفى اطباء بلاحدود		مرقد		
63	عدنان احمد حسين موانس	حروق بالجسم وشظايا	الجمهورية لسم الحروق	قائده ف مصنعة الهجرة والجوازات	مرقد		
64	عدنان علي فضل الصنفتي	جريح	مستشفى الجمهورية		غادر المستشفى		
65	علي احمد خيران	اجراءات طوارئ	الامن السياسي		جيده		
66	علي حمود الهدياتي	اجراءات طوارئ	البريهي		غادر المستشفى		

م	اسم الجريح	الاصابه	المستشفى	الصفه	ملاحظات	القسم	رقم التلفون
67	علي سالم مثنى	رضوض متعدده بالرأس والاطراف	البريهي	ضابط في الامن (وزارة الداخليه)	مرقد	غرفة خاصة رقم ١٥	
68	علي سعيد علي سالم	شظايا	مستشفى الجمهوريه		غادر المستشفى		
69	علي عبيدات	جريح	الوالي		غادر المستشفى		
70	علياء فؤاد	جريح	مستوصف بابل				
71	عمار شجاع الدين	جريح	مستشفى اطباء بلاحدود		غادر المستشفى		
72	عمر باريش	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى الجمهوريه		غادر المستشفى		
73	عمر مبارك عمر باحميش	شظايا متفرقه	الالمانى	عسكري	مرقد		
74	فنتحي يحيى الاحمدى	اجراءات طوارئ	الالمانى	مستشار وزارة السياحه	غادر المستشفى		
75	فضل عن عا	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى اطباء بلاحدود		غادر المستشفى		
76	فهم عن صالح	جريح	مستشفى البريهي		مرقد		
77	فهم ناصر عن حيدر	اجراءات طوارئ	البريهي		غادر المستشفى		
78	لايد ه ثم الحدي	طوارئ	النميب	مدر برنامج الاعلام	غادر المستشفى		
79	لطف ف صل عبدالله الحامد	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى الجمهوريه		غادر المستشفى		
80	لم بن وسام هشام	شظايا	النميب	طفله عمرها ٩ شهور	مرقد		
81	ماجد احمد ماهر طاهر	اجراءات طوارئ	الالمانى	عسكري	غادر المستشفى		
82	ماجد حسن عبده شمسان	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى الجمهوريه		غادر المستشفى		
83	ماهر محمد علي	شظايا بالكنتف والفخذ الايمن	البريهي	لوة طوارئ امن عدن	مرقد	غرفة خاصة رقم ١٠	
84	محسن محمد عبدالله عبدالمتاح	نزيف في الدماغ وكسور في عظام الجمجمه وعظام الوجه	البريهي	مرقد/عنايه	قسم الامراض الجراحي		
85	محفوظ حسن شغل	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى البريهي	اجراءات طوارئ	غادر المستشفى		
86	محفوظ محمد محفوظ راجح	حروق في الجسم مع كسور مقلته في عظام الساق الايسر	البريهي	نائب مدير الامن السياسي	عنايه/مرقد	قسم الامراض البطني	
87	محمد الجديري	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى الجمهوريه		غادر المستشفى		
88	محمد حسين مبارك حيدر	اجراءات طوارئ	اطباء بلاحدود		غادر المستشفى		
89	محمد عبدالقوي صالح	اجراءات طوارئ	اطباء بلاحدود		غادر المستشفى		
90	محمد عبدالولي صالح مقبل	حروق بالجسم	البريهي	الامن السياسي	مرقد/بليغه		
91	محمد علي الجنيدى	جريح	مستشفى خليج عدن	سكرتير محافظ	غادر المستشفى		
92	محمد علي عوان	اصابه بالساق اليسرى /طوارئ فمط	صابر	القوات الخاصه	غادر المستشفى		
93	محمد علي مارش	شظايا في الرجل	البريهي	اعلامي	مرقد		
94	محمد علي محمد	اجراءات طوارئ	اطباء بلاحدود		غادر المستشفى		
95	محمد مساعد قاسم الامير	شظيه كبيرة في الفخذ الايسر مع فقدان مادي لعضلات الفخذ(م اجراء عمليه استخراج الشظيه)	البريهي	وكيل وزارة الداخليه لخدمات الشرطة	مرقد	غرفة خاصة رقم ٢١٠	
96	محمد مصطفى محمد مكر	اصابه في اليد	مستوصف الشفاء		مرقد		
97	محمد موسى محمد عمر	اجراءات طوارئ	صابر		غادر المستشفى		
98	محمود صالح طالب	شظايا	مستشفى الجمهوريه		غادر المستشفى		
99	محمود صالح	شظايا	مستشفى الجمهوريه		رقد		
100	مفيد حسن البحري	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى الجمهوريه		غادر المستشفى		
101	منار سعيد عبدالله	جروح متتكره في المرفق الايسر والجبه وكسر في عظام الالف	البريهي	امن خفر السواحل	مرقد	غرفة عامه رقم ٤	
102	مهدي محمد ناصر حنتوش	جريح	صابر	عميد في الجيش			
103	ناصر احمد مبارك	شظايا	اطباء بلاحدود		رقد		
104	ناصر الشريف	شظايا	خليج عدن	نائب وزير النقل	غادر المستشفى		

م	اسم الجريح	الاصابه	المستشفى	الصفه	ملاحظات	القسم	رقم التلفون
105	ناصر ثابت محمد قحطان	جريح	الالمانى	عسكري	مرقد		
106	نبيل سكرة	اصابه في الكنتف		عميد	مرقد		
107	نقيب مفيد يحيى اليهري	شظايا بالرأس	الالمانى	عنايه/مدير سجن المنصوره	مرقد	قسم العنايه	
108	هاني ناصر احمد حيدر النسي	شظايا	الوالي	الامن السياسي	رقد		
109	وسيم قحطان	جريح	مستشفى الجمهوريه		غادر المستشفى		
110	وضاح عبدالله ياديب	شظايا بسيطه	البريهي		غادر المستشفى		
111	وعد بدر معاون	جريح	مستشفى المصافي	ابن الامين العام للمجلس المحلى البريغه	مرقد		
112	ياسين محمد عبدالباقي	اجراءات طوارئ	الالمانى	عسكري	غادر المستشفى		
113	يحيى عمر عبدالقوي الحمادي	جريح	الالمانى	عسكري الحزام الامنى	مرقد		
114	يحيى عمر محمد	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى الجمهوريه		غادر المستشفى		

المرجع  
مكتب وكيل محافظة عدن لشئون الشهداء والجرحى

Source: Government of Yemen

## Annex 8 Mukha Port Attack, 11 September 2021

### I. Introduction

1. The Panel is investigating the attack at Mukha Port in Al Mukha, Ta'izz Governorate, which began at approximately 0945 hours and lasted until 11.15 hours on 11 September 2021, shortly after a representative of a Government of Yemen committee arrived at the port for meetings. The attack, during which two missiles and six UAVs were deployed, resulted in one injury to a port worker. There was damage to an office container used as conference room, to a warehouse and to the base of a control tower. At the time of the attack, the port was reportedly being converted for civilian use after years of exclusive military occupation.<sup>98</sup> The committee was meant to oversee this development, which would be an important milestone in normalising relationships between the WCJF and the Government, as well as in opening an additional port for civilian imports on the West Coast. Therefore, the Panel initiated investigations into this attack as a threat to peace, security, or stability of Yemen and a potential violation of international humanitarian law.

### II. Methodology

2. The Panel received information, including images, videos, and other documentary evidence from the Government of Yemen and the National Resistance. The Panel conducted interviews with representatives of the port authority, National Resistance, the visiting committee, Government of Yemen, local authorities, and other witnesses. The Panel has given the Houthis the opportunity to comment on the Panel's findings regarding the incident, a response is pending.<sup>99</sup> The Panel has not had an opportunity to inspect the debris directly of the weapons systems used in the attack but has requested to do so during a future visit to the West Coast.

### III. Description of the incident

3. On 11 September 2021, the committee was scheduled to attend several meetings at the Mukha Port.<sup>100</sup> In August 2021, the Panel was informed that the conversion of Mukha Port to civilian use had begun with the establishment of a customs post<sup>101</sup> and the appointment of a civilian port management team.<sup>102</sup> According to port officials, at least two civilian vessels had already docked at the port.<sup>103</sup> The committee, appointed by the Yemeni Minister of Transport (figure 8.1), was planning to conduct a general visit of the port to assess the repairs.<sup>104</sup> Therefore, this visit was viewed by all stakeholders as an important step towards future civilian oversight.

<sup>98</sup> According to the port authorities, the port had been under military occupation since at least 2017.

<sup>99</sup> Letter dated 13 December 2021.

<sup>100</sup> This meeting was, initially, scheduled for 7/8 September 2021, but was postponed to 11 September 2021, according to a port official.

<sup>101</sup> Source: Customs official. The document of the decision is with the Panel. The aim of this post was to allow the Government of Yemen to collect the revenue. According to a custom official, this revenue will be deposited with the Central Bank of Yemen in Aden after the establishment of the port. In a discussion with the Panel in May 2021, one of the concerns expressed by an official of the Government of Yemen was that the Mukha port was under the control of the National Resistance, and that the Government was unable to collect the revenue.

<sup>102</sup> Sources: Ministry of Transport official, National Resistance Forces, and port official.

<sup>103</sup> The Panel is unable to independently verify. On 30 July 2021, the port was opened to receive commercial ships, according to this official.

<sup>104</sup> The National Resistance Forces and the Government of Yemen.

Figure 8.1  
**Appointment of the Committee that visited the Mukha Port on 11 September 2021**



Source: Confidential


4. The Panel was informed that on 11 September 2021, at approximately 0930 hours, five senior officials of the committee arrived at the port.<sup>105</sup> Their first meeting commenced at approximately 0930 hours in the office of the General Manager (map 8.1).<sup>106</sup> There were at least 13 persons in this meeting room.<sup>107</sup> The representatives of the committee and some port officials were still at this meeting when the first missile hit near the office container used as a conference room in a different part of the port at 0945 hours, and therefore, were unharmed. The second missile hit a warehouse one minute later.

<sup>105</sup> According to the National Resistance, these individuals were the Deputy Under Secretary for Port Affairs, Ministry of Transport; the Director of Marine Environmental Protection, Maritime Affairs Authority; the Project Manager, Gulf of Aden Ports Corporation; the Director, Department of Maritime Affairs, Ministry of Transport; The Director of Information of the Ministry of Transport and his team and Port of Al Mukha’ officials.

<sup>106</sup> Two individuals present at the meeting.

<sup>107</sup> Information from the port officials and visiting delegation. The Panel was informed by a port official that the Head of Port Security was at the meeting, and that the Head of the Coast Guards of Mukha, who was supposed to attend the meeting, did not attend.

Map 8.1



**Source:** Panel, based on various sources.

4. Had the meeting been in the conference room, which was attacked, as is considered the norm for a high-profile visit,<sup>108</sup> there would have been casualties (see figure 8.2). The Government of Yemen and the National Resistance in their identical letters to the Panel stated that “(t)he committee was scheduled to hold a meeting in the port’s conference room, which was struck by one of the ballistic missiles. However, none of the Committee members were injured because the committee was late in starting its visit.”<sup>109</sup> This information was disputed by two individuals who participated in the meeting and stated that the conference room was not meant to be the venue, but as the committee was planning to visit the whole port, they could still have been harmed by the attack.

5. The attack lasted for approximately 90 minutes, with two missiles and three UAVs impacting on different targets and an additional three UAVs being shot down (see table 8.1 and map 8.2). The duration and scope of the attack indicates that the perpetrators also intended to damage the port facilities (see table 8.2). The incident resulted in an injury to a port worker from shrapnel.

<sup>108</sup> The Panel met both political and military leaders in the conference room in late August 2021.

<sup>109</sup> Letter from National Resistance dated 09 October 2021 and letter from the Government of Yemen dated 28 October 2021. Both letters had similar content and wording.


Table 8.1  
**Details of the attack on 11 September 2021**

<i>Target</i>	<i>Type of projectile</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Coordinates of targeted location</i>	<i>Description of the location</i>
Target 1	Missile	09.45	43° 13' 58.116" 13° 18' 33.8472"	Near a conference room.
Target 2	Missile	09.46	43° 14' 16.368" 13° 18' 34.1496"	A warehouse used by the West Coast Humanitarian Unit. <sup>110</sup>
Target 3	UAV	10.30	43° 13' 53.904" 13° 18' 36.936"	Base of the port control tower, which was approximately 15 metres away from the impact point of the first missile.
Target 4	UAV	10.44	43° 14' 18.492" 13° 18' 39.2112"	Exploded near an earth wall separating two maintenance yards.
Target 5	UAV	10.44	43° 14' 0.276" 13° 18' 20.3256"	Exploded next to an earth wall.
Target 6	UAV	11.03	Intercepted; exploded in mid-air	Port Guards responded by firing at the UAV.
Target 7	UAV	11.15	Intercepted; exploded in mid-air	Port Guards responded by firing at the UAV.
Target 8	UAV	11.15	Intercepted; exploded in mid-air	Port Guards responded by firing at the UAV.

**Sources:** Panel, based on information provided by the Government of Yemen and the National Resistance.

Map 8.2

**Locations of the five impact points**



<sup>110</sup> This is a unit that is affiliated with the National Resistance that carries out relief and humanitarian work on the West Coast.

*Source:* Panel, based on coordinates provided by the Government of Yemen and the National Resistance.

1. The first missile hit near a conference room and completely destroyed it (see Figure 5.2).

Figure 8.2

**Damage to the area (Target #1)**



*Sources:* Government of Yemen and the National Resistance

Figure 8.3

**Damage to the conference room**



*Source:* Confidential

Figure 8.4  
Images of the missile (Target #1)



**Sources:** Government of Yemen and the National Resistance

1. According to the Government of Yemen and the National Resistance, at 0946 hours, the second missile struck a hangar that was being used as a warehouse by the “West Coast Humanitarian Unit”. They informed the Panel that images taken by the surveillance camera demonstrated that the angle of descent was from the East.

Figure 8.5  
Damage to the hangar used as a warehouse (Target #2)



*Sources:* Government of Yemen and the National Resistance

Figure 8.6  
Image of the second missile prior to impact (Target #2)



*Sources:* Government of Yemen and the National Resistance

8. The National Resistance stated that the following humanitarian items were destroyed in the second missile attack (see table 8.2).

Table 8.2

**Items destroyed by the second missile**

	<i>Category</i>	<i>Number</i>
1	Food basket	2,142 baskets
2	Shelter tents	920
3	Tarpaulins	1,800
4	Oxygen cylinders	70
5	First-aid kits	43
6	Children's clothing	437
7	Hunting equipment	100
8	Canvas roll	100

**Source:** National Resistance

9. An UAV impacted at the base of the port control tower. According to information received by the Panel, port workers reported that at least two of the UAVs approached at a low altitude from an easterly direction.

Figure 8.6

**Impact point of the UAV (Target #3)**

**Sources:** Government of Yemen and the National Resistance

Figure 8.7  
Impact point of another UAV and damage caused (Target #4)



*Sources:* Government of Yemen and the National Resistance

Figure 8.8  
**Impact point of the third UAV (Target #5)**



**Sources:** Government of Yemen and the National Resistance

9. According to information received by the Panel, the following damage to the port occurred (see table X.3).

Table 8.3

**Damage arising from the attacks**

	Category	Damage
1	Buildings	4 buildings (19 rooms)
2	Offices	14
3	Warehouses	1
4	Control tower	1
5	Vehicles	23
6	Port protection boats	2
7	Miscellaneous furniture	
8	Electrical equipment and tools	
9	Water tanks	
10	Other damage	

**Sources:** Government of Yemen and the National Resistance

#### IV. Advance Warning

10. There were no advance warnings that the port would be a target. There were no reported sightings of surveillance UAVs on the day of the attack,<sup>111</sup> although surveillance UAVs were observed over the port about three days prior to the attack.<sup>112</sup> The Ta'izz Military Axis informed the Panel that they warned

<sup>111</sup> Panel interviews with two witnesses.

<sup>112</sup> The Panel was informed that these drones are still being observed over Al Mukha port as of November 2021.

the relevant authorities of preparations for a large-scale Houthi attack a few days before 11 September 2021 (see paragraph 11).<sup>113</sup>


#### IV. Attribution of responsibility

11. The National Resistance informed the Panel that, “the ballistic missiles and drones that the Houthi militias used to attack the port of Mukha were launched from areas controlled by those militias in Ta‘izziyah District, Ta‘izz Governorate.”<sup>114</sup> The Ta‘izz Military Axis informed the Panel that, on 5 September 2021, they provided information to their hierarchy of a possible large-scale attack by the Houthis, as there was information indicating that the Houthis were transporting missiles from Ta‘izz airport to the Al Hawban area.

12. The Houthis have not, to the knowledge of the Panel, claimed responsibility for the attacks on Mukha Port, although both the Government of Yemen and the National Resistance have attributed the attack to the Houthis.<sup>115</sup>

Map 8.3

#### Launch directions of the missiles



**Source:** Panel, Google Earth, based on information provided by Ta‘izz Military Axis

13. The Panel has obtained low-quality images of the debris of the UAVs reportedly used in the attack (see figure 8. 8). The images show engine parts as well as a piece of fuselage, apparently made from fiberglass. The debris shown in these images is consistent with components of UAVs manufactured and used by the Houthis. The National Resistance stated that, in their assessment, the UAVs used were SAMAD-3 models, however, the Panel is unable to independently verify this based on the limited

<sup>113</sup> The Panel was provided evidence to support these statements.

<sup>114</sup> Letters to the Panel from the Government of Yemen and National Resistance dated 9 October and 28 October 2021, respectively..

<sup>115</sup> Letters to the Panel from the Government of Yemen and National Resistance dated 9 October and 28 October 2021, respectively..

information available at this stage. The Panel has not received any other information regarding the type of missile used in the attacks.

Figure 8.9:

**Debris of the missiles/drones**



*Sources:* Government of Yemen and the National Resistance

## VI. Analysis of IHL violations

13. Measures had been taken in 2021 to convert Mukha Port back into a civilian port. At the time of the attack, the conversion had not yet been completed and military personnel remained at the facility. The attack took place when a high-level committee visited the port. The visit was originally supposed to take place on 7 or 8 September and had been postponed to 09.30 am on 11 September 2021.<sup>116</sup>

14. The Panel finds it likely that the missile and UAV attack targeted the members of the committee and senior port officials, which would be a violation of IHL.<sup>117</sup> The visiting members of the committee and the port officials are civilians under IHL. Military personnel were likely present at the port at the time of the incident. Under IHL, parties to a conflict must always distinguish between combatants

<sup>116</sup> Source: Port authority official.

<sup>117</sup> See article 13 (1) of Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions which prohibits direct targeting of civilians.

and civilians.<sup>118</sup> If the target had been military forces present in the port, the attack could have been carried out at another time.

15. Under IHL, Mukha Port, at the time of the attack, was likely a dual-use object. This does not affect the question whether the committee was the intended target of the attack or not. Therefore, it is unlikely that the perpetrators respected the principles of distinction or proportionality and precautions.

<sup>119</sup>

## VII. Conclusions

16. Based on the analysis of the available evidence, the Panel concludes that the visiting committee was the likely target of the attack. Additionally, the Panel finds that another objective of the attack could have been to hamper the civilian conversion of the port. Like in the case of the Aden International Airport attack on 30 December 2020 (see annex 7), which targeted the Prime Minister and members of his cabinet, it is possible that the perpetrators intended to disrupt initiatives aimed at normalizing the situation on the ground. The Panel also notes that on 10 November 2021, three missiles were launched towards two small military camps in Mukha,<sup>120</sup> which coincided with the first visit of the new Special Envoy of the Secretary General to Yemen to the city.<sup>121</sup> This attack, which unlike the one on Mukha Port was claimed by the Houthis, might have been an attempt to disrupt his visit. The Panel is not aware of evidence suggesting any other party to the conflict in Yemen, other than the Houthis, has used UAVs of the kind used in the Mukha port attack.

<sup>118</sup> See article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions, art. 13 APII, and Customary International Humanitarian Law rule 1 (hereafter CIHL). The CIHL rules as well as their interpretation and related practice can be consulted online at: [https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1\\_rul](https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul).

<sup>119</sup> See CIHL rules 14 and 15.

<sup>120</sup> The name of the Giants camp that was hit was reportedly *معسكر صويلح* and the National Resistance's camp was an administrative base camp. Two missiles impacted inside the camps, and one impacted outside, according to sources on the West Coast. <https://www.2dec.net/news47328.html>. The Panel cannot independently verify the number of missiles used. See below footnote.

<sup>121</sup> Information provided by the Ta'izz Military Axis to the Panel confirms that these missiles were launched possibly from Houthi controlled areas in Ta'izz. The Houthis stated that on that day "two ballistic missiles (that they launched) struck an enemy training camp in the west of Taiz province". See [en.yagency.net/243466/](http://en.yagency.net/243466/).

## Annex 9 Impact of Houthi activities on former female detainees

1. The Panel continues to monitor the activities of different armed groups that impact adversely on women, children, and minorities in a manner that threatens the peace, security, and stability of Yemen. The Panel in 2021 documented the targeting of present and former female detainees, politically active women as well as female professionals opposing the Houthis. According to the women interviewed, the Houthis, through their actions, have created an environment that undermines women's capacity to effectively participate in community and leadership activities. This annex is based on interviews with 14 former detainees and their families.<sup>127</sup>

### I. Continued repression of former female detainees

2. Former female detainees and/or their families informed the Panel that they continue to suffer marginalization by their communities and political leaders after their release. For most women, their detention severely affected their ability to continue their work in political or community-based activities. It also impacted their family life and the education of their children. In addition to those interviewed in 2019 and 2020, in 2021, the Panel interviewed former female detainees who had been raped during their imprisonment; the family of a woman who had become paralyzed during her incarceration and was unable to speak after close to a year of enforced disappearance; women who had been tortured and/or mutilated in detention; and women who had been subjected to enforced disappearance.<sup>123</sup>

3. Former detainees are particularly vulnerable in Sana'a and in other Houthi-controlled areas. According to former female detainees interviewed by the Panel, they are called "prison graduates" by the population and are often excluded from community activities because of the stigma associated with prostitution and sexual violence. Two former detainees informed the Panel that they witnessed another female detainee being killed by her relatives on the day of her release at the prison gate. The witnesses presumed this was because the detainee had brought shame to her family through her incarceration. The Panel also received information that the family of a well-known female detainee is facing daily insults, while being stigmatized because of her ongoing detention.

4. There are no effective measures in place to protect or support women fleeing Houthi-controlled areas over prolonged periods of time, despite the provisions of resolution 2467 (2019).<sup>124</sup> As a result, some of the women who have been interviewed by the Panel since 2019 had to return to their homes in Houthi-controlled areas. The Panel has not been able to re-establish communication with them since their return due to significant safety concerns. Women interviewed by the Panel continue to show signs of trauma because of their ordeals while incarcerated. Some women, who are now living outside of Houthi-controlled areas, have no means to cover their daily expenses and their children's education has stopped. The Panel was informed that some would like to bring their perpetrators to justice, but that no financial or legal means are available.<sup>125</sup>

5. Women were also separated from their husbands and/or families for reasons related to detention. One woman informed the Panel that her family sold most of their belongings to bribe Houthi officials

<sup>122</sup> This included nine former female detainees and/or their families whose cases were not previously reported by the Panel, as well as five more former female detainees whose cases were reported in [S/2020/326](#) and [S/2021/79](#).

<sup>123</sup> Most women suffered multiple forms of violence.

<sup>124</sup> Paragraph 16 (a) and (d) of resolution 2467 (2019) asks "to ensure that survivors of sexual and gender-based violence in conflict in the respective countries receive the care required by their specific needs and without any discrimination" The resolution further encourages Member States and other actors to give due consideration to the establishment of a survivors' fund and to support civil society organizations working on this issue. See also paragraphs 17, 19 and 20 of resolution [2467\(2019\)](#).

for her release. When she left the prison, the family refused to communicate with her because Houthi officials had informed them that she engaged in prostitution, a claim she denies.<sup>126</sup> In another case, the family decided that the woman would leave her home in a Houthi-controlled area for her safety, while her husband continued his work inside the Houthi-controlled area.<sup>127</sup> Women who have been separated from their families continue to be at high risk for continued sexual violence and further traumatization (see paragraph 6). One woman, who left Houthi-controlled areas for Government-controlled areas after her ordeal, stated that the military in Government-controlled areas kept harassing her because she had arrived from Sana'a.

6. The Panel has received information that compromising videos and images of female detainees were taken by the Houthis. The women were threatened with the release of these videos and images. This potentially exposes former detainees to further violence and trauma. Three women stated how the Houthis made sexually compromising videos of them; and/or forced them to confess on video to sleeping with identified military commanders belonging to anti-Houthi forces. In another incident, the Houthis submitted similar coerced and sexually compromising videos as evidence against the detainee before the prosecution.<sup>128</sup> The Panel was also informed of an identified prison director who downloaded unveiled photos of female detainees from their phones, while he was interrogating them, and threatened to release them unless the detainees complied with his orders.

7. Many of the women interviewed by the Panel since 2019 were active members of the General People's Congress (GPC). It is unclear if these female detainees were included in the Government's list of detainees for prisoner exchanges. The Panel was also informed of threats against former detainees in a third country and was told of physical harm done to another former detainee,<sup>129</sup> likely committed by Houthi supporters present in that country.<sup>130</sup> Even amongst survivors, there are fears that some former detainees may be working for the Houthis as informers.

## **II. Outcome of the designation of Sultan Zabin (YEi.006) and update on sexual violence in Houthi-controlled detention centers**

8. On 25 February 2021, through the adoption of resolution 2251 (2021), the Security Council designated Sultan Saleh Aida Aida Zabin (YEi.006), including for instigating a policy of violence and sexual abuse against politically active women. On 26 February 2021, Zabin denounced his designation stating that it was the result of lobbying by "organized crime and terrorist organizations".<sup>131</sup> He continued as the director of the criminal investigation division in Sana'a until his alleged death on 5 April

<sup>125</sup> These women could identify their perpetrators either by their names or as belonging to the Houthi apparatus.

<sup>126</sup> The woman was arrested, and presumably also detained, in Sana'a.

<sup>127</sup> Three women informed the Panel that their immediate relatives were victims of "road-accidents" and they suspect the Houthis caused the accidents to install fear in the former detainees. The Panel was unable to verify independently the causes of the deaths. The ones who died were a sister and an adult female child of two women, and one case of paralysis of a minor child because of such "road-accidents".

<sup>128</sup> The detainee tried to have access to these after her release and was denied.

<sup>129</sup> The Panel stands ready to share this information orally with the members of the Security Council but will not provide such information in the report to protect the women and to ensure that host countries continue to accept these women.

<sup>130</sup> The Panel cannot independently verify this information as it did not meet the victim. This information was provided by two former detainees who knew the victim personally.

2021.<sup>132</sup> Houthi officials continued to publicly deny his involvement in the sexual violence of women and held an elaborate funeral for Zabin. However, several sources stated that the Panel's report ([S/2020/326](#)), resulted in tribal pressure on the Houthis to release some women.

Figure 9.1  
Extract of Facebook post by Sultan Zabin (26 February 2021)

العميد سلطان زابن  
26 February at 07:41 · 🌐

إن المواقف القوية والواضحة من الإرهاب والتصدى له ومقاومة الجريمة المنظمة وجرائم غسل الأموال ستظل هي المحور الرئيسي لعملائنا وإن تثنينا أية شوشرة إعلامية أو بلبلة من سيل الاتهامات الباطلة..  
إن هذا الخط والتوجه في محاربة الجريمة المنظمة والإرهاب لن نغيره ؛ لأننا نشعر أننا نقوم بواجبنا الشرعي والدستوري والوطني والإنساني..  
إسراءنا هنا على العمل الأمثل والجاد والمسؤول قد أثار غضب وحفيظة داععي الإرهاب والقوضى الأمنية المنمراء، كما أزعج كثيرا أجهزة المخابرات الدولية التي تعتبر بمحضها الغطاء الواسع للأصنام الإرهابية والجريمة المنظمة وتجارة المخدرات، مما دفعهم إلى تحريكه خلاياهم ولوبياتهم المتغلطة في المنظمات الدولية لكول التهم الباطلة ولوي عنق الحقيقة وتسويق التصفيات المتسرعة..  
نحن نقوم بواجبنا الشرعي والوطني والإنساني ولا نعطى أي اهتمام للإثارة الإعلامية الرخيصة ولا نهتم بما يروجوه أبقاق القوضى الذين يحركون بالريموت كترول من مطابخ منظمي الجرائم المنظمة وداعبي الإرهاب..  
ورحم الله امرأاً عرف قدر نفسه..

Strong and clear attitudes towards and countering terrorism, combating organized crime and money laundering crimes will remain the central focus of our work, and no media buzz or nightingale will distract us from the flow of false accusations.  
This line and direction in the fight against organized crime and terrorism will not be deviated; because we feel that we are doing our legitimate, constitutional, national and humanitarian duty.  
Our insistence on serious and responsible security work has aroused the anger and guardianship of terrorism supporters and the devastating security chaos, and it has also greatly disturbed the international intelligence agencies, some of which consider the broad cover of terrorism, organized crime and drug trade, leading them to activate his cells M and their lobbies lobbies in international organizations for false accusations and loy neck the truth and marketing Rankings in a rush...  
We are doing our legitimate, national and humanitarian duty and we are not paying any attention to the cheap media hype and we do not care about what the chaos horns who are moving with the remont control of the kitchens of organized crime organizers and terrorists supporters are promoting.

And God bless a woman who knew her worth..  
🌐 Rate this translation

👍👎👏👍👎👏 216

37 comments 15 shares

Source: <https://m.facebook.com/sultan.zabinye/>.

9. After the designation of Zabin, the Panel documented other cases involving repeated rape and sexual violence in Houthi-controlled territory. Unlike in previous years, when women were raped to “purify” them, or as a punishment, or to coerce confessions (annex 5, [S/2020/326](#)), in 2021, the Panel documented a case where a female detainee was forced to have sexual intercourse with multiple men at secret detention centres because she was told that she was “being prepared for her future role as a sex worker” for important clients. According to the Houthis, her job was to obtain information from them. Additionally, the Panel also received further information that for at least one detainee, working as a prostitute to gather information for the Houthis was made a condition for their release.<sup>133</sup>

10. The Panel is investigating the involvement of an identified female in the trafficking of vulnerable women as sex workers after their release from Houthi prisons. Women whose families refuse to accept them after their detention are particularly vulnerable to such abuse. The female security wing of the Houthis (Zainabiyath) continues to repress and control women in prisons, professional workspaces, and in public places. In 2021, the Panel documented four more cases of sexual violence where the female security wing was directly involved in arrests, detention and/or violence, including in one case, where they tortured a woman. This new information complements the violations documented previously by the Panel in [S/2020/326](#). The Panel is unaware of any measures taken by the Houthis to prevent sexual and other forms of violence against women in detention.

<sup>131</sup> See [https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story\\_fbid=1051903415320657&id=517842145393456&m\\_ent-stream\\_source=timeline&anchor\\_composer=false](https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=1051903415320657&id=517842145393456&m_ent-stream_source=timeline&anchor_composer=false).

<sup>132</sup> <http://www.ypagency.net/354210>. On 5 April 2021, the ministry of interior announced Sultan Zabin's death from a terminal illness. The Panel continues to investigate if Zabin has indeed died, and the circumstances of his death as new information has emerged that merits consideration. The Panel will further investigate.

<sup>133</sup> In 2019, the Panel documented a similar case where a woman was released, according to her, because she accepted to prostitute herself to help Houthis get information from their enemies or to compromise their enemies. She informed the Panel that she was prepared to say anything to stop the regular rape and sexual violence she had to endure in secret detention centers.

11. According to information received and media reports Brigadier Ahsan Al-Hijazi is likely the successor of Sultan Zabin as the director of the criminal investigation division.<sup>134</sup> The Panel is unaware of any information, at this stage, that links him as a successor to Zabin in the above-mentioned policy.

12. In 2019, the Panel reported that Abdul Hakim al-Khaiwani, former deputy minister of interior, publicly stressed the strong relationship between the ministry of the interior, the prosecution and legal authorities in carrying out arrests and detentions in respect of countering “prostitution” networks (paragraph 22, [S/2020/326](#)). In 2021, a victim informed the Panel that al-Khaiwani was involved in her torture while in detention. Al-Khaiwani currently serves as the director of security and intelligence bureau of the Houthis.

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<sup>134</sup> [www.yagency.net/373403](http://www.yagency.net/373403). <http://althawrah.ye/archives/703942>.  
<https://www.saba.ye/ar/news3145632.htm>.

## Annex 10 Houthi cultural courses and summer camps as a threat to peace and security in Yemen

### I. Overview

1. The Panel finds that the conflict in Yemen continues, partly, because of the Houthis' ability to continue the recruitment of new fighters, despite heavy casualties on the battlefronts (see annex 4). Their ability to exercise political and security control over their territories and populations, in violation of resolution [2216 \(2015\)](#), relies to a significant extent on their ability to monitor and suppress dissent (see annex 9). The Panel is therefore investigating the impact of summer camps as well as religious and cultural courses in perpetuating the conflict and in radicalizing civilians, including children.

2. During the reporting period, these camps and courses were used to: (a) solidify Abdulmalik al Houthi's (YEi.004) authority and to consolidate his group's control over civilians;<sup>135</sup> (b) limit individual freedoms of expression, thought, conscience and religion;<sup>136</sup> (c) recruit fighters, including children;<sup>137</sup> (d) promote violence, hatred<sup>138</sup> and radicalization;<sup>139</sup> and (e) obtain popular support for the continuation of the conflict.<sup>140</sup> The Panel is also investigating incidents of reprisals against civilians who refused to participate in these courses (paragraphs 23 to 25),<sup>141</sup> including through the denial of humanitarian assistance (paragraph 20 and 21).<sup>142</sup>

<sup>135</sup> The Panel considers attempts by Houthi authorities to solidify their control over Houthi-controlled areas to be a violation of paragraph 1 of resolution [2216 \(2015\)](#), including paragraphs 1 (b) and (d).

<sup>136</sup> This would include those situations where individuals are forced to attend these religious courses or chant slogans when those conflict with their belief systems. This includes freedoms relating to political expression and religion. See Articles 10, 18 (1), (2) and (4) and 19 (1), (2) and (3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which entered into force for Yemen on 9 May 1984. No derogations have been made by the Government of Yemen.

<sup>137</sup> This would include situations where those courses operate to directly or indirectly recruit adults and children for conflict-related activities. In respect to recruitment of adults by the Houthis, the Panel finds it likely that these activities constitute a violation of paragraph 1 of resolution [2216 \(2015\)](#), as the nature of the conflict is such that the recruited Houthis are primarily fighting the Government of Yemen; and therefore, the act of recruitment is primarily aimed at undermining the Government's control over its territory. The recruitment of children under the age of 18 years by armed groups is prohibited under international law and anyone engaging in recruitment also falls within the designation criteria under paragraph 6 of resolution [2511\(2020\)](#). See article 4 (1) Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict, article 4 (3) (c) APII, CIHL rules 137 and 137.

<sup>138</sup> This would include situations where adults and children are forced to chant slogans that promote violence against nationalities or religious minorities and where textbooks for these courses, and lectures, demonize groups based on nationality, race or religion. Hate speech is defined by the Panel according to the United Nations Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech (2019) "any kind of communication in speech, writing or behavior, that attacks or uses pejorative or discriminatory language with reference to a person or a group on the basis of who they are, in other words, based on their religion, ethnicity, nationality, race, color, descent, gender or other identity factor." See [www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/advising-and-mobilizing/Action\\_plan\\_on\\_hate\\_speech\\_EN.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/advising-and-mobilizing/Action_plan_on_hate_speech_EN.pdf). See also Article 20 (1) on the ban on war propaganda and 20 (2) of the ICCPR that prohibits "any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence". See also General Comment 17 of the ICCPR Committee, Human Rights Committee, General Comment 11, Article 20 (Nineteenth session, 1983), Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, [U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 12 \(1994\)](#).

<sup>139</sup> This would include those situations where individuals condone, support, facilitate or use violence to further the ideological or political goals espoused in these lectures. The Panel notes that there is no universally accepted definition for radicalization. The notion of 'radicalization' is generally used to convey the idea of "a process through which an individual adopts an increasingly extremist set of beliefs and aspirations. This may include, but is not defined by, the willingness to condone, support, facilitate or use violence to further political, ideological, religious or other goals." See A/HRC/33/29, para. 19.

<sup>140</sup> The Panel finds that these activities constitute threats to the peace, security and stability of Yemen and fall under paragraph 17 of resolution [2140 \(2014\)](#), while also violating paragraph 1 of resolution [2216 \(2015\)](#).

<sup>141</sup> See paragraphs 17 and 18 of resolution [2140 \(2014\)](#).

<sup>142</sup> See paragraph 19 of resolution [2216 \(2015\)](#).

3. It should be noted that religious and cultural courses organized by the Houthis have been a part of Yemeni society since at least the 1990s. Some of these courses, which aimed to provide religious education to children during their vacations, were called summer schools, summer centres or summer camps (summer camps). The Panel does not claim that every religious or cultural course in Yemen, including those in Houthi-controlled areas, falls within the Panel's mandate.<sup>143</sup> This investigation is limited to those camps and courses which fall under the criteria set out in the previous paragraph. The Panel also notes that the content and format of these courses vary between governorates, target groups, the local organizers, and other factors. Therefore, this annex is not meant to provide a generic description of all courses and summer camps held in Houthi-controlled areas. A detailed presentation of the Houthi perspective on these courses was shown in an al Masira documentary.<sup>144</sup>

4. During the reporting period, the Panel conducted bilateral in-person or remote interviews with thirty medical professionals, including those that rehabilitate former child combatants, teachers, participants in the courses, civil society activists, and former detainees who had been forced to undergo various religious and cultural courses, sometimes, as a condition of release.<sup>145</sup> This annex also contains outcome of information gathered on cases relating to 16 children.<sup>146</sup>

5. The Panel also received over 15 investigative and other reports on these cultural and religious courses. The Government of Yemen provided a list of locations where children have been receiving military training.<sup>147</sup> In this report, the Panel only reflects information that it was able to verify independently through testimonies and documentary evidence. Where sources have consented, the Panel has deposited these reports with the Secretariat for viewing by Member States.

## II. Types of “summer camps” and “cultural courses”

6. The Panel investigates the role of “summer camps” for children and religious and cultural training courses for adults and children (hereinafter “cultural courses”) to radicalize participants and to recruit new fighters. The Panel's investigations demonstrate that there are several types of “summer camps” and “cultural courses”; and, for ease of reference, the Panel classifies them as follows:<sup>148</sup>

<sup>143</sup> For example, the Panel was informed during its West Coast visit that Tareq Saleh forces were hosting summer schools.

<sup>144</sup> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2opF11zkY88>.

<sup>145</sup> This annex only contains information obtained from those who had either participated in or refused to participate in these courses or those who had first-hand information on the courses. Information provided by the Government of Yemen and civil society activists, who themselves had no experience with these courses, was considered as background information, and where consent was provided, the investigative reports of others are deposited with the Secretariat.

<sup>146</sup> This included four in-person interviews with children and their families; and four remote interviews with families of children. The Panel chose not to remotely interview children; but relied on their families' testimonies. In one case, for example, there were reports of sexual violence committed against the child by a military trainer. The Panel, as a policy, avoids the remote interviewing of children who have been subjected to sexual violence due to the potential harm such an interview could have on the child. During in-person interviews, the Panel ensures that a caregiver is in the room and that it obtained the informed consent of both the caregiver and the child. The Panel also includes in this report testimonies of a further five children and their families gathered on behalf of the Panel; and further three interviews with families of children gathered by a Yemeni organization, where full testimonies were provided to the Panel, with identification information of the children, were provided to the Panel.

<sup>147</sup> Most of these locations are schools. The Panel also notes open-source information on the closure of schools to enable such to be converted into summer camps. Some documents are referred to in this report; and others, where consent was given to share the documents, are deposited with the Secretariat.

<sup>148</sup> This is not an official classification; but a classification of the Panel for ease of understanding the concept of these courses and summer camps.

- a. Duration and format of the courses: half-day-courses; short courses from a few days to a few weeks; residential versus day courses; the Panel is also aware of open-ended courses.<sup>149</sup>
- b. Contents of the courses: some combine basic military training with “religious” or “cultural” lessons, others focus exclusively on the latter.<sup>150</sup> The Panel notes that some purely military training courses are also called “summer camps”.
- c. Target groups of the courses: children, university students, professionals, the general population, as well as specific courses for detainees. For adults, the Panel was not informed of the use of military training in “cultural courses”<sup>151</sup>

7. The summer camps and cultural courses are systematically organized and reach large parts of the population. In August 2019, the Houthi-affiliated media stated that there were 3,500 “summer camps” that trained 284,000 students. The cultural courses and summer camps are often implemented at the local level; for example, the supervisors<sup>152</sup> in a hospital or school may host these courses for their staff or students. Supervisors at the local level appear to take responsibility for the courses organized for the general population in Houthi-controlled areas.<sup>153</sup>

### III. Summer Camps and Cultural Courses for Children

#### A. The use of summer camps and cultural courses to recruit children as fighters or for supervisory functions

8. The Panel is investigating the cases of four children, aged between 7 and 14 years, who have received military training in summer camps or have been taken to military camps under the pretext of attending cultural courses.<sup>154</sup> In paragraph 120 of [S/2020/326](#), the Panel also reported on a 13-year-old child who was lured by the Houthis to a military training camp. They had told him he was going to participate in a three-day educational camp. He was kept for three months and received training on how to use small arms. He was sent to the front after the completion of the course (see annex 33 of [S/2020/326](#) for details).

9. In the cases of the four children above, the two younger children were taught how to clean weapons and trained on how to evade “rockets” in what was supposed to be a “summer camp”.<sup>155</sup> One child

<sup>149</sup> Those children interviewed by the Panel stayed from 3 – 9 months in these camps. Based on their testimonies, some children stay for longer until they are ready to be taken to the battlefield. For adults, the longest period that the Panel was informed of, was a week, except for the courses for detainees which lasted months. It should also be noted that for adults, the Panel has not documented cultural or religious courses that also provided military training. The Panel was however informed of possible “cultural” lectures in adult military camps, to radicalize fighters, so that their loyalty could be secured even in the most dangerous frontlines.

<sup>150</sup> The Panel was also informed of two types of camps: those that are open to all students, and they are taught “cultural” content, where some children are chosen from those and are provided opportunities for leadership and for acting as potential recruiters of adults in their families and other children. Then there were other camps that are for the selected few that are trained to go into battle.

<sup>151</sup> One reason for this maybe the lack of stigma and the lack of social resistance to adults joining in the fighting, as opposed to children, where the parents may object. For example, taking children from their homes in the pretext of participating in summer camps have occurred in four documented cases. The Panel also documented such a case in 2019, see paragraph 120 of [S/2020/326](#).

<sup>152</sup> In Houthi-controlled territories, alongside “formal state authorities” there are individuals who are appointed by the Houthi leadership to oversee or supervise the functions of those authorities or institutions. These individuals have significant powers, and they act by and on behalf of the Houthi leadership to implement central decisions at the local level. The highest-level supervisor at a governorate-level is the governorate supervisor, who would supervise the governor, and all activities in that governorate through a network of supervisors.

<sup>153</sup> Based on Panel discussions with participants of courses, their families and civil society activists researching the issue.

<sup>154</sup> Discussions with children and relatives.

<sup>155</sup> Discussions with Yemeni children in 2021, in the Gulf region.



Figure 10.1  
Children shouting slogans at a summer camp in 2019



Source: al Masira<sup>160</sup>

14. The Panel has had access to images from textbooks used in the summer camps. The Panel notes that the texts call for Jihad against both Israel, the United States of America and their supporters, and calls it a duty to stop the United States of America from executing its “evil plans” (figure 1).

Figure 10.2  
Study material used in summer camps



Source: Confidential (left),<sup>161</sup> Al Masirah (right)<sup>162</sup>

15. The Panel received documents on changes made to school curricula as well as to the textbooks used in “summer camps”. These changes are said to distort history in favour of the Houthi leadership’s right to govern in Yemen and to distort historical Islamic accounts with the aim to promote fighting

<sup>160</sup> See <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2opF11zkY88> dated 4 August 2019.

<sup>161</sup> This text stated: “By Jihad; the believer beats their enemies, which are America and Israel, and all those that support them, and these countries have to be free from these countries, so the truth will shine. So, let's do the Jihad for the sake of God. America is the major enemy for Muslims wherever they are. America is trying to fight Islam and control the world because the Jews are controlling them... America is the source of evil in the world, she has killed millions of Muslims. She has captured the Muslims in Afghanistan and Iraq...and now wants to capture Yemen and they want to kill the Yemeni people with their planes, rockets, and missiles... it is our duty to do Jihad and not allow America to execute her plans. We cannot let them capture our country. America is a major devil.”

<sup>162</sup> See <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2opF11zkY88> dated 4 August 2019.


over peaceful solutions.<sup>163</sup> The Government of Yemen and other civil society commentators, alleges that this will have a lasting adverse impact on the children.<sup>164</sup> The Panel takes note of these allegations, but lacks the capacity and resources to investigate the distortions to the curricula in detail.<sup>165</sup>

16. The Panel is investigating the role of the Jihad Magazine published by “Imam al Hady Cultural Foundation”, affiliated to the Houthi movement,<sup>166</sup> in promoting hatred against Jews and nationals of Israel, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, the United States of America and among children and encouraging children and families to fight.<sup>167</sup> This foundation also produces videos on the same topics.<sup>168</sup>

Figure 10.3

### Extract from the Jihad magazines

A young boy and his friends attack an enemy ship, which carries the flags of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the Islamic State.



*Jihad Repels the Aggression at Sea*

[Right:] “Jihad, look! There’s the Enemy, attacking innocent people once more!”

[Left:] “It’s the Arrogant Enemy. Only the language of force will push them back... Are you ready, friend?”

<sup>163</sup> See for example, “Yemen’s teachers’ union accuses Houthis of indoctrinating children”

<https://theArabweekly.com/yemens-teachers-union-accuses-houthis-indoctrinating-children>. See excerpts of textbooks and translations at [https://www.impact-se.org/wp-content/uploads/Review-of-Houthi-Educational-Materials-in-Yemen\\_2015-19.pdf](https://www.impact-se.org/wp-content/uploads/Review-of-Houthi-Educational-Materials-in-Yemen_2015-19.pdf), at pages 15, 45. See footnote 103. See also [https://sanaacenter.org/ar/publications-all/the-yemen-review-ar/15338#Houthi\\_remake\\_education\\_system](https://sanaacenter.org/ar/publications-all/the-yemen-review-ar/15338#Houthi_remake_education_system) for an overview of the changes to the school and university system. See also [https://sanaacenter.org/ar/publications-all/the-yemen-review-ar/15338#Curriculum\\_changes](https://sanaacenter.org/ar/publications-all/the-yemen-review-ar/15338#Curriculum_changes).

<sup>164</sup> Panel discussions with Government of Yemen and civil society activists in 2020 and 2021.

<sup>165</sup> The documents received by the panel supporting these allegations are deposited with the Secretariat for viewing by member states of the Committee.

<sup>166</sup> Twitter: [https://twitter.com/Alhady\\_co17?s=11](https://twitter.com/Alhady_co17?s=11), website: [www.alforgan.net](http://www.alforgan.net). YouTube channel: [https://www.youtube.com/c/Alhady\\_co17](https://www.youtube.com/c/Alhady_co17).

<sup>167</sup> See old editions archived at



"Allah . . . look at all those sea creatures, killed en masse . . ."

"Allah! It's the Occupier's crime, mass killing to build military bases . . ."

Jihad, having climbed to dry land: "Thieves, murderers and criminals! Why all this hatred?

Friends, have you seen the crimes of the Emirati occupation against our precious islands?!"

"It's all been documented. We must expose their lies and their crimes for the whole world to see!"

[Emirati ship:] "I'd also like some flat land to build a military base. Don't worry, you pretty and rare trees, we're going to take good care of you . . ."

[Yemeni child, left:] "This is the enemy which murders children and women!"

29

**Source:** [https://www.impact-se.org/wp-content/uploads/Review-of-Houthi-Educational-Materials-in-Yemen\\_2015-19.pdf](https://www.impact-se.org/wp-content/uploads/Review-of-Houthi-Educational-Materials-in-Yemen_2015-19.pdf), p. 29-31 (translated by impact-se).

### A. Use of schools and mosques to recruit children and incite hatred

17. The Panel notes the use of presumably safe spaces to recruit children as fighters and to spread hatred.<sup>169</sup> In Bayhan, Shabwah, barely a week after the Houthis took control,<sup>170</sup> there were reports of Houthi religious leaders coming from Ibb, Saada and other areas. Photographs show these imams distributing stickers with the Houthi slogan to children. The Panel also notes videos allegedly showing children from a school in Bayhan shouting the Houthi slogan.<sup>171</sup> The Shabwani educational authorities informed the Panel that they took immediate steps, on 29 September 2021, to close all schools in the Al Ain, Bayhan and Usaylan areas to prevent the children from becoming radicalized (see Figure 10.2). The schools reportedly re-opened after the educational authorities obtained a guarantee from the Houthis that they would not interfere with the education of the children (see annex 11).

<sup>169</sup> The Panel in this context means spaces that provide children with protected environments in which they participate in organized activities to play, socialize, learn, and express themselves. See <https://resourcecenter.savethechildren.net/pdf/2923.pdf> for a definition of a child-friendly safe space.

<sup>170</sup> According to local sources, Houthis took control of Bayhan around 22 September 2021.

<sup>171</sup> Authenticity of video confirmed by two local sources.

Figure 10.4

Document issued by educational authorities closing schools, citing “ideological and security” concerns for the children, 29 September 2021



*Source:* Confidential

18. The Panel also documented the use of the al Saleh Mosque in Sana’a for a summer camp, where children as young as seven years were provided with basic military training (see figure 10.4 and annex 11). The Panel was informed that participants of this camp included homeless children who had come to the mosque seeking shelter.<sup>172</sup> The Panel also notes that summer camps, like mosques, are meant to be safe spaces where children can engage in religious activities consistent with their belief systems.<sup>173</sup> Yet in five cases that it documented, children were taken from cultural courses held in schools to military training, and in another five cases, parents were informed that the children were in cultural courses when they were in fact in military training.

<sup>172</sup> This information was provided by other children who have stayed at the camp.

<sup>173</sup> See for example [https://samrl.org/pdf/4554\\_5851609623282320014.pdf](https://samrl.org/pdf/4554_5851609623282320014.pdf) on the recruitment of children.

Figure 10.5

**Sana'a-based prime minister inspects a summer school held in al Saleh Mosque, June 2021**



*Source:* [www.ypagency.net/367625](http://www.ypagency.net/367625)

#### **D. Physical harm and sexual violence against children at camps**

19. The Panel received information on sexual violence committed by an instructor against a child who underwent military training.<sup>174</sup> The child's phone was taken away from him, and the parents were told that the child was taken to a cultural course. Therefore, it took some time before the parents could find the child, and for the child to communicate to the parent what had happened to him. Children who are separated from their parents for prolonged periods of time, and whose means of communication were removed, have a higher likelihood of have been exposed to violence, as they become particularly vulnerable once they are separated from their parents. The Panel also finds that sexual violence is likely underreported in Yemen due to the social stigma associated with the crime. The Panel continues to investigate. In another case, some children who tried to escape from their "summer camp" were reportedly caught and beaten up.<sup>175</sup>

#### **E. Denial of humanitarian assistance**

20. The Panel has received information from multiple sources on nine cases in which Houthi supervisors have threatened families that they would be denied humanitarian assistance, if their children would not participate in summer camps or military courses.<sup>176</sup> These incidents occurred between 2018 – 2020.

<sup>174</sup> The Panel will refrain from providing further information to protect the identity of the child but stands ready to provide the Security Council verbally with further information on the circumstances of the violence.

<sup>175</sup> This information was provided by other children who have stayed at the camp.

<sup>176</sup> In five cases, where the Panel has not had access the families because of safety concerns for the families, it spoke to the researchers that documented these cases, who collected further information from the families on behalf of the Panel. The Panel has the names of the beneficiaries, the names of Houthi individuals who denied assistance, the dates of incidents and locations. The Panel stands ready to provide further situational information, without disclosing any identifiable information, as appropriate.

According to a Yemeni non-governmental organization, in two cases, families were in fact deprived of humanitarian assistance. In another case documented by this organization, the Houthi supervisor offered a 15-year-old child to be registered to receive humanitarian aid in exchange for joining the Houthis on the frontlines. The child accepted and enrolled in a cultural and military training course for two months, after which he went to fight for the Houthis. He died in battle. Additionally, the Panel received information that a teacher was denied access to humanitarian assistance from a non-governmental organization because he refused to teach the “Houthi curriculum” in his class, and to send his children to fight. The teacher had previously been receiving this assistance for 5 years. The Panel interviewed another teacher in 2019, who stated that food baskets given by organizations were only distributed to teachers following the Houthi ideology. The Panel also received information on two children being sent cultural courses for 6 months, in exchange for humanitarian assistance provided by the local supervisor. After the children returned from the cultural course, assistance was only resumed after the parent agreed to send the children to military training. The assistance was provided by the supervisor directly to the families, allegedly these were UN assistance. In another case involving multiple children, the supervisor promised that the children will be acting as his security detail, and they would only attend cultural courses in a school in Sana’a.<sup>177</sup> The children were taken with the promise that the family would receive humanitarian assistance from the supervisor.<sup>178</sup> Three months later, the children were taken for military training.<sup>179</sup> When the parents asked the supervisor to return the children, the latter stated that he would continue to provide assistance, as well as the salaries to the parents. The supervisor informed the parents that one child was killed in the battle in Ma’rib. The parents, after their children returned or was killed in battle, approached the supervisor for continued humanitarian assistance, at which point he informed them that the priority for assistance would be for those families whose members are fighting. Some of the aid given by the supervisor had the UN logo.<sup>180</sup> In all of these cases, the cultural courses or summer camps were held in schools and it is from these schools that the children were then taken to the military fronts.

21. The Panel was informed that humanitarian assistance is denied through the removal of families’ names from the list of beneficiaries.<sup>181</sup> Local supervisors appear to have control over these lists.<sup>182</sup> The Panel has received information that at least two families took this threat seriously enough for them to send their children to the frontlines.<sup>183</sup> The Panel finds that local Houthi supervisors are exploiting the prevailing poverty to recruit children as fighters.<sup>184</sup> The Panel notes that in a 2021 study done by a local

<sup>177</sup> These were daily classes and the children would return home every day from the „summer camp“.

<sup>178</sup> The family received several packages of assistance directly from those affiliated with the supervisor.

<sup>179</sup> The children were gradually taken. Initially they would return home every day, but then they would return after a week, and then after 2 weeks until finally they were enrolled in a residential military training.

<sup>180</sup> The UN informed the Panel that such a practice of providing humanitarian assistance in exchange for fighting was unlikely as the UN would be informed if their food was diverted in this manner. The researchers informed the Panel that it was more unlikely that the families living under the control of the supervisor, would inform the UN, that their local supervisor was diverting food from the UN.

<sup>181</sup> The Panel notes open-source reporting on this issue: “... interviews for this paper, two families said the local Houthi supervisor forced them to send their children to the battlefields in exchange for humanitarian aid and a small salary. The salaries their children receive and the humanitarian aid they get, although very limited, is the main source of income they have.” See [www.hudson.org/research/16848-yemen-s-clash-of-two-revolutions](http://www.hudson.org/research/16848-yemen-s-clash-of-two-revolutions). See also <https://alsahwa-yemen.net/p-33739> “Houthis take advantage of “citizens” need for aid to recruit them to fight”. See also <https://alsahwa-yemen.net/p-33739> which states that “the sources indicated that Houthi supervisors deprived many families in marginalized communities of domestic gas and humanitarian assistance as a result of their children’s refusal to attend courses, lectures and programs of sectarian militias and to join their ranks.”(unofficial translation).

<sup>182</sup> Confidential source.

<sup>183</sup> Confidential source who interviewed the families.

<sup>184</sup> See study done by a local organization on the reasons for children to drop-out of school. According to them 4.7% of those interviewed dropped out because they were recruited by a party to a conflict but 48.3% dropped out for economic reasons. <https://mwatana.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/War-Of-Ignorance-1.pdf>.

Yemeni organization over 57% of children across Yemen who dropped out of school stated that they would re-join when their economic situation improved.<sup>185</sup> For children and families who are poor, humanitarian assistance given by organizations is vital to their economic survival. Thus, the Panel finds that the ability to access humanitarian assistance is a powerful incentive for parents and children to join fighting. The Panel continues to investigate.

#### IV. Cultural trainings targeting the general population

22. The Panel finds that the cultural courses provided in Houthi-controlled areas have also been perpetuating the conflict. They enable the Houthis to counter localized resistance to recruitment, to control popular dissent, and to maintain support for the Houthi leadership and its ideology. In some cases, individuals were forced to attend the courses as a demonstration of their loyalty to the Houthis cause.<sup>186</sup>

23. For example, one woman stated that she took multiple courses, even though they were contrary to her religious beliefs. She feared reprisals from the Houthis if she refused to participate.<sup>187</sup> In the cases investigated by the Panel, Houthi-appointed supervisors or managers in schools and hospitals monitor the participation of the employees in these activities. There are reports that non-participation has resulted in job losses.<sup>188</sup> In prisons, some men and women are provided ideological courses as a condition of release (see annex 9 and paragraph 26 below).

24. The Panel documented the arrest and detention of, and sexual violence committed against two women who had refused to participate in the cultural courses. One refused to participate because the course materials were contrary to her political beliefs, and the other because she saw these courses as promoting hatred. Both women did not want to shout the Houthi slogan. One of these women, while being sexually abused, was told that what was being taught in the courses was the “real Islam”. It was made clear to her that the violence used against her was because of her refusal to participate in the courses.<sup>189</sup> This woman believed that she was targeted because she was well-respected within her community, and because the Houthis wanted her to use her influence to recruit new fighters.<sup>190</sup>

25. The Panel was informed that medical professionals who attend these courses were expected to encourage patients to send their male relatives to fight in the conflict. Several individuals informed the Panel that they suspect that some of their co-workers may have become informers for the Houthis after they had taken a cultural course.

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<sup>185</sup> Ibid.

<sup>186</sup> The panel also notes that in some cases individuals are free to choose whether to participate or not. Interviews conducted with individuals in Houthi-controlled areas, 2021.

<sup>187</sup> Interview in \Yemen, 2021.

<sup>188</sup> Confidential sources in some schools and hospitals, as well as civil society activists.

<sup>189</sup> <sup>1</sup> In-person interview with the Panel in 2021.

<sup>190</sup> Interview, 2021.

## A. Cultural trainings targeting vulnerable populations

### i. Targeting detainees

26. The Panel finds that cultural courses are also being used in a systematic manner in secret detention centres. These “rehabilitation” courses impose the Houthi vision of Islam, incite hatred against various groups, and disseminate lectures from the Houthi leadership. The Panel was informed of some organized courses using videos and different lecturers. One male detainee informed the Panel that the attendance of a six-month religious course, teaching Islam from the beginning, was a condition for his release. He, therefore, accepted to participate in the training and was indeed released after completion.<sup>191</sup> A female detainee said she begged to join the courses because she hoped that it would facilitate her release.<sup>192</sup> Another detainee said he was forced to take the courses and to shout the slogan despite him not being a Muslim. This individual also said he did so to demonstrate his loyalty in order to be released.<sup>193</sup>

### ii. Targeting children of female detainees

26. The Panel received information on four children between seven and 15-years old, who were forcibly taken away by the Houthis from their caretakers, after their mothers were detained. In two cases, their relatives were informed that the children were taken to a cultural course until their mothers are released. In fact, they were taken to a summer camp and provided with basic military training.<sup>194</sup> In the case of a third child, he was reportedly taken from a female detainee. She was subsequently informed by the Houthis, while still in detention, that the child had died on the Ma’rib front.<sup>195</sup> The Panel notes a report in 2021 of another child dying under similar circumstances.<sup>196</sup>

27. In another case, a mother informed the Panel that her interrogators told her that if she did not cooperate with them, her eight-year-old son would be taken by the Houthis to fight.<sup>197</sup> In view of the circumstances of the five children referenced here, the Panel has initiated investigations to establish whether the Houthis have a policy targeting the children of female detainees for military recruitment.

### iii. Targeting ethnic minorities

28. The Panel received information from Ta’izz and elsewhere on the possible targeting of children from ethnic minority groups for recruitment in summer camps, which it is in the process of verifying.<sup>198</sup>

<sup>191</sup> In-person interview with Panel in 2021 in Yemen.

<sup>192</sup> Interview with Panel in 2021 in Yemen.

<sup>193</sup> In-person interview with Panel in 2021.

<sup>194</sup> The Panel conducted in-person interviews with the children and a caregiver.

<sup>195</sup> The mother refused to be interviewed by the Panel as she was in Sana’a.

<sup>196</sup> See <https://gulfstateanalytics.com/houthi-crimes-against-women/>. It states “Then Doaa, arrested along her one-year-old daughter, spent two years in jail. Her husband obtained a divorce in her absence. Doaa says her older son was recruited by Houthis and deployed to the front lines where he died. She was not informed until her released”

<sup>197</sup> In-person interview with Panel in 2021.

<sup>198</sup> Information from the Ta’izz military axis and civil society. The Panel received also information on specific supervisors involved in organizing these courses. For open-source reporting on minority children see <https://alsahwa-yemen.net/p-33739> which states that “the sources indicated that Houthi supervisors deprived many families in marginalized communities of domestic gas and humanitarian assistance as a result of their children's refusal to attend courses, lectures and programs of sectarian militias and to join their ranks.”

## V. Responsibility of Member States and international organizations

29. The Panel notes that some Member States and international organizations, including United Nations entities, have provided support to the ministry of education in Sana'a. The Panel finds that these entities are likely aware of the use of Houthi slogans in schools and in textbooks used in summer camps, which incite hatred against various groups and entice students to join the Houthi military.<sup>199</sup> Organizations supporting schools in Houthi-controlled areas have a responsibility to ensure that schools are safe spaces. Children should be able to study without being forced to shout political slogans or being asked to contribute to hate speech against various groups and nationalities or without being at risk of being recruited into the Houthi military. At minimum, those supporting the ministry of education should engage in a dialogue with the Minister or relevant authorities on the allegations above, as well as allegations concerning changes into school curriculum, and underscore that changes to curriculum and conduct in school should be in line with Yemen's international human rights obligations. It should also enhance existing monitoring mechanisms to ensure that funds and material provided to support the education of children are not diverted or misused to promote Houthi ideology, Houthi cause, or the conflict.

## VI. Individuals responsible for these policies

30. The top Houthi leadership is responsible for the use of some summer camps for ideological training, and, in some cases, basic military training.<sup>200</sup> The leadership is also responsible for organizing cultural courses, and any curriculum changes in schools that may entice children to fight. High numbers of children are recruited and killed in fighting, a fact which is also acknowledged in official Houthi media (figure 10.5).<sup>201</sup> In his annual report on children and armed conflict, the UN Secretary-General noted that the Houthis had recruited 134 boys and 29 girls in 2020 (S/2021/437). In the same report, the continuing rise in the number of grave violations, including the recruitment of children, particularly by the Houthis, and persistent high numbers of children killed and maimed, and increase in denials of humanitarian access were highlighted.<sup>202</sup>

<sup>199</sup> For publicly available information on summer camps see "With the aim of transferring them to the fronts...the Houthis sort students in their summer centers" at <https://www.alyqyn.com/print~33181>; "summer camps..."fuel" for Houthi battles in Yemen" at <https://al-ain.com/article/children-camps-summer-houthis-yemen>, "Houthis chart a path of no return for Yemen's generations" at <https://www.alarabiya.net/arab-and-world/yemen/2019/08/05/الحوثيون-يرسمون-طريق-اللاعودة-لاجيال-اليمن>

<sup>200</sup> See for example the participation of top leaders at the graduation ceremony of the al Saleh mosque (annex 11).

<sup>201</sup> The Panel has received over a hundred of extracts of similar photos of child martyrs, with their ages, but it cannot independently verify if all are children.

<sup>202</sup> See S/2021/437 and <https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/where-we-work/yemen/>.

Figure 10.6  
**Images of a child “martyr” in the Houthi media**<sup>203</sup>



**Source:** Government of Yemen

31. The Panel is not aware of any measures taken by the Sana’a-based minister of education, Yahyah Bader al Din al Houthi, to stop children being recruited, or to investigate allegations on schools and summer camps being used for child recruitment. The Panel also finds that the Sana’a-based minister of defense, major general Mohammad Nasser Al-Atifi,<sup>204</sup> has not taken any effective measures to prevent the recruitment of children into the Houthi military. The Panel notes that Abdulmalik al Houthi (YEi.004) has stated that he fully supports the summer camps and will continue to fund them.<sup>76</sup> The Panel has initiated investigations into the roles of Abdullah Al-Razhi, director-general of educational coordination and summer activities at the ministry of youth and sport; and Muhammad Hussein Majd Al-Din Al-Muaydi, minister of youth and sports, in sustaining this policy.<sup>205</sup>

Figure 10.7  
**Yahayah Badreddin al Houthi**



**Source:** Al Masirah

<sup>203</sup> According to Government of Yemen, this 13-year-old child was killed in January 2020. Source: Government of Yemen. The Panel has received similar images and videos of children allegedly killed on the battlefield from multiple sources.

<sup>204</sup> وزير الدفاع اللواء محمد ناصر العاطفي

<sup>205</sup> althawrah.ye/archives/677254. In Arabic, the name of the minister of youth and sports is وزير الشباب والرياضة محمد حسين مجد الدين المؤيدي

Figure 10.8

major general Mohammad Nasser Al-Atifi (second from right)



Source: [https://hodhodyemennews.net/en\\_US/2021/01/18/yemens-defence-minister-yemen-is-rapidly-developing-new-weapons-of-deterrence/](https://hodhodyemennews.net/en_US/2021/01/18/yemens-defence-minister-yemen-is-rapidly-developing-new-weapons-of-deterrence/)

Figure 10.9

Guests at a graduation ceremony for summer camp in al Saleh mosque



Source: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2opF11zkY88> (in the lower image, Abdul Aziz bin Habtoor, prime minister, Mohammed Ali al Houthi and Taha Al Mutawkkel, minister of health, are shown to attend a graduation ceremony at al Saleh Mosque)

32. Regarding the cultural courses, it is likely that the governorate-level supervisors exercise oversight while local supervisors implement the policy that had been formulated at the central level. The Panel continues to receive information that the ultimate control over the local supervisors lies with Abdulmalik al Houthi (YEi.004) and Mohammed Ali al Houthi.<sup>206</sup>

<sup>206</sup> Confidential sources in Yemen, including in Houthi-controlled areas.

**Annex 11                    The use of Al Saleh Mosque as a summer school and for military purposes**

The Panel has determined that the publication of this annex may pose a threat to individuals and entities, and their activities in Yemen. Therefore, the information in this annex is not for publication.

## Annex 12 Attack on Jeddah port on 14 December 2020

1. In the early morning hours of 14 December 2020, the port of Jeddah was attacked by at least three water-borne improvised explosives (WBIED) causing significant damage to two vessels, a merchant tanker and a Saudi warship, as well as to the port infrastructure. In June 2021, the Panel visited the sites of the attacks and interviewed representatives of the Royal Saudi Navy and Saudi Aramco, which operates parts of the port, and which had chartered the merchant tanker. The Panel has also been in contact with the operator of the tanker involved in the incident.

Figure 12.1

**Satellite images showing approximate impact locations of the WBIEDs**



**Source:** Google Earth, Panel

2. The first and the second WBIED employed targeted King Faisal Naval Base, a facility which hosts the Headquarters of the Western Fleet of the Royal Saudi Navy, and functions as the home port for its vessels. At 0007 hours, the first WBIED hit the Western end of Pier #8 located towards the Southern end of the base. The subsequent explosion caused significant damage to the concrete structure. The damage, as well as some of the repair work, was still visible when the Panel visited the impact location in June 2021. At 0015 hours, a second WBIED impacted the hull of the BORAIDA (902) on the starboard side. The vessel, a naval replenishment tanker based at Jeddah, was moored at that time to the North of Pier #8. The Panel has requested more information (including detailed images) on the damage caused to the warship from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, a response to which is pending at the time of

writing. However, during the Panel's visit to the naval base, the repairs to the vessel's hulls were visible and an image obtained from other sources (see below) clearly shows damage above the waterline shortly after the attack.

Figure 12.2

**The BORAIDA shortly after the attack at King Faisal Naval Base**



*Source:* Confidential

3. At 0044 hours, the third WBIED impacted the port side of the hull of the Singaporean-flagged merchant tanker BW RHINE (IMO: 9341940), which was moored at Main Berth #1 of the Saudi Aramco's Marine Terminal, a facility several kilometres away from King Faisal Naval Base in a North-Western direction. The vessel was operating a scheduled charter on behalf of Saudi Aramco and was offloading refined petroleum products. According to Saudi Aramco, at the time of the attack, the tanker had already been in port for about 20 hours and about 20 percent of the cargo was still onboard the vessel. The impact and subsequent explosion penetrated the hull of the ship at two locations at the waterline. The holes measured approximately 30 centimetres x 30 centimetres. The impact also caused a fire with flames reported to be 20 meters high which burned for about one hour. While the crew of the BW RHINE reported to the shipping line that they had heard two explosions from the direction of King Faisal Naval Base as well as subsequent gun fire, which caused the master to stop the offloading of the cargo, they did not receive a warning that an attack on Saudi Aramco's Marine Terminal was imminent.

Figure 12.3

**Damage to the hull of the BW RHINE**

**Source:** Confidential

4. No injuries were reported from the attacks on either the Saudi Aramco Marine Terminal nor the ones on the King Faisal Naval Base and while the damage to the vessels and the piers required extensive repairs, the Saudi Aramco Marine Terminal was able to resume operations shortly after the attack. However, as noted in annex 16, the supply of petroleum products to the Western region of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia depends heavily on Saudi Aramco's terminal and storage infrastructure in Jeddah. If the attack had done more damage to the tanker or the terminal infrastructure, the repercussions on the economy and civilian infrastructures for this part of the Kingdom would have been significant. In addition, a successful attack on a fully loaded oil tanker could have resulted in an oil spill, which would have serious environmental and economic repercussions for communities which depend on the Red Sea for their livelihoods, as well as a potentially negative impact on global trade and commerce.

Figure 12.4

**Recovery of the debris of the WBIED which hit the BW RHINE**

**Source:** Confidential

5. During its visit, the Panel was able to inspect the debris of the three WBIEDs which were used in the attacks on 14 December 2020. The Panel notes that the design of the boats is different from previous models deployed by the Houthi forces in the Red Sea.<sup>207</sup> Measuring between 6 and 8 meters from bow to stern and powered by two, 75-horsepower Yamaha outboard engines, these WBIEDs are basically skiffs converted for autonomous military deployment. Regrettably, the Panel has not been able to inspect the guidance and control systems of the WBIEDs, but it will likely, in the Panel’s assessment, as in the case of previous generations, rely on pre-set GPS coordinates to guide it to its target. The Panel has also not been able to inspect any remnants of the warheads used in the WBIEDs, but images of debris recovered from the inside of the BW RHINE, as well as the “significant internal blast damage” reported by the crew, could imply that they were carrying a shaped charge similar to the ones used in some Houthi UAVs (see annex 15 of the Panel’s Final Report, [S/2020/326](#)) as well as in the WBIED attack on the Saudi-flagged merchant tanker ARSAN (IMO: 9421415) in the Southern Red Sea on 24 July 2018 (see annex 15 of the Panel’s Final Report, [S/2019/83](#)).

<sup>207</sup> The Houthis have previously used converted ten-meter patrol boats manufactured by the UAE (2017), as well as the smaller, 5.8 metre long, purpose-build ‘Blowfish’ model (since 2018), which is powered only by a single outboard engine. The design used in the attack on Jeddah port is more similar to the converted skiffs used in the attack on the Saudi-flagged tanker GLADIOLUS (IMO: 9169548) in the Gulf of Aden on 3 March 2020 (see paragraph 63 and annex 22 of the Panel’s Final Report, [S/2021/79](#)).

Figure 12.5

**Metal debris recovered from inside the BW RHINE, likely part of the shaped charge**



*Source:* Confidential

6. If the attack was conducted in the context of the conflict in Yemen, IHL would apply.<sup>208</sup> In this case, the attack against the King Faisal Naval Base would be permitted under IHL as this military base is a military objective by its nature.<sup>209</sup> However, the attack against the Singaporean-flagged merchant tanker in the Saudi Aramco Marine Terminal, a civilian tanker, is contrary to the IHL principle of distinction.<sup>210</sup> The Panel estimates that the targeting accuracy of the WBIEDs used in this attack is fairly high, with a margin of error of less than five metres. In addition, the distance between Main Berth #1, where the BW RHINE was moored, and King Faisal Naval Base is approximately 2,000 meters. It is therefore likely that the civilian tanker was the intended objective of the attack, in violation of international humanitarian law.

<sup>208</sup> For instance, if Houthi forces were responsible, the attack would be part of the conflict between the Houthis and the KSA. However, if the attack was conducted by another group, such as a terrorist group, with no link with the conflict in Yemen, IHL would not be applicable. In this case, the Panel concluded that the attack was conducted with near certainty by the Houthis, and therefore is linked with the conflict.

<sup>209</sup> CIHL rule 8.

<sup>210</sup> CIHL rule 1.

### Annex 13      Attack on Yanbu port on 27 April 2021

At 0615 hours on 27 April 2021, a patrol vessel of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia identified a target approaching the port of Yanbu, on the west coast of Saudi Arabia, from the open sea at a distance of six nautical miles (approximately 11 kilometres) and heading towards the Saudi Aramco refinery at high speed (more than 30 knots, approximately 55 kilometres/hour). The patrol vessel intercepted the target, which turned out to be a water borne improvised explosive device (WBIED) and disabled it at 0630 hours, approximately two nautical miles (3.7 kilometres) away from the refinery. At 0815 hours, the disabled craft had been moved by the waves to a location close to the Yanbu desalination plant where it was destroyed by another military patrol. The Panel has interviewed the crew of a merchant tanker, the *TORM HERMIA* (IMO: 9797993), which was moored at berth 71 of Yanbu port, and which had first reported the incident. Three crew members said that they observed the incident stating that the explosion took place at 08.05 hours approximately 1.4 nautical miles (2.6 kilometres) away from the tanker to the South-East between buoy 6R and 3R (see figure 13.3). The Panel has learned that following the incident, the Saudi military conducted a survey of the area and discovered the wreckage of a second WBIED in the Shu'ban al-Sab'ah area, approximately 30 nautical miles (55 kilometres) South of Yanbu port.

Figure 13.1

#### **WBIED approaching Yanbu port as observed by the Saudi patrol vessel**




**Source:** Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

Figure 13.2  
**Destruction of the WBIED by the Saudi military**



Source: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia


Figure 13.3  
**ECDIS screenshot from the TORM HERMIA showing the approximate location of the explosion**



Source: Confidential

Figure 13.4

Map showing the locations of the intercept and destruction of the first WBIED, as well as the location where the wreck of the second WBIED was found



Source: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

## Annex 14 Attack on Jizan port on 30 July 2021

At 1712 hours on 30 July 2021, the crew of the Bahamas-flagged crude oil tanker ALBERTA (IMO: 9486922) noticed a UAV approaching at high speed from the starboard side. The vessel was moored at berth #1 of the Saudi Aramco Jizan Bulk Plant Terminal, loading crude oil. The UAV exploded over the vessel's bow in the vicinity of the forecastle at an unknown height in a matter consistent with a loitering munition. The ALBERTA only sustained minor damage, including several holes in the floor of the main deck, possibly as a result of fragmentation,<sup>211</sup> as well as damage to a hydraulic line and a mooring winch. Neither a fire nor injuries among the crew members were reported. The crew was able to document a number of pieces of debris on the deck of the ALBERTA, which were later collected by the Saudi military. While the Panel has not been able to inspect the debris, the images show clearly that the weapon system used was a UAV, most likely a medium-range, QASEF-type, which has been documented multiple times by the Panel in cross-border attacks by the Houthis on locations in the South of Saudi Arabia. Whereas the explosives carried by those UAVs likely would be unable to seriously damage the vessel itself, it can cost the lives of crew members as evidenced by the attack on the MERCER STREET a day earlier (see annex 15). The distance from Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen to the Jizan Bulk Plant Terminal is approximately 80 kilometres, which put the port within reach of medium-range UAVs.

Figure 14.1

### Possible fragmentation damage on the main deck of the ALBERTA



*Source:* Confidential

<sup>211</sup> Houthi UAVs often carry fragmentation warheads, which explode into a mass of small, fast-moving metal fragments (“fragmentation”) that are lethal against individuals.

Figure 14.2

**Possible fragmentation damage in the roof of the main cavity**



*Source:* Confidential

Figure 14.3

**Debris of the wing of the UAV made from fiberglass**



*Source:* Confidential

Figure 14.4  
**Debris of the engine of the UAV**



**Source:** Confidential

Figure 14.5  
**Small parts, possibly pieces of fragmentation from the UAV**



**Source:** Confidential

## Annex 15      Attack on MERCER STREET on 29 July 2021

1. The oil products tanker MERCER STREET (IMO: 9539585) was attacked three times over the span of several hours on 29 July 2021<sup>212</sup>, while steaming empty in international waters in the Gulf of Oman *en route* from Tanzania to the United Arab Emirates. The first attack occurred at 1045 hours when the crew reported that a UAV had missed the vessel, crashing approximately one nautical mile off the aft starboard. The bridge watch heard a loud buzzing noise followed by an explosion in the ocean, causing the water to erupt 15-20 metres in the air and black smoke rising at the point of impact. The second attack happened approximately 45 minutes later, at about 1130 hours. The bridge watch again reported a buzzing noise and stated that the UAV approached from the aft port quarter of the ship at an altitude of 20-25 metres. Prior to reaching the MERCER STREET, the UAV suddenly pitched nose up before rotating back down and proceeded in a 170 degrees downward descent towards the ship. According to the crew, the UAV was “light desert green” in colour. The second UAV narrowly missed the MERCER STREET and crashed into the ocean about one metre off the stern. The crew observed black smoke from an explosion on impact and recovered some pieces of UAV debris from the deck of the MERCER STREET. Following the second attack, the ship increased its speed from 11 knots (20 kilometres per hour) to 16 knots (30 kilometres per hour) but maintained its course.


2. The third attack happened at 2030 hours and this time the UAV hit the MERCER STREET’s aft superstructure from above, impacting the pilot’s cabin located on the aft bridge deck. The impact killed the ship’s master, a Romanian citizen, as well as a British security officer, making this the first fatal attack on a commercial vessel in the waters surrounding the Arabian Peninsula in many years. The attack also destroyed the vessel’s communication equipment and created a breach in the roof of the pilot’s cabin. It also damaged the bridge deck, as well as the C and B decks. In the aftermath of the attack, the crew mustered inside the citadel and informed the company, which in turn alerted the U.S. Navy. U.S. forces were then dispatched to assist the vessel, to conduct a preliminary survey of the damage, and to accompany the MERCER STREET to a safe harbour.

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<sup>212</sup> Some reports state that the attacks took place on 29 and other that it occurred on 30 July 2021, the reason for that apparent discrepancy is that international naval forces are using Zulu time, the military version of coordinated universal time (UTC). In this report the Panel is using local, i.e., Gulf Standard Time, which is UTC+4.

Figure 15.1

**Aerial view of the aft castle showing the location of the impact**



**Source:**

<https://www.centcom.mil/Portals/6/PressReleases/MERCERSTREETATTACK06AUG2%20final.pdf>

Figure 15.2

**Impact location of the UAV on the aft superstructure**



**Source:**

<https://www.centcom.mil/Portals/6/PressReleases/MERCERSTREETATTACK06AUG2%20final.pdf>

Figure 15.3  
**Internal view of the impact location from the Pilot's cabin**



*Source:*  
<https://www.centcom.mil/Portals/6/PressReleases/MERCERSTREETATTACK06AUG2%20final.pdf>

Figure 15.4  
**Damage to exterior bulkhead below the impact point**



*Source:* Confidential

Figure 15.5  
**Vertical stabilizer of the UAV**



**Source:**

<https://www.centcom.mil/Portals/6/PressReleases/MERCERSTREETATTACK06AUG2%20final.pdf>

Figure 15.6  
**Debris of a servo actuator from the UAV**



**Source:** Confidential

Figure 15.7  
**Fiberglass debris from the UAV recovered from the bridge wing**



*Source:* Confidential

Figure 15.8  
**Sketch by a crew member of the UAV used in the second attack**



*Source:* Confidential

## Annex 16 Attack on the Saudi Aramco Bulk Plant in Jeddah North

17. At 0342 hours in the early morning of 23 November 2020, the Saudi Aramco petroleum products distribution facility in Jeddah North was attacked by a cruise missile, which hit the top of storage tank #103 coming from a South-Westerly direction. One of 13 similar structures at the site used to store petroleum products such as diesel oil, gasoline and jet fuel. The tank has a capacity of 500,000 barrels and was filled with diesel at the time of the attack. The attack caused an explosion and a subsequent fire in the attack, the burn marks of which were still clearly visibly during the Panel's visit to the facility in June 2021 and it took the company's response team and the fire brigade about 40 minutes to extinguish the fire. Subsequent investigations showed that the impact of the missile had created a hole of 3.93 meters x 2.56 meters in the external roof of the storage tank and had completely destroyed the floating internal roof, a six-millimeter-thick structure made of carbon steel on top of the product. Company representatives interviewed by the Panel confirmed that there had been no advance warning of an attack.

**Figure 16.1**

Satellite Images showing the approximate impact point of the missile




*Source:* Google Earth, Panel

18. Shortly after the attack, a spokesman for the Houthi forces, brigadier general Yahya Sarie, announced in the Houthi-affiliated media that “the Yemeni missile forces targeted an Aramco

distribution station in Jeddah with a winged missile, Quds 2, which is announced for the first time”<sup>213</sup>. On the same day, in a letter to the President of the Security Council ([S/2020/1135](#)), the Permanent Representative of KSA also attributed responsibility for the “terrorist attack” on the bulk plant to the Houthi militia. The Panel also notes that the modus operandi of the attack, despite more limited in scale, is broadly like the previous attacks on the oil infrastructure in KSA, including the high-profile attack on 14 September 2019 on the Aramco facilities in Abqaiq and Khurays ([S/2020/326](#)).

**Figure 16.2**

Damage to the external roof of storage tank #103



**Source:** Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

19. While operations at the Bulk Plant resumed within hours of the attack, storage tank #103 was out of service for about four months for repairs, which according to the company cost it approximately USD 1.5 million. Even though there were 15 employees of Saudi Aramco at the site when the attack happened, no injuries occurred. However, had the missile hit another storage tank containing a more flammable fuel than diesel oil (such as kerosene), it is possible that the tank’s firefighting system would not have been able to contain the blaze and that other tanks in the facility would have also been affected. The Panel believes that the missile system used by the Houthis in this attack (see paragraph 5 below) is sufficiently precise that storage tank #103 was deliberately targeted, but it not clear whether the attackers were aware what kind of fuel was stored there at the time of the attack.

20. According to information received by the Panel during its visit to the facility, the North Jeddah Bulk Plant has a total storage capacity of 5.2 billion barrels and plays a critical role in distributing up to 120,000 barrels of refined petroleum products per day to customers in the Jeddah, Mecca and al-Baha regions, which accounts for 25 to 30 percent of the Kingdom’s supplies. In addition to more than 1,000 petrol stations, the facility also supplies public utilities such as the King Abdulaziz International

<sup>213</sup> <http://en.ypagecy.net/198784/>.

Airport in Jeddah, the Saudi Electricity Company and the vital Saline Water Conversion Corporation, which is responsible for the provision of most potable water in the Jeddah region. While the facility also supplies the Saudi military with petroleum products, it is mostly supplying civilian customers. If the plant had been out of service of a significant period, the impact on the Kingdom's economy as well as on the welfare of the residents of the Western region would likely have been significant.

**Figure 16.3**

Debris of the cruise missile used in the attack



**Source:** Panel

21. The Panel has been able to inspect the debris of the missile used in the attack and was informed that some parts were found inside of storage tank #103 during the repair works. The debris is consistent with the land attack cruise missile, which has been previously documented by the Panel as having been used in several attacks on targets in KSA in 2019 (annex 16 of [S/2020/326](#)) and whose parts were seized by the U.S. Navy from a dhow in the Gulf of Aden in November 2019 (paragraph 79 and annex 19 of [S/2021/79](#)). The damage to storage tank #103 of is also consistent with a missile of this type. The distance between the facility and Houthi-controlled territory is about 700 kilometres, which would put it close to maximum range estimated by the Panel for this weapon system. Whereas the Houthi forces have claimed that the missile used in the attack was a “Quds-2” cruise missile, during its inspection the Panel has not been able to identify significant design differences to the “Quds-1” model which was used in 2019. The Panel is investigating the chain of custody of some of the commercial components used in the manufacturing of the missile (annex 23) to establish whether the missile was manufactured in Yemen, as claimed by the Houthis, or supplied by an external party.

22. The Aramco Bulk Plant can be considered as a dual-use object under IHL as it provides supplies both to the Saudi military and civilians. However, according to information received by the Panel, most petroleum products distributed by the facility are for civilian use. For instance, the Panel was informed by a company representative that approximately one percent of the aviation fuel distributed by the Bulk Plant are supplied to the Royal Saudi Air Force in Jeddah. As for other petroleum products distributed to the military, the Panel was unable to obtain specific data. Storage tank #103, which was the specific objective of the attack (see paragraph 3 above) was not providing an effective contribution to the Kingdom's military action in Yemen and the Panel fails to see how its

destruction offered the Houthis forces a definite military advantage. Therefore, the Panel considers that the tank was, at the time of the attack, a civilian object<sup>214</sup>. In addition, the Panel notes the importance of the Aramco Bulk Plant facility in providing supplies to critical civilian infrastructures such as the King Abdulaziz International Airport in Jeddah, the Saudi Electricity Company and the Saline Water Conversion Corporation. The Panel concludes that the principle of distinction was not respected in this attack.<sup>215</sup>

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<sup>214</sup> See CIHL rules 8 and 9.

<sup>215</sup> See CIHL rule 1.

## Annex 17      Attacks on Abha International Airport

1. Abha International Airport (IATA: AHB) is a civilian airport in the ‘Asir Province in the South of KSA, approximately 95 kilometers from the Yemeni border. This proximity to Houthi-controlled areas is also one of the reasons why the airport has been attacked more often than any other civilian facility in the KSA, even though the airports in Jizan and Najran<sup>216</sup> have also been attacked multiple times. In June 2021, the Panel visited Abha International Airport, as well as the nearby town of Khamish Mushait, which hosts an important Royal Saudi Air Force Base and met with airport staff and military officials to discuss the threats to civilian aviation. The Panel was also able to view CCTV footage of some of the attacks. In 2019, prior to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, Abha International Airport handled 4.5 million passengers, making it the fifth largest airport in the Kingdom in terms of passenger numbers<sup>217</sup>. According to airport staff interviewed by the Panel, the airport is the main hub for the Southwestern region, offering a mix of domestic and international flights. Due to its colder climate, Abha is also an important destination for domestic tourism, in particular during the summer months and during Ramadan.

### Figure 17.1

Attacks on Abha International Airport as of 31 August 2021

<i>Date</i>	<i>Type of Attack</i>	<i>Casualties</i>
11 April 2018	UAV	6 injured
26 May 2018	UAV	2 injured
17 July 2018	UAV	None
6 September 2018	UAV	None
12 June 2019	Cruise Missile	26 injured
14 June 2019	UAV	None
23 June 2019	UAV	20 injured, 2 deaths
2 July 2019	UAV	10 injured
29 July 2019	UAV	5 injured
8 August 2019	UAV	None
28 August 2019	Cruise Missile	None
30 August 2019	UAV	None
10 September 2020	UAV	None
10 February 2021	UAV	None
16 February 2021	UAV	None
10 May 2021	UAV	None
31 August 2021	UAV	None
31 August 2021	UAV	8 injured
<b>Total</b>		<b>77 injured, 2 deaths</b>

**Source:** Confidential

2. The Panel received information showing that there were 18 successful attacks on the airport between the start of the aerial attacks in 2018 and 31 August 2021, causing a total of 77 injuries and 2 deaths. The airport authorities told the Panel that until 31 June 2021 (the day of the Panel’s visit), the airport received a total of 491 threats, which are defined as warnings from the Saudi military about incoming UAVs and missiles. They also noted that all warnings trigger an interruption of airport

<sup>216</sup> According to the airport authorities in Abha, Najran Domestic Airport (IATA: EAM), which in 2014 handled 600,000 passengers, was closed completely between May 2015 and May 2019 as a result of the threats from Houthi-controlled Yemen.

<sup>217</sup> <https://gaca.gov.sa/web/en-gb/news/15/03/2019-aa>.

operations and an evacuation of passengers and staff from the apron into the terminal building.<sup>218</sup> According to the management of the AHB, not all successful attacks are preceded by a warning<sup>219</sup> and even when warnings are received, this is typically just a few minutes before the impact. This clearly shows that the Houthi forces have become more adept at evading detection by the Saudi air defenses, when using UAVs and cruise missiles. The late notice is also likely due to the close proximity of Abha to Yemen and the mountainous terrain, both of which limit the opportunities to detect and intercept an aerial threat. The following paragraphs describe some of the more “successful” attacks in greater detail.

**Figure 17.2**

Satellite image showing the approximate impact locations of the attacks discussed below



**Source:** Google Earth, Panel

3. While the majority of attacks on the airport have been conducted with short-range Qasf-type UAVs which do not carry enough explosives to penetrate the concrete roof of the terminal building, it also experienced two cruise missile attacks in 2019. The attack on 12 June 2019 took place at 0225 hours in the morning when a Quds-1 land attack cruise missile penetrated the roof of the baggage hall

<sup>218</sup> Airport staff informed the Panel that prior to June 2019 passengers were evacuated from the apron and the terminal to the landside areas of the facility as those were considered to be safe from attacks. Following the attack on the outdoor McDonalds restaurant located on the landside, which claimed the lives of two civilians and injured 21 others (see paragraph 4), the airport changed its security protocol and now evacuates into the terminal building, which provides some protection against UAV attacks.

<sup>219</sup> Out of the 16 successful attacks, prior warning was only received in ten cases.

in the arrival terminal. The subsequent explosion, which was captured by CCTV cameras, injured 26 passengers and airport staff. This was the first documented case of a Quds-1 cruise missile ever being deployed by the Houthi forces. The airport authorities informed the Panel that they received no prior warning from the Saudi military about the incoming missile. The second cruise missile attack took place on 28 August 2019, but no significant damage was reported. The Panel has inspected the debris of both cruise missiles in 2019 (see annex 16 of [S/2020/326](#)), as well as parts of a missile of the same type, which were seized by the U.S. Navy from a dhow in the Gulf of Aden (see paragraph 79 and annex 19 of [S/2021/79](#)).

### Figure 17.3

CCTV footage showing the moments immediately before and after the missile attack on 12 June 2019



**Source:** <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IjsuhpROPyg>

4. The most lethal attack on Abha International Airport took place at 2120 hours on 23 June 2019 when a UAV exploded on the landside of the terminal building, immediately killing one civilian, who was at that time eating at an outdoor table of the McDonalds restaurant, and injuring 22 other people, one of whom died later from his injuries. Houthi UAVs (as well as some missiles) often carry a fragmentation warhead, i.e. small fragmentation, typically metal cubes, are scattered over a wide area following the detonation of the explosive filler. The UAVs are programmed to fly to pre-set GPS coordinates and then explode in mid-air, typically at a height of some 20 metres, or more rarely impact directly in a building or other structure, exploding on contact. This type of weapons with large blast effect and multiple fragmentations used in an area where there are civilians does not allow for discrimination between civilians and fighters. Contrary to IHL prescription, it also does not minimize damages to civilians and civilian objects.<sup>220</sup>

<sup>220</sup> CIHL rules 1 and 15.

**Figure 17.4**

Damage from fragmentation from a UAV attack visible on the apron of the airport



**Source:** Panel

5. At 1242 hours in the afternoon on 10 February 2021 Abha International Airport was attacked by a Qasef-type UAV, which hit a parked Airbus A320-214 with the registration code HZ-FAB operated by FLYADEAL (IATA: F3), a Jeddah-based low-cost airline. The explosion penetrated the fuselage of the aircraft on the left side and triggered a fire, which was put out by the airport fire brigade. In this specific case, the airport authorities received a warning from the Saudi military about 20 minutes before the attack which allowed them to complete the deplaning of the 119 passengers from the plane and to evacuate them to the terminal building. Even though the plane only suffered limited damage, it was out of service for four months. As far as the Panel is aware, this is the first incident in which a civilian aircraft in KSA was damaged by a Houthi UAV attack. The Panel has been informed by the airport authorities that the warhead of the UAV in this case did not contain fragmentation, which could imply that in this case the plane rather than the passengers was targeted. Under IHL, only military objectives can be the object of attack. According to information received by the Panel, the plane was not used by military and there was no military personnel or civilians having lost their protection under IHL on board or near the airplane. The Panel therefore concludes that the airplane was a civilian object protected under IHL against direct attacks and that the passengers and people nearby the airplane were also protected under IHL.<sup>221</sup>

<sup>221</sup> See CIHL rules 1, 5-8.

**Figure 17.5**

Still from video footage showing the damage to the fuselage



**Source:** <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/10/plane-catches-fire-after-houthi-attack-abha-airport-saudi-tv>.

4. In addition to the human casualties, there has been significant economic damage, both directly in terms of necessary repairs and protective measures such as the construction of a blast barrier between the apron and the terminal building, as well as indirect costs due to higher insurance premiums, reduced slots at the airport and a stop to night-time operations. Airport management estimates that the losses from the attacks amount to Saudi Riyal 40 million (approximately USD 10.65 million). Unlike in the case of attacks on other targets, the Houthi forces have repeatedly claimed responsibility for the strikes on Abha International Airport, stating that the facility is used for military operations by the Coalition<sup>222</sup>. During the meeting with the Panel, the airport management categorically denied that the facility was used for military operations. While the Panel is unable to independently verify this claim, it notes that the Saudi Air Force regularly operates from King Khalid Air Base in Khamis Mushait, about 13 kilometres East of Abha International Airport.

5. Abha International Airport is a civilian airport and is used by civilians. The Panel found that the attacks mentioned above were conducted in contravention to the principle of distinction.<sup>223</sup> In the case where the airport would be used for military operations by the Coalition, only attack against military objects or equipment and military personnel would be permitted by IHL. In addition, because the airport is used by civilians any attack should be conducted with constant care to spare civilians and civilian objects and all feasible precautions should be taken to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.<sup>224</sup>

<sup>222</sup> With reference to the attack on 10 February 2021, the spokesman of the Houthi forces Yahya Sarie was quoted as saying: “The UAV air force targeted the airfield of warplanes at Abha International Airport – which is used for military purposes to target Yemeni people – with four drones”, see <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/yemen-houthis-saudi-arabia-abha-airport-attack>.

<sup>223</sup> CIHL rule 1.

<sup>224</sup> CIHL rule 15.

**Annex 18: New Houthi weapons displayed to the media**

Figure 18.1  
**SAMMAD-4 UAV at the exhibition (side view)**<sup>225</sup>



Figure 18.2  
**SAMMAD-4 UAV at the exhibition (top view)**



<sup>225</sup> There are some indications that the UAV shown in the exhibition is a mockup, which is not airworthy.

Figure 18.3  
Unguided projectile carried by the SAMMAD-4 UAV



Figure 18.4  
RUJUM Hexcopter at the exhibition<sup>226</sup>



<sup>226</sup> Unlike the other new attack UAVs shown in the exhibition, the RUJUM was deployed in several attacks by the Houthis on different frontlines. At least two RUJUM hexcopters were shot down by GoY-affiliated forces, but despite several requests, so far, the Panel has been unable to inspect their debris, preventing further technical analysis.

Figure 18.5  
KHATIF UAV at the exhibition (side view)



Figure 18.6  
KHATIF UAV at the exhibition (top view)



Figure 18.7  
MERSAD Reconnaissance UAV at the exhibition (top view)



Figure 18.8  
Detail of the MERSAD Reconnaissance UAV at the exhibition



Source for figures 18.1 – 18.8: Almasirah.net

**Annex 19: Seizure of weapons from a dhow on 10 February 2021**

Figure 19.1

***Shu'ai*-type dhow interdicted on 10 February 2021**

**Source:** <https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/2503935/winston-s-churchill-seizes-illicit-weapons-from-two-dhows-off-somalia/>

Figure 19.2

***Shu'ai*-type dhow interdicted on 10 February 2021**

**Source:** <https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/2503935/winston-s-churchill-seizes-illicit-weapons-from-two-dhows-off-somalia/>

Figure 19.3  
**Jelbut-type dhow interdicted on 10 February 2021**



**Source:** <https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/2503935/winston-s-churchill-seizes-illicit-weapons-from-two-dhows-off-somalia/>

Figure 19.4  
**Jelbut-type dhow interdicted on 10 February 2021**



**Source:** <https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/2503935/winston-s-churchill-seizes-illicit-weapons-from-two-dhows-off-somalia/>

Figure 19.5  
**Type 56-1 assault rifles wrapped in plastic**



*Source:* Confidential

Figure 19.6  
**Type 56-1, 7.62x39mm assault rifle and detail of the markings showing that the weapon was manufactured in 2017 by Factory 26 in China**



**7.62mm Type 56-1**  
**(Symbol) 17-CN 62068328**

*Source:* Confidential

Figure 19.7  
**PKM-pattern, 7.62x54mm calibre general-purpose machine guns**



*Source:* Confidential

Figure 19.8  
**Detail of the marking on one of the PKM-pattern general-purpose machine guns, likely indicating that it was manufactured in China**



**(Triangle) CF / M80 / 401702**

*Source:* Confidential

Figure 19.9  
AM-50 'Sayyad', 12.7x99mm calibre Anti-Material Rifle



Source: Confidential

Figure 19.10  
Details of markings on the Anti-Material Rifle



7A0347

2701264  
CAL12.7X99

264

Source: Confidential

Figure 19.11  
Ghadir-4 optical weapons scope



GH4-951036

Source: Confidential

Figure 19.12  
Components of 12,7x108mm calibre 'DSchK' heavy machine guns



*Source:* Confidential

Figure 19.13  
Marking on the receiver of one the heavy machine guns



**180058**

*Source:* Confidential

Figure 19.14

Yemeni Boat License for the *Um-Almadain 1*<sup>227</sup> found on the *Jelbut*-type dhow (front side)<sup>228</sup>



Source: Confidential

Figure 19.15

Yemeni Boat License for the *Um-Almadain 1* found on the *Jelbut*-type dhow (rear side)




Source: Confidential

<sup>227</sup> The Panel notes that the description of the *Um-Almadain 1* does not match the images of the *Jelbut*-type dhow. Therefore, it is likely that this boat license is for another vessel.


<sup>228</sup> The Panel has obtained the full name and unredacted picture of the owner of the vessel.

Figure 19.16  
**Farsi-language warehouse receipt for ARIZONA brand cigarettes<sup>229</sup> found on the *Jelbut*-type dhow**



Source: Confidential

Figure 19.20  
**Mapping of coordinates allegedly retrieved from GPS devices onboard of the *Jelbut*-type dhow**



Source: Confidential

<sup>229</sup> The Panel inspected many similar receipts for cigarettes in Farsi, which were found on the dhow *Bahri-2*, seized with a cargo of weapons off the coast of Somalia on 24 June 2020. See figure 15.18 in annex 15, [S/2021/79](#).

Figure 19.21

Yemeni Boat License for *Ramaz Al-Karama 1* found on the *Shu'ai*-type dhow (front side)<sup>230</sup>



Source: Confidential

Figure 19.22

Yemeni Boat License for *Ramaz Al-Karama 1* found on the *Shu'ai*-type dhow (rear side)



Source: Confidential

<sup>230</sup> The Panel has obtained the full name and unredacted picture of the owner of the vessel.

**Annex 20     Seizure of weapons from a dhow on 6 May 2021**

Figure 20.1

***Shu'ai*-type dhow interdicted on 6 May 2021**



**Source:** <https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/2600834/uss-monterey-seizes-illlicit-weapons-in-the-north-arabian-sea/#images-2>

Figure 20.2

**Small arms and light weapons wrapped in green plastic onboard the dhow**



**Source:** <https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/2600834/uss-monterey-seizes-illlicit-weapons-in-the-north-arabian-sea/#images-3>

Figure 20.3  
ATGMs and wrapped SALW in the cargo hold of the dhow



*Source:* <https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/2600834/uss-monterey-seizes-illicit-weapons-in-the-north-arabian-sea/#images-4>

Figure 20.4  
Type 56-1, 7.62x39mm calibre assault rifle seized from the dhow



*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.5

Markings documented by the Panel indicating that it was manufactured China in 2017 at Jianshe Arsenal (State Factory 26)



7.62mm Type 56-1  
(Symbol – Factory 26) 17-CN / 62130678

*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.6

M80, PKM-pattern, 7.62x54mm calibre general-purpose machine guns



*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.7

Markings documented by the Panel indicating that it was manufactured in China in 2017<sup>231</sup> at Jianshe Arsenal (State Factory 26)



(Symbol – Factory 26)  
M80 / 17-CN 02415

*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.8

Type 85, 7.62x54mm calibre sniper rifle<sup>232</sup>




*Source:* Panel

<sup>231</sup> The Panel notes that the Chinese PKM-pattern machine guns, unlike the Type 56-1 assault rifles, showed significantly more wear and tear. It is possible that they were assembled using repurposed parts of older PKM-pattern machine guns. In 2020, the Panel noted that PKM-pattern machine guns seized by the Royal Saudi Navy from dhows sometimes combined parts with Cyrillic markings with parts bearing Chinese markings, which would support this theory.

<sup>232</sup> This is a Chinese copy of the Dragunov SVD-63 sniper rifle, which is manufactured in Russia. The Panel notes that this is the first time in recent years that this type of rifle has been seized in the Arabian Sea.

Figure 20.9

**Markings documented by the Panel indicating that it was manufactured China in 2017 at Jianshe Arsenal (State Factory 26)**



**(Symbol - Factory 26)  
7.62mm Type 85  
17-CN  
3309924**

*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.10

**PKM-pattern, 7.62x54mm calibre general-purpose machine guns manufactured in Bulgaria<sup>233</sup>**



*Source:* Panel

<sup>233</sup> The Panel notes that this is the first time in recent years that Bulgarian-manufactured weapons were seized from a dhow in the Arabian Sea.



Figure 20.13  
Detail of marking on PKM-pattern general purpose machine gun<sup>235</sup>



0409

*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.14  
Detail of marking on PKM-pattern general purpose machine gun



2500144

*Source:* Panel

<sup>235</sup> The Panel notes that the dot peen marking used on the machine guns has also been observed on the AM-50 'Say-yad' anti-material rifle (see figure 20.21). Dot Peen marking is not known to be used on Chinese or Russian manufactured weapons.

Figure 20.15  
Detail of stamp<sup>236</sup> on PKM-pattern general purpose machine gun



*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.16  
Similar stamp documented on the rifle selector lever of Iranian G3A1 assault rifle



*Source:* <https://irp.fas.org/world/iran/smallarms.pdf>

<sup>236</sup> The Panel notes that not all the PKM-pattern general-purpose machine guns, which the Panel assesses to be of Iranian-origin were bearing this stamp. The Panel believes that the machine guns were assembled using repurposed parts from older weapons, some of which had original government markings.

Figure 20.17  
**RPG-7 launchers, likely manufactured in Iran<sup>237</sup>**



*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.18  
**Detail of marking on RPG-7 launchers**



**0011803108**

*Source:* Panel

<sup>237</sup> The Panel notes that the RPG-7 launchers do not have clear markings showing the country and year of production. The Panel notes that all RPG-7 launchers inspected since 2019 have identical physical characteristics, including the green plastic heat shield, which is different from other versions of the RPG-7 launchers, as well as similar markings, highlighted in yellow (see figure 20.18).

Figure 20.19

AM-50 'Sayyad', 12.7x99mm calibre anti-material rifle, likely manufactured in Iran<sup>238</sup>



Source: Panel

Figure 20.20

AM-50 'Sayyad' anti-material rifle on display in Teheran in September 2013




photo : Foad Ashtari

Source: <https://armamentresearch.com/iranian-am50-and-russian-orsis-t-5000-rifles-in-iraq/>

<sup>238</sup> The Panel notes that the anti-material rifles seized from the dhow have no clear markings showing the country and year of production, however it also notes that all anti-material rifles inspected since 2018 have identical physical characteristics and markings. The AM- 50 'Sayyad' is an unlicensed copy of the HS.50 anti-material rifle manufactured in Austria. The main technical differences include a different grip and barrel design.

Figure 20.21  
Detail of marking on AM-50 Sayyad anti-material rifle<sup>239</sup>



**1700399 / 580 / 26011580 / CAL12.7X99**

*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.22  
Detail of marking on AM-50 Sayyad anti-material rifle



**6A1155**

*Source:* Panel

<sup>239</sup> The Panel notes that the dot peen marking on the AM-50 ‘Sayyad’ is similar to the marking on some of the PKM-pattern machine guns which were seized from the same dhow (see figure 20.13 and 20.14). The Panel has observed similar markings on other AM-50 ‘Sayyad’ rifles inspected since 2018.

Figure 20.23

**Ghadir-4 rifle 12x50 optical weapon scope and its metal box, likely made in Iran**



*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.24

**Detail of marking on Ghadir-4 rifle 12x50 optical weapon scope**



**RG-004 A1  
1700560**

*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.25

Ghadir-4 rifle scope visible on the poster (not mounted on the rifle) in the Iranian media



Source: <https://www.khabarazma.com/4206519/>- باز دید-فرمانده نیروی زمینی ارتش از لشکر ۱۶ زرهی قزوین- (عکس))

Figure 20.26

Ghadir-4 rifle scope visible on the poster (not mounted on the rifle) in the Iranian media



Source: <https://www.khabarazma.com/4206519/>- باز دید-فرمانده نیروی زمینی ارتش از لشکر ۱۶ زرهی قزوین- (عکس))

Figure 20.27

**5.45x39mm calibre AKS-74U assault rifle manufactured in the Soviet Union**



*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.28

**5.45x39mm calibre AKS-74U assault rifle manufactured in the Soviet Union**



*Source:* Panel


Figure 20.29  
Detail of markings indicating manufacture at the Tula Arms Plant in 1988



(Symbol – Tula Arms Plant) 88 / 985076


Source: Panel

Figure 20.30  
9M133 Anti-tank guided missile manufactured in Russia and transport container (in the background)



Source: Panel

Figure 20.31  
Detail of markings documented by the Panel



9M113 / 07-85-536 / 2580 / 36-86-22

Source: Panel

Figure 20.32  
9M111M Anti-tank guided missile manufactured in Russia



Source: Panel

Figure 20.33  
Detail of markings documented by the Panel



9M111M / 10-83-MK / 100486 / 42-85-53

Source: Panel

Figure 20.34  
9M111-2 Anti-tank guided missile manufactured in Russia



Source: Panel

Figure 20.35  
Detail of markings documented by the Panel



9M111-2 / 03-79-MK / 47-80-53


Source: Panel

Figure 20.36  
**POSP 12x50M Telescopic Sight manufactured in Belarus**



*Source:* Panel


Figure 20.37  
**Detail of serial number indicating manufacture in 2017**



**1701165**

*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.38  
Document found with the sights indicating that quality control took place in May 2017



Source: Panel

Figure 20.39  
POSP 8x42 Telescopic Sight manufactured in Belarus



Source: Panel

Figure 20.40  
Detail of serial number



596-1-1242

Source: Panel

Figure 20.41  
Yemeni Boat License for *Ramaz Al-Karama 1* found on the dhow<sup>240</sup> (front side)<sup>241</sup>




Source: Confidential

<sup>240</sup> The Panel notes that this appears to be the same license, which was previously documented on the smaller dhow seized on 10 February 2021 (see figure 19.21), raising the possibility that this is the same vessel. The Panel also notes that at least one dhow crew member was present on both occasions (see annex 21).

<sup>241</sup> The Panel has obtained the full name and unredacted picture of the owner of the vessel.

Figure 20.42


Yemeni Boat License for *Ramaz Al-Karama 1* found on the dhow (rear side)



Source: Confidential

Figure 20.43

Image from the Garmin ECHOMAP Plus device showing waypoint at Jask



Source: Confidential

Figure 20.44  
**Coordinates and dates reportedly retrieved from Garmin ECHOMAP Plus device**

GPS Device from 6 May 2021 Interdicted Flagless Dhow: Garmin echoMAP Plus 5AZ026107 Point Data



Source: Confidential

**Annex 21: Images and ID documents of the crew members of the dhows**

The Panel has determined that the publication of this annex may pose a threat to individuals and entities, and their activities in Yemen. Therefore, the information in this annex is not for publication.

## Annex 22 Seizure of thermal weapon sights at the Shahn border crossing on 22 June 2021

1. The Panel is investigating the chain of custody of seven RU90/120G thermal weapon sights, which were seized at 2000 hours on 22 June 2021 by Yemeni customs officers at the Shahn crossing on the border with Oman. The Panel has been informed that the sights were transported in the driver's cabin of a Mercedes truck with Omani license plates,<sup>242</sup> which was transporting tiles and ceramics from Oman to Yemen. The commercial truck driver, an individual holding a Pakistani passport,<sup>243</sup> told the customs officers that he received the package from a Yemeni individual called Ali in Mazyuna, a small settlement in Oman close to the border with Yemen, who asked him to deliver it to another Yemeni individual, who would be waiting for him on the Yemeni side of the border crossing. The driver claimed that he did not know what was inside the parcel and that he transported it as a favour, i.e., without receiving material compensation. The Panel understands that the person, who was supposed to pick up the parcel disappeared when he saw that the package was impounded, and that the driver was released after questioning. The Panel has obtained the Omani mobile phone numbers of "Ali" and the person, who was supposed to pick up the parcel on the Yemeni side and has contacted Oman requesting more information on the identity of the two individuals. A response is pending.

2. The Panel has obtained images as well as the serial numbers of the thermal weapon sights, which were seized at the border crossing. The Panel notes that the sights have technical characteristics consistent with thermal weapons sights manufactured by Rayan Roshd Afzar, a Chinese Iranian joint venture. Sights from this manufacturer have been seized from dhows in the Gulf of Oman and inspected by the Panel on multiple occasion (see paragraph 52 and annex 20, [S/2020/326](#), as well as paragraph 88 and annex 14, [S/2021/79](#)). Iran has informed the Panel that "the thermal weapon sights are NOT consistent with sights manufactured in Iran", however the Panel has noted information from publicly available sources (see figures 22.4 to 22.6 below), which seems to corroborate the Panel's analysis regarding their origin. The Panel continues to investigate.

Figure 22.1

### RU90/120G thermal weapon sight seized at the border



**Source:** Confidential

<sup>242</sup> The Panel has obtained the full details, i.e., license and engine serial number of the truck.

<sup>243</sup> The Panel has obtained the name and passport details of the driver.

Figure 22.2  
**RU90/120G thermal weapon sight seized at the border**



*Source:* Confidential

Figure 22.3  
**RU90/120G thermal weapon sight seized at the border**



*Source:* Confidential

Figure 22.4  
Rayan Roshd Afzar promotional leaflet

Roshd  
Rayan

## رایان رشد افزار

### دوربین حرارتی

### RU90G / RU120G

WWW.MILITARY.IR

دوربین حرارتی مدل RU90G / RU120G  
بمنظور مراقبت، شناسایی و هدف گیری  
طراحی و ساخته شده است که قابل نصب  
بر روی انواع سلاح را دارا می باشد و در  
شرایط مختلف محیطی (تاریکی مطلق  
مه، دود، ابر) قابل استفاده است.

قابلیت ها:

- قابلیت نصب بر روی انواع سلاح
- قابلیت استفاده بصورت دستی جهت دیده بانی
- قابلیت برنامه ریزی تا ۸ رتیکل هدف گیری
- بدنه مقاوم و آب بندی شده
- کاربری آسان

Source: [https://twitter.com/green\\_lemonnn/status/661560849878925312/photo/4](https://twitter.com/green_lemonnn/status/661560849878925312/photo/4)

Figure 22.4

Still from promotional video for Rayan Roshd Afzar night vision equipment



Source: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gQB2HqsgNUk>

Figure 22.5

Still from promotional video for Rayan Roshd Afzar night vision equipment



Source: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gQB2HqsgNUk>

Annex 23 Chain of custody of the 30.600 G OEM pressure transmitter

Figure 23.1 House Air Waybill for the shipping of the transmitters from Germany to China in June 2020

NUE-14018567 Shipper's Name and Address BD Sensors GmbH BD-Sensors-Str. 1 95199 Thierstein Germany T: +499235982052 F: +499235981111		Shipper's Account Number NUE-14018567		Not Negotiable <b>Air Waybill</b> Issued by Streck Transportges. mbH Neuwieder Strasse 14 90411 Nuernberg			
BD Sensors China Block B 2nd Floor, Building 10 No. 1188 Lianghang Rd. Pujiang Town 201112 Shanghai China T: 00862151600190803		Consignee's Account Number		Copies 1, 2 and 3 of this Air Waybill are originals and have the same validity.			
Issuing Carrier's Agent Name and City Streck Transportges. mbH Neuwieder Strasse 14 90411 Nuernberg		Accounting Information MAWB: 999-76025784		It is agreed that the goods described herein are accepted in apparent good order and condition (except as noted) for carriage SUBJECT TO THE CONDITIONS OF CONTRACT ON THE REVERSE HEREOF. ALL GOODS MAY BE CARRIED BY ANY OTHER MEANS INCLUDING ROAD OR ANY OTHER CARRIER UNLESS SPECIFIC CONTRARY INSTRUCTIONS ARE GIVEN HEREOF BY THE SHIPPER, AND SHIPPER AGREES THAT THE SHIPMENT MAY BE CARRIED VIA INTERMEDIATE STOPPING PLACES WHICH THE CARRIER DEEMS APPROPRIATE. THE SHIPPER'S ATTENTION IS DRAWN TO THE NOTICE CONCERNING CARRIER'S LIMITATION OF LIABILITY. Shipper may increase such limitation of liability by declaring a higher value for carriage and paying a supplemental charge if required.			
Agent's IATA Code		Agent's Account No.		Reference Number 121420060024			
Airport of Departure (Addr. of First Carrier) and Requested Routing Nuernberg		Optional Shipping Information EXW THIERSTEIN		Declared Value for Carriage EUR			
To		By First Carrier		Routing and Destination			
PVG		CA		Shanghai-Pu Dong			
Requested Flight/Date		CA1042/07		Amount of Insurance XXX			
Handling Information NSC		ECDs: 20DE871528552419E0, 20DE871528553293E1		Insurance - If carrier offers insurance, and such insurance is requested in accordance with the conditions thereof, indicate amount to be insured in figures in box marked "Amount of Insurance".			
20 Packages marked address and 7765		SC1		X			
No. of Pieces PCP	Gross Weight	Rate Class	Commodity Item No.	Chargeable Weight	Rate Charge	Total	Nature and Quantity of Goods (incl. Dimensions or Volume)
20	540.0K	Q		540.0		As agreed	transmitter not restricted 3/ 62x 32x 44 cm 1/ 42x 42x 42 cm 3/ 52x 42x 42 cm 1/ 48x 36x 36 cm 12/ 62x 42x 47 cm TTL VOL: 2.142 CBM 9026.20
20	540.0K					As agreed	
Prepaid		Weight Charge		Collect		Other Charges	
Valuation Charge		Tax		Total Order Charges Due Agent		Total Order Charges Due Carrier	
Total Prepaid		Total Collect		As agreed		Streck Transportges. mbH Julia Gabsteiger Signature of Shipper or its Agent	
Currency Conversion Rates		CC Charges in Dest. Currency		2020-JUN-03 16:58 Nuernberg		NUE AS CARRIER Signature of Issuing Carrier or its Agent	
For Carrier's Use only at Destination		Charges at Destination		Total Collect Charges		NUE-14018567	

Original 3 (for Shipper)

Figure 23.2

Excerpt from packing list showing that the transmitter was exported from Germany to BDS Sensors China in June 2020

Packing list				
BD Sensors GmbH BD-Sensors-Str. 1 95199 Thierstein		Shipping address 104437 BD SENSORS CHINA No.1188 Lianhang Rd., Pujiang town TJ-201112 SHANGHAI		
Total Number of Parcels: 20 Cartons				
Total weight: 539,950 KG				
Shipment Number/Date: 7765/02.06.2020				
Pack No.: 14 of 20 Cartons				
Gross weight: 17,400 KG (62.000 x 32.000 x 44.000 cm)				
Description Your order	Code Pos.	Sales order	Pos.	Quantity Prod. order
SPE800 BDS2005-043 Delivery/Item: 31143453/000110 SN : ( 10845219 - 10845228 )	26.600 20	G-4002-R-1-5-100-300-1-000 21148843	20	2388881 10 PC
OEM Pressure transmitter BDS2005-017 Delivery/Item: 31143453/000180 SN : ( 10844242 - 10844441 )	30.600 10	G-4001-R-1-8-100-300-2-1-000 21148539	10	2387876 100 PC

Figure 23.3

Bank information showing the transfer of funds from Oman to China for the purchase of the transmitters



## 对账单

借总笔数:0  
贷总笔数:1  
开始日期:20200601  
账号:上海, 121917329332501, 美元, 欧智博德仪器仪表(上海)有限公司  
用户所属公司:欧智博德仪器仪表(上海)有限公司  
笔数:1

借总金额:0.00  
贷总金额:13595.00  
结束日期:20200630  
集团公司名称:欧智博德仪器仪表(上海)有限公司  
打印时间:2021/6/10 13:19

交易类型	摘要	借	贷	余额	业务参考号	收/付方名称	收/付方账号	收付方开户行名	公司一卡通号
国外特汇入 款项汇入中 心	汇入汇款流程 解付		13,595.00	13,595.00		INTERNATIONA L SMART DIGIT AL INTERFACE POBOX 1445 M USCAT MUSCAT		BANK NIZWA MUSC AT	



Figure 23.5

**Proof of delivery document showing that the transmitters were received in Muscat**



**الملكية اللوجستية  
ROYAL LOGISTICS**

---

**PROOF OF DELIVERY** Date: 07.07.20

TO :

Consignee: INTERNATIONAL SMART DIGITAL INTERFACE COMPANY LLC

Shipper: ED SENSORS CHINA

AOL: SHANGHAI

AOD: MUSCAT

AWB: HYKC20070006

ETA: 05.07.2020

Commodity: ED SENSORS


No of Pcs: 02

Gross Weight: 33 KGS

This is to confirm that we are received the cargo in good order

Date: *7-7-2020*

Name: *Muhammad Almuhammad Mohammed*

Signature: 

Stamp: 



Figure 23.6  
**Order by Light Energy for Alternative Energy in Yemen<sup>244</sup> (first page)**

Brand Name	Color	Ean	Model Number	Part Number	Size	Quantity
BD Sensors	Black	1101202176261	BD30.600 G-4001-R-1-8-100-3	BD30.600 G-4001-R-1-8-100-3	Stander	200

طلب أصناف

الجمهورية اليمنية صنعاء، شارع الخميني بيت روس

<sup>244</sup> The Panel notes that the letterhead does not show any contact information, the Panel has so far been unable to find more information about this company.

Figure 23.7

**Order by Light Energy for Alternative Energy in Yemen (second page), stating that the transmitters are for use in a central air conditioning system**

**LIGHT ENERGY**  
Solar energy regulator & electrical technologies  
Equipment, fixtures & maintenance  
2020 / 1

**لايت إنرجي**  
منظومات الطاقة الشمسية و التقنيات الكهربائية  
تجهيزات وتركيبات و الصيانة

تم تقديم الطلب على شراء صمام حساس ضغط او صمام منظم للضغط يعمل في أنظمة التبريد المركزيه و يقوم بعمل تنظيم الضغط لهذه المنظومه لتتلقى حصول ضغط زائد و قتل و عمل في نظام التبريد . وسوف يتم تركيب هذا الصمامات في منظومات التبريد هذه وتم ارفاق بعض المخططات من قبلنا نحن  
من اجل التوضيح اكثر لعمل هذا الحساس وانه يستخدم في نظام التبريد بأسم منظم ضغط.

**The refrigeration system**

**Retrofit Refrigerants**

Source: Clivintec

Figure 23.8

**Invoice from the importer in Oman for the company in Yemen<sup>245</sup>****International Smart Digital Interface L.L.C**

Adress: 8730 WAY BLOCK NO 387  
 City, Street : ALMAABILAH SOUTH MUSCAT OMAN  
 Phone: (968)95674188  
 Email: muaadh@internationaldigitalinterface.com  
 Website: internationaldigitalinterface.com

**INVOICE**

DATE 30/04/2020  
 PI # [01160]

**TO****Light Energy company**

solar energy regulator and electrical technologies  
 Equipment, fixtures and maintenance  
 contact Number: +967779326097

REQUISITIONER	SHIP VIA	F.O.B.	SHIPPING TERMS

ITEM	DESCRIPTION	QTY	UNIT PRICE	TOTAL
Pressure transmitter 30.600 G	30.600 G-4001-R-1-8-100-300-2-1-000	200	120.00	24,000.00

**Comments or Special Instructions**

SUBTOTAL	24,000.00
TAX	-
SHIPPING	-
OTHER	-
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$ 24,000.00</b>

If you have any questions about this Invoice, please contact above Details



<sup>245</sup> The Panel has been informed that the payment was made in cash in advance by a person, reportedly a Yemeni, claiming to act on behalf of the Yemeni company. The Panel has also tried to find out to whom the Yemeni mobile number on the invoice is registered, so far without success.

Figure 23.9

**Proof of delivery of the transmitters dated 8 July 2020 and signed by one Ziyad Muqbil Fari',<sup>246</sup> allegedly acting on behalf of a Yemeni company**




*Sources for figures 23.1 – 23.9: Confidential*

<sup>246</sup> The Panel was informed that the transmitters were picked up in Muscat. The Panel has contacted both Oman and Yemen regarding the identity of the person, who signed the receipt. Responses are pending.

## Annex 24 Chain of custody of the 3W-110i B2 engine

Figure 24.1

### Diagram showing the chain of custody of the engine



Source: Panel

Figure 24.2

### Screenshot from Taobao.com showing the details of the purchase order



Source: Confidential

Figure 24.3

### Unofficial translation of the screenshot in Figure 24.2

Order number: 118674510762461297		Time of creation: 2018-01-25 00:09:31					
Third-party purchase of engines for model aircraft, 3W-110 iB2, imported from Germany, genuine product shipped directly from Germany		¥14999.00	25	Access after-sales portal	Jermozi Contact me	Transaction successful Details	¥380975.00 (including shipping fee: ¥6000.00) View shipping Cell phone order
Colour: Silver	Type of aircraft: Fixed-wing						



Figure 24.5

## Unofficial translation of the screenshot in figure 24.4

<b>Taobao website</b>							
Current order status: Transaction successful							
<b>Taobao reminder</b>							
Transaction is successful. For after-sales requests from buyers, please engage with buyers to ensure proper after-sales service.							
<b>Order details</b>		<b>Shipping and delivery</b>					
<b>Buyer information</b>							
Nickname:	jermozl	Real names:	A***				
Location:	Guangzhou, Guangdong	Phone number:	0***				
Email:	h*** Send site message	Alipay:	h***				
<b>Product</b>	<b>Product attributes</b>	<b>Status</b>	<b>Unit price (CNY)</b>	<b>Quantity</b>	<b>Discount</b>	<b>Total price (CNY)</b>	<b>Shipping fee (CNY)</b>
Third-party purchase of engines for model aircraft, 3W-110 iB2, imported from Germany, genuine product shipped directly from Germany	Colour: Silver Type of aircraft: Fixed-wing	Delivery confirmed	14999.00	25	-	374975.00	6000.00 (express delivery)
Payment received: CNY <b>380975.00</b>							
Order number:	118674510762461297						
Alipay transaction number:	2018012521001001800575095937						
Time of transaction:	2018-01-25 00:09:31						
Time of payment:	2018-01-25 04:57:31						
Time of confirmation:	2018-04-02 17:54:01						
Current order status: Transaction successful							
<b>Taobao reminder</b>							
Transaction is successful. For after-sales requests from buyers, please engage with buyers to ensure proper after-sales service.							
<b>Order details</b>		<b>Shipping and delivery</b>					
<b>Shipping information</b>							
Recipient address:	Mr. Wei, 13699747779, Fuli International Shoe Trade Center, RM 1020, 37 Huanshi West Rd, Liwan District, Guangzhou, Guangdong Province, 510145						
Shipping method:	Express delivery						
Name of shipper:	EMS						
Shipping number:	CI982007400DE						

Figure 24.6

**Packing list showing that the engine was transferred to Delro Modelltechnik**



Kunde /  
Customer: 753.1 Packliste / Packing list  
DELRO MODELLTECHNIK

Datum /Date: 06.03.18

AB-2018-3086

Karton Nr. / Box no.	Menge / Qty.	Einheit / Unit	Artikelnummer / Articlenumber:		Seriennummer / Serialnummer	Kartongröße / Box Size	Gewicht / Weight (Kg)	verpackt / packed
8	1	Stück / pcs. Paar / pair	10.001.420	3W-110iB2 + Boxerzündung 35cm	1822108K			
9	1	Stück / pcs. Paar / pair	10.001.420	3W-110iB2 + Boxerzündung 35cm	1822093K	H124	9,20	IL
	1	Stück / pcs. Paar / pair	10.001.420	3W-110iB2 + Boxerzündung 35cm	1822095K			
10	1	Stück / pcs. Paar / pair	10.001.420	3W-110iB2 + Boxerzündung 35cm	1822104K	H124	9,20	IL
	1	Stück / pcs. Paar / pair	10.001.420	3W-110iB2 + Boxerzündung 35cm	1822105K			
11	1	Stück / pcs. Paar / pair	10.001.420	3W-110iB2 + Boxerzündung 35cm	1822084K	H124	9,20	IL
	1	Stück / pcs. Paar / pair	10.001.420	3W-110iB2 + Boxerzündung 35cm	1822086K			
12	1	Stück / pcs. Paar / pair	10.001.420	3W-110iB2 + Boxerzündung 35cm	1822090K	H124	9,20	IL
	1	Stück / pcs. Paar / pair	10.001.420	3W-110iB2 + Boxerzündung 35cm	1822091K			
13	1	Stück / pcs. Paar / pair	10.001.420	3W-110iB2 + Boxerzündung 35cm	1822102K	H124	9,20	IL
	1	Stück / pcs. Paar / pair	10.001.420	3W-110iB2 + Boxerzündung 35cm	1822103K			
		Stück / pcs. Paar / pair						
		Stück / pcs. Paar / pair						
		Stück / pcs. Paar / pair						
		Stück / pcs. Paar / pair						

Source: Confidential

Figure 24.7

## Invoice for the sale of the engines by Delro-Modelltechnik to TDQQ

## Delro Modelltechnik

Delro Modelltechnik - Herforder Str. 103 - 32584 Löhne

An  
Wu. TDQQ GMBH  
Feldbergstr. 7  
64293 Darmstadt  
DRechnungsnummer: 15245  
Kundennummer: 800191  
Rechnungsdatum: 15.02.2018

Seite: 1 von 1

## RECHNUNG

Menge	Einheit	Bezeichnung	Einzelpreis	Rabatt	Gesamtpreis
25	Stück	Motor 3 W-110 iB2	1.205,37 €	7,5 %	27.874,18 €
1		Teil 1 Anzahlung am 31.01.18	-8.403,37 €		-8.403,37 €
1		Teil 2 Anzahlung am 025.02.18	-5.042,02 €		-5.042,02 €

Gesamt netto	14.428,79 €
USt. 19%	2.741,47 €
<b>Gesamtsumme</b>	<b>17.170,26 €</b>

Zahlbar sofort ohne Abzug.

Telefon: 05732/982053  
E-Mail: mail@delro.deBIC: GENODEM 1 HFV  
IBAN: DE10 4949 0070 0059 8081 02  
Kontoinhaber: Detlef Rottmann  
Bank: Volksbank Bad Oeynhausen  
Herford eG  
Bankleitzahl: 494 900 70  
Kontonummer: 59 808 102  
IBAN:  
BIC:Geschäftsführer: Detlef Rottmann  
Inhaber: Detlef Rottmann  
USt-ID: DE 124 365 151  
Steuernummer: 31051130568

Source: Confidential





Figure 25.2

## Annual Return of HSJ Electronic (HK) Limited (continued)

表格  
Form**NAR1**本申報表的結算日期  
Date to which this Return is Made Up

14 / 07 / 2019

日 DD / 月 MM / 年 YYYY

非上市公司的成員詳情(第 13 項)

**Particulars of Member(s) of a Non-listed Company (Section 13)**

截至本申報表的結算日期的成員詳情 Particulars of Member(s) as at the Date to which this Return is Made Up

股份類別 Class of Shares

Ordinary

此類別股份的已發行總數 Total Number of Issued Shares in this Class

10,000

姓名/名稱 Name	地址 Address	股份 Shares			備註 Remarks
		現時持有量 Current Holding	轉讓 Transferred		
			數目 Number	日期 Date	
張紅峰 ZHANGHONGFENG	廣東省深圳市龍崗區寶荷路 業豐山谷花園1樓複式21C	10,000			

Figure 25.3

## Annual Return of HSJ Electronic (HK) Limited (continued)

表格 Form	<b>NAR1</b>	公司編號 Company Number	1480116
<b>12 董事 Directors</b>			
<b>A. 董事(自然人) Director (Natural Person)</b>			
<b>1 身分 Capacity</b>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 董事 Director	<input type="checkbox"/> 候補董事 Alternate Director	代替 Alternate to
中文姓名 Name in Chinese	張紅峰		
英文姓名 Name in English	姓氏 Surname	ZHANG	
	名字 Other Names	HONGFENG	
前用姓名 Previous Names	中文 Chinese		
	英文 English		
別名 Alias	中文 Chinese		
	英文 English		
住址 Residential Address	廣東省深圳市龍崗區		
	寶荷路振業樓山谷花園1棟複式21C		
	國家/地區 Country/Region	中國	
電郵地址 Email Address			
身分證明 Identification			
(a) 香港身分證號碼 Hong Kong Identity Card Number			( - )
(b) 護照 Passport	簽發國家 Issuing Country	China	
	號碼 Number	CHINAID14262219810326291X	

Figure 25.4  
Annual Return of Vista Automation & Communication

存案 Filed



公司註冊處  
Companies Registry

周年申報表  
Annual Return

表格  
Form **NAR1**

公司編號 Company Number  
2224659

**1 公司名稱 Company Name**

VISTA AUTOMATION & COMMUNICATION INDUSTRIES LIMITED

**2 商業名稱 (如有的話) Business Name (If any)**

**3 公司類別 Type of Company**

私人公司 Private company    
  公眾公司 Public company    
  擔保有限公司 Company limited by guarantee

**4 本申報表的結算日期 Date to which this Return is Made Up**

15 / 04 / 2019

日 DD / 月 MM / 年 YYYY

(如屬私人公司，本申報表應列載截至公司成立為法團的周年日期的資料。  
 如屬公眾公司，申報表的結算日期應為該公司的會計參照期結束後的 6 個月屆滿之日。  
 如屬擔保有限公司，申報表的結算日期應為該公司的會計參照期結束後的 9 個月屆滿之日。  
 For a private company, the information in this return should be made up to the anniversary of the date of its incorporation.  
 For a public company, the return should be made up to the date that is 6 months after the end of its accounting reference period.  
 For a company limited by guarantee, the return should be made up to the date that is 9 months after the end of its accounting reference period.)

**5 隨本表格交付的財務報表所涵蓋的會計期 Period Covered by Financial Statements Delivered with this Form**  
 (私人公司無須填報此項 A private company need not complete this section)

日 DD / 月 MM / 年 YYYY

至  
To

日 DD / 月 MM / 年 YYYY

**6 註冊辦事處地址 Address of Registered Office**

ROOM 803, CHEVALIER HOUSE,

45-51 CHATHAM ROAD SOUTH,

TSIM SHA TSUI, KLN

地區  
Region

Hong Kong

**本處專用 For Official Use**

Document Ref. No.:70001449322

Submission Date:15/04/2019

Resubmission Date:-



Figure 25.5  
Annual Return of Vista Automation & Communication (continued)

表格 Form	<b>NAR1</b>	公司編號 Company Number	2224659
<b>12 董事 Directors</b>			
<b>A. 董事(自然人) Director (Natural Person)</b>			
<b>1 身分 Capacity</b>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 董事 Director	<input type="checkbox"/> 候補董事 Alternate Director	代替 Alternate to
中文姓名 Name in Chinese	張紅峰		
英文姓名 Name in English	姓氏 Surname	ZHANG	
	名字 Other Names	HONGFENG	
前用姓名 Previous Names	中文 Chinese		
	英文 English		
別名 Alias	中文 Chinese		
	英文 English		
住址 Residential Address	FUSHI 21C BUILDING 1 ZHENYE LUANGU GARDEN		
	BAOHE ROAD LONGGANG DISTRICT SHENZHEN		
	GUANGDONG		
國家/地區 Country/Region	China		
電郵地址 Email Address			
<b>身分證明 Identification</b>			
(a) 香港身分證號碼 Hong Kong Identity Card Number			( - )
(b) 護照 Passport	簽發國家 Issuing Country	China	
	號碼 Number	CHINAID14262219810326291X	

Figure 25.6  
Annual Return of Vista Automation & Communication (continued)

表格 Form	<b>NAR1</b>	附表一 Schedule 1 (非上市公司適用) <b>FOR NON-LISTED COMPANY</b> 公司編號 Company Number			
本申報表的結算日期 Date to which this Return is Made Up		2224659			
15 / 04 / 2019 日 DD / 月 MM / 年 YYYY					
非上市公司的成員詳情(第 13 項) <b>Particulars of Member(s) of a Non-listed Company (Section 13)</b> 截至本申報表的結算日期的成員詳情 Particulars of Member(s) as at the Date to which this Return is Made Up					
股份類別 Class of Shares	Ordinary				
此類別股份的已發行總數 Total Number of Issued Shares in this Class	10,000				
姓名/名稱 Name	地址 Address	股份 Shares			備註 Remarks
		現時持有量 Current Holding	轉讓 Transferred		
			數目 Number	日期 Date	
張紅峰 ZHANGHONGFENG	PUSHI 21C BUILDING 1 ZHENYE LUANGU GARDEN BAOHEROAD LONGGANG DISTRICT SHENZHEN GUANGDONG	10,000			

Source for 25.1 – 25.6: Confidential

## Annex 26 Economic Issues

### I. Economic Issues that pose a potential threat to peace, security or stability

1. The Panel examined various issues concerning the economy of Yemen, which pose a threat to its peace, security, or stability. The deteriorating economic situation has resulted in frustration, deprivation, and resentment amongst the population, offering a fertile breeding ground for further conflict and social unrest. Some political groups have sought to take advantage of this situation. The STC's Economic Committee (EC) under Aidarous Al-Zubaidi held meetings with the Southern Money Exchange Association, without the participation of the or the Government of Yemen and discussed measures to alleviate the economic challenges arising from the volatile exchange rate situation.<sup>247</sup> Such actions by the STC over the banking and exchange companies are viewed by some as a challenge to the authority of the Central Bank of Yemen and the Government of Yemen, as part of a larger ongoing power struggle between the Government of Yemen and the STC.<sup>248</sup>

2. In the past few months, in order to ensure monetary and financial discipline and stability, the Central Bank of Yemen has issued a new regulation to improve the functioning of money exchange businesses, including measures such as stricter licensing conditions for new applicants and the introduction of e-auction systems. The Central Bank of Yemen has also taken some measures against certain exchange companies, suspending 80 exchange companies for legal violations and non-compliance with its instructions and shutting down 141 unlicensed companies.<sup>249</sup> In August 2021, the IMF made a Special Drawing Rights (SDR) allocation for Yemen, worth USD 665 millions of reserves. This, according to the IMF is expected to improve Yemen's foreign exchange reserves by over 70 percent, and help address the crisis, especially food and medical needs of the population.<sup>250</sup>

### II. Depreciation of the Yemeni rial (YER)

3. The rapid depreciation of the YER, which hit a historic low in early December, crossing the 1700 mark per USD, not only impacts economic stability, but poses a grave threat to peace in Yemen. The total external assets of Yemen, as a share of total assets, fell to 4.5 percent as of June 2021 from 5.3 percent in 2020 and 9.6 percent in 2019; the net foreign assets of the Central Bank of Yemen, as of June 2021, had further decreased by 13 percent, reaching a negative value of YER 958.3 billion.<sup>251</sup> This decline is attributed to the ongoing political instability which impacted the exports of oil, depriving Yemen of its primary source of foreign exchange. Secondly, in 2020, inward remittances by Yemeni diaspora declined by over 20 percent.<sup>252</sup> The exchange rate which was YER 591 per USD at the end of 2019 reached about YER 700 per USD at the end of 2020, and recently crossed the YER 1700 per USD, restricting Yemen's ability to finance imports of essential goods, thereby exerting severe strains on the purchasing power capacity of its already impoverished population. According to the Central Bank of Yemen, the cost of the national minimum food basket (MFB), which is indicative of the cost of living,

247 <https://www.aden-tm.net/NDetails.aspx?contid=179225>. During the Panel's meeting with the EC on 21 August 2021 in Aden, the EC stated that these meetings were held to improve the situation.

248 During the meeting of the Panel with the EC of the STC on 21 August 2021 in Aden, the EC clarified that since the Government of Yemen and the Central Bank of Yemen did not do their job properly leading to the collapse of the YER and increase in the prices of basic commodities, they had to intervene.

249 Information provided by the Central Bank of Yemen.

250 <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/yemen-get-655-mln-imf-reserves-new-sdr-allocation-2021-08-23/>.

251 CBY's Quarterly Bulletin, Economic and Monetary Developments Issue No.4 (September 2021).

252 CBY's Quarterly Bulletin, Economic and Monetary Developments Issue No.4 (September 2021).

reached 56,283 YER in June 2021, about 21 percent higher than the cost at the beginning of 2021.<sup>253</sup> In July 2021, the Government of Yemen, in order to earn additional Government revenue, doubled the exchange rate used for calculating Customs duties on non-essential goods imported through the ports under Government of Yemen control, from YER 250 per USD to YER 500 per USD.<sup>254</sup> Although this new rate is almost 29 percent of the prevailing market exchange rate of about YER 1700 per USD, this move by the Government of Yemen has increased the cost of imported goods. The Houthis criticised this decision and reacted by reducing the exchange rate for Customs purposes to YER 250 per USD for imports through the Hudaydah port, under their control.<sup>255</sup> As, currently, there are no imports of non-essential goods through ports under Houthi control, there will not be any real impact of this move by the Houthis and it appears to be part of the propaganda war.

### III. Fragmentation of the Banking and Financial System

4. A stable banking and financial sector is a critical prerequisite for ensuring larger economic stability. The present scenario does not offer promising signs for the future of Yemen's banking and financial sector, and thereby of its economic stability.

5. In the aftermath of the move of the Central Bank of Yemen's headquarters from Sana'a to Aden in September 2016, the bifurcation of the Central Bank of Yemen into two rival institutions was effectively formalised with the functioning of the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden and the cby, Sana'a. This has led to a tussle between the two institutions for regulatory supremacy over the Yemeni banking sector. The escalation of conflict has led to the intensification of the economic crisis and further politicisation of the banking sector.

6. The areas under the control of the Houthis have a higher population; Sana'a is the major financial and trading hub of Yemen, and nearly all banks and exchange companies have their headquarters situated in Sana'a. In order to consolidate its own control and authority in this strategic region, the cby, Sana'a adopted measures aimed at undermining the authority of Central Bank of Yemen, Aden. Chief among these have been the denial of vital information concerning the economy and banking sector of Yemen to Central Bank of Yemen, Aden,<sup>256</sup> and to ban currency notes printed by the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden after 2017<sup>257</sup>. The Panel has been informed that the Houthi authorities have subjected those financial institutions not complying with such instructions to reprisals and punitive actions, including seizure of their assets and funds, imposition of fines, and detention of bank officials.

7. A central bank requires reports from commercial banks, and exchange companies that contain information on various aspects such as assets and liabilities, local and foreign currency holdings, foreign currency trades, internal and external financial transfers, import financing, and loans. These reports allow the central bank to monitor the banking sector with respect to their financial health, compliance with local laws and instructions, international regulations concerning anti-money laundering and combatting terrorist financing, and to frame and implement monetary, fiscal and economic policies as well

253 CBY's Quarterly Bulletin, Economic and Monetary Developments Issue No.4 (September 2021).

254 <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/yemens-government-doubles-customs-exchange-rate-boost-finances-2021-07-26/>.

255 <http://en.ypageency.net/231497/>.

256 Circular No. (4) of 2020, titled "Communication with the Enemy", addressed to all the exchange companies and institutions operating in the Republic of Yemen, was issued by the cby's Financial Information in Sana'a on 28 January 2020.

257 Circular issued by the ministry of finance in Sana'a on June 23, 2021 to all the finance affairs managers and the treasurers in charge of taxes/customs collection, and circular issued by the headquarters of cby - Sana'a on 27 June 2021.

as banking and trade regulations. In January 2020, banks and exchange companies operating in Sana'a were instructed by the cby, Sana'a, not to provide any data to "any illegal parties associated with the mercenaries", and that the submission of any data to any of these parties will be considered as communicating with the enemy and the violator will be held responsible (Figure 26.1 and Appendix 1).

8. In the absence of vital information regarding the operations of financial institutions in Houthi-controlled areas, functional capabilities of the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden stand severely challenged. Objecting to this, the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden, responded by demanding reports and full access to information from commercial, Islamic, and microfinance banks and money exchange companies concerning all their activities and not merely activities confined to areas under the control of the central Government. Fines have been imposed by the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden on certain banks not complying with these stipulations.<sup>258</sup> Additionally, the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden has also instructed the banks to shift their operational centres to Aden, failing which, they would be subjected to action, including suspension of their licences and informing other entities not to bank with them (Figure 26.2 and Appendix 2).<sup>259</sup>

<sup>258</sup> "In accordance with Commercial Bank Law No. 38 of 1998, YKB, IBY, and YBRD are liable to pay the daily fines (between 51,000-100,000 Yemeni rials) that CBY-Aden have been calculating since June 2020 for the banks' failure to provide monthly monetary data." - Yemen Economic Bulletin: Battle to Regulate Banks Threatens to Rupture the Financial Sector - Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies <https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/12004>.

<sup>259</sup> <http://en.adenpress.news/news/33475>.

Figure 26.1

Circular dated 28 January 2020 issued by cby, Sana'a to the banks for not sharing data with enemy

CENTRAL BANK OF YEMEN  
HEAD OFFICE

البنك المركزي اليمني  
المركز الرئيسي

وحدة جمع المعلومات المالية  
Financial Information Unit

Date: 28/01/2020  
No.: 99/20/2020

صنعا في 28|01|2020م

تعميم رقم (2) لسنة 2020م  
الى كافة البنوك العاملة في الجمهورية

المحترم  
الأخ / المدير العام / المدير الاقليمي  
بنك /  
تحيته ورعي،،

الموضوع / التخابر مع العدو

بالإشارة إلى الموضوع أعلاه، وإلى توجيهات الاخ/ المحافظ عطفاً على اوامر من السلطات العليا، بمخاطبة البنوك والصرافين بعدم موافاة أي جهات غير قانونية مرتبطة بالمرتزقة بأي بيانات وأن تسليم أي بيانات لأي من تلك الجهات سيعتبر تخابراً مع العدو وسيحمل كل من يخالف ذلك كامل المسؤولية. وعليه وجب مخاطبتكم بذلك.

وتقبلوا تحياتنا،

رئيس وحدة جمع المعلومات المالية  
وليد محمد السادة

فأخس : 274113 تليفون 274093 ص . ب 393 صنعا - الجمهورية اليمنية P.O.Box:393 Sana'a Y.R Tel : 274093 Fax 274113

Source: Central Bank of Yemen, Aden

Figure 26.2

## Statement dated 5 August 2021 of Central Bank of Yemen, Aden regarding action to be taken against the non-compliant banks

أصدر البنك المركزي اليمني اليوم، بيان هام موجه الى جميع البنوك التجارية والإسلامية العاملة في عموم الجمهورية، بشأن عدم التزام بعض البنوك بتقديم حساباتها الختامية والتي أصدر البنك المركزي بها مسبقاً مذكرات للبنوك بشأن الالتزام بتسليم البيانات المالية خلال مدة (15) يوم، والتي انتهت موعدها اليوم.

وفي اجتماعه اليوم مع قيادات من قطاعي الرقابة على البنوك والعمليات الخارجية أكد نائب محافظ البنك المركزي شكيب الحبيشي حرص البنك المركزي على سلامة أداء القطاع المصرفي اليمني واستمرارية نشاطه في خدمة الاقتصاد الوطني بما يكفل الحفاظ على سمعته لدى المؤسسات المالية والمصرفية الدولية، وانطلاقاً من مسئولياته القانونية، فقد تضمن بيان البنك المركزي حزمة من الإجراءات لتصحيح بنية القطاع المصرفي، وأهمها تصنيف بعض البنوك غير المنضبطة قانوناً، كبنوك غير ملتزمة وتعميم أسماءها لدى المؤسسات المالية والمصرفية الدولية، الى جانب التوجيه الملزم بنقل مراكز عمليات البنوك التجارية والإسلامية الى عدن، حيث المقر الرئيسي للبنك المركزي اليمني، ولكي يمكنه من القيام بإجراءات التحقق من كافة عملياتها والتفتيش الميداني المباشر والتأكد من التزامها بالوفاء بالمتطلبات القانونية لها، وكذا التزامه بترحيل النقد الاجنبي للبنوك لتغذية حساباتها الخارجية، لمواجهة التزامات عملاءها المستوردين.

نص البيان:

حرصاً من البنك المركزي على سلامة أداء القطاع المصرفي اليمني واستمرارية نشاطه في خدمة الاقتصاد الوطني وبما يكفل الحفاظ على سمعته لدى المؤسسات المالية والمصرفية الدولية، وانطلاقاً من مسئولياته القانونية بموجب المادة (45) من قانون البنك المركزي اليمني رقم (14) لسنة 2000م والمواد (27)، (28)، (29)، (30)، (31) من قانون البنوك رقم (38) لسنة 1998م والتي أعطت البنك المركزي الحق في طلب أية بيانات أو معلومات من أي بنك يراها ضرورة عن موقفه المالي وعملياته المصرفية المختلفة بهدف فحصها ومراجعتها والتحقق من سلامة الوضع المالي للبنك وأنه يمارس أنشطته وفقاً للقوانين وتعليمات البنك المركزي بما فيها التعليمات الخاصة بإجراءات مكافحة غسل الأموال وتمويل الإرهاب، كما ألزمت تلك المواد البنوك على تقديم البيانات المالية السنوية المدققة والمتطلبات الإضافية المرتبطة بها والتي يصادق عليها البنك المركزي.

وعطفاً على المذكرات الصادرة من البنك المركزي للبنوك بشأن الالتزام بتسليم البيانات المالية خلال مدة (15) يوم، والتي تنتهي بتاريخ 6 يوليو 2021م، وبسبب عدم التزام بعض البنوك بالمتطلبات الواردة في تلك المذكرات.

وعليه فإن البنك المركزي يحمل البنوك غير الملتزمة المسئولية الكاملة عن أية تبعات قد تترتب على ادراجها في القائمة الرسمية للبنوك المصنفة كبنوك غير ملتزمة، والتي سيتم الإعلان عنها وإتاحتها لجميع الجهات المحلية والبنوك والمؤسسات المالية والمصرفية الخارجية والمنظمات الدولية الأخرى.

ويوجه البنك المركزي مشدداً، أن على كافة البنوك التجارية والإسلامية المرخص لها في بلادنا الإسراع بأن تكون مراكز إدارة عملياتها بعدن، حيث يتواجد المقر الرئيسي للبنك المركزي وبما يمكنه من القيام بإجراءات التحقق من جميع عملياتها والتفتيش الميداني المباشر لمؤيداتها والتأكد من التزامها بالوفاء بكافة المتطلبات القانونية اللازمة لها.

كما يهيب البنك المركزي بكافة الشركات والمؤسسات التجارية المستوردة عدم تنفيذ أي عمليات مالية أو مصرفية ومنها فتح الاعتمادات والتحويلات مع البنوك التي سيتم ادراجها ضمن قائمة البنوك المصنفة كبنوك غير ملتزمة، ولن يتحمل البنك المركزي المسئولية عن أية أضرار ناتجة عن تنفيذ عمليات أو معاملات اذا أجريت عبر تلك البنوك.

كما يؤكد البنك المركزي بأنه سيتولى ترحيل مبالغ النقد الاجنبي الخاصة بالبنوك التجارية والإسلامية المرخص لها والملتزمة، لتغذية أرصدة حساباتها لدى البنوك في الخارج، بهدف تغطية اعتماداتها وتحويلاتها لغراض مواجهة التزاماتها وتحديد عمليات الاستيراد.

صادر عن البنك المركزي اليمني

المركز الرئيسي - عدن

بتاريخ: 5 أغسطس 2021م

Source: <https://yemen-yba.com/10376> and <https://cby-ye.com/news/131>.

9. Caught between the conflicting directions from the cby, Sana'a and the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden, banks and exchange companies currently struggle to operate and ensure legal compliance in a highly challenging and coercive regulatory environment. The Yemen Bank Association (YBA) and the Yemeni Exchangers Association (YEA) have unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate a solution to the challenges faced by them in implementing the conflicting directions of the rival central banks. The YBA has also opposed the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden's direction requiring banks to shift their operational centres to Aden.<sup>260</sup> Challenges in implementation and the looming threat of punitive action has meant that the banking community currently faces tremendous stress.

#### IV. Currency War

10. In order to finance fiscal deficits, the Central Bank of Yemen has adopted the controversial tool of 'monetary emissions',<sup>261</sup> wherein new currency is printed and circulated into the economy. Apart from being inflationary, this has created new economic challenges. There is now a currency war by proxy between the Government of Yemen and the Houthis through their respective central banks. Although the armed conflict began in 2014, the two central banks emerged in 2016 and both areas continued to use the same currency notes up to 2019 until the cby, Sana'a, banned the new currency notes printed by the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden, for use in the areas under the control of the Houthis. According to the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden, "the January 2020 ban on newly printed banknotes in the region under Houthi control has limited the government's ability to pay salaries in this area and complicated monetary policy operations. This has increased the cost of financial transactions, reduced market transparency, and widened exchange rate gaps between Aden and Sana'a — to as much as 100 percent in some instances."<sup>262</sup>

11. The Panel has received information that the cby, Sana'a, issued a circular on 23 June 2021 banning the use of certain currency notes, printed in the year 2017 in the denomination of one thousand Yemeni rials in different series, issued by the Central Bank of Yemen in Aden, in areas under Houthi control (Figure 26.3 and Appendix 3). Treating such currency as counterfeit notes, the cby, Sana'a prohibits the dealing, possession, or transfer of these notes within Houthi-controlled areas. Through another circular, issued on 27 June 2021, the cby, Sana'a, reiterated that the receipt, promotion, and circulation of such currency notes would entail prosecution on charges of harming the national economy (Figure 26.4 and Appendix 4).

<sup>260</sup> See the press release dated 12 August 2021 issued by the YBA, <https://yemen-yba.com/10376/>.

<sup>261</sup> Introducing cash to circulation in economy.

<sup>262</sup> CBY's Quarterly Bulletin, Economic and Monetary Developments Issue No.4 (September 2021).



Figure 26.4

Circular dated 27 June 2021 by cby, Sana'a stating that the receipt, promotion, and circulation of certain currency notes printed by Central Bank of Yemen, Aden would attract prosecution



**REPUBLIC OF YEMEN**  
**CENTRAL BANK OF YEMEN**  
 Head Office Sana'a

**الجمهورية اليمنية**  
**البنك المركزي اليمني**  
 المركز الرئيسي - صنعاء

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**تعميم صادر عن البنك المركزي اليمني - المركز الرئيسي صنعاء**

إدخاذاً بالبيان الصادر عن البنك المركزي اليمني - المركز الرئيسي صنعاء - بتاريخ 2021/6/22م بشأن منع التعامل أو حيازة أو نقل العملة المزيفة فئة (1000) ريال التي يبدأ رقمها التسلطي بغير حرف ( أ ) والمدون عليها عام 1438هـ - 2017م، واستناداً إلى أحكام القوانين النافذة، ولما تقتضيه المصلحة الوطنية من منع تسرب العملة المزيفة، فإن البنك المركزي يهيب بجميع القاعدين من المناطق المعنثة إلى مناطق حكومة الإنقاذ الوطني الالتزام بما يلي:

1. عدم نقل العملة المزيفة المشار إليها أعلاه.
2. أن الحد الأعلى المسموح بنقله من العملة اليمنية القانونية هو مبلغ (100.000) مائة ألف ريال فقط لكل شخص، ويسمح بنقل أي مبلغ من العملات الأجنبية.

وفي حالة المخالفة ستقوم الجهات المختصة بضبط المخالفين واتخاذ الإجراءات القانونية بشأنهم وفق الحد الأقصى للعقوبات المقررة في قانون مكافحة غسل الأموال وتمويل الإرهاب والقوانين الأخرى النافذة.

كما يهيب البنك بجميع المواطنين الاتصال على الرقم المجاني (8006800) أو رقم (01274327)، للإبلاغ عن أية مخالفة مما سبق.

علماً أن البنك سيقوم بصرف مكافأة بما يعادل نسبة (5%) من المبلغ المضبوط لمن قام بالإبلاغ عن المخالفة.

تأمل من الجميع الالتزام تحقيقاً للمصلحة العامة.

والله الموفق..

صادر عن البنك المركزي اليمني  
 المركز الرئيسي - صنعاء  
 2021/6/27م



صورة للتوزيع:  
 - رئيس مجلس الوزراء  
 - رئيس مجلس القضاء الأعلى  
 - وزير الداخلية  
 - رئيس جهاز الأمن والمخابرات  
 - وزير الصناعة والتجارة  
 - وزير الإدارة المحلية  
 - النائب العام  
 - الفرقة التجارية والصناعية  
 - جمعية البنوك اليمنية  
 - جمعية الصرافين اليمنيين

فاكس : 274360 تليفون التعميم : 274310-18 من ص.ب. 59 صنعاء - الجمهورية اليمنية  
 Email : governor@centralbank.gov.ye Fax : 274360 Tel Operator : 274310 B.O.Box 59 Sana'a Y.R

Source: Central Bank of Yemen, Aden

12. A peculiar situation has arisen, as a result, wherein old notes printed prior to 2017 remain legal tender in both areas, and because of the ban imposed by the cby, Sana'a, the newer notes remain largely in circulation in areas under Government of Yemen control only. Due to this ban, areas under Houthi control face a major cash crunch, while the surplus currency notes in Government of Yemen areas has

led to inflation and the rapid depreciation of the YER rate. The market value of YERs varies between old and new notes and also between the two regions, with profiteers charging higher transfer costs between the two regions, as entities running businesses in Houthi-controlled areas are forced to purchase old banknotes at high premia from the black market. Since the experiment with the new notes backfired, the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden reportedly printed and put billions of YERs in old banknotes into the market and withdrew the newly printed banknotes of YER 1,000 denomination, allowing the people to get old banknotes from local banks and exchange firms.<sup>263</sup> The cby, Sana'a, promptly banned these newly printed notes. While the exchange rate crossed YER 1700 per USD in areas under the control of the Government of Yemen, the rates in Houthi-controlled areas largely hover around the YER 600 per USD mark. This dismal ground situation has sharply fractured the economies of both parts of Yemen, adversely impacting domestic trade, and threatening economic stability in the country.

13. The international community should take note of the severity of this economic crisis and take concrete measures to prevent further divisions in Yemen which could lead to an irreversible fait accompli. In the absence of rapid improvements in the political and security situations, the future economic prospects appear to be gloomy.<sup>264</sup>

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<sup>263</sup> <https://www.arabnews.com/node/1905641/business-economy>.

<sup>264</sup> <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/yemen/publication/economic-update-october-2021>.

**Appendix 1 Unofficial Translation of Circular dated 28 January 2020 issued by cby, Sana'a to the Banks for not sharing data with enemy**

Central Bank of Yemen  
Head Office  
Sana'a

Financial Information Unit

Date : 28/01/2020

Circular No. (2) 2020  
To all banks operating in the Republic of Yemen

Regional Director

**Subject / Communication with the enemy**

Referring to the above subject, and to the governor's directives with the orders of the higher authorities to address the banks and money changers not to provide any data to any illegal parties associated with the mercenaries, and to submit any data to any of these parties will be considered as communicating with the enemy and anyone who violates that will be held responsible.

Signed by:

Mr. Wadea Mohammed AL-Saddah,  
Head of Financial Information Collection Unit

## **Appendix 2 Unofficial Translation of Statement dated 5 August 2021 of Central Bank of Yemen, Aden regarding action to be taken against the non-compliant banks**

In the interest of the Central Bank for the sound performance of the Yemeni banking sector and the continuity of its activity in the service of the national economy in a manner that ensures the preservation of its reputation with international financial and banking institutions, and based on its legal responsibility under Article (45) of the Central Bank of Yemen Law No. (14) of 2000 AD and Articles (27) , (28), (29), (30), (31) of the Banking Law No. (38) of 1998 AD, which gave the Central Bank the right to request any data or information from any bank it deems necessary about its financial position and its various banking operations with the aim of examining them and reviewing them and verifying the soundness of the bank's financial position and that it carries out its activities in accordance with the laws and instructions of the Central Bank, including the instructions for anti-money laundering and terrorist financing procedures.

In addition to the memoranda issued by the Central Bank to banks regarding the obligation to submit the financial statements within a period of (15) days, which ends on July 6, 2021 AD, and due to the failure of some banks to comply with the requirements contained in those memos. Accordingly, the Central Bank holds the non-compliant banks fully responsible for any consequences that may result from their inclusion in the official list of banks classified as non-compliant banks, which will be announced and made available to all local authorities, banks, external financial and banking institutions and other international organizations.

The Central Bank stresses that all commercial and Islamic banks licensed in our country should expedite the establishment of their operations management centres in Aden, where the headquarters of the Central Bank is located in a way that enables it to carry out verification procedures for all its operations and direct field inspection of its supporters and to ensure its commitment to fulfilling all necessary legal requirements she has. The Central Bank also calls upon all importing companies and commercial institutions not to carry out any financial or banking operations, including opening credits and transfers with banks that will be included in the list of banks classified as non-compliant banks, and the Central Bank will not be responsible for any damages resulting from the implementation of operations or transactions if conducted through those banks.

The Central Bank also confirms that it will carry out the transfer of foreign exchange amounts of licensed and committed commercial and Islamic banks, to feed their account balances with banks abroad, with the aim of covering their credits and transfers for the purposes of meeting their obligations, specifically import operations.

*Source:* <https://cby-ye.com/news/131>

**Appendix 3 Unofficial Translation of Circular dated 23 June 2021 by cby, Sana'a banning the use of certain currency notes printed by Central Bank of Yemen, Aden**

Republic of Yemen  
Ministry of Finance  
Number: 110-380

Date: 23/06/2021

Ministers, Governors of governorates, Heads of boards of directors  
Finance affairs managers  
Fund custodians having charge of collection

Subject: The prevention of Counterfeit Currency circulation

Based on the authority of the Ministry of Finance and in implementation of the decisions of the National Salvation Government to prevent the circulation of any business, the Headquarter of Central Bank of Yemen– Sana'a decides to ban dealing with it.

And since the so-called Bank of Aden, managed by the aggression, committed a forgery of printing, denomination of 1,000 rials, issued in 2017, a crime that is added to the record of crimes targeting the national economy and national labor values and affecting legal positions and national capital, then confronting these crimes is a patriotic duty. All components must be promoted, foremost among which are state institutions.

And the Ministry of Finance confirms the following:

1. Prohibition of dealing in (counterfeit) currency, which was confirmed by the Central Bank in its statement dated 06/22/2021 (Copy attached)
2. Whoever receives an amount or denomination promoting any of these counterfeit currencies will be directly referred to the representative and the penal code in force against him will be applied (damaging the national economy in institutions and unauthorized circulation of counterfeit currencies).
3. The importance of educating all government institutions' cadres towards confronting the economic policies of economic aggression.
4. All those working in the financial position in the institutions of the state must be vigilant and follow up on what is issued about managing monetary policy in the competent authority (the Central Bank – Sana'a) and directed to act accordingly.

The Bank also calls upon all citizens to call the toll-free number (800500) or (8006800) to report any violation of the foregoing.

Signature

Mr. Rashid Abuud Abu Lahuum  
Deputy Prime Minister of Economic Affairs

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**Appendix 4 Unofficial Translation of Circular dated 27 June 2021 by cby, Sana'a stating that the receipt, promotion, and circulation of certain currency notes printed by Central Bank of Yemen, Aden would attract prosecution**

**Republic of Yemen  
Central Bank of Yemen  
Head office Sanaa**

**Circular issued by the Headquarters of the Central Bank of Yemen - Sana'a**

An appendix to the statement issued by the Headquarter of Central Bank of Yemen - Sanaa - dated 22/06/2021 regarding prohibiting dealing, possession, or transfer of counterfeit currency in denominations of (1000) riyals, whose serial number is without the letter (A) and recorded in year 1438 - 2017 on it to the provisions of the laws in force, and what the national interest requires of preventing the leakage of false work.

The Central Bank of Yemen calling on all those coming from "the localized areas" (referring to the areas under the control of the legitimate government) to the areas of "the National Salvation Government" (referring to the areas under the control of Houthis) to abide by the following two things:

- 1) Not to transfer any counterfeit currency.
- 2) One hundred thousand (100,000) Yemeni Riyals is the maximum permissible limit for transferring the legal Yemeni currency for each person; however, transferring any amount of foreign currency is not prohibited.

And in the case of the violator the competent authorities will arrest the violators and take legal measures in their regard according to the maximum penalties stipulated in the Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Law and other applicable laws.

The Bank also calls upon all citizens to call the toll-free number (8006800) or (01274327) to report any violation of the foregoing.

Note that the Central Bank in Sanaa will pay the person who reported the violation a reward equivalent to (5%).

Hope everyone is committed to achieve the public interest.

**Issued by the Central Bank of Yemen  
Head Office - Sana'a  
27/06/2021**

Annex 27 Memorandum No 3821 of 27 June 2021 issued by the president al-Amana special-ised criminal prosecution court to the Tadhamon Bank

الرقم: ٣٨٢١  
التاريخ: ٢٧/٠٦/٢٠٢١  
المرفقات:

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ  
العدل أساس الحكم

النيابة العامة  
النيابة الجزائية المتخصصة

الأخ / مدير بنك التضامن الاسلامي  
تحية طيبة وبعد:

المحترم  
بالإشارة الى الأحكام القضائية الصادرة من المحكمة الجزائية الابتدائية المتخصصة بالأمانة ضد المحكوم عليه عبد ربه منصور هادي في القضية رقم 102 لسنة 2019م ج ج والتي قضت بإدانتته بتهمة المساس باستقلال الجمهورية اليمنية وإعانة العدو والتخابر مع العدوان والتخابر مع دولة الاحتلال اسرائيل ومعاقبته بالإعدام تعزيراً ومصادرة جميع أمواله الثابتة والمنقولة ، وبالإشارة الى منكرة الأخ رئيس لجنة حصر واستلام ممتلكات الخونة رقم 269/14174 وتاريخ 23 / 6 / 2021م والمتضمنة ان اموال المحكوم عليه عبد ربه منصور هادي النقدية المحجوز عليها لديكم هي الوضحة في الجدول التالي:

اسم العميل	المبلغ المحجوز	العملة	نوع الحساب	رقم الحساب
عبد ربه منصور هادي	31.289.623.900	ريال يمني	محفظة	001-886-271107-000
	636.221.984.25	ريال سعودي	جاري	112-682-211101-000
	907.722.643.44	ريال يمني	جاري	112-886-211101-000

وأنة قد تم فتح حساب لدى البنك المركزي خاص بإدارة الاموال المستردة والمصادرة تحت اشراف النيابة العامة.

ولذلك

يتم نقل تلك الاموال المحكوم بمصادرتها سائلة الذكر من لديكم الى البنك المركزي وايداعها في الحساب رقم (00/1215-10012) ريال يمني والحساب رقم (06/1215-10012) ريال سعودي الخاصين بإدارة الاموال المستردة والمصادرة تحت اشراف النيابة العامة واشعارنا بما يفيد ذلك في اسرع وقت ليتسنى لنا التصرف وفقاً للقانون.

وتقبلوا خالص تحياتنا،

عبد الله محمد زهرة  
رئيس النيابة الجزائية المتخصصة بالأمانة

صورة مع التحية لمعالي الاخ النائب العام

نجيب

Source: Confidential

**Appendix 1 Unofficial translation of Memorandum No 3821 of 27 June 2021**

No. 3821

Dated : 27/6/2021

**Public Prosecution  
Specialized Criminal Prosecution****The Manager**

Tadhamon Bank

With reference to the judicial rulings issued by the Criminal Court of Al-Amana against the convicted Abdrabuh Mansour Hadi, Case No. 102 of 2019 Case No. 407 of 2019 which sentenced him to conviction on charges of compromising the independence of the Republic of Yemen and advocate the enemy in communication with occupying country, Israel and death penalty punishment, condemnation and confiscation of all fixed and movable property, and with reference to the memorandum of Chairman of the Committee for the inventory and receipt of the properties of the traitors No. 14174/269 dated 23/6/2021 and included the money of the convicted Abdrabuh Mansour Hadi is seized with Al-Tadhamon Islamic Bank that is shown in the following table:

Customer Name	Seized Amount	Currency	Account Type	Account Number
19100 Abdrabuh Mansour Hadi	31.289.623.900	Yemeni Rial	Saving	001-886-271107-000
	636.221.984.25	Saudi Riyal	Current	112-682-211101-000
	907.722.643.44	Yemeni Rial	Current	112-886-211101-000

And that an account has been opened with you in the Central Bank for the management of the recovered and confiscated funds under the supervision of the Public Prosecution.

**Therefore**

Those funds, which were sentenced to confiscation above, shall be transferred from you to the Central Bank and deposited in account No. (00/1215-10012) Yemeni Rial and account No. (06/1215-10012) Saudi Riyals for managing the recovered and confiscated funds under the supervision of the Public Prosecution according to the law.

**Abdullah Mohammad Zahra****President- Al-Amana Specialized Criminal Prosecution**

Annex 28 Circular of 28 June 2021 issued by the central bank of yemen, Sana'a regarding freezing the funds of the Tadhamon Bank

REPUBLIC OF YEMEN  
CENTRAL BANK OF YEMEN  
HEAD OFFICE - Sana'a



الجمهورية اليمنية  
البنك المركزي اليمني  
المركز الرئيسي - صنعاء  
التاريخ: 2021/06/28  
الرقم:

وحدة جمع المعلومات المالية  
Financial Information Unit

عاجل

(تعميم الى جميع منشآت وشركات الصرافة العاملة في الجمهورية)

المهترم

الأخ / المدير العام

تحية طيبة وبعد،

الموضوع/ الحجز على جميع اموال وارصدة بنك التضامن الاسلامي

بالإشارة الى الموضوع أعلاه، والى مذكرة الاخ/ رئيس النيابة الجزائية المتخصصة بالأمانة القاضي/ عبدالله محمد زهرة رقم (3830) بتاريخ 2021/6/27م والمسلمة الينا بتاريخ 2021/6/28م بخصوص الحجز على جميع اموال بنك التضامن الاسلامي المودعة في جميع القطاعات المصرفية.

يتم حجز جميع اموال وارصدة بنك التضامن الاسلامي المودعة لديكم في أي صورة كانت فوراً وموافاتنا بجميع الاموال والارصدة المحجوزة يومنا هذا.

وتقبلوا خالص التحية والتقدير،،



فكس : 274113 تليفون 274093 ص . ب 393 صنعاء - الجمهورية اليمنية Sana'a Y.R P.O.Box:393 Tel : 274093 Fax 274113

Source: Confidential

**Appendix 1 Unofficial Translation of Circular of 28 June 2021**

**REPUBLIC OF YEMEN**

**CENTRAL BANK OF YEMEN  
HEAD OFFICE - Sana'a**

**Date: 28 June 2021**

**Financial Information Unit  
(Circular to all public money exchange institutions and companies in the Republic)**

**General Manager,**

**Subject : Seizure of all funds and balances of Al- Tadhamon Islamic Bank**

In reference to the above subject and to the memorandum of the Chief of the Specialized Criminal Prosecution of Al-Amana, Judge Abdullah Muhammad Zahra No. (3820) dated 27/6/2021 and handed over to us on 28/6/2021 regarding the seizure of all funds of Al-Tadhamon Islamic Bank deposited in all banking sectors.

All funds and balances of Al-Tadhamon Islamic Bank deposited with you, in any form, shall be seized immediately and we shall be provided with all the funds and balances seized today.

**Chief of Financial Information Unit  
Wadi Mohammad Al-Sada**

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**Fax: 274113 Lablon 274093M. Box 393 People - Republic of Yemen Fax 274113  
Tel: 274093 P.O.Box:3938, sana'a VR**

## Annex 29 Telecom Sector in Yemen

1. Despite the ongoing conflict, the telecommunications industry continues to witness significant growth and has been a major source of revenue for the Houthi authorities. According to the World Bank, prior to 2015, government revenue from the telecommunications industry was said to be second largest after hydrocarbons.<sup>265</sup> The number of mobile phone connections rose from 15.7 million in 2014 to 18.6 million by end-2019 and the number of internet users rose from 3.2 million in 2014 to 7.2 million by end-2019.<sup>266</sup>

2. A sector with a high revenue generating potential would naturally attract significant attention from the rival factions in the conflict. The majority of the telecom companies in Yemen are based in Sana'a, and a sizeable number of users reside in the Houthi-controlled areas. The Houthi authorities in Sana'a allegedly exercise control over these telecom companies and the sector, reportedly, has been a major source of revenue to the Houthis.<sup>267</sup> The Panel has received information that the Houthis, under the leadership of Abdullah Misfer Al-Shaer, have taken control of certain Sana'-based telecom companies.

3. The political, regulatory, and operational roles in the telecom sector in Yemen have not been segregated. The ministry of telecommunications and information technology responsible for the areas under the control of the Houthis is the overarching body that performs all types of roles concerning this sector: formulating bylaws, policies and plans; managing the spectrum for mobile broadband services; granting licenses; maintaining the national numbering plan; approving pricing policies for services; regulating all sub-sectors, namely landline and mobile telephony, internet services, and posts and also enforcing the laws, especially the licensing agreements between the Sana'-based ministry and the telecom service providers.

4. Companies operating in the areas under the control of the Houthis face policy uncertainties, levy of illegal fees and charges, extortion and confiscation of their assets. Licenses are deliberately issued for short durations to create operational uncertainties for companies.<sup>268</sup> The companies are forced to pay fees for a temporary extension of the operating licence on an annual basis, which provide a regular source of revenue to the authorities, both legal and illegal. The Panel received information that a total amount of about USD 22 million per annum, including an annual renewal fee of USD 13.2 million and the balance towards the frequency fees and the management fees, was collected by the de-facto authorities in Sana'a from some Sana'-based telecom companies.<sup>269</sup>

<sup>265</sup> <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/337651508409897554/Yemen-information-andcommunication-technology-ICT>.

<sup>266</sup> <https://sanaacenter.org/publications/main-publications/12721> quoting from (i) for 2014 data, Central Statistical Organisation (CSO), "Statistical Year Book for 2016 – Chapter 13: Communications & Information Technology," and (ii) for 2019 data, MTIT (Sana'a), "Telecommunication and Information Technology Infrastructure Indicators 2019 [AR]."

<sup>267</sup> Panel received information from the GoY and other sources. "According to unofficial estimates, the Houthis annually receive about 80 billion riyals (equivalent to \$160 million) from the public and private telecommunications sector." see <https://alkhaleejonline.net/>.

<sup>268</sup> Panel received information from confidential sources that annual renewal fees of USD 13.2 million was collected by the ministry of telecom from the telecom companies; and taking into account the frequency fees and the management fees, the total revenue collected from MTN and Sabafon was about USD 22 million per annum.

<sup>269</sup> According to a report, published at <https://sanaacenter.org/publications/main-publications/12721>, "In 2016, MTN Yemen paid \$36.4 million for a 29-month extension to their original 15-year license that was granted in July 2000, thereby extending their operating license to December 2017. .... MTN Yemen, which held a market share of 42.8% as of 2016 according to their estimates, presumably paid—according to the terms of their license agreement—what would have amounted to YER 1.7 billion annually for the duration of their 15-year license that became effective in July 2000." The Panel has written to MTN for confirmation and their response is awaited.

5. The Houthis illegally collect fees under the pretext of regulating the telecommunications sector. The Sana'a-based companies continue to pay various fees such as license renewal fees, taxes, and zakat fees. The Panel has received information that some of the companies have also been subject to financial extortion by the Houthis who have also confiscated the funds and assets of private telecommunications companies in Yemen.<sup>270</sup> Further, according to a media report, Houthis allegedly took over Y mobile telecommunication company after arranging to declare it "bankrupt by a court under their control."<sup>271</sup> Y telecom, reportedly, "declared bankruptcy in March 2020 and left behind its physical assets such as real estate and its inventory of equipment in Sana'a, to restart its operations in Aden using 4G technology."<sup>272</sup> Y telecom has been requested by the Panel for a confirmation, their response is awaited.

6. The Government of Yemen has informed the Panel that USD 25 million of funds of MTN, Sana'a, located in the company's account maintained with the International Bank of Yemen, have allegedly been confiscated.<sup>273</sup> Finally, with effect from 17 November 2021, MTN Group, which held 82.8% of the shares in MTN Yemen, left Yemen by transferring its "majority shareholding in MTN Yemen to Emerald International Investment LCC. Emerald is a subsidiary of Zubair Investment Center LLC, an affiliate of Zubair Corporation LLC, which is the minority shareholder in MTN Yemen."<sup>274</sup> The Panel wrote to Sabafon in Aden, Sabafon in Sana'a, Y Telecom, YemenNet, MTN, TeleYemen in Aden and TeleYemen in Sana'a about this and for other information. While TeleYemen, Sana'a has replied to the Panel (see paragraph 84), responses from other companies are awaited.

7. The Panel was informed that Abdullah Mesfer Al-Shaer was appointed as managing director/chairman of Sabafon, Sana'a on 29 July 2019 and that he subsequently appointed the Vice-Chairman of the Board of Directors, the Executive General Manager and the Financial Manager of Sabafon, Sana'a (Figure 29.1 and Appendix 1).

<sup>270</sup> As per the report of the Emirati al-Bayan newspaper, in 2018, the Ansarullah authorities confiscated YER 51 billion from Yemeni telecom operators distributed as follows: YER 27 billion from Sabafon, YER 17 billion from Y, YER 7 billion from MTN Yemen. See: <https://www.al-bayan.ae/one-world/arabs/2019-10-08-1.3668294>.

<sup>271</sup> As per media report, quoting sources in the Sana'a-based ministry of communications and information technology, Sana'a, the Houthi leaders, namely Muhammad Ali al-Houthi, Abu Ali al-Hakem, and others were seeking to take over the mobile telecommunications company (Y) after declaring it bankrupt. "A commercial court subject to the control of the Houthi militias in Sana'a announced in an official announcement in Al-Thawra newspaper published on Wednesday March 11, 2020 the bankruptcy of 'Y' mobile company." See <https://www.newsyemen.net/new/53464>. The Panel has written to Y Telecom for confirmation and their response is awaited.

<sup>272</sup> <https://sanaacenter.org/publications/main-publications/12721>.

<sup>273</sup> Letter from the Government of Yemen to the Panel.

<sup>274</sup> <https://www.mtn.com/mtn-group-progresses-with-the-simplification-of-its-portfolio-with-exit-from-yemen/>.



Figure 29.2

## Press release by Sabafon shareholders on the attack and shifting of Head Office to Aden

### Press release Issued by the Extraordinary Meeting of Sabafon Shareholders

(Sabafon shareholders unanimously annul the proceedings of the so-called judicial trustee)

Yemen Company for Mobile Telephony (Sabafon) held an extraordinary general assembly meeting of the shareholders of the company in Amman, Jordan on Thursday, the fifth of September, 2019. It was attended by the absolute majority of the company's shareholders including Bahrain Telecommunications Company (Batelco), Consolidated Contractors Company C.C.C, Hayel Saeed Anam Group, Al-Ahmar Group and a representative of the Yemeni Government.

The Assembly reviewed the illegal actions that the company was exposed to recently by armed groups affiliated to the authorities of Sana'a and decided to continue the activity of the company and also approved the transfer of the company's headquarters, administration and operations to the city of Aden, the temporary capital of the Republic of Yemen in implementation of the invitation of the Government of Yemen. The assembly also made important decisions and statements regarding the future of the company's activities and operations.

1- Condemnation of armed groups of the illegal authorities controlling the capital Sana'a on Wednesday, 31-7-1919 AD, breaking in and seizing the headquarters of Sabafon Company in Sana'a, controlling its departments, changing its guard, controlling its facilities, equipment and systems in Sana'a and imposing illegal managers on the company's departments in Sana'a appointed by that armed group affiliated to the authorities in Sana'a, which is considered illegal by the United Nations and the international community.

2- The association refutes the allegations and fake news made by the intruders of the company belonging to the authorities of Sana'a. In this regard, the Assembly affirms that the general assembly meeting of the shareholders of the company was not held during this year, except this extraordinary meeting held in Amman on 5-9-2019. The Assembly of company's shareholders has not taken any decisions to change the current board of directors' members, chairman or the managers of the company.

3 - The Assembly condemns the use of fraud and forgery as a cover for these blatant procedures based on that the intruders have held a fake meeting of the General Assembly of the company, while it is nothing more than a major lie that has nothing to do with the truth and a fabrication of papers and documents not issued by the authorities of the legal company. The reality of what happened to the company in Sana'a is the robbery by force and outside the framework of the law and the constitution of the rights of local and international shareholders who contributed and invested in the Republic of Yemen with good intention and credit according to the law and under the guarantees of the Constitution and the investment laws of the Republic of Yemen.

4- The Assembly condemns all illegal steps and actions taken by impersonators of managers in Sana'a who are appointed by the armed group and attempts to communicate illegally with local and international entities, including suppliers, distributors, banks and local and international service providers of the company. The Assembly calls on all local and international banks, distributors, suppliers and service providers of the company not to deal with any party or entity under any justification or reason, except by written instructions by the authorized signatories of the company duly, namely: current Chairman and CEO of the company and the financial manager that no decisions were taken by the general assembly of the company to change them.

5 - To report the invalidity, illegality and the lack of any documents of any kind or source provided by the illegal impersonated administration that controls the company's building and facilities in Sana'a under the protection of the armed group and the illegal Sana'a authorities as they are issued by illegal authorities located in the city of Sana'a, which is under the control and instructions of those authorities which control the capital Sana'a by armed force which are considered illegal by the United Nations and the international community.

6- The Assembly calls upon suppliers, entities, banks, distributors and others to emphasize the importance of implementing the Company's requests issued by its legal Department because of the importance of this matter and the critical current circumstances and the Company's and its shareholders' fears of the damages that may affect the Company as a result of dealing with the illegal administration in Sana'a. In this regard, the assembly confirms the importance of protecting the banks accounts and funds, and the company's dealings with the entities, suppliers, banks, distributors and others of the tampering of the illegitimate authorities of Sana'a and those working with them in violation of the constitution, all laws and religious canons.

7- Holding the authorities, suppliers, banks, distributors and others dealing with the illegal administration in Sana'a full legal and criminal responsibility for all material and moral damages that affect the company and its various interests as a result of ignoring the company's requests, its legal management and its shareholders not to deal with the banks accounts, funds, transactions and interests of the company with any person or entity except through the official and legal administration of the company.

8- Announcing and reporting that the breaking in of the company by armed force and seizing the company by the armed group of the illegal authorities of Sana'a shall be considered as ignoring the Constitution, all laws in force, the state and its bodies and the judiciary. Stealing the funds and property owned by others and seize them by armed force, impersonating the shareholders, chairman and member of board of directors and the managers shall be considered criminal offenses and full-fledged crimes.

9- The Assembly decided to take all legal measures against those who committed these crimes or cooperate in achieving them against the company, its shareholders and employees, or impersonate the shareholders, members of the board of directors, its chairman, the CEO or any other administrative or legal status without any right and outside the law. The actors of the aforementioned crimes (persons and official and non-official entities), including the use of all rights and legal guarantees of the company and its shareholders to protect investments determined by laws, bilateral agreements and constitutional guarantees.



Yemen Company for Mobile Telephony - Sabafon  
Headquarters in the temporary capital of Aden  
Republic of Yemen

**Source:** <https://twitter.com/sabafonyemen/status/1178301571769217024>.


9. The Government of Yemen has informed the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (IANA) alleging that the office of TeleYemen in Sana'a is controlled by the Houthis and that TeleYemen, owned by the Government of Yemen has been relocated to Aden (Figure 29.4). The Panel wrote to TeleYemen, Sana'a about this, but the company denies any takeover by the Houthis and stated that its management was appointed prior to the current conflict and that this transfer to Aden was never officially communicated and, therefore, it does not recognize the transfer under company law. The Panel is investigating the extent of control exercised by the Houthis over some of the telecom companies.

10. Control over the telecom sector can provide a major strategic advantage to the Houthis. The Panel is investigating whether the Houthis have gained effective control over the national Top Level Domain (TLD), '.ye'. Control over the TLD and illegal use of communication interception tools potentially would provide Houthis with the capacity to monitor and interdict traffic, censor content, carry out internet shutdowns, ban social media sites and personal messaging services, monitor private communications of opponents, and block domains in all parts of the country.

11. The Panel has received information that TeleYemen, has recently purchased a ‘bandwidth management system’ that uses deep packet inspection. Deep Packet Inspection can monitor all data, messages, text, voice, and video traffic over any packet in the bandwidth. TeleYemen, Sana’a has stated to the Panel that “the laws of Yemen require ISPs to filter certain content that goes against the law and Islamic doctrines and that they use it for the purpose of protecting children from any inappropriate content and there is no illegal usage”.<sup>278</sup>

Figure 29.4

### Letter from the Minister of Telecommunication and Information Technology, Government of Yemen to IANA



**Source:** Government of Yemen

<sup>278</sup> Letter from TeleYemen, Sana'a to the Panel dated 17 December 2021.

12. Considering the importance of the telecom sector for the economy and the general needs of the people of Yemen, this sector should be depoliticised, double taxation avoided, import policy reviewed to permit *bonafide* imports for use by the telecom companies across Yemen, and tariff rationalised. Access to telecommunication and internet is essential for the civilian population and any measures taken in respect to this sector should not result in any adverse consequences for the civilian population.

## Appendix 1 Unofficial translation: Notification of changes in management of Sabafon

### Subject / Notification of changes in management in the company and the change of authorized signatories to the financial system with you

Yemeni mobile phone company - Sabafon

Based on the company's general assembly meeting and its election of a new board of directors and a new chairman of the board, a new executive management has been appointed for the company, and we ask you to change all dealings with the company based on the new changes in its management through:

1. Radically cut off dealings with the previous administration
- 2 - Completely cancel the powers and signatures of the previous administration
- 3 - Approval of the powers and signatures of the authorized names by the new administration described below, on all checks and transfers from all company accounts on your part, in addition to all financial transactions.

Name	Designation
Abdullah Mesfer Al-Shaer	Chairman of the Board of Directors
Ahmed Ahmed Musaid	Vice-Chairman of the Board of Directors
Abdul Khaliq Ali Ali al Gaili	Executive General Manager
Ali Ahmed Ahmed Jahiz	Financial Manager

Signature

Abdullah Mesfer Al-Shaer  
Chairman of the Board of Directors

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**Annex 30: Seizure of Telecom equipment by Yemeni Customs**

1. The Panel received allegations that Houthi authorities are illegally importing telecom equipment through land borders at Al Mahara, and that the Houthis have been setting up international calling facilities using satellite receivers, which are connected to SIM boxes that can attach about 100 SIM cards. Houthis also allegedly resort to illegal diversion of international calls and provide international call services to the users at rates less than the official rates. The revenue collected through these illegal call facilities is allegedly used by the Houthis for their activities that threaten peace, security and stability in Yemen.
2. The Government has informed the Panel that, “to strengthen their war-disciplined system, the militias are working on importing and smuggling precision equipments and communications equipment, whether traditional or those via satellite”.<sup>279</sup> The Government also informed that they have seized many consignments of telecom equipment, and “there are dozens of shipments that reach the Houthis through smuggling networks, and this poses a great danger to the security and stability of Yemen and Yemenis and contributes to prolonging the war.”<sup>280</sup> The Government has informed that they would share the details with the Panel.
3. The Panel is investigating a case in which a consignment of telecom equipment imported into Yemen in May 2021 through the Oman-Yemen land border was seized by the Yemeni Customs at Al-Mahara, as the said telecom equipment were brought into Yemen without obtaining permission or licence from the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology of the Government of Yemen to import these items.
4. The Panel is investigating if the individuals or entities behind these illegal imports of telecom equipment have any links with or if they act on behalf of individuals designated under the 2140 sanctions regime or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them, and, if so, whether funds, financial assets or economic resources are being generated out of the use or sale of these equipment and/or whether these are used in violations of the sanctions regime for activities that threaten peace security and stability in Yemen. The Panel continues to investigate the allegations.

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<sup>279</sup> Letter from the Government of Yemen to the Panel.

<sup>280</sup> Letter from the Government of Yemen to the Panel.


## Annex 31: Black-marketing and Illegal Fees on import of Fuel

1. According to various sources, the Houthis have created an artificial scarcity of fuel in areas under their control in order to force the traders to sell oil on the black-market operated by them and collect illegal fees from the sales. As per information made available by the Government of Yemen, the Houthis have collected official revenues on fuel imports in excess of YER 70 billion.<sup>281</sup>

2. Prior to June 2019, Hudaydah port was the major port of import of fuel into Yemen (48%), compared to Aden (33%), Mukalla (16%) and Nishtun (3%).<sup>282</sup> There has been a significant change in the pattern of fuel import into Yemen since then. In April-May 2021, the share of Hudaydah port had come down to 8 percent.<sup>283</sup> With the announcement by Saudi Arabia of a grant of USD 422 million worth of petroleum products to the Government of Yemen in March 2021,<sup>284</sup> for power stations and to support public services, as the country faced a fuel shortage, the volumes of imports through the southern ports started increasing in May–June 2021. Of the total quantities of fuel imported into the areas under the control of the Houthis, during April-May 2021, only eight percent (54,679 Metric Tonnes (MTs)) was imported through Hudaydah port and 92 percent (631,959 MTs) was transported by road after being imported through Aden, Mukalla and Nishtun ports under the control of the Government of Yemen.<sup>285</sup> The fuel supply to the Houthi-controlled areas by the land route, during April-May 2021, was about 10 thousand metric tonnes per day, which represented about 65 percent of the fuel imported into Yemen, in contrast to 6 thousand metric tonnes per day in January-March 2021,<sup>286</sup> evidencing an increase in supply through the land route.<sup>287</sup>

Figure 31.1

### Fuel Imports from January 2020 to July 2021 in MTs



**Source:** [https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20210817\\_acaps\\_yemen\\_analysis\\_hub\\_fuel\\_prices\\_0.pdf](https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20210817_acaps_yemen_analysis_hub_fuel_prices_0.pdf).

<sup>281</sup> See the press release of the Government of Yemen available at <https://www.mofa-ye.org/Pages/13405/>.

<sup>282</sup> [https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20210817\\_acaps\\_yemen\\_analysis\\_hub\\_fuel\\_prices\\_0.pdf](https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20210817_acaps_yemen_analysis_hub_fuel_prices_0.pdf).

<sup>283</sup> <https://www.mofa-ye.org/Pages/13405/>.

<sup>284</sup> <https://www.reuters.com/article/yemen-security-saudi-int-idUSKBN2BM36W>.

<sup>285</sup> <https://www.mofa-ye.org/Pages/13405/>.

<sup>286</sup> <https://twitter.com/SECYemen1/status/1378097160252751875>.

<sup>287</sup> <https://www.mofa-ye.org/Pages/13405/>.

3. The Panel has received information that although the customs duties are collected at the first port of import in non-Houthi controlled areas, the Houthis, illegally collect additional fees and customs duties from the traders at their land customs stations.<sup>288</sup> The business of supplying fuel to Houthi-controlled areas has been found to be very lucrative for many, except of course the end-consumers: the Government of Yemen has increased its customs revenue from the imports; the STC also allegedly collect fees of about YER12 per litre of imported fuel from the importers;<sup>289</sup> and the importers/traders who seize this opportunity to get enriched. Unfortunately, the consumers on both sides have to suffer, the consumers in the Houthi-controlled areas pay more because of the land transportation cost, double taxation and the illegal practices being followed by the Houthis and the consumers in the Government of Yemen-controlled areas pay more mostly because of the depreciating YER, profits by the traders and other hidden supply chain and distribution costs. As per a report, “Fuel prices at Yemen Petroleum Company (YPC) stations in DFA-controlled areas increased by 76% between July 2018 and April 2021, from YER 6,807 to YER 12,000 per 20 litres. --In IRG-controlled areas, prices rose by 108% between July 2018 and April 2021, from YER 5,372 to YER 11,175 per 20 litres.”<sup>290</sup> The Panel has been informed that the increase in fuel prices has negatively impacted the implementing partners of international humanitarian organizations.

<sup>288</sup> The Panel was informed by an importer that the Houthis collect YER 37 per litre since February 2021.

<sup>289</sup> The Panel was informed by an importer that earlier they were paying YER 7 per litre but since April 2021, it has been increased to YER 12 per litre and this amount is deposited in some designated account in an exchange company in Aden. During the meeting of the Panel with the Economic Committee (EC) of the STC on 21 August 2021 in Aden, the EC clarified that it represented local taxes.

<sup>290</sup> [https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20210817\\_acaps\\_yemen\\_analysis\\_hub\\_fuel\\_prices\\_0.pdf](https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20210817_acaps_yemen_analysis_hub_fuel_prices_0.pdf).

**Annex 32: Saudi Deposit**

The Panel has determined that the publication of this annex may pose a threat to individuals and entities, and their activities in Yemen. Therefore, the information in this annex is not for publication.

### Annex 33 Investigation of Coalition airstrikes in Yemen

1. In this annex, the Panel presents case studies of Coalition airstrikes in Yemen investigated by the Panel since January 2021.

2. The deterioration of the security situation in Yemen affected the capacity of the Panel to have access to all information needed in respect to several investigations on airstrikes. The Panel itself and its sources were unable to undertake numerous travels, especially in areas near conflict zones. The fear of witnesses in Houthi-controlled areas to communicate with the Panel or to register the geolocation of incidents also affected the Panel's investigations.

3. The Panel received information, reports and/or pictures relating to six incidents that were allegedly attributable to the Coalition and was able to conclude investigations on two incidents (see appendix hereafter). The Panel sent a letter to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in respect to the six cases and is awaiting a reply.

4. For the four remaining cases described below, the Panel received insufficient evidence to conclude its investigation:

a) One incident occurred on 28 February 2021 at approximately 1230 hours, in which an explosive ordnance hit a house in al Hawk district, Al Hudaydah. It resulted in the death of five people, including one child, and the injury to a woman, and a child. The Panel received information that the incident could have been a UAV attack. The Panel has not received pictures of explosive ordnance debris and is unable to reach a conclusion in this respect. According to the Civilian Impact Monitoring Project,<sup>291</sup> the location of the incident was 14° 46' 28.2" N, 42° 57' 58.32" E.

b) One airstrike occurred on 7 March 2021 at approximately 1430 hours in which a civilian area in Al Amanat Al Asimah (Sana'a city) was hit. The incident resulted in the injury to a man and two children, as well as damage to shops and houses. According to information received by the Panel from two different sources, the location of the incident was in the vicinity of 15° 23' 28.68" N, 44° 11' 7.8" E.

c) Another airstrike occurred on 10 May 2021 at approximately 1600 hours in Rada'a district, Al Bayda, which targeted a car resulting in the death of one man and the injury of two women. According to the Civilian Impact Monitoring Project, the location of the incident was 14° 22' 48"N, 44° 55' 15.6" E.

d) A fourth incident occurred on 18 September 2021, in which a car in Merkhaj al Ulya district, Shabwah, was hit, resulting in the death of five people including a child and a woman. According to the Civilian Impact Monitoring Project, the location of the incident was 14° 26' 5.28" N, 45° 54' 50.76" E. On 22 September 2021, the spokesperson of the Coalition, Brigadier General Turki Al-Maliki said that: "the Coalition confirms that it has not received any information nor coordination from UN OCHA in Yemen regarding this allegation as per the coordination mechanism in such cases. No such information has been conveyed to the Coalition regarding the claimed airstrike. The Coalition considers these claims seriously, takes all necessary and required procedures to validate them, and announce the results of any investigations through proper referral to the Joint Incidents Assessment Team."<sup>292</sup>

<sup>291</sup> <https://civilianimpactmonitoring.org/>

<sup>292</sup> See online: <https://www.spa.gov.sa/2289036>.

5. In its report S/2019/83, annex 34, the Panel presented the results of its investigation in respect to a shelling incident that occurred on 2 August 2018 in the city of Hudaydah and which hit the al Thawra hospital and a market. The Panel concluded that both Houthi forces and the Coalition could have been responsible for the attack. On 29 September 2021, the JIAT released the result of some investigations, including this specific one, and concluded that the Coalition Surface Forces did not carry out any firing in Hudaydah city on that date.<sup>293</sup> The Panel has still not received any information from Houthi forces in connection to this attack.

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<sup>293</sup> <https://www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=en&newsid=2290995>

## Appendix 1 Airstrike against Al Raks village, Al Mahliyah district, Ma'rib, 16 January 2021

### I. Background

1. At approximately 0830 hours on 16 January 2021, an explosive ordnance allegedly launched from an aircraft, hit a car in Al Mahliyah district, Ma'rib. The incident resulted in the death of the driver who was, according to information received by the Panel, a merchant transporting food (see figure 33.1).
2. The Panel received different information regarding the specific location of the incident but was not able to verify it. According to a report received by the Panel, the incident occurred in Wadi Dhaza (وادي دحظة) on the road between the Al Amoud area and Al Raks village in the Al Mahliyah district. According to a local source, the incident occurred on the main road of Al Raks village, while the driver was going from one shop to another. According to the Civilian Impact Monitoring Project,<sup>294</sup> the incident occurred in Al Raks village at 14° 33' 37.08"N, 45° 17' 34.8"E.

### II. Legal analysis

3. According to information received by the Panel, the victim was not involved in hostilities and there were no military activities or fighting in the area at the time of the attack.
4. Under IHL, parties to the conflict must, at all times, distinguish between civilians and combatants, and direct attacks only against combatants.<sup>295</sup> They also have the obligation to take all feasible precautions to avoid or minimise incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.<sup>296</sup>
5. Based on the information received by the Panel, it seems unlikely that the principle of distinction was respected.

Figure 33.1

#### Car after the incident



*Source:* Confidential

## Appendix 2: Al Salif Port, Al Hudaydah, 21 March 2021

<sup>294</sup> <https://civilianimpactmonitoring.org/>

<sup>295</sup> See CIHL, rule 1 at [https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1\\_rul](https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul).

<sup>296</sup> CIHL rule 16 at [https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1\\_rul](https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul).

## I. Background

1. At approximately 0230 hours on 21 March 2021, two explosive ordnances launched from an aircraft hit, approximately five minutes apart, a warehouse and a building owned by the Yemeni International Company for Food Production Ltd at Al Salif port (15° 18' 51.50"N, 42°40' 36.16"E) (see figures 33.2, 33.3 and 33.4). The incident resulted in the injury of six workers of the company.
2. The Panel received pictures of remnants of the explosive ordnances found in both buildings and they are consistent with guided bombs used by the Coalition (see figure 33.5).
3. The Panel sent a letter to the Coalition in respect to this incident and is awaiting a reply.

## II. Legal analysis

4. The Panel received information from several sources that the Houthis are using the port of Al Salif for military activities, among others for the manufacturing of sea mines. However, the Panel still lacks conclusive evidence.<sup>297</sup>
5. According to information received by the Panel, the two buildings in the port of Al Salif referenced above were used for civilian purposes and not for military operations. They are located in a compound separated by a concrete wall in which several offices, accommodation, warehouses and grain silos are housed.
6. Under IHL, parties to the conflict must, at all time, distinguish between civilians and combatants, and direct attacks only against combatants.<sup>298</sup> They also have the obligation to take all feasible precautions to avoid or minimise incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, and damage to civilian objects.<sup>299</sup>
7. Based on the information received, the Panel concludes that it is unlikely that the principles of distinction and proportionality were respected, however, if additional information is provided, the Panel stands ready to review its findings.

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<sup>297</sup> The Panel welcomes any information and evidence in this respect.

<sup>298</sup> See CIHL, rule 1 at [https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1\\_rul](https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul).

<sup>299</sup> CIHL, rule 16 at [https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1\\_rul](https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul).

Figure 33.2  
Location of the two buildings hit in Al Salif port




Source: Google Earth, Panel

Figure 33.3  
Damages to the accommodation buildings



Source: Confidential

Figure 33.4  
**Damages to the warehouse and impact crater**



**Source:** Confidential

Figure 33.5  
**Pictures of debris found on the site after the incident**



**Source:** Confidential

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**Annex 34      Violations in the context of detention**

The Panel has determined that the publication of this annex may pose a threat to individuals and entities, and their activities in Yemen. Therefore, the information in this annex is not for publication.

## Annex 35 Use of explosive ordnance in civilian populated areas attributed to Houthi Forces

1. The Panel is investigating eight incidents of indiscriminate use of explosive ordnance in populated areas by Houthi forces in Ma'rib and Ta'izz, which allegedly led to the deaths of 33 people, including eight children, and injuries to 51 others, including 11 children (see Table 34.1).

2. The Panel's investigations are based on interviews with victims and witnesses, reports, pictures and videos, as well as other information available in the public domain. The Panel sent a letter to the Houthi authorities in that respect and is awaiting a reply. If the Houthi political or military leadership can provide information and evidence regarding these attacks that may counter the Panel's preliminary findings, the Panel stands ready to review its findings.

Table 35.1

### Cases of indiscriminate use of explosive ordnance in populated areas by the Houthi forces between December 2020 and November 2021 investigated by the Panel

<i>Appendix</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Impact Point</i>	<i>Victims/Damage</i>
1	12 December 2020	13°34'28.36" N, 44° 1'23.75"E	Al Ahli Football club, Ta'izz	Two people killed, including one child, and two children injured.
2	8 January 2021	13°35'58.8"N, 43°57'45.6"E	Near the old airport in Al Mudhaffar Ta'izz	One child killed, one woman and one child injured.
3	20 February 2021	13°35'51.7"N, 44°00'58.1"E	Al Qahira, Ta'izz city	One child killed, four people injured, including three children.
4	5 March and 8 May 2021	13°35'12.16"N, 44° 1'25.01"E	Al Thawra hospital, Ta'izz	One person injured.
5	3 April 2021	tbc	Al Rawda, Ma'rib	One child killed, four children injured.
6	5 June 2021	15°28'50.3"N, 45°18'47.4"E	Gas station, Ma'rib	Allegedly 14 killed, including one child, and 5 injured.
7	10 June 2021	15°27'54.4"N, 45°19'29.8"E	Mosque, Ambulances, Ma'rib	Allegedly six killed and 32 injured.
8	30 October 2021	13°34'30.7"N, 44°01'46.2"E	Al Camp Street, Ta'izz	Three children killed, one child injured.

*Source:* Panel

## Appendix 1 Al Ahli football club, Ta'izz city, 12 December 2020

### I. Background

1. On 12 December 2020, at approximately 0600 hours, an explosive ordnance hit the Al Ahli football club in Ta'izz city. The club is in the vicinity of the Al Shohada'a stadium (13°34'28.36" N, 44° 1'23.75"E) in a civilian area.
2. Eight civilians were present and the attack resulted in the death of one boy and one man, as well as injuries to three other boys.
3. The Al Ahli football club is located in the "Olympic field" in Ta'izz, which is an area hosting several sports clubs.
4. According to the information received by the Panel, the explosive ordnance was launched from a mountainous area North of the impact point which is under Houthi control.

### II. Analysis of IHL violations

5. According to the information received by the Panel, there was no military presence at the Al Ahli football club or in its vicinity at the time of the attack.
6. Under IHL, civilians and civilian objects should not be the object of attacks.<sup>300</sup>
7. Mortar bombs and artillery shells have a high level of inaccuracy, and the likelihood of indiscriminate effects increases when those weapons are used on targets in the proximity of civilians and civilian objects, and especially in a densely populated area such as the city of Ta'izz.
8. The Panel concludes that the principle of distinction was not respected.

Figure 35.1

#### Location of the impact



**Source:** Google Earth, Panel

<sup>300</sup> See article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions, article 13 (2) Additional Protocol II and Customary IHL, rule 1.

Figure 35.2  
**Damages to the Club**



Source: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3nJTA4uBTgo&ab\\_channel=VICENews](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3nJTA4uBTgo&ab_channel=VICENews)

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**Appendix 2 Area in the vicinity of the old airport in Al Mudhaffar, Ta'izz, 8 January 2021****I. Background**

1. On 8 January 2021, at approximately 1100 hours an explosive ordnance hit a residential area in Ta'izz city, near the old airport in Al Mudhaffar (13°35'58.8"N, 43°57'45.6"E).
2. The incident resulted in the death of a 15-year-old boy, and injuries to a woman and a child.

**II. Analysis of IHL violations**

3. According to information received by the Panel, there was no military presence in the area at the time of the attack.
4. Under IHL, civilians and civilian objects should not be the object of attacks.<sup>301</sup>
5. Mortar bombs and artillery shells have a high level of inaccuracy, and the likelihood of indiscriminate effects increases when those weapons are used on targets in proximity to civilians and civilian objects, especially in densely populated areas such as the city of Ta'izz.
6. The Panel concludes that the principle of distinction was not respected.

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<sup>301</sup> See article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions, article 13 (2) Additional Protocol II and Customary IHL, rule 1.

Figure 35.3  
**Location of the impact**



**Source:** Google Earth, Panel

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## Appendix 3 Al Qahira, Ta'izz city, 20 February 2021

### I. Background

1. At approximately 1700 hours on 20 February 2021, an explosive ordnance hit a civilian area in Al Qahira, Ta'izz (13°35'51.7"N, 44°00'58.1"E). The attack resulted in the death of one child and injuries to four people: three children and one man.

### II. Analysis of IHL violations

2. According to information received by the Panel, there was no military presence in the area at the time of the attack.

3. Under IHL, civilians and civilian objects should not be the object of attacks.<sup>302</sup>


4. Mortar bombs and artillery shells have a high level of inaccuracy, and the likelihood of indiscriminate effects increases when those weapons are used on targets in proximity to civilians and civilian objects, and especially in densely populated areas such as the city of Ta'izz.

5. The Panel concludes that the principle of distinction was not respected.

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<sup>302</sup> See article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions, article 13 (2) Additional Protocol II and Customary IHL, rule 1.

Figure 35.4  
**Location of the attack**



**Source:** Google Earth, Panel

## Appendix 4 Al Tharwa hospital, Ta'izz city, 5 March and 8 May 2021

### I. Background

1. On 5 March 2021, an explosive ordnance hit the operation theatre of the Al Tharwa hospital in Ta'izz (13°35'12.16"N, 44° 1'25.01"E). The incident resulted in injuries to one man. The operation theatre was hit again on 8 May 2021 at approximately 2330 hours and resulted in damage to the hospital.
2. This is not the first time the Panel has reported on this hospital being hit by explosive ordnances. See appendix 3, Annex 33 of [S/2021/79](#), table 9 and annex 51 of [S/2018/193](#), and paragraph 183 and annex 67 of [S/2018/594](#).

### II. Analysis of IHL violations

3. Under IHL, hospitals and medical centers exclusively assigned for medical purposes must be respected and protected in all circumstances. Hospitals only lose their protection if they are being used outside their humanitarian function to commit acts harmful to the enemy. Furthermore, the protection of hospitals and medical units may cease only after a warning has been given and only after a reasonable time has elapsed after such a warning.<sup>303</sup>
4. According to information received by the Panel, the explosive ordnance came from the North of Tai'zz where the Houthis occupy a mountainous area.
5. The Panel concludes that the principle of distinction, and the rules affording protection to medical units were not respected.<sup>304</sup>

<sup>303</sup> See article 3 common to the Geneva Convention, art. 11 AP II and CIHL rule 28.

<sup>304</sup> See article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions, art. 13 APII, and CIHL rule 1.

## Appendix 5 Al Rawdah, Ma'rib city, 3 April 2021

### I. Background

1. At approximately 1630 hours on 3 April 2021, an explosive ordnance hit Al Rawdah area, Ma'rib city (see figures 35.5 and 35.6). This resulted in the death of one child and injuries to four other children. According to testimonies and reports received by the Panel, the children were playing on the street when the explosive ordnance hit.
2. According to information received by the Panel, the explosive ordnance originated from Sirwah district, parts of which are under the control of the Houthi forces.
3. The Panel was unable to identify the specific location of the impact point but received information that it is located approximately two kilometres South from the Sahn Al Jin military camp<sup>305</sup> and 1.5 kilometres North-West of a military base (see figure 35.7)

### II. Analysis of IHL violations

1. As mentioned above, the Panel notes two military locations at approximately two and 1.5 kilometres away from the location of the incident.
2. However, the Panel also notes that the explosive ordnance fell in a civilian area and that only civilian children were victims of the attack.
3. Under IHL, parties to the conflict must, in the conduct of hostilities, take constant care to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects. All feasible precautions must be taken to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.<sup>306</sup>
4. Mortar bombs and artillery shells have a high level of inaccuracy, and the likelihood of indiscriminate effects increases when those weapons are used on targets in proximity to civilians and civilian objects, and especially in densely populated areas.
5. The Panel concludes that the principle of precautions was not respected.

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<sup>305</sup> 15°30'22.0"N, 45°19'36.0"E

<sup>306</sup> CIHL, rule 15.

Figure 35.5  
Damage resulting from the explosive ordnance



*Source:* Confidential

Figure 35.6  
**Debris of the explosive ordnance**



*Source:* Confidential

Figure 35.7  
**Rawdah area (within the black line) and proximity of military facilities**



*Source:* Google Earth with Panel's annotation

## Appendix 6 Petrol station, Ma'rib city, 5 June 2021

### I. Background

1. Between 1700 and 1730 hours on 5 June 2021, an explosive ordnance hit a petrol station in Ma'rib city (15°28'50.3"N, 45°18'47.4"E). According to reports, pictures, videos, and testimonies received by the Panel, the incident resulted in the deaths of between 14 and 21 civilians, including one child, and injuries to five people. Seven cars were also destroyed. The Panel only received conclusive evidence of the death of one child and one man.
2. According to information received by the Panel, several people, including some military personnel, were queuing at the petrol station to refuel at the time of the incident.
3. The Panel received information that there is a military base belonging to the Government of Yemen in the vicinity of the petrol station (see figure 35.9).
4. The Houthi forces acknowledged the attack and said that the target was the military camp nearby and Mohammed Ali Al Houthi called for an independent investigation (see figure 35.8).<sup>307</sup>
5. According to information received by the Panel, the attack was launched from Sirwah district, located towards the West of Ma'rib city from areas under the control of Houthi forces at the time.

### II. Analysis of IHL violations

6. The Panel notes the proximity of a military base belonging to the Government of Yemen to the petrol station and that, according to a declaration made on social media by Mohamed Ali Al Houthi, the military base was the intended objective of the attack.
7. However, the explosive ordnance hit a civilian target, a petrol station, and according to information received by the Panel, most of the victims were civilians, including children.
8. Under IHL, parties to the conflict must, in the conduct of hostilities, take constant care to spare the civilian population, civilians, and civilian objects. All feasible precautions must be taken to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.<sup>308</sup>
9. Mortar bombs and artillery shells have a high level of inaccuracy, and the likelihood of indiscriminate effects increases when those weapons are used on targets in proximity to civilians and civilian objects, and especially in densely populated areas.
10. The Panel concludes that the principle of precautions was not respected.

<sup>307</sup> [https://twitter.com/Moh\\_Alhouthi/status/1401614620809433090](https://twitter.com/Moh_Alhouthi/status/1401614620809433090).

<sup>308</sup> CIHL, rule 15.

Figure 35.9

**Statement of Mohamed Ali Al Houthi on Twitter calling for an independent investigation<sup>309</sup>**

**Source:** [https://twitter.com/Moh\\_Alhouthi/status/1401614620809433090](https://twitter.com/Moh_Alhouthi/status/1401614620809433090)

Figure 35.8

**Location of the impact and proximity of military objectives**

**Source:** Google Earth, Panel

<sup>308</sup> Non-official translation: “We asked the brothers in the Yemeni Ministry of Defense, and they said that they bombed only the camp in the picture below, and they have proof. We welcome and call for investigation by independent committees into the matter regarding what was said about Ma’rib today or what happened regarding the killing of the children of the Republic of Yemen and civilians in all governorates who were targeted by America and its coalition”.

Figure 35.10  
**Damage to the petrol station**



*Source:* Confidential

## Appendix 7 A Mosque, Ma'rib city, 10 June 2021

### I. Background

1. On 10 June 2021 at between 1800 and 1900 hours, two or three explosive devices and a UAV, hit a mosque (15°27'54.4"N, 45°19'29.8"E) and its vicinity (see figure 35.11). Two civilian houses and a few ambulances were also affected. The incident resulted in the death of six people and the injuries to 32 additional people, including two or three members of the medical staff and one woman. The Panel received a list with the names of all victims.<sup>310</sup> The Panel has not been able to verify the identity of each victim, but the number received from different sources and reports are similar.
2. According to information received by the Panel, the area contains buildings belonging to the Police, the Criminal Investigation Department, the Planning and International Cooperation Office, as well as other governmental offices.
3. According to reports received by the Panel, three ambulances that responded to the incident were also damaged. Successive attacks at an interval of several minutes increase the risk of civilian casualties, in particular to medical personnel and first responders (see figure 35.12).

### II. Analysis of IHL violations

4. The Panel notes that the area is located approximately two kilometres from the petrol station hit on 5 June 2021 (see Appendix 6) and is in the vicinity of a military base.
5. However, the Panel notes that only civilian objects were hit: a mosque, ambulances, and civilian houses.
6. The Panel, therefore, concludes that it is likely that the principle of distinction was not respected, especially in respect to the UAV which has a high level of accuracy. If the military base was the intended objective, the Panel concludes that the principle of precautions was not respected. Indeed IHL, parties to the conflict must, in the conduct of hostilities, take constant care to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects. All feasible precautions must be taken to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.<sup>311</sup>

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<sup>310</sup> Confidential source.

<sup>311</sup> CIHL, rule 15.

Figure 35.11  
**Location of attack**



**Source:** Google Earth, Panel

Figure 35.12  
**Distance between the petrol station hit on 5 June 2021 and the mosque hit on 10 June 2021**



**Source:** Google Earth, Panel

**Figure 35.13**  
Damage to the Mosque



*Source:* Confidential

**Figure 35.14**  
Debris of the UAV



*Source:* Confidential

Figure 35.15  
**Damage to an ambulance**



**Source:** Confidential

## **Appendix 8 Near al Camp street, Ta'izz city, 30 October 2021**

### **I. Background**

1. On 30 October 2021, at approximately 1135 hours an explosive ordnance (see figure 35.16) hit a civilian area in the city of Ta'izz (13°34'30.7"N, 44°01'46.2"E) near Al Khaeer mosque, killing three children and injuring a fourth (see figure 35.17). All children were from the same family. Two adults were also reportedly injured, but the Panel has not been able to verify this information.
2. According to information received by the Panel, this is a civilian area, and no military operations were going on in the area at the time of the attack.

### **II. Analysis of IHL violations**

3. According to the information received by the Panel, there was no military presence in the area at the time of the attack.
4. Under IHL, civilians and civilian objects should not be the object of attacks.<sup>312</sup>
5. Mortar bombs and artillery shells have a high level of inaccuracy, and the likelihood of indiscriminate effects increases when those weapons are used on targets in proximity to civilians and civilian objects, and especially in densely populated areas such as the city of Ta'izz.
6. The Panel concludes that the principle of distinction was not respected.

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<sup>312</sup> See article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions, article 13 (2) Additional Protocol II and Customary IHL, rule 1.

Figure 35.16  
**Remnants found at the location of the incident**



*Source:* Confidential

Figure 35.17  
Location of the attack



Source: Google map

Figure 35.18  
Impact point



Source: Confidential

## Annex 36 Indiscriminate use of landmines, IEDs and other explosive remnants by Houthi forces

### I. Background:

1. The indiscriminate use of landmines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by the Houthis is endemic and systematic. Since 2016, the Panel has been documenting the impact of landmines and IEDs on civilians (see [S/2021/79](#), paras 140-142, [S/2020/326](#), paras 115-117 and [S/2018/193](#), annexes 43 and 44).

2. The indiscriminate use of landmines is prohibited by IHL.<sup>313</sup> When landmines are used, parties to the conflict must take particular care to minimize their indiscriminate effects. They also must record their placement to the extent possible. In addition, although not directly binding on non-state armed groups, Yemen is party to the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (see section III on the use of anti-personnel mines by Houthis).

### II. West Coast:

3. During its visit to Aden, Al Khokha and Al Mukha and Al Khokha in August 2021, the Panel met with a wide range of stakeholders involved in monitoring and demining activities in Yemen, including Project Masam, the Yemen Executive Mine Action Center (YEMAC) and UNDP. The Panel was informed that there is no centralized database listing all clearance activities, incidents and emergency interventions undertaken by these different entities in Yemen. It is therefore difficult to have complete and exhaustive data.

4. The Panel was nevertheless able to gather significant information, as mentioned below:

- Between November 2020 and August 2021, the following explosive items were removed from the West Coast by the local demining teams (YEMAC, Project Masam and/or West Coast armed groups):

Table 36.1

#### Explosive items removed from the West Coast between November 2020 and August 2021 by district and type of items

Districts:	Anti-Tank/Vehicle Mine	Anti-Personnel Mine	Sea mine	Explosive devices	Missiles	Shells (rockets)	Cluster munition	Pressure plates
Bab el Mandab	123	20		10	2	120		
Dhubab	148	26		16	1	124	1	
Mawza	135	31		24	5	132	3	6
Al Mukha	176	37	1	21	8	140	2	3
Khokha	184	26	1	25	5	138		8
Hays	321	41		31	9	155	4	10
Thuhayata	252	43	2	19	11	126	2	11
Durahimi	1,153	19	3	29	22	119	2	4

<sup>313</sup> See CIHL, rules 80, 81, 82, and 83.

Al Halia	730	52		116	33	130	10	22
Al Hawk	253	12	1	35	12	122	1	8
<b>Total</b>	<b>3,475</b>	<b>307</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>326</b>	<b>108</b>	<b>1,306</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>72</b>

*Source:* Local demining staff

- The Panel received information from the local authorities of Al Hudaydah and Al Khokha that, between January and June 2021, landmines and other explosive devices laid in those territories of the Al Hudaydah Governorate, which are under the control of the Government of Yemen, resulted in a high number of casualties. Most of them occurred in the district of Al Durahimi. In total, 17 children were killed and 15 were injured, nine women were killed and five injured, and 37 men were killed and 35 injured. The Panel also received information about several incidents affecting civilians between the months of July and October 2021. Two are detailed below.
- During a meeting in Al Mukha, the Panel was informed that according to the most recent survey, in 2021, 78 percent of the West Coast territory is confirmed to be a hazardous area, i.e. territory in which the presence of landmines, IEDs and/or unexploded ordnances (UXO) has been confirmed, and the other 22 percent is suspected to be a hazardous area. The Panel was informed that there are ten YEMAC teams on the West Coast: three in Al Mukha, one in Mawza, one in the South of Ta'izz, one in Jabal Habashi, two in Al Khokha, one in Mudhafar, one in Al Ma'afer and one in Durahimi. Each YEMAC team has the capacity of clearing areas of approximately 625m<sup>2</sup> per month.
- The Panel was also informed that demining teams in Yemen, including on the West Coast, proceed only for emergency demining, i.e., clearance of roads and passages to infrastructures and locations used by the civilians such as schools, hospitals, and water tanks. Therefore, no area can be considered as completely cleared and the risk of landmines is always there for the civilian population. In addition, the Panel was informed that in areas near active conflict zones, demined areas are constantly remined by the Houthis. The Panel received a list of 74 locations in Al Bayda, Al Jawf, Ma'rib and Shabwah where demining activities had been undertaken, which since have been retaken by Houthi forces.<sup>314</sup>
- The Panel received specific information on 62 cases in which demining teams were called for emergency interventions between September 2020 and August 2021 in ten districts across three Governorates, as mentioned below:
  - i) Ta'izz – Mawza: six incidents, including At Muoa`ad Bin Jabel School<sup>315</sup>, where three anti-tank mines, three artillery shells, ten fuses, and one IED were found on 12 December 2020.
  - ii) Ta'izz- Dhubab: seven incidents, where anti-personnel mines, anti-tank mines, IEDs and artillery shells were found on the roads in or near villages, fishing areas and the Al Shaykh Saeid Port.
  - iii) Ta'izz-Al Mukha: four incidents, where anti-personnel mines, anti-tank mines, IEDs and artillery shells were found on the village roads, farms and houses. One of these incidents resulted in the death of a civilian in Al Gadeed<sup>316</sup> in July 2021.
  - iv) Ta'izz- Al Wazi'iyah: five incidents, where explosive devices were found on the roads. In one of these incidents, cattle was killed<sup>317</sup> and in another one, five anti-tank mines, two IEDs, one

<sup>314</sup> Specific GPS coordinates on file with the Panel.

<sup>315</sup> N 43°38'06.11", E 13°22'34.54"

<sup>316</sup> N 43°21'53.10", E 13°06'20.80"

<sup>317</sup> N 43°40'20.50", E 13°17'24.50"

- artillery shell, and seven anti-personnel mines were found near roads and houses used by civilians.<sup>318</sup>
- v) Tai'zz-Dhubab: 15 incidents, where anti-tank mines were found on the roads used by the civilians, and inside farms. In Al Aradee Almandab, anti-personnel mines were also found at a fishing site.<sup>319</sup>
  - vi) Ad Dali-Qa'atabah: ten incidents where anti-personnel mines were found in or near civilian houses and farms.
  - vii) Al Hudaydah: 11 incidents, including one at a site in Al Tuhayata where 12 civilians were killed in November 2020.<sup>320</sup> In Al Khokha, landmines were found at the entrance of Al Fawz school in November 2020,<sup>321</sup> and others around a water well in December 2020,<sup>322</sup> in Al Hali, explosive devices were also found near a water pipe in August 2021,<sup>323</sup> and in Al Tuhayata, two 500-kilo bombs were found near a water pipe and cleared in January 2021(see figure 36.6).<sup>324</sup>
  - viii) Lahij-Al Madaribah: four incidents, where anti-tank and anti-personnel mines were found on and near the roads used by the civilians, including on a road leading to a water well.<sup>325</sup>
- In addition, the Panel received information from Project MASAM that between November 2020, and the end of July 2021, they cleared 1,830 anti-personnel mines, 26,867 anti-vehicle mines, 315 IEDs and 40,141 UXO in Aden, Ad Dali, Al Hudaydah, Al Jawf, Ma'rib, Shabwah and Ta'izz. Between July 2018 and November 2021, 4,168 anti-personnel mines, 95,525 anti-vehicle mines, 6,109 IEDs and 178,834 UXO were cleared by the group.

### III. Anti-personnel mines:

5. In 2021, the Panel continued to receive evidence of anti-vehicle mines modified by the Houthis for use as large anti-personnel landmines. The Panel was informed of two ways by which this is achieved: one is the use of pressure plates and the other is through the reduction of the headspace above the fuse within an improvised anti-tank device (see figure 36.1).

Figure 36.1:

#### Plastic cap used to reduce the headspace



**Source:** Project Masam

<sup>318</sup> N 43°50'28.70", E 13°09'29.70

<sup>319</sup> N 43°25'38.10", E 12°56'61.10"

<sup>320</sup> N 43°09'48.32", E 14°12'18.81"

<sup>321</sup> N 43°15'42.63", E 13°48'09.12"

<sup>322</sup> N 43°22'15.97", E 13°53'38.76"

<sup>323</sup> N 43°01'27.01", E 14°47'07.57"

<sup>324</sup> N 43°04'42.01", E 14°12'07.26"

<sup>325</sup> N 43°32'64.00", E 12°55'11.70"

#### IV. Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)

6. Houthi forces continued to manufacture a significant number of IEDs of different shapes and types, including IEDs concealed as rocks, palm tree trunks, as well as different booby traps. Those IEDs are activated through different means including pressure plates, crush wires, and passive infra-red sensors (see figures 36.2 to 36.5)

Figure 36.2:

##### **IEDs activation system: pressure plate**



*Source:* Panel

Figure 36.3:  
**IEDs activation system: crush wire**



*Source:* Panel

Figure 36.4:  
**IEDs activation system: passive infra-red sensor**



*Source:* Panel

Figure 36.5:  
**Booby trap**



*Source:* Panel

7. The Panel also received evidence that the Houthi forces use old aviation bombs as IEDs in the civilian areas, with significant risk for the civilian population. For instance, the Panel received evidence of two of these bombs being laid inside a water pipe in Al Thuhayata (43°04'42.01"N, 14°12'07.26"E) and cleared in January 2021 and that another nine were found at the entrance of a school in Medghal, Ma'rib and cleared in November 2018 (15°36'49.29"N, 44°53'2.65"E) (see figure 36.6).

Figure 36.6:  
**Aviation bombs found inside a water pipe and cleared between 5 and 7 January 2021**



*Source:* Confidential

Figure 36.7:  
**Aviation bombs found at the entrance of a school and cleared on November 2018**



*Source:*

Project Masam

8. The Panel also received evidence of five anti-vehicle mines and 11 IEDs found in a school in al Khokha district, al Hudaydah and cleared on 25 November 2021 (13°52'07.88"N 43°25'32.87"E) (see figure 36.8).

Figure 36.8:  
**Anti-vehicle mines and IEDs found in a school in al Khokha**



*Source:* Project Masam

## V. Sea Mines

9. During its visit to the West Coast in August 2021, the Panel received documents, pictures, and other information about the use deployment of sea mines by the Houthis from different sources including people involved in demining and military sources. According to the information received, eight sea mines were found and removed from GoY-controlled areas of the West Coast between November 2020 and August 2021. Most sea mines found on the West Coast are contact-type sea mines. Some magnetic sea mines have also been found in the past.

10. The Panel was informed during a meeting with the Yemen Coast Guard in August 2021 that during the period from mid-October to mid-April, due to bad weather conditions, there were fewer patrols on the West Coast and that the Houthis were using this opportunity to lay mines.

11. The Panel also received information that the Houthi forces possess the capacity to produce sea mines,<sup>326</sup> but has not been able to independently verify this.

## VI. Examples of landmine incidents affecting civilians

12. The Panel received information on several incidents of landmine explosions killing or injuring civilians in 2021. The Panel conducted broader investigations on two of them to illustrate the danger of unrecorded landmines in civilian areas.

13. On 29 July 2021, in Ad Durayhimi<sup>327</sup> district, Al Hudaydah Governorate, a car transporting 14 people ran over an explosive device hidden in the ground. Three people were killed, including two children and 11 were injured, including three children. Two of the injured people, one man and one child, died later from their wounds.<sup>328</sup>

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<sup>326</sup> Information received from confidential source.

<sup>327</sup> Approximately at 14°36'38.49"N, 43°01'06.13"E

<sup>328</sup> The Panel communicated with three of the victims, received information, including pictures and list of victims from the authorities of Al Hudaydah Governorate, as well as from confidential sources.

Figure 36.9:  
Car after the explosion



**Source:** Confidential

Figure 36.10:  
Search for other landmines and/or IEDs around the incident location



**Source:** Confidential

14. On 13 September 2021, at approximately 1800 hours a lorry triggered an anti-vehicle landmine in Al Qataba area, Al Khokha district, Al Hudaydah (13°53'44.44"N, 43°15'18.36"E). The incident resulted in the injuries of 13 children and two women.<sup>329</sup> On 14 September 2021, a monitoring team went

<sup>329</sup> Some media reported 17 victims, but the Panel was able to verify 15: <https://alamalika.net/site/2021/09/13/شاهد-بالتفديو-17-جرحا-معظمهم-نساء-واط>. The Panel received information from two different sources as well as video and pictures of the victims at the hospital after the incident.

to the area to search for and clear other explosive devices. They found a locally made anti-vehicle landmine believed to be similar to the one detonated by the lorry the day before.

Figure 36.11:  
**Location of the incident**



**Source:** Confidential

Figure 38.12:  
**Anti-vehicle landmine found near the location of the incident on 14 September 2021**



**Source:** Confidential

15. The Panel also received evidence of an incident in Mayfa'a district, Shabwah, on 29 September 2021, which resulted in the death of one child and the injuries to three men. The incident was caused

by the explosion of IEDs left in a garbage dump near a mosque. When a fire started in the dump, civilians gathered to control it and were either killed or injured by the explosion.

## **VII. Risks associated with Demining**

16. The Panel received information from two different sources about incidents that occurred during demining operations in Yemen. One source informed the Panel that 29 workers had died during demining activities between 2018 and 2021. Another source informed the Panel that between 2015 and 2021, 45 workers had died during demining operations, and 37 were injured. According to sources involved in demining activities, these numbers are high compared to other areas of operation, and increased training and protective equipment should be provided to demining workers in Yemen. The Panel was also informed by different sources in Yemen that Houthis are constantly developing new technologies relating to landmines and IEDs, which makes the task of the demining teams more difficult and requires continuous training.

## **VI. Import of demining material**

17. The Panel received evidence that, in one case, requests for importing demining equipment, including protective material and detectors, took over a year and half before being approved by the Government of Yemen. Considering the needs and importance of this matter, the authorities in charge of approving importation of equipment related to mine clearance should take appropriate measures to reduce delays.

## **Annex 37 Obstruction to humanitarian assistance in Houthi-controlled areas**

The Panel has determined that the publication of this annex may pose a threat to individuals and entities, and their activities in Yemen. Therefore, the information in this annex is not for publication.

**List of acronyms**

ATGM	Anti-Tank Guided Missile
APII	Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts (Protocol II)
AQAP	Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula
CBY	Central Bank of Yemen in Aden
cby	Central Bank of Yemen in Sana'a
CCTV	Closed-circuit Television
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CIHL	Customary International Humanitarian Law
EC	Economic Committee of the STC
ECDIS	Electronic Chart Display and Information System
EUC	End-User Certificate
FSO	Floating Storage and Offloading Facility
GoY	Government of Yemen
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
IHRL	International Human Rights Law
IMO	International Maritime Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IP	Internet Protocol
ISP	Internet Service Providers
JIAT	Joint Incident Assessment Team
KSA	Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
NM	Nautical Mile
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
PBNR	Political Bureau of the National Resistance
PN	Promissory Notes
RCC	Redeployment Coordination Committee
RPG	Rocket-propelled Grenade
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SAM	Surface-to-Air Missile
STC	Southern Transitional Council
TEL	Transport-Erector-Launchers
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UAV	Uncrewed Aerial Vehicle
UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UNITAR	United Nations Institute for Training and Research
UNMHA	United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement
UNOSAT	United Nations Satellite Centre
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
WBIED	Water-borne Improvised Explosive Device
WCJF	West Coast Joint Forces
YCG	Yemeni Coast Guard
YEMAC	Yemen Executive Mine Action Center
YER	Yemeni rial