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Chairman: Mr. Leopoldo BENITES (Ecuador).

AGENDA ITEM 27

Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (continued) (A/6390-DC/228, A/C.1/L.370/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1/Corr.1 and Rev.1/Add.2-4, A/C.1/L.374, A/C.1/L.377-379)

GENERAL DEBATE (concluded)

1. Mr. PASHA (Pakistan) recalled that the United States Secretary of Defence had said recently that the United States would have to deploy Poseidon missiles because of the development of an effective anti-ballistic-missile system by the Soviet Union. That was another step towards the abyss of nuclear catastrophe. It also emphasized the urgent necessity of devising effective machinery to control and channel into peaceful uses the unprecedented scientific and technological advances in the development of weapons of mass destruction. A heavy burden of responsibility lay primarily upon the nuclear-weapon Powers. Their professions of good intentions must be matched by practical gestures in order that progress might be made in the negotiations on a multilateral treaty for general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

2. It was disappointing that the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament had been unable to reach any specific agreement on the question of general and complete disarmament or on collateral measures. Lack of progress in the Eighteen-Nation Committee was largely due to the absence of France and the exclusion of the People's Republic of China, both nuclear-weapon Powers. Certain smaller Powers which were militarily significant in their own regions were not members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee and for that reason the convening of a world disarmament conference, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2030 (XX), would stimulate current efforts to bring about general and complete disarmament.

3. Such collateral measures of disarmament as a comprehensive test ban treaty, the cut-off in the

production of fissionable material for military use, and a halt in the production of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles, together with the reduction and ultimate elimination of stockpiles of such weapons and delivery vehicles, were important. But the question of concluding an acceptable agreement on non-proliferation in accordance with resolution 2149 (XXI) was no less urgent. In the meantime, through the extension of the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency to the peaceful nuclear programmes and establishments of all Member States, the United Nations might be able to prevent a nuclear arms race among the present non-nuclear States. Mere declarations of intention to devote nuclear programmes and establishments exclusively to peaceful purposes were not enough to inspire confidence. Those who objected to the IAEA safeguards should drop their objections and throw open their peaceful nuclear programmes and establishments to IAEA inspection. He fully endorsed what the Secretary-General had said in the introduction to his annual report on the work of the Organization (A/6301/Add.1) about international safeguards.

4. Extension of the partial test ban treaty to cover underground nuclear tests was equally urgent. The divergencies between the Soviet and United States positions on the issue of on-site inspections could be bridged only if the two Powers showed a greater spirit of accommodation and a political will to end underground tests. The Swedish proposals for the adoption of a system of "verification by challenge" as a means of ensuring the observance of a comprehensive test ban and for a "detection club" deserved careful consideration.

5. Vast sums of money were being spent on armaments and armed forces while millions of men, women and children were condemned to hunger, disease and illiteracy. According to the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, total defence expenditure in 1964 had amounted to over \$130,000 million, of which \$90,000 million had been spent by the United States and the Soviet Union between them and about \$16,000 million by the economically less developed countries. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Treaty Organization countries between them had accounted for some 85 per cent of the total. In the less developed countries, defence expenditures in recent years had risen at a much faster rate than those of the developed countries. Furthermore, defence expenditures in 1964 had absorbed some 7 per cent of the world's total output of goods and services. While increasing sums of money and resources were being diverted to unproductive military uses, the amount of official foreign economic aid had not kept pace with the

developing countries' needs. In 1964 the amount of economic assistance by the developed countries to the developing countries had been the equivalent of about 6 per cent of world defence expenditures. Pakistan, which had introduced a draft resolution on the economic and social consequences of disarmament at the fifteenth session—subsequently adopted by the General Assembly as resolution 1516 (XV)—welcomed the decisions of the Governments of Iran, Mali, the Ivory Coast and Tunisia to allocate one day's defence expenditure to a UNESCO fund for the world campaign against mass illiteracy. If their example was followed by the major Powers, immense benefits would flow from the diversion of resources from the military to the economic and social sectors.

6. The United Nations, in its preoccupation with the threat of nuclear war, must not overlook the danger of the conventional arms race in various parts of the world. To eliminate that danger and the underlying causes of tension in certain regions, the United Nations must develop effective machinery for the pacific settlement of disputes as a necessary corollary to the process of disarmament.

7. His Government, realizing the need for a concise and clear report on the implications of nuclear weapons technology for world security and economic and social advancement, had welcomed the proposal made by the Secretary-General in the introduction to his annual report (A/6301/Add.1) for the establishment of an appropriate body of the United Nations to study the implications of all aspects of nuclear weapons, and had therefore joined the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.370/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1/Corr.1 and Rev.1/Add.2-4, which he commended to the Committee for its unanimous approval.

8. Mr. ODHIAMBO (Kenya) said that world disarmament was but a dream without the appropriate political climate. A study of political conditions in the world today showed that the peoples in the continents of Africa, Asia and Latin America were obliged to continue their struggle against neo-colonialism and to fight wars of liberation, as in Viet-Nam. In other parts of the world there was tension between the socialist countries and the capitalist countries, despite the rapprochement between the two Powers engaged in the space race. The struggle for equal rights had also generated its own tensions. The United Nations could do much to remove the tensions by promoting education in world citizenship. The United Nations must make its voice heard in all corners of the globe and help the rising generations to overcome the old barriers of class, colour, religion and race and to appreciate the brotherhood and interdependence of mankind which twentieth century technology had made imperative.

9. The Saudi Arabian representative's suggestion that the United Nations should broadcast radio programmes on the question of nuclear weapons might be extended to include other aspects of the problem of general and complete disarmament. Unless the current disarmament negotiations were accompanied by a vigorous and urgent campaign of education in world citizenship, it would be impossible to create conditions suitable for disarmament. He therefore supported draft resolution A/C.1/L.370/Rev.1

and Rev.1/Add.1/Corr.1 and Rev.1/Add.2-4, which sought to give the peoples of the world a better understanding of the dangers of the nuclear arms race.

10. Nuclear disarmament was but a first step towards general and complete disarmament. It was therefore a matter of urgency that agreement should be reached on a number of measures such as a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, a cut-off in the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, and a comprehensive test ban treaty, all of which could be done without upsetting the present military balance between the two major alliances.

11. He fully approved the Malaysian representative's comments (1448th meeting) on the report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, which had made disappointingly little progress in the past year. His delegation attached great importance to an agreement on non-proliferation which would allow all States, big and small, to live in peace without fear of nuclear attack. The proposals in the joint memorandum of 17 August 1966 submitted by the eight non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee^{1/} on a comprehensive test-ban treaty deserved careful consideration.

12. In regard to the question of convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, a more practical approach in present circumstances would be for the nuclear Powers to sign an international declaration pledging themselves generally not to be the first to use nuclear weapons in any armed conflict. It might be argued that such a pledge could easily be violated, but every international agreement was liable to meet with the same cynical objection. There must be a certain amount of mutual trust in disarmament negotiations if the parties were to achieve any results. At the least, the psychological impact of such an international pledge would greatly contribute to the easing of present world tension and would facilitate progress towards general and complete disarmament. If a world disarmament conference were convened in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2030 (XX), it would provide the most suitable setting for the nuclear-weapon Powers to sign a solemn declaration that they would not be the first to use nuclear weapons.

13. There were of course other measures, including the reduction of conventional armaments and military spending, which would have to be taken before general and complete disarmament could be achieved, and a satisfactory solution would have to be found to the problem of verification. In addition, there were collateral measures that could be the subject of separate agreements. His delegation believed, however, that the most essential first step was to halt and reverse the arms race. An agreement to stop the manufacture and spread of nuclear weapons would mark the beginning of a new epoch in human history and the possibility of social progress for all men. He hoped therefore that the vast resources squandered on the arms race would be released for the social and economic development of all peoples.

^{1/} See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1966*, document DC/228, annex 1, sect. O.

14. It was regrettable that the attitudes of the cold war had reappeared in the discussion of two of the draft resolutions before the First Committee. Draft resolution A/C.1/L.374 was based on principles which had been recognized some fifty years ago; he hoped that it would be given a more generally acceptable formulation before it was put to the vote. His delegation also supported draft resolution A/C.1/L.377, which was in harmony with the declared intention of the African States to maintain a nuclear-free zone in the territories of Africa and in African air space. Consequently, flights by aircraft carrying nuclear weapons over Africa would violate that declared intention.

15. Mr. KOUYATE (Mali) regretted the continued failure of United Nations bodies to reach agreement on general and complete disarmament. The specific disarmament measures envisaged in recent years had never been put into effect. The Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, signed at Moscow on 5 August 1963, had not been followed by positive steps in the direction of nuclear disarmament. The Eighteen-Nation Committee had itself reported that it had not reached any specific agreement during the past year. Disarmament negotiations seemed always to develop into talking matches between the two super-Powers.

16. In the debate in the First Committee at the twentieth session on the draft resolution on the question of convening a world disarmament conference (resolution 2030 (XX)), his delegation had predicted that, if the major nuclear Powers did not genuinely want to disarm, a world disarmament conference would be no more successful than the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. It had stated—and it still believed—that a conference on general and complete disarmament without the participation of the People's Republic of China, and other countries which were still unjustifiably excluded from the United Nations, would be doomed to failure. Similarly, the questions of non-proliferation and of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons could never be settled until certain Powers decided, in the overriding interests of the international community, to discontinue their ostracism of the People's Republic of China.

17. His Government's policy of disarmament had been clearly expressed at the Conferences of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held at Belgrade in 1961 and at Cairo in 1964, and at other international gatherings. As a developing country, Mali urgently needed peace to continue its task of national reconstruction. It was convinced that the problem of disarmament should be approached realistically and that all Governments, particularly those of the nuclear Powers, should subordinate their national interests to the wider aspirations of mankind as a whole.

18. His delegation was a sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/L.370/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1/Corr.1 and Rev.1/Add.2-4 and hoped that it would be adopted unanimously.

19. Some representatives had argued that draft resolution A/C.1/L.377 had been introduced merely

for propaganda purposes. His delegation did not share that view and would vote for the draft resolution. When a United States bomber carrying unarmed nuclear devices had crashed off the Spanish coast in January 1966, no nuclear explosion had followed. But there was no guarantee that the precautions allegedly taken to avoid accidental detonation of nuclear devices would be equally effective on another occasion.

20. With regard to the Hungarian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.374), his delegation did not intend to engage in sterile polemics, but wished merely to reaffirm that the Government of Mali condemned the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

21. Mr. SHARIF (Indonesia) said that disarmament negotiations in recent years had been marked by alternating moods of optimism and pessimism. Optimism had prevailed during the General Assembly's sixteenth session when, after a long deadlock in the former Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament, the Soviet and United States Government had issued a joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations.^{2/} In one of those principles it was stated that an international disarmament organization should be established within the framework of the United Nations, and that the organization and its inspectors should be assured unrestricted access without veto to all places, as necessary for the purpose of effective verification. Today, five years after that historic statement, the Committee might have expected the international disarmament organization to report on the implementation of the disarmament programme which, according to the joint statement, was to be carried out in an agreed sequence, by stages, until it was completed, with each measure and stage carried out within specific time-limits. In fact, no international disarmament organization had yet been established, nor had a single weapon been destroyed. Since 1961 various proposals for the reduction of armaments and armed forces had been discussed in the First Committee and referred to the Eighteen-Nation Committee for further consideration. And that Committee, in paragraph 33 of its latest report (A/6390-DC/228), had again stated that it had not reached any specific agreement.

22. His delegation was grateful to all the members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee for the efforts they had made under difficult circumstances and was sure that the Committee had, as stated in paragraph 32 of its report, discussed all the questions before it in a thorough and concrete manner. But, like the Malaysian representative, he regretted that the report did not contain more detailed information on the negotiations and on points on which agreement had or had not been reached. The Eighteen-Nation Committee had been requested by the General Assembly, in resolution 1722 (XVI), to negotiate on the basis of the USSR-United States joint statement of agreed principles, and in future it should give the First Committee more information on the progress made towards the implementation of those principles.

^{2/} See Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 19, document A/4879.

23. Its failure to reach agreement during the past year had been due above all to the fact that the two major nuclear Powers and their respective political groupings were still suspicious of one another. Every effort should now be made to dispel those mutual suspicions. As any future nuclear war would result in the annihilation of mankind, the major Powers themselves should take account of the interests and aspirations of the non-aligned world as well as of their own national interests.

24. In any programme of general and complete disarmament, the highest priority should be given to nuclear disarmament. He agreed with the suggestion made by the representative of Sweden (1451st meeting) that non-proliferation measures should be divided into two parts: first, the conclusion of a treaty prohibiting the transfer and acceptance of nuclear weapons and, secondly, an agreement banning the manufacture of nuclear weapons. His delegation attached the greatest importance to other collateral measures, such as the destruction under supervision of certain types of nuclear weapons, a verified freeze and a reduction in the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and the conversion of fissionable materials to peaceful uses. Those would all be useful steps in the direction of nuclear disarmament.

25. A reduction in conventional weapons was also highly desirable. In the present-day world, newly independent nations needed weapons to defend themselves against countries still trying to dominate them. But they could not manufacture weapons themselves and relied almost exclusively on purchases from the industrially developed countries. Often they were obliged to abandon their non-alignment, join political groupings, and even accept foreign military bases on their territories, in order to obtain the weapons they needed for their self-defence. As the Guinean representative had pointed out, developing countries wishing to buy conventional weapons were continually subject to strong neo-colonialist pressures. Furthermore, the purchase of weapons consumed a considerable proportion of the foreign exchange earnings the developing countries needed for their economic development. The immense sums now spent on armaments could be used much more profitably to finance development projects in all parts of the world. As the eight non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee had suggested in their memorandum of 19 August 1966,^{3/} adequate steps should be taken to envisage channelling important resources, freed by measures of disarmament, to the social and economic development of countries hitherto less developed.

26. The problem of general and complete disarmament was complicated, but agreed solutions were urgently needed. The security of all mankind depended on them. The conclusion of the partial test ban treaty of 1963, the expressions of intention not to station in outer space any objects carrying nuclear weapons or other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, the establishment of the "hot line" between the two major nuclear Powers and the hopeful pros-

pects for an early agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons were, indeed, encouraging. But there were still a vast number of disarmament problems which the United Nations had not even begun to consider. Viewed against that background the progress already made was very modest. Serious consideration of the eight principles in the USSR-United States joint statement of agreed principles might produce more impressive results.

27. His Government was a party to the Declaration of the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held at Cairo in 1964, and whole-heartedly supported the proposal in the Declaration for convening a world disarmament conference to which all countries would be invited. It was glad to note that the proposal had been endorsed in General Assembly resolution 2030 (XX). Some difficulties might be encountered in preparing for the conference, but his delegation would support any further proposals for convening it, after adequate preparation, at the earliest possible time. Lastly, as his delegation had already suggested (1442nd meeting), the Eighteen-Nation Committee should be elevated to the status of a Council, as a principal organ of the United Nations under Article 7 of the Charter.

28. Mr. VAKIL (Iran) said that he would not repeat the questions he had posed at the last session of the General Assembly, even though they had never been answered. He would only say that nothing had happened in the interim, at the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, to give him reason to take heart.

29. The developing countries had a special interest in disarmament because the resulting resources could be used, in part at least, to meet their needs for capital. The developing nations could contribute little to the realization of general and complete disarmament. If, however, they could secure funds by proposing measures of disarmament capable of immediate execution, they would have made a contribution there as well. The General Assembly, in resolution 1837 (XVII), had called for the diversion of savings from general and complete disarmament to meet the needs of the developing countries. Because there had been no progress in disarmament, no savings from that source had been reported. However, the resolution also called upon States to accelerate their efforts to assist the developing countries pending the achievement of general and complete disarmament. One highly suitable way of doing that would be to pass on some of the savings from collateral measures of disarmament to the developing countries. The partial test ban treaty, for example, had presumably yielded savings, but so far none of them had been applied to the needs of the developing States. A further collateral measure being considered was the freezing of military expenditures at present levels, followed by their reduction. Savings thus made, perceptible in simple accounting terms, lent themselves readily to the claims of economic development.

30. The slackening pace at which capital was moving to the developing countries made it urgent to explore collateral measures as a source of development

^{3/} See Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1966, document DC/228, annex I, sect. F.

capital. It did not seem too much to ask that, if only as a token, the arms-burdened States should forgo a fraction of their military expenditure. Direct diversion of sums earmarked for military expenditure to development would give expression to the developed nations' intention to disarm and to their desire to help the developing nations. Iran, which was hardly a leader in the arms race, had taken such a combined disarmament and development initiative in the form of a contribution made that year to UNESCO of the equivalent of one day's military expenditure for use towards the promotion of universal literacy, an indispensable condition of development. The Ivory Coast, Mali, Morocco and Tunisia had joined Iran in that effort. But only the general adoption of such a scheme could permit a significant contribution to disarmament and the eradication of illiteracy. A small step of the kind Iran proposed could be taken quickly, given the necessary goodwill. Further action of a similar kind would require study and his delegation proposed that such study should be undertaken by Governments as a matter of urgency. Together with the delegations of Morocco, Tunisia and the United Republic of Tanzania, his delegation had submitted a draft resolution relating to that collateral measure of disarmament (A/C.1/L.379). If the developed countries were to consider taking a modest step of the kind proposed in the draft resolution, that would be an earnest of their desire to make progress in disarmament and to match their professions of concern for the welfare of the developing countries with action.

31. Mr. CSATORDAY (Hungary), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, expressed his delegation's appreciation of the support many delegations had given to its draft resolution (A/C.1/L.374). Some representatives had raised objections, however, in particular in connexion with his statement introducing it (1451st meeting). The United States representative had described the statement as "propaganda, pure and simple". He accepted that description of his statement, which had indeed been a certain kind of propaganda, as the United States representative's reply had been also. To engage in propaganda was in his understanding to advocate a certain course before a public audience in order to obtain support for it. His delegation was glad to propagandize for such causes as disarmament, peace, security, the self-determination of peoples and the freedom of nations. His propaganda speech, unlike that of the United States representative, had in fact been pure and simple. He had not sought to distort facts, but only to present them. He had asked only for the implementation of an international agreement, the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, of 17 June 1925.

32. The United States representative, in his reply (1452nd meeting), had tried in a very sophisticated way to prove that chemical weapons were humane and harmless, and had reasserted his country's determination to continue to use chemical warfare. He had claimed at one point that the draft resolution had nothing to do with disarmament while at another point he had stated that he would have sup-

ported it, were it not tendentious. The prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons as one kind of weapon of mass destruction should definitely be regarded as part of the question of general and complete disarmament. Such prohibition represented a very important collateral measure. It was fully in the spirit of Article 11 of the Charter and bore some relation to agenda item 29, which the Committee was to consider. The idea of eliminating chemical, biological and radiological weapons had already been incorporated in the USSR draft treaty on general and complete disarmament.^{4/} Furthermore, as he had said at the 1451st meeting, the problem had been dealt with at the Washington Conference on Limitation of Armament in 1922 and at the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments of 1932-1934, which had reached a limited agreement on the prohibition of chemical warfare. Thus there was ample proof that the problem raised in the draft resolution was considered by the community of nations to be a part of the disarmament question.

33. Some of the facts he had presented in his statement had been challenged. In reply he would refer exclusively to United States sources which could not be claimed to be under communist influence. It had been alleged that certain chemical materials used by the United States could not be regarded as weapons under the terms of the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925. However, the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, which was published in the United States, stated under "chemical warfare": "The term gas is applied to those chemical agents used in war which, by ordinary and direct chemical action, produce a toxic or powerful irritant effect on the human body"; tear gas was mentioned as one of the means of chemical warfare. Next, twenty-two United States scientists had appealed against the chemical and biological warfare conducted by the United States. Among them were seven Noble Prize winners whose authority on the subject could not be questioned. Their appeal, as reported in *The New York Times* of 20 September 1966, supported his position. They wrote: "No lasting distinction seems feasible between incapacitating and lethal weapons or between chemical and biological warfare. The great variety of possible agents forms a continuous spectrum...". The claim that the weapons were not meant to kill was answered by the scientists, who wrote: "Under the intense pressures of actual war... it is difficult to keep even so mild a substance as tear gas from being used in ways that can set the stage for the introduction of lethal chemicals. For example, when... we spread tear gas over large areas and make persons emerge from protective cover to face attack by fragmentation bombs or when we use tear gas so that a moving target cannot move so fast, we use gas to kill". Lastly, as reported in *The New York Times* of 15 November 1966, hundreds of persons of note from seventy-three different countries, including many prominent scientists, had stated that the war in Viet-Nam, by violating certain conventions "and the 1925 Geneva Protocol condemning all forms of chemical warfare, is arousing universal

^{4/} Ibid., Supplement for January to December 1965, document DC/213/Add.1.

indignation and increasing opposition in the United States itself against the policy of the Government". Thus his previous statement (1451st meeting) had been well founded and would no doubt receive considerable support.

34. Following that statement, the Saudi Arabian representative had endorsed the draft resolution and requested the addition of words condemning the use of ultra-modern weapons of mass destruction which were now in the development stage. Such weapons were covered by the paragraph in the draft resolution which referred to weapons of mass destruction, and further elaboration would be impossible because some of the weapons were still in the realm of fiction. The draft resolution dealt with known weapons with known effects and against whose use there were already international agreements. He hoped that the Saudi Arabian representative would not press his suggestion.

35. His delegation believed that the acceptance of a unanimous declaration condemning the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons was a matter of paramount importance. Whether or not chemical or bacteriological warfare was employed in future was largely a question of whether or not the policy opposing its use could be kept in force. It was to maintain that policy that his delegation had submitted its draft, which it appealed to all delegations to support.

36. Mr. FOSTER (United States of America), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that, had the Hungarian representative approached the problem with a sincere desire for advance towards controls on the use of truly chemical and bacteriological agents, no one would have disagreed. But by approaching the issue by means of a distorted charge against United States activities in Viet-Nam, he had himself chemically poisoned something which could have

been of value to the whole world and in which the United States could have joined.

37. The Hungarian representative had referred to the mild chemical of tear gas. That was not a poison gas. It had been used on occasion by nearly half the Governments represented in the United Nations to control unruly mobs of their own citizens, and so obviously it did not have the characteristics which the Hungarian representative ascribed to it. As to the few United States individuals who had signed an appeal, they were private citizens, whatever their qualifications, and their recommendations were considered by United States Government officials and taken into account when decisions were made. He wondered whether in Hungary the same consideration was given to those who opposed the Government's plans. In short, the Hungarian representative's "facts" had not been proved.

38. He hoped that the idea in the draft resolution could be put into effect everywhere and that means could be found to control chemical and bacteriological warfare. The United States had taken the lead in that matter in two world wars and would like to see the approach taken by the Hungarian delegation converted into a useful and sincere initiative to advance the work at Geneva in the matter of toxic weapons of mass destruction.

39. The CHAIRMAN said that the general debate on agenda item 27 was now concluded, and statements on the draft resolutions would be heard at the next meeting. The Committee would then go on to consider agenda item 28, and the voting on the proposals submitted under agenda item 27 would take place at a later meeting, probably on 18 November.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 5.10 p.m.