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*Chairman: Mr. C. W. A. SCHURMANN
(Netherlands).*

AGENDA ITEM 29

The Korean question: report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (A/5512 and Corr.1, A/5512/Add.1, A/C.1/887, A/C.1/889, A/C.1/892, A/C.1/893, A/C.1/894, A/C.1/L.335) (continued)

1. Mr. CAMPBELL (United Kingdom) said that the seeming immobility of the Korean question was regrettable. The basic issues, however, remained the same as they had been in earlier years, and the blame for that lay in the continuing intransigence of the North Korean authorities and their continuing refusal to co-operate with the United Nations in its declared purpose of finding a just solution to the problem of Korea. The absence of progress in the fundamental problem of reunification was reflected in the fourteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.335), of which his delegation was a sponsor and whose terms were virtually identical with those of General Assembly resolution 1855 (XVII). Nevertheless, certain recent developments were worth mentioning, and some points that had been made before ought to be reiterated.

2. He recalled the statement made in August 1962 by the Acting President of the Republic of Korea, that what the Koreans wanted and were determined to create was a new and workable democracy which would reflect their country's highest ideals and would be suited to existing conditions. That realistic statement of the intentions of the Government of the Republic had been borne out by events. Within the past few months, the Republic of Korea had held presidential and National Assembly elections, and the two addenda to UNCURK's report (A/5512/Add.1) provided confirmation, based on evidence gathered by a number of observer teams who had been given unrestricted access to all the voting processes, that both elections had been properly organized and held in an orderly and regular manner. The emergence of civilian government in South Korea, although delayed for a few months, had now been successfully accomplished. The picture of the Republic of Korea that one derived from the UNCURK reports was that of a young country building up its political and economic institutions in accordance with the democratic ideals to which it was devoted; especially commendable were the efforts of the Republic of Korea to make a success of its five-year plan. The

reports of UNCURK and the statement made in the Committee the previous day by the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Korea gave irrefutable evidence that the affairs of the Republic were going well and in the right direction.

3. On the North Korean side the picture was less encouraging; indeed, there had been some disturbing developments. The North Korean authorities were still taking an attitude of defiance and derision towards the United Nations and its competence to deal with the Korean question; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in its statement of 25 September 1963 (A/C.1/889), had said that its Government would never recognize and would reject United Nations resolutions on Korea. That attitude was exemplified by the memorandum of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea dated 22 November 1963 (A/C.1/893), which was full of outrageous statements in which the method of abuse was used to conceal the absence of rational argument. There had also been changes for the worse on the military side; not only had there been a military build-up north of the armistice line but continuing attacks had been made against the United Nations forces. His delegation hoped that the tenor of the Committee's debates would make it absolutely clear that the United Nations would not countenance such violations of the basic principles of international behaviour.

4. The points that deserved to be reiterated were, for the most part, contained in the fourteen-Power draft resolution. First, by operative paragraph 1 the General Assembly would reaffirm the basic objectives of the United Nations in the Korean question, namely, to bring about the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government. By operative paragraph 2 it would call upon the North Korean authorities to accept those objectives. It was only the continued refusal of the North Korean régime to co-operate with the United Nations that was preventing progress towards the unity of the country. Finally, by operative paragraph 4 it would request the United Nations Commission to continue its work until the unification of Korea was achieved.

5. In conclusion, he wished to dispel the confusion spread by the North Koreans and some of their friends, who were trying to create the impression that it was not the United Nations but the United States that was really involved in Korea. The falsity of that charge was demonstrated by the eloquent statements that had been made in the Committee by representatives of many countries whose forces, like those of the United Kingdom, had taken part in the Korean war. The war had been fought by the United States and many other States on behalf of the United Nations, and the United Nations had the responsibility of bringing about a real and lasting peace based on the unification and independence of Korea. The United Nations could not aban-

don its ideals and objectives simply because they were not in sight of achievement; that would undermine the confidence not only of the Korean people but of all peoples in the United Nations. If only for that reason, he had no doubt that the draft resolution would be adopted by the Committee and recommended to the General Assembly.

6. Mr. HAY (Australia) said that in studying the latest report of UNCURK (A/5512 and Corr.1 and Add.1), and looking back over previous UNCURK reports down through the years, his delegation saw three things that stood out.

7. First, the United Nations had each year a frank and detailed account of developments in South Korea. That contrasted sharply with the virtual absence of any knowledge about North Korea, which refused to admit United Nations bodies to its territory. UNCURK had shown its objectivity over the years by reporting not only favourable developments in South Korea but also those which provided grounds for criticism.

8. Secondly, the Republic of Korea was to be congratulated on its record of co-operation with the various United Nations bodies sent to South Korea since the establishment of the first South Korean Government in 1948. The South Korean Government had never limited UNCURK's freedom to move about freely and to say and write what it thought fit, and on several occasions it had even modified some of its actions in response to suggestions by the United Nations. The North Korean régime, on the other hand, did not recognize the competence of the United Nations at all.

9. Thirdly, it should be noted that South Korea had had democratic Governments during most of the period since 1948, and now, once again, had a broadly based democratic régime with a freely functioning Parliament. UNCURK, which had observed the recent presidential and National Assembly elections, reported that they had been carried out in a fair and orderly manner.

10. With regard to the fourteen-Power draft resolution, of which his delegation was a sponsor, the second preambular paragraph reaffirmed past General Assembly resolutions in which the United Nations had sought to bring about a peaceful, just solution in Korea that would be in accordance with the interests and wishes of the Korean people and would contribute to the peace and stability of the Far East. The third preambular paragraph noted that the United Nations forces originally sent to Korea had in greater part already been withdrawn and that the remainder would be withdrawn when the conditions for a lasting settlement laid down by the General Assembly had been fulfilled. Some representatives had argued that the United Nations forces were large, that they dominated the country politically, and that they should therefore be withdrawn. But the fact was that the United Nations forces were neither large enough nor so organized and disposed as to be able to dominate political and economic life in South Korea. For example, the political changes in the Republic of Korea a year or so before had clearly not been instigated by the United Nations Command and had indeed been carried out without its knowledge.

11. It was equally wrong to state that the presence of the United Nations forces was preventing the unification of Korea, since the withdrawal of the occupying forces from South Korea after the Second World War had not contributed to the peaceful unification of the country and had, in fact, resulted in unprovoked aggression from the North. The Republic of Korea could not reasonably be asked to risk another invasion. It

had to be borne in mind that the North Koreans had continued to violate the Armistice Agreement of 27 July 1953^{1/} and that troops withdrawn from North Korea into Communist China could be brought back within a few hours, whereas the United Nations forces would have to withdraw thousands of miles from Korea. The United Nations forces had gone to South Korea to repel aggression, and they were staying there to discourage further aggression.

12. By operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution, the General Assembly would reaffirm that the objectives of the United Nations in Korea were to bring about, by peaceful means, the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government, and the full restoration of international peace and security in the area. Those were surely objectives to which no one could take exception.

13. By operative paragraph 4, the Assembly would request UNCURK to continue its work. His delegation felt that UNCURK's presence in Korea was a demonstration of continued United Nations interest and that it could promote not only the achievement of the United Nations objectives in that country but also the latter's political, social and economic development. He urged the Committee to adopt the draft resolution.

14. Mr. ZEA (Colombia) said he entertained no high hopes that the present discussion in the United Nations would bring a major advance towards the unification of the Korean peninsula; certain political situations on the Asian continent were too well consolidated to permit North Korea to liberate itself in the near future from the control to which it had been subjected for so many years. Nevertheless, his delegation could not accept the view that the discussion was useless, or dangerous to peace and to the recent atmosphere of relative harmony. To fail to discuss or try to solve an international problem did not make the problem disappear.

15. The peace-making efforts of the United Nations should be exerted where they were most needed, in other words where there was discord; the most sensitive problems of the cold war should be debated with the most care, for once they were solved other advances would come more easily. Moreover, the division of various countries against the will of their peoples was one of the greatest tragedies of the present day and posed an ever-present risk of world war.

16. A settlement of the Korean question would be possible only through democratic methods. The leaders of the Republic of Korea had declared their desire for unification and had been supported by the people of South Korea in thoroughly honest elections. The people of North Korea, on the other hand, had no opportunity under the existing régime to speak out, much less act, for unification with their South Korean brothers under a single Government. While South Korea stood for the unification of the country through elections verified and supervised by international organizations, North Korea had resorted to armed force and foreign assistance. Only the method advocated by South Korea was in keeping with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, and consequently the course pursued by the Organization in the past remained the only possible course. All of the General Assembly's resolutions on

^{1/} Official Records of the Security Council, Eighth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1953, document S/3079, appendix A.

the subject retained their validity, and the work of UNCURK should be continued and intensified.

17. Some speakers had urged that the United Nations should change its policy on the Korean question so as to make possible an understanding between the two parts of the peninsula. But if that was to be possible the North Korean authorities too would have to alter their attitude. They would have to recognize the authority of the United Nations, consent to the holding of free and supervised elections—in other words, elections in which the voters could choose between different individuals and different systems of government—and agree in advance to accept the result, even if it was unfavourable to them. Until such a change took place, the United Nations would have to maintain the course outlined in the fourteen-Power draft resolution.

18. In conclusion, he expressed the hope that the Republic of Korea would soon be admitted as a Member of the United Nations.

19. Mr. DE BEUS (Netherlands) expressed regret that, as the report of UNCURK showed, the North Korean authorities were continuing to oppose the United Nations stand on Korean unification, thereby further delaying a proper and definitive settlement of the Korean question. His delegation still felt that the unification of Korea should be brought about in accordance with the objectives fixed by the United Nations, i.e. through the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government.

20. He was pleased to note, on the other hand, that there had been considerable progress during the preceding year towards a return to representative government in the Republic of Korea. On 17 December 1962, a referendum on constitutional amendments had been held, according to UNCURK's report, in a free and orderly manner. It was to be noted that 85 per cent of the registered voters had participated and that more than one-fifth of them had shown, by casting negative votes, that the voting was completely free. Between December 1962 and February 1963, more than 2,750 politicians barred from political activity under the Political Purification Law of 1962 had been given clearance, leaving 269 still under the ban. The presidential elections held on 15 October 1963 and the National Assembly elections held on 26 November 1963, both of which had been closely observed by UNCURK, had been completely free and fair. That conclusion, which was stated in the addenda to UNCURK's report (A/5512/Add.1), was borne out by the fact that President Park had won election by only a narrow margin and that the opposition parties had won a substantial percentage of the votes in the National Assembly elections.

21. The present Government of the Republic of Korea deserved full credit for the progress which had been achieved, and its Foreign Minister's statement in the Committee confirmed the view that UNCURK's presence in Korea had been a contributing factor in that regard. His delegation, which hoped that the establishment of representative government in the Republic of Korea would help to make possible all-Korean elections under United Nations supervision, would do everything it could to enable UNCURK to continue its work. A number of speakers had stated that the problem of Korea must be solved by the Korean people themselves; surely, however, there was no better way to

apply that principle than by holding elections throughout Korea under United Nations supervision.

22. It was in the light of those considerations that his delegation had joined in sponsoring the fourteen-Power draft resolution, by which the General Assembly would reaffirm the objectives of the United Nations in Korea, call upon the North Korean authorities to accept those objectives, and request UNCURK to continue its work.

23. Mr. SZEWCZYK (Poland) said that the discriminatory practice of excluding the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from the Committee's deliberations was highly disturbing; the United States argument that the Government of that country must accept certain conditions before it could be allowed to participate was totally unjustified.

24. The problem of the reunification of Korea was an internal matter of concern only to the Koreans; no solution could be imposed from outside by a State, a group of States or an international organization. For that reason, the Polish delegation had consistently maintained that the activity of UNCURK was not only useless but harmful, since the Commission represented only one side and constituted an additional impediment to any understanding between North and South. The annual reports of UNCURK had served destructive purposes by distorting the picture of the situation in Korea; they could not advance the cause of the Korean people, but could be useful only to those who were interested in preserving their position in Korea through the military occupation of the southern part of the peninsula.

25. Although the United Nations had no authority to bring about the reunification of a divided country, in the case of Korea it could help to remove the obstacles that prevented unity. The first obstacle to be removed was the presence of foreign troops in South Korea, which not only created constant tension within the country but also, contrary to the assertions of some delegations, gave rise to the incidents taking place along the 38th parallel. The presence of foreign troops hampered all political progress in South Korea, restricted the freedom of action of its people and thereby obstructed progress towards unification. Thus, UNCURK's very approach to the problem of the unification of Korea could not but cause serious concern; if unification was a condition for the withdrawal of the so-called United Nations troops, then the Korean question was caught in a vicious circle.

26. The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was ready at all times, as its memorandum of 22 November 1963 (A/C.1/893) showed, to agree to holding free general elections throughout North and South Korea for the peaceful reunification of the country. In view of the disinclination of the South Korea authorities to accept that proposal at present, however, it had also put forward concrete proposals for solving the question gradually, through a series of intermediate steps. One of those steps would be the conclusion, after the United States army had been withdrawn from South Korea, of an agreement between North and South Korea to refrain from attacking each other and to reduce their armed forces to 100,000 men or fewer. That measure could be followed by economic and cultural exchanges and co-operation between the two parts of Korea. The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had also proposed setting up a confederation of the North and South; a supreme national committee composed of representatives of the present two Gov-

ernments could jointly deal with matters of common concern, while the present social and political systems and the independent activities of the two Governments would be maintained. After an atmosphere of national amity had been established through those intermediate steps, a unified central Government would be formed and the complete unification of the country achieved through the holding of all-Korean free elections on a democratic basis. Those proposals were in keeping with the national interests of the entire Korean people and with the interests of peace in the Far East and the world.

27. The Polish delegation would vote against the fourteen-Power draft resolution, for it was convinced that the problem of the reunification of Korea was not within the competence of the United Nations and that consequently UNCURK should be dissolved. The United Nations should bring about the withdrawal of foreign forces from South Korea so as to facilitate a rapprochement between North and South.

28. Mr. KHOSBAYAR (Mongolia) said that the so-called Korean question had been brought before the United Nations in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, and was being discussed, as in the past, without the participation of representatives of one of the parties concerned, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which was the legitimate spokesman of the Korean people. The debates on the Korean question dealt with the annual reports of the so-called United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, whose activities in no sense reflected the noble idea expressed in its name. Under the circumstances, the Committee's discussion, far from promoting a solution of the problem, merely served to complicate it further.

29. The question of Korean unification was a purely domestic concern of the Korean people. Foreign interference and the presence of foreign troops in South Korea against the will of the Korean people not only represented the main obstacle to the peaceful unification of Korea but also created a source of tension in the Far East. Ten years after the signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement, the United States continued to violate paragraph 60 of that Agreement by keeping its troops in South Korea. The memorandum of 25 July 1963 submitted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (A/C.1/887) gave details of the systematic violations of the Armistice Agreement committed by the United States, which had increased its military forces in South Korea, brought in new types of armaments and built new military bases and other installations.

30. The protection given to the South Korean authorities by the United States had the effect of restricting the democratic rights and freedoms of the people and of promoting chaos in South Korean political and economic life. The disastrous state of industry and agriculture in South Korea had caused famine and a steady decline in the standard of living; by August 1963, the number of unemployed had reached 7 million.

31. The statement dated 25 September 1963 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (A/C.1/889) showed that the best way in which the United Nations could help the Korean people to unify their country on a peaceful, democratic basis was to bring about the withdrawal of United States and other foreign troops from South Korea and dissolve the so-called United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea. The

Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had repeatedly made specific proposals to the South Korean authorities for the peaceful unification of Korea in accordance with the wishes of the entire Korean people, but they had been disregarded.

32. His delegation would vote against the fourteen-Power draft resolution, since it represented a new attempt to perpetuate the occupation of South Korea by United States troops and called for the continuance of UNCURK, which served neither the interests of the Korean people nor the cause of international peace and security.

33. Mr. MATSUI (Japan) said that the issue involved in the Korean question was not only the reunification and rehabilitation of Korea but also the restoration of international peace and security in the area. The Republic of Korea had always faithfully subscribed to the United Nations objectives in Korea, which had been consistently affirmed in a series of General Assembly resolutions over more than a decade. As in previous years, the report of UNCURK testified to the sincere efforts being made by the Republic of Korea and to the profound desire of its people for the peaceful reunification of their country, as also to UNCURK's own efforts in promoting the United Nations objectives there. It had been particularly gratifying to note that the recent elections had been conducted in an orderly and fair manner; his country welcomed the progress of the South Korean people towards political stability and hoped that the institution of a sound and democratic system of government in South Korea would lead to economic and social improvements and help to bring into being a unified and democratic Korea.

34. In contrast, the North Korean régime still denied the right of the United Nations to deal with the Korean question and went so far as to demand the dissolution of UNCURK. Any acceptance of such a contention would nullify the endeavours of the past eighteen years and do grave injury to the prestige and authority of the United Nations. A real settlement of the question could only be brought about not by a change of attitude on the part of the United Nations but by a reversal of position on the part of the North Korean régime.

35. Once again the North Korean régime, in its memorandum of 22 November 1963 (A/C.1/893), had raised in regrettable terms the question of the withdrawal of so-called foreign troops from Korea, which it declared to be a prerequisite for reunification. He wished to point out that the United Nations forces in Korea were not those of a specific nation but were there as the agents of the United Nations, pursuant to General Assembly resolutions, and would remain there until the United Nations objectives had been achieved. Nothing less than the North Korean régime's acceptance of the competence and authority of the United Nations and its co-operation in fulfilling the conditions laid down by the General Assembly for a settlement in Korea could justify the complete withdrawal of the United Nations forces.

36. In the light of those considerations, his delegation would support the fourteen-Power draft resolution.

37. Mr. DATCU (Romania) said that the report before the Committee (A/5512 and Corr.1 and Add.1) merely confirmed his delegation in its view that UNCURK had served no useful purpose and should be abolished. As a first step in the peaceful unification of Korea, the General Assembly should ensure that all foreign troops were withdrawn from South Korea. The occupation troops which purported to be United Nations forces

had been sent there in flagrant violation of the Charter, and were kept outside the control of the Security Council, which, according to the Charter, bore the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

38. Any solution to the Korean problem must respect the basic principle of non-interference in domestic affairs. There were no foreign troops in the territory of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which was pursuing a peaceful policy of economic and cultural development. South Korea, on the other hand, was riddled with foreign military bases and was following a policy hostile to the national interests of the Korean people. The Government of South Korea had refused to accept the reasonable proposal submitted by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for unification on the basis of free elections. The proposals put forward by that Government in its memorandum of 22 November 1963 (A/C.1/893) constituted the basis on which the problem of unifying Korea and maintaining peace in the area could be solved.

39. His delegation opposed the continuance of the present harmful policy of interference in Korea and supported those delegations which advocated allowing the Korean people to solve the problem of unification in accordance with their sovereign wishes and interests. It would vote against the fourteen-Power draft resolution as being prejudicial both to those interests and to international peace and security.

40. Mr. BUDO (Albania) said that the discussion of the so-called Korean question which was imposed on the United Nations year after year by the United States in furtherance of its aggressive aims and in violation of the purposes and principles of the Charter was one of the matters which had done most to discredit the Organization in the eyes of world opinion. Ever since the second session of the General Assembly, in defiance of the generally recognized principles of international law, the Organization had been used to the detriment of the peoples of both Koreas and of peace in the Far East as an instrument of United States interference in the internal affairs of Korea, interference culminating in the armed aggression committed under the United Nations flag against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The case of Korea was one of the saddest chapters in the history of the United Nations.

41. At previous sessions of the General Assembly, his delegation had consistently stressed that the United Nations had no justification either in equity or in law for considering the Korean question, and that such action was inconsistent not only with the fundamental principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other States, but also with the principal purpose of the United Nations—to maintain and strengthen international peace and security. Unfortunately, a deaf ear had been turned to those arguments because the United States had used the voting procedure to impose its arbitrary and intolerable views. That was a sad fact from which all Member States devoted to peace and freedom must draw the inevitable conclusion in their endeavours to make the United Nations an effective focal point of co-operation in the settlement of the great problems besetting mankind.

42. Once again, the Korean question was being foisted on the General Assembly and the United States was forcing through illegal resolutions in order to justify its occupation of South Korea and to mask its aggressive

policy towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the People's Republic of China and other Asian countries. But the peaceful reunification of Korea was a matter for the Korean people and for them alone; that was the fundamental principle that the United Nations should observe in dealing with the matter. The resolutions and other illegal measures adopted so far, including the establishment of the so-called United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, had merely served to further the aims of the United States by splitting Korea more deeply asunder, continuing the military occupation of South Korea and thereby increasing the danger of war. That was indubitably inconsistent with the provisions of the Charter, the interests of the Korean people and the preservation of peace in the Far East.

43. Furthermore, the procedure hitherto adopted of permitting the representatives of the puppet Government of South Korea to participate in the discussions in the Committee while denying that right to the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea—an independent, sovereign and peaceful State—violated the letter and spirit of the Charter, as well as international law and practice; and past experience had shown its futility. If the United Nations really wished to ascertain the true prospects for the settlement of the Korean question, it should have invited the Government of the Democratic People's Republic to send representatives to New York.

44. As in the past, the principal obstacle to a settlement of the Korean question was the military occupation and the régime of terror set up by the United States in South Korea in furtherance of its aggressive policy. If the Korean problem was to be solved and Korea unified on democratic lines, the General Assembly must forgo its illegal methods and, in keeping with the Charter, repeal all previous resolutions on the subject, dissolve UNCURK and ensure the withdrawal of all foreign forces now in South Korea. That last measure, indeed, was provided for in paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement; but the United States had seen fit to violate that and all other provisions of the Agreement, with the result that ten years after the end of the Korean war, South Korea was still occupied by American troops. In North Korea, on the other hand, the Chinese volunteers had been withdrawn as long ago as 1958, and since then there had been no foreign forces in that country.

45. After disbanding the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and unilaterally annulling paragraph 13 of the Armistice Agreement, banning the dispatch of new forces and arms to Korea, the United States had greatly reinforced its military strength in South Korea. The South Korean army had been expanded from sixteen divisions at the time of the armistice to thirty-one divisions in 1956, and now totalled over 600,000 men. The United States had dispatched reinforcements to South Korea on several occasions, and had sent in nuclear weapons and radio-controlled rockets, including Honest John, Matador, Nike-Hercules and Hawk missiles and atomic artillery, as well as a large number of modern military aircraft and warships. It had set up a number of military bases, turning South Korea into a potential springboard of aggression in the Far East. The American forces had committed innumerable acts of provocation on land and sea and in the air against North Korea in violation of the Armistice Agreement; a detailed list of such acts would be found in the memorandum of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of

Korea dated 25 July 1963, attached to document A/C.1/887. One such act had been the so-called "accidental" violation of North Korean air space on 17 May 1963. In its report on that incident (A/5641), the United States Government itself had provided an example of its own violation of the Armistice Agreement and of the territorial integrity of North Korea. Not content with such activities and with the harsh régime of colonial terrorism and exploitation to which it was subjecting the population of South Korea, the United States was attempting to set up other aggressive military alliances in the region, thereby obstructing any possibility of a peaceful settlement of the question of the reunification of Korea. All those actions undertaken in furtherance of the world-wide ambitions of the United States had increased the danger of a conflict in Korea and posed a serious threat to peace in the Far East.

46. Contrary to what was asserted in the report of UNCURK, the political and economic situation in South Korea was one of extreme chaos. Industry was bankrupt and more and more plants were shutting down. The country's agriculture had been irreparably damaged, and unemployment, poverty and famine were rife. Under the fascist military régime, the people were deprived of the most elementary human rights, including freedom of speech, of the Press and of assembly. Such were the terrible consequences of United States colonialist and militarist subjugation and exploitation. In referring to the so-called free elections recently held in South Korea, the United States representative had forgotten to add that that masquerade, like everything else in South Korea, had been forced down the people's throats at bayonet-point in the interest of the United States masters of the country. Yet despite their sufferings, the South Korean people had not abandoned their struggle against foreign occupation and for reunification, as was evidenced by their repeated overthrow of the successive puppet Governments set up by the United States authorities. The will of the people of South Korea for liberation and unification would triumph in the end.

47. In contrast to the disastrous situation obtaining in South Korea, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea offered the spectacle of a flourishing country whose people had repaired the ravages of war and created an entire new modern industry and agriculture in which collectivization and mechanization had brought about a striking increase in production. Thanks to its prosperity, North Korea would be able effectively to assist its neighbour to the south; indeed, its Government had often stated that that material prosperity was the common heritage of the whole country.

48. In accordance with its consistent policy of bringing about the peaceful and democratic reunification of Korea, the North Korean Government had advanced a series of constructive proposals. In October 1962, Kim Il Sung, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, had called for the withdrawal of armed forces, the conclusion of a peace treaty including provisions for partial disarmament, and the organization of economic and cultural exchanges between North and South Korea leading to the establishment of a confederation providing for a supreme national council made up of representatives of both Governments to deal with national questions of common interest, the two existing political systems being left unchanged. When that initial phase had been successfully accomplished, free and democratic elections would be held throughout the

country with a view to setting up a single central Government for a completely unified Korea.

49. Those realistic proposals had been systematically opposed by the United States, which held sole sway in South Korea; it was clear therefore that the attitude of the United States Government was entirely unrelated to the vital interests of the Korean people. The main obstacle to the reunification of Korea remained the occupation of South Korea by United States forces. Only when those forces, and all other foreign troops, were withdrawn would the Korean people really be free to settle their own affairs, to express their wishes and to embark on the requisite negotiations with a view to unification. The General Assembly should renounce its past illegal practices and lose no time in taking the necessary steps, including in particular the immediate dissolution of UNCURK, which had been nothing but a tool in the hands of the United States. Only thus could the United Nations help to redress the situation in Korea and to consolidate peace in the Far East.

50. Mr. RAMIREZ PANE (Paraguay) said that he would like to comment briefly, on the basis of personal observation, on what the United Nations was doing to carry out its responsibilities in Korea. During his visit to the Republic of Korea the previous summer, he had found the Korean people and their leaders grateful for what UNCURK and earlier United Nations commissions had done for Korea during the past sixteen years. He had also heard praise from the members of UNCURK for the manner in which they had been permitted to travel about freely and talk to whomever they wished. At the same time, he had found a sense of frustration in the Commission at the North Korean Government's refusal to permit it to fulfil its mandate in the North. In his opinion, UNCURK should be permitted to continue its work until the peaceful unification of Korea was achieved.

51. He had had numerous meetings with members of the United Nations forces, who were to be commended for their alertness and for their comradely relations with the armed forces of the Republic of Korea. Vigilance was indeed necessary, for the North Korean armed forces had committed nearly 2,700 violations of the Armistice Agreement since its signing in 1953 and had in recent months made a number of major incursions south of the armistice demarcation line. The North Koreans had greatly increased their armed forces, and now had 950 combat aircraft. It should also be borne in mind that North Korea was supported by hundreds of thousands of Chinese Communist troops across the Yalu River, and had concluded formal military alliances with Communist China and the Soviet Union in 1961. The North Korean Government demanded the withdrawal of the United Nations forces so that the Republic of Korea would be left exposed to new aggression. The presence of those forces in Korea helped to safeguard peace and security in the Far East and throughout the world.

52. The United Nations sought to solve the Korean problem, in accordance with the principle of self-determination, through free, nation-wide elections supervised by the United Nations and based on proportional representation of the two parts of Korea. However, the North Korean Government refused to agree to that system of representation, and it rejected United Nations supervision because it knew that United Nations observers would not permit undemocratic elections.

53. He had found a flourishing economy in the Republic of Korea, which was now carrying out a five-year economic development plan aimed at achieving a 40 per cent increase in gross national product by 1966. He had been particularly impressed with the university students, who were the country's future leaders. During his visit, preparations for the Presidential and National Assembly elections had been under way in an atmosphere of complete freedom; as UNCURK now reported, those elections had been properly organized and held in an orderly manner.

54. He hoped that the General Assembly would once again reaffirm the objectives of the United Nations in Korea by giving overwhelming support to the fourteen-Power draft resolution.

55. Mr. PRANDLER (Hungary) said that the debate on Korea was anachronistic and out of place in the present favourable international atmosphere. It was ironic that the First Committee should continue to discuss a situation which, according to Mr. Dwight D. Eisenhower, former President of the United States, in his latest book^{2/} had nearly led to the use of the atomic bomb. To keep such an item on the agenda was harmful, and contrary to the United Nations Charter. For that reason, the Hungarian Government had consistently supported the rejection by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of United Nations intervention in the domestic affairs of sovereign States. The only action requiring United Nations intervention was the withdrawal of foreign troops from South Korea and the bringing together of the two States into direct negotiations, without outside interference.

56. While the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had scrupulously carried out the provisions of the Armistice Agreement, the Government of South Korea, by allowing United States forces to be stationed indefinitely in its territory, had flagrantly violated paragraph 60 of the Agreement.

^{2/} Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The White House Years: Mandate for Change, 1953-56* (Garden City, New York, Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1963).

57. It had already been shown that UNCURK had no *raison d'être* and that its existence was a flagrant violation of the Charter. It might have been assumed that, as the years passed, the Commission would have made some attempt at objectivity. Unfortunately, that was not the case. Its report was biased and misleading, though some inkling of the real facts could be gained from a few remarks—and he referred specifically to paragraphs 40, 71 and 156 and to footnote 30 on page 9 of the report. The only fruitful act the Commission could perform would be to dissolve itself.

58. The only possible solution of the so-called Korean question was unification carried out by the Koreans themselves, without foreign intervention; the promotion of economic and cultural exchanges between North and South; the withdrawal of United States and United Nations forces from South Korea; the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the North and the South; and the reduction of the armed forces on both sides to 100,000 troops or less. Co-operation would also make it possible to re-establish contacts between the industrial North and the agricultural South with a view to relieving the disastrous economic situation in the latter area, on which the report of the Commission was utterly silent.

59. The fourteen-Power draft resolution constituted further proof that the sponsors, the vast majority of which belonged to Western military alliances, were unable to assess realistically the so-called Korean question. His delegation would vote against the draft resolution, since it represented an obsolete approach. He endorsed the consistent policy advocated by the socialist countries and the constructive proposals put forward by the representatives of Indonesia and Mali. He hoped that the United Nations would assist the Koreans by discontinuing all activities constituting interference in their domestic affairs. The item should be removed from the agenda and give place to the many other important problems confronting the Committee.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.