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Proposed programme budget for 2021

Proposed programme budget for 2021

Part II

Political affairs

Section 3

Political affairs

Special political missions

Thematic cluster II: sanctions monitoring teams, groups and panels, and other entities and mechanisms

Summary

The present report contains the proposed resource requirements for 2021 for 15 special political missions grouped under the thematic cluster of sanctions monitoring teams, groups and panels, and other entities and mechanisms.

The proposed resource requirements for 2021 for special political missions grouped under this cluster amount to \$62,188,900 (net of staff assessment).

* A/75/50.



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** The part consisting of the proposed programme plan for 2021 is submitted for the consideration of the General Assembly in accordance with the established budgetary procedures and practices reaffirmed in paragraph 13 of resolution [72/266 A](#).

*** In keeping with paragraph 11 of resolution [72/266 A](#), the part consisting of the post and non-post resource requirements is submitted through the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions for the consideration of the General Assembly.

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I. Financial overview

1. The proposed resources for 2021 for special political missions grouped under thematic cluster II amount to \$62,188,900 (net of staff assessment). Table 1 provides the comparison between the proposed resources for 2021 and the resources for 2020 as approved by the General Assembly in its resolution 74/263 A.

Table 1

Resource requirements

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2019	2020	2021		Variance
	Expenditure	Appropriation	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	2021 vs. 2020 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(3)-(2)
Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo	1 140.8	1 430.6	1 467.2	–	36.6
Panel of Experts on the Sudan	1 047.2	1 088.9	1 077.2	–	(11.7)
Panel of Experts on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea	3 103.9	2 912.0	3 189.4	–	277.4
Panel of Experts on Libya	1 264.2	1 395.5	1 372.3	–	(23.2)
Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic	1 095.8	1 211.2	1 120.9	–	(90.3)
Panel of Experts on Yemen	1 889.9	2 324.6	2 275.2	–	(49.4)
Panel of Experts on South Sudan	1 126.6	1 357.7	1 305.4	–	(52.3)
Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team pursuant to resolutions 1526 (2004) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities	5 397.8	5 899.5	5 954.4	–	54.9
Office of the Ombudsperson established pursuant to resolution 1904 (2009)	560.1	653.3	644.6	–	(8.7)
Implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)	1 634.6	1 548.0	1 433.2	–	(114.8)
Panel of Experts on Mali	991.4	1 325.7	1 213.1	–	(112.6)
Panel of Experts on Somalia	1 723.0	1 850.8	1 873.7	–	22.9
Special political mission in support of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction	2 469.2	2 969.3	3 012.0	21.0	42.7
Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate	10 575.6	11 147.4	11 143.7	125.2	(3.7)
United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da'esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant	19 703.5	20 338.7	25 106.6	–	4 767.9
Total	52 723.6	57 453.2	62 188.9	146.2	4 735.7

II. Special political missions

1. Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo

(\$1,467,200)

A. Proposed programme plan for 2021 and programme performance for 2019

Overall orientation

Mandates and background

2. The Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo is responsible for monitoring the implementation of the arms embargo, assets freeze and travel ban, as well as for providing information relevant to the potential designation of individuals and entities. The mandate derives from the priorities established in relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolutions [1533 \(2004\)](#), [1596 \(2005\)](#), [1649 \(2005\)](#), [1698 \(2006\)](#), [1807 \(2008\)](#), [1857 \(2008\)](#), [1896 \(2009\)](#), [1952 \(2010\)](#), [2021 \(2011\)](#), [2078 \(2012\)](#), [2424 \(2018\)](#) and [2478 \(2019\)](#). The sanctions regime is aimed at preventing individuals and entities from undermining the peace, stability or security of the Democratic Republic of the Congo through, for example, predatory acts by armed groups against artisanal miners and the communities surrounding mines.

Programme of work

Objective

3. The objective, to which this mission contributes, is to ensure the full implementation of the sanctions regime concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which includes an arms embargo, an asset freeze and a travel ban.

Strategy

4. To contribute to ensuring the full implementation of the sanctions regime concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Group of Experts will provide updated information to the Security Council and the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1533 \(2004\)](#) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This action is expected to result in an enhanced capacity of the Council and the Committee to take follow-up action on alleged violations of the Democratic Republic of the Congo sanctions regime. Past results in this area include the provision of information that has enabled the Committee to list individuals and entities for sanctions violations.

External factors for 2021

5. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2021 is based on the following assumptions:
 - (a) Member States comply with the resolutions of the Security Council and cooperate with the Group of Experts;
 - (b) The security situation allows the Group of Experts to conduct missions, as needed.
6. The Group of Experts integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate, and as guided by the relevant Security Council resolutions. Gender balance is taken into consideration in the recruitment and rostering of experts. The terms of reference for the

experts indicate that experts should incorporate gender perspectives into their substantive areas of responsibility. The Group of Experts is also guided by the gender strategy of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs of the Secretariat, including in the provision of available gender training to staff and sanctions-specific gender training to all experts.

7. With regard to cooperation with other entities, the Group of Experts cooperates with, among others, Member States, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and private entities to request information relevant to its investigations into the implementation and/or violations of the sanctions regime concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
8. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, the Group of Experts cooperates with, among others, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), the offices of the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict and on Sexual Violence in Conflict and other sanctions monitoring teams, groups and panels, as appropriate. In the context of safety, security and logistics, the Group of Experts cooperates with MONUSCO, the Department of Safety and Security of the Secretariat and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

Evaluation activities

9. A self-evaluation of mission processes to develop the mission concept, including support from the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs for such processes, to identify constraints and opportunities is planned for 2021.

Programme performance in 2019 against planned result

10. A planned result for 2019, which is the enhanced capacity of the Security Council to adjust the sanctions regime, as referred to in the report of the Secretary-General on estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council for 2019 for thematic cluster II ([A/73/352/Add.2](#)), was achieved, as evidenced by the 19 recommendations made by the Group of Experts in its midterm and final reports and agreed upon by the Committee, which exceeded the target of 10.

Programme performance in 2019: improvements in the tracing of Congolese minerals in the regional and international markets

11. In its reports between 2017 and 2018 (see [S/2017/1091](#), [S/2018/531](#) and [S/2018/1133](#)), the Group of Experts noted that some States members of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region had not taken appropriate measures to prevent and counter the smuggling of gold and other natural resources from the Democratic Republic of the Congo into their territories. The Group of Experts had documented that International Conference on the Great Lakes Region certificates were not in place in some countries and that, in instances where they were used, some had been forged by smugglers.
12. From 2017 to 2019, the Group of Experts continued to investigate the matter and interviewed several actors involved in the mining sector in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region. The Group of Experts substantiated how armed groups and smugglers had benefited from the weak enforcement of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region certificates to vitiate the official supply chain of regional and other States with gold sourced from areas controlled by armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In its reports, the Group of Experts continued to recommend that States members of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region use its certificates and uphold their national legislation to combat gold smuggling from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Following the reports of the Group of Experts and its briefings to the Committee concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Committee addressed official

communications to the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region secretariat requesting information on efforts undertaken by its members to address gold smuggling at the national and regional levels. In 2019, one International Conference on the Great Lakes Region country officially adopted the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region certificate, while another country requested that refineries established in its jurisdiction comply with its national legislation on the transparency of gold production, import and export.

Progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

13. This work contributed to ensure the full implementation of the sanctions regime concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as demonstrated by the recommendations that the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region received from the Committee and efforts undertaken by some countries of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region to strengthen their framework to counter gold smuggling.

Table 2
Performance measure

2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Committee has limited understanding of gold smuggling from the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the region	Committee receives new information from the Group of Experts on gold smuggling from the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the region	Committee continues to receive detailed information from the Group of Experts on gold smuggling from the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the region	Committee addresses recommendations to Member States for efforts in countering gold smuggling from the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the region	Regional countries enhance efforts to counter gold smuggling from the Democratic Republic of the Congo to their countries

Planned result for 2021: enhanced implementation of the sanctions regime concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo

14. In its final (see [S/2019/469](#)) and midterm (see [S/2019/974](#)) reports for 2019, the Group of Experts noted that armed groups and elements of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo continued to benefit from the illegal exploitation of natural resources. The Group of Experts also highlighted that local and foreign armed groups continued to commit severe violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, including cases of sexual violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
15. As identified in its final report for 2019, the Group of Experts will continue to investigate, identify and report on the illegal exploitation and smuggling of natural resources by armed groups, focusing on the support from regional and international networks, as well as on the activities of foreign and local armed groups and their impact on the protection of civilians. The Group of Experts also intends to investigate and report on the violation of the arms embargo.

Internal challenge and response

16. The challenge for the Group of Experts was the difficulty in validating some information for the preparation of specific reports, given the difficulty in obtaining access to certain areas and persons in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, owing to the security situation and logistical challenges. In response, the Group of Experts will increase its reporting on the issues cited above by travelling, security permitting, to areas that have been difficult to gain access to in the past and by interviewing additional actors, including humanitarian workers, and populations that have been victims of attacks

by armed groups. The deployment of a dedicated security officer supporting the Group of Experts in organizing missions is expected to improve access. To complement this information, the Group of Experts also intends to travel to relevant Member States to collect information on the violation of the arms embargo and to identify the support provided to armed groups in the illegal exploitation of natural resources.

Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

17. This work is expected to contribute to ensuring the full implementation of the sanctions regime concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which would be demonstrated by increased reporting by the Group of Experts, increased recommendations and follow-up by the Security Council on these issues, improved policies for the protection of civilian population in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and the designation of individuals or entities to the sanctions list.

Table 3
Performance measure

2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Committee receives information from the Group of Experts on the activities of armed groups in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo	Committee has a good understanding of all armed groups active in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo	Committee takes action to address the situation of activities of armed groups in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo	Committee adds individuals and/or entities to the sanctions list	Improved policies for the protection of the civilian population in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo owing to the restraining and signalling functions of sanctions listings

Deliverables

18. Table 4 lists all deliverables, by category and subcategory, for the period 2019–2021 that contributed and are expected to contribute to the attainment of the objective stated above.

Table 4
Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo: deliverables for the period 2019–2021, by category and subcategory

Category and subcategory	2019 planned	2019 actual	2020 planned	2021 planned
A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
Parliamentary documentation (number of documents)	7	6	7	7
1. Reports to the Security Council and updates, monthly reports, country visit reports, investigative reports and/or reports on outreach activities to the sanctions committee	7	6	7	7
Substantive services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	7	7	7	7
2. Meetings of sanctions committee	5	5	5	5
3. Chair's briefings to Member States	2	2	2	2
Conference and secretariat services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	7	7	7	7
4. Meetings of sanctions committee	5	5	5	5
5. Chair's briefings to Member States	2	2	2	2

Category and subcategory	2019 planned	2019 actual	2020 planned	2021 planned
B. Generation and transfer of knowledge				
Seminars, workshops and training events (number of days)	5	5	5	5
6. Induction seminar for new members of the Group of Experts	5	5	5	5
Publications (number of publications)	2	–	2	–
7. Implementation assistance notice and guidance document	2	–	2	–
C. Substantive deliverables				
Consultation, advice and advocacy: recommendations concerning new individuals and entities to be listed; consultations with Member States on the implementation of the sanctions regime; consultations and advice to broaden engagement with international, regional, subregional and other organizations; and advice on the implementation of relevant resolutions.				
Fact-finding, monitoring and investigation missions: missions and requests for information relating to compliance with the sanctions regime.				
Databases and substantive digital materials: archives of documents collected by the Group of Experts.				
D. Communication deliverables				
Outreach programmes, special events and information materials: outreach programmes to report on the work of the Group of Experts; fact sheets on the work and mandate of the special political mission; and notes verbales on the activities of the sanctions committee/Group of Experts.				
External and media relations: press releases on the activities of the sanctions committee/Group of Experts.				
Digital platforms and multimedia content: dissemination of information on the activities and mandate of the sanctions committee/Group of Experts through its website.				

B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2021

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 5

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2019	2020	2021	Variance	
	Expenditure	Appropriation	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	2021 vs. 2020 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(3)-(2)
Civilian personnel costs	90.3	257.3	324.0	–	66.7
Operational costs	1 050.5	1 173.3	1 143.2	–	(30.1)
Total (net of staff assessment)	1 140.8	1 430.6	1 467.2	–	36.6

Table 6
Positions

	<i>Professional and higher categories</i>								<i>General Service and related categories</i>			<i>National staff</i>				<i>Total</i>
	<i>USG</i>	<i>ASG</i>	<i>D-2</i>	<i>D-1</i>	<i>P-5</i>	<i>P-4</i>	<i>P-3</i>	<i>P-2</i>	<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>Field/ Security Service</i>	<i>General Service</i>	<i>international</i>	<i>National Professional Officer</i>	<i>Local level</i>	<i>United Nations Volunteers</i>	
Approved 2020	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	2	—	—	2	—	—	—	2
Proposed 2021	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	2	—	—	2	—	—	—	2
Change	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

19. The proposed resource requirements for the Group of Experts for 2021 amount to \$1,467,200 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for the salaries and common staff costs (\$324,000) for the continuation of two positions (2 P-3) to provide substantive administrative and security support to the sanctions regime, and operational costs (\$1,143,200) comprising expert fees (\$738,300) and the travel (\$264,600) of the six experts of the Group of Experts, official travel of staff (\$26,700), and other operational and logistical support requirements, including rental of premises, rental of vehicles, communications and information technology services, and other supplies and services (\$113,600).
20. In 2021, it is proposed that the number and levels of positions for the Group of Experts remain unchanged. A 5 per cent vacancy rate has been applied to the staff costs.
21. The increase in the requirements proposed for 2021 compared with the appropriation for 2020 is attributable to increased requirements under civilian personnel costs, owing to the application of a lower vacancy rate of 5 per cent for 2021 compared with 50 per cent applied to one position initially established in 2020, offset in part by reduced requirements for travel for the experts.

Extrabudgetary resources

22. No extrabudgetary resources were available in 2020 or are projected for 2021 for the Group of Experts.

2. Panel of Experts on the Sudan

(\$1,077,200)

A. Proposed programme plan for 2021 and programme performance for 2019

Overall orientation

Mandates and background

23. The Panel of Experts on the Sudan is responsible for monitoring the implementation of the arms embargo, assets freeze and travel ban, as well as for providing information relevant to the potential designation of individuals and entities. The mandate is defined in Security Council resolution [1591 \(2005\)](#). The sanctions regime is one of the tools used by the Council to address the conflict in Darfur and is aimed at preventing and containing threats to the stability of Darfur and the region and a peaceful settlement of the conflict in Darfur.

Programme of work

Objective

24. The objective, to which this mission contributes, is to ensure the full implementation of the sanctions regime concerning the Sudan, which includes an arms embargo, an assets freeze and a travel ban, as well as to report on the possible threats to the peace and stability of Darfur.

Strategy

25. To contribute to ensuring the full implementation of the sanctions regime, the Panel of Experts will provide updated information to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1591 \(2005\)](#) concerning the Sudan. This work is expected to result in enhanced capacity of the Council and the Committee to take follow-up action on alleged violations of the sanctions regime. Past results in this area include detailed information shared with the Committee on the operations of Darfuri armed groups in Libya and their impact on the conflict in Darfur.

External factors for 2021

26. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2021 is based on the following assumptions:
- (a) Member States comply with the resolutions of the Security Council and cooperate with the Panel of Experts:
 - (b) The security situation allows the Panel of Experts to conduct missions, as needed.
27. The Panel of Experts integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate, and as guided by the relevant Security Council resolutions. Gender balance is taken into consideration in the recruitment and rostering of experts. The terms of reference for experts in the Panel of Experts indicate that they should incorporate gender perspectives into their substantive areas of responsibility. The Panel of Experts is also guided by the gender strategy of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, including in the provision of available gender training to staff and sanctions-specific gender training to all experts.

28. With regard to cooperation with other entities, the Panel of Experts cooperates with, among others, Member States, the African Union and the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID).
29. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, the Panel of Experts on the Sudan cooperates with, among others, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the United Nations Children's Fund and other sanctions monitoring teams, groups and panels, as appropriate, notably the Panels of Experts on South Sudan and on Libya. In the context of safety, security and logistics, the Panel of Experts on the Sudan cooperates with UNAMID, the Department of Safety and Security and UNDP.

Evaluation activities

30. A self-evaluation of mission processes to develop the mission concept, including support from the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs for such processes, to identify constraints and opportunities is planned for 2021.

Programme performance in 2019 against planned result

31. A planned result for 2019, which is enhanced capacity of the Security Council to adjust the sanctions regime, as referred to in the report of the Secretary-General on estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council for 2019 for thematic cluster II ([A/73/352/Add.2](#)), was achieved, as evidenced by the six recommendations made by the Panel of Experts in its interim and final reports and agreed upon by the Committee, which exceeded the target of four.

Programme performance in 2019: identifying new funding sources of key Darfuri armed group

32. Among the armed groups that have played an active role in the conflict in Darfur, the Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid remains the only one still operating within and deriving income from Darfur. In recent years, the group's leader, Abdul Wahid Nur, has faced both internal leadership challenges and external pressure from government military operations in its traditional stronghold of Jebel Marra. As a result, the group's ability to derive income from taxing camps for internally displaced persons in the area has declined, decreasing its military capabilities.
33. In its final report for 2019 (see [S/2019/34](#)), the Panel of Experts documented how the discovery of a significant gold field in an area controlled by the Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid led to a resurgence in the group's operational capabilities. Early in 2019, gold was discovered in the Torroye area, which was controlled by the group. The Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid dispatched key commanders to the area to organize the taxation of miners. The Panel of Experts informed the Sudan sanctions committee that the group had since been able to acquire new weapons, ammunition and recruits as a result of its new source of funding.

Progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

34. This work contributed to ensuring the full implementation of the sanctions regime concerning the Sudan, as demonstrated by the provision of updated information to the Committee on new sources of funding for a key Darfuri armed group.

Table 7
Performance measure

2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Panel of Experts noted the Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid among armed groups whose operational capabilities were diminished by government military operations in Darfur	As the other armed groups, Justice and Equality Movement and Sudan Liberation Army-Minni Minawi, are pushed out of Darfur, government forces launch attack against the Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid in Jebel Marra	Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid faces increased pressure but retains control in pockets of the Darfur area	Major fighting resumes between Government and the Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid	Committee is made aware of Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid new funding sources, leading to resurgence in operational capabilities

Planned result for 2021: further reporting on Darfuri armed group operations in Libya

35. In its final report to the Security Council for 2019, the Panel of Experts noted the continued presence of Darfuri armed groups in Libya. The role of these armed groups in the Libyan conflict continues to evolve as alliances and battle lines shift. The Panel of Experts also highlighted the significant increase in the military capability of Darfuri armed groups as they acquired new equipment in Libya. This could potentially constitute a threat to peace and security within the Darfur area, in particular in the light of recent progress in peace talks. In previous reports, the Panel of Experts had documented how Darfuri armed groups used equipment obtained in Libya to launch attacks into Darfur. Because of the presence and activities of Darfuri armed groups in neighbouring countries, the Libya, South Sudan and the Sudan sanctions committees held joint consultations in 2019 to discuss a common approach to prevent Darfuri armed groups from engaging in destabilizing activities.
36. The Panel of Experts recommended in its report that the Security Council urge warring Libyan factions to stop their cooperation with Darfuri armed groups and to stop providing them with financing and military equipment. In 2021, in line with its mandate to assess threats to the stability of Darfur and the region, the Panel of Experts will continue to investigate the financing sources, motivations and capabilities of Darfuri armed groups operating in Libya. In this context, the Panel of Experts will concurrently continue to collect information on potential violations of the arms embargo, presenting statements of cases for listing, among others, individuals or entities, by the Committee, as appropriate. The Panel of Experts will do so through continued engagement with key actors, including the Government of the Sudan, armed groups, UNAMID and other sanctions monitoring teams, groups and panels, as appropriate.

Internal challenge and response

37. The challenge for the Panel of Experts was the difficulty in validating some information for the preparation of specific reports, given the difficulty in gaining access to the Sudan. In response, the Panel of Experts will increase its cooperation with the relevant United Nations entities on the ground and, in parallel, explore the possibility of travelling to alternate destinations, including relevant Member States, in order to gain access to information that is available and can be provided by third parties. To complement this, the Panel of Experts also intends to intensify contacts, interviews and liaisons through, among other, teleconferencing.

Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

38. This work is expected to contribute to reporting on the possible threats to the peace and stability of Darfur, which would be demonstrated by the Committee's increased awareness of Darfuri armed groups' operations in Libya through briefings, communications and reports produced by the Panel of Experts, enabling the Security Council/Committee to take appropriate follow-up action.

Table 8

Performance measure

2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Committee receives information from the Panel of Experts noting incursion of 2 Darfuri rebel groups into Darfur from bases in Libya and South Sudan	Committee receives reporting from the Panel of Experts on how Darfuri armed groups consolidated their presence in Libya	Committee receives reporting from the Panel of Experts on increasing alliances between Darfuri armed groups and Libyan armed actors	Committee receives reporting from the Panel of Experts on activities, structures and motivations of Darfuri rebel groups operating in Libya	Committee receives updated information on movements of Darfuri rebel groups in Libya

Deliverables

39. Table 9 lists all deliverables, by category and subcategory, for the period 2019–2021 that contributed and are expected to contribute to the attainment of the objective stated above.

Table 9

Panel of Experts on the Sudan: deliverables for the period 2019–2021, by category and subcategory

Category and subcategory	2019 planned	2019 actual	2020 planned	2021 planned
A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
Parliamentary documentation (number of documents)	6	6	6	6
1. Reports to the Security Council and updates, monthly reports, country visit reports, investigative reports and/or reports on outreach activities to the sanctions committee	6	6	6	6
Substantive services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	8	5	8	6
2. Meetings of sanctions committee	6	5	6	6
3. Special meetings on thematic and regional topics and capacity challenges of Member State	2	–	2	–
Conference and secretariat services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	8	5	8	5
4. Meetings of sanctions committee	6	5	6	5
5. Special meetings on thematic and regional topics and capacity challenges of Member State	2	–	2	–
B. Generation and transfer of knowledge				
Seminars, workshops and training events (number of days)	5	5	5	5
6. Induction seminar for new members of the Panel of Experts	5	5	5	5
Publications (number of publications)	2	–	2	–
7. Implementation assistance notice and guidance document	2	–	2	–

Category and subcategory	2019 planned	2019 actual	2020 planned	2021 planned
C. Substantive deliverables				
Consultation, advice and advocacy: recommendations concerning new individuals and entities to be listed; consultations with Member States on the implementation of the sanctions regime; consultations and advice to broaden engagement with international, regional, subregional and other organizations; and advice on the implementation of relevant resolutions.				
Fact-finding, monitoring and investigation missions: missions and requests for information relating to compliance with the sanctions regime.				
Databases and substantive digital materials: archives of documents collected by the Panel of Experts.				
D. Communication deliverables				
Outreach programmes, special events and information materials: outreach programmes to report on the work of the Panel of Experts; fact sheets on the work and mandate of the special political mission; and notes verbales on the activities of the sanctions committee/Panel of Experts.				
External and media relations: Press releases on the activities of the sanctions committee/Panel of Experts.				
Digital platforms and multimedia content: dissemination of information on the activities and mandate of the sanctions committee/Panel of Experts through its website.				

B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2021

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 10

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2019	2020	2021		Variance
	Expenditure	Appropriation	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	2021 vs. 2020 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(3)-(2)
Civilian personnel costs	150.9	158.8	143.5	–	(15.3)
Operational costs	896.3	930.1	933.7	–	3.6
Total (net of staff assessment)	1 047.2	1 088.9	1 077.2	–	(11.7)

Table 11

Positions

	Professional and higher categories									General Service and related categories		National staff				
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Subtotal	Field/ Security Service	General Service	Total inter-national	National Professional Officer	Local level	United Nations Volunteers	Total
Approved 2020	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	1	–	–	1	–	–	–	1
Proposed 2021	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	1	–	–	1	–	–	–	1
Change	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

40. The proposed resource requirements for the Panel of Experts for 2021 amount to \$1,077,200 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for the salaries and common staff costs (\$143,500) for the continuation of one position (P-3) to provide substantive, administrative and security support to the sanctions regime, and operational costs (\$933,700) composed of experts' fees (\$621,600) and travel

of the five experts (\$235,000), official travel of staff (\$17,700), and other operational and logistical support requirements, including rental of premises, rental of vehicles, communications and information technology services, and other supplies and services (\$59,400).

41. In 2021, it is proposed that the number and level of the position for the Panel of Experts remain unchanged. A 5 per cent vacancy rate has been applied to the staff costs.
42. The decrease in the requirements proposed for 2021 compared with the appropriation for 2020 is attributable primarily to reduced requirements under civilian personnel costs, owing to the application of a lower percentage of common staff costs based on recent expenditure patterns.

Extrabudgetary resources

43. No extrabudgetary resources were available in 2020 or are projected for 2021 for the Panel of Experts.

3. Panel of Experts on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

(\$3,189,400)

A. Proposed programme plan for 2021 and programme performance for 2019

Overall orientation

Mandates and background

44. The Panel of Experts on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is responsible for monitoring the implementation of the sanctions regime with regard to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including an arms embargo relating to nuclear, ballistic missile and other weapons of mass destruction programmes, sectoral bans on coal, minerals and fuel, a ban on the export of luxury goods, a travel ban and/or assets freeze on designated individuals and entities, a ban on the provision of financial services, a ban on specialized teaching and training in disciplines that could contribute to prohibited activities and programmes, and cargo inspection and maritime procedures, as well as for providing information relevant to the potential designation of individuals and entities. The mandate derives from the priorities established in the relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolutions [1718 \(2006\)](#), [1874 \(2009\)](#), [2087 \(2013\)](#), [2094 \(2013\)](#), [2270 \(2016\)](#), [2321 \(2016\)](#), [2371 \(2017\)](#), [2375 \(2017\)](#), [2397 \(2017\)](#) and [2464 \(2019\)](#). The sanctions regime is aimed at ensuring that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea abandons all nuclear weapons and its existing nuclear programme, and acts strictly in accordance with the obligations applicable to parties under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the terms and conditions of the Agreement of 30 January 1992 between the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Programme of work

Objective

45. The objective, to which this mission contributes, is to ensure the full implementation of the sanctions regime concerning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which includes an arms embargo, an assets freeze, a travel ban, maritime and financial measures, a ban on petroleum products and crude oil, a coal ban and sanctions measures in other sectoral areas.

Strategy

46. To contribute to the full implementation of the sanctions regime concerning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Panel of Experts will continue to monitor, investigate and report on sanctions implementation, including sophisticated sanctions evasion techniques. This work is expected to result in enhancing the understanding of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1718 \(2006\)](#) and the Security Council of the scope of sanctions evasion and proposing recommendations to improve implementation. Past results in this area include the designations of individuals, entities and vessels involved in sanctions evasion and the Committee's approval of the Panel's recommendations.

External factors for 2021

47. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2021 is based on the following assumptions:
 - (a) Member States will comply with the resolutions of the Security Council and cooperate with the Panel of Experts;
 - (b) The security situation allows the Panel of Experts to conduct missions, as needed.
48. The Panel of Experts integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate, and as guided by the relevant Security Council resolutions. Gender balance is taken into consideration in the recruitment and rostering of experts. The terms of reference for experts in the Panel of Experts indicate that experts should incorporate gender perspectives into their substantive areas of responsibility. The Panel of Experts is also guided by the gender strategy of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, including in the provision of available gender training to staff and sanctions-specific gender training to all experts.
49. With regard to cooperation with other entities, in the context of information-sharing, the Panel of Experts cooperates, among others, with Member States, the European Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Financial Action Task Force, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
50. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, the Panel of Experts cooperates, among others, with other sanctions monitoring teams, groups and panels, as appropriate. In the context of safety and security, information technology security and logistics, the Panel of Experts cooperates with the Department of Safety and Security, the Office of Information and Communications Technology and UNDP.

Evaluation activities

51. A self-evaluation of mission processes to develop the mission concept, including support from the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs for such processes, to identify constraints and opportunities is planned for 2021.

Programme performance in 2019 against planned result

52. A planned result for 2019, which is improved compliance by States and other entities with the sanctions regime, as referred to in the report of the Secretary-General on estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council for 2019 for thematic cluster II ([A/73/352/Add.2](#)), was achieved, as evidenced by 74 communications from States and other entities informing the Committee of compliance-related issues, which exceeded the target of 25, and by 53 communications from States and other entities seeking advice on how to comply with the measures, which exceeded the target of 20.

Programme performance in 2019: Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1718 \(2006\)](#), Security Council and international community continue to receive updated information on sanctions evasions in the maritime sphere

53. The sanctions regime concerning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea includes prohibitions on imports and exports of select goods, including those that can contribute to the country's nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, and certain commodities such as coal, crude oil and refined petroleum products. Much of this trade takes place through ocean shipping. Accordingly, in recent

years, the Panel of Experts, as mandated by the Security Council, has continued to monitor potential violations of Council sanctions in the maritime sphere. The Panel of Experts has supported the Committee and Council through investigating and identifying not only individuals and entities involved in evading sanctions in the maritime sphere, but also vessels for sanctions designation. This includes identifying evasion techniques, such as physical disguises, deactivation of the automatic identification system, use of small vessels without International Maritime Organization (IMO) numbers and night transfers. As a result, the Committee and Council have designated a number of vessels for sanctions. To assist stakeholders in implementing sanctions, in 2017, the Panel of Experts recommended that the Committee establish a list of designated vessels (subject to relevant measures in resolution [2270 \(2016\)](#)) and maintain the list of designated individuals and entities. Beginning with the adoption of this recommendation and subsequent publication of a designated vessel list in June 2017, the Committee designated additional vessels within the sanctions regime in 2017 and 2018. Those were published on the website of the Committee as four different lists of designated vessels.

54. In 2019, the Panel of Experts provided further updates of sanctions evasion trends and techniques, including in its final report (see [S/2019/171](#)). Given the proliferation of vessels designated over time (58, contained in five different lists, in total as of 2019), under different listing criteria, the Panel of Experts recommended that a consolidated list of all designated vessels be developed to assist stakeholders in implementing the Democratic People's Republic of Korea sanctions regime. Accordingly, the Committee approved its Chair's proposal for the Panel of Experts to develop such a list for the Committee's consideration.

Progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

55. This work contributed to the full implementation of the sanctions regime concerning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, as demonstrated by the agreement by the Committee on the recommendation to develop a consolidated list of designated vessels.

Table 12
Performance measure

2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
N/A	Security Council/Committee receives information from Panel of Experts on sanctions evasion taking place in the maritime sphere, in violation of strengthened sanctions measures	Committee approves Panel of Experts recommendation to begin to maintain a list of designated vessels, as Security Council imposes additional sanctions on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including sectoral sanctions	Security Council/Committee receives updated information from Panel of Experts on sanctions evasion through use of vessels; Committee receives assistance from Panel of Experts in continuing to maintain lists of designated vessels	Committee receives and approves Panel of Experts recommendation to consolidate the lists of designated vessels, to facilitate implementation of sanctions regime

Abbreviation: N/A, not applicable.

Planned result for 2021: continued investigations into and reporting on evasion techniques and assistance to improve sanctions implementation

56. Security Council resolutions [2270 \(2016\)](#), [2321 \(2016\)](#), [2371 \(2017\)](#), [2375 \(2017\)](#) and [2397 \(2017\)](#) significantly strengthened the sanctions regime concerning the Democratic People's Republic of

Korea by expanding measures in terms of scale, scope and complexity. As a result, there has also been an expansion of the scope and volume of the work of the Panel of Experts.

57. Through its reporting in 2019, the Panel of Experts was able to provide the 1718 Committee and the Security Council with a detailed analysis of the advanced techniques used for sanctions evasion, especially concerning illicit ship-to-ship transfers using the manipulation of vessel automatic identification system transmissions and aided by weak monitoring by flag States. The Panel of Experts demonstrated the complex ways in which global banks and insurance companies continue to unwittingly facilitate payments and provide coverage for vessels involved in ever-larger, multi-million-dollar, illegal ship-to-ship transfers of petroleum products, as well as an increasing number of ship-to-ship coal transfers and attempted trans-shipments. The Panel of Experts made a number of recommendations for strengthening Member State implementation of maritime sanctions.

Internal challenge and response

58. The challenge for the Panel of Experts was the difficulty in validating some information for the preparation of specific reports and developing targeted and focused analysis in all its mandated areas. In response, the Panel of Experts will expand its monitoring through outreach and visits to key regions, Member States and other implementation partners for more focused reporting and specific recommendations, with the aim of providing a more accurate assessment of the scope of violations of the relevant sanctions measures, and assisting them in improving the implementation of the measures.

Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

59. This work is expected to contribute to the full implementation of the sanctions regime concerning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which would be demonstrated by the Security Council being enabled to close loopholes in sanctions implementation in key regions and Member States.

Table 13

Performance measure

2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Outreach with European Union and Member States in key regions and assist Member States in improving their domestic legal frameworks and implementation	Continued outreach with European Union and Member States in key regions and assist Member States in improving their domestic legal frameworks and identifying implementation loopholes	Continued outreach with European Union countries and assist Member States in improving implementation	Continued systematic regional outreach and Member State visits for targeted assessment and assistance	Improved implementation at national and regional levels, more comprehensive national implementation reports, and the Security Council is enabled to close loopholes in sanctions implementation in key regions and Member States

Deliverables

60. Table 14 lists all deliverables, by category and subcategory, for the period 2019–2021 that contributed and are expected to contribute to the attainment of the objective stated above.

Table 14

Panel of Experts on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea: deliverables for the period 2019–2021, by category and subcategory

<i>Category and subcategory</i>	<i>2019 planned</i>	<i>2019 actual</i>	<i>2020 planned</i>	<i>2021 planned</i>
A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
Parliamentary documentation (number of documents)	32	21	32	30
1. Reports to the Security Council and updates, monthly reports, country visit reports, investigative reports and/or reports on outreach activities to the sanctions committee	32	21	32	30
Substantive services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	14	7	14	14
2. Meetings of sanctions committee	7	6	7	6
3. Chair's briefings to Member States	2	1	2	3
4. Special meetings on important thematic and regional topics and capacity challenges of Member States	5	—	5	5
Conference and secretariat services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	14	7	14	14
5. Meetings of sanctions committee	7	6	7	6
6. Chair's briefings to Member States	2	1	2	3
7. Special meetings on important thematic and regional topics and capacity challenges of Member States	5	—	5	5
B. Generation and transfer of knowledge				
Seminars, workshops and training events (number of days)	5	5	5	5
8. Induction seminar for new members of the Panel of Experts	5	5	5	5
Publications (number of publications)	5	—	5	—
9. Implementation assistance notice and guidance document	5	—	5	—
C. Substantive deliverables				
Consultation, advice and advocacy: recommendations concerning new individuals and entities to be listed; consultations with Member States on the implementation of the sanctions regime; consultations and advice to broaden engagement with international, regional, subregional and other organizations; and advice on the implementation of relevant resolutions.				
Fact-finding, monitoring and investigation missions: missions and requests for information relating to compliance with the sanctions regime.				
Databases and substantive digital materials: archives of documents collected by the Panel of Experts.				
D. Communication deliverables				
Outreach programmes, special events and information materials: outreach programmes to report on the work of the Panel of Experts; fact sheets on the work and mandate of the special political mission; and notes verbales on the activities of the sanctions committee/Panel of Experts.				
External and media relations: press releases on the activities of the sanctions committee/Panel of Experts.				
Digital platforms and multimedia content: dissemination of information on the activities and mandate of the sanctions committee/Panel of Experts through its website.				

B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2021

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 15

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2019	2020	2021		Variance
	Expenditure	Appropriation	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	2021 vs. 2020 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(3)-(2)
Civilian personnel costs	697.0	706.5	801.3	–	94.8
Operational costs	2 406.9	2 205.5	2 388.1	–	182.6
Total (net of staff assessment)	3 103.9	2 912.0	3 189.4	–	277.4

Table 16

Positions

	Professional and higher categories								General Service and related categories		National staff					Total
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Subtotal	Field/ Security Service	General Service ^a	Total inter-national	National Professional Officer	Local level	United Nations Volunteers	
Approved 2020	–	–	–	–	–	1	2	–	3	–	3	6	–	–	–	6
Proposed 2021	–	–	–	–	–	1	2	–	3	–	3	6	–	–	–	6
Change	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

^a Comprising one Principal level and two Other level.

61. The proposed resource requirements for the Panel of Experts for 2021 amount to \$3,189,400 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for salaries and common staff costs (\$801,300) for the continuation of six positions (1 P-4, 2 P-3 and 3 General Service) to provide substantive, administrative and security support to the sanctions regime, and operational costs (\$2,388,100) comprising expert fees (\$1,550,800) and travel of the eight members of the Panel (\$144,200), official travel of staff (\$24,000), facilities and infrastructure (\$245,600), and other operational and logistical support requirements, including the rental of vehicles, communications and information technology services, and other supplies and services (\$423,500).
62. In 2021, it is proposed that the number and levels of positions for the Panel of Experts remain unchanged. A 5 per cent vacancy rate has been applied to the staff costs.
63. The increase in the requirements proposed for 2021 compared with the appropriation for 2020 is attributable primarily to the provision for the subscription to one geospatial satellite imagery database and the application of a higher percentage of common staff costs, based on actual expenditure in 2019.

Extrabudgetary resources

64. No extrabudgetary resources were available in 2020 or are any projected for 2021 for the Panel of Experts.

4. Panel of Experts on Libya

(\$1,372,300)

A. Proposed programme plan for 2021 and programme performance for 2019

Overall orientation

Mandates and background

65. The Panel of Experts on Libya is responsible for monitoring the implementation of the arms embargo, assets freeze, travel ban and measures in relation to attempts to illicitly export petroleum, and for providing information relevant to the potential designation of individuals and entities. The mandate derives from the priorities established in relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolutions [1973 \(2011\)](#), [2009 \(2011\)](#), [2017 \(2011\)](#), [2040 \(2012\)](#), [2095 \(2013\)](#), [2144 \(2014\)](#), [2146 \(2014\)](#), [2213 \(2015\)](#), [2292 \(2016\)](#), [2362 \(2017\)](#), [2441 \(2018\)](#) and [2509 \(2020\)](#). The sanctions regime is aimed at preventing and containing threats to the peace, security and stability of Libya, including obstructing or undermining the successful completion of the political transition.

Programme of work

Objective

66. The objective, to which this mission contributes, is to ensure the full implementation of the sanctions regime concerning Libya, which includes an arms embargo, an assets freeze, a travel ban and measures in relation to attempts to illicitly export petroleum.

Strategy

67. To contribute to the full implementation of the Libya sanctions regime, which includes an arms embargo, an assets freeze, a travel ban and measures in relation to attempts to illicitly export petroleum, the Panel of Experts will provide updated information to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) concerning Libya. This work is expected to result in enhanced capacity of the Council and its Committee to take follow-up action on alleged violations of the Libya sanctions regime. Past results in this area include new implementation assistance notices on the assets freeze and on the travel ban.

External factors for 2021

68. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2021 is based on the following assumptions:
- (a) Member States comply with the resolutions of the Security Council and cooperate with the Panel of Experts;
 - (b) The security situation allows the Panel of Experts to conduct missions in the field.
69. The Panel of Experts integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate, and as guided by the relevant Security Council resolutions. Gender balance is taken into consideration in the recruitment and rostering of experts. The terms of reference for experts in the Panel of Experts indicate that experts should incorporate gender perspectives into their substantive areas of responsibility. The Panel of Experts is also guided by the gender strategy of the

Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, including in the provision of available gender training to staff and sanctions-specific gender training to all experts.

70. With regard to cooperation with other entities, in the context of information-sharing, the Panel of Experts cooperates, among others, with Member States, the European Union, the European Union Border Assistance Mission in Libya and the European Union military operation in the Mediterranean.
71. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, the Panel of Experts cooperates with the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), IMO, the World Bank and other sanctions monitoring teams, groups and panels, as appropriate. In the context of safety, security and logistics, the Panel of Experts cooperates with the Department of Safety and Security, UNSMIL and UNDP.

Evaluation activities

72. A self-evaluation of mission processes to develop the mission concept, including support from the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs for such processes, to identify constraints and opportunities is planned for 2021.

Programme performance in 2019 against planned result

73. A planned result for 2019, which is the improved compliance by States and other entities with the sanctions regime, as referred to in the report of the Secretary-General on estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council for 2019 for thematic cluster II ([A/73/352/Add.2](#)), was achieved, as evidenced by 200 communications from States and other entities informing the Committee of compliance-related issues, which exceeded the target of 60.

Programme performance in 2019: enhanced sanctions implementation through engagement

74. In 2019, the Panel of Experts recommended that the Committee strengthen dialogue with interested Member States, in particular those in the region, in order to identify information gaps and report capacity-building requirements in the context of the implementation of the sanctions regime. Subsequently, the Committee organized a meeting with 22 interested Member States in August 2019, which led to a number of proposals for enhancing guidance provided by the Committee to Member States. Implementation was enhanced as a result of these steps. The most recent such meeting had been held in 2014. To further build on this engagement, the Committee is considering an updated implementation assistance notice on the travel ban measure. With regard to the assets freeze, the Committee met with the Libyan Investment Authority, a listed entity, to discuss the implementation of the measure in relation to this entity. With respect to the arms embargo, the Committee organized a meeting to hear updates from the Panel of Experts and UNSMIL on its implementation and thereafter issued a press release in which it called upon Member States to respect the measure. Concerning the measures aimed at preventing illicit exports of petroleum, the Committee began consideration of an implementation assistance notice. All these actions taken by the Committee are aimed at enhancing the implementation of the sanctions regime, including by providing Member States with updated guidance.

Progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

75. This work contributed to the full implementation of the sanctions measures concerning Libya, as demonstrated by the issuance of a press release dated 5 September 2019 by the Security Council in which it indicated follow-up actions to the meeting held in August 2019 with relevant Member States, leading to the preparation by the Panel of Experts of the first draft of the updated

implementation assistance notice on the travel ban, as well as the first draft of the implementation assistance notice on illicit exports of petroleum.

Table 17

Performance measure

2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Committee follows up on dialogue process initiated in 2014, taking into account the reporting received from the Panel of Experts	Committee engages with Member States on an ad hoc basis, depending on the issue at hand, based on the reporting from the Panel of Experts	Committee continues its engagement with Member States, as necessary, based on the recommendations of the Panel of Experts	Committee continues its engagement with Member States, as necessary	Upon recommendation of the Panel of Experts, the Committee holds a meeting with 22 interested Member States, resulting in the initiation of proposals to provide updated guidance, thereby enhancing implementation of the sanctions measures

Planned result for 2021: improving the effectiveness of the arms embargo

76. The final report of the Panel of Experts in 2019 (see [S/2019/914](#)) contained information on multiple cases of non-compliance with the sanctions regime, in particular with the arms embargo. The Panel of Experts continued to identify instances of the transfer of arms and related materiel to Libya by land, air and sea, pointing to the domination of the use of precision-guided munitions launched from unmanned combat aerial vehicles in the current conflict in Libya. In the final report, the Panel of Experts proposed five recommendations, addressed to the Security Council and the Committee, aimed at improving the implementation of the arms embargo.
77. The Panel of Experts will continue to monitor, investigate and identify instances of non-compliance with the arms embargo and seek to undertake more missions to Libya, improvements in the security situation there permitting, and additional visits to the region.

Internal challenge and response

78. The challenge for the Panel of Expert was to validate some information for the preparation of specific reports, given the deteriorating security situation in Libya. In response, the Panel of Experts will increase its cooperation with the relevant United Nations entities on the ground and, in parallel, will travel to alternate destinations, including relevant Member States, in order to gain access to information that is available and can be provided by third parties. To complement this, the Panel of Experts also intends to intensify contacts, interviews and liaisons through teleconferencing with a broader set of interlocutors.

Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

79. This work is expected to contribute to the full implementation of the sanctions regime concerning Libya, which would be demonstrated by the provision of information on individuals and entities acting in violation of the arms embargo. This would enable the Security Council and the Committee to call upon Member States to respect the arms embargo and list relevant individuals and entities, as needed.

Table 18
Performance measure

2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Panel of Experts provides the Committee with information on non-compliance with the arms embargo	Committee continues to follow developments related to non-compliance	Panel of Experts provides the Committee with mandated reports and presentations, and additional briefings and ad hoc updates on instances of non-compliance with the arms embargo, as well as information on individuals meeting the sanctions designation criteria for their involvement in arms embargo violations	On the basis of information provided by the Panel of Experts, the Security Council and the Committee call upon Member States to respect the arms embargo and list individuals and entities involved in arms embargo violations	Improved compliance with the arms embargo through the provision of information on individuals and entities acting in violation of the arms embargo

Deliverables

80. Table 19 lists all deliverables, by category and subcategory, for the period 2019–2021 that contributed and are expected to contribute to the attainment of the objective stated above.

Table 19
Panel of Experts on Libya: deliverables for the period 2019–2021, by category and subcategory

Category and subcategory	2019 planned	2019 actual	2020 planned	2021 planned
A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
Parliamentary documentation (number of documents)	6	7	6	7
1. Reports to the Security Council and updates, monthly reports, country visit reports, investigative reports and/or reports on outreach activities to the sanctions committee	6	7	6	7
Substantive services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	3	8	3	3
2. Meetings of the sanctions committee	3	8	3	3
Conference and secretariat services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	3	8	3	3
3. Meetings of the sanctions committee	3	8	3	3
B. Generation and transfer of knowledge				
Seminars, workshops and training events (number of days)	5	5	5	5
4. Induction seminar for new members of the Panel of Experts	5	5	5	5
Publications (number of publications)	1	–	1	1
5. Implementation assistance notice and guidance document	1	–	1	1

Category and subcategory	2019 planned	2019 actual	2020 planned	2021 planned
C. Substantive deliverables				
Consultation, advice and advocacy: recommendations concerning new individuals and entities to be listed; consultations with Member States on the implementation of the sanctions regime; consultations and advice to broaden engagement with international, regional, subregional and other organizations; and advice on the implementation of relevant resolutions.				
Fact-finding, monitoring and investigation missions: missions and requests for information relating to compliance with the sanctions regime.				
Databases and substantive digital materials: archives of documents collected by the Panel of Experts.				
D. Communication deliverables				
Outreach programmes, special events and information materials: outreach programmes to report on the work of the Panel of Experts; fact sheets on the work and mandate of the special political mission; and notes verbales on the activities of the sanctions committee/Panel of Experts.				
External and media relations: press releases on the activities of the sanctions committee/Panel of Experts.				
Digital platforms and multimedia content: dissemination of information on the activities and mandate of the sanctions committee/Panel of Experts through its website.				

B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2021

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 20

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2019	2020	2021	Variance	
	Expenditure	Appropriation	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	2021 vs. 2020 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(3)-(2)
Civilian personnel costs	156.9	206.1	194.5	–	(11.6)
Operational costs	1 107.3	1 189.4	1 177.8	–	(11.6)
Total (net of staff assessment)	1 264.2	1 395.5	1 372.3	–	(23.2)

Table 21

Positions

	Professional and higher categories									General Service and related categories		National staff					Total
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Subtotal	Field/ Security Service	General Service ^a	Total inter- national	National Professional Officer	Local level	United Nations Volunteers		
Approved 2020	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	1	–	1	2	–	–	–	2	
Proposed 2021	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	1	–	1	2	–	–	–	2	
Change	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	

^a Other level, unless otherwise specified.

81. The proposed resource requirements for the Panel of Experts for 2021 amount to \$1,372,300 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for salaries and common staff costs (\$194,500) for the continuation of two positions (1 P-3 and 1 General Service) to provide substantive, administrative and security support to the sanctions regime, and operational costs (\$1,177,800) comprising expert fees (\$737,100) and travel (\$333,800) of the six members of the Panel, official travel of staff (\$18,700), and other operational and logistical support requirements, including rental of premises, rental of vehicles, communications and information technology services, and other supplies and services (\$88,200).
82. In 2021, it is proposed that the number and levels of positions for the Panel of Experts remain unchanged. A 5 per cent vacancy rate has been applied to the staff costs.
83. The decrease in the requirements proposed for 2021 compared with the appropriation for 2020 is attributable primarily to lower requirements under: (a) civilian personnel costs, owing to the application of a lower percentage of common staff costs based on recent expenditure patterns; and (b) operational costs, resulting from lower requirements for the official travel of staff.

Extrabudgetary resources

84. No extrabudgetary resources were available in 2020 or are projected for 2021 for the Panel of Experts.

5. Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic

(\$1,120,900)

A. Proposed programme plan for 2021 and programme performance for 2019

Overall orientation

Mandates and background

85. The Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic is responsible for monitoring the implementation of the arms embargo, assets freeze and travel ban, as well as for providing information relevant to the potential designation of individuals and entities. The mandate derives from the priorities established in relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolutions [2127 \(2013\)](#), [2134 \(2014\)](#), [2149 \(2014\)](#), [2196 \(2015\)](#), [2262 \(2016\)](#), [2339 \(2017\)](#), [2399 \(2018\)](#), [2454 \(2019\)](#), [2488 \(2019\)](#) and [2507 \(2020\)](#). The sanctions regime is aimed at preventing individuals and entities from undermining the peace, stability or security of the Central African Republic through, for example, gathering information and reporting on key issues, such as violations of international humanitarian law and human rights, as well as the illicit trafficking in weapons into the country and the exploitation of natural resources to finance the conflict.

Programme of work

Objective

86. The objective, to which this mission contributes, is to ensure the full implementation of the sanctions regime concerning the Central African Republic, which includes an arms embargo, an assets freeze and a travel ban.

Strategy

87. To contribute to the full implementation of the Central African Republic sanctions regime, which includes an arms embargo, an assets freeze and a travel ban, the Panel of Experts will continue to gather first-hand information on the implementation of the sanctions regime, in particular on cases related to arms trafficking and the trafficking in natural resources in the Central African Republic. This work is expected to result in detailed reporting to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [2127 \(2013\)](#) concerning the Central African Republic through the Panel's midterm and final reports and periodic progress updates. Past results in this area include the provision of detailed information to the Committee on arms traffickers in the region who are supplying armed groups in the Central African Republic with weapons, including the names of certain traffickers, and thorough reporting on the continued trafficking in natural resources.

External factors for 2021

88. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2021 is based on the following planning assumptions:
- (a) Member States comply with the resolutions of the Security Council and cooperate with the Panel of Experts;
 - (b) The security situation allows the Panel of Experts to conduct missions, as needed.

89. The Panel of Experts integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate and as guided by the relevant Security Council resolutions. Gender balance is taken into consideration in the recruitment and rostering of experts. The terms of reference for experts in the Panel of Experts indicate that they should incorporate gender perspectives into their substantive areas of responsibility. The Panel of Experts is also guided by the gender strategy of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, including in the provision of available gender training to staff and sanctions-specific gender training to all experts.
90. With regard to cooperation with other entities, in the context of information-sharing, the Panel of Experts cooperates, among others, with Member States, the African Union, the European Union Military Training Mission in the Central African Republic, the Economic Community of Central African States, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and the Central African Economic and Monetary Community.
91. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, the Panel of Experts cooperates, among others, with the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, and other sanctions monitoring teams, groups and panels, as appropriate. In the context of safety, security and logistics, the Panel of Experts cooperates with the Department of Safety and Security, MINUSCA and UNDP.

Evaluation activities

92. A self-evaluation of mission processes to develop the mission concept, including support from the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs for such processes, to identify constraints and opportunities is planned for 2021.

Programme performance in 2019 against planned result

93. A planned result for 2019, which is the improved compliance by Member States and other entities with the sanctions regime, as referred to in the report of the Secretary-General on estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council for 2019 for thematic cluster II ([A/73/352/Add.2](#)), was achieved, as evidenced by 58 communications from Member States and entities informing the Committee of compliance-related issues, which exceeded the target of 50.

Programme performance in 2019: better understanding among Member States of cross-border arms trafficking by armed groups

94. The cross-border smuggling of weapons and ammunition remains a major concern for the Security Council, and the Panel of Expert's investigations undertaken on this issue in 2019 contributed to a better understanding of the various actors involved, trafficking routes through neighbouring States and their trafficking methods.
95. Throughout 2019, including in its final report for 2019 (see [S/2019/930](#)), the Panel of Experts provided detailed information on illicit trafficking in weaponry by armed groups from the territory of neighbouring States. The Panel of Experts also provided detailed information on how the leader of one armed group had increased the military capacity of his group, as well as that of other armed groups, by facilitating their acquisition of weapons. The Panel of Experts had previously reported that two of those armed groups had been threatening the Government of the Central African Republic.

Progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

96. This work contributed to the full implementation of the Central African Republic sanctions regime, as demonstrated by actions taken by Member States to prevent the cross-border smuggling of weapons and efforts made by regional States to prevent cross-border arms trafficking.

Table 22

Performance measure

2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Security Council/Committee receives information on arms trafficking in the Central African Republic through cross-border smuggling by armed groups	Committee receives detailed information on cases of cross-border smuggling of weapons in several areas of the Central African Republic	Committee receives detailed information on cases of cross-border smuggling of weapons in several areas of the Central African Republic	Committee receives detailed information on cases of cross-border smuggling of weapons in several areas of the Central African Republic	Security Council has the information necessary to consider and possibly enforce measures taken against cross-border arms trafficking

Planned result for 2021: better understanding by Member States of natural resources trafficking

97. As noted by the Panel of Experts in its final report for 2019, trafficking in natural resources remains rampant in all regions of the country. The State continues to benefit from only a very small amount of revenue generated from the exploitation of natural resources in its territory. Less than 10 per cent of the national production of gold and diamonds is exported through legal channels.
98. In 2021, the Panel of Experts will continue to investigate and report on the illegal exploitation and smuggling of gold and diamonds by armed groups, the link between natural resources trafficking and arms trafficking, and the impact of such illegal exploitation on the stability of the Central African Republic and its economy.

Internal challenge and response

99. The challenge for the Panel of Experts was the restricted access to various areas in the Central African Republic due to the deteriorating security situation and dangers associated with the investigation of the illegal exploitation and smuggling of natural resources by armed groups. In response, the Panel of Experts will seek to enlarge its pool of information-gathering sources, increase its cooperation with the relevant United Nations entities on the ground and, in parallel, explore the possibility of travelling to alternate destinations, including relevant Member States, in order to gain access to information that is available and can be provided by third parties. To complement this, the Panel also intends to intensify contacts, interviews and liaisons through teleconferencing with other interlocutors.

Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

100. This work is expected to contribute to the full implementation of the Central African Republic sanctions regime, which would be demonstrated by increased action by the Security Council, its Committee and other relevant Member States on this issue based on the comprehensive information on the illegal exploitation of and trafficking in natural resources provided by the Panel of Experts.

Table 23
Performance measure

2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Security Council receives information on the illegal exploitation of natural resources in the Central African Republic by armed groups	Committee receives first-hand and detailed information on cases of illegal exploitation of natural resources in the Central African Republic by armed groups	Committee receives first-hand and detailed information on cases of illegal exploitation of natural resources in the Central African Republic by armed groups	Committee receives first-hand and detailed information on cases of illegal exploitation of natural resources in the Central African Republic by armed groups	Committee receives comprehensive information on the illegal exploitation of and trafficking in natural resources, with recommendations for action

Deliverables

101. Table 24 lists all deliverables, by category and subcategory, for the period 2019–2021 that contributed and are expected to contribute to the attainment of the objective stated above.

Table 24
Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic: deliverables for the period 2019–2021, by category and subcategory

Category and subcategory	2019 planned	2019 actual	2020 planned	2021 planned
A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
Parliamentary documentation (number of documents)	14	8	14	8
1. Reports to the Security Council and updates, monthly reports, country visit reports, investigative reports and/or reports on outreach activities to the sanctions committee	14	8	14	8
Substantive services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	9	11	9	12
2. Meetings of sanctions committee	7	11	7	11
3. Chair's briefings to Member States	2	–	2	1
Conference and secretariat services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	9	11	9	12
4. Meetings of sanctions committee	7	11	7	11
5. Chair's briefings to Member States	2	–	2	1
B. Generation and transfer of knowledge				
Seminars, workshops and training events (number of days)	5	5	5	5
6. Induction seminar for new members of the Panel of Experts	5	5	5	5
Publications (number of publications)	2	1	2	1
7. Implementation assistance notice and guidance document	2	1	2	1
C. Substantive deliverables				
Consultation, advice and advocacy: recommendations concerning new individuals and entities to be listed; consultations with Member States on the implementation of sanctions regime; consultations and advice to broaden engagement with international, regional, subregional and other organizations; and advice on the implementation of relevant resolutions.				
Fact-finding, monitoring and investigation missions: missions and requests for information relating to compliance with the sanctions regime.				
Databases and substantive digital materials: archives of documents collected by the Panel of Experts.				

Category and subcategory	2019 planned	2019 actual	2020 planned	2021 planned
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D. Communication deliverables

Outreach programmes, special events and information materials: outreach programmes to report on the work of the Panel of Experts; fact sheets on the work and mandate of the special political mission; and notes verbales on the activities of the sanctions committee/Panel of Experts.

External and media relations: press releases on the activities of the sanctions committee/Panel of Experts.

Digital platforms and multimedia content: dissemination of information on the activities and mandate of the sanctions committee/Panel of Experts through its website.

B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2021**Resource requirements (regular budget)**

Table 25

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2019	2020	2021	Variance	
	Expenditure	Appropriation	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	2021 vs. 2020 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(3)-(2)
Civilian personnel costs	250.3	233.1	216.7	–	(16.4)
Operational costs	845.5	978.1	904.2	–	(73.9)
Total (net of staff assessment)	1 095.8	1 211.2	1 120.9	–	(90.3)

Table 26

Positions

	Professional and higher categories								General Service and related categories		National staff					Total
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Subtotal	Field/Security Service	General Service ^a	Total international	National Professional Officer	Local level	United Nations Volunteers	
Approved 2020	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	1	–	1	2	–	–	–	2
Proposed 2021	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	1	–	1	2	–	–	–	2
Change	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

^a Other level, unless otherwise specified.

102. The proposed resource requirements for the Panel of Experts for 2021 amount to \$1,120,900 (net of staff assessment), and would provide for salaries and common staff costs (\$216,700) for the continuation of two positions (1 P-3 and 1 General Service) to provide substantive, administrative and security support to the sanctions regime, and operational costs (\$904,200) comprising expert fees (\$528,100) and travel (\$248,500) of the five members of the Panel, official travel of staff (\$21,400), and other operational and logistical support requirements, including rental of premises, rental of vehicles, communications and information technology services, and other supplies and services (\$106,200).

103. In 2021, it is proposed that the number and levels of positions for the Panel of Experts remain unchanged. A 5 per cent vacancy rate has been applied to the staff costs.
104. The decrease in the requirements proposed for 2021 compared with the appropriation for 2020 is attributable primarily to lower requirements for the travel of experts and the official travel of staff.

Extrabudgetary resources

105. No extrabudgetary resources were available in 2020 or are projected for 2021 for the Panel of Experts.

6. Panel of Experts on Yemen

(\$2,275,200)

A. Proposed programme plan for 2021 and programme performance for 2019

Overall orientation

Mandates and background

106. The Panel of Experts on Yemen is responsible for monitoring the implementation of the assets freeze, travel ban and targeted arms embargo on designated individuals and entities, as well as for providing information relevant to the potential designation of such individuals and entities. The mandate is defined in Security Council resolution [2140 \(2014\)](#), as modified by resolution [2216 \(2015\)](#). The sanctions regime is aimed at preventing and containing threats to the peace, security or stability of Yemen, such as obstructing or undermining the successful completion of the political transition.

Programme of work

Objective

107. The objective, to which this mission contributes, is to ensure the full implementation of the sanctions regime concerning Yemen, which includes a targeted arms embargo, an assets freeze and a travel ban.

Strategy

108. To contribute to the full implementation of the Yemen sanctions regime, the Panel of Experts will provide updated information to the Security Council and the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [2140 \(2014\)](#). This work is expected to result in the enhanced capacity of the Council and the Committee to take follow-up action on alleged violations of the Yemen sanctions regime. Past results in this area include the provision of information that has enabled the Committee to list individuals for sanctions violations.

External factors for 2021

109. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2021 is based on the following assumptions:
- (a) Member States comply with the resolutions of the Security Council and cooperate with the Panel of Experts;
 - (b) The security situation allows the Panel of Experts to conduct missions, as needed.
110. The Panel of Experts integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate, and as guided by the relevant Security Council resolutions. Gender balance is taken into consideration in the recruitment and rostering of experts. The terms of reference for experts in the Panel of Experts indicate that experts should incorporate gender perspectives into their substantive areas of responsibility. The Panel of Experts is also guided by the gender strategy of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, including in the provision of available gender training to staff and sanctions-specific gender training to all experts.

111. With regard to cooperation with other entities, in the context of information-sharing, the Panel of Experts cooperates, among others, with Member States, the Combined Maritime Forces and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL).
112. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, the Panel of Experts cooperates, among others, with the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Food Programme, the International Organization for Migration, the United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism and other sanctions monitoring teams, groups and panels, as appropriate. In the context of safety, security and logistics, the Panel of Experts cooperates with the Department of Safety and Security, the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen and UNDP.

Evaluation activities

113. A self-evaluation of mission processes to develop the mission concept, including support from the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs for such processes, to identify constraints and opportunities is planned for 2021.

Programme performance in 2019 against planned result

114. A planned result for 2019, which is an enhanced capacity of the Security Council to adjust the sanctions regime, as referred to in the report of the Secretary-General on estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council for 2019 for thematic cluster II ([A/73/352/Add.2](#)), was achieved, as evidenced by 10 recommendations made by the Panel of Experts agreed upon by the Committee, which exceeded the target of 9.

Programme performance in 2019: increased cooperation by regional actors with the Panel of Experts

115. Beginning in 2015, the Panel of Experts recommended that the Committee consider a visit to Yemen and the region in support of the implementation of the sanctions regime. In subsequent, consecutive years, the Panel of Experts continued to recommend the Committee to engage with regional actors on various implementation issues and with a view to facilitating enhanced cooperation between these actors and the Panel.
116. Early in 2019, the Committee agreed to a first-ever visit by the Chair to the region, the terms of reference of which included the collection of information on sanctions implementation and the promotion of improved cooperation between the Panel of Experts, the Committee and countries in the region. The visit, in which the Panel of Experts also participated, led to an increased awareness of the sanctions regime in the region and enhanced cooperation by the regional actors with the Panel. Prior to the visit, the Panel of Experts had pointed to a time lag in invitations extended by Member States to inspect seized and recovered arms and related materiel that were supplied in potential violation of the targeted arms embargo. In 2019, following the visit, the Panel of Experts received timely invitations from Member States to inspect such items, thereby allowing the Panel to present higher quality and more timely information to the Committee and the Council.

Progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

117. This work contributed to the full implementation of the sanctions regime concerning Yemen, as demonstrated by an increase in responses to requests of the Panel of Experts and letters from the Member States visited over the duration of the mandate.

Table 27
Performance measure

2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Panel of Experts recommends that the Committee visit the region in support of sanctions implementation	Panel of Experts continues to make recommendations on implementation and cooperation issues vis-à-vis relevant Member States to the Committee	Panel of Experts continues to make recommendations on implementation and cooperation issues vis-à-vis relevant Member States to the Committee	Panel of Experts continues to make recommendations on implementation and cooperation issues vis-à-vis relevant Member States to the Committee	Chair of the Committee visits the region to increase awareness of the sanctions regime and foster cooperation by regional actors with the Panel of Experts

Planned result for 2021: increased awareness of the use of commercial components in military applications

118. In 2019, the Panel of Experts reported on the increasing import to Houthi-controlled areas of commercial civilian components and their use by the Houthis to manufacture unmanned aerial vehicles, waterborne improvised explosive devices and other weapons systems.
119. In its final report for 2019 (see [S/2020/326](#)), the Panel of Experts recommended the establishment of a list of commercially available components, such as engines, servo actuators and electronic parts, and the use of that list to raise the awareness of customs and export control authorities of the threats emanating from the proliferation of weapon systems used by Houthi forces in the conflict in Yemen.

Internal challenge and response

120. The challenge for the Panel of Experts was the difficulty in validating some information for the preparation of specific reports, given the lack of access to the country and therefore to key interlocutors. In response, the Panel of Experts will increase its cooperation with the relevant United Nations entities on the ground and, in parallel, explore the possibility of travelling to alternate destinations, including relevant Member States, in order to gain access to information that is available and can be provided by third parties. To complement this, the Panel of Experts also intends to intensify contacts, interviews and liaisons through teleconferencing with other interlocutors.

Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

121. This work is expected to contribute to the full implementation of the sanctions regime concerning Yemen, which would be demonstrated by increased responses from Member States to queries from the Panel of Experts regarding the chain of custody of these components before they reach Houthi-controlled areas to be used in the conflict in Yemen.

Table 28
Performance measure

2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Committee receives information from the Panel of Experts on the types of weapons being used in the Yemen conflict by individuals and entities subject to the targeted arms embargo	Committee receives information from the Panel of Experts on the use of commercially available items or components in military applications	Committee receives information from the Panel of Experts on the increased use of commercial components in military applications	Security Council tasks the Panel of Experts with continuing to report on commercially available components used in certain military applications in Yemen	Member States have their awareness raised on the use of commercial components in certain military applications in Yemen, resulting in a reduction in their supply and use in the conflict

Deliverables

122. Table 29 lists all deliverables, by category and subcategory, for the period 2019–2021 that contributed and are expected to contribute to the attainment of the objective stated above.

Table 29
Panel of Experts on Yemen: deliverables for the period 2019–2021, by category and subcategory

Category and subcategory	2019 planned	2019 actual	2020 planned	2021 planned
A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
Parliamentary documentation (number of documents)	2	1	2	2
1. Reports to the Security Council and updates, monthly reports, country visit reports, investigative reports and/or reports on outreach activities to the sanctions committee	2	1	2	2
Substantive services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	3	3	3	3
2. Meetings of sanctions committee	3	3	3	3
Conference and secretariat services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	3	3	3	3
3. Meetings of sanctions committee	3	3	3	3
B. Generation and transfer of knowledge				
Seminars, workshops and training events (number of days)	5	5	5	5
4. Induction seminar for new members of the Panel of Experts	5	5	5	5
Publications (number of publications)	2	–	2	2
5. Implementation assistance notice and guidance document	2	–	2	2
C. Substantive deliverables				
Consultation, advice and advocacy: recommendations concerning new individuals and entities to be listed; consultations with Member States on the implementation of the sanctions regime; consultations and advice to broaden engagement with international, regional, subregional and other organizations; and advice on the implementation of relevant resolutions.				
Fact-finding, monitoring and investigation missions: missions and requests for information relating to compliance with the sanctions regime.				
Databases and substantive digital materials: archives of documents collected by the Panel of Experts.				

Category and subcategory	2019 planned	2019 actual	2020 planned	2021 planned
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D. Communication deliverables

Outreach programmes, special events and information materials: outreach programmes to report on the work of the Panel of Experts; fact sheets on the work and mandate of the special political mission; and notes verbales on the activities of the sanctions committee/Panel of Experts.

External and media relations: press releases on the activities of the sanctions committee/Panel of Experts.

Digital platforms and multimedia content: dissemination of information on the activities and mandate of the sanctions committee/Panel of Experts through its website.

B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2021**Resource requirements (regular budget)**

Table 30

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2019	2020	2021	Variance	
	Expenditure	Appropriation	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	2021 vs. 2020 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(3)-(2)
Civilian personnel costs	746.0	1 033.4	1 015.7	–	(17.7)
Operational costs	1 143.9	1 291.2	1 259.5	–	(31.7)
Total (net of staff assessment)	1 889.9	2 324.6	2 275.2	–	(49.4)

Table 31

Positions

	Professional and higher categories								General Service and related categories		National staff					Total
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Subtotal	Field/ Security Service	General Service	Total inter-national	National Professional Officer	Local level	United Nations Volunteers	
Approved 2020	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	1	5	–	6	–	2	–	8
Proposed 2021	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	1	5	–	6	–	2	–	8
Change	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

123. The proposed resource requirements for the Panel of Experts for 2021 amount to \$2,275,200 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for the salaries and common staff costs (\$1,015,700) for the continuation of eight positions (1 P-3, 5 Field Service and 2 Local level) to provide substantive, administrative and security support to the sanctions regime, and operational costs (\$1,259,500) comprising expert fees (\$621,600) and travel (\$232,400) of the five members of the Panel, official travel of staff (\$53,700), and other operational and logistical support requirements, including rental of premises, rental of vehicles, communications and information technology services, medical, and other supplies and services (\$351,800).

124. In 2021, it is proposed that the number and levels of positions for the Panel of Experts remain unchanged. A 5 per cent vacancy rate has been applied to international staff costs, while national staff costs are based on the assumption of full incumbency of the positions.
125. The decrease in the requirements proposed for 2021 compared with the appropriation for 2020 is attributable primarily to lower requirements for official travel for security-related training and lower requirements under civilian personnel resulting from the application of a lower percentage of common staff costs for international positions, based on recent expenditure trends.

Extrabudgetary resources

126. No extrabudgetary resources were available in 2020 or are projected for 2021 for the Panel of Experts.

7. Panel of Experts on South Sudan

(\$1,305,400)

A. Proposed programme plan for 2021 and programme performance for 2019

Overall orientation

Mandates and background

127. The Panel of Experts on South Sudan is responsible for monitoring the implementation of the arms embargo, assets freeze and travel ban, as well as for providing information relevant to the potential designation of individuals and entities. The mandate derives from the priorities established in relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolutions [2206 \(2015\)](#) and [2428 \(2018\)](#). The sanctions regime is aimed at, but not limited to, targeting spoilers of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, which was signed on 12 September 2018.

Programme of work

Objective

128. The objective, to which this mission contributes, is to ensure the full implementation of the sanctions regime concerning South Sudan, which includes an arms embargo, an assets freeze and a travel ban.

Strategy

129. To contribute to ensuring the full implementation of the sanctions regime concerning South Sudan, the Panel of Experts will assist the Security Council and the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#) concerning South Sudan in carrying out its mandate, including through providing information relevant to potential designations, in particular the names of those undermining the implementation of the peace agreement or planning, directing or committing acts that violate international human rights law or international humanitarian law, including acts involving sexual and gender-based violence in South Sudan. The Panel of Experts will also continue to report on violations of the arms embargo and gather information on armed groups or criminal networks engaging in the illicit exploitation of or trade in natural resources in South Sudan. This work is expected to result in the designation by the Committee of individuals and/or entities on the relevant sanctions list. Past results in this area include the designation on the South Sudan sanctions list of six individuals by the Committee in 2015 and of two individuals by the Council in 2018.

External factors for 2021

130. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2021 is based on the following assumptions:
- (a) Member States comply with the resolutions of the Security Council and cooperate with the Panel of Experts;
 - (b) The security situation allows the Panel of Experts to conduct missions, as needed.
131. The Panel of Experts integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate, and as guided by the relevant Security Council resolutions. Gender balance is taken into consideration in the recruitment and rostering of experts. The terms of reference for

experts in the Panel of Experts indicate that experts should incorporate gender perspectives into their substantive areas of responsibility. The Panel of Experts is also guided by the gender strategy of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, including in the provision of available gender training to staff and sanctions-specific gender training to all experts.

132. With regard to cooperation with other entities, in the context of information-sharing, the Panel of Experts cooperates with, among others, Member States, the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).
133. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, the Panel of Experts cooperates with the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the offices of the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict and on Sexual Violence in Conflict, and other sanctions monitoring teams, groups and panels, as appropriate. In the context of safety and security, information technology security and logistics, the Panel of Experts cooperates with UNMISS, the Department of Safety and Security and UNDP.

Evaluation activities

134. A self-evaluation of mission processes to develop the mission concept, including support from the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs for such processes, to identify constraints and opportunities is planned for 2021.

Programme performance in 2019 against planned result

135. A planned result for 2019, which is the enhanced capacity of the Security Council to adjust the sanctions regime, as referred to in the report of the Secretary-General on estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council for 2019 for thematic cluster II ([A/73/352/Add.2](#)), was achieved, as evidenced by 12 recommendations made by the Panel of Experts agreed to by the Committee, which exceeded the target of 4.

Programme performance in 2019: implementation of the sanctions regime in support of the peace process in South Sudan

136. On 12 September 2018, the main parties to the conflict in South Sudan signed the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan following the outbreak of hostilities in July 2016. The South Sudan sanctions regime supports the implementation of the Agreement, including through the arms embargo. In this context, the Council mandated the Panel of Experts, among other things, to gather, examine and analyse information regarding activities of illicit trafficking networks supplying arms to individuals and entities undermining the implementation of the Agreement.
137. In its final report (see [S/2019/301](#)), the Panel of Experts reported on, among other things, the implementation of the arms embargo and provided the Security Council and the Committee with relevant information in that regard. In a follow-up to a recommendation contained in the report of the Panel of Experts, on 7 May 2019, the Committee issued a press release in which it encouraged Member States to engage formally with air cargo companies and regional aviation authorities, informing them of the provisions of the arms embargo established pursuant to resolution [2428 \(2018\)](#) and encouraging them to cooperate with the inspections mandated pursuant to paragraph 10 of that resolution.

Progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

138. This work contributed to ensuring the full implementation of the sanctions regime concerning South Sudan, as demonstrated by the encouragement directed to Member States by the Committee, in follow-up to a recommendation of the Panel of Experts, to take action in relation to an aspect of the arms embargo.

Table 32

Performance measure

2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Sanctions regime does not contain an arms embargo	Sanctions regime does not contain an arms embargo	Sanctions regime does not contain an arms embargo	Security Council imposes an arms embargo	Member States are encouraged to take action in relation to an aspect of the arms embargo, in follow-up to a recommendation of the Panel of Experts

Planned result for 2021: reporting on human rights violations, including sexual and gender-based violence, as a means to ensure the full implementation of the peace process in South Sudan

139. By its resolution [2428 \(2018\)](#), the Security Council underscored that planning, directing or committing acts that violate applicable international human rights law or international humanitarian law and acts involving sexual and gender-based violence constituted actions that threaten the peace, security and stability of South Sudan, and were therefore subject to possible sanctions designation. Notwithstanding progress in the peace process, the cessation of hostilities and a decline in acts of political violence in 2019, the Panel of Experts reported that human rights violations, in particular instances of sexual and gender-based violence, continued to persist.
140. The Panel of Experts will therefore increase its focus on human rights violations, including acts of sexual and gender-based violence, and provide the Security Council and the Committee with information relevant to potential designations.

Internal challenge and response

141. The challenge for the Panel of Experts was the difficulty in validating some information for the preparation of specific reports, given the difficulty in gaining access to certain areas and persons in South Sudan, owing to the security situation and logistical challenges. In response, the Panel of Experts will increase its reporting to the Committee on the issues cited above by interviewing additional actors, including populations affected by human rights violations and sexual and gender-based violence, in locations that are accessible to the Panel, including outside of South Sudan.

Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

142. This work is expected to contribute to ensuring the full implementation of the sanctions regime concerning South Sudan, which would be demonstrated by an increase in reporting by the Panel of Experts on human rights violations, including sexual and gender-based violence, which may lead to designations of individuals or entities on the Committee's sanctions list.

Table 33
Performance measure

2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Committee receives information on human rights violations, including sexual and gender-based violence, in South Sudan	Committee amends the designation criteria by including sexual and gender-based violence as a stand-alone designation criterion	Committee receives a statement of case for potential sanctions designation based on human rights violations, including sexual and gender-based violence	Committee receives a statement of case for potential sanctions designation based on human rights violations, including sexual and gender-based violence	Committee sanctions individuals and/or entities who have committed human rights violations, including sexual and gender-based violence

Deliverables

143. Table 34 lists all deliverables, by category and subcategory, for the period 2019–2021 that contributed and are expected to contribute to the attainment of the objective stated above.

Table 34
Panel of Experts on South Sudan: deliverables for the period 2019–2021, by category and subcategory

Category and subcategory	2019 planned	2019 actual	2020 planned	2021 planned
A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
Parliamentary documentation (number of documents)	18	14	18	18
1. Reports to the Security Council and updates, monthly reports, country visit reports, investigative reports and/or reports on outreach activities to the sanctions committee	18	14	18	18
Substantive services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	7	6	7	7
2. Meetings of sanctions committee	6	5	6	5
3. Chair's briefings to Member States	1	1	1	2
Conference and secretariat services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	7	6	7	7
4. Meetings of sanctions committee	6	5	6	5
5. Chair's briefings to Member States	1	1	1	2
B. Generation and transfer of knowledge				
Seminars, workshops and training events (number of days)	5	5	5	5
6. Induction seminar for new members of the Panel of Experts	5	5	5	5
Publications (number of publications)	1	–	1	1
7. Implementation assistance notice and guidance document	1	–	1	1
C. Substantive deliverables				
Consultation, advice and advocacy: recommendations concerning new individuals and entities to be listed; consultations with Member States on the implementation of sanctions regime; consultations and advice to broaden engagement with international, regional, subregional and other organizations; and advice on the implementation of relevant resolutions.				
Fact-finding, monitoring and investigation missions: missions and requests for information relating to compliance with the sanctions regime.				
Databases and substantive digital materials: archives of documents collected by the Panel of Experts.				

Category and subcategory	2019 planned	2019 actual	2020 planned	2021 planned
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D. Communication deliverables

Outreach programmes, special events and information materials: outreach programmes to report on the work of the Panel of Experts; fact sheets on the work and mandate of the special political mission; and notes verbales on the activities of the sanctions committee/Panel of Experts.

External and media relations: press releases on the activities of the sanctions committee/Panel of Experts.

Digital platforms and multimedia content: dissemination of information on the activities and mandate of the sanctions committee/Panel of Experts through its website.

B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2021**Resource requirements (regular budget)**

Table 35

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2019	2020	2021	Variance	
	Expenditure	Appropriation	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	2021 vs. 2020 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(3)-(2)
Civilian personnel costs	253.4	319.8	329.2	–	9.4
Operational costs	873.2	1 037.9	976.2	–	(61.7)
Total (net of staff assessment)	1 126.6	1 357.7	1 305.4	–	(52.3)

Table 36

Positions

	Professional and higher categories									General Service and related categories		National staff				Total
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Subtotal	Field/ Security Service	General Service ^a	Total inter-national	National Professional Officer	Local level	United Nations Volunteers	
Approved 2020	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	1	–	2	3	–	–	–	3
Proposed 2021	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	1	–	2	3	–	–	–	3
Change	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

^a Other level, unless otherwise specified.

144. The proposed resource requirements for the Panel of Experts for 2021 amount to \$1,305,400 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for salaries and common staff costs (\$329,200) for the continuation of three positions (1 P-3 and 2 General Service) to provide substantive, administrative and security support to the sanctions regime, and operational costs (\$976,200) comprising expert fees (\$583,200) and travel (\$267,400) of the five members of the Panel, official travel of staff (\$30,300), and other operational and logistical support requirements, including rental of premises, rental of vehicles, communications and information technology services, and other supplies and services (\$95,300).

145. In 2021, it is proposed that the number and levels of positions for the Panel of Experts remain unchanged. A 5 per cent vacancy rate has been applied to the staff costs.
146. The decrease in the requirements proposed for 2021 compared with the appropriation for 2020 is attributable primarily to reduced requirements for travel of the experts, which are offset in part by increased requirements under civilian personnel costs resulting from the application of a higher percentage of common staff costs based on recent expenditure patterns.

Extrabudgetary resources

147. No extrabudgetary resources were available for 2020 or are projected for 2021 for the Panel of Experts.

8. Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team pursuant to resolutions [1526 \(2004\)](#) and [2253 \(2015\)](#) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities

(\$5,954,400)

A. Proposed programme plan for 2021 and programme performance for 2019

Overall orientation

Mandates and background

148. The Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, which supports the work of both the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions [1267 \(1999\)](#), [1989 \(2011\)](#) and [2253 \(2015\)](#) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, and the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1988 \(2011\)](#), is responsible for assisting in and reporting on the implementation of the assets freeze, travel ban and arms embargo on designated individuals and entities. The mandate is derived from the priorities established in the relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolutions [1267 \(1999\)](#) [1526 \(2004\)](#), [1988 \(2011\)](#), [1989 \(2011\)](#), [2253 \(2015\)](#), [2255 \(2015\)](#), [2368 \(2017\)](#) and [2501 \(2019\)](#). The sanctions regimes are aimed at strengthening the Council's response to threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts and at contributing to the peace, stability and security of Afghanistan.

Programme of work

Objective

149. The objective, to which this mission contributes, is to ensure the full implementation of sanctions regimes concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida and the Taliban, which include arms embargoes, asset freezes and travel bans.

Strategy

150. To contribute to the full implementation of sanctions regime concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida, the Monitoring Team will provide updated information to the Security Council and the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions [1267 \(1999\)](#), [1989 \(2011\)](#) and [2253 \(2015\)](#) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities. This work is expected to result in an enhanced capacity of the Council and its Committee to take follow-up action on alleged violations of the sanctions regime. Past results in this area include the provision of new information on the activities of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida by the Monitoring Team, enabling the Council and the Committee to take appropriate action, such as adjusting the sanctions lists.
151. To contribute to the full implementation of the 1988 sanctions regime, the Monitoring Team will provide updated information to the Security Council and the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1988 \(2011\)](#). This action is expected to result in an enhanced capacity of the Council and its Committee to take follow-up action on alleged violations of the sanctions regime.

Past results in this area include new information on the activities of the Taliban available to the Council and the Committee, enabling the Council and the Committee to take appropriate action.

External factors

152. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2021 is based on the following planning assumptions:
 - (a) Member States comply with the resolutions of the Security Council and cooperate with the Monitoring Team;
 - (b) The security situation allows the Monitoring Team to conduct missions, as needed.
153. The Monitoring Team integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate, and as guided by the relevant Security Council resolutions. Gender balance is taken into consideration in the recruitment and rostering of experts. The terms of reference for experts in the Monitoring Team indicate that experts should incorporate gender perspectives into their substantive areas of responsibility. The Monitoring Team is also guided by the gender strategy of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, including in the provision of available gender training to staff and sanctions-specific gender training to all experts.
154. With regard to cooperation with other entities, in the context of information-sharing, the Monitoring Team cooperates with, among others, Member States, the International Air Transport Association, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the World Customs Organization, the Financial Action Task Force and INTERPOL.
155. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, the Monitoring Team cooperates with, among others, the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, the Group of Experts assisting the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#), the Office of the Ombudsperson established pursuant to Security Council resolution [1904 \(2009\)](#), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and other sanctions monitoring teams, groups and panels, as appropriate. In the context of safety and security, information technology security and logistics, the Monitoring Team cooperates with the Department of Safety and Security and United Nations field missions and country teams, as appropriate.

Evaluation activities

156. A self-evaluation of mission processes to develop the mission concept, including support from the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs for such processes, to identify constraints and opportunities is planned for 2021.

Programme performance in 2019 against planned result

157. A planned result for 2019, which is the enhanced capacity of the Security Council to take follow-up action on alleged violations, as referred to in the report of the Secretary-General on estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council for 2019 for thematic cluster II ([A/73/352/Add.2](#)), was achieved, as evidenced by 27 discussions held at the meetings of the Committees on instances of non-compliance with the sanctions regimes, as reported by the Monitoring Team or a Member State, which exceeded the target of 20.

Programme performance in 2019: addressing the evolving and dispersed nature of the terrorist threat

158. In 2019, the Monitoring Team submitted three reports to the relevant sanctions committees that contained analyses of the evolution of the threat posed by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida globally and of the threat posed by the Taliban to peace and stability in Afghanistan, and recommendations to strengthen the implementation of the relevant sanctions regime. All recommendations were approved by the relevant committees. As a result, the Monitoring Team's recommendations were circulated to all Member States, which enhanced the implementation of the sanctions regimes. Among the most important recommendations to Member States was one that stressed the need to ensure access to relevant databases at all border crossing points to facilitate screening against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions list and the INTERPOL suspected foreign terrorist fighters database, which includes non-listed individuals.
159. In 2019, the Monitoring Team found that, notwithstanding the fall of the "caliphate" in the Syrian Arab Republic, Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh) had begun to reassert itself in both Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic, mounting increasingly bold insurgent attacks. Threats from Al-Qaida and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh) affiliates persisted globally, especially in Afghanistan, its immediate neighbourhood and in parts of Africa and South-East Asia. In West Africa in particular, the combined efforts of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida affiliates threatened the stability of fragile Member States. The Monitoring Team's fourth regional meeting in West Africa of intelligence and security services, in September 2019, allowed the Monitoring Team to collect relevant information on the evolution of the terrorist threat. This contributed to the Monitoring Team's ability to conduct a thorough threat analysis of the region, which was reflected in its twenty-fifth report, submitted to the 1267 Committee in December 2019.
160. In 2019, the Monitoring Team continued to support the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1988 \(2011\)](#) by reporting on the implementation of the sanctions regime imposed on the Taliban, the threat posed by the Taliban in Afghanistan and assisting the Government of Afghanistan and other Member States in strengthening the implementation of the sanctions regime and facilitating exemptions to the measures, as needed.

Progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

161. This work contributed to ensuring the full implementation of the sanctions regimes concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida, and the Taliban, as demonstrated by a joint briefing to all Member States by the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions [1267 \(1999\)](#), [1989 \(2011\)](#) and [2253 \(2015\)](#) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities and by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1988 \(2011\)](#). This allowed Member States to better understand the threat from Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida, and the activities of the Taliban, and the relevant counter-terrorism work of the Council, as well as issues pertaining to sanctions measures imposed on the Taliban, and to take appropriate measures and subsequently report to the Council and the Committees on the implementation of relevant Council resolutions.

Table 37

Performance measure

2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Committees have limited information on the financing of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida and the challenges that business entities face in implementing relevant Security Council resolutions	Committees have more information on Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida financing and on the challenges that business entities are facing in implementing relevant Security Council resolutions	Committees have limited information on the terrorist threat in certain regions	Committees have more information and data from the Monitoring Team on the terrorist threat in the Middle East, West Africa, South-East Asia and Central Asia	Committees have more detailed information and data from the Monitoring Team on the evolution of the terrorist threat in various regions after the fall of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh) "caliphate"

Planned result for 2021: following an evolving threat

162. In 2021, the Monitoring Team will strengthen its monitoring and analysis of the evolving nature of the terrorist threat posed by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida by liaising closely with Member States, relevant regional, subregional and international bodies, and will make recommendations on addressing those threats, including by enhancing the implementation of the sanctions regime. Similarly, the Monitoring Team will continue to strengthen its engagement with the Government of Afghanistan on issues pertaining to sanctions measures imposed on the Taliban.

Internal challenge and response

163. The challenge for the Monitoring Team was the need to orient the team's capacity to address the continuous evolution of the terrorist threat. Considerable time and effort, including adequate logistics and security arrangements, was required to enable the Monitoring Team to travel to new regions of focus, in order to build stronger partnerships with national authorities that monitor and address the terrorist threats. In response, the Monitoring Team will continue to strengthen its engagement with Member States and regional and subregional bodies in addressing the threat through continued country visits and regional and subregional intelligence meetings. On the basis of this outreach, Member States are expected to request new listings and amendments to existing entries on the Committees' sanctions list.

Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

164. This work is expected to contribute to the full implementation of the sanctions regimes concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida, and the Taliban, which would be demonstrated by continued reporting to the Council and Committees, enabling them to take appropriate action, such as updates to the sanctions lists.

Table 38
Performance measure

2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Security Council/Committees have limited information on the terrorist threat in certain regions	Security Council/Committees have more information and data from the Monitoring Team on the terrorist threat in the Middle East, West Africa, South-East Asia and Central Asia	Security Council/Committees have more detailed information and data from the Monitoring Team on the evolution of the terrorist threat in various regions after the final fall of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh) "caliphate"	Security Council/Committees have comprehensive information and data from the Monitoring Team on the evolution of the terrorist threat in various regions and on the evolution of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida	Security Council has comprehensive information on the terrorist threat, and adjusts sanctions regime; Committees consider amendments to listing entries and new designations of individuals and entities

Deliverables

165. Table 39 lists all deliverables, by category and subcategory, for the period 2019–2021 that contributed and are expected to contribute to the attainment of the objective stated above.

Table 39
Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team pursuant to resolutions [1526 \(2004\)](#) and [2253 \(2015\)](#) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities: deliverables for the period 2019–2021, by category and subcategory

Category and subcategory	2019 planned	2019 actual	2020 planned	2021 planned
A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
Parliamentary documentation (number of documents)	13	21	13	13
1. Reports to the Security Council and updates, monthly reports, country visit reports, investigative reports and/or reports on outreach activities to the sanctions committees	13	21	13	13
Substantive services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	27	46	27	32
2. Meetings of sanctions committees	20	27	20	20
3. Chair's briefings to Member States	2	1	2	2
4. Regional meetings for security and intelligence services on the threat posed by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida and the implementation of the sanctions regime	5	18	5	10
Conference and secretariat services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	27	46	27	32
5. Meetings of sanctions committees	20	27	20	20
6. Chair's briefings to Member States	2	1	2	2
7. Regional meetings for security and intelligence services on the threat posed by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida and the implementation of the sanctions regime	5	18	5	10

Category and subcategory	2019 planned	2019 actual	2020 planned	2021 planned
B. Generation and transfer of knowledge				
Seminars, workshops and training events (number of days)	145	206	145	145
8. Regional workshops on the implementation of relevant resolutions	140	196	140	140
9. Induction seminar for new members of the Monitoring Team	5	10	5	5
C. Substantive deliverables				
Consultation, advice and advocacy: recommendations concerning new individuals and entities to be listed; consultations with Member States on the implementation of sanctions regimes; consultations and advice to broaden engagement with international, regional, subregional and other organizations; and advice on the implementation of relevant resolutions.				
Fact-finding, monitoring and investigation missions: missions and requests for information relating to compliance with the sanctions regimes.				
Databases and substantive digital materials: implementation, dissemination and maintenance of the enhanced data model and archives of documents collected by the Monitoring Team.				
D. Communication deliverables				
Outreach programmes, special events and information materials: outreach programmes to report on the work of the Monitoring Team; fact sheets on the work and mandate of the special political mission; and notes verbales on the activities of the sanctions committees/Monitoring Team.				
External and media relations: press releases on the activities of the sanctions committees/Monitoring Team.				
Digital platforms and multimedia content: dissemination of information on the activities and mandates of the sanctions committees/Monitoring Team through their websites.				

B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2021

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 40

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2019	2020	2021		Variance
	Expenditure	Appropriation	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	2021 vs. 2020 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(3)-(2)
Civilian personnel costs	2 319.2	2 504.8	2 658.0	—	153.2
Operational costs	3 078.6	3 394.7	3 296.4	—	(98.3)
Total (net of staff assessment)	5 397.8	5 899.5	5 954.4	—	54.9

Table 41
Positions

	<i>Professional and higher categories</i>									<i>General Service and related categories</i>		<i>National staff</i>				
	<i>USG</i>	<i>ASG</i>	<i>D-2</i>	<i>D-1</i>	<i>P-5</i>	<i>P-4</i>	<i>P-3</i>	<i>P-2</i>	<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>Field/</i>	<i>General Service^a</i>	<i>Total inter-national</i>	<i>National</i>	<i>Local level</i>	<i>United Nations</i>	<i>Total</i>
										<i>Security Service</i>			<i>Professional Officer</i>		<i>Volunteers</i>	
Approved 2020	–	–	–	–	1	4	6	–	11	–	8	19	–	–	–	19
Proposed 2021	–	–	–	–	1	4	6	–	11	–	8	19	–	–	–	19
Change	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

^a Other level, unless otherwise specified.

166. The proposed resource requirements for the Monitoring Team for 2021 amount to \$5,954,400 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for salaries and common staff costs (\$2,658,000) for the continuation of 19 positions (1 P-5, 4 P-4, 6 P-3 and 8 General Service) to provide substantive, administrative and security support to the sanctions regime, and operational costs (\$3,296,400) comprising expert fees (\$1,939,400) and travel (\$401,700) of the 10 members of the Monitoring Team, official travel of staff (\$123,900), and other operational and logistical support requirements, including rental of premises, communications and information technology services, and other supplies and services (\$831,400).
167. In 2021, it is proposed that the number and levels of positions for the Monitoring Team remain unchanged. A 5 per cent vacancy rate has been applied to the staff costs.
168. The increase in the requirements proposed for 2021 compared with the appropriation for 2020 is attributable primarily to the increased requirements under civilian personnel costs resulting from the application of a higher percentage of common staff costs based on recent expenditure patterns, which are offset in part by reduced requirements for the travel of the experts and official travel of staff.

Extrabudgetary resources

169. No extrabudgetary resources were available in 2020 or are projected for 2021 for the Monitoring Team.

9. Office of the Ombudsperson established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1904 (2009)

(*\$644,600*)

A. Proposed programme plan for 2021 and programme performance for 2019

Overall orientation

Mandates and background

170. The Office of the Ombudsperson to the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities is responsible for reviewing delisting requests from individuals or entities inscribed on the related sanctions list. The mandate is defined in Council resolution 1904 (2009), as modified by subsequent resolutions (1989 (2011), 2083 (2012), 2161 (2014) and 2368 (2017)).

Programme of work

Objective

171. The objective, to which this mission contributes, is to provide an independent review of delisting requests of individuals, entities and undertakings on the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions list. In doing so, the Office ensures that listed individuals, entities and undertakings have access to fair and clear procedures for the administration of requests for removal (delisting).

Strategy

172. To contribute to an independent review of delisting requests of individuals, entities and undertakings on the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions list, the Office of the Ombudsperson will process and fairly and expeditiously consider all requests for delisting and travel to interview each petitioner in person in their country of residence. This work is expected to result in informed decision-making by the Committee on the Ombudsperson's recommendation on the delisting request contained in a comprehensive report on each case. Past results in this area include the seven cases considered by the Ombudsperson in 2019, for which all recommendations regarding the outcome of the request were accepted by the Committee.

External factors for 2021

173. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2021 is based on the following assumptions:
- (a) Member States comply with the resolutions of the Security Council and cooperate with the Office of the Ombudsperson;
 - (b) The security situation allows the Office of the Ombudsperson to conduct missions, as needed.
174. The Office of the Ombudsperson integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate. That perspective may also serve as a basis for the Ombudsperson's recommendation as to whether individuals and entities should remain subject to the sanctions measures. The Office is also guided by the gender strategy of the Department of

Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, including in the provision of available gender training to staff and sanctions-specific gender training to the Ombudsperson.

175. With regard to cooperation with other entities, in the context of information-sharing, the Office of the Ombudsperson cooperates with, among others, Member States, the European Union, academic institutions, think tanks and international law associations.
176. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, the Office of the Ombudsperson cooperates with, among others, OHCHR, UNODC, the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, the United Nations University and the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team pursuant to resolutions [1526 \(2004\)](#) and [2253 \(2015\)](#) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities. In the context of safety and security, information technology security and logistics, the Office cooperates with the Department of Safety and Security, the Office of Information and Communications Technology and UNDP.

Evaluation activities

177. A self-evaluation of mission processes to develop the mission concept, including support from the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs for such processes, to identify constraints and opportunities is planned for 2021.

Programme performance in 2019, against planned result

178. A planned result for 2019, which is improved recourse by listed individuals and entities to an independent and impartial review of their listing, as referred to in the report of the Secretary-General on estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council for 2019 for thematic cluster II ([A/73/352/Add.2](#)), was achieved, as evidenced by the seven comprehensive reports on delisting requests submitted to the Committee by the Ombudsperson, compared with a target of six, and the fact that all the Ombudsperson's recommendations regarding the outcome of the request were accepted by the Committee.

Programme performance in 2019: ensuring a fair and expeditious review of delisting requests

179. Every individual and entity designated on the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions list may apply to have their designation reviewed by the Ombudsperson. Upon receipt of a petition, the Ombudsperson gathers all relevant information, discusses this information with the petitioner in a face-to-face interview and compiles a comprehensive report for the Committee. In this report, the Ombudsperson makes a recommendation on whether the sanctions should remain in place.
180. For every petition received, the Ombudsperson will process and consider all requests for delisting fairly and expeditiously and travel to interview the petitioner in their country of residence, which is expected to result in the fulfilment of due process rights for all petitioners.


Progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

181. This work contributed to an independent review of delisting requests of individuals, entities and undertakings on the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions list, as demonstrated by the widespread acceptance among stakeholders, implementers and courts that the Ombudsperson process affords a sufficiently robust, independent review and is the first port of call for those designated individuals and entities who wish to exercise their due process rights.

Furthermore, the provision of the Ombudsperson's independent reviews of delisting requests was demonstrated by the Committee's ability to take informed decisions in the seven cases considered by the Ombudsperson in 2019. In all seven cases, the Committee followed the Ombudsperson's recommendation regarding the outcome of the request.

Figure I

Performance measure: number of comprehensive reports submitted to the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities by the Ombudsperson, 2015–2019



Planned result for 2021: ensuring a fair and expeditious review of delisting requests

182. As set out above, for every petition received, the Ombudsperson will continue to process and consider all requests for delisting fairly and expeditiously and travel to interview the petitioner in his or her country of residence, which is expected to result in the enjoyment of due process rights for all petitioners.

Internal challenge and response


183. The challenge for the Office of the Ombudsperson was to increase the efficiency in dealing with the petitions received. In response, with the appointment of a new Ombudsperson in 2018, the Office will continue to establish working methods that allow for continuity in its work, streamlining and improving the efficacy of internal processes.

Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

184. This work is expected to contribute to an independent review of delisting requests of individuals, entities and undertakings on the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions list, which would be demonstrated by five comprehensive reports of the Ombudsperson on the delisting requests informing decision-making by the Committee.

Figure II

Performance measure: number of comprehensive reports submitted to the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities by the Ombudsperson, 2017–2021



Deliverables

185. Table 42 lists all deliverables, by category and subcategory, for the period 2019–2021 that contributed and are expected to contribute to the attainment of the objective stated above.

Table 42

Office of the Ombudsperson established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1904 (2009): deliverables for the period 2019–2021, by category and subcategory

Category and subcategory	2019 planned	2019 actual	2020 planned	2021 planned
A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
Parliamentary documentation (number of documents)	7	9	8	8
1. Biannual report of the Office of the Ombudsperson to the Security Council	—	2	—	2
2. Comprehensive reports by the Ombudsperson to the sanctions committee	7	7	8	6
Substantive services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	6	8	7	7
3. Presentations of comprehensive reports by the Ombudsperson to the sanctions committee	5	7	6	6
4. Ombudsperson's briefings to Member States	1	1	1	1
Conference and secretariat services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	6	8	7	7
5. Presentations of comprehensive reports by the Ombudsperson to the sanctions committee	5	7	6	6
6. Ombudsperson's briefings to Member States	1	1	1	1
C. Substantive deliverables				
Consultation, advice and advocacy: consultations with Member States and petitioners on delisting requests; advice on delisting procedures; and advocacy on due process.				
Fact-finding, monitoring and investigation missions: missions and requests for information relating to delisting requests.				
Databases and substantive digital materials: archives of documents collected by the Ombudsperson.				
D. Communication deliverables				
Outreach programmes, special events and information materials: outreach programmes to report on the work of the Ombudsperson; fact sheets on the work and mandate of the special political mission; and periodic updates to the Historical Guide of the Ombudsperson Process.				
Digital platforms and multimedia content: dissemination of information on the activities and mandate of the Ombudsperson through its website.				

B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2021

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 43

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2019	2020	2021		Variance
	Expenditure	Appropriation	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	2021 vs. 2020 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(3)-(2)
Civilian personnel costs	244.2	295.5	283.2	–	(12.3)
Operational costs	315.9	357.8	361.4	–	3.6
Total (net of staff assessment)	560.1	653.3	644.6	–	(8.7)

Table 44

Positions

	Professional and higher categories									General Service and related categories		National staff					Total
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Subtotal	Field/ Security Service	General Service ^a	Total inter- national	National Professional Officer	Local level	United Nations Volunteers		
Approved 2020	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	–	1	–	1	2	–	–	–	2	
Proposed 2021	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	–	1	–	1	2	–	–	–	2	
Change	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	

^a Other level, unless otherwise specified.

186. The proposed resource requirements for the Office of the Ombudsperson for 2021 amount to \$644,600 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for salaries and commons staff costs (\$283,200) for the continuation of two positions (1 P-4 and 1 General Service) to provide substantive and administrative support to the Office, and operational costs (\$361,400) comprising fees (\$205,900) and travel (\$28,400) of the Ombudsperson, official travel of staff (\$35,800), and other operational and logistical support requirements, including rental of premises, rental of vehicles, communications and information technology services, and other supplies and services (\$91,300).
187. In 2021, it is proposed that the number and levels of positions for the Office of the Ombudsperson remain unchanged. A 5 per cent vacancy rate has been applied to the staff costs.
188. The decrease in the requirements proposed for 2021 compared with the appropriation for 2020 is attributable primarily to reduced requirements under civilian personnel costs resulting from the application of a vacancy rate of 5 per cent for 2021, compared with the assumption of full incumbency approved in 2020.

Extrabudgetary resources

189. No extrabudgetary resources were available in 2020 or are projected for 2021 for the Office of the Ombudsperson.

10. Implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)

(\$1,433,200)

A. Proposed programme plan for 2021 and programme performance for 2019

Overall orientation

Mandates and background

190. The mission is responsible for supporting the work of the Security Council and its facilitator in relation to the implementation of Council resolution 2231 (2015) and as set forth in the note by the President of the Security Council of 16 January 2016 (S/2016/44). In its resolution, the Council endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, urged its full implementation and called upon all Member States and regional and international organizations to support its implementation.
191. In addition, the restrictions established in annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) are aimed at improving transparency and creating an atmosphere conducive to the full implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. In October 2020, the first two of the specific restrictions contained in annex B are set to expire (arms-related transfers to/from the Islamic Republic of Iran and travel ban), while the other restrictive measures are set to expire no later than October 2023 (ballistic missile-related transfers and activities, and assets freeze) and October 2025 (nuclear-related transfers and activities (procurement channel)). In October 2025, provided that the provisions of the previous Security Council resolutions on the Iranian nuclear issue have not been reinstated in the interim, all the provisions of resolution 2231 (2015) shall be terminated and the Council will have concluded its consideration of the Iranian nuclear issue.

Programme of work

Objective

192. The objective, to which this mission contributes, is to ensure the full implementation by all Member States and regional and international organizations of resolution 2231 (2015), including the restrictive measures established in annex B to the resolution.

Strategy

193. To contribute to the full implementation by all Member States and regional and international organizations of resolution 2231 (2015), including the restrictive measures established in annex B to the resolution, the mission will continue to support the work of the Security Council and its appointed facilitator and to report regularly, as mandated, to the Council on the implementation of the resolution. This action is expected to result in improved transparency, an atmosphere conducive to the full implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and an increase in cooperation on alleged actions inconsistent with annex B restrictions. Past results in this area include the timely reporting by the facilitator and the Secretary-General to the Council on the implementation of the resolution every six months and the meetings of the Council in the “2231 format” at the expert level to review the findings and recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General prior to its public release.

External factors for 2021

194. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2021 is based on the following assumptions:
 - (a) Participants in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action remain committed to its full and effective implementation;
 - (b) The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, its implementation and that of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) continue to enjoy the full support of the broader international community.
195. The mission integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate. Gender parity will continue to be taken into consideration in the recruitment of staff. The mission is also guided by the gender strategy of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, including in the provision of available gender training.
196. With regard to cooperation with other entities, the mission liaises and cooperates with, among others, Member States and the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission established in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action for the processing of proposals through the procurement channel. The mission also cooperates with Member States on various issues related to the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), including alleged actions inconsistent with its annex B restrictions. In addition, the mission liaises and cooperates with IAEA.

Evaluation activities

197. A self-evaluation of mission processes to develop the mission concept, including support from the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs for such processes, to identify constraints and opportunities is planned for 2021.

Programme performance in 2019: enhanced understanding and implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#)

198. In May 2018, the withdrawal of the United States of America from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and the steps taken by the Islamic Republic of Iran since May 2019 to reduce its nuclear-related commitments under the Plan introduced uncertainty regarding the future of the Plan and resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). Subsequently, a significant reduction in the number of proposals submitted through the procurement channel was registered.
199. In this context, the mission, took several actions to contribute to the continuity of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and encourage the international community's support for both the Plan and resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) through the following:
 - (a) Promotion of information related to the resolution, including the restrictive measures established in its annex B, through the reports of the facilitator and the Secretary-General and preparing the briefings to the Security Council on these reports;
 - (b) Support of the work of the Security Council in its monitoring of the resolution, in taking action, as appropriate, to improve the implementation of the resolution and in responding appropriately to information regarding alleged actions inconsistent with the resolution;
 - (c) Support for the work of the facilitator in organizing informal meetings, managing communications and correspondence, maintaining and archiving all relevant information and documents, and promoting publicly available information;
 - (d) Administrative support of the Security Council's review of recommendations from the Joint Commission concerning the procurement channel.

Progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

200. This work contributed to the full implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), as demonstrated by their commitment to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and to the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), which was expressed by Member States during the informal meetings in the 2231 format, as convened by the facilitator; during the Security Council briefings on non-proliferation, which considered the three reports (those of the Secretary-General, the facilitator and the Joint Commission); and in feedback provided by the facilitator and other Council members on the mission's mandated activities in support of the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), including the procurement channel.

Table 45

Performance measure

2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
N/A	Implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), through reporting to the Security Council and support for the facilitator	Continuous implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), through reporting to the Security Council and support for the facilitator	Continuous implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), through reporting to the Security Council and support for the facilitator	Continuous implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), through reporting to the Security Council and support for the facilitator

Abbreviation: N/A, not applicable.

Programme performance in 2019 against planned result

201. A planned result for 2019, which is the improved organization and procedural aspects of meetings and enhanced technical Secretariat support to the work of the Security Council on resolution 2231 (2015), as referred to in the report of the Secretary-General on estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council for 2019 for thematic cluster II (A/73/352/Add.2), was achieved, as evidenced by the degree of satisfaction expressed by the facilitator on behalf of the Security with the technical, procedural and administrative support provided by the mission. Since 2016, this degree of satisfaction has been consistently maintained with a satisfactory or higher rating (85 per cent and above) based on feedback received, and covers outputs such as the reports of the facilitator (two, as mandated) and the number of expert-level meetings of the Council related to the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).

Planned result for 2021: maintaining the continuous implementation of resolution 2231 (2015)

202. The withdrawal of the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in May 2018 and its subsequent decision to reimpose all its national sanctions that had been lifted pursuant to the Plan, as well as the steps taken by the Islamic Republic of Iran since May 2019 to reduce its nuclear-related commitments under the Plan, introduced uncertainty regarding the future of the Plan and resolution 2231 (2015).
203. In January 2020, the E3 (France, Germany and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) referred their concerns to the Joint Commission through the dispute resolution mechanism of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. All participants, however, continued to emphasize their full commitment to the preservation of the Plan and its full and effective implementation. In October 2020, two of the specific restrictions, as set out in annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), are set to

expire (arms-related transfers to/from the Islamic Republic of Iran and travel ban), while the remaining restrictive measures are set to expire no later than October 2023 (ballistic missile-related transfers and activities, and assets freeze) and October 2025 (nuclear-related transfers and activities (procurement channel)).

204. The mission, amid this overall context, continues to disseminate information related to the resolution, including the restrictive measures (annex B), through the reports of the Secretary-General and the facilitator, as well as briefings to the Security Council on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and by participating in outreach events, as necessary. The mission continues to hold regular consultations with Council members, Member States and Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action participants, with a view to ensuring a coherent and timely response by the Organization.

Internal challenge and response

205. The challenge for the mission was to strategize and plan its outreach mandate in support of the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, owing to the uncertainty of the future of the Plan. In response, the mission will intensify contacts with Security Council members and relevant interlocutors to emphasize the continued mandate to implement the resolution and the Plan and facilitate dialogue and efforts by all Member States, as appropriate, in ensuring the preservation of the Plan. The mission will continue to support the work of the Secretary-General and the facilitator on the implementation of the resolution.

Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

206. This work is expected to contribute to the continuous implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) through regular reporting by the Secretary-General and support for the work of the facilitator, which would be demonstrated by the appreciation and satisfaction of the Security Council, the facilitator and Council members and a willingness by Member States to engage in continuous dialogue concerning resolution 2231 (2015), including its restrictive measures.

Table 46
Performance measure

2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Continuous implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), through reporting to the Security Council and support for the facilitator	Continuous implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), through reporting to the Security Council and support for the facilitator	Continuous implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), through reporting to the Security Council and support for the facilitator	Continuous implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), through reporting to the Security Council and support for the facilitator	Continuous implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), through reporting to the Security Council and support for the facilitator

Deliverables

207. Table 47 lists all deliverables, by category and subcategory, for the period 2019–2021 that contributed and are expected to contribute to the attainment of the objective stated above.

Table 47

Implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015): deliverables for the period 2019–2021, by category and subcategory

<i>Category and subcategory</i>	<i>2019 planned</i>	<i>2019 actual</i>	<i>2020 planned</i>	<i>2021 planned</i>
A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
Parliamentary documentation (number of documents)	2	2	2	2
1. Reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council	2	2	2	2
Substantive services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	8	6	8	8
2. Meetings of the Security Council	7	6	7	7
3. Facilitator's briefings to Member States	1	—	1	1
Conference and secretariat services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	6	4	6	6
4. Meetings of the Security Council	5	4	5	5
5. Facilitator's briefings to Member States	1	—	1	1
B. Generation and transfer of knowledge				
Publications (number of publications)	3	—	3	—
6. Guidance documents	3	—	3	—
C. Substantive deliverables				
Consultation, advice and advocacy: consultations and advice on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).				
Fact-finding, monitoring and investigation missions: findings and recommendations to the Security Council to improve the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).				
D. Communication deliverables				
Outreach programmes, special events and information materials: outreach programmes to report on the work of the special political mission; fact sheets on the work and mandate of the special political mission; and notes verbales on the activities of the Security Council in the context of resolution 2231 (2015).				
External and media relations: press releases on the activities of the Security Council in the context of resolution 2231 (2015).				
Digital platforms and multimedia content: dissemination of information on the activities and mandate of the special political mission through its website.				

B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2021

208. In line with Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), the restrictions on arms-related transfers and the travel ban restriction are due to expire on 18 October 2020, and based on the projection that the workload related to the procurement channel will not increase, the mission has undertaken a review of its staffing structure and resource requirements. In this regard, it is proposed that two positions of Political Affairs Officer (1 P-4 and 1 P-3) be abolished.

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 48

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2019	2020	2021	Variance	
	Expenditure	Appropriation	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	2021 vs. 2020 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(3)-(2)
Civilian personnel costs	1 373.8	1 288.1	1 217.0	–	(71.1)
Operational costs	260.8	259.9	216.2	–	(43.7)
Total (net of staff assessment)	1 634.6	1 548.0	1 433.2	–	(114.8)

Table 49

Positions

	Professional and higher categories								General Service and related categories		National staff					Total
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Subtotal	Field/Security Service	General Service ^a	Total inter-national	National Professional Officer	Local level	United Nations Volunteers	
Approved 2020	–	–	–	–	1	3	3	–	7	–	2	9	–	–	–	9
Proposed 2021	–	–	–	–	1	2	2	–	5	–	2	7	–	–	–	7
Change	–	–	–	–	–	(1)	(1)	–	(2)	–	–	(2)	–	–	–	(2)

^a Other level, unless otherwise specified.

209. The proposed resource requirements for 2021 amount to \$1,433,200 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for salaries and common staff costs (\$1,217,000) for the continuation of seven positions (1 P-5, 2 P-4, 2 P-3 and 2 General Service), and operational costs (\$216,200) comprising official travel of staff (\$57,000), and other operational and logistical support requirements, such as rental of premises, communications and information technology services, and other supplies and services (\$159,200).
210. In 2021, it is proposed that two positions of Political Affairs Officer (1 P-4 and 1 P-3) be abolished, as explained in paragraph 208 above. A 5 per cent vacancy rate has been applied to staff costs.
211. The decrease in the requirements proposed for 2021 compared with the appropriation for 2020 is attributable mainly to reduced requirements under civilian personnel costs, resulting from the proposed abolishment of two positions, and reduced requirements under operational costs, resulting from lower provisions for the rental of premises in connection with the proposed abolishment of two positions.

Extrabudgetary resources

212. No extrabudgetary resources were available in 2020 or are projected for 2021 for the implementation of Security Council resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).

11. Panel of Experts on Mali

(*\$1,213,100*)

A. Proposed programme plan for 2021 and programme performance for 2019

Overall orientation

Mandates and background

213. The Panel of Experts on Mali is responsible for monitoring the implementation of the assets freeze and the travel ban, as well as for providing information relevant to the potential designation of individuals and entities. The mandate derives from the priorities established in Security Council resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#), [2432 \(2018\)](#) and [2484 \(2019\)](#). The sanctions regime is aimed at preventing and containing threats to the peace, security or stability of Mali and the region.

Programme of work

Objective

214. The objective, to which this mission contributes, is to ensure the full implementation of the sanctions regime concerning Mali, which include an assets freeze and a travel ban.

Strategy

215. To contribute to the full implementation of the sanctions regime concerning Mali, the Panel of Experts will provide updated information to the Security Council and the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#) concerning Mali. This action is expected to result in enhanced capacity of the Council and its Committee to take follow-up action on alleged violations of the sanctions regime. Past results in this area include the provision of information on acts falling under the designation criteria, which has enabled the Committee to list individuals and entities for sanctions violations.

External factors for 2021

216. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2021 is based on the following assumptions:
- (a) Member States comply with the resolutions of the Security Council and cooperate with the Panel of Experts;
 - (b) The security situation allows the Panel of Experts to conduct missions, as needed.
217. The Panel of Experts integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate, and as guided by the relevant Security Council resolutions. Gender balance is taken into consideration in the recruitment and rostering of experts. The terms of reference for experts in the Panel of Experts indicate that experts should incorporate gender perspectives into their substantive areas of responsibility. The Panel of Experts is also guided by the gender strategy of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, including in the provision of available gender training to staff and sanctions-specific gender training to all experts.

218. With regard to cooperation with other entities, the Panel of Experts cooperates with, among others, Member States and regional and subregional organizations, including the Economic Commission of West African States, the African Union and the European Union.
219. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, the Panel of Experts cooperates with, among others, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and other sanctions monitoring teams, groups and panels, as appropriate. In the context of safety, security and logistics, the Panel of Experts cooperates with the Department of Safety and Security, MINUSMA and UNDP.

Evaluation activities

220. A self-evaluation of mission processes to develop the mission concept, including support from the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs for such processes, to identify constraints and opportunities is planned for 2021.

Programme performance in 2019 against planned result

221. A planned result for 2019, which is the enhanced capacity of the Security Council to take follow-up action on alleged violations, as referred to in the report of the Secretary-General on estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council for 2019 for thematic cluster II ([A/73/352/Add.2](#)), was achieved, as evidenced by the 17 official communications sent by the Committee to Member States and other entities on alleged violations cited by the Panel of Experts, which exceeded the target of 5.

Programme performance in 2019: strengthening efforts for the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali

222. On 15 May 2015, the Government of Mali and two coalitions of armed groups signed the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali. The Panel of Experts is mandated to provide the Committee with information on individuals and entities who obstruct the implementation of the Agreement.
223. In 2019, the Panel of Experts investigated cases of individuals and entities that obstructed, delayed and threatened the implementation of the Agreement, including through acts of violence, organized crime and collusion with terrorist groups. In this context, the Panel of Experts submitted relevant information to the Committee, which subsequently imposed a travel ban on five individuals belonging to armed groups who had taken action undermining the implementation of the Agreement, including through targeted violence, obstruction of humanitarian aid and the trafficking in migrants and drugs. Subsequently, having received additional information from the Panel of Experts, the Committee also imposed an assets freeze on the five individuals.

Progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

224. This work contributed to the full implementation of the sanctions regime concerning Mali, as demonstrated by the designation of five individuals on the Committee's sanctions list, in support of the Agreement.

Table 50
Performance measure

2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
N/A	N/A	Panel of Experts investigates those who impede the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali	Committee receives information from the Panel of Experts, enabling it to impose sanctions measures on three individuals (travel ban) obstructing/threatening the implementation of the Agreement	Committee receives information from the Panel of Experts, enabling it to impose sanctions measures on five individuals (travel ban and assets freeze) obstructing/threatening the implementation of the Agreement

Abbreviation: N/A, not applicable.

Planned result for 2021: potential links between armed groups and terrorist groups

225. In 2019, the Panel of Experts focused on providing the Committee with information relevant to the potential designation of individuals and/or entities who may be engaged in hostilities in violation of the Agreement, and obstructing and/or threatening the implementation of the Agreement. In this connection, the Panel of Experts focused its investigations on cases of sanctioned individuals, previously reported to the Committee as involved in major drug seizures in Guinea-Bissau, Morocco and the Niger; identified a string of shell companies established in Algeria, Mali, Morocco and the Niger, possibly used to launder drug money and to finance illicit trafficking operations; and documented multiple travel ban violations by sanctioned individuals.
226. While implementing its activities, the Panel of Experts provided evidence that many signatory parties continued to maintain links with organized crime and terrorist groups, and noted an increased number of cases of individual members of compliant armed groups involved in terrorist activities or colluding with terrorist actors to attack the Malian Defence and Security Forces.

Internal challenge and response

227. The challenge for the Panel of Experts was the difficulty in validating some information for the preparation of specific reports, with restricted access to remote areas in Mali, with limited contact with affected communities, in particular women's organizations, with information and evidence on criminal and terrorist activities threatening and impeding the implementation of the Agreement. In response, the Panel of Experts will increase its cooperation with the relevant United Nations entities on the ground and, in parallel, explore the possibility of travelling to alternate destinations, including relevant Member States, in order to gain access to information that is available and can be provided by third parties. To complement this, the Panel of Experts also intends to intensify contact, interviews and liaisons through teleconferencing with other interlocutors.

Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

228. This work is expected to contribute to the full implementation of the sanctions regime concerning Mali, which would be demonstrated by an increased number of designations of individuals and/or entities on the Committee's sanctions list.

Table 51
Performance measure

2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Panel of Experts starts investigating those impeding the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali	Committee is provided information by the Panel of Experts, enabling it to increase the number of designations of individuals and/or entities on the Committee's sanctions list (3 individuals under travel ban), in support of the implementation of the Agreement	Committee is provided information by the Panel of Experts, enabling it to increase to the number of designations of individuals and/or entities on the Committee's sanctions list (5 individuals under travel ban and assets freeze), in support of the implementation of the Agreement	Security Council/Committee is provided information by the Panel of Experts, enabling it to adjust the sanctions regime and/or increase the number of designations of individuals and/or entities on the Committee's sanctions list, in support of the implementation of the Agreement	Security Council/Committee is provided information by the Panel of Experts, enabling it to adjust the sanctions regime and/or increase the number of designations of individuals and/or entities on the Committee's sanctions list, in support of the implementation of the Agreement

Deliverables

229. Table 52 lists all deliverables, by category and subcategory, for the period 2019–2021 that contributed and are expected to contribute to the attainment of the objective stated above.

Table 52
Panel of Experts on Mali: deliverables for the period 2019–2021, by category and subcategory

Category and subcategory	2019 planned	2019 actual	2020 planned	2021 planned
A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
Parliamentary documentation (number of documents)	3	3	3	3
1. Reports to the Security Council and updates, monthly reports, country visit reports, investigative reports and/or reports on outreach activities to the sanctions committee	3	3	3	3
Substantive services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	6	6	6	6
2. Meetings of sanctions committee	6	6	6	6
Conference and secretariat services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	6	6	6	6
3. Meetings of sanctions committee	6	6	6	6
B. Generation and transfer of knowledge				
Seminars, workshops and training events (number of days)	5	5	5	5
4. Induction seminar for new members of the Panel of Experts	5	5	5	5
Publications (number of publications)	2	2	2	2
5. Implementation assistance notice and guidance document	2	2	2	2
C. Substantive deliverables				
Consultation, advice and advocacy: recommendations concerning new individuals and entities to be listed; consultations with Member States on the implementation of the sanctions regime; consultations and advice to broaden engagement with international, regional, subregional and other organizations; and advice on the implementation of relevant resolutions.				

Category and subcategory	2019 planned	2019 actual	2020 planned	2021 planned
Fact-finding, monitoring and investigation missions: missions and requests for information relating to compliance with the sanctions regime.				
Databases and substantive digital materials: archives of documents collected by the Panel of Experts.				
D. Communication deliverables				
Outreach programmes, special events and information materials: outreach programmes to report on the work of the Panel of Experts; fact sheets on the work and mandate of the special political mission; and notes verbales on the activities of the sanctions committee/Panel of Experts.				
External and media relations: press releases on the activities of the sanctions committee/Panel of Experts.				
Digital platforms and multimedia content: dissemination of information on the activities and mandate of the sanctions committee/Panel of Experts through its website.				

B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2021

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 53

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2019	2020	2021	Variance	
	Expenditure	Appropriation	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	2021 vs. 2020 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(3)-(2)
Civilian personnel costs	151.4	123.9	145.7	—	21.8
Operational costs	840.0	1 201.8	1 067.4	—	(134.4)
Total (net of staff assessment)	991.4	1 325.7	1 213.1	—	(112.6)

Table 54

Positions

	Professional and higher categories									General Service and related categories		National staff				
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Subtotal	Field/Security Service	General Service	Total international	National Professional Officer	Local level	United Nations Volunteers	Total
Approved 2020	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	1
Proposed 2021	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	1
Change	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

230. The proposed resource requirements for the Panel of Experts for 2021 amount to \$1,213,100 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for salaries and commons staff costs (\$145,700) for the continuation of one position (P-3) to provide substantive, administrative and security support to the sanctions regime, and operational costs (\$1,067,400) comprising fees (\$477,100) and travel (\$187,000) of four experts, official travel of staff (\$199,400), and other operational and logistical support requirements, including the rental of premises, rental of vehicles, communications and information technology services, and other supplies and services (\$203,900).

231. In 2021, it is proposed that the number and levels of positions for the Panel of Experts remain unchanged. A 5 per cent vacancy rate has been applied to the staff costs.
232. The decrease in the requirements proposed for 2021 compared with the appropriation for 2020 is attributable primarily to reduced requirements for experts' fees and travel costs, from five experts in 2020 to four in 2021, owing to the lack of consensus in the Committee on appointing a fifth expert, which are offset in part by additional requirements under civilian personnel costs, resulting from the application of a higher percentage of common staff costs, based on the recent expenditure patterns.

Extrabudgetary resources

233. No extrabudgetary resources were available in 2020 or are any projected for 2021 for the Panel of Experts.

12. Panel of Experts on Somalia

(\$1,873,700)

A. Proposed programme plan for 2021 and programme performance for 2019

Overall orientation

Mandates and background

234. The Panel of Experts on Somalia is responsible for monitoring the implementation of the assets freeze, the travel ban and the targeted and territorial arms embargoes, the charcoal ban and the improvised explosive device components ban. The Panel of Experts is also responsible for providing information relevant to the potential designation of individuals and entities based on listing criteria delineated in various Security Council resolutions. Its mandate is referenced in Council resolutions [2444 \(2018\)](#) and [2498 \(2019\)](#). The sanctions regime is aimed at supporting the efforts of the Somali authorities to deliver stability and security in Somalia and to prevent any flows of weapons and ammunition to Somalia in violation of the arms embargo.

Programme of work

Objective

235. The objective, to which this mission contributes, is to ensure the full implementation of the sanctions regime concerning Somalia, which includes an assets freeze, a travel ban, targeted and territorial arms embargoes, a charcoal ban and an improvised explosive device components ban.

Strategy

236. To contribute to ensuring the full implementation of the sanctions regime concerning Somalia, the Panel of Experts will provide updated information to the Security Council and the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution [751 \(1992\)](#) concerning Somalia. This work is expected to result in the enhanced capacity of the Council and its Committee to take follow-up action on alleged violations of the sanctions regime concerning Somalia. Past results in this area include the reporting and recommendations of the Panel of Experts to the Council in relation to the threat posed by improvised explosive device attacks by Al-Shabaab, which led to the imposition of an improvised explosive device components ban.

External factors for 2021

237. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2021 is based on the following assumptions:
- (a) Member States comply with the resolutions of the Security Council and cooperate with the Panel of Experts;
 - (b) The security situation allows the Panel of Experts to conduct missions, as needed.
238. The Panel of Experts integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate, and as guided by relevant Security Council resolutions. Gender balance is taken into consideration in the recruitment and rostering of experts. The terms of reference for the experts of the Panel of Experts indicate that experts should incorporate gender perspectives into their substantive areas of responsibility. The Panel of Experts is also guided by the gender strategy of the

Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, including in the provision of available gender training to staff and sanctions-specific gender training to all experts.

239. With regard to cooperation with other entities, in the context of information-sharing, the Panel of Experts cooperates with, among others, Member States, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), INTERPOL, IGAD, the African Union, the European Union and the European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation.
240. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, the Panel of Experts cooperates, among others, with the World Bank, IMF, ICAO, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS), the United Nations Office at Nairobi, UNODC and other sanctions monitoring teams, groups and panels, as appropriate.
241. In the context of safety, security and logistics, the Panel of Experts cooperates with the Department of Safety and Security, the United Nations Office at Nairobi, UNSOM, UNSOS, AMISOM and UNDP.

Evaluation activities

242. A self-evaluation of mission processes to develop the mission concept, including support from the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs for such processes, to identify constraints and opportunities is planned for 2021.

Programme performance in 2019 against planned result

243. A planned result for 2019, which is the enhanced capacity of the Security Council to adjust the sanctions regime, as referred to in the report of the Secretary-General on estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council for 2019 for thematic cluster II ([A/73/352/Add.2](#)), was achieved, as evidenced by eight recommendations by the Panel of Experts incorporated by the Council into subsequent resolutions, which exceeded the target of two.

Programme performance in 2019: imposition of an improvised explosive device components ban

244. In recent years, Al-Shabaab has been increasing attacks by using improvised explosive devices. From July 2018 to July 2019, Al-Shabaab carried out 548 improvised explosive device attacks in Somalia, compared with 413 attacks from July 2017 to July 2018, representing the highest number of improvised explosive device attacks in one year in Somali history. Given the prominence of improvised explosive devices as Al-Shabaab's weapon of choice, the Panel of Expert has been continuing the investigation into improvised explosive devices, which was started by its predecessor, the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea.
245. The Panel of Experts has been conducting the improvised explosive device investigation since its establishment pursuant to resolution [2444 \(2018\)](#). In consultation with explosive ordnance disposal experts and chemists, the Panel of Experts compiled a list of chemicals and other common components that could be used by Al-Shabaab to construct improvised explosive devices. The Panel of Experts contacted shipping companies that routinely conduct transits to main Somali ports, as well as relevant Member States, requesting information on consignments containing potential improvised explosive device inputs. In the meantime, post-blast laboratory analyses obtained by the Panel of Experts have established that Al-Shabaab has carried out at least 11 improvised explosive device attacks in Somalia using home-made explosives. This information provided the Panel of Experts with definitive evidence for the first time that Al-Shabaab had been manufacturing its own home-made explosives since at least July 2017, and likely before then. Information received by the

Panel from a range of explosive ordnance disposal experts also suggested a probable connection between the development of home-made explosives by Al-Shabaab and the increased frequency of improvised explosive device attacks in Somalia in recent years. The increased number of improvised explosive device attacks by Al-Shabaab and the obtainment by the Panel of Experts of definitive evidence showing Al-Shabaab's development of home-made explosives led the Panel to recommend, in its final report for 2019 and transmitted to the Security Council (see [S/2019/858](#)), that the Council undertake appropriate measures to counter the improvised explosive device threat.

Progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

246. This work contributed to ensuring the full implementation of the sanctions regime concerning Somalia, as demonstrated by the adoption by the Security Council of resolution [2498 \(2019\)](#), by which the Council imposed a new ban on components for improvised explosive devices (paras. 26–28).

Table 55

Performance measure

2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
N/A	N/A	N/A	Security Council establishes the Panel of Experts on Somalia by its resolution 2444 (2018)	Security Council/Committee receives reporting on improvised explosive devices and adjusts the sanctions regime concerning Somalia

Abbreviation: N/A, not applicable.

Planned result for 2021: analysis of the revenue sources of Al-Shabaab

247. In its resolution [2498 \(2019\)](#), the Security Council requested the Panel of Experts, with input from the Federal Government of Somalia and UNODC, to conduct an analysis of all of Al-Shabaab's revenue sources and their methods of storage and transfer, to map Al-Shabaab's illegal taxation systems and to provide recommendations to the Committee.
248. Since its establishment in 2018, the Panel of Experts has been investigating the revenue sources of Al-Shabaab. In 2020, the Panel of Experts intensified and broadened its work in this area and provided the Committee and the Security Council with detailed information and recommendations. The Panel of Experts will continue this work in 2021, building on its work in previous years.

Internal challenge and response

249. The challenge for the Panel of Experts was the difficulty in validating some information for the preparation of specific reports, given the difficulty of access to certain areas and persons that could provide information on Al-Shabaab's revenue sources. In response, the Panel of Experts will increase its cooperation with the relevant United Nations entities on the ground, travel to alternate locations where relevant information might be available, and gather information through interviews and interaction through teleconferencing tools.

Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

250. This work is expected to contribute to ensuring the full implementation of the sanctions regime concerning Somalia, which would be demonstrated by the provision to the Federal Government of Somalia, the federal member states of Somalia, Member States and private sector entities of information about Al-Shabaab's revenue sources, to better enable them to implement the assets freeze with regard to Al-Shabaab and its listed members.

Table 56

Performance measure

2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
N/A	Security Council establishes the Panel of Experts by its resolution 2444 (2018)	Panel starts investigations of Al-Shabaab's revenue sources, as tasked by the Security Council	Security Council receives a comprehensive overview of Al-Shabaab's revenue sources from the Panel of Experts	Security Council receives a detailed analysis of Al-Shabaab's revenue sources and specific recommendations on how to reduce the revenues of Al-Shabaab from the Panel of Experts; the Council receives the information needed to adjust the sanctions regime

Abbreviation: N/A, not applicable.

Deliverables

251. Table 57 lists all deliverables, by category and subcategory, for the period 2019–2021 that contributed and are expected to contribute to the attainment of the objective stated above.

Table 57

Panel of Experts on Somalia: deliverables for the period 2019–2021, by category and subcategory

Category and subcategory	2019 planned	2019 actual	2020 planned	2021 planned
A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
Parliamentary documentation (number of documents)	13	12	12	12
1. Reports to the Security Council and updates, monthly reports, country visit reports, investigative reports and and/or reports on outreach activities to the sanctions committee	13	12	12	12
Substantive services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	4	5	4	4
2. Meetings of sanctions committee	4	5	4	4
Conference and secretariat services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	4	5	4	4
3. Meetings of sanctions committee	4	5	4	4

Category and subcategory	2019 planned	2019 actual	2020 planned	2021 planned
B. Generation and transfer of knowledge				
Seminars, workshops and training events (number of days)	5	5	5	5
4. Induction seminar for new members of the Panel of Experts	5	5	5	5
Publications (number of publications)	1	2	1	1
5. Implementation assistance notice and guidance document	1	2	1	1
C. Substantive deliverables				
Consultation, advice and advocacy: recommendations concerning new individuals and entities to be listed; consultations with Member States on the implementation of the sanctions regime; consultations and advice to broaden engagement with international, regional, subregional and other organizations; and advice on the implementation of relevant resolutions.				
Fact-finding, monitoring and investigation missions: missions and requests for information relating to compliance with the sanctions regime.				
Databases and substantive digital materials: archives of documents collected by the Panel of Experts.				
D. Communication deliverables				
Outreach programmes, special events and information materials: outreach programmes to report on the work of the Panel of Experts; fact sheets on the work and mandate of the special political mission; and notes verbales on the activities of the sanctions committee/Panel of Experts.				
External and media relations: press releases on the activities of the sanctions committee/Panel of Experts.				
Digital platforms and multimedia content: dissemination of information on the activities and mandate of the sanctions committee/Panel of Experts through its website.				

B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2021

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 58

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2019	2020	2021		Variance
	Expenditure	Appropriation	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	2021 vs. 2020 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(3)-(2)
Civilian personnel costs	378.1	392.6	434.8	—	42.2
Operational costs	1 344.9	1 458.2	1 438.9	—	(19.3)
Total (net of staff assessment)	1 723.0	1 850.8	1 873.7	—	22.9

Table 59
Positions

	<i>Professional and higher categories</i>									<i>General Service and related categories</i>		<i>Total international</i>	<i>National staff</i>			<i>United Nations Volunteers</i>	<i>Total</i>
	<i>USG</i>	<i>ASG</i>	<i>D-2</i>	<i>D-1</i>	<i>P-5</i>	<i>P-4</i>	<i>P-3</i>	<i>P-2</i>	<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>Field/ Security Service</i>	<i>General Service^a</i>		<i>National Professional Officer</i>	<i>Local level</i>			
Approved 2020	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	1	–	1	2	–	4	–	6	
Proposed 2021	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	1	–	1	2	–	4	–	6	
Change	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	

^a Other level, unless otherwise specified.

252. The proposed resource requirements for the Panel of Experts for 2021 amount to \$1,873,700 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for salaries and common staff costs (\$434,800) for the continuation of six positions (1 P-3, 1 General Service and 4 Local level) to provide substantive, administrative and security support to the sanctions regime, and operational costs (\$1,438,900) comprising fees (\$1,003,600) and travel (\$208,900) of six experts, official travel of staff (\$25,100), and other operational and logistical support requirements, including rental of premises, rental of vehicles, communications and information technology services, and other supplies and services (\$201,300).
253. In 2021, it is proposed that the number and levels of positions for the Panel of Experts remain unchanged. A 5 per cent vacancy rate has been applied to international and national staff costs.
254. The increase in the requirements proposed for 2021 compared with the appropriation for 2020 is attributable primarily to increased requirements for national staff costs owing to the application of the revised salary scale effective 1 November 2019, which are offset in part by reduced requirements for travel of the experts.

Extrabudgetary resources

255. No extrabudgetary resources were available in 2020 or are projected for 2021 for the Panel of Experts.

13. Support to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction

(\$3,012,000)

A. Proposed programme plan for 2021 and programme performance for 2019

Overall orientation

Mandates and background

256. The special political mission in support of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction is responsible for the provision of substantive, administrative and logistical support to assist the Committee in achieving the aims of the resolution. The mandate derives from Council resolution 1540 (2004) and subsequent resolutions, including 1673 (2006), 1810 (2008), 1977 (2011), 2055 (2012) and 2325 (2016). In resolution 1977 (2011), the Committee's mandate was extended until 25 April 2021.
257. The mission supports the activities of the Committee relating to the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) through the organization of regional and subregional workshops on the implementation of the resolution and through country-specific missions and activities; by strengthening the cooperation between international and regional bodies through the organization of joint meetings on cooperation in promoting the aims of the resolution; and by facilitating effective partnerships with civil society and the private sector.
258. National efforts to implement resolution 1540 (2004) are the cornerstone of the 1540 architecture. In cooperation with the Committee and relevant international, regional and subregional organizations, the mission continues, as its top priority, to assist interested Member States in their national implementation efforts through country-specific visits and dialogues, national round tables and peer reviews, with the objective of building capacity, facilitating technical assistance and identifying and disseminating effective 1540 implementation practices.
259. In its resolution 1977 (2011), the Security Council encouraged the Committee to enhance cooperation and information-sharing with relevant international, regional and subregional organizations on technical assistance and all other issues of relevance for the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). The mission promotes such cooperation by working together with these organizations to exchange information and identify synergies that can enhance implementation of the resolution for the benefit of their relevant Member States.
260. The Security Council has repeatedly reaffirmed that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security. By its resolution 1540 (2004), acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the Council decided that all Member States should refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery. In addition, all States, in accordance with their national procedures, were requested to adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws that prohibit any non-State actor from engaging in such activities, in particular for terrorist purposes, and to take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials.
261. Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) is part of the international non-proliferation regime. It strengthens the regime by making important requirements of other relevant international instruments applicable to all Member States in the coverage of these instruments with respect to actions by

non-State actors and by requiring Member States to implement robust domestic controls on materials related to weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery in a manner absent from other international instruments.

Programme of work

Objective

262. The objective, to which this mission contributes, is to prevent non-State actors from developing, acquiring, manufacturing, possessing, transporting, transferring or using nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery.

Strategy

263. To contribute to the prevention of non-State actors from developing, acquiring, manufacturing, possessing, transporting, transferring or using nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, the mission will continue to facilitate assistance to Member States, at their request, organize capacity-building events on the national, regional and international levels and facilitate outreach to and enhance cooperation with stakeholders such as international, regional and subregional organizations, as well as civil society, including industry and academia. This action is expected to result in the adoption of additional measures within national legal frameworks, the strengthening of their enforcement through enhanced capacity, improved awareness of the requirements of resolution 1540 (2004) and the strengthening of cooperation among relevant stakeholders. Past results in this area include the submission of first reports on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) by non-reporting States, the submission of additional implementation reports by Member States, the additional nomination of 1540 points of contact by States and the joint organization of 1540-related events and activities with partners from the stakeholder community.

External factors for 2021

264. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2021 is based on the following assumptions:
- (a) The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery to non-State actors remains a threat to international peace and security;
 - (b) The political environment in the Security Council continues to enable the Committee to reach consensus on the implementation of planned activities;
 - (c) Member States continue to cooperate with the Committee;
 - (d) Member States will have increased need for assistance to comply with their obligations under resolution 1540 (2004).
265. The mission integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate, and outlined in the gender mainstreaming action plan of its supporting office, the Office for Disarmament Affairs. In 2020, this will be enhanced by the organization of the international women's conference on preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to non-State actors, with an emphasis on resolution 1540 (2004) and specifically aimed at participants from the global South.
266. With regard to cooperation with other entities, the mission cooperates with various Governments, international, regional and subregional organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) on organizing outreach activities, including to industry and academia, to raise awareness of the

requirements of resolution 1540 (2004) and to facilitate assistance to Member States, at their request, in building capacity and drafting legislation to enhance the implementation of the resolution.

267. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, the mission works with other relevant United Nations organizations and agencies, such as UNODC, the Office of Counter-Terrorism, the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, IAEA and others, to exchange information on activities relevant to resolution 1540 (2004), plan and organize joint outreach and capacity-building events and facilitate assistance to Member States, at their request.

Programme performance in 2019 against planned result

268. A planned result for 2019, which is improved interaction with and among Member States, including by enhancing synergies of relevant United Nations system entities and cooperation with other international organizations, as referred to in the report of the Secretary-General on estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council for 2019 for thematic cluster II (A/73/352/Add.2), was achieved, as evidenced by 59 outreach events organized, facilitated and/or participated by the mission in 2019, which exceeded the target of 40.

Programme performance in 2019: comprehensive review of the status of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004)


269. In resolution 1977 (2011), the Security Council tasked the Committee with conducting a comprehensive review of the status of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) prior to the expiration of its mandate on 25 April 2021.
270. The work of the mission during the reporting period was carried out against the background of the preparations for the upcoming comprehensive review and the plan to hold at least two additional Committee meetings to receive input and proposals by relevant stakeholders with regard to enhancing the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004).
271. In this context, in addition to its regular working meetings, in October 2019, the mission supported the Committee in organizing open consultations with Member States and international and regional organizations on the specificity of States. Prior to the consultations, Member States were invited to submit their views regarding a working paper produced by the mission on a possible approach to implementation and reporting that takes into account the specificity of States with respect to their ability to manufacture and export weapons of mass destruction-related materials, with a view to prioritizing efforts and resources where they are most needed, without affecting the need for the comprehensive implementation of resolution 1540 (2004).
272. Furthermore, the Committee organized a second meeting in preparation of the comprehensive review with invited international and regional organizations on cooperation and coordination at the expert level dealing with the accounting and securing of weapons of mass destruction-related materials in the context of resolution 1540 (2004).

Progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

273. This work contributed to the prevention of non-State actors from developing, acquiring, manufacturing, possessing, transporting, transferring or using nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, as demonstrated by the provision to Member States at 12 meetings of relevant information and proposals for measures to enhance the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004).

Figure III

Performance measure: number of meetings during which information and proposals for measures to enhance the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) were provided, 2015–2019



Planned result for 2021: technical cooperation projects to enhance the capacity of States to fully implement resolution 1540 (2004)

274. To strengthen the Committee's assistance mechanism, the mission will increase the number of technical cooperation projects with Member States and international and regional organizations that will contribute to enhancing the capacity of States and the number of national measures implemented to fulfil their obligations under the resolution. These projects will comprise activities to match assistance requests by States with offers of assistance by prospective assistance providers, the organization of national capacity-building events and workshops in support of the development of national implementation action plans and first or additional implementation reports to the Committee.

Internal challenge and response


275. The challenge for the Committee was the limited capacity of the mission to handle the increased workload in the preparation for the comprehensive review, given that the mission faced increasing demands from Member States to support their implementation, monitoring and reporting activities, as evidenced by 59 activities facilitated, organized and participated in 2019, exceeding the previously planned target of 40. The initial process of the review, including the review process of the implementation status of all 193 Member States, also began in 2019, which added to the workload of the mission. In response, the mission strengthened cooperation with its partners and organized joint and cost-shared activities that allowed the alleviation of some administrative and financial burdens of the mission, while ensuring quality deliverables for Member States and the Committee. The mission further worked to maximize virtual and back-to-back missions of staff and experts in its efforts to efficiently and effectively make use of its limited capacity to meet increasing demands.

Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

276. This work is expected to contribute to the prevention of non-State actors from developing, acquiring, manufacturing, possessing, transporting, transferring or using nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, which would be demonstrated by the submission of first reports by Member States that have not yet done so and the submission of voluntary national implementation action plans by Member States to the Committee, with a target of 46.

Figure IV

Performance measure: submission of voluntary national implementation action plans by Member States to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004)



Deliverables

277. Table 60 lists all deliverables, by category and subcategory, for the period 2019–2021 that contributed and are expected to contribute to the attainment of the objective stated above.

Table 60

Support to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction: deliverables for the period 2019–2021, by category and subcategory

Category and subcategory	2019 planned	2019 actual	2020 planned	2021 planned
A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
Parliamentary documentation (number of documents)	2	2	3	2
1. Annual programme of work of the Committee for the Security Council	1	1	1	1
2. Annual review of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) for the Security Council	1	1	1	1
3. Final document on the comprehensive review of the status of implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) for the Security Council	–	–	1	–
Substantive services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	12	12	12	12
4. Meetings of the Committee	4	4	4	4
5. Meetings of the working groups of the Committee	8	8	8	8
B. Generation and transfer of knowledge				
Field and technical cooperation projects (number of projects)	10	10	10	12
6. Assistance missions to Member States on legislative measures for the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), at State's invitation	3	3	3	5
7. Round tables with Member States in support of the submission of national implementation reports to the Committee, at State's invitation	2	2	2	2
8. Missions to Member States to support the development of resolution 1540 (2004) national implementation action plans, at State's invitation	5	5	5	5
Seminars, workshops and training events (number of days)	3	3	3	3
9. Regional workshops on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004)	2	2	2	2
10. Training for resolution 1540 (2004) points of contact of Member States	1	1	1	1

Category and subcategory	2019 planned	2019 actual	2020 planned	2021 planned
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C. Substantive deliverables

Consultation, advice and advocacy: open consultations of the Security Council on resolution 1540 (2004) and advice through country-specific visits on the implementation of the resolution, at invitation of Member States.

Databases and substantive digital materials: maintenance of database on requests for assistance for the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), on national implementation reports and on national matrices for resolution 1540 (2004).

D. Communication deliverables

Outreach programmes, special events and information materials: organization of and presentations at outreach events on preventing non-State actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction in the context of resolution 1540 (2004), including addressing civil society, such as academia and industry.

Digital platforms and multimedia content: updates to and maintenance of the website of the Committee.

B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2021

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 61

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2019	2020	2021		Variance
	Expenditure	Appropriation	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	2021 vs. 2020 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(3)-(2)
Civilian personnel costs	842.8	842.4	773.1	—	(69.3)
Operational costs	1 626.3	2 126.9	2 238.9	21.0	112.0
Total (net of staff assessment)	2 469.1	2 969.3	3 012.0	21.0	42.7

Table 62

Positions

	Professional and higher categories									General Service and related categories		National staff				United Nations Volunteers	Total
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Subtotal	Field/ Security Service	General Service	Total inter-national	National Professional Officer	Local level			
Approved 2019	—	—	—	—	1	—	2	—	3	—	2	5	—	—	—	—	5
Proposed 2020	—	—	—	—	1	—	2	—	3	—	2	5	—	—	—	—	5
Change	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

^a Other level, unless otherwise specified.

278. The proposed resource requirements for the mission for 2021 amount to \$3,012,000 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for salaries and common staff costs (\$773,100) for the continuation of five positions (1 P-5, 2 P-3 and 2 General Service) to provide substantive and administrative support to the Committee; and operational costs (\$2,238,900) comprising expert fees (\$1,671,200) and travel (\$137,700) of the nine experts of the Committee, official travel of the members of the

Committee and staff (\$97,800), facilities and infrastructure (\$240,200) and communications and information technology (\$92,000).

279. In 2021, it is proposed that the number and levels of positions for the mission remain unchanged. A vacancy rate of 5 per cent has been applied to the staff costs.
280. The increase in the requirements proposed for 2021 compared with the appropriation for 2020 is attributable primarily to increased requirements under: (a) facilities and infrastructure, owing to the increase in the cost of rental of premises; and (b) official travel, owing to the higher number of proposed trips. The increase is offset in part by reduced requirements under civilian personnel costs, owing to the application of a 5 per cent vacancy rate for 2021, compared with the assumption of full incumbency approved in 2020, and to the application of a lower percentage of common staff costs based on recent expenditure patterns.

Extrabudgetary resources

281. In 2020, extrabudgetary resources in the amount of \$1,000,000 will be used to organize or support a number of activities relating to resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#).
282. In 2021, extrabudgetary resources in the amount of \$1,000,000 are projected to be used to organize or support a number of activities relating to resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#), including country visits, the facilitation of the participation of Member States in events relating to the resolution, including in regional workshops, the preparation of national action plans and related country-specific activities, the facilitation of national capacity-building in implementing specific requirements of resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#), regional outreach meetings and the training of national points of contact.

14. Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate

(\$11,143,700)

Foreword

The threats posed by terrorism and violent extremism continue to undermine international peace and security. Countering those threats remains a priority concern of the Security Council, the Counter-Terrorism Committee and its Executive Directorate. The year 2021 will mark the twentieth anniversary of the adoption of Council resolution [1373 \(2001\)](#). This anniversary will provide an opportunity to take stock of what has been achieved, identify what more remains to be done and decide how best to proceed in the coming years. Over the past two decades, we have witnessed a considerable evolution in the terrorist landscape, and this has required us to adapt and respond in creative and innovative ways. As the terrorist threat has evolved, so too have the assessment practices of the Executive Directorate and its recommendations to Member States. For the past 15 years, the Executive Directorate has assessed the implementation by Member States of their counter-terrorism obligations, providing advice and recommendations on ways to increase their capacities to prevent terrorist attacks, respond to threats and bring terrorists to justice. At the Executive Directorate, we work closely with Member States, other United Nations entities, international and regional organizations, civil society, academia and the private sector to address those threats, trends and challenges. We strive to stay ahead of the curve and to think creatively, and we focus on outcomes and impact.

The Executive Directorate seeks to address the evolution in the threats posed by terrorism and violent extremism through innovative approaches. One such approach includes our global initiative on access to digital evidence across borders, through which we have collaborated with United Nations entities and international and regional organizations to co-organize regional and national workshops around the world on enhancing cooperation and strengthening capacity in obtaining digital evidence from Internet service providers in countering terrorism. The aim of the workshops is to enhance the capacity of central authorities, prosecutors and investigators to request, preserve and obtain electronic evidence through international cooperation, with the objective of bringing terrorists to justice. Preventing and suppressing the financing of terrorism and identifying and addressing the links between terrorism and organized crime are further areas in which the Executive Directorate continues to identify innovative approaches.

The Executive Directorate remains a unique body in the United Nations counter-terrorism architecture, through its mandate and capacity to assess the implementation endeavours of Member States, facilitate the delivery of technical assistance for capacity-building, promote the relevant international standards, codes and good practices, and contribute expertise and support to the counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism agenda of the Security Council, the Committee and the entire United Nations community.

Working closely with partner organizations to help to provide support for Member States in their fight against terrorism has always featured prominently in the work of the Executive Directorate. In 2019, it supported Member States in the Lake Chad Basin region in adopting comprehensive and tailored prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration strategies, working closely with a number of regional bodies, including the Lake Chad Basin Governors' Forum for regional cooperation on stabilization, peacebuilding and sustainable development. As direct results of that work, Member States have reduced the backload of criminal cases involving individuals formerly associated with Boko Haram, Cameroon has established a national commission on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and Chad has recently adopted a regulation on the creation of a centre to host individuals formerly associated with Boko Haram who have surrendered.

Despite these and many other achievements, much remains to be done. We shall continue to work collectively with our partners to ensure a whole-of-United Nations, whole-of-Government and whole-of-society approach that takes into consideration both hard and soft measures, to be implemented both vertically and horizontally. In our efforts to further develop and refine policy and guidance on counter-terrorism issues, it is essential that we continue to engage closely with Governments, United Nations entities, civil society partners and the private sector to assess capacities, identify good practices and facilitate the provision of technical assistance where needed.

(Signed) Michèle Coninsx
Executive Director, Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate

A. Proposed programme plan for 2021 and programme performance for 2019

Overall orientation

Mandates and background

283. The Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate is responsible for supporting the Counter-Terrorism Committee in its work to monitor, promote and facilitate the implementation by Member States of the relevant Council resolutions on terrorism. The mandate derives from resolution [1373 \(2001\)](#) and from subsequent ones, including [1377 \(2001\)](#), [1535 \(2004\)](#), [1566 \(2004\)](#), [1624 \(2005\)](#), [1787 \(2007\)](#), [1805 \(2008\)](#), [1963 \(2010\)](#), [2017 \(2011\)](#), [2129 \(2013\)](#), [2133 \(2014\)](#), [2160 \(2014\)](#), [2161 \(2014\)](#), [2170 \(2014\)](#), [2178 \(2014\)](#), [2185 \(2014\)](#), [2195 \(2014\)](#), [2220 \(2015\)](#), [2242 \(2015\)](#), [2253 \(2015\)](#), [2309 \(2016\)](#), [2322 \(2016\)](#), [2331 \(2016\)](#), [2341 \(2017\)](#), [2354 \(2017\)](#), [2368 \(2017\)](#), [2370 \(2017\)](#), [2388 \(2017\)](#), [2395 \(2017\)](#), [2396 \(2017\)](#), [2462 \(2019\)](#) and [2482 \(2019\)](#). The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy also sets forth several tasks for the Executive Directorate with respect to facilitating the delivery of technical assistance and promoting good counter-terrorism practices. By its resolution [2395 \(2017\)](#), on threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts, the Council extended the mandate of the Executive Directorate until 2021.
284. The constant evolution of the terrorist threat and the increasingly global virtual outreach of terrorist networks remain significant concerns for Member States. Both Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida have demonstrated the ability to evolve, adapt and reinvent themselves when under pressure from counter-terrorism measures. In response to its recent territorial losses, Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh) is seeking to regain momentum and will continue to exploit unresolved conflicts, as well as ethnic, religious, political and socioeconomic turbulence, to achieve its goals. The return and relocation of foreign terrorist fighters and their family members from the conflict zones of the Middle East also presents States with a number of major challenges, including the need to identify ways to deal effectively with such individuals, while also ensuring protection of international human rights law and the need to develop effective prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration strategies, as well as programmes to prevent their further radicalization and recruitment, including in prisons. The demands of Member States for technical assistance in these areas continue to grow. The promotion of international standards, codes and effective and good practices remains crucial to our efforts to assist Member States in addressing these emerging threats and challenges.

Programme of work

Objective

285. The objective, to which this mission contributes, is to enhance and consolidate Member States' counter-terrorism policies, institutions and operations, by ensuring the full implementation of resolution [1373 \(2001\)](#) by Member States, and inform the efforts of the United Nations to provide capacity-building and technical assistance.

Strategy

286. To contribute to the full implementation of resolution [1373 \(2001\)](#) by Member States and assisting in identifying and addressing gaps in implementation and capacity, the Executive Directorate will undertake assessments of Member States' implementation of resolution [1373 \(2001\)](#) and subsequent resolutions, both through assessment visits and through assessment tools such as the e-DIS (detailed implementation survey), and make technical recommendations to Member States on the ways to strengthen their implementation. The Executive Directorate will engage closely with the Office of

Counter-Terrorism and other partners to facilitate the delivery of technical assistance aimed at implementing its recommendations. This work is expected to result in the strengthening of capacities of Member States to combat terrorism and to achieve the full implementation of resolution 1373 (2001), while respecting human rights and humanitarian and refugee law. Past results in this area include a considerable number of recommendations, which have been endorsed by the Counter-Terrorism Committee and implemented by Member States. The Executive Directorate's global implementation surveys demonstrate a continued trend towards increased implementation of resolution 1373 (2001) and subsequent resolutions by Member States.

287. To contribute to the improved alignment of United Nations technical assistance and capacity-building with gaps in implementation and capacity relating to the requirements of resolution 1373 (2001) and subsequent Security Council resolutions, identified by the Executive Directorate and supporting balanced implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, the Executive Directorate will continue to build its partnerships with United Nations entities, in particular the Office of Counter-Terrorism; UNODC, the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team pursuant to resolutions 1526 (2004) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities, international and regional organizations, academia, civil society, the private sector and the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact. The Executive Directorate will continue to prioritize relations and partnerships with other United Nations entities using its comparative advantage as the expert assessment body for the Council and the Counter-Terrorism Committee. The Executive Directorate's technical expertise will contribute to the overall capacity-building efforts of the United Nations system. This work is expected to result in the strengthening of the capacity of Member States to build resilience to terrorism and violent extremism among all sectors of society. Past results in this area include the Executive Directorate's contribution of technical expertise to the Office of Counter-Terrorism in its work to design the United Nations Countering Terrorist Travel Programme, the development of its technical assistance programme on the freezing of terrorist assets pertaining to resolution 1373 (2001) and its provision of technical advice within the framework of the work of the Global Counter-Terrorism Compact to develop guidance and advise Member States on developing national comprehensive and integrated counter-terrorism strategies.
288. To contribute to identifying and assessing issues, trends and developments relating to the implementation of resolutions 1373 (2001), 1624 (2005), 2178 (2014) and other relevant resolutions, and to advise the Counter-Terrorism Committee on practical ways for Member States to implement resolutions 1373 (2001), 1624 (2005), 2178 (2014) and other relevant resolutions, the Executive Directorate will draft analytical materials, reference tools and guidelines and promote international standards and codes and best practices. This work is expected to result in the strengthening of the capacity of Member States to operationalize their obligations pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) by facilitating acceptance and understanding of the international best practices, techniques and tools available to combat terrorism. Past results in this area include the protection of critical infrastructure against terrorist attacks: Compendium of good practices; the guidelines to facilitate the use and admissibility of military evidence; the report on the links between human trafficking and terrorism, including its financing, prepared pursuant to Council resolution 2388 (2017); the revision of the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards; and the provision of support to the Counter-Terrorism Committee in organizing a number of open briefings to Member States on a broad range of thematic issues.

External factors for 2021

289. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2021 is based on the following assumptions:
 - (a) The consent of Member States to receive assessment visits;
 - (b) The ability to organize and conduct visits/assessments in accordance with United Nations safety and security measures (i.e., the visiting delegation is able to complete its tasks in a safe environment);

- (c) The ability to co-arrange with partners events and activities aimed at promoting the relevant international standards, codes and best practices, as well as the policy guidance of the Counter-Terrorism Committee.
- 290. The Executive Directorate integrates a gender perspective into its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate. This includes, among others, strengthening the evidence base on gendered drivers of radicalization and the development of gender-sensitive guidance on the response, including in the context of returning and relocating foreign terrorist fighters and their family members. The Executive Directorate will continue to strengthen its dialogue and engagement with Member States, civil society and the research community on gender-related issues, trends and developments.
- 291. With regard to cooperation with other entities, the Executive Directorate will continue to develop or strengthen private-public partnerships aimed at assisting States in dealing with online terrorist content and in protecting critical infrastructures and “soft” targets against terrorist attacks; leverage its Global Research Network to bring together policymakers and researchers from around the world; and engage and enhance its partnerships with international, regional and subregional organizations, civil society organizations, think tanks and academic organizations in order to assist the Counter-Terrorism Committee in identifying national, regional and thematic challenges, developments and trends.
- 292. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, the Executive Directorate works with other United Nations entities within the framework of the Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact to facilitate, through its expertise and recommendations, the effective delivery of technical assistance and capacity-building to Member States; collaborates with the Office of Counter-Terrorism and UNODC on relevant issues (e.g., addressing Member States’ prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration strategies of suspected terrorists, including foreign terrorist fighters and their family members); and works closely with other Security Council subsidiary bodies and their expert groups to enhance information-sharing, plan and organize joint special meetings (e.g., on the linkages between organized crime and terrorism), coordinate visits to Member States and cooperate in other ways to assess Member States’ implementation of the relevant Council resolutions.

Programme performance in 2019 against planned result

- 293. A planned result for 2019, which is improved capacity of Member States to implement Security Council resolutions [1373 \(2001\)](#), [1624 \(2005\)](#), [2178 \(2014\)](#) and [2396 \(2017\)](#), as referred to in the report of the Secretary-General on estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council for 2019 for thematic cluster II ([A/73/352/Add.2](#)), was achieved, as evidenced by the 167 recommendations made by the Counter-Terrorism Committee to ensure compliance with the relevant resolutions, exceeding the target of 160. In addition, the actual number of recommendations made by the Executive Directorate and agreed upon by Member States was 78, exceeding the target of 60.
- 294. A planned result for 2019, which is the provision of comprehensive guidance to Member States on the implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions and the relevant provisions of the General Assembly counter-terrorism resolutions, as referred to in the proposed budget for 2019, was achieved, as evidenced by 65 workshops/seminars, against a target of 60, facilitated by the Executive Directorate, together with United Nations entities and international, regional and subregional organizations, to develop national or regional counter-terrorism capacities.

Programme performance in 2019: Member States take significant steps towards countering terrorism, based on Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate recommendations

- 295. In 2019, the Executive Directorate, acting on behalf of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, conducted 16 visits to Member States to assess their implementation of resolution [1373 \(2001\)](#) and subsequent Security Council resolutions.


296. Throughout their visits, the Executive Directorate delegations conducted numerous on-site visits to relevant institutions and bodies and met with a range of government offices and law-enforcement officials to discuss a broad range of issues, including legal and criminal justice reform and countering terrorism financing. The Executive Directorate's reports on the assessments contained a number of recommendations for the relevant Governments aimed at strengthening their implementation of resolution 1373 (2001) and other relevant resolutions, and identified a number of areas in which the Member States concerned would benefit from receiving technical assistance from their partners to effectively implement those recommendations.

Progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

297. This work contributed to the full implementation of resolution 1373 (2001) and subsequent Security Council resolutions, as demonstrated by all 16 Member States visited receiving recommendations on implementing their counter-terrorism obligations. All Member States concerned began to implement the Executive Directorate's recommendations. A good example of the impact of those recommendations was the creation of dedicated financial investigations units within existing law enforcement structures to complement the existing legal and institutional mechanisms working to identify and address issues of corruption, money-laundering and terrorism financing. This enhanced their compliance with the requirements contained in relevant Council resolutions, in particular 2462 (2019). Following the visits, the Executive Directorate and the Office of Counter-Terrorism conducted "deep dive" missions to some Member States to assist them in fulfilling specific requirements in the area of border control set forth in Council resolutions, in particular 2178 (2014) and 2396 (2017), developing road maps to advance implementation.

Figure V

Performance measure: number of Member States receiving assessment visits, 2015–2019



Programme performance in 2019: Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate leads the way in guiding Member States on “military evidence”

298. An integral part of the international community's efforts to counter terrorism is bringing the perpetrators of terrorist acts to justice. For this purpose, prosecutors and courts need evidence that is admissible in accordance with the rules of evidence and procedure of their courts. In conflict or post-conflict situations, however, investigators and prosecutors face challenges in ensuring that evidence is collected and retained in a manner that will ensure its admissibility in proceedings. Moreover, there may be insufficient or non-existent civilian investigatory capacity in the State in which the terrorist acts are occurring and/or no capacity to provide mutual legal assistance between the Government and foreign authorities. Addressing this situation is especially urgent in view of the number of foreign terrorist fighters who have fled or are seeking to flee the conflict zones in which they perpetrated the terrorist acts.


299. In 2019, the Executive Directorate launched the guidance document, “Guidelines to facilitate the use and admissibility as evidence in national criminal courts of information collected, handled, preserved and shared by the military to prosecute terrorist offences” (“military evidence guidelines”). Based on several sources, including international law and Member States’ practices, the guidance is designed to provide Member States with the information required to ensure that foreign terrorist fighters who have committed crimes, including those returning or relocating from conflict zones, may be investigated and, where appropriate, prosecuted. Although the foreign terrorist fighter phenomenon provided the initial impetus for the development of this guidance, its applicability extends well beyond Iraq, the Syrian Arab Republic and the foreign terrorist fighter phenomenon. The guidelines are intended to serve as a basis for discussion and to illustrate the issues that will need to be comprehensively addressed at the national level by national authorities responsible for determining and enforcing the criteria for the admissibility of evidence in national criminal proceedings.

Progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

300. This work contributed to enhancing the capacity of Member States to ensure full implementation of resolution 1373 (2001) and subsequent Security Council resolutions, as demonstrated by the provision of five clear guidelines addressed to international policymakers, national policymakers, national law enforcement and criminal justice authorities, international judicial and police organizations, and militaries. The guidelines will assist Member States in developing their domestic policies and legal frameworks on this matter. The Executive Directorate has therefore provided a starting point for discussions that will strengthen the capacity of Member States to operationalize their obligations pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) by improving the collection, handling, preservation and sharing of relevant information and evidence obtained, as called for by the Council in its resolution 2396 (2017). The resulting discussions ultimately contribute to facilitating acceptance and understanding of international best practices, techniques and tools available in this area.

Figure VI

Performance measure: number of technical materials providing guidance to Member States on the implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions, 2015–2019



Planned results for 2021

Result 1: assisting Member States in identifying and addressing implementation and capacity gaps in accordance with the requirements of resolution 1373 (2001) and subsequent Security Council resolutions

301. The Security Council, in its resolution 2395 (2017), tasked the Executive Directorate with identifying and addressing gaps in the implementation by Member States of resolution 1373 (2001) and subsequent resolutions. As the terrorist threat continues to evolve, Member States with capacity gaps will continue to require technical assistance in order to respond to new threats and challenges, meet international standards and work to achieve full compliance with their counter-terrorism obligations.
302. The Executive Directorate will continue to refine its assessment methodologies, in consultation with the Counter-Terrorism Committee. Its assessments take the form of desk-based reviews of Member States (detailed implementation survey and overview of implementation assessment) and visits to Member States. The visiting delegations can employ a range of different methodologies, depending on the circumstances, including comprehensive assessments, follow-up assessments and specific “deep dive” analyses. The assessments led to the development of a set of recommendations for the visited Member States aimed at strengthening the implementation of their counter-terrorism obligations, the identification of best practices that may be useful to other Member States and the identification of technical assistance needs to address capacity gaps.

Internal challenge and response


303. The challenge for the Executive Directorate was the significant increase in the number of resolutions on counter-terrorism adopted by the Security Council. As terrorism continues to evolve and to threaten international peace and security in new ways, the number of resolutions imposing obligations on Member States has grown considerably over recent years. This has created a corresponding growth in the number of issues that the Executive Directorate must assess in order to measure the effective implementation of resolution 1373 (2001) and subsequent Council resolutions. In response, the Executive Directorate will continue to revise its assessment methodologies, in consultation with the Counter-Terrorism Committee, to make the most effective use of qualitative and quantitative data, including through the introduction of the new e-DIS.

Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

304. This work is expected to contribute to assisting Member States in identifying and addressing gaps in implementation and capacity, which would be demonstrated by the continued provision of recommendations to 15 Member States aimed at strengthening their implementation of resolution 1373 (2001) and subsequent Council resolutions. It would be further demonstrated by the continued facilitation of technical assistance by partners aimed at addressing capacity gaps identified in Executive Directorate assessments.

Figure VII

Performance measure: number of Member States receiving assessment visits, 2017–2021



Result 2: better alignment of United Nations technical assistance and capacity-building with implementation and capacity gaps relating to the requirements of resolution 1373 (2001) and subsequent Security Council resolutions identified by the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate and supporting balanced implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy

305. The Executive Directorate is the primary United Nations repository of counter-terrorism-related technical and legal expertise. Its experts represent a broad range of disciplines, including prosecution, legislative drafting, international law, law enforcement, border management, financial investigations, gender analysis, information technology and political analysis. The Executive Directorate is mandated to make this expertise available to the United Nations system, including to the Office on Counter-Terrorism, to provide technical advice on the design and implementation of United Nations programmes to implement the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.
306. The Executive Directorate will work with the Office on Counter-Terrorism and other implementing partners in supporting the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy by providing technical advice on the design and implementation of projects and programmes under pillar I (“Measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism”), pillar II (“Measures to prevent and combat terrorism”), pillar III (“Measures to build States’ capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the United Nations system in this regard”) and pillar IV (“Measures to ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism”) of the Strategy and will cooperate to facilitate the delivery of technical and capacity-building assistance to States in need and to raise awareness of the terrorist threat, including by engaging in dialogue with Member States and international and regional organizations, cooperating with technical assistance providers and promoting the sharing of information.

Internal challenge and response


307. The challenge for the Executive Directorate was to ensure ongoing fruitful cooperation and follow-up with relevant entities and bodies to facilitate the delivery of technical and capacity-building assistance to States in need, on the basis of Executive Directorate recommendations. In response, the Executive Directorate will work to strengthen and enhance transparency in its interaction with its partners regarding the implementation of its recommendations (with the consent of the relevant Member States), forge stronger relationships and partnerships to ensure a smooth process and build on established synergies through regular follow-up and expert subject-matter support.

Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

308. This work is expected to contribute to the balanced implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which would be demonstrated by 22 capacity-building workshops, meetings and events to which the Executive Directorate contributes its technical or legal expertise and advice, aimed at forging a common platform for coordination and collaboration.

Figure VIII

Performance measure: number of capacity-building workshops, meetings and events to which the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate contributed expertise, 2017–2021



Result 3: identification of trends and provision of advice on practical ways for Member States to implement resolution 1373 (2001) and subsequent Security Council resolutions

309. Whereas the Executive Directorate's mandate to assess Member States' implementation of resolution 1373 (2001) and subsequent Security Council resolutions is vertically focused on individual Member States, it is also mandated to horizontally focus on issues, trends and developments relating to the implementation of the relevant resolutions. Owing to the evolving nature of the terrorist threat, Member States require advice on best practices, international standards and emerging trends to ensure that they have up-to-date advice on implementing their obligations to combat terrorism and help to maintain international peace and security.
310. In order to achieve this, the Executive Directorate plans to deepen its engagement and partnership with United Nations entities, international and regional organizations, academia, civil society and the private sector to draft and promote international standards and reference tools such as best practices, guidelines and recommendations. It will also highlight new trends, issues, developments and challenges relating to terrorism. In particular, the Executive Directorate, as the Chair of the Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact Working Group on Border Management and Law Enforcement relating to Counter-Terrorism, will lead a joint project on developing guidelines for Member States to facilitate the implementation of Security Council resolution 2370 (2017) and the relevant international standards and good practices on preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons. The Executive Directorate will also play a lead role, in accordance with Council resolution 2396 (2017), in coordinating the United Nations position and contributions to the Global Counter-terrorism Forum watch-listing guidance manual initiative. It will also strengthen the evidence base on the drivers of female radicalization to terrorism and the impact of counter-terrorism strategies on women's human rights by gathering and disseminating gender-sensitive research and holding relevant research-focused events with the participation of women's civil society representatives and researchers. Furthermore, the Executive Directorate will prepare a global report on the state of international and multi-stakeholder cooperation, as well as legislative developments and good practices in the collection and use of digital evidence in cross-border counter-terrorism investigations, pursuant to Council resolutions 2322 (2015) and 2396 (2016) and the Guiding principles on foreign terrorist fighters (Madrid Guiding Principles).

Internal challenge and response


311. The challenge for the Executive Directorate was that the identification of trends requires it to engage with as many partners as possible so that it obtains sufficiently comprehensive and diverse views concerning the most recent trends. This requires it to participate in a sufficient number of events and conduct a sufficient number of assessment visits annually to obtain a good understanding of global trends. In response, the Executive Directorate will invest more in deepening its partnerships with implementing partners, researchers and think tanks, as well as in its communications efforts.

Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

312. This work is expected to contribute to the provision of advice to the Counter-Terrorism Committee on practical ways for Member States to implement resolutions [1373 \(2001\)](#), [1624 \(2005\)](#), [2178 \(2014\)](#) and other relevant Security Council resolutions, which would be demonstrated by five Executive Directorate publications, guiding principles, compendiums of best practices and other practical guides developed for Member States to help them to strengthen their compliance with their obligations pursuant to the relevant Council resolutions on terrorism.

Figure IX

Performance measure: number of technical materials providing guidance to Member States on the implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions, 2017–2021

**Deliverables**

313. Table 63 lists all deliverables, by category and subcategory, for the period 2019–2021 that contributed and are expected to contribute to the attainment of the objective stated above.

Table 63

Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate: deliverables for the period 2019–2021, by category and subcategory

Category and subcategory	2019 planned	2019 actual	2020 planned	2021 planned
A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
Substantive services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	18	16	18	20
1. Meetings of the Counter-Terrorism Committee	12	12	12	12
2. Briefings to Member States	6	4	6	8
B. Generation and transfer of knowledge				
Technical materials (number of materials)	3	5	3	4
3. Reports on trends and developments related to the implementation of Security Council resolutions on counter-terrorism	3	5	3	4
C. Substantive deliverables				
Consultation, advice and advocacy: facilitation of technical assistance delivery and capacity-building activities relating to the implementation of all relevant United Nations counter-terrorism resolutions and development of guidelines for Member States to assist them in responding to new and emerging challenges.				
Fact-finding, monitoring and investigation missions: assessment visits on the implementation of Security Council resolutions on counter-terrorism.				
Databases and substantive digital materials: database of contacts for third-party terrorist-asset-freezing requests and database on stocktaking of Member States' implementation of Security Council resolutions on counter-terrorism.				

Category and subcategory	2019 planned	2019 actual	2020 planned	2021 planned
D. Communication deliverables				
External and media relations: factsheets, folders, publications and flash drives to distribute to Member States, the media, civil society and non-governmental organizations to promote the work of the Committee and the Executive Directorate.				
Digital platforms and multimedia content: maintenance and updating of the Committee's website, newsletter and all social media platforms.				

B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2021

314. In its resolution 2462 (2019), the Security Council requested the Executive Directorate to strengthen its assessment process relating to countering the financing of terrorism. The Council also requested it to provide, annually, a thematic summary assessment of gaps identified and areas requiring more action to implement key counterterrorism financing provisions of relevant Council resolutions for the purpose of designing targeted technical assistance and capacity-building efforts, and to ensure that it allocated the necessary resources to carry out these tasks.
315. Pursuant to such requests, the Executive Directorate will strengthen its capacity and the provision of expertise in 2021, through the addition of two proposed positions, and targeted and focused follow-up visits to support Member States.

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 64

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2019	2020	2021		Variance
	Expenditure	Appropriation	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	2021 vs. 2020 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(3)-(2)
Civilian personnel costs	8 593.7	8 948.2	8 726.3	–	(221.9)
Operational costs	1 981.9	2 199.2	2 417.4	125.2	218.2
Total (net of staff assessment)	10 575.6	11 147.4	11 143.7	125.2	(3.7)

Table 65

Positions

	Professional and higher categories								General Service and related categories		National staff					Total
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Subtotal	Field/ Security Service	General Service ^a	Total international	National Professional Officer	Local level	United Nations Volunteers	
Approved 2020	–	1	1	2	9	19	7	3	42	–	8	50	–	–	–	50
Proposed 2021	–	1	1	2	9	20	8	3	44	–	8	52	–	–	–	52
Change	–	–	–	–	–	1	1	–	2	–	–	2	–	–	–	2

^a Comprising one Principal level and seven Other level.

316. The proposed resource requirements for the Executive Directorate for 2021 amount to \$11,143,700 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for salaries and common staff costs (\$8,726,300) for the continuation of 50 positions (1 Assistant Secretary-General, 1 D-2, 2 D-1, 9 P-5, 19 P-4, 7 P-3, 3 P-2 and 8 General Service) and the proposed establishment of 2 positions (1 P-4 and 1 P-3) to provide substantive support to the Executive Directorate, and operational costs (\$2,417,400) comprising official travel of staff members of the Executive Directorate (\$1,160,400), facilities and infrastructure (\$1,027,000), communications and information technology (\$218,100), and other supplies and services (\$11,900).
317. In 2021, it is proposed that two positions, comprising one position of Legal Officer (P-4) and one position of Political Affairs Officer (P-3) be established, as explained below. A vacancy rate of 5 per cent has been applied to the estimates for the existing positions and a vacancy rate of 50 per cent has been applied to the estimates for the two proposed new positions:
- (a) Legal Officer (P-4): the Security Council, in its resolution [2462 \(2019\)](#), requested the Executive Directorate to strengthen its assessment process relating to countering the financing of terrorism. The proposed position will provide the Executive Directorate with the required technical expertise that it currently does not have, in the areas of financial intelligence units, conduct of financial investigations, appraisal of the cooperation between private and public sector entities in identifying possible vulnerable economic sectors to terrorist financing, and identifying good practices and possible emerging trends and integrating them into the Directorate's assessment and analytical work;
 - (b) Political Affairs Officer (P-3): the Security Council, also in its resolution [2462 \(2019\)](#), requested the Directorate to provide a thematic summary assessment of gaps identified and areas requiring more action to implement key counterterrorism financing provisions of relevant Council resolutions. The proposed position will strengthen the Executive Directorate's capacity in supporting the Counter-Terrorism Committee in its coordinated efforts with its partners, including members of the Office on Counter-Terrorism, UNODC and the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team pursuant to resolutions [1526 \(2004\)](#) and [2253 \(2015\)](#) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities, reviewing and designing adequate technical assistance programmes, facilitating targeted and focused follow-up visits and developing data collection and analysis to support the production of the mandated thematic summary.
318. The decrease in the requirements proposed for 2021 compared with the appropriation for 2020 is attributable primarily to lower requirements under civilian personnel costs owing to the application of a lower percentage of common staff costs based on recent expenditure patterns and the revision of average staff costs based on the within-grade steps of current incumbents. The variance is offset in part by increased requirement under facilities and infrastructure owing to an increase in the cost of rental of premises and the one-time provision for the relocation costs for the proposed new office accommodation.

Extrabudgetary resources

319. In 2020, extrabudgetary resources in the estimated amount of \$1,822,700 will be used to support Executive Directorate activities and relevant initiatives aimed at promoting the implementation of Security Council resolutions [1373 \(2001\)](#), [1624 \(2005\)](#), [2178 \(2014\)](#) and [2396 \(2017\)](#).
320. In 2021, the Executive Directorate will continue to use extrabudgetary resources in the estimated amount of \$774,600 to organize several new and follow-up workshops in various regions of the world in accordance with the programme of work approved by the Counter-Terrorism Committee, conduct research on strategic, political, legal, institutional and security issues related to information and communication technology and counter-terrorism, and support international cooperation in counter-terrorism.

15. United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da'esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant

(\$25,106,600)

Foreword

I am pleased to submit the proposed 2021 budget for the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da'esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant.

As reflected in this submission, 2019 represented a year of significant progress for the Investigative Team, with more than 120 staff members in place and the core infrastructural and policy framework governing our work established. Evidence-collection activities in locations across Iraq, including Mosul, Tikrit, Dahuk and Sinjar, have moved forward rapidly. This is reflected in the excavation of mass grave sites in the village of Kocho, the digitization of documentary evidence held by national courts in Tallkayf, Mosul, and the collection of testimonial material in internal displacement camps in the village of Khanke, Dahuk. The Investigative Team remains grateful for the crucial cooperation and collaboration of Iraqi national authorities as partners in the delivery of this work.

The 2021 budget reflects both the progress made to date by the Investigative Team and the essential further adaptations to its structure and staffing needed to allow us to continue to deliver effectively on the mandate provided by the Security Council.

Driving our sense of purpose, and central always to the focus of our work, has been our engagement with affected communities, religious groups and survivors. Their message to us remains clear: members of Da'esh must be held accountable for their crimes. The establishment of the Investigative Team represented a promise to these survivors by the international community that their demands will be met with action. As we look towards 2021, it is this sense of urgency that will continue to guide our work.

(Signed) Karim Asad Ahmad **Khan**
Special Adviser and Head of the United Nations Investigative Team to
Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da'esh/
Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant

A. Proposed programme plan for 2021 and programme performance for 2019

Overall orientation

Mandates and background

321. The United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da'esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant is responsible for supporting domestic efforts to hold Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh) accountable for acts that may amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, by collecting, preserving and storing evidence in Iraq. The mandate is defined in Security Council resolution [2379 \(2017\)](#), which further provides that the Investigative Team must conduct its investigative activities to the highest possible standards, to ensure the broadest possible use before national courts and in complementing investigations being carried out by the Iraqi authorities, or by authorities in third countries at their request.
322. In addition, the Security Council underlined, through paragraph 3 of its resolution [2379 \(2017\)](#), that the Special Adviser and Head of the Investigative Team will also promote, throughout the world, accountability for acts that may amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide committed by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, and work with survivors, in a manner consistent with relevant national laws, to ensure that their interests in achieving accountability for Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant are fully recognized.
323. In 2019, the Investigative Team made the transition from its start-up phase to a fully operational entity, with more than 120 staff members now supporting its work, including investigators, legal officers, forensic specialists and witness protection officers. In parallel, key operating procedures, technological equipment and evidence management facilities have been established to facilitate the collection, storage and analysis of evidentiary material, in line with international standards. Harnessing the increased substantive and infrastructural capacity, the Investigative Team has expanded its investigative strategy to include a number of additional investigative priorities, ensuring that its focus and key objectives reflect the breadth of communities throughout Iraq that are affected by the crimes committed by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant.
324. In the first full year of its work, the Investigative Team has focused on targeted field-based activities in Sinjar, Mosul, Tikrit and other locations throughout Iraq, collecting key documentary, forensic and testimonial material capable of filling evidentiary gaps in support of domestic proceedings. Engagement with survivors and affected communities has remained central to these efforts, with the Investigative Team implementing advanced witness protection and support measures to ensure that even the most vulnerable members of Iraqi society are able to come forward with their accounts.
325. The provision of support by the Investigative Team to the Government of Iraq in pursuit of accountability has remained a key focus. Capacity-building and technical support has been provided in such fields as the excavation of mass graves, DNA analysis and evidence digitization. Cooperation with the Government has also been central to the effective conduct of investigative activities, as the Investigative Team has been able to draw on a wide range of existing documentary and digital material held by Iraqi national authorities in pursuit of its investigative priorities.
326. The Special Adviser has also continued his efforts, in line with paragraph 3 of resolution [2379 \(2017\)](#), to identify and highlight globally the key challenges faced by survivors seeking to contribute to accountability processes in relation to crimes committed by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. The Investigative Team has also sought to place emphasis on harnessing the collective voices of survivors to combat the global narrative of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and thereby expose the incoherent and illegitimate nature of the ideology underpinning its criminal activities. In that regard, the Special Adviser has met with communities throughout Iraq and participated in a range of events outside the country in order to demonstrate how survivors can be empowered and play a crucial role in accountability efforts by coming forward with their accounts.

Programme of work

Objective

327. The objective, to which this mission contributes, is to hold members of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh) accountable for acts that amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide, as proved in fair and independent criminal proceedings.

Strategy

328. To contribute to holding members of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant accountable for acts that amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide, as proved in fair and independent criminal proceedings, the Investigative Team will continue to collect documentary, forensic and testimonial evidence, in line with its investigative strategy, and in accordance with Security Council resolution [2379 \(2017\)](#) and the terms of reference regarding the activities of the Investigative Team in Iraq. This strategy is reflected in the second and third reports of the Special Adviser and Head of the Investigative Team to the Security Council (see [S/2019/407](#) and [S/2019/878](#)). The strategy will be adapted and expanded so as to enhance the ability of the Investigative Team to deliver effectively on its mandate and ensure that its investigative work addresses the crimes committed by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant against a broad range of communities in Iraq.
329. To contribute to holding Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant members accountable for acts that amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide, as proved in fair and independent criminal proceedings, the Investigative Team will continue to engage with key Iraqi national authorities in order to identify evidentiary material relevant to its mandate and digitize such evidence so as to allow for its integration into the evidentiary database of the Investigative Team. This work is expected to result in the expansion of the total evidentiary data lake of the Investigative Team that will, in turn, allow for the further strengthening of cases files in relation to individual Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant members and the ongoing refinement of investigative priorities. Past results in this area include the successful digitization and analysis of a wide range of documentation and digital items, including laptops and mobile phones, seized by Iraqi authorities from Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant.
330. To contribute to holding Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant members accountable for acts that amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide, as proved in fair and independent criminal proceedings, the Investigative Team will continue to expand the support that it provides to work led by key national authorities, including the Mass Graves Directorate of the Martyrs Foundation and the Medico-Legal Directorate of the Ministry of Health of Iraq, as well as in cooperation with the Kurdistan Regional Government. This work is expected to result in the increased collection of forensic evidence from mass grave sites in Iraq and the consequent return of remains to the families of victims. Past results in this area include the successful provision of support in relation to the excavation of mass grave sites relating to crimes committed against the Yazidi community in Sinjar, northern Iraq.
331. To contribute to holding Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant members accountable for acts that amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide, as proved in fair and independent criminal proceedings, the Investigative Team will continue to strengthen its ability to engage with the most vulnerable witnesses and survivors of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant crimes in Iraq. This work is expected to result in the collection of testimonial evidence from those who have not previously come forward with their accounts to any accountability mechanisms. Past results in this area include the collection of witness statements from vulnerable members of affected communities in northern Iraq in late 2019 and early in 2020.
332. In accordance with its investigative strategy, the Investigative Team will focus the work of its field investigation units on clear, objective investigative priorities. Building on those priorities identified in the second report of the Head of the Investigative Team to the Security Council, further

adjustments will be made to their substantive scope so as to ensure that the Investigative Team is able to effectively investigate crimes committed throughout Iraq, with a focus on those most responsible for their commission. The Investigative Team will also continue to ensure that it is able to support its medium-term structural investigations, while also retaining the operational capacity to respond rapidly to opportunities to support ongoing domestic proceedings through targeted shorter-term investigative and analytical work.

External factors for 2021

333. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2021 is based on the following planning assumptions:
 - (a) The international community continues to support the mandate and activities of the Investigative Team;
 - (b) The Government of Iraq continues to provide strong cooperation and support with respect to the work of the Investigative Team, as facilitated by the national coordinating committee designated by the Government;
 - (c) The Kurdistan Regional Government continues to provide strong cooperation and support with respect to the mandate and activities of the Investigative Team;
 - (d) The Investigative Team continues to receive strong support for its work among religious actors, community leaders and survivor groups;
 - (e) The field-based investigative activities of the Investigative Team continue to be facilitated by the National Operations Centre of the Office of the Prime Minister and other relevant national counterparts;
 - (f) The security situation remains broadly permissive with respect to the field investigative activities of the Investigative Team, allowing access to affected populations, key stakeholders and crime scenes, with appropriate security measures taken;
 - (g) Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant remains a security threat within Iraq, reflecting its ability to operate as a decentralized covert terrorist network and to conduct targeted attacks against elements viewed as hostile to its interests;
 - (h) Affected communities and survivors continue to publicly call for urgent action to be taken with respect to the investigation of crimes committed by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant against their communities.
334. The Investigative Team integrates a gender perspective in all its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate. On the basis of its engagement with victim groups and national authorities in 2019 and 2020, as well as the conduct of its investigative activities with respect to crimes of sexual and gender-based violence perpetrated by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant in Iraq, the Investigative Team will strengthen the role of the Sexual and Gender-based Crimes and Crimes against Children Unit within the Office of Field Investigations. Focus will be placed on ensuring that the Investigative Team is able to comprehensively investigate the practice of sexual enslavement and gender-based crimes perpetrated by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, in a manner complementary to the other investigative priorities of the Team. In doing so, and through the implementation of specialized measures led by its Witness Protection and Support Unit, the Investigative Team will encourage women and girls who have suffered sexual and gender-based crimes to come forward and engage with the Team.
335. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) will remain a key operational partner for the Investigative Team in 2021. In line with its mandate, the Investigative Team will continue to ensure that it maximizes efficiencies by leveraging the existing resources of UNAMI. A key step in this respect will be the continued embedding of positions for mission support staff posts within the UNAMI institutional structure, as appropriate,

and with the objective of ensuring the deployment of allocated resources in the most effective manner. Cost-sharing arrangements with respect to key operational costs, including use of vehicles and United Nations aviation capacity, will also continue to be implemented.

336. The Investigative Team will also continue to expand its cooperation with other key United Nations entities in order to ensure complementarity of effort and coherence of approach. This will include cooperation with United Nations entities so as to obtain information and material relevant to its investigative priorities, such as the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions [1267 \(1999\)](#), [1989 \(2011\)](#) and [2253 \(2015\)](#) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh) and Al-Qaeda and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, OHCHR and the United Nations Institute for Training and Research, in particular the Operational Satellite Applications Programme.
337. In order to strengthen its ability to align its work in the field of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant accountability with the activities of other United Nations entities, the Investigative Team will continue to engage proactively with UNODC, the Counter-Terrorism Committee and Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, the Office of Counter-Terrorism, the Office of the Special Representative for the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities, the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict and the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict. The Investigative Team will also continue to draw on the knowledge and expertise of the Mine Action Service.
338. In 2021, the Government of Iraq, the Iraqi judiciary and all elements of Iraqi society will continue to be crucial partners in the work of the Investigative Team. In this respect, the Investigative Team will further strengthen its cooperative modalities with the national coordinating committee designated by the Government and continue to develop operational cooperation with key national authorities. In support of its work in the collection of documentary, forensic and digital evidentiary material, the Investigative Team will seek to further strengthen cooperative and collaborative relationships with key national authorities and counterparts, including Iraqi courts and investigative judges, the Mass Graves Directorate of the Martyrs Foundation, the Medico-Legal Directorate of the Ministry of Health of Iraq, the Ministry of Defence and others. The National Operations Centre of the Office of the Prime Minister will, in particular, remain a crucial partner in the facilitation and support for the field-based investigative activities of the Investigative Team.
339. The intergovernmental task force, established by the Kurdistan Regional Government, comprising all relevant Regional Government entities and established to facilitate cooperation with the Investigative Team, will remain an important partner. The Investigative Team will also continue to strengthen its working relationships with individual relevant authorities of the Regional Government, including the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Martyrs and Anfal Affairs and the Counter-Terrorism Group.
340. The Investigative Team will also strengthen its efforts to engage with all communities in Iraq affected by the crimes of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, with a view to ensuring that the activities of the Team fully reflect their experiences and needs. This will include continued field visits to engage with religious leaders, affected communities, survivors and witnesses in areas such as Erbil, Tall Afar, Mosul, Ninawa plains, Anbar Province, Diyala Province and Salah al-Din Province.
341. Further work will also be undertaken in order to further strengthen the high-level support of national Governments with respect to the work of the Investigative Team. Consultations will be held, both in Baghdad and New York and in other international forums, with a view to identifying how Member States can further support the work of the Investigative Team, including through the secondment of national experts as government-provided personnel. Reflecting the fact that national authorities represent a crucial source of information and evidentiary material relevant to the investigative priorities of the Investigative Team, strengthened efforts will be undertaken to engage with Member States, with a view to facilitating the provision of relevant material to the Team. Where necessary, relevant supplementary legal architecture, in addition to the terms of reference, will be put in place

with Member States, including the conclusion of memorandums of understanding, so as to establish the legal and practical frameworks necessary to facilitate the transfer of such information.

342. In addition, in line with paragraph 3 of resolution [2379 \(2017\)](#), the Special Adviser will continue to engage with national authorities, through bilateral outreach activities and multilateral discussions, to identify common challenges and innovative solutions with respect to the investigation and prosecution of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant crimes globally. Emphasis will be placed on how the work of the Investigative Team can most effectively contribute to these efforts and how the interests of survivors can be fully recognized as part of domestic accountability processes.
343. With regard to cooperation with other entities, the Investigative Team will also continue to prioritize the development of relationships with international and regional organizations capable of providing support to the implementation of its mandate. Focus will be placed on entities that may serve as an effective entry point for cooperation with relevant national authorities that are in a position to provide information of relevance to its mandate, as well as those that are best placed to provide appropriate legal assistance and capacity-building to the Government of Iraq in order to strengthen its courts and judicial system, pursuant to paragraph 9 of resolution [2379 \(2017\)](#). Key entities in this regard will include the European Union, the African Union, the League of Arab States, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, INTERPOL and the International Commission on Missing Persons.
344. In accordance with the terms of reference regarding its activities in Iraq, the Investigative Team will also continue to strengthen relationships with NGOs and private sector bodies, with a view to benefiting from their expertise, gaining access to relevant evidentiary material and ensuring that the voices of all relevant parties are heard.

Evaluation activities

345. The following self-evaluations are planned for 2021:
 - (a) As part of its reporting requirements to the Security Council, the Investigative Team will conduct a formal self-evaluation with respect to the effectiveness of its investigative activities in Iraq;
 - (b) The Investigative Team will also carry out a formal self-evaluation on the work of the Special Adviser in promoting global accountability for the crimes of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant.

Programme performance in 2019 against planned result

346. A planned result for 2019, which is to support domestic efforts to hold Da'esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant accountable for atrocity crimes, as referred to in the report of the Secretary-General on estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council for 2019 for thematic cluster II ([A/73/352/Add.6](#)), was achieved, as evidenced by the production of six dossiers outlining detailed and evidence-based understanding of potential responsibility of members of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant leadership for such crimes, for potential sharing with national authorities and use in criminal proceedings conducted by competent domestic courts based on the collection of a broad range of evidence by the Investigative Team, which met the target of six. That evidence was collected through a range of activities, which included the completion of more than 230 days of field missions during the budgetary period. In line with the investigative priorities of the Investigative Team, these reports and related field-based missions primarily related to crimes committed by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant in Sinjar, Dahuk, Mosul and Tikrit.
347. A further planned result for 2019, which is the strengthening of the capacity of domestic authorities in Iraq to conduct investigations, as referred to in the proposed budget for 2019, was achieved, as

evidenced by the three training and support initiatives provided to national authorities in the area of the collection and analysis of forensic evidentiary material, which met the target of three. Three specific training initiatives were achieved during 2019 addressing the areas of:

- (a) Retrieval of biometric data and DNA profiling of bone and tooth samples of bodies excavated from mass grave sites through the use of rapid DNA technology;
- (b) Processes and practices with respect to, among others, the gathering of ante-mortem and post-mortem information, evidence-collection mechanisms, security arrangements for excavation sites and facilities for the storage of biological material;
- (c) Processes and practices with respect to the extraction of digital evidentiary material from hardware, including mobile phones and personal computers.

Programme performance in 2019: forensic, testimonial, digital and documentary evidentiary material collected in line with international standards

- 348. During the start-up phase of its activities early in 2019, the Investigative Team put in place the staffing, facilities and standard operating procedures necessary to operationalize its mandate. On the basis of this infrastructural framework, the Investigative Team was able to make significant progress in the collection of evidentiary material in line with international standards. This was reflected in the completion of more than 230 days of field-based investigative activities in 2019 and the collection of more than 20 terabytes of evidentiary material relevant to its three initial investigative priorities.
- 349. Cooperation with Iraqi judicial authorities was of particular importance with respect to the collection of documentary evidence, with relevant investigative judges and national courts working with the Investigative Team to identify case files and supporting materials of relevance to its mandate. In one example, the Investigative Team worked with national counterparts at Tallkayf Court, Mosul, in order to scan and digitize all judicial case files relevant to its ongoing investigative activities. In an initial pilot project completed in October 2019, 3,800 pages of case files were digitized pertaining to 37 cases of direct relevance to the structural investigations of the Investigative Team.

Progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

- 350. This work contributed to holding Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant members accountable for acts that amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide, as proved in fair and independent criminal proceeding, as demonstrated by the effective collection of documentary, forensic and digital evidence in cooperation with Iraqi authorities.
- 351. With respect to the collection of forensic evidence, the Investigative Team supported Iraqi national authorities and authorities of the Kurdistan Regional Government in the completion of the excavations at 17 mass graves in and around the village of Kojo in Sinjar district, north-western Iraq, with assistance provided by the Team, ensuring that the work was conducted in line with international standards. Supported by the Investigative Team, that work led to a conceptual shift to the treatment of mass grave sites as formal crime scenes, with targeted assistance delivered in relation to site coding, surface surveys, excavation activities, the preservation of the crime scene, adherence to appropriate field protocols, the completion of evidence-collection forms and the classification and packing of evidentiary material. Detailed digital photography and 3-D laser scanning of key crime scenes collected through these activities has been integrated into the evidentiary base.

Table 66
Performance measure

2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
N/A	N/A	N/A	Absence of evidentiary material available to national authorities collected, in line with international standards, to support domestic proceedings	Initial forensic, testimonial, digital and documentary evidentiary material and evidentiary analyses made available for use by domestic authorities and used to fill evidentiary gaps in domestic proceedings

Abbreviation: N/A, not applicable.

Planned result for 2021: development of case files adapted to requirements of domestic criminal legislation

352. Through its evidence-collection activities in 2019 and early in 2020, the Investigative Team has begun to establish an extensive evidentiary and analytical base to be drawn on by national authorities in the investigation and prosecution of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant members for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. As reflected above, and in line with its mandate pursuant to paragraph 2 of resolution [2379 \(2017\)](#), this evidentiary material has been collected, stored and preserved in line with international standards, with a view to ensuring its broadest possible use before national courts and complementing investigations being carried out by Iraqi authorities or investigations carried out by authorities in third countries, at their request.

Internal challenge and response

353. A challenge faced by the Investigative Team to date has been to ensure, in parallel with the conduct of its investigative activities, that the case files ultimately developed based on evidentiary material collected respond to the specific evidentiary needs of domestic authorities in Iraq and third States and thereby strengthen their ability to secure prosecutions of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant members for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. In particular, the challenge in this regard will be to ensure that the evidence-collection practices, analytical work and the strategic development of investigations by the Investigative Team are carried out in a manner that accommodates the specificities of the domestic legal frameworks in which they are most likely to be used.
354. In response, the Investigative Team will work closely with Iraqi authorities and authorities from other States in which prosecutions of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant members for such crimes may take place in order to further tailor its operational work so as to satisfy the procedural and substantive requirements of relevant domestic criminal codes and criminal legislation. This will be effected through: (a) the enhanced mapping of ongoing investigations and prosecutions of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant members for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in Iraq and third States; (b) the strengthening of engagement with national authorities in which such investigations and prosecutions are taking place; and (c) the implementation of structured case-building exercises with investigative judges in Iraq in order to assist in the analysis and restructuring of evidentiary material originally collected for the prosecution of terrorism offences into case files capable of supporting the prosecution of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.

Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

355. This work is expected to contribute to holding Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant members accountable for acts that amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide, as proved in fair and independent criminal proceedings, which would be demonstrated by an increase in the number of successful prosecutions of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant members for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in relation to which support by the Investigative Team has been provided.

Table 67

Performance measure

2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
N/A	Absence of evidentiary material available to national authorities collected, in line with international standards, to support domestic proceedings	Initial forensic, testimonial, digital and documentary evidentiary material and evidentiary analyses made available for use by domestic authorities and used to fill evidentiary gaps in domestic proceedings	Domestic proceedings taken forward in Member States with respect to Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant crimes, on the basis of international-standard evidentiary material and comprehensive analyses produced by the Investigative Team	Prosecutions achieved with respect to Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant crimes, on the basis of international-standard evidentiary material and comprehensive analyses produced by the Investigative Team

Abbreviation: N/A, not applicable.

Deliverables

356. Table 68 lists all deliverables, by category and subcategory, for the period 2019–2021 that contributed and are expected to contribute to the attainment of the objective stated above.

Table 68

United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da'esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant: deliverables for the period 2019–2021, by category and subcategory

Category and subcategory	2019 planned	2019 actual	2020 planned	2021 planned
A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
Parliamentary documentation (number of documents)	2	2	2	2
1. Reports of the Special Adviser and Head of the Investigative Team for the Security Council	2	2	2	2
Substantive services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	2	2	2	2
2. Meetings of the Security Council	2	2	2	2
B. Generation and transfer of knowledge				
Seminars, workshops and training events (number of days)	3	3	5	8
3. Seminars aimed at sharing relevant knowledge and technical assistance with national authorities and enhancing their cooperation with the Investigative Team	3	3	5	8

Category and subcategory	2019 planned	2019 actual	2020 planned	2021 planned
Technical materials (number of materials)	6	6	15	25
4. Reports outlining detailed evidence-based understanding of potential responsibility of members of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh) leadership for atrocity crimes, for potential sharing with national authorities and use in criminal proceedings conducted by competent domestic courts	6	6	15	25
C. Substantive deliverables				
Consultation, advice and advocacy: consultation on ensuring complementarity of investigations with those of national authorities; advocacy with victims' groups to ensure that interests of survivors are reflected in accountability efforts; and consultations with witnesses and victims' groups to ensure that they are fully engaged in the work of the Investigative Team.				
Fact-finding, monitoring and investigation missions: investigation missions to collect testimonial, forensic, digital, documentary and other physical evidence, and missions to investigate sexual and gender-based violence.				
Databases and substantive digital materials: centralized evidentiary database.				
D. Communication deliverables				
Outreach programmes, special events and information materials: outreach programme to engage Member States and international organizations in promoting the accountability of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.				
External and media relations: comprehensive media strategy aimed at providing counter-narrative to Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant online messaging.				
Digital platforms and multimedia content: online portal allowing public access to non-restricted material collected by the Investigative Team.				

B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2021

357. Drawing on the experience gained by the Investigative Team through the conduct of its activities in Iraq to date, the Team continues to assess its structure and operations, with a view to ensuring the effective delivery of its mandate with respect to the investigation of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant crimes in a manner consistent with the highest possible standards, as required pursuant to paragraph 2 of resolution 2379 (2017). Reflecting the result of such efforts, a number of changes to the staffing structure are proposed for 2021, representing a targeted response to the specific needs identified by the Investigative Team, including strengthening its senior management capacity in investigations, adapting the geographic and institutional location of specific Units, ensuring the most efficient deployment of resources and securing ongoing adherence to international standards in the conduct of its work.

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 69

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2019	2020	2021		Variance
	Expenditure	Appropriation	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	2021 vs. 2020 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(3)-(2)
Civilian personnel costs	11 057.3	13 004.5	17 633.2	—	4 628.7
Operational costs	8 646.2	7 334.2	7 473.4	—	139.2
Total (net of staff assessment)	19 703.5	20 338.7	25 106.6	—	4 767.9

Table 70
Positions

	<i>Professional and higher categories</i>									<i>General Service and related categories</i>		<i>Total international</i>	<i>National staff</i>			<i>United Nations Volunteers</i>	<i>Total</i>
										<i>Field/ Security Service</i>	<i>General Service</i>		<i>National Professional Officer</i>	<i>Local level</i>			
	<i>USG</i>	<i>ASG</i>	<i>D-2</i>	<i>D-1</i>	<i>P-5</i>	<i>P-4</i>	<i>P-3</i>	<i>P-2</i>	<i>Subtotal</i>								
Approved 2019	–	1	–	2	5	15	17	4	44	44	–	88	23	29	8	148	
Proposed 2020	–	1	1	2	5	15	17	4	45	44	–	89	23	29	8	149	
Change	–	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	–	1	–	–	–	1	

358. The proposed resource requirements for the Investigative Team for 2021 amount to \$25,106,600 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for salaries and common staff costs (\$17,633,200) for the continuation of 148 positions (1 Assistant Secretary-General, 2 D-1, 5 P-5, 15 P-4, 17 P-3, 4 P-2, 44 Field Service, 23 National Professional Officer, 29 Local level and 8 United Nations Volunteers) and the proposed establishment of one position (D-2), as well as operational costs (\$7,473,400) comprising consultants and consulting services (\$172,200), official travel (\$568,100), facilities and infrastructure (\$1,808,800), ground transportation (\$336,000), air operations (\$43,000), communications and information technology (\$3,079,200), medical (\$242,600), and other supplies, services and equipment (\$1,223,500).
359. Vacancy rates of 20 per cent for international positions, 50 per cent for National Professional Officers and 25 per cent for Local level positions have been applied to staff costs. A vacancy rate of 50 per cent has been applied to one international position (D-2) proposed for establishment.
360. The increase in the requirements proposed for 2021 compared with the appropriation for 2020 is attributable mainly to additional requirements under civilian personnel costs, resulting from: (a) the application of lower vacancy rates of 20 per cent for international, 50 per cent for National Professional Officer and 25 per cent for Local level positions, compared with 41 per cent for international, 76 per cent for National Professional Officer and 55 per cent for Local level positions applied in the approved 2020 budget; and (b) the application of a higher percentage of common staff costs based on recent expenditure patterns.
361. On the basis of the progress made and additional capacity needs identified to date through the implementation of its mandate, a number of adaptations to the structure of the Investigative Team are proposed, focusing on the following three areas:
- (a) Strengthening the ability of the Investigative Team to conduct effective field-based investigative activities in key areas in northern Iraq;
 - (b) Addressing an increasing need for dedicated legal analysis capacity in order to further support the development of comprehensive case files capable of supporting domestic criminal proceedings;
 - (c) Ensuring the consistent application of standard operating procedures and policies across the Investigative Team, in line with the requirements of resolution 2379 (2017).
362. With respect to strengthening the senior management of the Investigative Team, it is proposed that one position of Director of Investigations (D-2) in the Office of Field Investigations be established, reflecting a response to the significant increase in the demands placed on the management structure of the Team with respect to the provision of strategic guidance and support to the field investigation units and a related increase in the need for senior-level representation in engagements with counterparts, including the Government of Iraq, affected communities and other stakeholders.
363. Reflecting developments in the work of some of the specialized thematic units of the Investigative Team, it is proposed that the Sexual and Gender-based Violence Unit be renamed the Sexual and

Gender-based Crimes and Crimes against Children Unit in order to accurately reflect the substantive scope of the work that it is carrying out, and that the Victim and Witness Protection Unit be renamed the Witness Protection and Support Unit so as to reflect the work of the Unit in providing support to witnesses and thereby allowing them to come forward with their accounts to the Team.

364. With respect to further adapting the Investigative Team's structure to optimize mandate delivery, it is proposed that 57 positions be redeployed or reassigned across the Team (1 D-1, 2 P-5, 7 P-4, 6 P-3, 3 P-2, 14 Field Service, 15 National Professional Officer, 4 Local level and 5 United Nations Volunteers), to achieve the objectives set out in para. 361 (a) to (c) above, as detailed below:

Office of the Special Adviser

- (a) Redeployment of one position of Legal Officer (P-4) from the immediate Office of the Chief of Analysis and one position of Political Affairs Officer (P-4) from the immediate Office of the Chief of Staff to the Office of the Special Adviser to strengthen the ability of the Office to provide strategic guidance and support on legal and political issues in response to the expansion of the operational activities of the Investigative Team;
- (b) Redeployment of one position of Legal Officer (P-4) from the Sexual and Gender-based Crimes and Crimes against Children Unit of the Office of Field Investigations to New York as a backstopping position to engage with Member States, United Nations entities and other stakeholders at Headquarters with respect to the complex legal issues inherent in its mandate and activities, especially issues related to the implementation of paragraph 3 of resolution [2379 \(2017\)](#), to promote accountability;
- (c) Redeployment of one position of Administrative Assistant (Field Service) from the Information Systems Management Unit of the Office of Analysis to the Office of the Special Adviser in order to ensure the effective deployment of administrative support across the amended staffing structure of the Investigative Team;

Office of Field Investigations

- (d) Redeployment of two positions of Administrative Assistant (Field Service), one from the Field Investigations Planning and Operations Centre in the Office of the Chief of Staff and one from the Office of the Special Adviser, to the immediate Office of the Director of Field Investigations in order to provide support to the day-to-day functioning of the Office of Field Investigations;
- (e) Redeployment of one position of Administrative Assistant (Field Service) in the Office of Field Investigations from Baghdad to Dahuk in order to ensure the provision of appropriate administrative support to the field investigation units and Sexual and Gender-based Crimes and Crimes against Children Unit proposed to be relocated to that location;
- (f) Establishment of the Legal Strategy Unit within the Office of Field Investigations, which will serve as a centralized legal analysis and review entity, working across all units within the Office in order to ensure that evidentiary material collected is compiled and structured into case files capable of supporting the underlying elements of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. It is proposed that the staffing of the Unit be accommodated through:
 - (i) Reassignment of one position of Chief of Investigations (D-1) from the immediate Office of the Director of Investigation to Principal Legal Officer (D-1);
 - (ii) Redeployment of two positions of Legal Officer (1 P-3 and 1 United Nations Volunteers) from Field Investigation Unit 1;
- (g) Relocation of Field Investigation Units 1 and 3 and the Sexual and Gender-based Crimes and Crimes against Children Unit within the Office of Field Investigations from Baghdad to Dahuk in order to further enhance the ability of the Investigative Team to collect evidence capable of filling existing evidentiary gaps through its field-based investigative activities. This will allow

for more effective engagement with affected communities and easier access to key crime scenes and reduce the costs associated with investigative activities. In total, this represents a redeployment of 16 positions (2 P-5, 2 P-4, 2 P-3, 2 P-2, 6 National Professional Officer and 2 United Nations Volunteers);

- (h) Reassignment of one position of Legal Officer (P-4) as an Investigator (P-4) in Field Investigative Unit 3 in order to strengthen the investigative capacity of the Unit, increase the ability to engage effectively with witnesses and allow for the provision of enhanced strategic guidance to all members of the Investigative Team with respect to the development of lines of enquiry;
- (i) Realignment of the Forensic Sciences Unit from the Office of Analysis to the Office of Field Investigations with the consequent redeployment of four positions (1 P-4, 1 P-3, 1 P-2 and 1 United Nations Volunteers). This will ensure greater coherence between the work of the Forensic Sciences Unit in the collection of forensic evidentiary material, both physical and digital, and the work of the field investigation units in the development of investigations into persons of interest, in line with the investigative priorities of the Investigative Team;

Office of the Chief of Staff

- (j) Redeployment of two positions to the immediate Office of the Chief of Staff, as follows:
 - (i) One position of Special Assistant/Political Affairs Officer (P-3) from the immediate Office of the Special Adviser to provide support to the Chief of Staff in all aspects of the work of the Office, ensuring in particular that the coordination role and responsibilities of the Chief of Staff with respect to mission support, field operations planning and human resources are delivered effectively;
 - (ii) One position of Administrative Assistant (Field Service) from the Witness Protection and Support Unit to provide administrative support to all reporting units under the Office of the Chief of Staff;
- (k) Realignment of the Archives and Records Management Unit from the Office of Analysis to the Office of the Chief of Staff, with a consequent redeployment of four positions (1 P-4, 2 Field Service and 1 National Professional Officer), in order to further support the coherent and uniform application of policies with respect to the classification of documentation and information security across all offices and units;
- (l) Redeployment of one position of Joint Operations Officer (P-3) in the Field Investigations Planning and Operations Centre from Baghdad to Dahuk;
- (m) Redeployment of six positions of Associate Field Interpreter (National Professional Officer) to the Language Services Unit, comprising one from the Office of the Special Adviser, one from the Witness Protection and Support Unit under the Office of the Chief of Staff and 4 from the Office of Field Investigations (Units 1, 2 and 3 and Sexual and Gender-based Crimes and Crimes against Children Unit). These redeployments will serve to centralize the function of translation services within the Language Services Unit and ensure that interpretation and translation are conducted in line with common standards across the Investigative Team. It is proposed that two of these positions be relocated from Baghdad to Dahuk so as to provide appropriate support to Field Investigation Units 1 and 3 and the Sexual and Gender-based Crimes and Crimes against Children Unit;
- (n) Reassignment of one position and redeployment of three positions to mission support, as follows:
 - (i) Reassignment of one position of Translator (Field Service) from the Language Services Unit to Logistics Officer (Field Service) to provide assistance to the Administrative Officer in the planning of all end-to-end logistics activities and ensuring cost efficiencies across the supply chain of the Investigative Team;

- (ii) Redeployment of two positions, comprising one Administrative Assistant (Local level) from the Office of National Engagement and Support and one Administrative Officer (National Professional Officer) from the Analysis and Evidence Unit to provide administrative support to the day-to-day functioning of mission support and to ensure an effective balance of administrative support across the Local level Team;
- (iii) Redeployment of one position of Transport Assistant (Local level) from Baghdad to Dahuk to provide transportation support to staff proposed to be redeployed to Dahuk;

Office of Analysis

- (o) Redeployment of one position of Legal Officer (United Nations Volunteers) from the Witness Protection and Support Unit to the immediate Office of the Chief of Analysis to provide support to the Chief of Analysis in addressing relevant legal issues arising from the work of the units in the Office;

Office of National Engagement and Support

- (p) Redeployment of one position of Associate Administrative Officer (National Professional Officer) from the Forensic Sciences Unit to the Office of National Engagement and Support to provide effective assistance to the Legal Officer (National Professional Officer) with respect to administrative matters;

Security Section

- (q) Redeployment of eight positions, comprising five Close Protection Officers (Field Service), one Security Officer (Field Service) and two Field Security Assistants (Local level) from Baghdad to Dahuk in order to further support the proposed relocation of the units to Dahuk and to ensure that their field-based work can be conducted in a safe and effective manner.

Extrabudgetary resources

- 365. Early in 2020, extrabudgetary resources totalling \$2,276,600 had been received in the trust fund of the Investigative Team, with total anticipated contributions expected to amount to \$5,950,000 by the end of the year. The largest portion of the contribution to the trust fund will support the Investigative Team in working collaboratively with the Government of Iraq through the provision of technical assistance and capacity development in the archiving and digitization of evidentiary material held by Iraqi authorities related to Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant crimes. Additional extrabudgetary contributions will support capacity development work with the Iraqi judiciary and other national authorities, including in areas such as forensic analysis. From mid-2020 until the end of the year, additional extrabudgetary funding is expected to be mobilized to ensure a continuation of the Investigative Team's specialized activities such as the exhumations of mass graves, investigations into Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant crimes against minority groups, analysis into the financial aspects of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant crimes, and witness and victim support measures.
- 366. In 2021, it is forecasted that extrabudgetary resources will amount to \$2,500,000, which reflects anticipated constraints on donor funding in the light of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic. These contributions are expected to support the further excavation of mass graves and forensic analysis activities, as well as investigations into Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant crimes against minority groups. Additional funding will also be sought in 2021 to enhance information and evidence management systems and the investigation of crimes against children.

Annex

Summary of follow-up action taken to implement the decisions and requests made by the General Assembly in its resolution [74/263 A](#), including the requests and recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions endorsed by the Assembly

Brief description of the recommendation

Action taken to implement the recommendation

General Assembly (resolution [74/263 A](#), sect. XVIII)

Requests the Secretary-General, in his next budget submission, to summarize the justification and link of the appropriation and use of travel expenses to support the implementation of Security Council resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) of 20 July 2015 and to present the role of the Secretariat in preparing reports on the resolution, as guided by the mandate of the Council (para. 14).

In relation to the implementation of Security Council resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), in according with paragraphs 6 and 7 of the note by the President of the Security Council dated 16 January 2016 ([S/2016/44](#)), the Council requested the Secretary-General to render support to the Security Council and its appointed facilitator, render administrative support for the processing of nuclear-related proposals through the procurement channel and report to the Council every six months on the implementation of the resolution.

The role of the Secretariat in preparing reports on the resolution is as follows: (a) support for the facilitator in the preparation of his/her biannual report to the Security Council; (b) facilitation of the transmission of the biannual report of the Joint Commission to the Council; and (c) the preparation of the biannual report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the resolution.

The team supporting the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) conducts travel at the invitation of Member States. The information gained through these travels contributes to the preparation of the biannual report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the resolution. The purposes of travel fall into the following categories: outreach, consultations, and monitoring and reporting.

Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions ([A/74/7/Add.3](#))

The Advisory Committee stresses that proposals on posts must always be justified on their own merits, taking into account the programmatic and/or workload requirements that are needed for the implementation of mandated programmes and activities ([A/72/7](#), para. 87; and [A/74/7](#), para. 81). Furthermore, the Committee trusts that the Secretary-General will continue to monitor the evolution of the security situation in Iraq and ensure the safety and security of the United Nations personnel as required (para. 14).

In preparing its budgetary submission for 2021, the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da'esh/ Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant has reviewed its staffing structure and operational requirements on the basis of the substantive demands anticipated to be placed on the Team, in line with its investigative strategy. As part of this process, an assessment has been conducted so as to ensure that the security component of the Investigative Team is capable of responding to anticipated threats connected with its

Brief description of the recommendation

The Advisory Committee trusts that the Secretary-General will provide the General Assembly with updated information on the status of vacant positions and ongoing recruitment efforts at the time of its consideration of the present report. The Committee expects that the recruitment for the aforementioned positions will be completed expeditiously (para. 17).

The Advisory Committee regrets the generally low compliance with the advance purchase policy. While recognizing that, depending on the nature of the official business involved, the predictability of certain types of trips can vary, the Committee expects that the missions will give the matter priority attention and reiterates that more efforts are required, in particular in areas where travel can be better planned, including through the development of concrete plans and strategies to improve adherence to the advance purchase policy. The Committee trusts that the Secretary-General will include information on such plans in his next budget submission (para. 23).

Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that the proposed budget anticipates the timely recruitment of a Security Officer (P-3) who would conduct security assessments to facilitate missions of the Group of Experts in the country and participate in selected missions, particularly to remote locations (see para. 8 (a) above; see also [A/74/6 \(Sect. 3\)/Add.3](#), para. 20). This would allow the Group to increase the number of its missions and to reach locations that were not previously accessed. The Advisory Committee trusts that necessary security support will be provided to the Panel of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the implementation of its mandates (para. 25).

Action taken to implement the recommendation

activities, in particular the field-based investigative function of its mandate. The Investigative Team considers that, while additional resources could be deployed effectively so as to further strengthen elements of the security apparatus of the Team, in particular with respect to its office in northern Iraq, the Security Section of the Team will be able to ensure the safety and security of mission personnel, drawing on the support of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq and that of Iraqi security forces, as appropriate.

The missions have taken efforts to fill such positions. The most recent information for all special political missions in this respect is presented in a consolidated manner in annex X to [A/74/6 \(Sect.3\)/Add.1](#).

The missions have taken the following actions: (a) broadcast messages and undertaken continuous awareness-raising of all personnel on the mandatory requirement to submit travel requests at least 21 calendar days prior to the commencement of travel; (b) required the provision of justification with supporting evidence for travel requests that did not meet the mandatory deadline of 21 calendar days prior to travel; (c) actively followed up with various stakeholders (e.g., Governments and United Nations country teams) to receive confirmation of the schedule and participant lists in meetings and conferences in a timely manner; and (d) encouraged approving officers to reduce the processing time of travel requests as much as possible.

The recruitment of the Security Officer is completed and the candidate selected. The onboarding was initiated but had to be put on hold owing to travel restrictions related to the coronavirus disease (COVID-19). This Security Officer complements the support that the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Department of Safety and Security regularly provide to the Group of Experts, including by assessing the risks and recommending the mitigation measures and by providing operational support, as appropriate, on a reimbursable basis.