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Safety and security in the United Nations system

Note by the Secretary-General

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the members of the General Assembly the report of the Joint Inspection Unit entitled “Safety and security in the United Nations system”.

* [A/72/50](#).



SAFETY AND SECURITY IN THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Safety and security in the United Nations system JIU/REP/2016/9

The security and safety of United Nations personnel have been persistent issues on the United Nations agenda and the subject of the United Nations reform process. High importance is attributed to personnel safety and security, and to security awareness in the field, given the number, type and severity of security incidents that have occurred in recent years, resulting in casualties and loss of life of United Nations personnel.

In preparing the present review, the Inspectors of the Joint Inspection Unit experienced different security scenarios and had the opportunity to witness the difficult conditions endured by staff and security personnel in some locations. The Inspectors understand that potential safety and security risks will continue to challenge the United Nations security system in all the environments where the United Nations operates. They would therefore like to express their gratitude and recognition to those who, often at the risk of their own well-being, continue to uphold United Nations values in support of local populations.

The scope of the present review is system-wide. It covers the United Nations, its funds, programmes and specialized agencies, focusing on the Joint Inspection Unit participating organizations and members of the Inter-Agency Security Management Network. The review focuses on the services that the Department of Safety and Security, as the primary coordinating actor of the United Nations security management system, needs to effectively provide to the United Nations system; it addresses strategic system-wide issues and does not look into specific technical areas of safety and security.

The Inspectors believe that there should be a focus on “strategic issues” that are vital to providing and enhancing security to United Nations personnel and premises, and the changing threats and risks faced by the United Nations security management system. In their view, the different issues identified by the Independent Panel on Safety and Security of United Nations Personnel and Premises Worldwide can be grouped into five different strategic areas, which form the basis of the review. Those areas are: security culture, security-related information management, safety and security standards, security crisis management and surge capacity, and resources and finance.

The Inspectors offer eight recommendations: one for the consideration of the General Assembly, in which they recommend that the Secretary-General prepare, in consultation with the High-level Committee on Management and the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB) and its appropriate networks, a proposal for a safety and security funding model; four addressed to the Executive Heads of United Nations organizations; two addressed to the Department of Safety and Security; and one addressed to the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security, as the Chair of the Inter-Agency Security Management Network.

Main findings and conclusions

The United Nations security management system has unquestionably evolved since the report entitled “Towards a Culture of Security and Accountability” of the Independent Panel on Safety and Security of United Nations Personnel and Premises Worldwide.¹ Since then, it has moved from a security

¹ Available from www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/terrorism/PanelOnSafetyReport.pdf.

phase system — considered to be one of the main difficulties faced in the field — to a risk-management philosophy of “how to stay”, based on the structured use of risk analysis. Furthermore, new policies have been developed and inter-agency cooperation has been made more robust. The United Nations security management system must provide security for approximately 180,000 personnel² and 300,000 dependants in very different environments, ranging from major cities to deep field locations, that are frequently affected by crime, natural hazards, social instability and often armed conflict. In addition, it must provide preventive measures and sufficient responses to global threats, such as terrorism. The task is not simple and poses tremendous challenges.

The United Nations security management system is characterized by its fragmentation in different areas and at different levels. Security resources and expertise are fragmented across the system, which is an issue when trying to assess the effectiveness of the United Nations security management system. While the Inspectors recognize the progress achieved in different areas (i.e., enhanced accountability, standard security training for staff and security professionals, the development of various system-wide security policies, etc.), the most significant progress in their view has been achieved through enhanced dialogue among the United Nations organizations in the context of CEB and related machinery.

The observed fragmentation calls for the enhanced sharing of the resources available system-wide at different levels. Members of the United Nations security management system should decide on how to make the most of the scarce resources available. In that regard, the Inspectors refer to higher levels of integration, ultimately with the aim of optimizing the security resources available system-wide and avoiding duplication. Integration should build upon the individual expertise accumulated by each of the organizations of the United Nations security management system and take into consideration their specific operational needs while providing the degree of autonomy necessary for them to realize their respective mandates in full independence.

Host country considerations

- The main responsibility for the safety and security of United Nations personnel and premises rests with the host country authorities, as widely recognized in international law and reflected in multiple resolutions of the General Assembly. In the view of the Inspectors, the primary responsibility of the host country and its relationship with the United Nations security management system does not fit in any of the strategic areas previously defined for the preparation of the present review; it is a cross-cutting theme that affects several areas.
- The support of the host Government is essential, inter alia, in the regular and timely sharing of information relevant to the security of United Nations personnel and premises. The relationship with the host country is also crucial for operations at different levels. An operational example is the timely provision of visas to United Nations security personnel when surge and emergency deployments are needed, or the prompt customs clearance of United Nations equipment.
- The Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel and its Optional Protocol are a legal framework supporting enhanced security measures and actions to be undertaken by host countries. As at June 2016, the Convention has been ratified by only 93 States. **The Inspectors would like to encourage Member States that have not yet done so to ratify the Convention as an expression of their determination to protect the lives of those working in support of their local populations.**

² See Report of the Secretary-General on safety and security of humanitarian personnel and protection of United Nations personnel (A/71/395), para. 2.

- It should be noted that some host country agreements were established a long time ago. However, the security environment worldwide has changed drastically over the years, and some agreements do not reflect the current security needs. **The Inspectors believe that host country agreements should be consistent with the primary responsibility of host country authorities and consequently reflect the specific local security context and be updated regularly. In that regard, they encourage host countries to fulfil their responsibility and make every effort to provide United Nations organizations with the safest environment possible.**

Security culture

A culture of safety and security is the cornerstone of any security system; it provides a common understanding of the importance of and need for safe and secure operating environments. A security culture helps to develop alertness and understand the different contexts and security implications of the work undertaken by United Nations personnel where security is not seen as an obstacle but as an enabler. A security culture can be established through the appropriate induction and training of personnel at different levels, by maintaining awareness through regular practice and relevant information-sharing, by promoting best practices and by ensuring compliance with pertinent policies and security measures approved at the local level.

- The establishment of a system-wide security culture is a multidimensional and unceasing undertaking. It does not happen overnight and requires the involvement of several actors, including not only security management, but also leadership and senior substantive management of organizations, which should lead by example. **The United Nations security management system comprises different entities with individual organizational cultures (i.e. humanitarian, peacekeeping, etc.) and different mandates. However, the interaction and cooperation between organizations is important and frequent and takes multiple forms. The Inspectors believe that it is possible to promote a basic system-wide security culture through common undertakings (i.e. training, etc.). Furthermore, they are convinced that it is not only possible, but also necessary.**
- A security culture is reflected in the approach personnel take when performing all types of functions, including routine ones. **The safety of personnel can be enhanced simply by promoting and embracing a security culture. However, staff safety is not only the responsibility of staff; United Nations organizations have a responsibility as employers and should comply with international labour standards on occupational safety and health, in particular the ILO Occupational Safety and Health Convention, 1981 (No. 155) and its relevant recommendations. The designated officer and Security Management Team should ensure that the United Nations organizations present in a given location comply with the pertinent safety regulations of the host country and engage with the local bodies responsible for civil safety whenever possible.**
- **The Inspectors had the opportunity to observe deficiencies in the implementation of safety and security policies in the field.** Despite efforts made to promote a new managerial culture, the Inspectors believe that there is a need to strengthen further the security culture across the organizations of the United Nations system at all levels, from senior management to staff. The proper implementation of security policies, compliance with relevant rules and personnel behaviour are all a reflection of a security culture. **A lack of compliance often becomes a safety or security issue. The current level of safety and security of staff can be enhanced from a cost effective perspective simply by achieving higher levels of compliance with current security regulations. Substantive management at all levels is essential in that regard and should be held accountable for the implementation of safety and security protocols within their respective areas of responsibility. More needs to be done regarding the enforcement of**

current regulations and standards with a view to further strengthening a security culture among United Nations personnel.

Security-related information management

Security risk management and risk analysis are an integral part of the United Nations security management system, thus the timely availability of relevant information is crucial for the proper functioning of the system. The ultimate goal is to have — when and where needed — the information required for the timely deployment of security preventive and/or mitigating measures.

The Inspectors highlight the fundamental role that Member States should continue to play in that regard. Indeed, cooperation with national security actors is essential for the United Nations. However, the sharing of information by Member States with the United Nations continues to be determined by national considerations rather than the information needs of the United Nations.

- Threat and risk assessments include the collection of relevant information and should provide the essential information required to determinate threats and associated risks, and appropriate host Government authorities must be consulted during that process.
- **Although progress has been achieved since the report of the Independent Panel, it is widely acknowledged that there is a need to strengthen further the threat and risk analysis capabilities within the United Nations security management system, including at the regional level.**
- **At present, no agency, fund or programme can on its own afford the state-of-the-art security technology and systems necessary. Thus, system-wide cooperation in the development and use of new security information systems is essential.**

Safety and security standards

Substantial progress has been made since the report of the Independent Panel in the areas of security awareness and the standardization of practices, with the recognition that clearer responsibilities, accountability and leadership, as well as greater collaboration and information-sharing among the different United Nations entities, are needed in order to ensure safe operations. To complement the baseline norms established in the existing security policies of the United Nations security management system, a set of minimum qualitative and quantitative requirements for premises and equipment, as well as standard procedures and training in operating and maintaining such equipment, should be developed and implemented to maximize the safety and security of United Nations personnel and properties.

- **Strengthening safety and security competencies through standard training.** A system-wide common training requirement has been established across the United Nations security management system in an effort to homogenize basic training for staff at large. In addition, the Department of Safety and Security offers specific training to security professionals of different organizations in an effort to standardize their qualifications. Moreover, some organizations (e.g., UNHCR and UNICEF) offer specific training to staff with additional needs, and some agencies, funds and programmes have developed their own security training activities according to their own specific needs.
- Security training is perhaps one of the most significant examples of standardization across the United Nations security management system. Such training is either “core” or “specialized”: core security training is intended to ensure that United Nations personnel at all levels are familiar with

their security responsibilities and the range of support available to them; specialized security training is designed to equip United Nations security personnel with the specific knowledge and expertise necessary to discharge their security responsibilities. Core security training for staff comprises the Basic Security in the Field and Advanced Security in the Field modules, which represent the foundation of the mandated security courses for United Nations security management system personnel at large.

Security crisis management and surge capacity

Security crisis management and surge capacity are central for the proper operation of the United Nations security management system. The United Nations system does not have the financial resources to introduce the preventive security measures needed to confront any potential threat that could develop in every location where system organizations operate. **The United Nations security management system is based on a structured risk analysis, meaning that security measures commensurate with the specific risks to be confronted should be implemented in a timely manner. That implies that, in order for the system to be effective, it should count on resources available to be redeployed, whether human and/or equipment, and rely on effective and flexible logistics and communications. Furthermore, the financial constraints faced by organizations and the limited security resources available within each organization call for the sharing and well-coordinated use of the currently fragmented security resources, which are scattered across the United Nations system.**

The Department of Safety and Security is the entity responsible for the security aspects of crisis management. It is also ideally placed and linked to marshal resources, including peacekeeping forces and logistic arrangements across the United Nations system, to assist in the crisis response and coordinate crisis reporting. No other entity in the United Nations system is similarly suited to lead such efforts.

- **There is a persistence of leadership, staffing and operational issues that may have a negative impact on the outcome of a security crisis. The Department of Safety and Security is responsible for the safety and security of staff in the field. However the operational responsibilities for many staff members rest fragmented across the system. The multiplicity of United Nations security management system bodies dealing with security crises at different levels and offering different services and support, each with their own recruitment procedures and contractual status, might induce some confusion. Fragmentation generates duplication of efforts and inefficiencies, which can have an adverse impact on the outcome of a crisis. All operational, organizational and logistical elements of the immediate response of the United Nations security management system to a security crisis must be streamlined and clearly laid out.**
- **Crisis management policy: work in progress.** The Inspectors are pleased to note that a crisis management policy was promulgated in 2016. It is an important document intended to ensure a coherent and effective crisis response across the United Nations. The policy provides clarity on roles and responsibilities and the architecture for decision-making, coordination, information exchange and communications. Although it does not yet apply to all United Nations system organizations, it does apply to members of the Policy Committee and the United Nations crisis management working group. All United Nations entities that have field presence and are members of the working group are responsible for ensuring that proper guidance and toolkits on crisis management are disseminated in the field.
- In June 2015, the Inter-Agency Security Management Network approved the creation of a working group responsible for drafting a United Nations security management system policy on

safety and security crisis management in the field. A section on crisis management in the field will be included in the new Security Policy Manual and is expected to be approved by the Network in 2017.

- **Surge capacity is an area that requires further enhancement**, according to the views expressed by officials interviewed in the field. The Department of Safety and Security is aware of that need, as recognized in its strategic review. However, it does not have a standing reserve team of security professionals ready to be deployed when required. Instead, surge deployments use existing resources within the Department of Safety and Security, Department of Field Support/Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Political Affairs and other organizations of the United Nations security management system. Since 2012, the Department of Safety and Security has reinforced its response capacity, including proactive deployments through surge security officers. The lack of standing security capacity necessitates the redeployment of resources available in other duty stations but needed to strengthen security in another area, to cater for a security threat or even a regular event. This often leads to the withdrawal of troops or security personnel, to the detriment of the releasing duty station, or compounds security, placing additional stress on the already limited resources available and overstretching security personnel duties at the releasing duty station.

Resources and finance

The issue of financing the United Nations security management system is a long-standing one. Extensive discussions have taken place in different forums in the past decade, including at the system-wide level in the framework of the High-level Committee on Management; several working groups have been established, and different funding and cost-sharing modalities have been considered. The solution to this complex issue has been the subject of lengthy discussions of security and financial professionals from the different entities comprising the United Nations security management system. The Inspectors hope that the information and proposals included in the review may serve as a basis in the current debate on funding.

The Secretary-General, in his proposal for a new United Nations security management regime,³ proposed that the system be funded from the regular United Nations budget. The report of the Independent Panel and other independent expert studies have identified the fragmentation and shortage of the resources necessary to confront the security threats faced by the United Nations system. The studies all agree that the issue is systemic, and have recommended that sufficient and sustainable funding be provided for safety and security. However, in General Assembly resolution [59/276](#), in which it decided to establish the Department of Safety and Security, the Assembly also decided to retain the previous cost-sharing arrangements concerning safety and security. Despite subsequent requests, the Assembly, while recognizing the operational difficulties linked to cost-sharing by organizations, has decided to maintain existing cost-sharing arrangements for safety and security.

The Inspectors share the views expressed by the Independent Panel on Safety and Security of United Nations Personnel and Premises Worldwide; their conclusion, after the thorough analysis of views stated by officers in field and Headquarters locations, is that a unique source of funding would be simpler to manage than the current cumbersome cost-sharing mechanisms; it would also enhance the transparency demanded by agencies, funds and programmes while facilitating accountability with respect to the use of safety and security resources.

³ See [A/59/365](#), para. 63.

- The current financial model supporting the United Nations security management system is complex and shows a clear fragmentation of funding sources, and is further compounded by different budget practices and budget cycles applied by various entities. The same degree of complexity applies to governance mechanisms, while different governing bodies of the United Nations system are involved in the approval of security resources, and none of them has a comprehensive vision of the global security needs and global level of resources involved at the system-wide level.
- The hybrid nature of the budget sources and their inherent lack of flexibility do not support a United Nations security management system that is based on structured risk analysis and designed to respond in a timely manner to crisis through the rapid redeployment of commensurate human or financial resources.
- In the view of the Inspectors, a truly unified security management system is a critical objective; the central funding of such a system would be the most effective way of safeguarding its unity and operational soundness. At present, in order to establish such a system, it would be necessary either for the United Nations to fund security requirements from the outset through its regular budget, or for a trust fund to be established by the clients of the security services — i.e. the members of the Inter-Agency Security Management Network — including the initial up-front agreement on the services to be rendered and associated costs. The Inspectors encourage the Department of Safety and Security and the members of the Inter-Agency Security Management Network to establish a results-based approach to the issue by establishing from the planning phase the expected results, agreeing on measuring indicators and allocating commensurate resources.

Recommendations for consideration by legislative organs

- **Recommendation 8:** The General Assembly should request the Secretary-General to prepare, in consultation with the High-level Committee on Management and CEB and its appropriate networks, a proposal for a safety and security funding model that would provide the Department of Safety and Security with a transparent, sustainable and predictable budget and the flexibility necessary to address unforeseen crises, to be considered during the seventy-second session of the Assembly.

Other recommendations

- **Recommendation 1:** The Executive Heads of United Nations system organizations, through the respective designated officers and in coordination with the Department of Safety and Security and the Office of Legal Affairs, should ensure that, by no later than April 2018:
 - Existing host country agreements within their respective organizations reflect the current security threats and contain commensurate security measures necessary to protect United Nations system organizations' personnel and premises
 - Future host country agreements contain a security annex reflecting the main responsibility of the host country with respect to the security of United Nations system organizations' personnel and premises
 - Existing and future host country agreements are regularly reviewed to reflect and adapt to changes in the respective security environments
- **Recommendation 2:** The Executive Heads of the United Nations system organizations,

through the Inter-Agency Security Management Network and the Department of Safety and Security, should ensure that, by no later than January 2018, a comprehensive system-wide policy for road safety is finalized and ready for implementation within each of their respective organizations .

- **Recommendation 3:** The Executive Heads of the United Nations system organizations that have not yet done so should ensure that, by no later than January 2018, appropriate security compliance mechanisms commensurate with the risk level assessed in each particular duty station are included in the individual performance appraisal systems in place for all staff within their respective organizations.
- **Recommendation 4:** The Department of Safety and Security, in coordination with the Executive Heads of United Nations system organizations and the respective designated officers, should ensure that, by no later than January 2018, evacuation plans are available in every location where those organizations operate, distributed to staff and regularly drilled in coordination, when possible, with local authorities.
- **Recommendation 5:** The Executive heads of the United Nations system organizations that have not yet done so should, by no later than January 2018, incorporate safety and security compliance indicators in the performance assessments at every management level, including senior management.
- **Recommendation 6:** The Department of Safety and Security, in consultation with the Inter-Agency Security Management Network, should, by no later than January 2018, strengthen the analysis capabilities of social media and other relevant big data sources by establishing a central location tasked with the regular analysis and system-wide prompt dissemination of security-related information.
- **Recommendation 7:** The Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security, as the Chair of the Inter-Agency Security Management Network, should, by no later than January 2018, develop a system-wide security surge policy, including the standard operating procedures necessary, with a view to clarifying surge standing resources and the roles and respective responsibilities of the different actors of the United Nations security management system.

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ABBREVIATIONS

CEB	United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMO	International Maritime Organization
ITC	International Trade Centre
ITU	International Telecommunications Union
JMAC	Joint Mission Analysis Centres
JOC	Joint Operations Centres
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OHCHR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
OIOS	Office of Internal Oversight Services
SIOC	Security Information Operations Centre
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNITAR	United Nations Institute for Training and Research
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNOCC	United Nations Operations and Crisis Centre
UNOCC	United Nations Operations and Crisis Centre
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
UNSMIN	United Nations security managers' information network
UNSMS	United Nations security management system
UNSSC	United Nations System Staff College
UN-Women	United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
USG	Under-Secretary-General
WFP	World Food Programme
WMO	World Meteorological Organization

I. INTRODUCTION

1. As part of its programme of work for 2014, the Joint Inspection Unit conducted a review of staff safety and security in United Nations system organizations. The review had been proposed by the Unit after conducting a feasibility study on the subject in 2013, which had concluded that interest was high among different stakeholders, including Member States and the participating organizations of the Joint Inspection Unit.

2. The security and safety of United Nations personnel have been a persistent issue on the United Nations agenda and the subject of the United Nations reform process. High importance is attributed to personnel safety and security, and to security awareness in the field, given the number, type and severity of security incidents that have occurred in recent years, resulting in casualties and loss of life of United Nations and humanitarian personnel.

A. Background information

3. According to its mission statement, The United Nations security management system is the collection of actors — including organizations — policies and procedures involved in the achievement of a global goal: to enable the conduct of United Nations activities while ensuring the safety, security and well-being of personnel and the security of United Nations premises and assets.

4. The first framework of accountability for the United Nations security management system was created in 2002. In 2009, CEB approved a revised framework of accountability that included clearer roles and responsibilities of the actors in the system at all levels. In its resolution [65/259](#), the General Assembly took note of the revised framework of accountability, which was subsequently promulgated throughout the system in 2011.⁴

5. The framework of accountability defines the main responsibilities with respect to the safety and security of United Nations personnel, indicating that the primary responsibility for the security and protection of personnel employed by the United Nations system organizations, their spouse and other recognized dependants and property and of the organizations' property rests with the host Government. In the case of international organizations and their officials, the Government is considered to have a special responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations or the Government's agreements with the individual organizations.

6. Furthermore, organizations of the United Nations system have a responsibility as employers to ensure that operating environments are safe and secured through the implementation of appropriate mitigating measures, supplementing host Governments' security measures when the risks to be confronted require measures beyond those that can be reasonably provided by the host Government.

7. The governance of the United Nations security management system is centred at CEB, its High-Level Committee on Management and the Inter-Agency Security Management Network, consisting of the senior managers who have oversight of security functions within each member organization of the system. The Network reviews existing and proposed policies, procedures and practices of the system and their implementation, and provides its recommendations to the High-level Committee on Management.⁵

8. The designated officer and the Security Management Team are responsible for the application and implementation of the United Nations security management system at the country or designated area levels. The most senior United Nations official in the country is normally appointed by the Secretary-General as the designated officer for Security and accredited to the host Government. The designated officer is accountable to the Secretary-General and receives delegated authority to take decisions in exigent circumstances, including the

⁴ [A/65/320](#) and Corr.1, paras. 1-22 and annex I.

⁵ Ibid., para. 7.

relocation or evacuation of personnel. The Team is chaired by the designated officer and is formed by the head of each United Nations organization present at the duty station and the Chief Security Adviser/Officer. The duties and responsibilities of those actors are included in the accountability framework of the Security Policy Manual and imposed by their respective Executive Boards. The Security Management Team often includes international and national non-governmental organization and delegations who have signed memorandums of understanding. The Team advises the designated officer on all security-related matters. In peacekeeping missions, where the Head of Mission serves as the designated officer, the Team may also include heads of components (i.e. military and police), offices or sections.

9. However, the primary coordinating body of the United Nations security management system is the Department of Safety and Security, intended to strengthen the system and enable safe operational activities by providing leadership, professional expertise, operational support and oversight. The Department of Safety and Security was established by the General Assembly in its resolution [59/276](#) and brings together into one organizational entity the pre-existing security management functions located in different entities of the Secretariat.

B. Objective

10. The initial objective of the present review was to evaluate the progress made since the report of the Independent Panel on Safety and Security of United Nations Personnel and Premises Worldwide, in particular how the United Nations security management system has improved in response to areas identified by that report; to assess how the current system is able to respond to the foreseen and unforeseen challenges it faces worldwide; to assess its coherence, at Headquarters and field locations; to assess the cost effectiveness of the system, namely, whether it provides its key stakeholders with value for money; and to identify gaps and improvements required in its resourcing, governance and management.

C. Scope

11. The scope of the review is system-wide. It covers the United Nations, its funds and programmes and specialized agencies, focusing on the participating organizations of the Joint Inspection Unit and members of the Inter-Agency Security Management Network. However, the strategic review of the Department of Safety and Security provided further information with which to develop the present report. As a result of the Department's review, a number of areas were identified for further strengthening, with an immediate focus on security analysis, physical security and a resource surge strategy. It was also the intention of the Department to develop further and enhance the following areas: headquarter support functions; the security risk management process; safety and security qualitative evaluation; crisis management; policy support; lessons learned and best practices; close protection; firearms management; hostage incident management; and safety policy and standards.

12. In addition, the review undertaken by the Department of Safety and Security looked into its relationship with the United Nations security management system, identifying the need to examine further the system in order to ascertain if it is the most efficient and effective way to deliver safety and security to the entire United Nations system, and if it is reflective of the current and future operating environment and therefore “fit for purpose”.

13. The present review does not cover the internal issues related to the Department of Safety and Security, avoiding duplication of efforts and the overlapping with the Department's own review. However, it builds upon the work done by the Department, focusing on the above-mentioned need and on the services that it, as main actor of the United Nations security management system, needs to effectively provide to the United Nations system; it addresses strategic system-wide issues but does not look into specific technical areas of safety and

security (e.g., aviation, maritime and information technologies, etc.), which should be part of specific individual reviews undertaken separately with the support of qualified experts.

14. It is not the purpose of the present review to produce an extensive follow-up of all 46 recommendations included in the report of the Independent Panel. However, a general perception, which can be confirmed in the review, was that a number of those recommendations remain outstanding. Nevertheless, one of the objectives of the review is to assess the improvement of the United Nations security management system in response to areas identified in the aforementioned report. In that regard, it should be noted that the report of the Independent Panel evaluated the strategic issues vital to the delivery and enhancement of the security of United Nations personnel and premises and the changing threats and risks faced by it. It also examined the vulnerabilities of United Nations operations around the world. In addition, it studied specific responses of host countries, and identified fundamental lessons drawn from previous reports. In its report, the Independent Panel made a number of recommendations relating to conflict prevention, peacebuilding and peacekeeping, as well as administrative and structural changes to United Nations peace operations. In summary, the report highlighted the need for: strategy and support for operations; a robust doctrine; realistic peacekeeping mandates; new capacity for information management and strategic analysis; improved mission guidance and leadership; rapid deployment standards; enhanced headquarters capacity to plan and support peace operations; and the establishment of integrated mission task forces.

15. In its report, the Independent Panel stressed several points, such as: (a) a strong requirement for unified capacity concerning policy, standards and coordination; (b) communication and compliance; (c) further enhancements to security-related information-sharing, threat analysis, risk assessment and contingency planning; (d) other aspects of security risk management, including protective measures for United Nations premises; (e) the need for a security culture and a shift in mindset from a “when to leave” to a “how to stay” approach; (f) the ability to respond to the complex and shifting security challenges faced by United Nations personnel; (g) the need for more clarity on roles and accountability to ensure full compliance with the overall United Nations security framework and its requirements; and (h) an effective set of security measures for personnel in field locations. Finally, the review contained criticism of the complexity and fragmentation of the security financing model, noting that the United Nations approach to protection at the field level suffers from a lack of political and financial support, both from United Nations headquarters and Member States.

16. The Inspectors believe that there should be a focus on “strategic issues” vital to the delivery and enhancement of the security of United Nations personnel and premises and the changing threats and risks faced by the United Nations security management system. In their view, the different issues identified by the Independent Panel can be grouped into five different strategic areas: **security culture, security-related information management, safety and security standards, security crisis management and surge capacity, and resources and finance.**

D. Methodology

17. In accordance with the internal standards and guidelines of the Joint Inspection Unit and its internal working procedures, the methodology followed in preparing the present report included a preliminary desk review, corporate questionnaires, interviews, focus groups with international and national staff, and in-depth analysis. Detailed questionnaires were sent to all participating organizations. On the basis of the responses received, the Inspectors conducted interviews with officials — both management and staff — of the participating organizations and sought the views of relevant representatives of Member States. As part of the review, the Inspectors held interviews at Headquarters (i.e. New York, Geneva and Rome) and undertook field missions in the following countries: the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Haiti, Kenya, Lebanon (North and South), Somalia, South Sudan and Uganda. In addition, two senior security consultants provided technical expertise. Comments from participating organizations on the draft report were sought and have been taken into account in finalizing the report.

18. It should be noted that, as an additional outcome of the field missions undertaken, a confidential management letter⁶ was prepared by the Joint Inspection Unit and addressed to the Department of Safety and Security in an effort to share with senior management the specific findings emanating from the field missions. It contained recommendations for addressing the issues that, in the view of the Inspectors, needed to be tackled.

19. The Inspectors had the opportunity to present the findings and recommendations emanating from their field missions and contribute to a general debate on safety and security, including a discussion with members of the Inter-Agency Security Management Network, on the five strategic areas indicated above at a meeting held on 23 June 2015 in Montreux, Switzerland. Those discussions have also served to inform the present review.

20. In accordance with article 11 (2) of the Joint Inspection Unit statute, the present report has been finalized after a consultation among the Inspectors so as to test its conclusions and recommendations against the collective wisdom of the Unit.

21. To facilitate the handling of the report and the implementation and monitoring of the recommendations contained herein, annex II contains a table indicating whether the report has been submitted to the organizations concerned for action or for information. The table identifies those recommendations relevant for each organization, specifying whether they require a decision by the organization's legislative or governing body or can be acted upon by the organization's executive head.

22. The Inspectors wish to express their appreciation to all who assisted them in the preparation of the report, and particularly to the Department of Safety and Security, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and WFP for their support, and to those who participated in the interviews and so willingly shared their knowledge and expertise.

II. HOST COUNTRY CONSIDERATIONS

23. The Inspectors would like to reiterate that the main responsibility for the safety and security of United Nations personnel and premises rests with the host country authorities, as widely recognized in international law and reflected in multiple resolutions of the General Assembly. As stated in the framework of accountability, that responsibility flows from every Government's normal and inherent function of maintaining order and protecting persons and property within its jurisdiction. In the case of international organizations and their officials, the Government is considered to have a special responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations or the Government's agreements with the individual organizations.

24. In the view of the Inspectors, the primary responsibility of the host country and its relationship with the United Nations security management system does not fit in any of the strategic areas previously defined for the preparation of the present review; it is a cross-cutting theme that affects several areas.

25. The support of the host Government is essential, *inter alia*, in the regular sharing of information relevant for the security of United Nations personnel and premises. Timeliness in sharing relevant information and taking appropriate action are also essential when the security of personnel may be at risk. The relationship with the host country is crucial for operations at different levels, such as the timely provision of visas to United Nations security personnel when surge and emergency deployments are needed or the prompt customs clearance of United Nations equipment. Those issues are discussed later in the review within each of the strategic areas affected.

26. The Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, done at New York on 9 December 1994 and its Optional Protocol form a legal framework supporting enhanced security measures and actions to be undertaken by host countries. As at June 2016, the Convention had been ratified by only 93

⁶ [JIU/ML/2015/1](http://www.unjiu.org/en/reports-notes/JIU%20Products/JIU_REP_2015_1_English.pdf), available from www.unjiu.org/en/reports-notes/JIU%20Products/JIU_REP_2015_1_English.pdf.

States. **The Inspectors would like to encourage Member States that have not yet done so to ratify the Convention as an expression of their determination to protect the lives of those working in support of their local populations.**

27. In that regard, it should be noted that some host country agreements were established a long time ago. However, the security environment worldwide has changed drastically over the years, and some agreements do not reflect the current security needs. The issue was addressed by OIOS in 2010, at which time it recommended that security provisions be revised, included in host country agreements. The Department of Safety and Security accepted that recommendation and initiated a pilot project involving negotiations of the supplementary host country agreements with respect to United Nations headquarters locations. Nonetheless, feedback received from officials within the United Nations security management system and the host countries that participated in the pilot project was not supportive, and the project was dropped.

28. **The Inspectors believe that host country agreements should be consistent with the primary responsibility of host country authorities and consequently reflect the specific security local context, including relevant security provisions, and should be updated regularly. In that regard, they encourage host countries to fulfil their responsibility and make every effort to provide United Nations organizations with the safest environment possible.**

29. An annex on security, to be updated systematically, could be attached to current and future agreements in order to reflect the changing security environment and the preventive measures necessary to be taken by the parties involved.

30. In order to have a consistent approach on the issue, the Department of Safety and Security should provide technical support to United Nations organizations in the preparation and subsequent updates of specific security annexes. From a legal perspective, and taking into consideration that different United Nations organizations present in a given location have similar security requirements vis-à-vis the host country authorities, the Office of Legal Affairs could provide the legal advice necessary, including the preparation of a common annex template to be used by United Nations organizations. In accordance with the framework of accountability, it is the responsibility of the designated officer to initiate and coordinate relevant negotiations with the host country authorities.

Recommendation 1

The Executive Heads of United Nations system organizations, through the respective designated officers and in coordination with the Department of Safety and Security and the Office of Legal Affairs, should ensure that, by no later than April 2018:

- **Existing host country agreements within their respective organizations reflect the current security threats and contain commensurate security measures necessary to protect United Nations system organizations' personnel and premises**
- **Future host country agreements contain a security annex reflecting the main responsibility of the host country with respect to the security of United Nations system organizations' personnel and premises**
- **Existing and future host country agreements are regularly reviewed to reflect and adapt to changes in the respective security environments**

III. SECURITY CULTURE

A. Need for a security culture: the United Nations system is a target

31. A culture of safety and security is the cornerstone of any security system and provides a common understanding of the importance and need of safe and secure operating environments, where safety and security are understood as intrinsic components of operations necessary to achieve programmatic goals, not as an overhead or afterthought. For the purpose of simplicity, the present review refers simply to a “security culture”, and includes in that term the safety aspect. A security culture helps to develop alertness and understand the different contexts and security implications of the work undertaken by United Nations personnel where security is not seen as an obstacle but as an enabler.

32. A security culture is established by the appropriate induction and training of personnel at different levels; maintaining awareness through regular practice and relevant information-sharing; promoting best practices; and ensuring compliance with pertinent policies and security measures approved at the local level.

33. The establishment of a system-wide security culture is a multidimensional and unceasing undertaking. It is related and influenced by diverse organizational factors such as history, strategies, type of employees, management styles, etc. It does not happen overnight and requires the involvement of several actors, including not only security management but also leadership and senior substantive management of organizations, which should lead by example. The United Nations security management system comprises different entities with individual organizational cultures (i.e. humanitarian, peacekeeping, etc.) and different mandates. However, the interaction and cooperation between organizations is important and frequent and takes multiple forms. In some cases, employees of one organization are hosted on another organization’s premises; in other instances, bigger organizations provide services to smaller ones (i.e. UNDP provides safety and security services to the regional offices of WMO, etc.). **The Inspectors believe that it is possible to promote a basic system-wide security culture through common undertakings (i.e. training, supervision, etc.). Furthermore, they are convinced that it is not only possible, but also necessary.**


34. United Nations personnel frequently operate in difficult security environments characterized by one or more of the following threat categories, as defined in the structured threat assessment model: armed conflict, terrorism, crime, civil unrest and hazards. In addition to general threats, such as harassment, burglary and robbery (see table 1 below for additional categories), United Nations personnel are subject to additional threats in certain locations (i.e. the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia and South Sudan) simply because they work for the United Nations. This is a serious issue in particular for local personnel, as determined by the Inspectors in their field missions. In that regard, the report of the Independent Panel indicated that the United Nations is being targeted by terrorists for what it is and what it represents, not because its people happen to be in the wrong place at the wrong time or for what any part of the organization happens to have done at a particular place, at a particular time. As such, the threat is not confined to any one country or region.

35. The Inspectors are also convinced that the United Nations system is a target for certain terrorist groups, simply for what it is. Attacks in the past against the United Nations prove this assertion, and the organized attacks in Baghdad (August 2003), Algiers (December 2007), Abuja (August 2011), Mogadishu (June 2013), Kabul (January 2014) and Garowe (April 2015) are all still fresh in our memories.

36. In recent years, security threats have become more difficult to measure, monitor or tackle due to the globalization process and its complexity. Furthermore, according to the *Global Terrorism Index for 2015* of the Institute for Economics and Peace,⁷ the level of global terrorist activity has greatly increased in the past decade, as indicated in Figure 1 below. This increase is of particular significance in some countries where the United Nations system operates.

⁷ Institute for Economics and Peace, *Global Terrorism Index 2015*, available from <http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2015.pdf>.

Figure 1
Terrorist incidents, 2000-2015



Source: Global Terrorism Index database

37. It should be noted that, according to the Institute for Economics and Peace, terrorist activity increased by 80 per cent in 2014 to its highest recorded level. The largest ever year-on-year increase in deaths from terrorism was recorded in 2014, when it rose from 18,111 in 2013 to 32,685. The number of people who have died from terrorist activity has increased more than nine-fold since 2000;⁸ this is a concerning trend to be taken into consideration by the United Nations security management system, which has evolved in the development of relevant mitigation measures (e.g., training, additional funding for minimum operating security standards requirements and the implementation of a new security risk management model).

38. However, terrorism is just one of the threats affecting United Nations personnel, who frequently operate in areas affected by several threat categories converging in the same location. United Nations and humanitarian personnel continue to be exposed to other significant security incidents, which have in certain cases resulted in death, injury or abduction, as well as other incidents such as robbery, residence break-ins, aggravated sexual assault, burglary, intimidation, harassment, arrest and detention. Table 1 below shows the number of staff affected by different types of security incidents in the past five years.

Table 1
United Nations civilian personnel affected by security incidents from 2010 to June 2016



Category of safety and security incidents	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Fatalities resulting from of acts of violence	5	26	19	18	15	23	5
Fatalities resulting from safety-related incidents	19	44	15	10	15	16	7
Injuries resulting from of acts of violence	68	145	112	82	65	99	33
Injuries resulting from safety-related incidents	164	166	209	144	101	130	3
Abduction	12	21	31	17	6	21	2
Robbery	239	417	408	314	530	511	242
Residence break-in	35	20	31	23	37	72	41

⁸ Ibid.

Category of safety and security incidents	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Aggravated assault	64	31	44	35	104	81	40
Sexual assault	9	5	4	4	8	12	13
Burglary of residence	385	418	493	322	430	380	150
Intimidation	210	224	209	81	149	228	107
Harassment	17	46	52	27	146	177	67
Arrest and detention	211	195	165	138	128	69	39
Total	1 438	1 759	1 793	1 216	1 734	1 819	749

Source: Report of the Secretary-General on safety and security of humanitarian personnel and protection of United Nations personnel (A/71/395).

39. The table above shows that 2015 saw the highest number of incidents in the past five years. **The Inspectors are concerned by the increase of violent acts against United Nations personnel.** Figures 2 and 3 below show a comparison for the period 2010-2015 between the fatalities and injuries caused by acts of violence and those resulting from safety issues (e.g., road accidents, etc.). As figure 3 shows, the number of fatalities caused by safety issues from 2012 to 2015 is very similar to the number of fatalities caused by violence. While the number of safety-related incidents can be reduced, as safety relates mainly to internal factors that can be acted upon (e.g., safer behaviour, compliance, stricter controls, etc.) acts of violence are more difficult to predict, they are caused mainly by external factors often beyond the control of organizations.



B. Staff safety

40. A security culture is reflected in the approach that personnel take when performing all types of functions, including routine ones. **The safety of personnel can be enhanced simply by promoting and embracing a security culture. However, staff safety is not only the responsibility of staff; United Nations organizations**

have a responsibility as employers. In that regard, the framework of accountability is very clear about the responsibility of senior management, indicating that the Secretary-General delegates to the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security the authority to make executive decisions relevant to the overall safety and security of United Nations personnel, premises and assets at field and headquarters locations. Furthermore, the Inspectors understand that Executive Heads of United Nations organizations have an equivalent responsibility for the safety of personnel within their respective organizations. In that regard, the framework of accountability states that the Executive Heads of the agencies, funds and programmes of the United Nations are responsible and accountable to the Secretary-General for ensuring that the goal of the United Nations security management system is met within their respective organizations. Without prejudice to their accountability to their own governing and legislative bodies. The designated officer and the Security Management Team are accountable at the country or designated area level for the safety of personnel.

41. The designated officer and Security Management Team should ensure that the United Nations organizations present in a given location comply with pertinent safety regulations of the host country and engage with local bodies responsible for civil safety whenever possible. In order to safeguard United Nations premises and the lives of personnel, it is of key importance to have direct access and well-coordinated procedures among United Nations organizations and local civil safety services (e.g., fire departments, health services, including hospitals and ambulance services, local police, etc.).


42. As described in subsequent paragraphs and in the above-mentioned confidential letter prepared by the Joint Inspection Unit, **the Inspectors had the opportunity to observe deficiencies in the implementation of safety and security policies in the field and, in that regard, they recall the need to fulfil the responsibility of United Nations organizations as employers by complying with international labour standards on occupational safety and health, including pertinent recommendations, in particular the ILO Occupational Safety and Health Convention, 1981 (No. 155).**

C. Road safety

43. One of the most dangerous activities for United Nations personnel, identified by the number of incidents, is road transportation; the number of fatalities resulting from road accidents remains high when compared with those caused by acts of violence, averaging over 15 fatalities per year, as reflected in figure 4 below.

Figure 4

Road fatalities (2010 to June 2016)



Source: Report of the Secretary-General on safety and security of humanitarian personnel and protection of United Nations personnel (A/70/383) and data by the Department of Safety and Security.

44. The Inspectors observed insufficient implementation of current road safety procedures and a lack of regard for basic safety and regulations in place. The Inspectors also noticed deficiencies in the implementation of road safety requirements, including passengers and often drivers not wearing seat belts, and no first aid kits of any kind found in several United Nations vehicles during the inspection tour. Furthermore,

proper security briefings of all persons entering high-threat environments by vehicle should also include an introduction to the communication devices in the vehicle and what the passengers' roles are in case of driver incapacitation. **There must be a change in attitude regarding attention to vehicle safety and basic safety regulations. Provisions included in the road safety section of the Security Policy Manual should be enforced.** If there is non-compliance with "minor" regulations (e.g., wearing seat belts), then more important ones (e.g., concerning drunk or reckless driving) will never be followed. **Management and security staff must set an example at all times by refusing to be in a vehicle that does not comply fully with road safety regulations.**

45. As required in the minimum operating security standards policy, every vehicle should include a simple basic first aid kit that drivers are trained to use. Threadbare tires were found even in areas like Goma, Democratic Republic of the Congo, where the roads are no more than dirt tracks. Despite the provisions in the policy relating to vehicles, there was no vehicle recovery devices (e.g., chains or tow ropes) in most of the vehicles in which the Joint Inspection Unit team rode. **Vehicle maintenance is not only a safety issue but also could easily become a security one.** Changing a flat tire takes time and can become a security issue if the need arises when in certain locations. The minimum operating security standards require just one spare tire for all vehicles, including field vehicles; however, if traveling in the field, the Inspectors are of the view that heavy-duty vehicles should carry two spare tires or at least an additional inflation tire sealant kit.

46. United Nations vehicles in Juba and at other locations are frequently equipped with speed limit reporting devices, which sends a report by computer when the vehicle exceeds the speed limit. United Nations drivers on routine missions often ignore the device alerts and, at times, drive at any speed they wish, as was observed by the Joint Inspection Unit team on a road trip from Goma to Kiwanja, when a United Nations car crossed a village at high speed to the point of endangering children and other pedestrians walking along roadways, causing large dust clouds which disturb pedestrians and soldiers who frequently yell, wave angrily and throw rocks at speeding United Nations vehicles. There must be consequences for speeding and reckless driving and this is the responsibility of individual United Nations security management system organizations. An appropriate penalty-type system should be instituted and implemented for drivers who speed or drive in a reckless manner. As recognized in the road safety policy, in addition to representing a safety and security risk for staff, the reputation of the United Nations as caring for the welfare of national citizens is at stake when well-marked vehicles are driven in a reckless manner.

47. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, senior management reported that, after three incidents of driving while intoxicated, staff members are no longer allowed to drive United Nations vehicles. According to reports, however, few if any staff have had their driving privileges revoked. The Inspectors believe that there should be a zero-tolerance policy for any incidents of driving United Nations motor vehicles while under the influence of alcohol. In the view of Inspectors, the provisions in the road safety policy requiring drivers not to operate vehicles, in any situation or under any circumstance, while under the influence of any substance that may impair their ability to operate the vehicle, should be strictly enforced.

48. In 2015, following the recommendations in its strategic review, the Department of Safety and Security developed a new revised compliance concept. According to the concept, the most senior security professional is expected to conduct an assessment of the United Nations security management system policies, including the road safety policy, on an annual basis. In their confidential letter, the Inspectors urged the Department to **take additional measures to promote compliance of all United Nations personnel in the field with provisions included in the road safety policy contained in the Security Policy Manual**, combining broad informative campaigns with the application by relevant management of disciplinary measures. In addition, the Inspectors strongly recommended the use of rewarding measures in accordance with proposals in the road safety policy, to encourage United Nations system organizations to implement programmes to reward drivers with a safe driving record. The Inspectors are not aware of any reward scheme in place so far in any of the locations visited.

49. The Inspectors are pleased to note that a revised road safety manual was issued by the Department of Field Support⁹ and that road safety is on the 2016 agenda of the Inter-Agency Security Management Network, in accordance with its recommendation that an overarching road safety strategy be formulated for the security management system and, if necessary, an umbrella policy for road safety, taking into consideration the diverse activities and needs of organizations. In that regard, the United Nations will work in cooperation with the new Special Envoy for Road Safety, who was appointed on 29 April 2015.¹⁰ A working group of the Network comprising 13 different organizations and departments across four major functional areas (i.e., security, medical, human resources and fleet management) has been established and is working in cooperation with the Special Envoy. Its work, goals and timeline were fully supported by the Network in June 2016. The Inspectors hope that some of the issues and ideas mentioned above may serve as a basis for the preparation of a new comprehensive road safety policy for the United Nations security management system.

Recommendation 2

The Executive Heads of the United Nations system organizations, through the Inter-Agency Security Management Network and the Department of Safety and Security, should ensure that, by no later than January 2018, a comprehensive system-wide policy for road safety is finalized and ready for implementation within each of their respective organizations.

D. Security culture: a work in progress

50. In 2004, the Security in Iraq Accountability Panel issued a report¹¹ in which it indicated that the organization and its staff would continue to have to accept risks and that the challenge would be to ensure that the organization has in place, for any given operation, a range of security measures commensurate with the degree of risk of that operation. This would require not only sufficient security resources, staff and training, but also a security culture within the organization.

51. The United Nations security management system has unquestionably evolved since then, moving from a security phase system — considered to be one of the main difficulties faced in the field — to a risk-management philosophy of “how to stay”, based on the structured use of risk analysis. Furthermore, new policies have been developed and inter-agency cooperation is more robust. However, the basic challenges currently faced by the system are the same ones indicated in the previous paragraph. The system must provide security for approximately 180,000 personnel and 300,000 dependants in very different environments, ranging from major cities to deep field locations, that are frequently affected by crime, natural hazards, social instability and often armed conflict. In addition, it must provide preventive measures and sufficient responses to global threats, such as terrorism. The task is not simple and poses tremendous challenges.

52. In 2009, CEB stated that thousands of women and men working for the United Nations system around the world regularly faced violence and threats and that, given the increasingly difficult and dangerous conditions faced by staff, the United Nations was at a critical juncture. Adding that urgent and dramatic action was needed to strengthen a United Nations security framework, it stressed the need to adopt a shift in culture and mindset from a “when to leave” to a “how to stay” approach to security management.¹²

⁹ Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support, “Road Safety Management in the Field”, available from http://dag.un.org/bitstream/handle/11176/400554/2016.07_Road%20Safety%20Manual_Oct16.pdf?sequence=4&isAllowed=y.

¹⁰ See report of the Secretary-General on safety and security of humanitarian personnel and protection of United Nations personnel (A/70/383), para. 55.

¹¹ Available from www.un.org/News/dh/iraq/SIAP-report.pdf.

¹² CEB/2009/HLCM/18, annex A.

53. Despite efforts made to embed security in the programme criticality framework and to promote a new managerial culture and new strategic vision, including a policy shift calling for a review of the architecture of the United Nations security management system to balance security with programme requirements, the Inspectors, on the basis of observations described below and interviews held during their field missions, believe that there is a need to strengthen further the security culture across the United Nations system organizations at all levels, from senior management to staff and including other personnel for which the organizations might have a security responsibility.

54. The proper implementation of security policies, compliance with relevant rules and personnel behaviour are all a reflection of a security culture. The Inspectors observed during the field missions some deficiencies in the implementation of security measures (e.g., access control and perimeter protection deficiencies, limited maintenance of security and safety equipment, substandard vehicle safety, poor implementation of radio checks, etc.). They witnessed variations of the security measures applied within the same security threat area. For example, in South Sudan, some complexes are walled with guarded gates while others have no walls, only pushed down chain-link fences with gaping holes in them. The findings from field missions to eight countries, representing a sample of very different threat environments, including peacekeeping, point to a need to reinforce the security culture of United Nations system organizations.

55. Given the nature of the work of the United Nations, it is difficult to provide absolute residential safety and security for staff, especially where the host Governments, owing to economic difficulties or lack of personnel, may not be able to provide the protection necessary. In that respect, the main goal of the minimum operating residential security standards was to provide staff with a reasonable level of security at their residence according to the risk level assessed for a given location. A common cause of residential security issues is often a lack of security culture. For example, in Haiti, officials interviewed indicated that physical security and standard procedures are in place. The Department of Safety and Security has a significant role to play at the local level ensuring security measures are properly implemented and maintaining staff awareness. However, compliance with the standards was very low (i.e. about 40 per cent out of total staff concerned), owing more to inadequate attitudes and behaviours of residents than to the evident lack of security personnel necessary for inspections of staff residences. As noted by the Inspectors during the focus groups conducted with international staff in the different field missions, staff did not embrace the standards and frequently challenged what was often deemed a bureaucratic system of regulations.

56. The minimum operating residential security standards policy was abolished at the end of 2015 and replaced by residential security measures, which are intended to clarify further and improve the old policy.¹³ The Inspectors welcome such measures since it was clear during their field visits that implementation of the standards was low. In that regard, it is important that the oversight bodies of the United Nations security management system closely monitor such measures.

57. The Inspectors recognize the efforts made by United Nations organizations in developing new common security policies contributing to the establishment of a common security culture. Progress has been achieved, as new policies have been promulgated in the past two years (e.g., an updated version of the “Saving Lives Together” framework, policies for air travel, the safety and security incident recording system, residential security measures, the management of stress and critical incident stress, gender considerations in security management, arming of security personnel, armed private security services and the role of the Department of Safety and Security, among others). In addition, an enhanced security risk management process was launched in December 2015 with a new policy and manual. Areas under review that are either being considered or developed include the road safety strategy, residential security risks for locally recruited personnel and crisis management in the field.

¹³ See the Field Security Handbook (2006), chap. V, sect. H, available from http://psm.du.edu/media/documents/international_regulation/united_nations/other/un_field_security_handbook.pdf.

58. The Inspectors welcome the regular dialogue among United Nations system organizations in the context of the Inter-Agency Security Management Network, and the planned development and/or update of relevant security policies, among which field crisis management, road safety and residential security risks for locally recruited personnel should be given priority. Those areas were the subject of extensive discussions and a sample of cross-cutting issues reported during most of the interviews held in the field. In particular, road safety deserves special attention, as discussed below. **The Inspectors are of the opinion that, although new and/or updated security policies may be needed, the issue rests mainly with the consistent implementation and enforcement of the current ones.**

59. The Inspectors welcome the initiative taken by those organizations (e.g. UNFPA) that have included mandatory security training as part of the performance appraisal and development systems for all staff at all levels, including a central facility for compliance monitoring. UNHCR has issued guidance to managers in high-risk environments and Heads of Office who hold such responsibilities as area security coordinator, to include safety and security in the assessment of performance. In the view of Inspectors, performance appraisal systems should contemplate the security requirements specific to the location where staff perform their functions.

Recommendation 3

The Executive Heads of the United Nations system organizations that have not yet done so should ensure that, by no later than January 2018, appropriate security compliance mechanisms commensurate with the risk level assessed in each particular duty station are included in the individual performance appraisal systems in place for all staff within their respective organizations.

E. Maintaining security awareness: limited drilling of security and safety procedures

60. As mentioned above, security training is of key importance for the development of a common security culture but is not enough on its own. Safety and security awareness should be maintained over time, and security-related skills and procedures should be tested and put into practice regularly. In addition, compliance with security regulations (e.g., radio checks, etc.) and the regular and timely distribution of security relevant information to personnel are considered major factors contributing to maintain security awareness.

61. The Inspectors are convinced certain areas require special attention and practice, including the regular testing of security procedures and plans. That issue is detailed in subsequent paragraphs and was reported to the Department of Safety and Security in the aforementioned confidential management letter, given its responsibility at the country level.

62. The Security Policy Manual, in its section on measures to avoid risk, contains provisions for the preparation of relocation and evacuation plans. The minimum operating security standards require that building emergency and evacuation plans be established for all United Nations offices and facilities. Furthermore, plans should be tested through exercises at least every six months. However, despite the existence of policies and plans, staff interviewed frequently reported that security drills were conducted occasionally. In some cases, it was indicated that there had been no security drills for more than six months in particular locations.

63. The Inspectors could ascertain through field interviews and focus group meetings with staff that evacuation plan drills were often partial but mostly “table-top” theoretical exercises, i.e. neither distributed to staff members nor systematically tested. Evacuation plans should be distributed, staff should be made aware of what would be expected of them during evacuations, and key elements relevant to their evacuation must be disseminated. In addition, plans must be drilled. Whenever feasible, the Inspectors highlight the need to coordinate with and include local authorities in the planning and drilling of evacuation plans.

64. When asked at focus group meetings what they would do if they heard gunfire in the hallway outside your office, most respondents at different locations did not have a clear idea of what might be the proper course of action and, based on their statements, the Inspectors concluded that none had been drilled on such a scenario.

65. Security quick drills are scheduled drills that last no more than 15 minutes, with the aim of developing a safety and security culture and maintaining staff awareness and relevant skills. Selected staff members are brought together and told of a security problem or issue (e.g. gunfire is heard outside the building, a car bomb has gone off, a colleague has collapsed from an apparent heart attack, there is a heavy odour of smoke in the building, etc.). The issue is then discussed, and the staff are asked to formulate an immediate plan of action. Systems and reactions are tested by security staff, who should monitor the exercise. Safe rooms are located, and first aid kits and fire extinguishers are inspected. Formal base/area-wide drills should be conducted at least once every six months to test all staff, the communication systems and the reaction times of the security staff and other emergency services. In the view of the Inspectors, the Department of Safety and Security and the security management of the agencies, funds and programmes should consider measures to develop further and maintain a security culture among staff, including periodic (e.g. biannually in low-risk areas, quarterly in high-risk areas) security quick drills.

Recommendation 4

The Department of Safety and Security, in coordination with the Executive Heads of United Nations system organizations and the respective designated officers, should ensure that, by no later than January 2018, evacuation plans are available in every location where those organizations operate, distributed to staff and regularly drilled in coordination, when possible, with local authorities.

F. Maintaining security awareness: the role of management

66. Several sources have recognized the importance of management in promoting a security culture. Managers have been described as the single most important element in both augmenting the security culture and in ensuring effective and appropriate security management,¹⁴ and it has been stated that a change in culture is needed and will only come about when senior managers see security as a strategic instrument for achieving substantive goals.¹⁵ It has also been stated that managers are responsible for the security of their staff who, in turn, are responsible to observe instructions and follow procedures designed to protect their security.¹⁶

67. The Inspectors are convinced of the key role that programme management plays in promoting a security culture by facilitating and promoting compliance with established security regulations, and observed different behaviours in that regard during their interviews. Representatives of some organizations pay very close attention to compliance with security requirements and even include in individual performance assessment mechanisms the relevant provisions for the proper compliance with security regulations. For example, one programme representative indicated that, if a member of staff misses two radio checks, a record is included in his or her individual performance assessment. Others take a more relaxed approach. It should be noted that not all of the provisions in the minimum operating security standards policy are mandatory. The standards are not global, and must instead be justified and approved at the local level. Radio checks are only mandatory at those locations where the security situation requires them. Although they were required in most of the locations visited by the Inspectors, the team witnessed the poor and uneven implementation of radio checks during several field visits. Furthermore, the minimum operating security policy requires that all international

¹⁴ See the report of the Steering Committee on Security Policy and Policy Implementation, available from www.unhcr.org/425e72672.pdf.

¹⁵ See "Towards a Culture of Security and Accountability", para. 16.

¹⁶ See General Assembly resolution 59/276, paras. 15 and 16.

personnel, drivers, wardens and national personnel deemed “essential” be issued with hand-held VHF/UHF radios and stresses that radio checks are to be conducted routinely.¹⁷

68. Often, security and safety policies exist but are enforced inconsistently. The framework of accountability for the United Nations security management system¹⁸ refers clearly to the accountability of United Nations personnel, indicating that personnel, regardless of rank or level, have the responsibility to abide by security policies, guidelines, directives, plans and procedures of the United Nations security management system and their organizations.

69. Lack of compliance often becomes a safety or security issue. The Inspectors are firmly convinced that the current level of safety and security of staff can be enhanced in a cost-effective manner simply by achieving higher levels of compliance with current security regulations. Substantive management at all levels is essential in that regard and should be held accountable for the implementation of security protocols within their respective areas of responsibility.

70. An example of the use of best practices is at UNFPA, where safety and security are streamlined in corporate policies, procedures and practices. An online work-plan management tool includes specific tasks and indicators on security compliance for managers, with assessments at the middle and end of the year.

71. Management should not only oversee and ensure compliance with security regulations, but also lead by example. However, this is not always the case: during interviews, national security staff at Juba and Goma stated that they were often intimidated by management to make exceptions or allowances for them regarding the rule about displaying identification cards or stopping their cars at entrances to compounds. At Entebbe, it was reported that a visiting senior manager had formally complained about guards stopping her and demanding identification and an explanation of the purpose of her visit, as was their duty. In the view of the Inspectors, **management, including senior management, must set the example by complying with all security requirements.**

72. More needs to be done regarding the enforcement of current regulations and standards with a view to further strengthening a security culture among United Nations personnel. Staff and managers alike must respect the system. The concept of compliance with security regulations is a key component of any security management system. Disciplinary measures are necessary, inter alia, to maintain the respect for the system, and are the last resort to address inappropriate professional conduct of staff and managers who deliberately contravene policies, rules or regulations. The issue of security compliance has been recognized for a long time; it should be noted that, in approving the establishment of the Department of Safety and Security, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General and Executive Heads to strengthen security compliance, including disciplinary measures.¹⁹

73. A common theme reported to Inspectors by senior managers of the Department of Safety and Security, and throughout field missions, is that policies, staff rules and regulations make it difficult, if not impossible, to discipline in a timely and appropriate manner those staff who violate security protocols. Cases of theft, sexual harassment, drunk or reckless driving and other serious or minor violations are often left uncorrected owing to cumbersome rules and procedures that frequently require disciplinary action to be approved at distant Headquarters locations.

74. The Inspectors could observe that the issue of addressing misconduct in a timely and proper manner was exacerbated in peacekeeping contexts, where military personnel are easily and understandably identified by the local populations as United Nations staff. Efforts have been made to strengthen conduct and discipline within

¹⁷ See minimum operating security standards, appendix 1.2., available from [https://popp.undp.org/UNDP_POPP_DOCUMENT_LIBRARY/Public/UN%20Minimum%20Operating%20Security%20Standards%20\(2009\).pdf](https://popp.undp.org/UNDP_POPP_DOCUMENT_LIBRARY/Public/UN%20Minimum%20Operating%20Security%20Standards%20(2009).pdf).

¹⁸ Available from https://undg.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/SPM_II_B_Framework_of_Accountability_04.02.2011.pdf.

¹⁹ See General Assembly resolution 59/276, paras. 15 and 16.

peacekeeping operations, through the integrated conduct and discipline framework established in 2012 and the work of the conduct and discipline units. However, serious deficiencies persist more than 10 years after the United Nations began addressing the issue of sexual exploitation and abuse in peacekeeping operations. **The Inspectors are concerned by the frustration of certain managers in the field, who are unable to properly address certain cases of misconduct, leading inevitably to a culture of enforcement avoidance.** Responsibilities for prevention and enforcement are dispersed at the mission level, at Headquarters and at national capitals for allegations against military and police personnel. The current system whereby the Secretariat follows up with Member States any disciplinary or legal action taken in such cases remains weak. Secretariat requests often remain unanswered by Member States. In other cases, Member States provide delayed or insufficient information. For civilian staff allegations, internal investigations are lengthy, averaging 16 months between 2008 and 2013.²⁰

75. The framework of accountability includes the responsibility of management at different levels (e.g., representatives of organizations participating in the United Nations security management system and designated officers²¹) to take action against non-compliance with United Nations security policies, practices and procedures. However, there is a need to enhance the timely addressing of misconduct and discipline cases. **The delayed or lack of action in the resolution of misconduct and indiscipline has an adverse impact on staff morale and on their security, sending the wrong message to staff at large, to the individuals concerned and to local populations, when affected.** Local communities are frequently uninformed as to the procedures for reporting incidents of misconduct by United Nations personnel and of the measures taken to prevent, inter alia, sexual exploitation and abuse. **The Inspectors believe that organizations should introduce additional measures, including informative and streamlined procedures, to address misconduct and indiscipline, particularly in high-risk areas.**

76. This undertaking is well beyond the individual responsibility of the Department of Safety and Security, and the issue should be addressed primarily by organizations or through a system-wide commitment at the High-level Committee on Management level; nevertheless, **the Inspectors stress the importance of dealing with security infringements in a timely manner and propose that organizations consider the possibility of establishing special fast-track disciplinary procedures, including local inter-agency boards, to be applied only in high-risk areas under well-defined circumstances and procedures when staff security is threatened.**

Recommendation 5

The Executive Heads of the United Nations system organizations that have not yet done so should, by no later than January 2018, incorporate safety and security compliance indicators in the performance assessments at every management level, including senior management.

G. Maintaining staff security awareness through information provision

77. The management of security information is discussed from a wider perspective in section IV. C. below. The present section only refers to information mechanisms as elements with which to promote a security culture and their role in maintaining security awareness. Organizations must ensure through management that their personnel, regardless of contractual status or whether they are international or local, is given the resources and information necessary to undertake their duties in a secure manner, including information on the security

²⁰ See OIOS, Evaluation Report No. IED-15-001, available from <https://oios.un.org/page/download2/id/13>.

²¹ The Designated Security Official, accredited to the host government as such, is accountable to the Secretary-General through the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security and is responsible for the security of United Nations personnel, premises and assets throughout the country or designated area.

resources available to respond to different risks. The provision of relevant security information is not only a moral and legal requirement, but also a key element for the development of security awareness and the maintenance of a security culture.

78. The minimum operating security standards policy requires that all new United Nations personnel and recognized dependents be provided with security relevant information.²² All personnel should also receive cultural sensitivity briefings appropriate to their country of assignment before or on arrival. The United Nations system operates in different security scenarios that demand different types and means of security information provision. The decision to put in place information provision mechanisms is normally taken by the local Security Management Team composed of the designated officer, who acts as chair, the head of each organization present at the duty station and the Chief Security Adviser/Officer. The Team advises the designated officer on all security-related matters. Frequently, staff information mechanisms costs are shared at the country level depending on the number of personnel of each entity on a pro rata basis; the Inspectors could determine that resources available locally frequently condition the provision of security information.

79. Security information provision mechanisms rely primarily on the communications infrastructure available in the country. However, in certain locations where the communications infrastructure is insufficient or not available, the United Nations is obliged to set up its own telecommunication infrastructure. While testing security information provision mechanisms during their field missions, the Inspectors found the Security Information Operations Centre (SIOC) particularly useful. The Centre is a key facility for managing security issues throughout a given operational area. It normally operates 24 hours a day and provides information and advice on security-related incidents, gathering information from different sources, including staff, who often provide mobile telephone numbers and residential addresses in order to be included in the SMS broadcast service whenever it is available, and in the security plan and emergency notification systems. The Centre communicates with staff through different means, including radio, SMS and e-mail. It provides different functionalities depending on the local context. For example, in South Sudan, it prepares daily updates, briefings and analysis for the Security Management Team, security cell, non-governmental organizations and diplomatic security briefings; acts as the channel to collect security-related information from the Department of Safety and Security field security coordination officer; and shares information with UNMISS, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the international community. Finally, the Centre coordinates security emergency support, providing direction and advice to staff. In the event of evacuation or relocation, staff will be provided with direction and advice by the Centre.

80. In addition to the above-mentioned resources, modern analysis technology can further facilitate the use of social media both as a source of security information and to provide staff with near real-time situational awareness, in particular of unfolding events. Likewise, enhanced information sharing and dissemination could be supported by the coordinated use of existing information technologies. In this regard the United Nations Office of Information and communication Technologies has develop tools for analysis and visualization, as well as for the transparent integration of existing systems.

81. Although the role of the Internet and social media in fuelling violence has been described as extremely alarming,²³ social media can also be a vital source of information for safety and security through the use of data analysis tools. In the case of natural disasters, for example, humanitarian organizations such as the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs use social media and the Digital Humanitarian Network²⁴ for

²² E.g., a country-specific security orientation briefing; a summary/extract of the country security plan and evacuation plan; the relevant country/area-specific security plan; the standard operating procedures and policies; information on compliance with all United Nations security policies; a copy of the current minimum operating security standards and minimum operating residential security standards applicable to the duty station; a briefing and paper on available medical arrangements and how to gain access to them; a copy of the country post-exposure prophylaxis protocol; and procedures in the event of exposure to HIV/AIDS.

²³ See A/71/395, para. 6.

²⁴ A group of volunteers on standby to support disaster response with data analysis, real-time media and social media monitoring, the rapid creation of crisis maps and other technical services. OCHA co-founded the group in 2012.

information-based response and relief services to the affected communities. However, the United Nations security management system neither makes structured use of relevant big data sources, including social media nor has a specialized unit devoted to the analysis and system-wide dissemination of security-related information. Social media is global and, as such, one information analysis centre properly equipped with data analysis tools should be enough to support the whole system. In the view of the Inspectors, this is a responsibility of the Department of Safety and Security, and the United Nations Operations and Crisis Centre, described in subsequent paragraphs, should be the location for such an undertaking, without prejudice to the fact that different agencies have capabilities and interests in this area and are willing to coordinate and share inputs. For example, UNHCR assesses and analyses data concerning global trends in attitudes and receptivity toward refugees and, when this has cross-cutting implications for security, shares information with the organization's field security service.

Recommendation 6

The Department of Safety and Security, in consultation with the Inter-Agency Security Management Network, should, by no later than January 2018, strengthen the analysis capabilities of social media and other relevant big data sources by establishing a central location tasked with the regular analysis and system-wide prompt dissemination of security-related information.

IV. SECURITY-RELATED INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

A. Information cycle

82. The second strategic area of the present review is security information management. This addresses the information cycle, namely, the planning, collecting, analysing, disseminating and storing of relevant information, and the information tools and systems used by the United Nations security management system.

83. Security risk management and risk analysis are an integral part of the United Nations security management system, thus the timely availability of relevant information is crucial for the proper functioning of the system. The ultimate goal is to have, when and where needed, the information required for the timely deployment of security preventive and/or mitigating measures. The exposure of United Nations personnel to different risks, from local risks such as crime, war or armed conflict, to global risks such as terrorism, poses huge challenges to security information management, and requires that information mechanisms be adapted to the context, including the global one.

84. The Inspectors agree with the views expressed in the report of the Independent Panel that the primary responsibility of Member States for the security and safety of United Nations officials and premises is a guiding principle of the United Nations, and that the United Nations as a whole can and should expect that the host Government provides security to the best of its ability. **The central element of the cooperation and trust between the two sides is information-sharing about security conditions.** Indeed, cooperation with national security actors is essential for the United Nations, which, as stated in the report of the Independent Panel, has no intelligence-gathering or analysis capacity of its own, and it relies entirely on that which Member States are willing to provide. The report also states that United Nations officials entrusted with security responsibilities should have direct access to the security services of every host Government in order to ensure the timely exchange of information and common analysis of available facts concerning the safety and security of United Nations personnel, activities and premises. However, the sharing of information by Member States with the

United Nations continues to be determined by national considerations rather than the information needs of the United Nations.

85. There is no definition of the concept of “intelligence” within the United Nations, and that term is rarely used in United Nations documents, despite the view that the United Nations has become a player, albeit a reluctant one, in the global intelligence game.²⁵ Instead, preference is given to the rather general and potentially confusing term “information”. Intelligence remains a controversial issue, and many continue to confound “intelligence” with “espionage”. Consequently, there are still those who claim that intelligence is lacking, as it violates the principles of consent of the parties and of impartiality. However, at the same time, it is generally accepted that a very high percentage of the intelligence gathered originates from open sources. In spite of the disinclination of nations to share intelligence with the United Nations and the latter’s reluctance to even consider itself an intelligence-gathering organization,²⁶ the United Nations has realized that intelligence-gathering does not necessarily entail methods that are illegal or subversive. The Inspectors note the development of a draft framework policy on this issue by the Department of Field Support and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

86. Threat and risk assessments include the collection of relevant information and should provide the essential information required to determine threats and associated risks. The appropriate host government authorities must be consulted during this process. The Inspectors confirmed through interviews in Headquarters and field offices visited that cooperation with host country security services is often fluid and information relevant for staff security is shared. Furthermore, in certain duty stations, it is not rare to have a representative of the host country security services participate and provide security information briefings to local security management teams. However, this is not always the case, in particular in peacekeeping environments or in conflict situations, when the United Nations may be perceived as partial by one of the parties in conflict.

87. Despite the reluctance of the United Nations to be involved in global intelligence, the rising demand for better situational awareness, particularly in peacekeeping contexts, has allowed the Organization to overcome its traditional resistance to the establishment of intelligence bodies within field missions. Joint Mission Analysis Centres (JMAC) have been set up in several peacekeeping operations mainly to support mission planning and decision-making. Although the quality of those Centres varies considerably between different operations, they all possess analytical teams tasked with producing balanced, timely and systematically verified information to support ongoing operations and senior policymakers, especially the mission head. The Centres generally collect, evaluate and analyse information to aid decision-makers in a legitimate and balanced fashion. Information analysis is also performed by Security Information Operations Centres, Security Information Coordination Centres, J2 branches of the Force Headquarters and by the Criminal Intelligence Units of the police components to support planning and decision-making in peacekeeping operations. **In the opinion of Inspectors the information relevant for staff security should be timely shared..**

B. Security information analysis

88. The Department of Safety and Security is responsible for the coordination and information-sharing of all safety- and security-related matters. Within the Department, the Division of Regional Operations includes the Threat and Risk Assessment Unit, which is tasked, inter alia, with identifying in a timely manner threats that may affect civilian personnel, assets and operations of the organizations of the United Nations system, and developing and distributing timely security threat information to the United Nations security management system at Headquarters and in the field. The Division serves as the safety and security focal point for field duty stations, providing primary operational and technical support. It is also responsible for the management of the Communications Centre, which, for the purpose of timely information-sharing, is geographically located within

²⁵ See A. Walter Dorn, "United Nations Peacekeeping Intelligence", chap. 17, available from http://walterdorn.net/pdf/PK-Intell_Dorn_OxfordHandbook_LargePrint_AsPublished-OCR_2010.pdf.

²⁶ Ibid.

the United Nations Operations and Crisis Centre (UNOCC), a jointly staffed Secretariat-wide crisis and coordination centre.²⁷

89. It should be noted that the nature of operations, in particular peacekeeping, condition information management. While in stable environments the main sources of security information are the host Government and open sources such as the media (e.g., press, radio and television broadcasts, etc.), in peacekeeping environments, the United Nations has understandably put in place specific information structures for local information-gathering and analysis that are not available in other contexts, such as Joint Operations Centres (JOC) and JMAC, which are described in subsequent paragraphs. Where they exist, JOC and JMAC are considered “mission-centric” and there are challenges regarding the sharing of relevant information with agencies, funds and programmes.

90. At the Headquarters level, the Assessment Unit, located within the Office of Military Affairs of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, is given analytical responsibilities and should provide a boost for peacekeeping information in the field and at Headquarters. The Office of Military Affairs Assessment Team is a consultative partner for the Department of Safety and Security; it may comment on United Nations security management system assessments for discretionary input and vice-versa.

91. Several external reports have criticized the capacity of the United Nations to gather and analyse information. It has been said that, to be convincing, United Nations indicators and warnings must clearly identify and follow emerging threats. This necessitates not only targeting specific information, but also having the means for thorough analysis, which the United Nations has lacked. Furthermore, United Nations management has seldom appreciated the value of intelligence.²⁸ It has also been said that individuals at both Headquarters and in the field agreed that the United Nations lacks the real-time information and analysis capabilities necessary to adequately protect United Nations staff and assets and successfully implement its mandates.²⁹

92. The issue has also been identified in internal reports. In its programme evaluation of the Department of Safety and Security systems for information management and analysis, OIOS stated that, while the Department had strengthened its overall analytical capacity since 2009, critical gaps in analysis remained and had led to missed opportunities for fully mitigating against risks for United Nations staff, premises and programmes. These included the lack of systematic forecasts and analytical conclusions for the information provided; a lack of customized analysis to be used in programmatic decisions; insufficient analysis about which mitigating measures would be commensurate with identified risks; a lack of regional analyses; and shortcomings with regard to format and dissemination of analyses. It should be noted that the Department of Safety and Security developed the security analysis process and practice course, initiated in 2007. Furthermore, the security analysis handbook, developed by the Department's Threat and Risk Assessment Unit and launched in 2012, provides all the relevant information for security analysts, and is not only intended for use by security analysts, but also by all security professionals under all circumstances. Although the handbook is not a formal manual adopted by the Inter-Agency Security Management Network process, all security professionals throughout the United Nations security management system are encouraged to make use of it.

93. Furthermore, the Department of Safety and Security, in its own strategic review, confirmed the need to strengthen its information analysis capacity, identifying threat and risk analysis as an immediate priority for 2015 and beyond. The Department currently has 10 security analyst posts with country/regional responsibilities.³⁰ The Inspectors welcome the initiative to strengthen analysis capacity, to address a recurrent

²⁷ See Secretary-General's bulletin on organization of the Department of Safety and Security (ST/SGB/2013/5).

²⁸ See "United Nations Peacekeeping Intelligence" (footnote 25 above).

²⁹ See Artiñano et al, "Adapting and Evolving: The Implications of Transnational Terrorism for United Nations Field Missions" (2014), available from www.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/content/docs/591c_Adapting_and_Evolving_The_Implications_of_Transnational_Terrorism.pdf.

³⁰ Regional senior security information analysts at the P-4 level in Bangkok, Dakar, Abuja, Algiers, Amman, Jerusalem, Panama and Manila. In addition, there are country analysts at the P-3 level in Beirut and N'Djamena.

area of discussion with officials interviewed in the field, who repeatedly demanded the strengthening of the Department's analysis capabilities with special emphasis on the regional dimension necessary to properly address transnational threats such as terrorism.

C. Security information-sharing and dissemination: JMAC, SIOC and other systems.

94. Security information is analysed then disseminated and stored using different structures and information systems. The Inspectors found of particular interest the JMAC, JOC and SIOC models. These information structures are key essential for gathering, analysing and disseminating relevant security information at various levels and targeting different audiences.

95. SIOC, discussed in previous paragraphs is an important means to maintain staff security awareness. It is part of the integrated United Nations security management structure located in areas prone to security challenges and where the organizations of the United Nations system have complex operations. The objectives of SIOC are to: develop security awareness; identify security threats; analyse such threats in a timely manner; develop recommendations on a variety of security measures; and provide operational security support to enable the organizations to fulfil their mandates in a more secure manner. To achieve those goals, a SIOC should ideally comprise two cells: analytical and operational.

96. Unfortunately, SIOCs are not available in every United Nations operation. Furthermore, despite being an important tool in all places, they are absent in more stable countries where the United Nations operates. SIOCs have been implemented in a piecemeal approach, heavily influenced by the limited resources available locally and the local presence of different United Nations entities, in particular peacekeeping operations. Responsibilities and resources are shared by the Department of Safety and Security and peacekeeping operations to varying degrees depending on the specific location. There are integrated missions where the Chief of SIOC and perhaps a small number of additional staff are appointed by the Department, while the bulk of the staffing is mission-appointed. Other peacekeeping missions have established entities emulating SIOCs. In 2009 and 2010, the Department established such Centres in Chad, Kenya, Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen, and staffed them with personnel appointed by the Department but administered by UNDP. Those Centres are still operational, except the one in Chad, which was discontinued in 2013 in conjunction with the closure of the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad, after which the posts were redeployed to regional/country analyst functions. In addition to the Department SIOCs, one Senior Operations Officer post is deployed to Afghanistan to lead SIOC in the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, which is staffed by the mission. SIOC in Beirut is staffed through a local cost shared budget by a Department country analyst.

97. The Inspectors believe that the SIOC model needs to be replicated across the system in a structured and phased manner, taking into account the local context and needs, including the capacity to understand local languages, all of which are determining factors when deciding on the size and functionalities to be installed. Ideally, SIOC backup sites should be established, given the importance of the Centres in daily operations and crisis management. In some cases, the Inspectors found backup facilities, but within the same building, which is not sufficient from a security perspective. Another issue found in certain locations was the lack of security personnel able to understand local languages. This is of special importance in information-gathering activities (e.g., JMACs, SIOC, JOC, etc.). Without this capability, it is not possible to analyse information originating from local sources (e.g., local press, local radio and television, social media local information, etc.).

98. The Joint Inspection Unit team had the opportunity to see how a SIOC works, receiving SMS and daily e-mails informing on security issues while in Lebanon. In addition, the Inspectors had planned a field visit to the operations of UNHCR in Zahle (Bekaa Valley, Lebanon). However, the visit could not take place due to repeated road blockages by demonstrations, forcing the team to take alternative roads and finally cancelling the


mission. While travelling, the team was kept informed regularly of events and the timely information provided by SIOC facilitated decision-making.

99. While SIOCs can be found in peacekeeping and non-peacekeeping contexts, JOC and JMAC are integrated structures to support decision-making that exist only in peacekeeping contexts. According to policies, they must be able to incorporate military, humanitarian, development and human rights perspectives in mission-wide information management. JOC and JMAC liaise with the United Nations country team and with non-United Nations entities in the country or region. The country team should share information with JOC and JMAC and is able to second personnel and contribute information. The particular arrangements vary depending on resources and the structures of the mission and the country team. It should be noted that JMAC should share security threat-related information with the Department of Safety and Security. Such information, although only used in peacekeeping contexts, provides important information if properly shared with the Department and United Nations agencies. The information flows and main actors involved in JMAC operations are described in figure 5 below.

100. JOCs are jointly staffed information hubs established in peacekeeping missions to ensure mission-wide situational awareness through integrated reporting on current operations and day-to-day situation reporting. As the primary facility to support crisis management, its functions include collecting information relating to situation updates from different entities and disseminating information of immediate operational interest.

Figure 5

JMAC information flows



101. It is not the purpose of the present review to assess the relevance and effectiveness of the information systems of the Department of Safety and Security, as was done by OIOS in 2014. However, the Inspectors wish to note the progress made in the development of security information systems with the establishment in 2008 of the United Nations Security Managers Information Network, a centralized portal of safety and security information providing standardized data collection and processing systems for United Nations staff worldwide. One of the systems included in the Network is the travel request information process system, which is used by staff members of United Nations departments, agencies, funds and programmes to request security clearance when travelling, and which also provides travel notification processing and travel advisories. However, that system does not provide travellers with information systematically, either in a standard briefing note or if an incident occurs, while they are travelling. The Network has been updated regularly to reflect changes in the security environment and lessons learned.

102. The Inspectors welcome cooperation at the system-wide level; a unified United Nations security management system responsive to global challenges requires global systems. **At present, no single agency, fund or programme can on its own afford the security technology and systems necessary. Thus, cooperation in the development and use of new security information systems is essential.** An example of cooperation is the working group on global identity management standards led by the Information and Communications Technology Network and the Inter-Agency Security Management Network. In that regard, there is a clear need for broader cooperation, not only among security professionals from different entities but also among different professional networks (e.g., Finance and Budget Network and the Inter-Agency Security Management Network, etc.).

V. SAFETY AND SECURITY STANDARDS

103. Substantial progress has been made since the 2008 report of the Independent Panel in the area of security awareness and standardization of practices, with the recognition that clearer responsibilities, accountability and leadership, as well as greater collaboration and information-sharing among the different United Nations entities, are needed in order to ensure safe operations. To complement the baseline norms established in existing United Nations security management system policies, minimum qualitative and quantitative requirements for premises and equipment, as well as standard procedures and training in operating and maintaining such equipment, should be developed and implemented to maximize the safety and security of United Nations personnel and properties.

A. Strengthening safety and security competencies through standard training

104. All organizations participating in the United Nations security management system have the same basic security needs when they operate at a given location, as all are subject to the same local threats. However, the mandates of and consequently the activities to be undertaken by organizations often differ. This implies that a basic common level of security, although necessary for all, is not enough to cover all the security needs of all organizations. In the view of the Inspectors, this evidence should lead, *inter alia*, the security training development strategy. In fact, a system-wide common training requirement has been established across the system in an effort to homogenize basic training for staff at large. In addition, the Department of Safety and Security offers specific training to security professionals of different organizations in an effort to standardize their qualifications, as described below. In addition, specific training is offered by some organizations to staff with additional needs (e.g., UNHCR, UNICEF, etc.). Furthermore, some agencies and programmes have developed their own security training activities according to their own specific needs.³¹

105. Security training is perhaps one of the most significant examples of standardization across the United Nations security management system. Such training is either “core” or “specialized”: core security training is intended to ensure that United Nations personnel at all levels are familiar with their security responsibilities and the range of support available to them; specialized security training is designed to equip United Nations security personnel with the specific knowledge and expertise necessary to discharge their security responsibilities.

106. Core security training for staff comprises the Basic Security in the Field and Advanced Security in the Field modules, which represent the foundation of the mandated security courses for United Nations security management system personnel-at-large. Those two courses are offered through distance learning and via CD ROM in those locations without access to the Internet, and, according to the United Nations Secretariat, more

³¹ Where country specific requirements are in place, UNHCR staff are required to undertake additional training; e.g., Security Awareness Induction Training or Safe and Secure Approaches in Field Environments. Some training specifically targets managers, e.g., the UNHCR security management learning programme. The UNICEF women’s security awareness training course is also offered to female staff members. This is voluntary training for women conducted by UNICEF by female security advisers.

than 180,000 certificates have been issued for Basic Security in the Field and 90,000 for Advanced Security in the Field since the programmes were initiated. Basic Security in the Field is mandatory for all United Nations personnel, regardless of their level or function. Advanced Security in the Field is mandatory for United Nations personnel assigned or travelling to field locations (i.e., locations that are not designated as headquarters). Certificates are issued for three years, then staff is required to recertify. According to questionnaire responses received by the Joint Inspection Unit, the rate of personnel having undertaken mandatory security training varies across organizations, ranging from 74 per cent, to organizations claiming a 100 per cent rate of compliance, with some organizations providing vague answers such as “extremely high” or “moderate” when asked about compliance rates.

107. It should be noted that the possibility for staff to take the Basic Security in the Field and Advanced Security in the Field security training courses directly on the website of the Department of Safety and Security is sometimes perceived as confusing to staff of some funds and programmes that offer the possibility to take the same courses through their own internal learning management systems. This, in addition, distorts training reporting within affected entities. **The Department of Safety and Security should strive to make its website more user-friendly to encourage staff of all organizations to take the relevant training courses on its website, to avoid duplication with other organizations.**

108. In addition, the Department of Safety and Security has collaborated since 2007 with the United Nations System Staff College on the delivery of Safe and Secure Approaches to Field Environment training. Developed in 2007, that course is a major step forward for high-risk locations, where it is mandatory. The content of the course is customized in accordance with a specific security context. In total, 44 train-the-trainer courses on Safe and Secure Approaches to Field Environment have been provided to present the programme in a decentralized manner, resulting in approximately 996 certified trainers as at September 2016. The programme has been delivered to more than 52,662 United Nations and associated personnel (e.g., non-governmental organizations, etc.) in 1,893 courses in 61 duty stations.

109. Specialized security training for security personnel is an integral part of the security professional platform of the Department of Safety and Security. The security certification programme certifies security professionals of the United Nations security management system to the standards of competencies required by a field security coordination officer.³² In addition, the Department of Safety and Security offers 24 courses on subjects ranging from hostage incident management, close protection officer training, women’s security awareness training, Designated Official training and emergency trauma bag/first responder instruction, among others. As indicated by the Secretariat, the 2014 training activities of the Department were diverse and extensive. In total, 239 courses were offered to 3,935 participants in person and 345,676 participants via e-learning. All Department training courses are available to both Headquarters and field locations, based on the needs assessment and the local security context.³³ Agencies, funds and programmes support the Department in the delivery of these system-wide programmes, and those that run independent specialist training programmes include participants from the United Nations security management system.

110. The current training approach, if continued, will harmonize in core security training in the medium term across the United Nations system, both for staff and for security professionals. However, this approach needs to be fully rolled out in the field, which will take some time. Over the course of several interviews, a common theme of frustration emerged with regard to ordering security services and receiving a wide variety of personnel with different types of training, qualifications and abilities, including the ability to speak and understand local languages. The United Nations, agencies, funds and programmes have a number of staff who are required to perform security duties; some organizations provide their own security staff with reportedly

³² As stipulated in chap. II of the Security Policy Manual, entitled “Framework of Accountability for the United Nations Security Management System”, available from https://undg.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/SPM_II_B_Framework_of_Accountability_04.02.2011.pdf.

³³ See A/70/383, paras. 51 and 52.

their own qualifications and training systems. This can make for a confusing system with regard to the management and delivery of security services.

111. The Inspectors observed that, despite the efforts mentioned in previous paragraphs, there was no uniformity on the training received by security professionals currently in the field across the United Nations system. The Department of Safety and Security has a major role to play in this respect, as it establishes, updates and oversees, in consultation with other relevant actors, the security training requirements for the various levels of responsibility and functions performed by different types and roles of personnel, including security professionals. Nevertheless, most of the officers and staff interviewed praised the training provided by the Department and expressed their strong request for additional security training at different levels.

112. The Inspectors consider appropriate the training approach taken, which builds on common needs through common, or core, training and encourage organizations to share their own training activities and resources with other organizations. In that regard, they welcome the joint venture training initiative — a collaborative approach in which selected professionals of the United Nations security management system from different organizations trained and certified by the Department of Safety and Security come together with the Department's training section for the delivery of core and specialized programmes. Joint venture training facilitates the harmonization of the policies, procedures and practices within the United Nations security management system, sharing knowledge and information across agencies, funds, programmes and organizations.

113. The Inspectors encourage the Department of Safety and Security to expand the portfolio of security training materials in consultation with the Inter-Agency Security Management Network and to continue to lead the roll-out of security training activities across the system. The Network's security training working group deliberates on the training needs for the United Nations security management system and is another example of inter-agency collaboration on training activities. **The Inter-Agency Security Management Network should agree on a common regular reporting mechanism to reflect the performance/level of achievement of security-related training within organizations of the United Nations security management system; this would allow the identification of areas of weakness and highlight areas of strength that can be leveraged, assisting in the allocation of resources. Reporting should include indicators for core and specialized training of staff, security staff, different managerial levels — including senior management — and other types of personnel whenever applicable.**

B. Need for standardization of equipment, maintenance and procurement practices

114. The Department of Safety and Security is expected to take the lead in setting security standards and providing guidance to embed them into individual security frameworks. As regards safety standards, the Department acknowledges it has a limited mandate and few resources dedicated to improving safety, except for aviation, fire and road safety, for which it provides general guidelines. However, it intends to develop an assessment that would define the required capacity and strategy to ensure personnel operate within the best safety environment possible. In that regard, the Department should make sure that minimum safety standards and technical specifications are included in any future safety policy.

115. The Security Policy Manual contains general safety and security policies, which are intended to be applied systematically by all duty stations. Some requirements and recommended standards are provided on personnel, facilities and telecommunication equipment. The minimum operating security standards policy (issued in 2009 and currently under revision) identifies measures designed to reduce the level of security risks to personnel, property and assets of the organizations. Each duty station is expected to develop and implement country-specific standards commensurate with their respective security risk management process. The policy identifies responsibilities, coordination mechanisms, documents and procedures to be implemented in the areas of telecommunications, medical equipment and supplies, vehicles, offices/premises, training and briefing.

116. The Inspectors found current United Nations security management system policies to be valid and relevant frameworks for United Nations staff both in a professional and residential context. However, much is left to interpretation, and local implementation of the policies depends on the involvement, knowledge and experience of the designated officers and Security Management Teams in adapting general security guidelines to the local context. Inspectors observed significant discrepancies between duty stations not only in terms of procedures but also in terms of equipment norms and specifications, from vehicles to perimeter fencing and personal protective gear. It is necessary but not sufficient to stipulate that standard operating procedures relating to body armour must be established or that field vehicles expected to operate in conflict-affected areas may be fitted with ballistic blankets. The establishment of minimum technical requirements would offer useful and efficient guidance to security managers and procurement officers when making decisions in equipment selection, purchase and use. It would also help to mitigate the impact of discrepancies in the capacity and quality of support provided by field offices of the Department of Safety and Security.

117. The minimum operating security standards policy stipulates that implementation of specialized expertise relies on the advice of a “qualified expert”, hired on an ad hoc basis when there is a local need for strengthened security features, such as structural reinforcement, blast walls, bunkers or surveillance and access control systems. The Inspectors believe that, instead of relying solely on individual expertise, minimum specifications for heightened security threat environments should be developed and centralized at the level of the Department of Safety and Security and made available to United Nations security management system organizations. The Department acknowledges that specialized expertise is more cost effective and best delivered when consolidated rather than developed in-country, and intends to strengthen its support in many areas, with special attention to threat and risk analysis, crisis management and physical security. A physical security unit has been established for that purpose. While some of the required expertise already exists within the Department, most specialized areas should be strengthened either by establishing a network of practitioners or by developing guidelines in order to provide the required level of guidance to all concerned organizations of the United Nations security management system.

118. This need to increase standardization is supported by participating organizations that request further guidance in defining minimum requirements and specifications for selecting and purchasing security equipment. An in-depth assessment of the conformity and uniformity of security measures implemented across the United Nations agencies and organizations, as recommended in the report of the Independent Panel, has yet to take place. Such an assessment should conduct a review of the technical specifications of security equipment, especially telecommunication equipment, United Nations and armoured vehicles, offices/premise protection and personal protective equipment.

119. Radio communications systems are a clear example of the need to standardize the use of equipment. In several locations visited, it was found that multiple radio systems with different capabilities were being used by different agencies and security personnel. Owing to limitations on one radio system, some vehicles had two systems installed, indicating an inefficient use of resources. In one location, the Department of Safety and Security radio room conducted radio checks for all funds, programmes and specialized agencies, while the Mission undertook its own staff radio checks through its own system. However, in any individual or collective emergency situation, Department-operated common radio rooms are expected to keep on supporting all United Nations personnel, including mission personnel, through Security Information Operations Centres/Emergency Response Teams/field security coordination officer teams in each location. In the view of the Inspectors, failed communications may result from the use of multiple radio systems, especially during crisis events.

120. The Inspectors believe that the Department of Safety and Security should lead the future standardization of field security communication resources across the United Nations system, including the selection of sufficient radio systems, compatible to the extent possible with the basic safety and security infrastructure already installed, such as in locations where United Nations peacekeeping operations are in place. The measures to be taken to enhance/update current radio communications should have as a final objective to have just one radio system, with appropriate backup facilities, in use at all locations.

The system should have the ability to locate radio users via a global positioning system. The system should be used throughout all locations so that security or other personnel responding to emergency surge incidents could bring with them compatible radios from other locations.

121. A similar need for standardization was observed by Inspectors with respect to the security features necessary for premises. Different locations had very different protection levels; although that is understandable, the Inspectors also witnessed very different implementations of premises security measures within the same location. The Department of Safety and Security is not responsible for providing engineering support to peacekeeping, special political and other missions. This is the responsibility of the Department of Field Support, service centres and missions. In 2010, the Department launched its Global Field Support Strategy aimed at strengthening its support to missions. Through modularization, the Engineering Section of the Logistics Support Division, the Department of Field Support and the Engineering Standardization and Design Centre within the United Nations Global Service Centre based in Brindisi intend to contribute to the optimal use of resources by establishing scalable service packages for person camps, logistics and air bases that can be modified to a mission's requirements. **The Department of Safety and Security should cooperate with the Department of Field Support to establish standard security requirements for premises from the design phase, advise and oversee in pertinent cases the final consistent implementation of the security requirements necessary;** however, the final implementation remains an agency-specific responsibility.

122. Defining technical standards on physical security with the advisory support of relevant in-house and external security experts, including systems engineers and blast assessment specialists, is one of the immediate priorities of the Department of Safety and Security, as defined in its 2015 strategic review. **The Inspectors concur that the Department of Safety and Security should lead the further development of minimum safety and security design standards for all United Nations premises, including quick evacuation and safe-room concepts.**

123. Furthermore, in the implementation of the minimum operating security standards and residential security measures,³⁴ the Department of Safety and Security should ensure that mandatory and recommended minimum design and technical standards cover all types of security equipment, from premises protection to personnel protection gear (e.g., bullet-proof jackets, helmets, weapons, etc.), vehicles (e.g., label and model, traction type, etc.) and telecommunication devices (e.g., radios, transmission lines, telephones, etc.). Additional advisory supports, along with compliance monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, must be provided in order to meet those minimum standards. Moreover, all of the information should be disseminated throughout the United Nations system, including duty stations, with the understanding that, at the local level, national offices of the Department of Safety and Security might adjust the design or opt for different technical standards because of the local safety and security environment.

124. Maintenance of equipment is another issue that was highlighted during the Inspectors' field visits. While it was not the objective of their mission or of the present report to undertake a comprehensive review of compliance with the required maintenance of safety and security equipment and premises in the locations visited, the Inspectors observed equipment maintenance issues that could jeopardize the premises' security or put the equipment at risk of failure.³⁵

125. **The staff responsible for using equipment, whether high-tech (e.g. video surveillance) or utilitarian (e.g. United Nations cars and armoured vehicles), should be trained on their maintenance and use. Furthermore, when considering the purchase of such equipment, thought should be given on how future repairs will be conducted.** This is especially true for security technology, which requires specialized expertise, spare parts and accessories that can only be found in major cities and often need to be imported from

³⁴ The policy on residential security measures was launched in November 2015. Those measures, unlike the minimum operating residential security standards, are based on the security risk management process and are more restrictive in scope.

³⁵ An example of such maintenance issues is mentioned in the confidential management letter to the Department of Safety and Security.

another country. **The Inspectors stress that, before installing security technology systems in remote areas, the ability to repair and maintain those systems locally and in a timely manner must be considered. When in doubt, low-tech solutions should be used.**

126. This is where the need for standardization and streamlining of the procurement process comes into play. In interviews, security managers and officers indicated a complex, slow procurement process for equipment and repair services, even basic items. Critical supplies, such as tyres, are sometimes difficult to obtain. The ability of remote facilities to obtain technical support/repairs after systems have been installed was of particular concern among security professionals.

127. The Inspectors are aware of the limited responsibilities of the Department of Safety and Security in the procurement process. However, they have decided to bring the procurement issue to the attention of Department management, as it has an impact on the safety and security of United Nations personnel. Furthermore, there are urgent procurement mechanisms in place (i.e., exigency cases procedure³⁶) that are unknown to some security managers and officers in the field, as reported by the Inspectors.

128. After analysing the procurement process, the Inspectors came to the conclusion that there is no systematic communication across the management of different functions or departments. In peacekeeping environments, for instance, the Department of Safety and Security has to interact with sections that report structurally to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and frequently following different administrative procedures. **The Department of Safety and Security field management needs to keep regular contacts with, inter alia, transportation and purchasing local units and premises and facilities management unites that participate in the relevant meetings of the sections, even if only as an observer. In the view of the Inspectors, security- and safety-related equipment should be given priority in the procurement system, in particular when maintenance is requested or a replacement is ordered.**

129. **It should be noted that, in some cases, delays in the deployment of security equipment is not related to the procurement process but to the slow and bureaucratic customs procedures established for import-export activities by host country authorities. In that regard, and in the context of operations of United Nations organizations, the Inspectors encourage the host country authorities concerned to facilitate the transit of United Nations personnel and equipment.**

130. **In the light of the aforementioned procurement difficulties, the Inspectors believe that thought should be given to the streamlining of the procurement process for security equipment through, inter alia, a more extensive use of long-term agreements,**³⁷ with preferred providers and alternative providers as back-up that would be informed about the minimum technical requirements, so as to harmonize practices and equipment across the United Nations system. Equipment, including vehicles, for Department of Safety and Security field locations is procured centrally at United Nations Headquarters through the Procurement Division of the Department of Management. The Department of Safety and Security has a logistics base in Dubai to keep stock. Items such as office equipment and furniture in its field locations are obtained through UNDP under the signed memorandum of understanding between them. The Department of Safety and Security and agencies, funds and programmes have different funding sources and rules and regulations for assets management under the International Public Sector Accounting Standards.

131. **It would be desirable to explore further the establishment of common procurement practices of security equipment through enhanced cooperation of the procurement network and the Inter-Agency Security Management Network, including the consideration of a common trading platform or market**

³⁶ Exigency cases are permitted when an emergent need or situation could lead to serious damage, loss or injury to property or persons if not addressed immediately. Emergency procedures are described in chap. 9, sect. 2 of the United Nations Procurement Manual, available from <https://www.un.org/Depts/ptd/sites/www.un.org.Depts.ptd/files/files/attachment/page/pdf/pm.pdf>.

³⁷ See [JIU/REP/2013/1](#).

place for the purchase of old or new equipment. This would also facilitate the reuse and refurbishment of equipment that complies with United Nations standards but is no longer needed in a particular location.

132. Finally, failure to comply with the safety and security standards should be addressed in a standardized manner, in order to ensure sufficient follow-up and monitoring, prioritize the use of financial resources for the purchase of suitable equipment and report all non-compliance issues to a centralized body. Compliance to United Nations standards is not always adequately investigated and, in practice, responses to non-compliance vary from one organization to the next. The framework of accountability is unspecific about this, stating only that instances of non-compliance and security policies, practices and procedures should be acted upon by representatives of United Nations security management system organizations and reported to the designated officer.

VI. SECURITY CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND SURGE CAPACITY

A. Integrated United Nations-wide crisis management framework

133. Security crisis management and surge capacity are central for the proper operation of the United Nations security management system. The United Nations system does not have the financial resources to introduce the preventive security measures needed to confront any potential threat that could develop in every location where system organizations operate. **The United Nations security management system is based on a structured risk analysis, meaning that security measures commensurate with the specific risks to be confronted should be implemented in a timely manner. That implies that, in order for the system to be effective, it should count on resources available to be redeployed, whether human and/or equipment, and rely on effective and flexible logistics and communications. Furthermore, the financial constraints faced by organizations and the limited security resources available within each organization call for the sharing and well-coordinated use of the currently fragmented security resources, which are scattered across the United Nations system.**

134. The Department of Safety and Security is the entity responsible for the security aspects of crisis management. It is also ideally placed and linked to marshal resources, including peacekeeping forces and logistic arrangements across the United Nations system, to assist in the crisis response and coordinate crisis reporting. No other entity in the United Nations system is similarly suited to lead such efforts.

135. The Security Policy Manual describes the security management structure and covers, inter alia, security planning in the field, emergency communication, continuity of United Nations operations and other security-related issues. Furthermore, it lists the actions to be undertaken by the designated officer and provides guidelines for the development of a security plan complete with a threat assessment. However, neither the Manual nor the United Nations security management system framework of accountability include or provide guidelines for a standardized comprehensive crisis management plan. The Inter-Agency Security Management Network is aware of this need for complete regulations on dealing with emergency situations, such as relocation and evacuation.

136. Acute safety and security incidents of various natures that affect United Nations staff, convoys and premises, whether as direct or collateral targets, have been increasing over the years, and that trend is not expected to abate any time soon. A distinction should be made between security incidents of a low degree of severity or limited impact, and an actual security crisis, which is defined as an unforeseen or sudden negative event or succession of events of such magnitude that it requires the implementation of urgent measures at the duty station(s) level and may lead to a reassessment of the location's security needs. The impact of such a crisis is potentially United Nations-wide and requires a well-coordinated and efficient response at the system level in order to safeguard lives, properties and public image.

137. The Inspectors welcome progress since the report of the Independent Panel addressed these issues. The concepts of lead departments executing and having delegated authority in crisis management was introduced formally at the United Nations Secretariat in 2013 when UNOCC was established; these concepts and related mechanisms have been effective according to stakeholders interviewed. The Centre is a joint effort by the following stakeholders: the Executive Office of the Secretary-General, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Field Support, Department of Political Affairs, Department of Safety and Security, Department of Management, Department of Public Information, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, OHCHR and UNDP. It produces daily integrated operational reports and briefings and alerts in case of major incidents and events. At the heart of the Centre is a joint watch room that operates 24 hours a day to collect data and information from an array of public and United Nations sources, including the UNITAR Operational Satellite Applications Programme.³⁸

138. Nonetheless, dealing with security crises and emergencies that can put people's lives at risk requires adequate integration and coordination mechanisms, starting at the level of the Department of Safety and Security, in certain cases the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Field Support and Department of Political Affairs, all the way to the security bodies present in the field. An absence of a clear chain of command can lead to the loss of time, resources, opportunities and ultimately lives. The respective roles and synergies of the different United Nations bodies dealing with security issues and crises are not always perceived in a consistent manner, as shown by the variety of practices across the United Nations when such a crisis occurs. The Department of Safety and Security remains a reference, but the role of UNOCC, for instance, is relatively new, and many organizations overlook its services, which are otherwise deemed useful in a time of crisis, especially the provision of daily security updates and other products. Some United Nations security management system organizations contribute to financing the Centre, while a significant number of United Nations entities neither contribute to nor use its services. **Strengthening coordination between the Department of Safety and Security, UNOCC, Department of Field Support and Department of Political Affairs would be a welcome development.**

139. It should be noted that some United Nations security management system organizations have their own operations centres tailored to support their individual needs and potentially enhancing the fulfilment of specific mandates.

140. The crisis coordination effort has expanded beyond the United Nations Secretariat boundaries with the launch in 2013 of the Saving Lives Together initiative, a joint endeavour involving the United Nations and international non-governmental organizations operating in complex threat environments to establish a more robust and integrated approach to address common security concerns. It is a framework that outlines the areas of collaboration on security issues between the United Nations and its non-governmental organization implementing partners. Saving Lives Together has been recently revised laying out coordination, operational, logistical and information-sharing arrangements for United Nations entities and their implementing partner organizations, depending on two security levels (regular and advanced). The Department of Safety and Security, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and non-governmental organization networks lead these efforts at the Headquarters level through a standing working group of the initiative. Detailed guidelines on implementing Saving Lives Together were issued in July 2016; if properly implemented, the coordination arrangements outlined in the guidelines will be valuable in crisis management and response, including evacuation and other support arrangements, noting that the responsibility for the safety and security of personnel remains with the employing organization.

141. However, each United Nations entity present in the field has its own security and crisis management arrangements in place, through the respective security offices. Some with a long-standing presence in the field, especially war zones and countries with prominent security threats, have mechanisms in place that respond to

³⁸ A technology-intensive programme that delivers imagery analysis and satellite solutions to relief and development organizations within and outside the United Nations System to help make a difference in such critical areas as humanitarian relief, human security, strategic territorial and development planning. See www.unitar.org/unosat/.

emergencies in a timely and efficient manner. There is a perception that most if not all United Nations entities have adequate mechanisms in place to deal with crisis situations on their own as long as minimum coordination mechanisms are in place. This is reflected in the United Nations security management system framework and in the collaboration modalities with other humanitarian and development actors at large.

B. Crisis management: need for further strengthening

142. In practice, the speed, adequacy and quality of the response across United Nations entities in dealing with a crisis vary significantly. There are discrepancies in security crisis management policies, some dealing merely with responsibilities and arrangements for relocation and evacuation aspects, others benefitting from more detailed and advanced crisis management plans. For instance, some United Nations security management system entities incorporate in their policies the concept of mass casualty incidents. Some organizations have an emergency hotline that is reachable 24 hours a day. A few organizations have adequate surge support and deployment capacity, such as the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, UNDP, UNHCR and UNICEF, which have dedicated units and emergency response teams. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs is the lead United Nations entity for coordinating a coherent response to emergencies and, as such, is fully equipped to organize surge deployment when needed.

143. Another example of crisis management is provided by UNDP; its crisis response unit is responsible for overseeing crisis response. This includes the coordination of corporate response to crisis, risk management, early warning coordination, crisis-related advocacy and inter-agency liaison. In addition, the UNDP Security Office involvement in the Inter-Agency Security Management Network working group on crisis response, and the training of designated officers conducted under the leadership of the Department of Safety and Security, supplement crisis response at the Headquarters level. At the country/field level, UNDP frequently relies on its own security officers to contribute to country-specific responses, often in collaboration with the crisis response unit, the Department of Safety and Security and other agencies in the field. Officers interviewed indicated that efforts are becoming more refined and institutionalized across UNDP and in its relations.

144. The support provided to United Nations personnel during a crisis may vary depending on a number of factors, even for organizations that have a long-standing presence in the field. Nevertheless, some entities are not physically present in the field and their staff may occupy temporarily an office within another entity's premises, or operate mainly from headquarters but regularly send staff members or consultants on mission or temporary detachment. These members of personnel depend on local offices of the Department of Safety and Security for their safety and security during their stay. However, those offices can be overstretched when a crisis occurs. As showcased in Mali in March 2012 following a coup d'état, it was reported that the local office had to provide assistance to other United Nations entities while organizing the evacuation of the staff of their Malian office. Although the Department of Safety and Security kept in touch with them, staff members from United Nations organizations without their own security support in the field had to organize their own evacuation at their own risk, and virtually no logistical support was provided.

145. Although the events in Mali do not reflect the normal response of the Department of Safety and Security, organizations without a local presence in certain field locations should make sure that their personnel — whether on mission or detached temporarily to those field locations — are properly informed and comply with the local security requirements necessary. In addition, arrangements with the Department should be in place to provide personnel on mission, or temporary assignments with the required security support.

146. Evacuation and relocation of personnel is another important element in crisis management. This is discussed in the above section on security culture, including observations during field missions (i.e. the deficient implementation of mandatory evacuation drills) and relevant recommendations.

147. Despite progress in basic security planning, additional efforts are required. In developing standardized policies and procedures to address security crises, the Department of Safety and Security should review existing mechanisms within the different United Nations entities that already have strong practices in place. A

balance must be found between strengthening the Department's mandate to provide better assistance across participating organizations and leaving enough flexibility to those organizations to continue operating in an efficient manner. The Inter-Agency Security Management Network should undertake a broad assessment of best practices and lessons learned in field crisis management by United Nations security management system entities. The evaluation of agencies, funds and programmes practices and experience in this area should lead to a United Nations-wide security crisis management framework covering all responsibilities, measures and coordination mechanisms to be implemented from the moment the crisis erupts to the aftermath and follow-up events.

148. With the view to operationalizing the current “how to stay” approach, it is paramount that the United Nations security management system place greater emphasis on security crisis management and contingency planning in order to harmonize practices, set minimum standards and coordinate the United Nations response. There is a need for a clearer definition of the role and responsibilities of the different security bodies, enhancing the synergies and cooperation between them and determining collaboration mechanisms and procedures depending on the type of crisis involved.

149. The Department of Safety and Security strategic review, which was completed in January 2015 and subsequently endorsed by the Inter-Agency Security Management Network and by the Policy Committee chaired by the Secretary-General in February 2015, identifies a number of areas for further strengthening, some of which relate to security crisis management, namely, the development of an enhanced surge deployment framework and the improvement of synergies with UNOCC.

C. Crisis management policy: a work in progress

150. In June 2015, in the final report of its twenty-second session, the Inter-Agency Security Management Network approved the creation of a working group responsible for drafting a United Nations security management system policy on safety and security crisis management in the field.³⁹ A section on crisis management in the field will be included in the new Security Policy Manual and is expected to be approved by the Network in 2017. The section received input from designated officers and security advisors, especially over the course of regional workshops and the crisis management training held in 2015.

151. The Inspectors are pleased to note that a crisis management policy was promulgated in 2016, to ensure a coherent and effective crisis response across the United Nations. The policy articulates how United Nations actors should coordinate efforts to respond collectively to situations that, owing to their magnitude, complexity or gravity of potential consequence, require a coordinated and multidisciplinary response. The crisis management policy and the Organizational Management System Policy provide clarity on roles and responsibilities and the architecture for decision-making, coordination, information exchange and communications.

152. It should be noted that the policy does not yet apply to all United Nations system organizations, as it is expected to be endorsed by the Inter-Agency Security Management Network in 2017, as mentioned above. The policy applies to members of the Policy Committee and the United Nations crisis management working group, which currently comprises the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Field Support, Department of Political Affairs, Department of Management, United Nations Development Operations Coordination Office, Department of Public Information, Department of Safety and Security, Executive Office of the Secretary-General, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, OHCHR, UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP and WHO. All United Nations entities that have field presence and are members of the Working Group are responsible for ensuring that proper guidance and toolkits on crisis management are disseminated to the field. **The Inspectors welcome the on-going efforts by the Inter-Agency Security Management Network in developing a system-wide security crisis management policy.**

³⁹ See www.unsceb.org/CEBPublicFiles/Final%20Report%20-%20IASMN%2022nd%20Session%20-%20Montreux%20June%202015%20-%20FINAL.pdf.

153. However, policies should be properly implemented and, as noted in other areas of the review, numerous security issues to be confronted are not related to the lack of policies, procedures or guidelines but to their compliance. The Executive Office of the Secretary-General, through UNOCC, is responsible for monitoring and ensuring compliance with the new crisis management policy and assisting United Nations entities with its implementation. **In that regard, the Inspectors are convinced that more needs to be done; they expect the Policy to be translated into specific standard operating procedures and guidelines to establish the consistent monitoring necessary for the pragmatic addressing of non-compliance, and this should be done as a matter of urgency given the unforeseen nature of crises.**

D. Surge capacity

154. The main purpose of surge deployments is to provide additional capacity when emergencies and crisis require additional resources not readily available in a given location. Appropriate surge capacity is crucial to provide an adequate response to security crisis. Complex emergencies require highly qualified personnel and other resources that can be dispatched rapidly to a specific geographic location. While surge staff is often recruited from rosters, which may be shared or individual, some organizations have emergency response teams ready to be deployed, which is costlier to maintain but more effective owing to their immediate availability.

155. The Department of Safety and Security warrants surge deployments in the following circumstances:

- Security emergencies and crisis situations
- Reinforcement of Department capacity in the field or at headquarters offices
- Temporary security coverage of additional field locations
- Security support in response to humanitarian emergencies
- Hostage takings/abductions
- Other requirements, as directed by the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security or the Director or Deputy Director of the Division of Regional Operations

156. For security management purposes, the Department of Safety and Security works on the basis of 203 countries or territories globally. Of those, 120 currently have a Department presence: principal security adviser/chief security adviser/security adviser posts are located in 104 countries or territories,⁴⁰ while 16 countries or territories are covered by standalone local security assistants. There are currently 83 countries or territories without a Department presence. Of those, 40 are covered remotely through Department field offices and two (Cyprus and Western Sahara) by chief security officers of peacekeeping missions. The countries and territories without a Department presence include most OECD countries, and approximately 25 overseas territories/countries/small island states in the Pacific and Caribbean with no or only a very small United Nations presence.

157. Surge capacity is an area that requires further enhancement according to the views expressed by officials interviewed in the field. The need to heighten surge capabilities is recognized in the Department of Safety and Security strategic review, which states that, to better support crises, the Department will develop an enhanced surge deployment framework to enable flexible and rapid deployment to crisis situations. The development of surge capacity, as mentioned in the strategic review, is welcomed by participating organizations.


158. However, the Department of Safety and Security does not have a standing reserve team of security professionals ready to be deployed when required. Instead, surge deployments use existing resources of the Department of Safety and Security, Department of Field Support/Department of

⁴⁰ In total, 23 of those principal security advisers/chief security advisers/security advisers have regional responsibilities extending coverage to a further 56 countries and territories.

Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Political Affairs and other United Nations security management system organizations. Since 2012, the Department of Safety and Security has reinforced its response capacity, including proactive deployments through surge security officers. While there has been a decrease in the number of officers deployed from 2014 to 2015, the number of deployment days has experienced a considerable growth, mainly owing to the fact that the average deployment duration has increased from 7 to 13 weeks, which can be explained in part by the severity and persistence of some recent crises (e.g., the Syrian conflict and refugee crisis, and conflicts in South Sudan and Yemen), as reflected in figure 6 below.

159. The lack of standing security capacity calls for the redeployment of resources available in one duty station but needed to strengthen security in another area, to cater for a security threat or even a regular event. This often leads to the withdrawal of troops or security personnel, to the detriment of the security of the releasing duty station or compound, thus placing additional stress on the already-limited resources available and overstretching security personnel duties at the releasing duty station.


Figure 6: Department of Safety and Security surge deployments, 2012-2015



160. Accordingly, the direct costs incurred by surge operations have increased significantly over the past three years, representing an amount of \$3,081,095 in surge staff and travel-related costs alone in 2015.⁴¹ Indirect administrative and management costs generated at headquarters and overtime costs incurred in releasing duty stations are not included in the figures provided. This trend shows that the need for surge capacity is increasing, as is the need for funding. It should be noted that costs of surge security personnel are not charged to the security budget shared by United Nations security management system organizations when security personnel is funded under jointly financed activities, as that would be a duplicated charge. Staff costs are reported and charged only when personnel funded under other funding sources are surged, to avoid subsidizing between different funding sources. Prior to 2015, surged personnel were mostly funded by jointly financed activities, thus already included in the shared budget. Budget issues are further discussed in the following section.

161. Figure 7 below shows the security areas requiring security surge capacity in 2015. It should be noted that 60 per cent of surge deployments relate to humanitarian assistance, followed by premises protection (20 per cent) and response to natural disasters (10 per cent).

⁴¹ Information provided by the Department of Safety and Security.

Figure 7: Department of Safety and Security surge deployments 2015

162. Although the Division of Regional Operations established a standard operating procedure for surge deployments in 2015, the Inspectors are of the view that the United Nations surge response, in particular its human resources policy and procedures, and coordination mechanisms between surge units and support functions (e.g., logistical and administrative support) should be further refined to enhance effectiveness and reduce costs. This is made difficult by differences in organizations' mandates, policies and operational apparatuses and, as a result, a lack of clear leadership, a degree of confusion and a duplication of efforts have been reported by officers interviewed.

163. Coordination with local or national Governments is also an issue. Surge deployments are normally launched within 24 hours, yet the main delay factor for surge deployments remains the availability of visas. As widely recognized, the primary responsibility under international law for the safety and security of United Nations and associated personnel lies with the Government hosting a United Nations operation. **The Inspectors would like to stress the importance of timely surge operations and the need to facilitate visas by concerned Governments allowing the timely deployment of security personnel with the final objective to safeguard the lives of United Nations personnel and assets.**

164. Since the Department of Safety and Security has included surge as an immediate priority in its strategic review, it will need to clearly define its mandate in this area, as surge operations in response to a crisis might affect the security, agenda and actions of other humanitarian actors and the general population at large. The Department's levels of intervention and accountability in the surge framework should be clearly defined, as should its implication within the Inter-Agency Standing Committee.⁴²

165. **There is a persistence of leadership, staffing and operational issues that may have a negative impact on the outcome of a security crisis. The Department of Safety and Security is responsible for the safety and security of staff in the field. However, the operational responsibilities for many staff members remain fragmented across the system. The multiplicity of United Nations security management system bodies dealing with security crises at different levels and offering different services and support, each with their own recruitment procedures and contractual status, might induce some confusion. Fragmentation generates duplication of efforts and inefficiencies, which can have an adverse impact on the outcome of a crisis. All operational, organizational and**

⁴² The Inter-Agency Standing Committee, established in June 1992, is the primary mechanism for inter-agency coordination of humanitarian assistance, in response to General Assembly resolution 46/182 on the strengthening of humanitarian assistance.

logistical elements involved in the immediate response of the United Nations security management system to a security crisis must be streamlined and clearly laid out.

Recommendation 7

The Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security, as the Chair of the Inter-Agency Security Management Network, should, by no later than January 2018, develop a system-wide security surge policy, including the standard operating procedures necessary, with a view to clarifying surge standing resources and the roles and respective responsibilities of the different actors of the United Nations security management system.

E. Training and counselling

166. Training on security crisis management is another important item on agenda of the Department of Safety and Security. A pilot training course on this topic was conducted in 2015 for the first time. The course should be offered regularly to relevant target audience and possibly synchronized with actual drills.

167. During its twenty-seventh session, held in Venice, Italy, in April 2014, the High-level Committee on Management discussed a paper presented by the Department of Safety and Security entitled “Reconciling duty of care for United Nations personnel while operating in high-risk environment”.⁴³ In the document, the Department presented the moral obligation of the United Nations to protect its staff and called upon all entities of the Organization to strengthen their support systems for United Nations personnel working across the globe, particularly those in high-risk environments.

168. The High-level Committee on Management agreed that a holistic examination of the programmatic need to “stay and deliver” should be conducted against the organizational imperative of duty of care for staff in high-risk environments, and established a working group chaired by the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security to undertake a comprehensive review of the issue of duty of care. The review undertaken indicates that the United Nations system currently does provide a comprehensive support system for staff operating in high-risk environment, although many staff and managers are not aware of all provisions and support structures. While many initiatives have been taken in recent years, especially through the Emergency Preparedness and Support Team and its variations among agencies, funds and programmes, to prepare staff and managers for emergency situations, the study also demonstrates that the current system, in particular with regard to medical and psychosocial support, focuses on mitigation rather than prevention, with wide variances among United Nations system organizations. The system would benefit greatly from a comprehensive, coordinated and harmonized approach at various levels, through the collaboration between the different streams of medical, psychosocial and human resources.

169. Post-crisis stress management and counselling services should be delivered in a timely manner to staff in need. Some United Nations security management system organizations have a comprehensive set of services relating to crisis preparedness and follow-up, for example, a dedicated unit, specific standard operating procedures and staff counsellors available either at Headquarters or in the regional offices. Others rely on the Department of Safety and Security, local United Nations staff and, in some specific cases, consultants and/or through their Critical Incident Stress Management Unit. The Unit provides counselling services in the field and at Headquarters, coordinates the United Nations response to critical incident stress and maintains a worldwide referral network of certified mental health

⁴³ See www.unsceb.org/content/action-reconciling-duty-care-un-personnel-while-operating-high-risk-environments.

professionals in 90 duty stations. From January 2013 to December 2014, the Unit conducted 11,001 counselling sessions and deployed counsellors in response to 54 major crises in the Middle East, Africa and Asia. In order to enhance the coordination between the Unit, United Nations security management system stress counsellors and security professionals in the provision of psychosocial services, the Inter-Agency Security Management Network approved the management of stress and critical incident stress policy in June 2015.

170. In parallel, the Emergency Preparedness and Support Team was created in May 2010 to improve the support to United Nations staff, especially survivors and the families of staff deceased or injured as a result of a crisis (whether malicious acts or natural disasters). It is located in the Office of Human Resources Management in New York and its mandate is to coordinate essential support to staff and their families during all phases of emergency incidents, including providing training programmes to staff members to ensure that they are equipped and prepared for emergencies.

F. Leadership issues

171. In some places where the United Nations operates, integrated security sections have been established to coordinate and manage the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Political Affairs security officers contracted by the Department of Field Support, under the management of a single security manager from the Department of Safety and Security, such as a principal or chief security adviser, who also heads the security cell comprising the Department and mission security officers and security professionals of the agencies, funds and programmes. Those integrated sections have been implemented in countries such as Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Mali, Sierra Leone, the Sudan and the Syrian Arab Republic. Often, they rely heavily on missions' assistance for transportation, equipment, safe accommodation, information and other facilities and, in some cases, guard services, convoy escorts and intervention forces. However, the number of integrated security sections have been limited owing to the lack of clear leadership and accountability in case of crisis.

172. Following a timely request by the Secretary-General that the Department of Safety and Security consolidate — in cooperation with members of the Inter-Agency Security Management Network, Department of Management and Office of Legal Affairs — the existing security resources within the Secretariat, especially the Department of Field Support/Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the United Nations Secretariat Safety and Security Integration Project was launched in August 2015 under the leadership of the Department of Safety and Security. The project is directed by a steering group and working groups comprising the Department of Safety and Security, Department of Management, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Political Affairs, Department of Field Support, Office of Legal Affairs and UNDP. It addresses three streams of work, namely, management authority for the Department of Safety and Security, human resources integration and funding for integrated security. The first phase (i.e., the integration of security resources of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Political Affairs and Department of Field Support under the management of the Department of Safety and Security) is expected to be completed by November 2017.

173. In that regard, **the Inspectors welcome the timely addressing of a major coordination issue persistently observed and reported by a majority of security professionals interviewed and reflected in the management letter addressed to the Department of Safety and Security in 2015. They concur with the decision made and stress the need to further pursue the implementation of the additional phases (i.e., human resources integration and funding for integrated security).**

174. **In the view of the Inspectors, once the security integration has taken place at the Secretariat level and the United Nations Secretariat Safety and Security Integration Project has come to an end, lessons learned and best practices should inform the development of a similar system-wide project, contemplating a higher integration of security resources in the context of the Inter-**

Agency Security Management Network. This higher level integration should have as an ultimate objective the optimization of security resources available system-wide, avoiding duplication. It should build upon the individual expertise accumulated by each United Nations security management system organization and take into consideration their specific operational needs while providing the degree of autonomy necessary for them to realize their respective mandates in full independence.

G. Immediate local response to a security crisis

175. All operational, organizational and logistical elements involved in the immediate response of the United Nations security management system to a security crisis must be clearly laid out and implemented by all parties involved. Some security studies show that security personnel must be able to deploy effective countermeasures within two seconds of the commencement of an attack. In the view of Inspectors, in high-threat environments, Department of Safety and Security staff should be armed and available to protect staff members at a moment's notice if an attack occurs. The analysis of the corporate questionnaire sent to organizations shows that only 26 per cent of agencies, funds and programmes of the United Nations has armed safety and security personnel.

176. Armed security agents should always have on their person a badge and other easily and externally identifying gear that personnel and other armed responders (e.g., national police forces or peacekeeping forces) have been briefed on. Security officers from the Department of Safety and Security who are not assigned to guard duty are often dressed in civilian clothes, which is understandable during routine duties. Some security agents carry concealed handguns without a badge or other identifying item next to the firearm; this may lead to some persons being alarmed when the firearm is accidentally exposed.

177. During events such as armed attacks, bombings and natural disasters, United Nations personnel may need to follow immediately the directives of United Nations security personnel. As such, security members must be easily identifiable and recognized to avoid confusion. Serious security events often occur without warning; therefore, security officers' response equipment must be ready and at hand at all times. Security staff should be equipped with clearly marked vests/equipment that identify them during emergencies as United Nations security personnel. **The Department of Safety and Security should establish a physical identification code applicable to all security staff, allowing for their immediate and clear identification during emergencies. The same reasoning applies to security personnel of agencies, funds and programmes and, consequently, an easy but common identification code for security staff at the United Nations security management system level should be established.**

H. Staff issues

178. Recent initiatives have sought to bridge the gap in the degree and nature of protection offered to international versus national staff. Focus group meetings organized with the participation of local staff in all field locations visited by the Joint Inspection Unit team highlighted the issue; in certain locations (e.g., Somalia and South Sudan), local personnel are subject to additional risks simply because they work for the United Nations. The risks are more apparent when commuting to the workplace and in particular while at their residences.

179. To complement the new residential security measures for United Nations personnel, the development of a policy on residential security risks for locally recruited United Nations personnel was recently undertaken. The policy will focus on the security risks associated with this category of personnel owing to their employment with the United Nations. The review of residential security risks for locally recruited personnel is currently under way, aimed at identifying the scope of the security risk faced by such personnel at their residences as a consequence of their employment with the United

Nations. The working group of the Inter-Agency Security Management Network was scheduled to report to the Steering Group of the Network in November 2016.

180. The Inspectors are of the opinion that organizations are responsible for enhancing the level of security provided to local personnel, and in that regard they welcome the initiative undertaken by the Inter-Agency Security Management Network and urge organizations to finalize and implement rapidly the relevant policy.

181. Another major difference exists between internationally recruited and national staff when there is a need to evacuate or relocate personnel and eligible family members from an area of unacceptable risk. Three alternatives are identified as risk avoidance measures in the event of a crisis: alternate work modalities (“work from home” or “stay at home”), relocation or evacuation. At the discretion of the designated officer, the first two alternatives may apply for international as well as locally-recruited staff. However, in case an evacuation is decided by the Secretary-General (on the basis of recommendations by the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security and designated officer), as per the current United Nations security management system policy, only international staff and their eligible dependents will be evacuated. The evacuation of local staff is conducted only in exceptional circumstances, specifically when they may be targeted as a consequence of their employment with the United Nations.

182. Evacuating local staff implies a number of cultural, procedural and financial issues. In certain cases, there is reluctance and even refusal from local staff to be evacuated, even with their eligible dependents, as their definition of “family” may go beyond the family and dependency concepts contemplated in United Nations policies and leaving other relatives behind during hard times is not an acceptable option. The cost of evacuating local staff, who in many duty stations outnumber international staff, is another issue. This should be balanced against the possibility that United Nations national employees who stay behind may be targeted not because they are identified as United Nations employees, but because of other criteria, such as religion or ethnicity, as illustrated in previous cases.⁴⁴ Relocation within the country, where there is an imminent threat of death, is a viable option but not always the best response, for instance, in case of a generalized genocide conflict. **The Inspectors believe that the evacuation of local staff should be contemplated on a case-by-case basis and always in consultation with relevant staff associations. In their view, local staff should be evacuated when relocation is not an option and the local context represents a threat to the lives of local staff and their dependents.**

183. Finally, contractual issues with security personnel were reported throughout the United Nations entities. It is well known that the current diversity of contracts used to hire security staff poses important challenges. Currently, several types of contractual arrangements and staff categories are used in different locations and, while security guards in New York have a unique category, those in other locations may belong to other categories, for example, General Service or Field Service. This is an issue, inter alia, for the implementation of staff mobility and the redeployment of surge staff. Furthermore, it disturbs career development, creates unfair situations and has an impact on staff morale. Each United Nations entity recruits its own security personnel and, while standard terms of references and job descriptions are proposed by the Department of Safety and Security, there is no standardized status or type of contract based on the type of work conducted by the employee. Some security professionals are employed in-house while the recruitment of other specialized expertise, such as close protection or fire safety, may be outsourced. For example, UNHCR makes use of local authorities’ expertise for fire safety.

⁴⁴ One notorious case was the non-evacuation of endangered Tutsi United Nations staff members during the Rwandan genocide in 1994, which led to the killing of several of them and their families.

184. The issue was identified in the management letter issued by the Joint Inspection Unit in 2015. **The Inspectors reiterate the need to unify contract types for security personnel performing the same functions, regardless of location or the entities they may work for.** This could be done using just one of the existing contract types or by creating a new one; however, in the context of the current discussions at the International Civil Service Commission, which include a move towards reducing the number of existing contract types, it would be desirable to use one of the existing types. **It is expected that the abovementioned United Nations Secretariat Safety and Security Integration Project initiative, will address the issue within the United Nations Secretariat in its second phase, namely, human resources integration. Similarly, the Inspectors recommend that there be a higher level of integration of security resources at the system-wide level in the context of the cooperation between the Inter-Agency Security Management Network and human resources networks. In their view, a higher level of integration of security resources could be achieved without jeopardizing the independence and operational autonomy of agencies, funds and programmes and while serving the best interests of the United Nations security management system as a whole.**

VII. RESOURCES AND FINANCE

185. The last strategic area of the review is resources and finance. In this section, the Inspectors address how the current funding arrangements support the United Nations security management system in reducing the vulnerability of the United Nations and associated personnel deployed across the world, and the impact in programme delivery. It also contains recommendations for funding alternatives, to be considered by the main stakeholders in the immediate and medium term, taking into account that the security threat landscape will continue to evolve.

A. Background

186. The issue of financing the United Nations security management system is a long-standing one. Extensive discussions have taken place in different forums in the past decade, including at the system-wide level in the framework of the High-level Committee on Management. Furthermore, several working groups have been established, and different funding and cost-sharing modalities have been considered. However, despite the progress achieved, the issue remains partially unresolved.

187. The Secretary-General, in his proposal for a new United Nations security management regime, proposed that the system be funded from the regular United Nations budget. However, in its resolution [59/276](#), in which it decided to establish the Department of Safety and Security, the General Assembly also decided to retain the previous cost-sharing arrangements for safety and security.

188. The report of the Independent Panel, and other independent expert studies, identified the fragmentation and shortage of the resources necessary to confront security threats faced by the United Nations system. All agreed that the issue was rather systemic and recommended adequate and sustainable funding for safety and security. The Independent Panel, convinced that the United Nations security system would benefit if it were to be funded entirely from the United Nations regular budget, recommended in its report the conversion of the Department of Safety and Security budget to the United Nations regular budget. Despite subsequent requests, the General Assembly, while recognizing the operational difficulties linked to cost-sharing by organizations, decided to maintain existing cost-sharing arrangements for safety and security rather than funding those costs under the United Nations regular budget.

189. **The Inspectors share the views expressed by the Independent Panel on Safety and Security of United Nations Personnel and Premises Worldwide. Their conclusion, after the thorough analysis of views stated by officers, both in the field and at Headquarters locations, is that a**

unique source of funding would be simpler to manage than the current cumbersome cost-sharing mechanisms, and would enhance the transparency demanded by agencies, funds and programmes while facilitating accountability with respect to the use of safety and security resources. However, cognizant of the repeated proposals to fund security from a single source – the United Nations regular budget – and of the inherent problems relating to this solution, including the views expressed by the General Assembly indicating that cost-sharing arrangements for field-related security activities are important to ensure that all parties concerned share both ownership of and accountability for the system, the Inspectors prefer to explore different solutions building upon the considerable efforts made by United Nations security management system entities in the past years in search of a commonly acceptable funding model.

B. Current funding model: a complex puzzle

190. The Department of Safety and Security is funded mainly by the United Nations regular budget and by cost-sharing mechanisms agreed in the context of the High-level Committee on Management. Following the recommendation made by the General Assembly in its resolution [61/263](#) on the cost-sharing arrangements, the High-level Committee agreed that field-related security costs would be apportioned on the basis of the actual percentage of staff resulting from statistical data collected by CEB. While regular budget covers the central costs of the management and direction of the operation”, the cost-sharing mechanism, also known as joint financed activities, covers costs that “are incurred in the field or are directly related to providing operational support by Headquarters to the field offices”.⁴⁵ It should be noted that the regular budget and resources for such activities are allocated on a biennial basis and often with a ceiling (e.g., for jointly financed activities); this set-up does not provide flexibility to adapt to sudden operational changes.

191. United Nations regular budget and jointly financed activities are re-costed over the course of the biennium, taking into consideration elements such as inflation and exchange rates and following the standard budget process applied by the United Nations Secretariat. It should be noted that there is not a common re-costing mechanism shared by all United Nations security management system entities; furthermore, some entities do not prepare their budgets in United States dollars, especially those based in Europe. In addition, some agencies, funds and programmes have reported that they are requested to cover joint security costs often after applicable budget cycles are over and with no recourse for reviewing the security costs charged. The agencies, funds and programmes must be able to assess reasonableness, accuracy and receipt of service and be able to assess and provide feedback on value for money. The combination of those elements has created certain difficulties for funds, programmes and agencies, when dealing with individual contributions to the budget for jointly financed activities, as they require certainty in the budget amounts for their own planning purposes. **The Inspectors encourage the Department of Safety and Security to further enhance transparency regarding the allocation and use of resources for jointly financed activities.**

192. It should be noted that, in addition to their specific contributions to the budget of jointly financed activities, agencies, funds and programmes sustain additional security costs, mainly relating to the security of their own headquarters and field offices, and the country cost-shared budgets. These are local contributions to locally shared budgets in specific locations where agencies, funds and programmes are part of the local security management system. The contributions cover local safety and security resources and activities over and beyond what is funded through the budget of such activities. The local or country budget requirements are dependent on the security environment in the particular location. In the current deteriorating security environment agency, funds and programmes are increasingly being required to contribute more funds to these local cost-shared budgets that are

⁴⁵ See the report of the Secretary-General on interorganizational security measures ([A/56/469](#), para. 32 (c)).

approved by their own governing bodies. In addition, financial resources at the country level are often supplemented by extrabudgetary contributions by donor countries.

193. Moreover, the funding of the Department of Safety and Security is complemented by other assessed and extrabudgetary funding derived from programme support income received as reimbursement for services provided to extrabudgetary activities, funds and programmes, and from the support account for peacekeeping operations, which enables the Department to provide security support to peacekeeping missions.

194. The above financing picture shows a clear fragmentation of funding sources further compounded by different budget practices (e.g., use of vacancy rates) and budget cycles applied by various entities (e.g., peacekeeping budgets are annual and start on 1 July every year, while the United Nations Secretariat budget cycle is biennial, starting on 1 January every other year). The same degree of complexity applies to governance mechanisms and, while different governing bodies of the United Nations system are involved in the approval of security resources, none of them has a comprehensive vision of the global security needs and of the global level of resources involved at the system-wide level.

195. The solution to this complex issue is the subject of lengthy discussions of security and financial professionals from the different entities comprising the United Nations security management system. However, the Inspectors expect that the information and proposals included may serve as a basis in the current debate on funding. Furthermore, at the time of writing the present review, they are pleased to note a number of initiatives currently being undertaken at various levels to address different aspects of the financing of safety and security requirements.

196. One of these initiatives, already mentioned in the review, is the United Nations Secretariat Safety and Security Integration Project, launched in August 2015 under the leadership of the Department of Safety and Security. The Project is intended to address, inter alia, the funding for integrated security within the United Nations Secretariat. In addition, related issues are being tackled at the United Nations system level by the working group on the locally cost-shared security budget established in March 2016, chaired by the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security and comprising representatives from agencies, funds and programmes and departments of the United Nations Secretariat.

197. In addition, and under the Finance and Budget Network of the High-level Committee on Management, the working group on governance of jointly financed security costs continues to work to develop an approach that ensures a transparent, consistent and predictable process for the preparation, review and approval of the jointly financed part of the United Nations security management system budget.⁴⁶ The working group has facilitated the development of budget templates and a review process for the presentation of the Department of Safety and Security budget, enabling the Finance and Budget Network and the Inter-Agency Security Management Network to assess the budgetary requirements of the system in a detailed structured manner prior to its formal submission.

C. Funding impact and relevant findings

198. The above-mentioned array of funding sources and actors involved poses a range of challenges to the operations of the Department of Safety and Security. The hybrid nature of the budget sources and its inherent lack of flexibility do not support a United Nations security management system that is based on structured risk analysis and designed to respond in a timely manner to crisis through the rapid redeployment of commensurate human or financial resources.

⁴⁶ See [CEB/2013/HLCM/FB/15](http://www.unsceb.org/CEBPublicFiles/Finance%20%26%20Budget%20Network/Document/FBN%2021st%20final%20conclusions.pdf), available from www.unsceb.org/CEBPublicFiles/Finance%20%26%20Budget%20Network/Document/FBN%2021st%20final%20conclusions.pdf.

199. In most of the interviews held, and especially in the focus groups with international staff organized in the different locations visited, the Inspectors were told that the fixed nature of budgets, irrespective of the sources, was not conducive to confronting the dynamic and challenging security environments in which the United Nations operates where new surge resources may be needed and often for extended periods of time, owing to sudden emerging risks, as proven by the nature of some of the current crises. **The current safety and security model requires appropriate information collection and analysis mechanisms, allowing the quick and precise determination of threats and risk levels, and the flexibility necessary to react to swift changing security environments. It also requires resources that can be made readily available to introduce the safety and security measures necessary in a timely manner.**

200. Paradoxically, while interviews held at the headquarter locations of agencies, funds and programmes revealed concerns about the amounts contributed towards funding jointly financed activities and the lack of transparency by the Department of Safety and Security regarding its use, those held in field locations with officers of the same agencies, funds and programmes showed general support for local Department activities and staff. Moreover, it was frequently stated that many security issues would be resolved if the Department had more local resources, both staff and equipment, corresponding to what the local threat environment dictates. In certain locations, the lack of security personnel, communication devices and armoured vehicles was disturbing programme delivery. The Inspectors were informed that the operations of agencies, funds and programmes were often affected by the limited security resources available to them. The Inspectors ascertained that the Department was underresourced to meet the operational safety and security demands of agencies, funds and programmes in some of the locations visited. They witnessed different cases where daily activities inside the area of operations were either cancelled or delayed owing to the lack of security resources, given that the Department personnel were overstretched and armoured vehicles had been diverted to other functions.

201. Also of concern was that different United Nations organizations performed different activities on the ground and had specific safety and security needs and, as a consequence of the different funding models, were allocated resources that often result in duplication and/or overlapping.

202. The corporate questionnaires revealed that UNDP, UNODC, UNRWA, UN-Women, IAEA, IMO, ITU and UNESCO projects had been suspended or terminated owing to lack of sufficient resources for safety and security on the ground. ILO and UNHCR assess safety and security resources early in the development of projects to ensure their safe implementation. Through the commitment of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR has secured enough funding to enable it to stay and deliver. Furthermore, UNHCR, because of its large presence in the field, maintains a budget to support immediate security requirements and a stockpile of equipment, including armoured vehicles, that may be required to facilitate operation in high-risk environments. Field safety advisors at headquarter locations are readily deployable to support emergency operations, while a roster of external security experts is maintained.

203. The responses of UNICEF staff to the Joint Inspection Unit questionnaire indicate that they operate in all environments, including high-risk ones, and there is rarely a shut down or suspension of programmes. However, there may be delays as a result of putting in place adequate risk mitigating measures. Furthermore, although there might be a reduction in the number of staff members working in a specific area, even in inaccessible locations, programmes are executed remotely through partners who remain on the ground. During the Inspectors' visits, both at headquarter offices and field offices, it was evident that UNICEF had in place its own resources to strengthen threat analysis, physical security and training to meet the operational safety and security demands of its programmes.

204. In response to the corporate questionnaire, most organizations indicated that they applied the principle of "no programme without security". At the same time, most of the organizations recognized that it was difficult to budget for the unknown. In addition, safety and security costs were increasing

exponentially, thus negatively affecting programme implementation as, once a project is up and running, it is very difficult to maintain security requirements for its life-cycle if a percentage of project funds is not devoted to security from the outset. Security planning and requisite funding must be taken into consideration from the conception of the project and remain available throughout its life-cycle in insecure or rapidly evolving security environments.

205. In the current operating environment, there is a need to supplement the resources of the Department of Safety and Security, particularly those support functions that have not increased in the line with the growing operational demand caused by a deteriorating security environment. According to the Department's strategic review, areas such as security threat analyses, physical security, training and development and executive office and policy require additional resources to cope with the increased demand placed on them to support security operations in the field. This is particularly the case because of the direct correlation between the support services provided by those areas and the needs to increase safety and security in the field as a result of additional and/or evolving risks.

206. In the view of the Inspectors, a truly unified security management system is a critical objective and its central funding would be the most effective way of safeguarding its unity and its operational soundness. At the present time, this would require either the United Nations to fund security requirements from the outset through its regular budget or the establishment of a trust fund by the clients of the security service, including the initial up front agreement on the services to be rendered and associated costs. The Inspectors encourage the Department of Safety and Security and the members of the Inter-Agency Security Management Network to establish a results-based approach to the issue by establishing from the planning phase the expected results, agreeing on measuring indicators and allocating commensurate resources.

207. In view of the decision of the General Assembly to maintain the existing arrangements with regard to cost-sharing for safety and security, CEB, through the High-level Committee on Management, has continued to monitor the apportionment of field-related security costs and agreed to a more participatory and transparent procedure for the preparation of the budget, which is subject to cost-sharing. The Inspectors welcome the joint consultations currently ongoing between the Finance and Budget Network and the High-level Committee, the Inter-Agency Security Management Network and the Department of Safety and Security on the governance of the jointly financed security budget.

D. Department of Safety and Security budget

208. While the demand for security and the current level of coverage (more than 150,000 personnel and 300,000 dependants in over 2,000 duty stations) have increased in recent years, the budget of the Department of Safety and Security has not experienced a commensurate growth. In interviews, Department senior management indicated that there was a lack of resources that constrains the operation and financing of the United Nations security management system. In fact, the Department is heavily dependent on non-regular budget resources, particularly on jointly financed activities, representing since 2010 more than 50 per cent of the total resources allocated, as reflected in table 2 below.

Table 2

Budget of the Department of Safety and Security for the period 2008-2017

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	2010-2011	2012-2013	2014-2015	2016-2017
	Expenditure	Expenditure	Estimate	Estimate
Regular budget*	177 969	186 347	181 075	188 352
Jointly financed activities	243 914	251 256	266 073	277 372
Other assessed/peacekeeping support account	7 629	7 351	7 389	7 528

Extrabudgetary	5 642	6 713	7 002	6 266
Total	435 154	451 667	461 539	479 517
Jointly financed activities/total	56.05%	55.63%	57.65%	57.84%

*Excluding the United Nations share of jointly financed activities, including programme support regular budget activities.

Source: Proposed programme budget for the biennium 2016-2017, section 34 ([A/70/6 \(sect. 34\)](#))

209. It should be noted that the Department of Safety and Security is subject to multiple budget processes. As a department of the United Nations Secretariat, it follows established procedures for the submission and approval of the part relating to its regular budget. In addition, the Department needs to follow another set of procedures, not yet formalized, for the part of resources financed by jointly financed activities. Evidently, this places an additional administrative burden on the Department.

210. The Inspectors welcome that the issue is currently being addressed through cooperation between the Finance and Budget Network and the Inter-Agency Security Management Network. If endorsed by the Finance and Budget Network and the Inter-Agency Security Management Network, the procedures agreed upon should be developed into a policy for the United Nations security management system in order to ensure that all organizations are fully aware of the agreed process.

211. The 2016/17 budget proposal for the United Nations security management system was presented in April 2015 at an ad hoc session of the Finance and Budget Network on 2016/17 budgets for jointly financed activities.

212. The Finance and Budget Network endorsed a 2016/17 budget of \$225,208,001. This amount was based on the budget proposal for the Department of Safety and Security prior to re-costing. The General Assembly, in its resolution [70/248](#) (part XXIV) of December 2015 approved a total 2016/17 budget for jointly financed security costs in the amount of \$227,184,500 (after re-costing). The Group noted that the Department of Safety and Security had made efforts to prioritize and implement programmes without real budget growth and that, despite increasing security challenges, the Department had not requested budget increases in the security budget for jointly financed activities from the final appropriation of 2014/15 in the 2016-2017 biennium, above and beyond the re-costing budgetary increases applied by the United Nations Secretariat (i.e., as noted in table 2 above, the original estimate for 2016/17 had been higher).

E. Proposed ideas for enhancing the current funding model

Immediate

213. The United Nations Department of Safety and Security should have sufficient flexibility, including when justified access to "surge" funding to provide the human and financial resources required for the security response to unforeseen incidents and crises that are occurring more and more regularly. One option could be to provide the Department with access to the contingency fund of the Secretary-General for unforeseen requirements.

214. Similarly, in order to reflect and respond to the current security environment, the Department of Safety and Security needs to have the full spectrum of delegated authorities (both human and financial resources) to centrally manage and assign all safety and security personnel across the duty stations. This would provide the basis for the Department to use existing resources in the most efficient and effective manner. These delegations are particularly important for the above-mentioned the United Nations Secretariat Safety and Security Integration Project.

Medium term

215. As recommended by the Independent Panel, the simplest funding model would be to have one budget source for the Department of Safety and Security that could be allocated flexibly depending on the security priorities on a biennium basis with a "surge" reserve to fund unforeseen safety security incidents and crisis as they occur. Although this would be the simplest model, it would require a significant change in the way funds are allocated to various functions and activities. In particular, it would require the General Assembly to change the way budgets are allocated for peacekeeping and special political missions. This would not, however, support the current integration of the Secretariat security resources into the Department.

216. A more practical model would be to use a model similar to the current support account — an extended and varied jointly financed or shared funding model that would apply to peacekeeping and special political missions, in addition to but separate from the current one used by agency funds and programmes. In such a funding model, all missions would be assessed on their security requirements depending on the size and scope of the mission and the security risk assessment. The "assessed contributions" from the particular mission would be provided directly to the Department of Safety and Security, who in turn, would deliver the security services to the mission. As the mission size and scope increases and decreases, or the security environment improves or deteriorates, the funding would increase or decrease. The allocation and expenditure of the resources would be assessed and reported upon annually to the General Assembly allowing for better reporting and monitoring.

217. In both the immediate and medium-term solutions, there needs to be a balance between field operational resources and the operational support and executive/corporate resources to ensure the three stay synchronized. It should be noted that the current financing model, which includes a ceiling on funds for jointly financed activities, is not flexible enough to adapt to significant changes in the number of personnel protected or in the number of operations undertaken. For any increase in field operational resource allocations, there is a need for a commensurate increase in the operational support and executive/corporate resources to support and enable the operational activity, and the same is true for any decrease in operational activity. This is consistent with the operating model of the Department of Safety and Security, where there is a direct relationship between all field operational activities and those activities that support and enable the field. As with the immediate solution, access to "surge" funding for unforeseen incidents and crisis would need to be available and accessible to the Department on an as-needed basis.

218. The funding model options above could provide the basis for a sustainable and predictable budget for the Department of Safety and Security. The model that is preferred and realistically achievable is to continue with the shared budget for the security services provided to the agency, funds and programmes and to have a similar funding arrangement for the services provided to peacekeeping and special political missions. The peacekeeping and special political mission safety and security funding to the Department would need to provide a degree of flexibility to redeploy a portion of the security resources across the peacekeeping and/or special political missions as the security environment deteriorates or improves in particular locations. This budget model would reflect the security environment in which the United Nations operates. It is also critical for the Department to continue to deliver safety and security services and to have sufficient resources to be deployed flexibly to respond in a global security environment.

Recommendation 8

The General Assembly should request the Secretary-General to prepare, in consultation with the High-level Committee on Management and CEB and its appropriate networks, a proposal for a safety and security funding model that would provide the Department of Safety and Security with a transparent, sustainable and predictable budget and the flexibility necessary to address unforeseen crises, to be considered during the seventy-second session of the Assembly.

Annex I: Apportionment of participating organizations and corresponding amounts in the 2016/17 budget of the United Nations Security Management System (in United States dollars)

Organization	Headcount as of 31 December 2011 (1)	Headcount as of 31 December 2013 (2)	Percentage of Staff as at 31 Dec 2013	Distribution of 2016-2017 budget based on percentage of staff (USD)	Minimum share applicable?	Headcount of those above minimum share	Percentage share of those above minimum contribution	Distribution of 2016-2017 budget based on percentage of staff and minimum contribution of \$75,000	Effective percentage shares for the 2016-2017 budget apportionment
	(a)	(b)	(b) = (a)/SUM(a)	(c)=(b)*227,184,500		(d)	(e)=(d)/SUM(d)	(f)	(g)=(f)/227,184,500
Total approved UNSMS budget 2016-2017	227,184,500								
ADB (3)	624	753	0.577%	1,310,268.22	-	753	0.6%	1,306,741	0.575%
EBRD	430	591	0.453%	1,028,377.84	-	591	0.5%	1,025,610	0.451%
CTBTO	-	-	0.000%	-	75,000.00	-	0.0%	75,000	0.033%
FAO	3,300	6,045	4.630%	10,518,687.07	-	6,045	4.6%	10,490,372	4.618%
IAEA	36	43	0.033%	74,822.75	75,000.00	-	0.0%	75,000	0.033%
ICAO	105	102	0.078%	177,486.53	-	102	0.1%	177,009	0.078%
ICC	113	101	0.077%	175,746.47	-	101	0.1%	175,273	0.077%
IFAD	113	90	0.069%	156,605.76	-	90	0.1%	156,184	0.069%
ILO	1,825	1,786	1.368%	3,107,754.36	-	1,786	1.4%	3,099,389	1.364%
IMF	613	963	0.738%	1,675,681.66	-	963	0.7%	1,671,171	0.736%
IMO	28	18	0.014%	31,321.15	75,000.00	-	0.0%	75,000	0.033%
ISA	-	-	0.000%	-	75,000.00	-	0.0%	75,000	0.033%
IOM	7,443	7,306	5.596%	12,712,907.81	-	7,306	5.6%	12,678,686	5.581%
ITC	24	14	0.011%	24,360.90	75,000.00	-	0.0%	75,000	0.033%
ITU	52	131	0.100%	227,948.39	-	131	0.1%	227,335	0.100%
OPCW	-	-	0.000%	-	75,000.00	-	0.0%	75,000	0.033%
PAHO	759	697	0.534%	1,212,824.63	-	697	0.5%	1,209,560	0.532%
UN (4)	27,790	29,123	22.306%	50,675,884.79	-	29,123	22.3%	50,539,473	22.246%
UNAIDS	516	637	0.488%	1,108,420.79	-	637	0.5%	1,105,437	0.487%
UNDP	26,609	23,681	18.138%	41,206,456.33	-	23,681	18.2%	41,095,534	18.089%
UNESCO	1,891	1,773	1.358%	3,085,133.53	-	1,773	1.4%	3,076,829	1.354%
UNFPA	3,338	3,406	2.609%	5,926,658.09	-	3,406	2.6%	5,910,704	2.602%
UNHCR	6,849	9,103	6.972%	15,839,802.88	-	9,103	7.0%	15,797,164	6.953%
UNICC	-	-	0.000%	-	75,000.00	-	0.0%	75,000	0.033%
UNICEF	11,548	12,233	9.370%	21,286,203.30	-	12,233	9.4%	21,228,904	9.344%
UNIDO	705	428	0.328%	744,747.41	-	428	0.3%	742,743	0.327%
UNOPS	2,208	2,979	2.282%	5,183,650.75	-	2,979	2.3%	5,169,697	2.276%
UN Women	949	1,096	0.839%	1,907,110.18	-	1,096	0.8%	1,901,977	0.837%
UNU	85	83	0.064%	144,425.31	-	83	0.1%	144,037	0.063%
UNV (5)	171	-	0.000%	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
UPU	6	6	0.005%	10,440.38	75,000.00	-	0.0%	75,000	0.033%
UNWTO	8	-	0.000%	-	75,000.00	-	0.0%	75,000	0.033%
WFP	12,559	11,762	9.009%	20,466,633.14	-	11,762	9.0%	20,411,540	8.985%
WHO	8,397	8,433	6.459%	14,673,959.98	-	8,433	6.5%	14,634,460	6.442%
WIPO	7	6	0.005%	10,440.38	75,000.00	-	0.0%	75,000	0.033%
WMO	36	36	0.028%	62,642.31	75,000.00	-	0.0%	75,000	0.033%
World Bank	7,218	7,136	5.466%	12,417,096.93	-	7,136	5.5%	12,383,672	5.451%
Total	126,355	130,561	100.000%	227,184,500.00	825,000.00	130,438.00	100.0%	227,184,500	100.000%


Notes:

- (1) Headcount of field staff as of 31 December 2011, from the census carried out by CEB Secretariat ([CEB/2012/HLCM/HR/30/Rev.1](#))
- (2) Headcount of field staff as of 31 December 2013, from the census carried out by CEB Secretariat (Document forthcoming)
- (3) As per MOU agreement between ADB and the Department of Safety and Security.
- (4) UN total includes 339 staff of UNRWA
- (5) UNV headcount is included in UNDP

Annex II: Overview of actions to be taken by participating organizations on the recommendations of the Joint Inspection Unit JIU/REP/2016/9

		Intended impact	United Nations, its funds and programmes															Specialized agencies and IAEA														
			CEB	United Nations*	UNAIDS	UNCTAD	ITC	UNDP	UNEP	UNFPA	UN-Habitat	UNHCR	UNICEF	UNODC	UNOPS	UNRWA	UN-Women	WFP	FAO	IAEA	ICAO	ILO	IMO	ITU	UNESCO	UNIDO	UNWTO	UPU	WHO	WIPO	WMO	
Report	For action		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
	For information		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
Recommendation 1		a,e		E	E			E		E		E	E		E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E		
Recommendation 2		a,e		E	E			E		E		E	E		E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E		
Recommendation 3		a,e		E	E			E		E		E	E		E	E	E	E	E	E		E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E		
Recommendation 4		e,f		E																												
Recommendation 5		a,e		E	E			E		E		E	E		E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E		
Recommendation 6		c,df,h		E																												
Recommendation 7		c,de,f		E																												
Recommendation 8		a,c,d,h		L																												

Legend: L: Recommendation for decision by legislative organ E: Recommendation for action by executive head

 : Recommendation does not require action by this organization

Intended impact: a: enhanced transparency and accountability b: dissemination of good/best practices c: enhanced coordination and cooperation d: strengthened coherence and harmonization e: enhanced control and compliance
f: enhanced effectiveness g: significant financial savings h: enhanced efficiency i: other.

* Covers all entities listed in [ST/SGB/2002/11](#) other than UNCTAD, UNODC, UNEP, UN-Habitat, UNHCR, UNRWA.