

SECURITY  
COUNCILDistr.  
GENERALS/3143  
24 November 1953

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE DATED 23 NOVEMBER 1953 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TRANSMITTING THE SEVENTY-FOURTH REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF 7 JULY 1950 (S/1588)

The Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to refer to Paragraph 6 of the Resolution of the Security Council of July 7, 1950, requesting the United States to provide the Security Council with reports, as appropriate, on the course of action taken under the United Nations Command.

In compliance with this Resolution, there is enclosed herewith, for circulation to the members of the Security Council, the Seventy-fourth Report of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period July 16 through July 31, 1953, inclusive.

REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND OPERATIONS IN KOREA  
FOR THE PERIOD 16-31 JULY 1953  
(Report No. 74)

I herewith submit report number 74 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 16-31 July 1953, inclusive. United Nations Command communiques numbers 1677-1689 provide detailed accounts of these operations.

From the 16th of July until the Armistice was signed on the 27th of July, there were executive sessions each day except for the 17th and 18th days of the month. There was an executive plenary session on the 16th, and on the 19th day there was both an executive plenary session and an executive liaison officers session. From the 20th day through the 26th there were executive sessions daily of both liaison and staff officers except on the 22nd day when there was a staff officer session only and on the 25th and 26th days liaison officers meetings only.

On 19 July the Communists made public a statement relative to the implementation of the Armistice Agreement. The United Nations Command noted the statement and reserved the right to discuss the Communist statement publicly.

Discussions during this period concerned reaching agreement as to the effective date of the Armistice; revision to the Draft Armistice Agreement, Military Demarcation Line and Demilitarized Zone; preparation of the documents, including maps; Temporary Agreement Supplementary to the Armistice Agreement; and arrangements for the signing of the Armistice.

On 26 July 1953, General Mark W. Clark, Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, announced that at 2:05 P.M. that date, United Nations Command and Communist delegates reached agreement on the terms of an armistice. In connection with the signing of the armistice, General Clark made the following statement:

"In order to speed the conclusion of the armistice and thus prevent additional casualties which would result from further delay, and because of unacceptable restrictions demanded by the Communists as a condition to the appearance at Panmunjom of their commanders, it has been agreed that none of the commanders will sign the Armistice Agreement at Panmunjom. Instead, both sides have authorized their senior delegates to sign the agreement at Panmunjom at 10 o'clock, Monday, 27 July. Twelve hours from that time the armistice will become effective.

"In accordance with the agreed upon procedure, the documents signed by the delegates at Panmunjom will be dispatched immediately to the headquarters of the respective military commanders for their signatures. I shall sign the documents at my advance headquarters at Munsan-ni."

Liaison officers of the United Nations Command and Communists reached agreement in executive session at Panmunjom on the 26th of July on details pertaining to the signing of an armistice and set 10 A.M., July 27, as the time and date for the signing.

On 27 July 1953, a military armistice between the United Nations Command and the armed forces of North Korea and Communist China was signed initially at 10 A.M. at Panmunjom, Korea, by Lieutenant General William K. Harrison, Jr., representing the United Nations Command and General Nam Il for the Communist forces. The documents to be signed by the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command were then returned to Munsan-ni, where they were signed by General Mark W. Clark. The armistice became effective at 10 P.M., 27 July 1953.

Even though armistice negotiations were culminated in an agreement during this period, strongly Communistic prisoners of war in United Nations Command custody made last minute efforts to create difficulties for their captors. As is often the case, the prisoners in the Kojedo complex created all the disturbance. Various compounds, obviously on order of their prisoner of war leaders, conducted drills, shouted, clapped their hands and conducted frenzied chants in violation of long standing instructions. In one instance, a United Nations Command enclosure commander was attacked.

There were detected during this period unmistakable signs that the non-repatriate prisoners remaining in United Nations Command custody were becoming increasingly apprehensive about their ultimate fate. Particular emphasis, therefore, was placed on presentation of factual data to these non-repatriates to point out the safeguards guaranteed them by the Armistice Agreement. Initiation of this program met with immediate success in allaying fears and apprehensions of this category of prisoners and contributed in large measure to the maintenance of order in their camps.

Elements of five Chinese Communist Forces armies continued to attack along the KUMSONG Salient during mid-July, raising the intensity and strength of enemy action to a new high for the last two years of the war. The western front remained relatively quiet during the period while the eastern front flared anew with North Korean troops attacking United Nations Command positions south of KOSONG and astride the SOYANG Valley, South of SCHUI. From the armistice on 27 July until the end of the period, no activity of significance was reported across the front, with the exception of numerous sightings of enemy work details in the forward areas.

Enemy activity across the western front again was centered around several United Nations Command outpost positions near FUNJI and Outpost BETTY, south of SANGNYONG. Additionally, just prior to the end of the previous period, the enemy launched a battalion-size attack against Outpost BETTY.

In a United Nations Command division sector near FUNJI little activity was noted early in the period. In this sector late on 19 July an undetermined-size enemy force attacked and occupied Outposts BERLIN and E. BERLIN. These positions were still in the enemy's hands at the armistice signing. East of FUNJI an enemy regiment heavily supported with artillery and mortar attacked United Nations Command main line of resistance positions on 24 July. Friendly elements counterattacked early on 25 July and restored lost positions. Later in the morning an enemy company launched another attack in the same area. After a brief firefight the enemy was forced to withdraw. Sporadic firing continued until another enemy company renewed the assault early on 26 July. The enemy was forced to withdraw after approximately one hour of intense fighting. Late in the period the United Nations Command defenders in this sector experienced a number of platoon-size probes, all of which withdrew after brief exchanges of fire. The adjacent United Nations Command division to the east remained exceedingly quiet with no enemy initiated action occurring that was larger than several squads in size.

South of SANGNYONG in another United Nations Command division sector enemy initiated action centered around Outpost BETTY. The Communists launched six attacks of platoon size or larger against the outpost in attempts to occupy

the position. The last attack, of company-size, was the only one in which the enemy had any success. In this engagement the Chinese assaulted the United Nations Command position on 25 July and after nine hours of vicious fighting the enemy force occupied the center and western portions of the outpost. Sporadic fighting continued throughout the afternoon of 25 July with the United Nations Command regaining control of the central portion of the position.

In another United Nations Command division sector east of SANGNYONG, enemy activity decreased to a marked degree from the bitter fighting of the previous period. Only two company and two platoon-size enemy initiated actions were reported. These actions were concentrated against Outposts WESTVIEW and DALE, none of which were significant and the enemy withdrew after briefly probing United Nations Command positions.

As indicated previously, the Chinese launched their KUMSONG Bulge attack on 13 July and continued to expand initial successes during the period. The weight of the action was against the center and eastern portions of the central front. Elsewhere across the central front, enemy activity was of a lesser intensity.

North of CHORWON in a United Nations Command division sector, enemy activity was insignificant. However to the east, the adjacent United Nations Command division experienced nine company or larger size attacks between 16-20 July. The remainder of the period in this sector was relatively quiet. Early on 16 July a Chinese company unsuccessfully attacked positions of this United Nations Command division west of KUMHWA. Smaller enemy probes were initiated concurrently in adjacent areas. These actions were followed with three attacks of company to battalion-size across the United Nations Command division front on the night of 16-17 July. Action was further intensified in this area on the subsequent night when the enemy mounted two battalion and two company-size attacks. Although hand-to-hand fighting resulted, the enemy was forced to withdraw after periods ranging from a few minutes to four hours. Two nights later the enemy again employed a company against the positions of this United Nations Command division. Hand-to-hand combat raged over positions, the depleted enemy force was compelled to withdraw, however, after several hours of intense battle. Until the armistice, small enemy groups intermittently probed these positions.

South of KUMSONG United Nations Command elements deployed across most of the central front continued to fight determinedly to contain and repel enemy attacks. These attacks commenced on the night of 13 July when the Chinese with five armies massed between KUMHWA and the FUKHAN River, launched wave upon wave of assault infantry against United Nations Command positions along the KUMSONG Salient. Initially the enemy employed elements of five divisions in the assault and by the close of the battle eight divisions from the five Chinese Communist Forces armies had been identified. This enemy attack resulted in the loss to the United Nations Command of the KUMSONG Salient and required a major readjustment of United Nations Command front line defenses.

In one United Nations Command division sector, east of KUMHWA, the enemy launched five attacks of battalion to regimental-size against United Nations Command defenders. These enemy actions were concentrated on 15 and 16 July and were a continuation of the large limited objective attack launched by the Chinese against the KUMSONG Bulge on 13 July. Throughout these heavy attacks on 15 and 16 July the United Nations Command defenders fought bitterly to retain every position, however, under the weight of the Communist onslaught, several outpost positions were relinquished and the United Nations Command was forced to withdraw slightly to compensate for minor penetrations of the United Nations Command main line of resistance. By midnight 16 July all action had ceased and until the armistice only a scattering of small probes and one minor company attack were reported.

South of KUMSONG in another United Nations Command division sector the action continued heavy from the previous period as a result of the large scale attacks by the Chinese on 13 July. The action of an enemy division attack reported in the previous period against this United Nations Command division continued on through 17 July. Subsequently, there was a slackening of activity in this sector until early on 22 July. During the next four days the Chinese mounted eight company and battalion-size attacks against elements of this United Nations Command division. Although the United Nations Command defenders were forced to withdraw from several outposts there were no large scale withdrawals from critical terrain and the Chinese were eventually compelled

to withdraw their depleted assault units. Brief enemy probes were experienced by these friendly elements until 27 July but no breach in the United Nations Command position was made.

At the beginning of the period south of KUMSONG a United Nations Command division fought to contain the Chinese southward drive of 13 July. On 18 and 19 July the enemy initiated seven company and battalion-size actions against elements of this United Nations Command division, forcing the United Nations Command to give ground to the numerically superior Chinese. However, by 20 July the tide of the battle began to change and friendly elements took the offensive to regain a portion of the ground lost. Remnants of the enemy assault force began a withdrawal to the north and the United Nations Command was able to re-establish a firm defense. No further enemy attacks were experienced in this sector until the enemy launched a two company-size attack shortly after daybreak on 23 July. The enemy was reinforced to regimental-size and finally after five hours of bitter fighting the United Nations Command forces withdrew slightly. The last action of the period, west of the regimental attack of 23 July, occurred on 25 July when another Chinese regiment assaulted the main line of resistance positions for over two hours before heavy United Nations Command fires forced the enemy to withdraw.

Elements of another United Nations Command division south of KUMSONG experienced ten attacks of company and battalion-size during the period. These attacks were all carried out between 21 and 24 July and resulted in minor losses of terrain for the United Nations Command. In most cases the Chinese were compelled to withdraw due to the heavy fire placed on their assault units by the United Nations Command. Although several penetrations of the United Nations Command main line of resistance were made, vigorous United Nations Command counterattacks resulted, in most instances, in a resumption of United Nations Command control.

Slightly to the east in an adjacent United Nations Command division heavy fighting commencing on 13 July continued on into late July. The Chinese maintained pressure with an undetermined large number of enemy continuing the action until 21 July. At this time there was a marked decrease in enemy

activity and for several days contact with the enemy was maintained only by aggressive United Nations Command patrols. The Chinese came back with a two platoon probe against an outpost of the division shortly before daybreak on 26 July. This probe lasted for over eight hours before the enemy completely withdrew. Subsequently, two enemy companies struck against the same friendly outpost the following evening. However, this enemy force found stiffening resistance and remained in contact for only one hour before withdrawing.

As the period opened a United Nations Command division was deployed astride the FUKHAN River. Later in the period another United Nations Command division relieved the former as the battle for the KUMSONG Bulge continued to bring pressure against elements of the United Nations Command across the central front. Early in the period the enemy was still pushing south overrunning United Nations Command positions due to the overwhelming weight of his assault forces. By 18 July the friendly forces in this sector were beginning to contain and stabilize the front. As enemy attacks waned in intensity, the United Nations Command elements began a series of counterattacks to seize the initiative. However, the enemy continued to launch attacks to keep pressure on the United Nations Command. Typical of the five company to battalion-size actions reported was the enemy battalion attack of 20 July. In this assault the enemy struck friendly main line of resistance positions shortly after dark and the mass of the enemy force broke into the United Nations Command trenches and engaged the United Nations Command defenders in a bitter hand-to-hand battle. Three hours of intense fighting for control of the position ended with the determined United Nations Command troops still denying occupancy of the position to the Chinese. After this depleted enemy force withdrew early on 21 July, the Chinese remained relatively quiet in this sector until the armistice.

There was an intensification of enemy activity across the eastern front in comparison to the relative inactivity of the previous period. A total of eighteen enemy initiated actions of company-size or larger occurred. These enemy attacks were concentrated against XMAS Hill south of MULGUJI, Hill 812 - Hill 854 complex south of SOHUI, and outpost positions south of KOSONG.



During the period one United Nations Command division, deployed between the FUKHAN River and the MUNDUNG-NI Valley, experienced three attacks of company-size or larger. These attacks were in consonance with those of the previous period against elements of this division. An enemy company probed outpost positions in the division's sector early on 18 July for one hour before withdrawing. Shortly after this action began, an enemy battalion, slightly to the east of the other action, assaulted outposts of the division. The enemy was again repelled after approximately a two hour firefight. Further east another enemy battalion attacked outposts of the same division and engaged the United Nations Command defenders in hand-to-hand combat. A vicious battle ensued with the United Nations Command relinquishing control of a platoon-size outpost for several hours. Subsequently a determined United Nations Command counterattack resecured the position, with the remnants of the enemy force withdrawing shortly after daybreak on 13 July. Throughout the remainder of the period this sector was inactive, with the exception of several minor probes on 19 July.

The United Nations Command division astride the SOYANG Valley experienced a marked increase in enemy attention. In the Hill 812 complex south of SOHUI the enemy briefly probed United Nations Command positions with a company on the night of 16-17 July. This action was quickly followed by a platoon attack in which the enemy reinforced to battalion-size and overran the United Nations Command main line of resistance. Concurrently, an enemy company attack slightly to the east was successful, after a bitter battle in the United Nations Command trenches, in throwing back the United Nations Command. Shortly thereafter the enemy occupied the position with two battalions. The attacks for control of Hill 812 resulted in enemy casualties estimated at 160 killed in action and 260 wounded in action.

Early on the morning of 18 July the enemy attempted to expand his success on Hill 812 by attacking Hill 854, east of the SOYANG Valley, with a regimental-size assault force. Although the enemy supported the effort with 30,000 rounds of artillery and mortar, the assaulting force broke and withdrew after approximately four hours of determined attacks. Thence until the armistice on 27 July, the enemy probed these positions with minor size forces; however, no actions of significance occurred.

In one United Nations Command division sector south of KOSONG enemy activity was particularly intense following a lengthy period of inactivity. The enemy launched eleven attacks of company-size or larger against United Nations Command outpost or main line of resistance positions in this area. The attacks were all brief and of little consequence, with the exception of an attack the enemy mounted with a company about daybreak on 18 July. The enemy struck against United Nations Command main line of resistance positions and after a fierce close-in battle the enemy overran one United Nations Command position. Elements of the United Nations Command division launched an aggressive counterattack about mid-morning but were repulsed by a strong enemy force on the objective. This sector of the front remained active until 27 July with the position remaining under enemy control.

United Nations Command naval aircraft, operating from fast attack carriers in the Sea of Japan continued their attacks on pre-selected targets and targets of opportunity from the main line of resistance to the Manchurian Border. More than four thousand sorties were flown during the period 16 through 27 July. The major effort of naval air during this period was directed against Communist front line and supporting positions. On 13 July, in order to counter an apparent effort by the Communist forces to gain ground along the front line prior to an armistice, maximum support was directed along the battleline. In furtherance of this effort four carriers carried out operations on around-the-clock basis until 27 July at 2200I. The targets on these strikes in direct support of friendly troops, for the most part, consisted of enemy supply and billeting areas, gun positions, bunkers, main supply routes, and trenches. Accurate evaluation of the results of many of these attacks was prohibited due to the nature of the target or to the nature of this type of mission.

The main supply routes throughout Northeast Korea were also struck daily in an effort to minimize the flow of supplies to enemy forces committed to the front line. These attacks resulted in the destruction of numerous railcars, trucks, and other rolling stock. In addition, several rail and highway bridges were destroyed and numerous rail and road cuts were inflicted.

In an effort to prevent the Communists from augmenting their air arm in Korea, another feature of naval air has been to maintain nine designated North Korean airfields in an unserviceable condition. These airfields were attacked under close observation to insure their continued unserviceability.

Enemy costal-defense positions in the Wonsan Harbor area continued to receive special attention when weather conditions permitted. In continuation of the effort to neutralize this particular threat to our surface forces and friendly-held islands, air strikes and co-ordinated air-gun strikes were scheduled against these positions. However, the effectiveness of these strikes was lessened due to low overcast over the target areas.

United Nations Command surface vessels continued the naval blockade of the Korean East Coast from the vicinity of Kosong to Chongjin. Marginal weather reduced the effectiveness of short bombardment in some instances. However, routine day and night patrols were made to insure that blockade runners were not using North Korean ports or landing areas, and to keep mineswept areas under surveillance. In addition these forces supported naval aircraft in the interdiction of east coast railroad and highway systems within range of ships' gunfire; supported minesweeping operations; supported troops ashore with naval gunfire and destroyed enemy facilities and installations whenever the opportunity presented itself.

A United Nations Command battleship, three cruisers and destroyers assigned rendered direct support for front line ground forces at the eastern terminus of the bomblines. These gunfire support missions were conducted against enemy strongpoints, gun positions, troop movements, bunkers, supply areas, trenches and supply routes. Harassing and interdiction fire was provided nightly on troop movements, rail and road junctions, supply areas and other worthwhile military targets.

Although enemy costal gun positions in the Wonsan area were less active than during previous periods they continued to pose a threat to United Nations Command surface forces and to friendly-held islands in that area. Various units were fired upon on numerous occasions but without being hit. Surface units continued to harass these gun positions daily with naval gunfire and air strikes which were vectored in on the particularly troublesome positions when weather permitted.

All United Nations Command naval units were ordered to cease fire on 27 July at 1000I except to return enemy fire or to answer calls for support of United Nations Command ground forces. On 27 July at 2200I, in accordance with armistice agreements, the surface blockade was lifted and the major task of east coast surface forces became the evacuation of friendly-held islands north of the demarcation zone.

Surveillance patrols south of the line of demarcation were set up to cover within the three mile limit in order to protect friendly shipping, guard against breaches or incidents concerning the armistice agreement and prevent infiltration.

On 29 July United Nations Command naval forces received a request to assist as practicable in the search and rescue of an Air Force RB 50 and crew reported down in the Sea of Japan. A cruiser, two helicopters and five destroyers were ordered to proceed and pick up survivors. Carrier based planes assisted in the search and a P2V, on routine anti-submarine patrol, was diverted to the scene to assist. An exhaustive search was conducted for nearly twenty-four hours. A trawler, fishing vessels, and other small craft were sighted in the area. A lifeboat, considerable wreckage and several oil slicks were detected. One survivor was picked up.

Marine aircraft based in Korea struck the enemy with one thousand eight hundred seventy-five combat sorties. The major effort was directed against Communist front line and supporting positions in an effort to counter an apparent effort by the Communist forces to gain ground along the front line prior to a possible armistice. Numerous bunkers, gun and mortar positions, supply and personnel shelters and enemy strongpoints were destroyed on these close support missions. An undetermined number of casualties were inflicted on enemy troops. Although bad weather greatly curtailed the interdiction effort supply lines, troop and supply areas and other military targets were struck almost daily. In addition, reconnaissance, intercept and escort sorties were flown throughout North Korea.

United Nations carrier based aircraft operating off the Korean West Coast continued their strikes on enemy targets from the front lines to the Chinnampo area. Marginal to non-operational weather reduced the effective sorties flown during the period. However, in spite of generally poor weather conditions, nearly five hundred sorties were flown. Attacks were pressed on the troop billeting areas, transportation facilities, supply areas and gun positions throughout the Hwanghae Province. Many rail cuts were inflicted on the main supply routes and a number of railcars, bridges and trenches were destroyed. Attacks were also made on particularly troublesome gun positions. Attacks on enemy troop concentrations resulted in the destruction of numerous buildings. Many troop casualties were also inflicted. After the armistice became effective planes of this unit engaged in reconnaissance and shipping surveillance flights.

United Nations Command surface units operating off the west coast of Korea continued to enforce the blockade of that coast south of latitude thirty-nine degrees and thirty-five minutes north to prevent ingress or egress, mining, or supply and reinforcement by sea. In addition these forces successfully defended friendly-held islands; supported friendly guerrilla activities and destroyed military installations and other worthwhile targets of opportunity. Coastal communications, troop concentrations, gun positions and other coastal targets were harassed almost daily by gunfire.

After the cease fire the major task of west coast surface vessels became the expeditious evacuation of personnel and equipment from coastal islands in accordance with paragraph 13b of the Armistice Agreement.

Coastal areas, anchorages and channels were maintained free of mines by daily minesweeping operations and check sweeps by United Nations Command minesweepers.

Patrol planes flew one hundred fifteen scheduled missions during the sixteen day period. These planes continued to support the United Nations Command effort in Korea by conducting daily shipping surveillance, anti-submarine and weather reconnaissance missions over the waters surrounding Korea.

In order to implement the exchange of prisoners in accordance with the armistice agreements United Nations Command surface units were directed to begin the lifts of Prisoners of War from the various camps to Inchon. Three ships loaded with 2400 prisoners of war arrived at Inchon on 30 July.

United Nations Command naval auxiliary vessels and transports provided personnel lifts and logistic support for the United Nations Command forces in Korea.

The last month of the Korean War witnessed a concerted effort against enemy airfields on the part of the United Nations Command Air Forces as the Communists intensified their repair and utilization of these installations. By maintaining close surveillance of the major fields, it was possible to immediately attack those that showed signs of increased activity. Post-strike and surveillance photography, accomplished on 27 July of thirty fields, revealed that none were serviceable for jet aircraft and that only Uiju possessed any aircraft which could be considered serviceable. At this installation photography showed eight possible serviceable aircraft in addition to nine possibly unserviceable (or dummy) aircraft. Therefore, the Communists are now legally denied the asset of a major offensive Air Force in

North Korea during the period of the armistice, just as they were forcefully denied this capability throughout the Korean War, by the air superiority displayed by United Nations Command air power.

The enemy made several last minute limited attacks to acquire advantageous vantage points along the front line. These thrusts were countered by air bombardments as fighter bomber, light bomber and medium bomber aircraft dumped tons of ordnance on Communist positions.

Throughout the period the Sabrejets provided escort and swept the northwest sector of Korea free of MIGs in order that the fighter bombers could attack their assigned ground targets without fear of Communist air attack. In this role the Sabrejets destroyed twenty MIGs, probably destroyed two, and damaged eleven. During the hours of darkness United Nations Command night fighter aircraft took over the counter air operations, providing escort for the B-29s and intercepting aircraft of unknown identity as detected by friendly ground radar screens.

Fighter bombers of the United Nations Command, while engaged in airfield neutralization and close support operations, still found time to maintain pressure upon the enemy's transportation system and supply centers. Although the period was marked by several days of non-operational weather, every advantage was taken of the opportunities presented whenever the skies cleared or the overcast lifted to permit visual attacks against the enemy's logistical network. Approximately two thousand sorties were flown on interdiction and armed reconnaissance operations as compared with over three thousand sorties devoted to close support. These attacks resulted in the destruction of buildings, vehicles, bridges, railcars, grounded enemy aircraft, supply stacks, personnel shelters, a locomotive, an ammunition dump, and several gun positions. In addition, rails and roads were cut and troop casualties were inflicted. Runways were cratered or enemy aircraft attacked at Pyongyang Main, Pyonggang, Uiju, Taechon, Sinuiju Northeast, Sinuiju, Saamcham, Pyong-ni, Namsi, Kangdong, Chunggangjin, Ongjin, and Kanggye Number One airfields.

Light bombers devoted the major portion of their effort to the close support role. Of almost one thousand sorties flown by these aircraft, approximately two thirds were in close support of friendly ground forces and the remainder were directed on armed reconnaissance and interdiction missions. As in the past the majority of the effort took place during the hours of darkness. Weather and bombing methods precluded an assessment of the complete results of these aircraft.

United Nations Command Superforts accomplished a major airfield neutralization program and were successful in reducing all their assigned runway targets to an untenable state. Over half of the two hundred plus sorties completed by the Superforts during the twelve days period were devoted to the airfield program. The runways at Uiju, Sinuiju, Namsi, Taechon, Pyong-ni, Pyongyang East, Pyongyang Main and Saamcham airfields took several poundings, and as of 27 July were left in a severely cratered condition. Photography of 19 July revealed that the Communists had slipped forty-three MIG-15s into North Korea and parked them in revetments at Uiju airfield. Medium bomber strikes were immediately directed against the runway to trap the MIGs and a subsequent strike against the revetted aircraft. These two missions, accomplished on the nights of 20 and 21 July were successful in cratering the runway and possibly destroying several of the revetted aircraft.

Medium bombers also performed eighty sorties expending about 720 tons of high explosive bombs on Communist front line positions in close support of United Nations Command ground forces. Three large scale missions were accomplished in this phase of operation on the nights of 16, 17 and 18 July when twenty-three, twenty-three and twenty-four sorties respectively, were effective.

The distribution of psychological warfare leaflets took a back seat during the airfield neutralization program as almost the entire effort was required to accomplish this priority mission. However, a total of eight medium bomber leaflet sorties were flown during the twelve day period, four of these on the night of 26 July. These latter four sorties distributed "Operation Wind-up" leaflets throughout North Korea, designed to create demands by the Communist fighting men upon their leaders to be released from service now that the war was about over.

Other targets attacked by the Superforts were the Hongwon marshalling yard and the Taewo-ri supply area.

Combat cargo aircraft flew normal logistical airlift of supplies, equipment and personnel in support of United Nations Command operations in Korea.

In late July 1953, President Eisenhower directed that distribution of about 10,000 tons of food be made to the people of Korea, as a practical expression of the sincere sympathy which the people of the United States feel for the Koreans, and as a token of United States appreciation for their valiant struggle against Communist aggression. Food was obtained from reserve United States military food stocks in Korea and Japan. Distribution was begun in Pusan on 29 July 1953, in Seoul on 30 July, and in Taegu and Taejon on 31 July. Every person in the Republic of Korea is eligible to receive a food gift under this program.

The United States Government authorized an initial expenditure of \$200 million for economic aid to the Republic of Korea, to be undertaken immediately, in addition to the existing co-ordinated United Nations Command-United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency program. This authorization resulted from the report and recommendations made to the President in July 1953 by Dr. Henry J. Tasca who, as Special Representative of the President for Korean Economic Affairs, conducted a survey in Korea on ways and means of strengthening the Korean economy.

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