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NOTE DATED 5 DECEMBER 1951 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES
TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TRANSMITTING THE THIRTY-FIRST REPORT OF THE
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND OPERATIONS IN KOREA IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF 7 JULY 1951 (S/1586)

Paris, December 5, 1951

The Representative of the United States to the United Nations present his compliments to the Secretary General of the United Nations and has the honour to refer to Paragraph 6 of the Resolution of the Security Council of July 7, 1950, requesting the United States to provide the Security Council with reports, as appropriate, on the course of action taken under the United Nations Command.

In compliance with this Resolution there is enclosed herewith, for circulation to the members of the Security Council, the Thirty-first Report of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period October 1 through October 15, 1951.

REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND OPERATIONS
IN KOREA FOR THE PERIOD 1 - 15 OCTOBER 1951
(Report No. 31)

I herewith submit Report Number 31 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 1-15 October, inclusive. United Nations Command Communiqués numbers 1038-1052, inclusive, provide detailed accounts of these operations.

Although no meetings of the delegations took place during this period, some progress was made, through meetings of liaison officers, in establishing proper conditions for a resumption of negotiations. On 3 October 1951, Generals Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh-huai replied to my letter of 27 September 51 which proposed Songhyon-Ni as a conference site. Their reply insisted that Kaesong, in Communist held territory, be kept as the conference site. I replied on 4 October 1951 rejecting Kaesong and requesting the Communist commanders to propose a site between the battle lines. On 7 October 51, Generals Kim and Peng replied proposing Pan Mun Jom as a conference site and further proposing a rectangular neutral zone to include Kaesong and Munsan. Liaison officers met at Pan Mun Jom on the 10th, 11th, 12th, and 14th of October. At the close of the period full agreement between liaison officers on the conditions for resuming the conference had not been reached, but substantial progress had been made.

On 12 October 51, an unfortunate incident occurred. Investigation has established beyond reasonable doubt that United Nations Command jet aircraft made two ground strafing attacks (they dropped no bombs) in the Kaesong area about 1730 hours on the afternoon of 12 October 51, the same aircraft making both attacks. On 14 October 51 in a letter to Generals Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh-huai, I stated that these attacks had been made in violation of United Nations Command standing instructions which specifically direct all units and pilots to avoid attack or overflight of the Kaesong area, that beyond reasonable doubt United Nations jet aircraft had made the attacks, and that the United Nations Command, therefore, accepted responsibility. The United Nations Command will continue to make every effort to prevent any recurrence of incidents which violated previously made agreements.

The enemy attitude continued essentially defensive throughout the period as United Nations forces applied heavy pressure on various parts of the front in

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strong local attacks. Although hostile forces offered determined resistance and their front line elements were heavily supported by artillery and mortar fire, they failed to prevent limited United Nations gains in several sectors. United Nations forces continued vigorous reconnaissance and combat patrolling, but most patrols were promptly intercepted by hostile screening forces. A Chinese Communist army relieved a North Korean corps in the Odong sector, extending the Chinese Communist zone of responsibility into the area east of the Pukhan River. Otherwise there were no significant changes in enemy dispositions. Front lines at the close of the period ran northeast from Munsan to Chunggang, thence eastward to Sohui, and northeast to the vicinity of Pohang.

On the western front, United Nations forces initiated strong limited objective attacks on the twenty mile front from Kigong to Orijong. In the Kigong sector, the enemy resisted with great determination from 3 to 9 October but made no decisive attempts to recover lost ground thereafter. In this action, the United Nations line advanced three to four miles westward to the immediate vicinity of Kigong. Fighting for high ground to the south and east of Orijong began on 1 October and continued to twelve days. The enemy bitterly contested every United Nations advance and mounted repeated counterattacks, some of which were temporarily successful.

During these operations a number of United Nations Command units distinguished themselves in action against the enemy.

The 15th Infantry of the 3rd Infantry Division in an attack characterized by aggressiveness and superb coordination captured the key hill 487 on 29 September 51. The capture of hill 487 afforded an excellent wedge into enemy defenses along line Jamestown, objective of operations COMMANDO. On 3 October, in coordination with the 1st Cavalry Division on its left, the 15th Infantry attacked west along the ridge running west from hill 487 to hill 477. The enemy tenaciously defended this ridge line from well prepared bunkers and emplacements, and only through a very aggressive attack with excellent coordination of all supporting units was the 15th Infantry able to wrest this key position from the enemy and inflict heavy losses on the Communist forces.

The key terrain to line Jamestown in the right portion of the 1st Cavalry Division zone was the hill mass dominated by hills 313, 347, and 418. In the left of the zone, the critical terrain was hill 346, the ridge extending northeast therefrom and hill 287 on the north of the ridge. The 7th Cavalry with

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the Greek Battalion attached and the 8th Cavalry with the Thailand Battalion attached shared equally in the success of the operation. The capture of hills 313, 347, and 413 was a combined effort of elements of the 7th and 8th Cavalry Regiments and the Greek Battalion which took hill 313. The enemy fought stubbornly in this area and launched strong counterattacks. The bitter and determined battle fought by our troops resulted not only in the capture of the hills but also hundreds of enemy casualties.

The 1st Commonwealth Division made its main effort on the right against hills 238 and 355. The nature of the enemy defense and the characteristics of the manner in which he conducted his defense was much the same as that found in the 1st Cavalry Division zone. Some of the heaviest artillery and mortar fire so far employed by the enemy was received by the attack element, and the enemy launched vicious and fanatical counterattacks in an effort to halt the drive. Despite the all out efforts of the enemy the attack was successfully pressed and completely defeated the enemy, inflicting heavy casualties and forcing the withdrawal of his decimated forces.

The nature of the enemy defense encountered in the above operation indicated that he planned to hold his position at all costs. Bunkers varying in size from very small to large enough to hold approximately a hundred men were reduced. The ridges were rimmed with deep, connecting, and sometimes covered trenches. Artillery positions were found in caves dug into the sides of hills. In spite of all Communist preparations, the persistent efforts in conducting the attacks on D Day by elements of the British, Cavalry, and 3rd Divisions succeeded in forcing the enemy to give up his extremely well prepared positions. Before yielding to the attack, the enemy lost 2500 counted killed, an additional 500 estimated killed, 20,000 estimated wounded, and 427 prisoners of war to the combined air, artillery and infantry weapons of the attacking troops. Much of the fighting, particularly near the tops of hills and ridges, was at grenade range and bayonet point.

The aggressiveness, fortitude, outstanding leadership, and excellent coordination with which these units conducted this operation brought about the early success of the attack and resulted in advancing the United Nations line in these zones from three to four miles. The seizing of the assigned objective secured terrain dominating the avenue of approach which had been successfully utilized by the enemy in the past and denies to him the use of important assembly areas for future attack against our forces.

On the thirty mile central front from Chunggang to the Pukhan River, action was confined to patrolling and local probing during most of the period. On 12 October, United Nations forces attacked on a ten mile front south of Haso and Chiklong and made moderate initial gains against variable resistance. Although the enemy is believed to have disposed one of his densest masses of artillery behind this sector, the bulk of his defensive fires were directed against United Nations artillery positions. Hitherto, nearly all hostile artillery fire has been directed against attacking infantry troops.

The most intense action of the period took place on a twenty mile sector of the eastern front immediately to the east of the Pukhan River. Fighting was virtually continuous in a bitter contest for high ground to the south of Amdong and Tupo. In one instance, United Nations forces fought for six days, from 6 through 11 October, to take a hill in the Amdong area; and elsewhere substantial enemy forces counterattacked repeatedly to retake dominating heights. Toward the end of the period, however, the hostile defenses showed signs of weakening, and United Nations forces on the Amdong-Tupo front succeeded in pushing one to three miles northward.

Although the enemy retains the capability of reverting to the offensive at any time of his choosing, his attitude at the close of the period was predominantly defensive. It is apparent that he is prepared for continued hostilities in that he has issued winter uniforms and has continued to maintain a high level in troop strength, training of reserves and replacements. He has continued to replace losses in combat units and has continued the periodic relief of exhausted units on the front. The steady volume of heavy traffic in the hostile rear indicates a strong effort to maintain high levels of supplies in forward areas. The preponderance of hostile reserves is still disposed in rear of the western front.

During the first two weeks of October, United Nations naval units bombarded enemy coastal positions and traffic arteries along the Korean seaboard from the front lines far to the north. On the west coast gun positions within thirty miles of the mouth of the Yalu were shelled by a British destroyer, while twenty miles up the Han River New Zealand and Australian frigates continued to pound enemy concentrations. On the east coast, surface ships methodically hammered bridges and rail and highway junctions from Koesong north to Chongjin. Surface striking forces steamed into Hungnam harbor to deliver the heaviest attacks on that

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Communist port since United Nations forces were withdrawn last December. The siege of Wonsan was continued and a British task group struck the Kojo area. In spite of increasing return fire from enemy coast artillery, no major casualties or damage to ships was received from this source although the United States Destroyer Earnest G. Small was damaged and suffered twenty-seven casualties when she struck a mine. An enemy jet strafing and bombing attack on the Destroyer Twining resulted in no damage, but was notable as the first air attack on a naval unit in many months.

Carrier aircraft including Australian Sea Furies and Fireflies, Marine Corsairs, Skyraiders, and Banshees and Panther jets concentrated the majority of their attacks on inland transportation routes and equipment, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy and smashing bridges, tunnels, warehouses, and marshalling yards with bombs and rockets. Close air support night-bombardment missions and attacks on troop centres in the mountainous interior filled out the schedules of the carrier forces.

Shore based Marine aircraft devoted their major effort to close air support but also carried out such varied missions as interdiction, night flare drops, and laying telephone lines from helicopters. Night and day operations were launched to add steadily to lengthening enemy casualty lists.

Assisted by helicopter spotting the smaller naval surface units continued check mine sweeping and interception of the occasional enemy small craft that attempted to penetrate the United Nations blockade. Although frequently subjected to heavy fire, they carried out dozens of useful tasks close in to the enemy beaches. Patrol boats and helicopters on several occasions gallantly rescued pilots shot down in hostile territory and surrounded by the enemy. A number of floating mines along both coasts of North Korea were detected and sunk.

United Nations land based aircraft under the direction of the Far East Air Forces increased slightly their rate of air activity during the current period. Primary emphasis was placed on close support of the ground forces in their new offensives and on the current interdiction programme which has been in progress for over a month. Additional air operations included airlift, counter air, reconnaissance, flare and leaflet drops and other specialized missions. Aircraft and crews from South Africa, Thailand, Australia, Greece and the Republic of Korea, as well as the United States Air Force and the United States Marine Corps participated.

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Close air support was rendered to the United Nations ground units in contact with the enemy by an average of seventy-five fighter aircraft a day. During daylight hours fighter bombers used napalm, rockets, bombs, and machine gun fire to neutralize targets designated by ground and airborne tactical air control parties. At night, targets adjacent to the front lines were attacked by light and medium bombers, thus permitting the enemy no respite. These attacks materially reduced the enemy's resistance to friendly advances.

The interdiction program, designed to reduce to a minimum the forward flow of enemy supplies, continued as a highlight of Korean air activities and was carried out on a round the clock basis. Hundreds of fighter bombers and light and medium bombers joined in the program by attacking supply dumps, marshalling yards, vehicle parks, bottle-necked traffic, and rail and highway bridges, as well as rail lines, rolling stock, and vehicles. The effectiveness of the program is indicated by the enemy's strenuous efforts to prevent the complete disruption of his transportation networks. Specific indications are the redeployment of anti-aircraft defenses to key communications facilities, a shift in the pattern and route of night truck traffic, cannibalization of rail lines, and heavy redeployment and commitment of labor forces to the affected areas.

Counter-air operations continued throughout the period with medium bombers striking North Korean airfields daily. Combat air patrols over northwestern Korea resulted in the destruction and damage of many enemy aircraft and permitted the medium bombers and fighter bombers to operate with relative freedom although the versatile fighter bombers on occasion were required to release their bombs prematurely in order to counter attacks by enemy jets. Additional defense was provided United Nations bombers by fighters which made flak suppression strikes against anti-aircraft installations in the vicinity of the objective areas.

Aerial combat accounted for the destruction or damage of over thirty-five MIG-15 aircraft. Ground fire from enemy troops and aerial combat resulted in the loss or damage of approximately twenty-five United Nations aircraft. The prompt and efficient action of air rescue personnel resulted in the saving of many crews from capture by the enemy.

Combat cargo aircraft lifted over 35,000 personnel, evacuated 4,500 sick and wounded personnel, and moved 4,500 tons of freight and supplies.

Pursuant to the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, a continuously expanding program of intellectual, recreational, and

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vocational opportunities is being provided prisoners of war by the United Nations Command. Thousands of illiterates are learning to read and write their own language. Through the media of radio broadcasts and motion pictures, increasing numbers of prisoners are learning something of the outside world. Entertainment is furnished not only by radio programs and movies, but also in the form of plays and programs written and produced by the prisoners themselves. There is increasing interest in vocational training and in the production of items to improve camp facilities. The construction of permanent type winter housing has employed a large number of prisoners, both skilled and unskilled. Other large scale vocational projects are under way.

Since the beginning of the Korean operation and the break out from the Pusan perimeter, much has been accomplished in the public health and welfare field for the civilian population of Korea. Extensive medical facilities have been developed for not only the destitute but also for the use of the general population.

At the present time there are 93 hospitals and 343 dispensaries operating under the direction of United Nations Civil Assistance Command. The current average load is 8516 in-patients and 22,790 out-patients.

The new fiscal year 1952 immunization program will commence shortly and shipment of smallpox and typhus vaccines to Korea will begin 15 October 1951.

Member nations and voluntary relief agencies have made generous contributions during the past year. However, additional supplies are needed to meet coming winter conditions.

