

# Conference on Disarmament

26 March 2013

English

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## Final record of the one thousand two hundred and eighty-fourth plenary meeting

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Tuesday, 26 March 2013, at 10.10 a.m.

*President:* Mr. Triyono Wibowo .....(Indonesia)

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**The President:** I declare open the 1284th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. Before we proceed, I would like to invite you to consider a request by a State not member of the Conference on Disarmament to participate in our work during the 2013 session. In addition to those we approved last month, the secretariat has received a request from Brunei Darussalam. This request is now before you in document CD/WP.575/Add.5, which includes all the requests that the secretariat had received by 4 p.m. yesterday, 25 March 2013. All requests from States not members received after that date will be presented for your consideration and decision at the next plenary meeting. Are there any comments on this request? As there are not, I take it that the Conference decides to invite Brunei Darussalam to participate in our work in accordance with the rules of procedure.

*It was so decided.*

**The President:** As was announced at the previous plenary meeting, this session is devoted to the consideration of one of the core agenda items of the Conference, namely, “Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons”. As at the three previous sessions, I will not impose any particular structure on our debate on this theme. Furthermore, following our rules of procedure, any delegation may raise any other disarmament topic that is not specifically related to the main debate of today. Having said this, I would now like to turn to the list of speakers which is before you. Several delegates wish to take the floor on this item. The first speaker on my list is the representative of Ireland, speaking on behalf of the European Union.

**Mr. Kos** (Ireland): I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The following countries align themselves with this declaration: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Georgia, Iceland, Montenegro, the Republic of Moldova, Serbia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons are mentioned in the decision contained in document CD/1864, and in the 2010 NPT Review Conference action plan, as one of the issues on the Conference on Disarmament agenda for substantive discussion.

The European Union, contributing to the global efforts to seek a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons in accordance with the objectives of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), recognizes the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in receiving unequivocal and legally binding security assurances from nuclear-weapon States. Positive and negative security assurances strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and can play an important role: they can serve both as an incentive to forgo the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and as a deterrent to their acquisition. The European Union is committed to promoting further consideration of security assurances, and welcomes the respective adjustments in the nuclear postures of some nuclear-weapon States.

The European Union reaffirms the continuing high value of the existing security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT on the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, provided for by the protocols to the treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones and the unilateral statements by each of the five nuclear-weapon States, as is noted in United Nations Security Council resolution 984 (1995). Such security assurances, which strengthen the disarmament and non-proliferation regime, respond to the legitimate interests of non-nuclear-weapon States.

The European Union continues to attach great importance to the development of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones. Established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States of the regions concerned, as elaborated in the guidelines adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission at its substantive

session of 1999, nuclear-weapon-free zones enhance regional and global peace and security and are a means to promote nuclear disarmament, stability and confidence.

The European Union calls on nuclear-weapon States to reaffirm, in the appropriate forums, existing security assurances as noted in Security Council resolution 984, and to sign and ratify the relevant protocols on nuclear-weapon-free zones, drawn up following the requisite consultations in accordance with the above-mentioned guidelines. In this respect we hope that the Protocol to the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty between member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the nuclear-weapon States will be signed as soon as possible.

The European Union offered support with regard to the implementation of the Pelindaba Treaty and the establishment and work of the African Commission on Nuclear Energy. We have been working on identifying instruments and means to support the Commission, depending on concrete assistance needs to be determined.

The European Union reiterates its commitment to a Korean peninsula free of nuclear weapons. The European Union strongly condemned the recent test by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which represents a serious threat to regional and international peace and security and clearly violates the relevant resolution of the United Nations Security Council.

The European Union regards the establishment of a zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems in the Middle East as a means of enhancing security and stability in the region. We regret the postponement of the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, which, in accordance with the decision of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, was scheduled to take place in 2012. We fully support the ongoing preparations for a successful conference with the participation of all States in the region and the efforts of the facilitator, Ambassador Laajava, to this end. We hope that the conference will be convened as soon as possible this year.

**The President:** I thank Mr. Kos for his statement. I now invite Ambassador Sajjadi of Iran to take the floor.

**Mr. Sajjadi** (Islamic Republic of Iran): Mr. President, I am pleased to see that Indonesia is presiding over this august body so efficiently. I would like to assure you of the full support of my delegation.

The history of the developments related to negative security assurances is indicative of a close linkage between the NPT and negative security assurances. Negative security assurances were the cornerstone of the package that helped the final conclusion of the NPT. The non-nuclear-weapon States decided to join the NPT, being aware of the discriminatory nature of this treaty, with the understanding that they would not be the target of use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The credibility of the non-proliferation regime depends on the degree of fulfilment of the promises of the nuclear-weapon States as the highest beneficiaries of this international regime. The nuclear-weapon States made some unilateral declarations. Subject to the full commitment of nuclear-weapon States to their declarations, these assurances remain partial, declaratory and limited, with no legal burden on the part of nuclear-weapon States, which does not constitute credible assurances.

In recent developments, some nuclear-weapon States fully breach these commitments and in a flagrant manner explicitly and implicitly threaten the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT.

The recent developments are not at all conducive to achieving the goal of negative security assurances, and the resistance to the start of negotiation on this issue is indicative of scenarios for possible use of nuclear weapons. The deplorable boycotting by nuclear-

weapon States of the International Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, at which the representatives of 127 countries and many international organizations and NGOs discussed the catastrophic humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons on mankind and our planet in the case of deliberate or accidental nuclear weapon use, was a setback with regard to negative security assurances and showed that the threat of use of nuclear weapons is real. This action is a clear example of the reluctance of some nuclear-weapon States to start negotiation on negative security assurances. Negative security assurances would not provide any technical difficulties or excuses to resort to technical difficulties. The Conference has witnessed a proposal that was a one-sentence treaty. Indeed, if there had been political will and honesty, this negotiation would have been very simple and should have reached concrete results many years ago. It is deplorable that, after more than 33 years of presenting this issue to the Conference, negative security assurances still elude us.

The international community should not be silent about the threats emanating from some of the nuclear-weapon States against the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT which are officially and repeatedly proclaimed by the high-ranking officials of some nuclear-weapon States. These threats are a blatant breach of the United Nations Charter, the principles agreed on at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the illegality of use of such weapons, and the package for conclusion and extension of the NPT, which shall not be tolerated any more. We should not await the deployment of such weapons to react. Such policies and practices seem to have learned no lesson from the massacre of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the grave humanitarian consequences of use of nuclear weapons. Therefore these kinds of inhumane threats should be condemned and not be condoned or repeated any more.

We believe that nuclear-weapon-free zones are positive steps towards strengthening global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and it is essential that nuclear-weapon States provide unconditional assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all States of such zones. We reject the arguments stating that security assurances should only be granted in the context of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Insistence on these kinds of weak arguments puts the credibility of the NPT in jeopardy. As the initiator of the proposal for the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of all nuclear weapons, since 1974 we have firmly supported the speedy establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. But it is a matter of serious concern that, due to the highest level of double standards and discrimination by some nuclear-weapon States in generously rewarding and pampering the non-NPT party of the region and at the same time exerting the highest level of pressure and threats against the NPT parties, the only obstacle to the creation of such a zone in the region, which is the non-NPT party, feels no pressure to move in the direction of the creation of such a zone in the Middle East. In fact, the reprehensible discrimination of some nuclear-weapon States creates a special situation for the non-NPT party of the Middle East that puts it beyond and above any international norms and regulations.

We remain convinced that the only absolute guarantee against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons is their total elimination through transparent, verifiable and irreversible measures, in accordance with article VI of the NPT and as stipulated in the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in 1996. Pending achieving that goal, nuclear-weapon States must provide legally binding, credible and effective security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of these weapons. Therefore, the conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States should be pursued as a matter of priority by the international community. We propose that the Conference on Disarmament establish an ad hoc committee to negotiate on a draft of a legally binding instrument on the illegality of use of nuclear weapons and providing unconditional security

assurances by the nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT as a matter of urgency.

**The President:** I thank Ambassador Sajjadi for his statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Japan, Mr. Yamamoto.

**Mr. Yamamoto** (Japan): Taking this opportunity, I would like to briefly state Japan's position on today's topic, negative security assurances.

Japan provides its basic support to the concept of negative security assurances. This position has remained the same since our signature of the NPT in 1970, when we delivered an official statement underscoring that the nuclear-weapon States must not have recourse to use of nuclear weapons or threaten to use such weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

We believe that it is fundamentally important for all States possessing nuclear weapons to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in their national security strategies. We should recognize, in this connection, that negative security assurances can make a significant contribution to reducing the role of nuclear weapons.

Negative security assurances are in the legitimate interests of non-nuclear-weapon States. Nuclear-weapon States should make their existing pledges concerning negative security assurances credible to the rest of the world and should provide stronger assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. At the same time, taking into account the ongoing challenges to peace and security of the international community, these assurances should only be given if the recipient State complies with the NPT. In this regard, we commend the strengthened assurances promised by the United States and the United Kingdom not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States that are parties to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.

We also believe that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, where appropriate, is a practical step towards promoting and realizing legally binding security assurances. In this connection, Japan strongly hopes that the protocol to the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone will enter into force at an early date. Nuclear-weapon-free zones have also been established in other regions, such as the South Pacific, Africa and Central Asia. Japan appeals to all the parties concerned to work together constructively in order to bring about the expeditious entry into force of the respective protocols of each zone.

**The President:** I thank the representative of Japan for his statement. I now invite Ambassador Kennedy of the United States of America to take the floor.

**Ms. Kennedy** (United States of America): I welcome this occasion to speak on the subject of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

The United States of America recognizes the importance many countries give to security assurances. My Government has provided such assurances to States that have renounced nuclear weapons and that are in full compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations. The United States' negative security assurance was first issued in 1978. Since then, it has been updated in 1995 and then revised and strengthened again in April 2010 as part of our Nuclear Posture Review. The current formulation followed a comprehensive assessment of United States nuclear deterrence policy, strategy and force posture. Under this formulation, the United States declared that it will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States that are parties to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.

The latest formulation of our assurance strengthens our long-standing negative security assurance in several ways. As a policy matter, the United States assurance applies

to any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the NPT in compliance with its nuclear non-proliferation obligations. This demonstrates that there is a clear security benefit to all who adhere to and fully comply with the NPT.

Additionally, in strengthening the assurance, the United States of America in its 2010 Nuclear Posture Review also affirmed that any State eligible for the assurance that used chemical or biological weapons against the United States of America or our allies and partners would face the prospect of a devastating conventional military response.

This negative security assurance is one of the benefits that non-nuclear-weapon States derive from being parties to the NPT and fulfilling their non-proliferation obligations. But even for States not meeting the criteria for this assurance, the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review made clear that it is in the interest of the United States of America as well as that of all nations that the nearly 68-year record of non-use of nuclear weapons be extended forever. The United States of America is fully aware of the consequences of nuclear use and will continue to give the highest priority to avoiding such an outcome. Former President Ronald Reagan had it right when he acknowledged back in 1984 that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought”. That is why the United States of America has already destroyed 87 per cent of its nuclear arsenal and will continue to do its part to maintain the record of non-use, and to move us towards a world free of nuclear weapons. A practical step-by-step approach, as laid out by President Obama in his 2009 Prague speech, has proven to us to be the most effective means to increase stability, reduce nuclear danger and advance the disarmament objectives of the NPT.

Among these steps, as was noted in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, the role of nuclear weapons in United States national security and military strategy has been reduced significantly in recent decades. Further steps can and should be taken. The fundamental role of United States nuclear weapons, which will continue as long as nuclear weapons exist around the world, is to deter nuclear attack on the United States of America and our allies and partners. We will continue to work to establish conditions under which a universal policy that makes deterrence of nuclear attacks the sole purpose of nuclear weapons could be safely adopted.

Another practical step could take place right here in the Conference on Disarmament. We have been striving to take the next logical and essential step toward the goal of global elimination of nuclear weapons by initiating negotiations on a treaty to ban production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. We regret that this has yet to happen, but continue our efforts with partners to achieve a way forward.

Practical steps also include the New START Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation. February marked the beginning of its third year in force, with implementation successfully under way. Additionally, Russia and the United States of America continue to engage in a bilateral dialogue to promote strategic stability and increase transparency on a reciprocal basis.

In addition, the five permanent members of the Security Council are looking forward to a fourth meeting in Geneva on 18 and 19 April, hosted by the Russian Federation, where we will continue the work of meeting our NPT commitments to break new ground through discussions on nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the associated verification challenges.

The United States of America also strongly supports nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties that are properly crafted, fully complied with and adopted in accordance with internationally accepted guidelines. They contribute to the stability and security goals of the regions adopting them and provide important regional complements to the NPT as well as valuable reinforcements for the global non-proliferation regime.

While the United States of America does not support a global treaty banning use of nuclear weapons against such non-nuclear-weapon States, we are prepared to continue to consider providing legally binding negative security assurances in the context of specific nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties. This policy allows us to consider such a legal commitment on a region-by-region basis.

The United States of America has worked actively to contribute to the establishment and success of nuclear-weapon-free zones. We have attended meetings of the members of nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties as an observer, and in 2012 joined in the celebration of the forty-fifth anniversary of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the first nuclear-weapon-free zone, which predated even the NPT. Keeping to the promise of then-Secretary of State Clinton to the 2010 NPT Review Conference, we have submitted to the United States Senate for advice and consent to ratification the relevant protocols to the treaties of Pelindaba and Rarotonga – the nuclear-weapon-free zones for Africa and the South Pacific. We have also engaged with the parties to the treaties of Bangkok and Semipalatinsk — the nuclear-weapon-free-zones for South-East Asia and Central Asia — in an effort to reach resolution of long-standing issues that would allow us to sign the relevant protocols to these treaties.

We and our partners among the five permanent members of the Security Council and in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations announced at the East Asia Summit in 2011 that negotiations on the protocol to the Treaty of Bangkok had reached a successful conclusion, and the United States of America and the other members of the P5 remain ready to sign the protocol. We are also working with interested parties on creating the conditions that would enable us to sign the relevant Protocol to the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapons-Free zone.

The United States of America is pleased that in 2012 the P5 and Mongolia issued parallel declarations regarding Mongolia's nuclear-weapons-free status. This is the capstone of many years of effort by the P5, Mongolia and the United Nations, and was welcomed in a consensus resolution of the United Nations General Assembly.

The United States of America also shares the goal of a Middle East zone free of all weapons of mass destruction, and we stand ready to help facilitate discussions among States in the region at the proposed Helsinki conference. We support this goal, recognizing that the mandate for a zone cannot be imposed from outside or without the consent of all concerned States; it must come from within the region. We regret that the Helsinki conference could not be convened in 2012, but our commitment to working with our partners and the States in the region to create conditions for a successful dialogue remains as strong as ever.

Mr. President, we appreciate this opportunity to share our views once again on negative security assurances, regional nuclear-weapons-free zones and the practical steps we are taking to help prevent forever the use of nuclear weapons.

**The President:** I thank Ambassador Kennedy for her statement. I now invite Ambassador Wai of Myanmar to take the floor.

**Mr. Wai (Myanmar):** I have the honour to deliver this statement on behalf of the member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), namely Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam.

Mr. President, at the outset, allow me to congratulate you, a fellow member of ASEAN, on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament at this important juncture. We are convinced that under your able leadership our deliberations in this august body will produce a fruitful outcome.

As nuclear disarmament remains the highest priority on the disarmament agenda of ASEAN, we commit ourselves to continuing our efforts to reach the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

In this regard, we emphasize the need to implement the outcomes of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT and reiterate our call for the full and effective implementation of the action plan as set out in the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions in the Final Document of the Review Conference, particularly the 22-point action plan for nuclear disarmament.

In strengthening our efforts on global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, ASEAN underscores the importance of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones where they do not exist, especially in the Middle East. In this regard, ASEAN looks forward to the convening of the Middle East conference on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.

The Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty) was opened for signature on 15 December 1995 in Bangkok as an essential component of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, the declaration on which was signed in Kuala Lumpur on 27 November 1971 in order to contribute towards strengthening the security of States within the zone and towards enhancing international peace and security as a whole.

We continue to believe that the nuclear-weapon-free zones created by the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Semipalatinsk, as well as Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status, contribute significantly to strengthening global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regimes.

We emphasize the importance of preserving South-East Asia as a zone free from nuclear weapons and free from the threat of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction. We also emphasize the importance of the full implementation of a non-proliferation and disarmament regime in pursuit of peace, security and prosperity in the region.

We take note of the progress made in concluding negotiations between ASEAN and the five nuclear-weapon States on the protocol to the Bangkok Treaty. We look forward to the signing of the protocol and related documents without reservations as early as possible.

We would like to stress that it is also necessary, in the context of nuclear-weapon-free zones, that nuclear-weapon States provide unconditional assurances not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against all States in nuclear-weapon-free zones.

We would also like to express our deep concern about the effect on regional peace and stability of the recent underground nuclear test conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. We encourage the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to comply fully with its obligations under all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions, namely 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) and 2094 (2013), and with its commitments under the 19 September 2005 joint statement of the Six-Party Talks.

In doing so, we would like to reaffirm our full support for all efforts to bring about the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula in a peaceful manner and the early resumption of the Six-Party Talks.

As States parties to the NPT and the Bangkok Treaty, ASEAN member States pursue non-proliferation and total disarmament in the world in general and in South-East Asia in particular.

In conclusion, ASEAN further emphasizes the necessity of redoubling our efforts to reach the goal of general and complete disarmament, with particular attention to a nuclear-weapon-free world, as a matter of utmost priority.



**The President:** I thank Ambassador Wai for his statement. I now invite Ambassador Tileuberdi of Kazakhstan to take the floor.

**Mr. Tileuberdi** (Kazakhstan): Kazakhstan has a firm conviction that total elimination of all nuclear arsenals is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and launching multilateral negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament at the Conference is a high priority for our delegation.

The development, production or use of nuclear weapons is increasingly being seen worldwide as incompatible with international humanitarian law. The International Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons underscored the potential of humanitarian approaches in this dimension.

Pending total abolition of nuclear weapons, codifying nuclear security assurances in a universal and legally binding manner is considered by Kazakhstan as a fully justified objective. Those nations that have opted to forgo their nuclear options by adhering to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States have a legitimate right not to be subjected to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

All existing arrangements and political declarations, including Security Council resolution 984 (1995), seem to be partial measures, as they do not create an obligation under international law and are subject to conditions and various reservations. Hence, drafting a clear, credible and unconditional multilaterally negotiated, legally binding document on negative security assurances is imperative, and to this end we should demonstrate genuine political will by commencing substantive talks within the Conference on Disarmament.

The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of respective regions, and taking into account provisions of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, is certainly a positive step towards building a safer world. It should be acknowledged more widely as one of the practical ways to tackle this goal. However, the establishment of such zones is not an end in itself, and, given their geographical limitation, such assurances cannot substitute for universal and legally binding agreements. They are an additional tool to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons given the current international realities. Thus, this kind of initiative should be encouraged by providing unconditional assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Although nuclear-weapon-free zones now cover more than half of the world, most of the negative security assurances protocols are still under negotiation or have not been ratified yet by some nuclear-weapon States, including the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia. The Treaty of Semipalatinsk is considered by Kazakhstan and other Central Asian States as an opportunity to foster peace and security in a very fragile region full of conflict potential and challenges as well as opportunities for a more stable and predictable future. This is one of many reasons why we attach priority to its earliest institutionalization. We do hope that the practicability and effectiveness of the treaty will be ensured soon through consultations with the five nuclear-weapon States, as stipulated in the 1999 United Nations Disarmament Commission guidelines.

This year will include its share of challenges as well. A principal one among these is the need to convene a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction. A Middle East zone would enhance both regional and global security and stability. Resolutions adopted by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation during Kazakhstan's chairship as well as documents approved later vividly demonstrate the member States' goodwill and their readiness for intensive consultations. In this context, we fully share the view of the United Nations Secretary-General, who stated earlier this year

that, while we have missed a deadline, we have not lost the opportunity to move this initiative forward.

In concluding my remarks, Mr. President, I wish to assure you that Kazakhstan stands ready to work with all delegations to explore avenues for resuming our negotiations on all core issues of the Conference, including negative security assurances.

**The President:** I thank Ambassador Tileuberdi for his statement. I now invite the representative of Algeria, Mr. Khelif, to take the floor.

**Mr. Khelif** (Algeria) (*spoke in French*): The Algerian delegation is pleased to participate in the debate on negative security assurances and wishes to reiterate the following aspects of its position regarding the issue.

Firstly, it should be highlighted that effective assurances against the use of nuclear weapons lie in their total, verifiable, transparent and definitive eradication, in line with the provisions of article VI of the NPT and the commitments made in that regard.

The issue of negative security assurances is not new. It was at the heart of discussions on the NPT when it was being concluded in the 1960s. It has been the subject of several commitments as part of the NPT review process. It should be remembered that under decision 2, paragraph 8, of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, which was responsible for reviewing the Treaty and its prorogation, in relation to the principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, States parties to the Treaty agreed to adopt other measures and provisions to shield non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. According to that solemn commitment, those provisions could take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument.

Negative security assurances have also been on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament since its creation in 1978 at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The final document of that session asked nuclear-weapon States to continue their efforts to conclude appropriate and effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Furthermore, United Nations General Assembly resolution 67/29 dated 4 January 2013, which was consistent with previous resolutions adopted since 1990, reaffirms the urgent need to reach an agreement on effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. To that end, it calls on the Conference on Disarmament to actively continue intensive negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement and concluding effective international agreements to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Unfortunately, all the efforts made in the Conference on Disarmament and in the context of the NPT have not produced results commensurate with the expectations of non-nuclear-weapon States because of the nuclear Powers' policies of deterrence.

Algeria attaches the utmost importance to the matter of negative security assurances as a vital element of the security needs of non-nuclear-weapon States. It is a legitimate right of non-nuclear-weapon States to have credible and effective negative security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In fact, such measures aim only to remedy the inherent security imbalance of the NPT, which is weighted against the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, particularly those not covered by a nuclear umbrella. Those measures should put into practice the principle of undiminished security for all.

It is the belief of Algeria, along with the other member States of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, that in order to be effective and credible, those measures should be codified in a universal legally binding instrument and be unconditional. Such arrangements

would strengthen the security of non-nuclear-weapon States and, at the same time, would further consolidate the nuclear non-proliferation regime as a whole.

We note with satisfaction the commitments made by the nuclear-weapon States, particularly the commitments made by the United States and the United Kingdom regarding strengthened assurances; we also note with satisfaction the commitments made by the other nuclear Powers. However, we continue to believe that the impact of the current safeguards regime is limited because it relies on the safeguards provided for by United Nations Security Council resolution 255 (1968), on the unilateral declarations of 1978 and 1982 and on those mentioned in United Nations Security Council resolution 984 (1995).

The protocols to the treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones provide for related legal measures. These arrangements, although important, fall short of the real security needs of non-nuclear-weapon States. Unilateral measures are not legally binding commitments and are subject to conditions.

The assurances provided in connection with nuclear-weapon-free zones are also subject to conditions. Moreover, nuclear-weapon-free zones do not exist in all regions of the world, in particular missing regions of high tension. The Middle East is a perfect example of this.

The Algerian delegation takes this opportunity to again express its deep disappointment at the fact that the international conference on the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, which was due to take place in December last year, has been postponed without proper justification.

Algeria is firmly committed to the effective implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East in order to rid the region of nuclear weapons and all weapons of mass destruction. It thanks the facilitator, Mr. Laajava, for his efforts and urges all parties concerned to ensure the necessary conditions are met so that this conference can be held as soon as possible and fulfil its set objectives.

The nuclear Powers are pursuing programmes to modernize their nuclear arsenals in order to maintain a so-called credible nuclear deterrent with a view to safeguarding, among other things, their vital interests and those of their allies, to confront alleged threats and to react to attacks using other weapons of mass destruction. Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations regarding the right of self-defence is often cited to justify such deterrence policies. Very well. Let us imagine that such an assertion is generally admissible in international law and international morality. How does the conclusion of a multilateral legal agreement guaranteeing the security of non-nuclear-weapon States constitute a threat to any State's right of self-defence?

Furthermore, Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations cannot be cited without being limited by humanitarian concerns, or to justify the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against States that have renounced the nuclear military option.

The current regime of security assurances has much more to do with policies of nuclear deterrence than with the security needs of non-nuclear-weapon States. Additionally, it further reinforces the role of nuclear weapons, rather than reducing it. In the same context, it is difficult to accept an approach that does not promote the credibility and authority of the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime.

The current international security conditions and dangerous doctrines of deterrence further strengthen our conviction that an international legally binding agreement that meets the security needs of non-nuclear-weapon States must be concluded. The Conference on Disarmament, by virtue of its mandate, seems to us to be the appropriate place to deal with this issue as part of a full and balanced programme of work and, in that respect, the

Algerian delegation continues to believe that decision CD/1864 of 29 May 2009 offers us a basis for agreeing on a programme of work that is acceptable to all, with a view to reviving substantive work on all the Conference's agenda items.

**The President:** I thank the representative of Algeria for his statement. I now give the floor to Ambassador Wu Haitao of China.

**Mr. Wu Haitao (China)** (*spoke in Chinese*): Negative security assurances constitute an important issue for the Conference. China believes that negative security assurances provided by nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear-weapon States play an important role in strengthening the international nuclear non-proliferation regime with the NPT as its cornerstone, safeguarding international security and achieving the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.

Firstly, the overwhelming majority of States aspire to negotiate and conclude an international legal instrument on negative security assurances. In 1978, the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament called on nuclear-weapon States to make effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and to strengthen the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. The Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference points out that the provision of legally binding security assurances by nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear-weapon States would help to strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. The action plan agreed at the 2010 NPT Review Conference explicitly stated that the Conference should, on the basis of an adopted programme of work, begin substantive work on negative security assurances as soon as possible.

Secondly, the provision of legally binding security assurances by nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear-weapon States is an important intermediate step towards achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. In return for their commitment not to develop or acquire nuclear weapons, non-nuclear-weapon States should receive negative security assurances from nuclear-weapon States. Commitments from nuclear-weapon States to the principle of no first use against other nuclear-weapon States and non-use against non-nuclear-weapon States will effectively reduce the threat of nuclear war and will create the conditions needed to promote further nuclear disarmament and achieve complete and thorough nuclear disarmament.

The third point I would like to raise concerns respect and support for efforts to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones. Taking local circumstances into account, the regions and countries concerned are making efforts to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of voluntary consultations and agreements, and this constitutes an important, positive contribution to help prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and carry forward the international nuclear disarmament process. The nuclear-weapon States should respect the status of nuclear-weapon-free zones and should earnestly undertake legally binding obligations in that regard, particularly obligations not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against nuclear-weapon-free zones. Meanwhile, the international community should work together to promote and support the establishment of new nuclear-weapon-free zones.

Fourthly, the Conference should begin substantive work as soon as possible with a view to concluding an international legal instrument on negative security assurances. The issue of negative security assurances is ripe for discussion within the Conference. Since the 1990s, the General Assembly has adopted resolutions every year calling on the Conference to begin negotiating an international legal instrument on negative security assurances. For many consecutive years, the Conference convened an ad hoc committee on negative security assurances, which thoroughly studied specific issues such as the possible channels and steps by which to achieve negative security assurances. The ad hoc committee made

many useful proposals and laid a solid foundation for the negotiation and conclusion of a legal instrument on the issue. The Conference should begin substantive work as soon as possible on the basis of those efforts.

My country's position on the issue of negative security assurances remains clear and consistent. Ever since China first acquired nuclear weapons, the country has been committed to the principle of no first use of nuclear weapons at any time or under any circumstances, and has undertaken not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones under any circumstances. China supports the early start of substantive work within the Conference to conclude an international legal instrument on negative security assurances, and it is enthusiastically open to any proposal or measure that might help to achieve progress on this issue.

**The President:** I thank the Ambassador of China for his statement. I now invite the representative of India, Mr. Vipul, to take the floor.

**Mr. Vipul (India):** Mr. President, allow me to thank you for this opportunity to state our views on negative security assurances, an issue which has been on the agenda of the Conference since 1979. The first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament called upon nuclear-weapon States to take steps to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. We believe that non-nuclear-weapon States have a legitimate right to be assured against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear weapons pose the gravest danger to humanity and to international peace and stability, and the best assurance against their use or threats of their use is their complete elimination. India has been consistent in its support for global, verifiable and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament. In the absence of global nuclear disarmament, as part of our doctrine of credible minimum nuclear deterrence, we have espoused the policy of no first use against nuclear-weapon States and non-use against non-nuclear-weapon States. We are prepared to convert these undertakings into multilateral legal arrangements.

In the current international climate there is greater support for progressive steps towards the delegitimization of nuclear weapons, which we believe is essential for achieving the goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. In our view delegitimization will not make nuclear weapons disappear in an instant; it will, rather, be a process that would help ease the path towards achieving Global Zero. Measures to reduce nuclear danger arising from the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and increasing restraint on the use of nuclear weapons are pertinent in this regard.

Our resolutions in the First Committee give expression to some ideas on reducing the salience of nuclear weapons in security doctrines and on their delegitimization. For over three decades, the First Committee has voted in favour of a resolution sponsored by India calling on the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. India's resolution in the First Committee on reducing nuclear danger is also supported by a large number of States. India has in its working paper CD/1816 also suggested specific measures, including a global "no first use" agreement.

As a G-21 member, India has supported the conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States as a matter of priority. The negotiation of such an instrument in the Conference will complement other measures to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in security doctrines and improve the international climate for promoting nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all their aspects. We remain committed to working with other Conference members towards the objective of the establishment of a subsidiary body to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

**The President:** I thank the representative of India for his statement. I now invite the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic, Ms. Issa, to take the floor.

**Ms. Issa** (Syrian Arab Republic) (*spoke in Arabic*): Mr. President, this being the first time that my country's delegation is taking the floor under your presidency, we would like to begin by congratulating you on your assumption of the functions of President of the Conference on Disarmament and wishing you success in your tasks. We are confident that your experience will help to move the Conference's work forward in a positive manner.

Nuclear weapons have existed for a long time and the danger of their proliferation and use, or the threat thereof, remains real. Consequently, their complete elimination constitutes the sole assurance that this danger will not materialize. Pending such elimination, we wish to emphasize the urgent need to agree on an unconditional and legally binding universal instrument to guarantee the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States and assure them that they will not be exposed to the use, or threatened use, of such weapons against them. This must be recognized as a legitimate right of the non-nuclear-weapon States, particularly in the light of their deep concern at the continued pursuit of military ideologies based on policies under which the development and strengthening of military alliances and the potential use, or threatened use, of nuclear weapons are regarded as a nuclear deterrent.

While welcoming the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones as a positive measure to promote disarmament and non-proliferation pending the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons, we wish to reaffirm the urgent need to expedite the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, pursuant to Security Council resolution 487 (1981), paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and the relevant General Assembly resolutions that have been adopted by consensus. We reiterate our deep concern at the postponement of the conference on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, which was expected to be held in Finland in 2012 in accordance with the resolutions of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, and we re-emphasize our rejection of all the pretexts put forward to justify its postponement. We are calling for the full implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and would like to point out that the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East differs from the establishment of other nuclear-weapon-free zones insofar as it is based on the resolution on the Middle East adopted within the framework of a deal under which the Arab States agreed to an indefinite extension of the NPT on this understanding, which the NPT depositary States accepted at the time. Accordingly, the establishment of this zone, to which the region has a right, is a responsibility that must be borne by the international community. We also wish to emphasize the fact that the security assurances provided by the non-nuclear-weapon States, either unilaterally or within the context of nuclear-weapon-free zones, constitute inadequate declarations since they are conditional and subject to specific geographical limitations and, consequently, cannot be regarded as a substitute for a legally binding and unconditional international instrument providing security assurances that the non-nuclear-weapon States will not be exposed to the use, or threatened use, of such weapons against them. We therefore stress the need to begin negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament with a view to drawing up such an instrument, which must be unambiguous and must reflect the interests of all States, within the framework of a comprehensive and balanced programme of work that addresses the four main issues on the Conference agenda in an equitable manner.

**Ms. Kasnakli** (Turkey): Mr. President, I would like to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference of Disarmament. I will try to keep my intervention as brief as possible, since the views of this delegation are very well known to the Conference.

First of all, Turkey supports the elaboration of legally binding international instruments which will assure the non-use of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States against non-nuclear-weapon States.

As a matter of fact, Turkey, along with numerous other members of the Conference, has repeatedly called for legally binding security assurances by nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT. These assurances would, without a doubt, help to strengthen the non-proliferation regime.

In our view, the issue of negative security assurances is firmly anchored in the NPT regime. The 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences not only endorsed the unanimously adopted United Nations Security Council resolution 984 (1995) on unilateral security assurances by each of the nuclear-weapon States but also called for the consideration of additional measures, including international legally binding instruments. The final document of the 2010 NPT review Conference also made specific references to negative security assurances. In this regard, it is incumbent upon all of us to implement the relevant articles of the 2010 action plan, namely actions 7, 8 and 9.

Turkey is of the opinion that nuclear-weapon-free zones play a significant role in enhancing regional and global peace. They are important tools in generating security and confidence.

Turkey is disappointed about the decision to postpone the international conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, which the 2010 NPT Review Conference had foreseen to be organized last year. It is Turkey's sincere expectation that the conference will take place as soon as possible, since this initiative would represent not only an important confidence-building measure at this critical stage in the Middle East, but also a significant stimulus to the NPT review process. To this end, we call on all States to adopt a constructive approach and deploy genuine efforts for the organization of the conference as soon as possible.

Turkey appreciates and continues to fully support the efforts of the facilitator, Ambassador Jaakko Laajava of Finland, and his team.

**The President:** I thank the representative of Turkey for her statement. I now invite the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to take the floor.

**Mr. Ri Jang Gon** (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): Mr. President, at the outset, on behalf of our delegation, allow me to congratulate you on your assumption of the Conference presidency. I assure you of my delegation's support and cooperation. My delegation takes this opportunity to express its appreciation to your predecessor, the Ambassador of India, for her sincere dedication to the work of the Conference.

In fact my delegation has asked for the floor to comment on the statement by the European Union. In the first place, my delegation categorically rejects the European Union's statement. As the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has declared on many occasions, it has never recognized United Nations Security Council resolutions against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Our strong and firm self-defensive step was entirely for defending the sovereignty of the country and the dignity of the nation in order to cope with extreme nuclear threats from foreign aggressors.

The European Union, however, again expressed its one-sided approach to the issue of the Korean peninsula in its statement. Its partiality does not constitute any help to the solution of the issue but rather only produces bad results in inciting one against the other. My delegation takes also this opportunity to urge the European Union and those countries to deal with the issue of the Korean peninsula on an impartial basis instead of talking negatively about my country's recently taken firm self-defensive measures.

Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is the result of the threat caused by existing nuclear weapons. However, it is regrettable that some countries differentiate between the existence of nuclear weapons and their proliferation and persist with their assertions on the issue of non-proliferation alone. Now, high-handed policies on nuclear weapons which are based on a double standard have reduced the NPT and other disarmament conventions to paper that is of no use and lacks binding force – a sure way of plunging the world into a nuclear arms race. There can be no justification for the fact that certain countries take issue with the peaceful nuclear activities of countries they detest while keeping out of their obligations to disarm their own nuclear weapons.

The peaceful use of nuclear arsenals is not a privilege conferred on specific countries but the legitimate right of sovereign States. It can be said that the provision of negative security assurances is essential to the existence of non-nuclear-weapon States and the promotion of the process of nuclear disarmament around the globe. Non-nuclear-weapon States demand that nuclear-weapon States unconditionally assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in all cases. For the past 60 years, from the time that nuclear weapons appeared, nuclear-weapon States have individually declared their commitment to assuring non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in international forums, including the United Nations. However, nuclear-weapon States are free to reverse their commitments at any time as these are unilateral, unconditional and not legally binding. All these facts prove that the current nuclear commitments can do little to solve the problem at all. Therefore the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is of the view that it is vital to establish an international legally binding instrument on negative security assurances.

**Mr. Akram** (Pakistan): Mr. President, since my delegation is taking the floor for the first time during your presidency, allow me to begin by congratulating you for assuming the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament and to assure you of our fullest cooperation.

The Conference on Disarmament has been discussing for several years now the need for concluding legally binding and effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. This issue is second in importance only to the issue of nuclear disarmament. This is recognized in the United Nations Secretary-General's disarmament action plan of 2008. The demand for negative security assurances was voiced by non-nuclear-weapon States in the 1960s, and it crystallized in 1968 during the concluding phase of negotiations for NPT. The response of the nuclear-weapon States, reflected in Security Council resolution No. 255 (1968), was considered inadequate by the non-nuclear-weapon States. The demand for assurances persisted and continues until today.

This demand was reinforced at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1978. The declarations made by four of the five nuclear-weapon States at that session and later at the NPT Review and Extension Conference and reflected in Security Council resolution 984 (1995) were also considered insufficient, qualified and partial by most of the non-nuclear-weapon States. The Conference on Disarmament and its predecessor, the Committee on Disarmament, have dealt with this issue for over 30 years. Since 1978 Pakistan has spearheaded the efforts to seek legally binding assurances from nuclear-weapon States in the United Nations General Assembly and in the Conference on Disarmament.

Pakistan remains committed to negative security assurances despite having become a nuclear-weapon State, and has declared that it will not use or threaten to use its nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State. We are ready for negotiations to conclude a legally binding multilateral treaty on negative security assurances.



Every year the General Assembly adopts a resolution tabled by Pakistan calling for effective, credible and legally binding assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. Last year's resolution once again recommended to the Conference on Disarmament to embark on intensive negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement on negative security assurances. The Conference on Disarmament must respond to this call now, to complete its unfinished business. In our view the rationales for developing legally binding instruments on negative security assurances are multiple, and I would now like to share them with you and all members of the Conference on Disarmament. The United Nations Charter obligates nations not to use or threaten to use force. This obligation extends to nuclear weapons. The right to self-defence in this context is not unrestricted. The option of using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States is not only strategically untenable but morally unacceptable and indeed reprehensible. The positive and negative assurances given so far are considered to be conditional and non-binding, amounting to mere political declarations. Nuclear-weapon-free zones can strengthen the security assurances of States but do not substitute for them. The zonal States do not have iron clad guarantees. Only one nuclear-weapon State has given unconditional negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States and the nuclear-weapon-free-zone States. With the indefinite extension of the NPT, most nuclear-weapon States presume that they have the right to retain nuclear weapons while complete nuclear disarmament under article VI of the NPT remains open-ended.

While it is regrettable that promotion of common security through complete nuclear disarmament as called for at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament remains elusive, negative security assurances could provide security, particularly for those countries that are not part of any military alliance and do not have the benefit of extended nuclear deterrence. Negative security assurances are in fact cost-free for the nuclear-weapon States, since they do not place any additional burden on them in terms of nuclear disarmament, nuclear arms reductions or reduction of their security compulsions. We believe that the conclusion of effective arrangements on negative security assurances could constitute a major confidence-building measure in the current tense international circumstances between the nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States, as well as among the nuclear-weapon States.

Negative security assurances could contribute to reducing the nuclear danger. They could ease the threats which arise from new doctrines of nuclear use, and could facilitate negotiations on other matters relating to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Negative security assurances would help lay the foundations for the Conference's negotiations on the three other core issues: nuclear disarmament, fissile material and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Substantive work can commence on the basis of either of the two draft texts submitted in the Conference on Disarmament in 1979 – the draft text CD/10 by Pakistan or the draft text CD/23 submitted by the G-21. For these reasons, my delegation believes that negative security assurances are eminently suitable for negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament at this stage. It is worth reflecting as to why the Conference on Disarmament has not been able to commence substantive work on negative security assurances despite the overwhelming cross-regional support as reflected in the relevant General Assembly resolutions and the G-21 statements in the Conference on Disarmament. In this regard, the States that oppose establishing a subsidiary body to negotiate negative security assurances should clearly outline their position and take responsibility for the ongoing stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament on this issue.

**The President:** I thank Ambassador Akram for his statement. I now give the floor to Mr. Vasiliev of the Russian Federation.

**Mr. Vasiliev** (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): First of all, Mr. President, I would like to congratulate you on taking up your post and assure you of my delegation's readiness to assist you in your work in any way.

Russia stands ready to work for global agreement in the Conference on Disarmament on assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, in keeping with the provisions of our military doctrine.

The issue of security assurances is of major significance in the context of the (NPT). The provision and application of such assurances is a fundamental task for all the parties to the Treaty. Russia consistently supports the wish of NPT parties which have no nuclear weapons to receive such assurances. We believe that achieving this goal would promote the universal application of the Treaty, strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and enhance confidence and predictability in relations among States.

In 1995 Russia and other nuclear Powers co-sponsored United Nations Security Council resolution 984 (1995), which provided for the granting of what are known as positive security assurances and noted national declarations on negative assurances issued by the nuclear States. We have repeatedly reaffirmed these obligations of ours, and do so again now.

The obligations of the nuclear States with regard to negative assurances have already been made legally binding through the protocols to treaties creating nuclear-weapon-free zones. Russia has signed and ratified such protocols to the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga and Pelindaba. We have also provided security assurances to Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan in connection with their renunciation of nuclear weapons. With the entry into force of the New START Treaty in the spring of 2011, the Budapest Memorandum retains its legal validity.

We support the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South-East Asia. We attach priority to its formalization in international law, and we are ready to sign the appropriate protocol to the Treaty of Bangkok with the traditional stipulations which will protect our national interests.

We also support Mongolia's efforts to strengthen its non-nuclear status. Under a bilateral treaty with Mongolia, Russia has undertaken to respect that status and provide the corresponding assurances. We have also acceded to the joint declaration by the nuclear States recognizing Mongolia's nuclear-free status, which was signed on the sidelines of the sixty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly.

In this way, Russia has now provided legally binding security assurances to over 120 States. As new nuclear-free zones are created, this number will grow. We stand ready to work for the expansion of such nuclear-weapon-free zones.

In this connection, we welcome the decision taken by the States of Central Asia to set up a nuclear-weapon-free zone in their region, and support the Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaty which those countries have concluded. We call on all nuclear States to provide support to the Treaty of Semipalatinsk and sign the protocol granting security assurances to its parties.

It is important that the idea of establishing a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery in the Middle East, in keeping with the decisions taken at the 1995 and 2010 NPT review conferences, should be placed on a practical footing. We are convinced that immediate action to formalize this idea would facilitate the comprehensive solution of the issues of non-proliferation and the effective support of peace and stability in that region. In that connection, we deeply regret that despite those decisions, the conference on such a zone did not take place in 2012. As one of the co-sponsors of the Middle East resolution adopted at the 1995 NPT Review Conference and a co-organizer of the planned conference, we are working hard to ensure it is held at an early date, in close cooperation with the other co-sponsors and the Special Coordinator, Jaakko Laajava.

The Conference on Disarmament has a mandate to work on the issue of security assurances by virtue of its unique format as a multilateral disarmament forum. In this connection, we reaffirm our support for the decision adopted at the 2010 NPT Review Conference on the prompt initiation of discussions in the Conference on Disarmament on negative security assurances in the framework of this forum's programme of work.

**The President:** I thank Mr. Vasiliev for his statement. I now invite Ambassador Oyarce of Chile, as the last speaker on my list, to take the floor.

**Mr. Oyarce** (Chile) (*spoke in Spanish*): Mr. President, this is the first time that we have taken the floor under your presidency, and we offer you our full cooperation. I thank you for the opportunity to share some observations on an issue that has been on the agenda since 1979.

We have a large body of resolutions and statements on this matter dating back more than 30 years. It is a subject to which express reference is made in paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of the NPT programme of action, and specific suggestions have been made systematically in the General Assembly's First Committee. That is a political fact. We consider negative security assurances to be a form of protection which is transitory and can be revoked. We know that the only valid guarantee is total and verified nuclear disarmament, but until we benefit from conditions and a political atmosphere that are conducive to reaching that ultimate goal, the work of this Conference should focus on how an agreement may be built through a universal and binding instrument that gives permanent guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States.

Chile has renounced the development, possession and use of nuclear weapons. We are part of the first nuclear-weapon-free zone established under the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and we are therefore certain that these initiatives provide the added value of trust and effective multilateral efforts. The Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean has experience in this area that should be taken into account. Nuclear-weapon-free zones represent a guarantee that can and should have a universal effect. Nations that have placed their trust in multilateral protection systems should enjoy legal certainty, and joining the NPT should, in this context, represent a guarantee for countries that have renounced nuclear weapons. We should agree on the establishment of the structure of a binding instrument with a control mechanism including verification measures and effective cooperation. There are numerous lines of thought that underpin negative security assurances on the basis of this Organization's own Charter, particularly in relation to the idea of human security. Realistically, we are aware that there are other elements involved in analysis of this issue, but they should not prevent us from continuing the work of this Conference.

I wish to conclude by indicating that we believe that the recent Oslo Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons is relevant in this context. To a certain extent, that Conference sent a signal and underlined that this key matter for this Conference must be addressed in a comprehensive and binding manner.

**The President:** I thank Ambassador Oyarce for his statement. I see the delegation of the Republic of Korea asking for the floor.

**Mr. Park** Younghyo (Republic of Korea): Mr. President, since this is the first time my delegation has taken the floor under your presidency, let me begin by congratulating you on the assumption of the presidency. We assure you of my delegation's full support and cooperation.

My delegation believes that one of the practical and substantial ways to cope with the problem of nuclear proliferation is to alleviate the legitimate security concerns of non-nuclear-weapon States by providing them with negative security assurances. Such

assurances should, however, be provided only to the non-nuclear-weapon States that faithfully comply with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

My delegation would like to take note of the fact that today the delegates of the European Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations reiterated their full support for denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

It is our sincere hope that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will fulfil its commitment under the 2005 joint statement of the Six-Party Talks as well as its obligations under the unanimously adopted United Nations Security Council resolutions in this regard.

**The President:** I thank the representative of the Republic of Korea for his statement. I see the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea asking for the floor.

**Mr. Ri Jang Gon** (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): My delegation also takes this opportunity to say a few words to the South Korean delegation, since it provoked the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in this forum.

My delegation wishes to tell the South Korean delegation very clearly that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea categorically rejected all United Nations resolutions against it, as we have declared just as before that we have never recognized those resolutions against us.

South Korea regards sycophancy towards the United States and confrontation with fellow countrymen as a means to keep itself alive. Now, as you know well, South Korea is standing against fellow countrymen in collusion with foreign forces for aggression, a major reason for tensions escalating between the North and South and the danger of a nuclear war increasing on the Korean peninsula.

Mounting tension is an inevitable product. South Korea blindly kowtows to the United States' hostile policy towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, turning everything it does into provocation while stepping up confrontation. It was none other than South Korea which took the lead in prodding the Security Council into cooking up a resolution with the aim of stifling the Democratic People's Republic of Korea economically. It is also South Korea that staged non-targeted pre-emptive nuclear attack drills together with the United States while crying out for coping with the so-called provocation from the North and making a so-called strong warning.

**The President:** I thank the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for his statement. Would any other delegation like to take the floor at this juncture? That does not seem to be the case.

Allow me to express my appreciation to you, distinguished colleagues, for the statements conveying your positions and recent developments on the issue of negative security assurances. In that regard, allow me now to highlight some salient points raised during today's discussion on negative security assurances, as follows.

Some delegations were of the view that the best way to deal with the issue of negative security assurances is through existing nuclear-weapon-free zones as well as the promotion of more such zones, and in that regard they call for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East as early as possible.

Several delegations believed that strong statements and assurances from nuclear-weapon States are extremely important to guarantee global peace and security. Delegates underlined that negative security assurances cannot be assured by political promises; therefore they call urgently for a legally binding instrument on negative security assurances and support negotiation of a treaty on that issue in the Conference on Disarmament.

Before concluding this plenary session, I wish to share with you Indonesia's plans for activities during the six-week recess of the Conference on Disarmament.

As the President of the Conference on Disarmament, I am engaged in consultations with member States to seek views on the most viable steps to advance the Conference on Disarmament. I am planning to continue my consultations during the recess. In my consultations in the past two weeks some member States encouraged me to try to formulate an initial draft programme of work using the previous draft programme of work as a reference. Some others, while expressing support if I were to try to formulate such an initial draft, also indicated that they would understand if finally I were not able to come up with a consensus draft because of the complexity and difficult nature of the issue. Some at first doubted that the present circumstances would enable us to reach a consensus on a programme of work. Whether Indonesia can come up with a draft programme of work or not will depend on the result of my consultations during the period of the six-week recess of the Conference on Disarmament.

I am going to seek possible elements for a draft programme of work during my consultations, and certainly Indonesia will take into consideration the concerns and positions of member countries.

If the result of those consultations indicates that submission of a draft programme of work seems undoable, then I will envisage addressing the remaining agenda items — 5, 6 and 7 — in the plenary sessions. The plenary meeting on 14 May 2013 will be devoted to an exchange of views on agenda items 5 and 6, "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons" and "Comprehensive programme of disarmament". The plenary meeting on 21 May 2013 will be devoted to agenda item 7, "Transparency in armaments".

Furthermore, while the Conference is in recess, Indonesia is planning to convene an informal lunchtime seminar in collaboration with the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). The theme of the seminar will be exploring avenues to address the stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament. As for the speaker at the seminar, at present I am still exploring with UNIDIR regarding the appropriate speaker for this seminar.

The timing of the lunchtime seminar coincides with the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference, but it has nothing to do with that meeting. I envisage that the seminar will be convened some time between 25 April and 3 May 2013. The exact date will be subject to the availability of a room, and as soon as confirmation of the date is received from the secretariat, Indonesia will circulate invitations.

The objective of the seminar is to discuss ways and means of overcoming the prolonged deadlock in the Conference on Disarmament as well as to garner new ideas that could be generated from an open discussion in an informal setting. The objective is also to contribute to the work of the Conference and to the work of producing a programme of work. The outcome of the seminar will be a factual report reflecting discussions at the seminar, and the report will be issued as an official document by Indonesia to the Conference on Disarmament and will be distributed to all members of the Conference as well as observers participating in the Conference. The invitees of the seminar will be Conference members and observers.

The third issue that I would like to share with you at this juncture is that the Ambassador of the Czech Republic, as coordinator of the informal group of observer States, sent me a letter on 19 March 2013 requesting me, as the President of the Conference on Disarmament, to consider meeting with all members of the group during the course of my presidency. The group would prefer to meet with me after our recess, in May 2013.

This is all that I would like to share with you. Would any other delegate like to take the floor? I give the floor to the representative of Algeria.

**Mr. Khelif** (Algeria) (*spoke in French*): Mr. President, the Algerian delegation requested the floor simply to ask for clarification regarding the document that you expect to present as a working document of the Conference on Disarmament following the informal seminar planned for May. Will that document be presented on behalf of Indonesia, as a member State, or will it be presented on behalf of the Chair?

**The President:** I will submit the documents of the outcome of the seminar as a member of the Indonesian delegation, not as the President of the Conference.

Would any other delegate like to take the floor? I see none, so we have come to the end of our session, and I wish you all a productive recess during the next six weeks. To those celebrating Easter, I wish a happy Easter and happy holidays. The meeting is adjourned.

*The meeting rose at 12 noon.*