

**Совещание государств – участников
Конвенции о запрещении разработки,
производства и накопления запасов
бактериологического (биологического)
и токсинного оружия и об их уничтожении**

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Совещание 2013 года

Женева, 9–13 декабря 2013 года

Совещание экспертов

Женева, 12–16 августа 2013 года

Доклад Совещания экспертов

I. Введение

1. Заключительный документ седьмой Конференции государств – участников Конвенции о запрещении разработки, производства и накопления запасов бактериологического (биологического) и токсинного оружия и об их уничтожении по рассмотрению действия Конвенции (BWC/CONF.VII/7) в разделе решений и рекомендаций содержал следующее решение:

"5. Вновь подтверждая полезность предшествующих межсессионных программ в период 2003–2010 годов, Конференция постановляет сохранить прежние структуры: ежегодные совещания государств-участников, которым предшествуют ежегодные совещания экспертов.

6. Цель межсессионной программы состоит в обсуждении и поощрении общего понимания и эффективных действий по тем вопросам, которые намечены для включения в межсессионную программу этой седьмой обзорной Конференцией.

7. Признавая необходимость обеспечения сбалансированности стремления к усовершенствованию межсессионной программы в пределах тех ограничений – как в финансовых, так и в людских ресурсах, – с которыми сталкиваются государства-участники, Конференция постановляет и далее ежегодно отводить на межсессионную программу по десять дней.

8. Конференция постановляет, что следующие темы должны быть постоянными пунктами повестки дня, которые будут рассматриваться каждый год и на Совещании экспертов, и на Совещании государств-участников в 2012–2015 годах:

- a) сотрудничество и помощь, в особенности укрепление сотрудничества и помощи по статье X;
- b) обзор достижений в области науки и технологии, имеющих отношение к Конвенции;
- c) укрепление национального осуществления.



9. Конференция постановляет, что в рамках межсессионной программы в указанные годы будут обсуждаться следующие другие пункты:

а) пути обеспечения более полного участия в МД (2012 и 2013 годы);

б) пути укрепления осуществления статьи VII, включая рассмотрение детальных процедур и механизмов для предоставления помощи и сотрудничества государствами-участниками (2014 и 2015 годы).

10. Совещания экспертов и совещания государств-участников в пересмотренном формате будут проводиться в течение пяти дней каждое.

11. Совещания первого года будут проходить под председательством представителя Группы неприсоединившихся и других государств, совещания второго года – под председательством представителя Восточноевропейской группы, совещания третьего года – под председательством представителя Западной группы, а совещания четвертого года – под председательством представителя Группы неприсоединившихся и других государств. Назначаемому сроком на один год Председателю будут оказывать поддержку два назначаемых на один год заместителя Председателя – по одному от каждой из двух других региональных групп.

12. Каждое Совещание экспертов будет готовить для рассмотрения Совещанием государств-участников фактологический доклад, освещающий его дискуссии. Этот доклад будет отражать работу по трем постоянным пунктам повестки дня, а также содержать отчет по другому пункту, намеченному для обсуждения в этом году.

13. Помимо докладов совещаний экспертов, совещания государств-участников будут также рассматривать – на ежегодной основе – прогресс в деле универсализации Конвенции и ежегодные доклады Группы имплементационной поддержки. В 2012 и 2013 годах Совещание государств-участников также рассмотрит доклад Совещания экспертов по МД, а в 2014 и 2015 годах Совещание государств-участников рассмотрит доклад Совещания экспертов по статье VII.

14. Все совещания – как экспертов, так и государств-участников – будут достигать любых выводов или результатов консенсусом.

15. Восьмая обзорная Конференция рассмотрит работу и итоги этих совещаний и примет решение о любых последующих действиях".

2. Резолюцией 67/77, принятой без голосования 3 декабря 2012 года, Генеральная Ассамблея среди прочего просила Генерального секретаря продолжать оказывать необходимую помощь правительствам – депозитариям Конвенции и предоставлять такие услуги, которые могут потребоваться в связи с осуществлением решений и рекомендаций конференций по рассмотрению действия Конвенции.

II. Организация Совещания экспертов

3. В соответствии с решением седьмой обзорной Конференции Совещание экспертов 2013 года было создано во Дворце Наций в Женеве с 12 по 16 августа 2013 года под председательством г-жи Юдит Кёрёми из Венгрии; обязанности заместителей Председателя исполняли посол Малайзии Мазлан Мухаммад и посол Швейцарии Урс Шмид.

4. На своем первом заседании 12 августа 2013 года Совещание экспертов приняло свою повестку дня (BWC/MSP/2013/MX/1) и программу работы (BWC/MSP/2013/MX/2), которые были предложены Председателем. Председатель также привлекла внимание делегаций к двум справочным документам, подготовленным Группой имплементационной поддержки (BWC/MSP/2013/MX/INF.1/Rev.1 и INF.2).

5. На том же заседании по предложению Председателя Совещание экспертов приняло в качестве своих правил процедуры с соответствующими изменениями Правила процедуры седьмой обзорной Конференции, которые содержатся в приложении III Заключительного документа обзорной Конференции (BWC/CONF.VII/7).

6. Обязанности секретаря Совещания экспертов исполнял руководитель Группы имплементационной поддержки г-н Ричард Леннан. Обязанности заместителя секретаря исполнял сотрудник по политическим вопросам Группы имплементационной поддержки г-н Пирс Миллет. В состав секретариата входила младший сотрудник по политическим вопросам Группы имплементационной поддержки г-жа Нгок Фуонг Хюинь.

III. Участие в Совещании экспертов

7. В Совещании экспертов участвовали следующие 83 государства – участника Конвенции: Австралия, Австрия, Азербайджан, Албания, Алжир, Аргентина, Бахрейн, Беларусь, Бельгия, Бенин, Болгария, Бразилия, Буркина-Фасо, Венгрия, Венесуэла (Боливарианская Республика), Гана, Гватемала, Германия, Гондурас, Греция, Грузия, Дания, Демократическая Республика Конго, Индия, Индонезия, Иордания, Ирак, Иран (Исламская Республика), Ирландия, Испания, Италия, Казахстан, Канада, Кения, Китай, Колумбия, Куба, Кувейт, Ливия, Литва, Мадагаскар, Малайзия, Мальта, Марокко, Мексика, Монголия, Нидерланды, Новая Зеландия, Норвегия, Пакистан, Панама, Перу, Польша, Португалия, Республика Корея, Российская Федерация, Румыния, Сальвадор, Саудовская Аравия, Святой Престол, Сенегал, Словакия, Соединенное Королевство Великобритании и Северной Ирландии, Соединенные Штаты Америки, Таиланд, Тунис, Турция, Украина, Уругвай, Филиппины, Финляндия, Франция, Хорватия, Черногория, Чешская Республика, Чили, Швейцария, Швеция, Шри-Ланка, Эквадор, Эстония, Южная Африка, Япония.

8. Кроме того, как предусмотрено в пункте 1 правила 44 Правил процедуры, в Совещании экспертов без участия в принятии решений участвовали три государства, которые подписали Конвенцию, но пока не ратифицировали ее: Мьянма, Непал, Объединенная Республика Танзания.

9. В соответствии с пунктом 2 а) правила 44 в Совещании экспертов участвовали в качестве наблюдателей два государства – Израиль и Намибия, – которые не являются ни участниками, ни подписавшими сторонами Конвенции.

10. В соответствии с пунктом 3 правила 44 на Совещании экспертов присутствовала Организация Объединенных Наций, включая Управление Организации Объединенных Наций по вопросам разоружения и Комитет по резолюции 1540 Совета Безопасности Организации Объединенных Наций.

11. В соответствии с пунктом 4 правила 44 статус наблюдателя для участия в Совещании экспертов был предоставлен Всемирной организации здравоохранения (ВОЗ), Всемирной организации по охране здоровья животных (МЭБ), Европейскому союзу, Интерполу, Международному комитету Красного Креста

(МККК), Организации по запрещению химического оружия (ОЗХО) и Продовольственной и сельскохозяйственной организации Объединенных Наций (ФАО).

12. Кроме того, по приглашению Председателя, в знак признания особого характера тем, находящихся на рассмотрении на этом Совещании, и без создания прецедента в неофициальных обменах на открытых заседаниях в качестве гостей Совещания экспертов участвовали семь научных, профессиональных, коммерческих и академических организаций и экспертов: Международная федерация ассоциаций по биобезопасности (МФАБ), Исследовательский, учебный и информационный центр по вопросам контроля (ВЕРТИК), Сеть изготовителей вакцин в развивающихся странах (СИВРС), "Нанобиосис", "Санофи", д-р Чэн Чжу и д-р Саймон Уэйн-Хобсон.

13. В соответствии с пунктом 5 правила 44 на Совещании экспертов присутствовали 13 неправительственных организаций и исследовательских институтов.

14. Список всех участников Совещания экспертов содержится в документе BWC/MSP/2013/MX/INF.3.

IV. Работа Совещания экспертов

15. В соответствии с программой работы (BWC/MSP/2013/MX/2) Совещание экспертов заслушало вступительные заявления от следующих 19 государств-участников: Алжира, Бенина, Бразилии, Ганы, Индии, Индонезии, Ирана (Исламской Республики) (от имени Группы Движения неприсоединения и других государств), Кении, Китая, Кубы, Литвы, Мадагаскара, Малайзии, Мексики, Пакистана, Российской Федерации, Филиппин, Швейцарии, Эквадора. Совещание также заслушало вступительное заявление от Европейского союза.

16. С 12 по 16 августа Совещание экспертов провело по два заседания, посвященных каждому из постоянных пунктов повестки дня: сотрудничеству и помощи, в особенности укреплению сотрудничества и помощи по статье X; обзору достижений в области науки и технологии, имеющих отношение к Конвенции; и укреплению национального осуществления (пункты 5–7 повестки дня), и два заседания, посвященных двухгодичному пункту повестки дня, касающемуся путей обеспечения более полного участия в мерах укрепления доверия (пункт 8 повестки дня). В ходе этих заседаний были заслушаны 59 презентаций или заявлений со стороны государств-участников, 11 – со стороны международных организаций и 5 – со стороны гостей Совещания.

17. Председатель под свою собственную ответственность и по своей инициативе подготовила документ с перечнем соображений, уроков, перспектив, рекомендаций, выводов и предложений, почерпнутых из презентаций, заявлений, рабочих документов и выступлений по пунктам повестки дня, обсуждавшимся на Совещании. Совещание экспертов отметило, что этот документ не был согласован и не имеет статуса. По мнению Председателя, документ мог бы помочь делегациям в их приготовлениях к Совещанию государств-участников в декабре 2013 года и при рассмотрении им вопроса о том, как лучше всего осуществлять "обсуждение, а также поощрение общего понимания и эффективных действий по" темам в соответствии с решением седьмой обзорной Конференции. Документ, подготовленный Председателем, приобщается в качестве приложения I к настоящему докладу (только на английском языке).

18. В ходе своей работы Совещание экспертов имело возможность опираться на ряд рабочих документов, представленных государствами-участниками и международными организациями, а также на заявления и презентации со стороны государств-участников, международных организаций и гостей Совещания, которые были распространены на Совещании.

V. Документация

19. Перечень официальных документов Совещания экспертов, включая рабочие документы, представленные государствами-участниками, содержится в приложении II к настоящему докладу. Все документы, указанные в этом перечне, имеются в наличии на веб-сайте Группы имплементационной поддержки по адресу <http://www.unog.ch/bwc> и в Системе официальной документации Организации Объединенных Наций (СОД) по адресу <http://documents.un.org>.

VI. Завершение Совещания экспертов

20. На своем заключительном заседании 16 августа 2013 года Совещание экспертов отметило, что Председатель подготовит предварительную повестку дня и программу работы для одобрения и принятия на Совещании государств-участников, которое будет проходить с 9 по 13 декабря 2013 года.

21. На том же заседании Совещание экспертов приняло консенсусом свой доклад, содержащийся в документах BWC/MSP/2013/MX/CRP.1 и CRP.2, с устными поправками, который должен быть выпущен в качестве документа BWC/MSP/2013/MX/3.

Annex I

[ENGLISH ONLY]

Considerations, lessons, perspectives, recommendations, conclusions and proposals drawn from the presentations, statements, working papers and interventions on the topics under discussion at the Meeting

Note: the source is given using the following codes: P = presentation (with date); S = statement (with date); WP = working paper (with number). See also the list of abbreviations at the end of this annex.

Agenda item 5: Standing agenda item: cooperation and assistance, with a particular focus on strengthening cooperation and assistance under Article X.

1. Challenges and obstacles to developing international cooperation, assistance and exchange in the biological sciences and technology, including equipment and material, for peaceful purposes to their full potential, and possible means of overcoming these

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
Algeria	In no way can the right to acquire equipment, substances and biotechnologies for development be restricted, impeded, stopped or made subject to preconditions.	S 12/8 AM
Algeria	Cooperation assistance activities by States Parties in order to fully tap the potential of Article X must be inspired by a global, lasting and coordinated approach so that these efforts are effective.	S 12/8 AM
Cuba	Developed countries should promote international cooperation for the benefit of developing countries and lift restriction to the free flow of ideas and equipment and to ensure that we can peacefully use our biological agents and toxins. To lift these barriers is an obligation on the States Parties.	S 12/8 AM
Brazil	Placing restrictions on the development of dual-use technology, materials and equipment needed to promote capacity building in the fields of sanitary control, detection, diagnosis and control of infectious diseases, including the production of some vaccines and other biological materials should be considered a violation of Article X.	S 13/8 AM
Canada	It is not possible given the nature of project funding and approval processes to list specific projects.	S 13/8 AM
Cuba	We would urge these restrictions be lifted ... restrictions and prohibitions that are politically motivated, which are a violation of the convention, in particular of Article X of the convention.	S 13/8 AM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
Cuba	A mechanism which allows a solution of disputes given these types of restrictions or denial of medicines, vaccines, personnel or diagnostic material to be used for peaceful purposes by a state or a group of states ... would be a specific step forward towards the distant achievement of the full, effective non-discriminatory implementation of Article X	S 13/8 AM
Canada	One important key to success is clear definition by partner countries of the type of assistance that they require. While generic requests for support are sufficient to initiate a dialogue, this dialogue will most likely not result in tangible projects if the requesting country cannot provide a thorough explanation of needs and define in very specific terms the type of support that could best help to address those needs.	S 13/8 PM
Canada	Assistance requests that are well-considered, properly consulted, and have realistic scope and budget are more likely to receive positive consideration.	S 13/8 PM
Canada	A strong commitment by the requesting party to support project implementation is critical. Those seeking support must be fully prepared to take an active role in whatever project results, including when it comes to concluding government-level agreements with provisions related to tax exemption, indemnification and access rights.	S 13/8 PM
Canada	Project partners must be prepared to support, maintain and sustain the assistance being provided. Commitment at multiple levels – individual, institutional and governmental – is essential for projects to succeed. This is not only essential to ensure the success of the project but can also help facilitate future cooperation.	S 13/8 PM
United States	All States Parties providing or receiving international assistance, such as medical countermeasures and medical and public health personnel, will need to work across sectors within their governments to identify and address logistical, legal, and regulatory barriers to the sharing of international assistance.	WP.6
United States	Well in advance of a possible receipt of a request for international assistance related to a biological attack or unusual disease outbreak, States Parties should explore the development of centralized, coordinated processes for assessing requests for assistance in the context of their unique statutes governing the asset(s) in question as well as their bilateral and multilateral agreements and partnerships.	WP.6
United States	States Parties should identify mechanisms for funding the procurement and transport of assets and examine potential liability arrangements for the provision of assistance. States Parties may also identify export/regulatory requirements that may impact potential deployment.	WP.6
United States	States Parties receiving assistance should explore processes and procedures for deciding whether to accept or decline offers of assistance to their national government and/or when to request assistance to supplement their own domestic response efforts.	WP.6
United States	States Parties should examine their capacities for receiving and distributing assistance once provided, for example, considering whether regulatory mechanisms are available which allow for the use of potentially unlicensed products or whether liability provisions under domestic law will adversely affect access to countermeasures.	WP.6

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
United States	States Parties should consider working across sectors and leveraging existing bilateral and multilateral partnerships, and creating new ones, to better coordinate plans and develop joint solutions to the exchange of assistance during public health and medical emergencies. The BWC provides a forum for discussion of such coordination and the sharing of experiences in this critical area.	WP.6
United Kingdom	There are fundamental challenges in securing global access to existing and new vaccines, which a range of international initiatives endeavour to address [an issue outlined in the report, presented at the meeting by WHO, on promoting Access to Medical Technologies and Innovations]. Global strategies to advocate vaccine development and use are required to overcome lack of uptake for some vaccines.	WP.8
United Kingdom	The cooperation and assistance data base could be made public in order to improve awareness of its contents and its accessibility to experts in the field. If there are sensitivities over placing requests for assistance on an open web-site, these could remain pass-word protected whilst offers of assistance could remain on the open pages	S 13/8 AM.
China	International cooperation to promote peaceful use of biotechnology remains one of the prominent pillars of the Convention. It helps enhance the implementation capability of States Parties, and promote healthy and sustainable development of the Convention.	S 12/8
China	Comprehensive grasp of the new trend and tendency of development in bioscience and biosecurity, timely assessment of their impacts on the Convention, as well as sharing experience and practices on biosafety and biosecurity management, are beneficial to the promotion of the effective implementation of the Convention. They also guarantee that bioscience and biotechnology could better benefit mankind, and all kinds of biosafety and biosecurity risks and threats could be effectively responded to.	S 12/8
India	The promotional aspects related to cooperation and assistance are crucial elements in strengthening of the convention and in achieving universal adherence.	S 13/8 AM
India	Despite limited resources, India has endeavoured to share its experience and capabilities with other developing countries in the form of training facilities, exchange of materials such as germplasm and diagnostic kits, holding of seminars and workshops, etc. Our scientists have taken active part and shared knowledge on biosafety, biosecurity and other issues relevant to the Convention through bilateral and multilateral avenues.	S 13/8 AM
India	As a sign of transparency and collaboration with our partners, international agencies such as the CDC have been part of the validation of major BSL-3 and BSL-4 laboratories in India.	S 13/8 AM
India	While the overall experience is positive, there continue to be some difficulties, for example, with visa procedures for scientists that hinder timely and regular collaboration on areas of common interest to the scientific community. There is need for reciprocity in cooperation and access in this regard.	S 13/8 AM
India	In the BWC there is a need for systematic and long- term provision of cooperation and assistance. In this context, [support] the establishment of a mechanism for full and effective implementation of Article X	S 13/8 AM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
Iran (NAM)	Full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of Article X is essential for the realization of the objective and purpose of the Convention and there is a legal obligation under Article X to promote the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of biological agents and toxins for peaceful purposes and not to hamper the economic and technological development of States Parties.	WP.17
Iran (NAM)	The developed countries bear special responsibility to promote international cooperation in the framework of the Convention for the benefit of developing countries and to remove and avoid all restrictions that are contrary to the letter and spirit of the Convention.	WP.17
Iran (NAM)	Emphasize the importance of overcoming challenges and obstacles to international cooperation, assistance and exchange of material, technologies and equipment in the field of biological sciences and technology is one of the main challenges for the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of Article X.	WP.17
Iran (NAM)	The existence of unjustified restrictions and or limitations, including the politically motivated ones, imposed against States Parties is in contravention of the provisions and the spirit of the Convention. There is an urgent need for the removal of any such restrictions. States Parties should work together to develop procedures to promote the full, effective, and non-discriminatory implementation of Article X and to develop procedures for the settlement of disputes arising from concerns about the implementation of Article X.	WP.17
Iran (NAM)	Recent advances in enabling technologies should be used to strengthen the sustainable development of States Parties and this requires renewed commitment and constructive and genuine cooperation between States Parties that takes into account humanitarian considerations and the needs of developing countries in meeting health related challenges. All States Parties should therefore fully utilize the database established by the Seventh Review Conference.	WP.17
Iran (NAM)	Taking into account the humanitarian requirements related to the health and security of mankind, renewed commitment, constructive and genuine cooperation between the South and the North are required in order to meet the continuing challenges of developing countries in health related issues. [There is a] need for an effective mechanism to ensure the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of the Article X. The Meeting of States Parties [should develop] concrete understanding and actions to enable a decision by the Eight Review Conference for such a mechanism.	WP.17
Iran (NAM)	In the context of the mechanism mentioned above, [there is an] urgent need of an undertaking by all State Parties that they never in any circumstances impose or maintain unilateral, bilateral or collective restrictions and/or limitations on trade of drugs, medicines, vaccines, diagnostics, biological agents, equipment or materials for peaceful purposes in particular for treatment of patients in developing countries.	WP.17
Iran (NAM)	[There is a] need for establishing procedures to settle disputes if a State Party is restricted and/or denied by another State Party or a group of States Parties on drugs, medicines, vaccines, diagnostics and related equipment and materials for peaceful purposes as enshrined in the Article X of the Convention, including by considering a standing body.	WP.17

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
Iran (NAM)	Strengthen the utilisation and improve the operation of the cooperation database that was established by the Seventh Review Conference for ensuring that specific, timely and concrete offers of cooperation under Article X are provided by States Parties in the database and considering the ways to improve reporting on this issue.	WP.17
Iran (NAM)	Provide necessary cooperation and assistance in the form of finances, equipment, reagents and training to developing countries to set up advanced laboratories for detecting and responding to infectious diseases.	WP.17
United States	National export control measures do not impede economic and technological development for peaceful purposes, and the statistics bear this out. Only a tiny fraction of a percent of all trade in biotechnology requires a license – and within that small subset, only a handful of licenses are actually denied.	S 13/8 AM
United States	The WHO/WIPO/WTO report underscores that facilitating international exchange in the life sciences is a complex matter. The private sector plays a tremendous role in ensuring both innovation and access, and governments can support or hinder through practices such as import tariffs or failures to uphold intellectual property rights. Both developed and developing countries have important roles in creating a legislative and regulatory environment that facilitates exchange.	S 13/8 PM

2. A range of specific measures for the full and comprehensive implementation of Article X taking into account all of its provisions, including facilitation of cooperation and assistance, including in terms of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes, and identification of critical gaps and needs in these areas

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
Malaysia	States Parties should develop an effective mechanism to successfully implement Article X of the Convention so as to ensure efficient mobilization and maximum utilisation of resources.	S 12/8 AM
India	Strengthened implementation of Article III would ensure that the cooperation envisaged under Article X is not abused. At the same time it is important that factors like lack of technical capability in developing countries is not used to hamper international cooperation	S 12/8 AM
Switzerland	Substantial commitments as well as transparency of needs, challenges and implementation achievements on the part of recipient countries constitute a key prerequisite for any kind of successful cooperation.	S 12/8 AM
Kenya	Areas that... need to be addressed by developing countries... include: (a) Improvement on inventories and safe custodies of valuable biological materials (b) introduction of curriculum at secondary and institutions of higher learning on biosafety and biosecurity (c) Establishment of rapid response systems on biosafety and biosecurity is-	S 12/8 AM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
	sues	
	(d) Continuous improvement on CBM forms to ensure transparency	
European Union	Appropriate export controls are compatible with the obligations undertaken under Article X of the BTWC	S 13/8 AM
Malaysia	Welcome offers by States parties to share of expertise and technical assistance	S 13/8 AM
Russian Federation	Donor states [should be] involved in international development programmes that aim at fighting against infectious diseases, and at capacity-building to ensure biological security	S 13/8 AM
Russian Federation	Necessary to develop more precise criteria of what falls under the BWC and what does not.	S 13/8 AM
Russian Federation	Activities of States Parties in transferring knowledge , information, technologies, materials and equipment designed to combat infectious diseases should be open and transparent irrespective of their funding sources.	S 13/8 AM
France	It would be useful to draw an assessment of the lessons that could be learnt from the use of the [assistance and cooperation] database.	S 13/8 AM
United Kingdom	It seems clear that effective coordination and responses across a wide range of government departments and agencies coupled with rapid detection and identification capabilities are essential in mitigating the effects of major outbreaks of infectious disease. Transparency and timely notifications and reporting internationally are also critical factors.'	S 13/8 PM
India	There is no causal link established between innovation and access to medicines by developing countries. In fact, evergreening policies for patenting incremental innovations without substantial improvement in medicines would have adverse impact on the delivery of health services. This is a challenge that needs to be overcome to enable developing countries to meet their requirements of public health.	S 13/8 PM
India	It is important that unless the invention shows enhancement of medicines by way of significant differences in properties apart from meeting independently the requirement of patentability, it is not considered for protection. In this regard, it is to be kept in mind that TRIPS provides for clear flexibilities to ensure protection of public health needs and availability of medicines at affordable prices to the poor. Article 7 of TRIPS provides that IPRs should contribute to promotion of technological innovation and transfer and dissemination of technology in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare and to a balance of rights and obligations.	S 13/8 PM
India	Compulsory licensing is one way of overcoming the obstacles to provision of medicines to developing countries. WIPO/WHO should conduct a study documenting the compulsory licensing practices among the Member States.	S 13/8 PM
United States	Detailed reports on the implementation of Article X, as requested by the Review Conference, are essential if States Parties are to identify gaps and strengthen implementation of Article X. To date, very few States Parties have submitted such reports.	S 13/8 AM

3. Ways and means to target and mobilize resources, including financial resources, to address gaps and needs for assistance and cooperation, in particular from developed to developing States Parties, and from international and regional organizations and other relevant stakeholders

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
Mexico	Promote technical assistance cooperation between all States Parties to the Convention, regardless of their level of development to prevent attacks from biological agents and to constitute national capacity to attend to and prevent surges of illnesses.	S 12/8 AM
Mexico	International cooperation is not just limited to financial resources but also includes the exchange of information, experiences, lessons learned, good practices and technical knowledge. Ways of cooperation include triangular, South-South, North-South, South-North and North-North.	S 12/8 AM
China	The reasonable demands of the developing countries for bioscience and biotechnology information, materials and equipment should be taken into account, so as to enable the developing countries to truly benefit from international co-operation.	S 12/8 AM
Canada	[Need a] clear definition by partner countries of the type of assistance they require. A strong commitment by the requesting party to support project implementation is no less critical.	S 13/8 AM
Iran (NAM)	States Parties should work together to mobilize resources to address needs for assistance and cooperation, in particular from developed to developing States Parties, and from international and regional organizations and other relevant stakeholders.	WP.17
Iran (NAM)	In light of rapid developments in the life sciences, there is a need to strengthen cooperation among States Parties in order to bridge the ever increasing gaps in the fields of biotechnology, genetic engineering, microbiology and other related areas between developed and developing countries.	WP.17
Iran (NAM)	The submission of clear, specific, and timely national reports on implementation of Article X agreed at the Seventh Review Conference and also an efficient electronic database for international cooperation in the context of Article X of the Convention could play a useful role in mobilizing and targeting resources.	WP.17
United States	The obligations of Article X are non-discriminatory and apply equally to developing and developed States Parties.	S 13/8 AM
United States	To date only two requests for assistance have been received. The assistance database should be moved to the publicly accessible portion of the website to facilitate wider use—if most people cannot access it, or are not even aware of it, then it will not be used.	S 13/8 AM
Australia	With the increasing globalisation of the biological sciences and the biotechnology sectors, a number of developing countries have increasingly advanced biological science and biotechnology sectors, which is resulting in greater levels of south-south cooperation.	S 13/8 AM

4. Education, training, exchange and twinning programmes and other means of developing human resources in the biological sciences and technology relevant to the implementation of the Convention, particularly in developing countries

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
United Kingdom	<p>The twinning scheme aims are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - To develop or enhance a sustainable and productive relationship between laboratories. And by exchanging knowledge and skills the candidate laboratory can develop capacity and expertise for a disease that is a priority in its region. - To ensure the laboratory complies with OIE standards and can promote these values. - It is important to provide guidance on safe working, biosecurity and biosafety which are crucial concerns when handling highly pathogenic agents such as brucellosis to help the candidate laboratory provide support to other countries and enhance its credibility as a potential future OIE reference laboratory. - To extend the OIE global network of expertise geographically. 	S 13/8 PM
United Kingdom	<p>Laboratory twinning is an excellent platform for strengthening cooperation between States Parties. Such projects also reduce vulnerabilities and strengthen the Convention by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Improving mechanisms for detecting, responding to and reporting outbreaks of infectious disease. - Enhancing biosafety and biosecurity - Strengthening existing international organisations and networks focussing on infectious disease. - Promoting transparency and the peaceful use of dual-use skills and knowledge. 	S 13/8 PM
Iran (NAM)	<p>Exchanges in education and training are of fundamental importance for the development of human resources in the field of biological sciences. It is only through international cooperation in education and training that we will be able to bridge the gap between the capabilities of developing and developed countries.</p>	S 13/8 AM
Iran (NAM)	<p>Developed countries should provide full access to students, scientists and other personnel from developing countries to their universities, advanced laboratories, research institutions, production facilities etc and remove any restrictions or limitations in this regard such as through restrictive visa regimes.</p>	S 13/8 AM
Iran (NAM)	<p>It is important that access is given to developing countries in institutions of higher learning and those with cutting edge technology. For example, developing countries should be given opportunities for training in advanced laboratories. This is important for them to keep pace with new S&T developments and would help them build defences against diseases, whether naturally occurring or deliberate.</p>	S 13/8 AM
Iran (NAM)	<p>The sharing of results of advanced research in life sciences is especially important for the scientists, engineers, students and teachers in developing countries to take full advantage of new developments in biological sciences and technology. There is scope for further work in BWC on this issue with the aim of evolving institutional measures.</p>	S 13/8 AM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
Iran (NAM)	Twinning programmes could be especially useful in capacity building and sharing of advanced expertise in developing countries and in improving global capacity for disease detection and control.	S 13/8 AM
United States	Visa review processes, like export control measures, are in place for valid national security reasons and are wholly legitimate. The concern that they may adversely impact access to education is understandable, but it is not borne out by the facts. While data on all developed countries not available, information readily available shows that there are more international students studying in U.S. colleges and universities today --both in absolute numbers and percentage terms -- than before 9-11.	S 13/8 AM

5. Capacity-building, through international cooperation, in biosafety and biosecurity, and for detecting, reporting, and responding to outbreaks of infectious disease or biological weapons attacks, including in the areas of preparedness, response, and crisis management and mitigation

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
Russian Federation	Response measures taken against infectious diseases irrespective of their causes (epidemic of natural origin, accident at a biological facility or deliberate use of biological agents as weapons) are largely the same.	S 12/8 AM
Russian Federation	Urgent assistance... can include testing systems and diagnostic equipment, means of specific and general immunization, biological environmental monitoring devices, special modification, isolation activities, advice and expert assistance.	S 12/8 AM
Russian Federation	Help can also be provided in relation to legislative aspects of national implementation of the Convention, logistic challenges related to storing and dealing with pathogens, development of scientific research capacity and training of national specialists.	S 12/8 AM
Malaysia	We must develop preparedness efforts to detect and respond to potential bio-threats. Given this fact, there is a need for scientific and technological cooperation between States Parties to fight against infectious diseases and to address the threats of bioterrorism.	S 12/8 AM
Philippines	Foster closer collaboration and synergy between states and international organizations such as INTERPOL. World Customs Organization, World Health Organization, World Organization for Animal Health and the Food and Agriculture Organization as biosecurity and biosafety are cross-cutting issues that necessitate a holistic response through the strengthening of international linkages.	S 12/8 AM
Iraq	Capacity-building with regards to Biosafety and Biosecurity requires and compels the States Parties to identify specifically their needs, based on accurate [assessment of] gaps.	S 13/8 PM
WHO	Laboratory services are essential to identify and confirm the infectious agents likely to cause public health emergencies of international concern.	S 13/8 PM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
WHO	Countries shall facilitate the transport, entry, exit, processing and disposal of biological substances and diagnostic specimens, reagents and other diagnostic materials for verification and public health response purposes.	S 13/8 PM
WHO	Despite self-assessment results for IHR Core Capacities, there is still great room for continuous improvement of global, national and local biorisk management.	S 13/8 PM
WHO	There is room for many to contribute to global Bio Risk Management: Develop international guidance; provide tools and methodologies; transfer knowledge; support countries' efforts; focus on areas where investment (human and financial) has most impact.	S 13/8 PM
United States	Recurring, seasonal disease and a proven, emergent threat (ie Influenza) requires constant international surveillance.	S 13/8 PM
United States	The natural variation of influenza viruses means diagnostic tests must be updated frequently to detect newly emergent strains.	S 13/8 PM
United States	Because Influenza can spread rapidly both in human and animal hosts, public health laboratories need access to the most current tests as quickly as possible.	S 13/8 PM
China	Emerging infectious diseases like human infection of H7N9 AI are one of the common biosafety and biosecurity challenges to the international community. However, due to our limited understanding of the virus and disease, it is imperative to remain vigilant and be prepared with further contingency plans.	WP.14
United Kingdom	The range of relevant human, animal and plant health activities under Article X are broad. It is not desirable, necessary or feasible to attempt to pull all these activities under Article X and only provide assistance if it is mediated through the Convention first. There is therefore no need for a cooperation committee or an Article X implementation mechanism. The Seventh Review Conference agreed on a standing agenda item on cooperation and assistance as well as an assistance data base and these are the best way to address Article X issues.	S13/8 PM
United Kingdom	The development of cheaper and more readily available vaccines is a significant issue for activities related to Article X, and for a wider range of other international initiatives for the development and application of scientific advances for the global prevention of disease.	WP8
United Kingdom	The design of vaccines that elicit broader spectrum immunity, or that can be designed constructed and produced rapidly in response to an emerging threat, or that can be produced without biological containment in geographically dispersed facilities, could significantly enhance the capability for provision of effective, lower cost, rapidly manufactured and widely accessible vaccines.	WP8
United Kingdom	Advances that avoid the need for cold chain handling and for administration by trained medical or veterinary personnel also reduce costs and logistical burden and have the potential to help get vaccines to where they are needed most.	WP8
United Kingdom	There are no prohibitions on the transfer of vaccines	S13/8 PM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
Iran (NAM)	underlines the importance of capacity-building through international cooperation in detecting, reporting, and responding to the outbreaks of infectious disease or biological weapons attacks, including in the areas of emergency preparedness, response, management, and mitigation.	S 13/8 AM
Iran (NAM)	States Parties should work to build capacity and reduce inequalities between developed and developing countries in the life sciences and related technologies.	S 13/8 AM
Iran (NAM)	all developed countries bear a special responsibility to promote international cooperation for capacity building to the benefit of the developing countries in the framework of the Convention.	S 13/8 AM
Iran (NAM)	The following measures could facilitate capacity building: a) identifying and addressing the need for, and facilitating the exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information for the use of biological agents for peaceful purposes, particularly to developing countries; b) Supporting states especially developing countries in building defenses against new and emerging diseases and developing national capacity for responding to biological threats through detection, containment, and decontamination; c) Promoting interagency coordination and multi-sectoral cooperation to prepare for, detect, and respond to infectious disease outbreaks whether natural, accidental, or deliberate in nature; d) Developing and implementing appropriate, sustainable and effective laboratory safety and security measures, through international cooperation on exchange of the new technologies, training materials and resources.	S 13/8 AM
Iran (NAM)	Reaffirm NAM proposal for strengthening Article X implementation as outlined in their Working Paper submitted to the Review Conference. 1) Identify and address the needs in terms of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information regarding the use of the bacteriological and toxin agents for peaceful purposes; 2) Identify and overcome the obstacles hampering the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of Article X of the Convention, including by addressing the denial cases of States Parties; 3) Mobilize the necessary resources, including financial resources, to facilitate the widest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information regarding the use of biological and toxin agents for peaceful purposes, in particular from developed to developing States Parties; 4) Facilitate the development of human resources in developing States Parties in the implementation of the Convention, taking into account the special situation faced by them; 5) Coordinate cooperation with other relevant international and regional organizations for financial and technological support of activities for the use of biological and toxin agents for peaceful purposes.	S 13/8 AM
Iran (NAM)	Note that while there is no agreed definition of biosafety and biosecurity in the Convention, emphasize the value of international cooperation in these two areas as well as in detecting, reporting and responding to outbreaks of infectious	S 13/8 AM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
	diseases whether naturally occurring or deliberate. Disease knows no borders and all international efforts must be made to enable States to strengthen their capacities for detecting, reporting and responding to outbreaks of infectious diseases. From a humanitarian point of view it is essential that developing countries receive full and timely cooperation and assistance in the form of medicines, vaccines, diagnostics and related equipment and materials for peaceful purposes as enshrined in Article X.	
United States	National systems or frameworks for biosafety and biosecurity are critical to ensuring sustainable biosafety and biosecurity at the laboratory level.	S 14/8 PM
Pakistan	Need for improving capacity of developing States Parties, through international cooperation and assistance in terms of materials, equipments, financial resources, technology and human resource development, to better equip them for detecting and responding to challenges that may arise in the context of the BWC.	S 13/8

6. Coordination of cooperation with other relevant international and regional organizations, and other relevant stakeholders

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
Russian Federation	Cooperation and assistance under Article X of the BWC have their specifics when compared to such related international organizations as the WHO or FAO.	S 12/8 AM
Indonesia	A closer cooperation between WHO and BWC in order to build an integrated approach on biosecurity and biosafety needs to be undertaken.	S 12/8 AM
Philippines	The Philippines supports developing closer synergies of effort between the BWC and WHO communities	S 12/8 AM
Malaysia	Work closely with WHO, OIE, FAO and the US CDC in strengthening international surveillance and detection of infectious diseases affecting humans, animals and plants	S 13/8 AM
Malaysia	States Parties to make use of Malaysia's Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter – Terrorism (SEARCCT)	S 13/8 AM
Russian Federation	It is necessary to strengthen the role of the BWC as a mechanism that coordinates Convention-related assistance that is provided through other formats.	S 13/8 AM
Iran (NAM)	Relevant international and regional organizations such as WHO and OIE play an important role in disease surveillance, prevention, detection and response and there is merit in coordination of cooperation with them in accordance with their respective mandates. However, the unique role of BWC as a Convention which deals with security related issues needs to be recognized and further efforts made for full and effective implementation of Article X within the Convention itself.	
United States	It would be neither feasible nor useful to draw a hard line between issues that should be addressed in other fora and those that should be addressed in the BWC. The BWC is a security treaty—but the changing nature of the biological weapons threat means that a wider range of actors have access to the necessary	S 16/8 AM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
	technology and materials, and that the risk of deniable or covert attacks must be considered. Thus issues of scientific governance and outreach, disease surveillance, and response have a role in BWC discussions. BWC States Parties must coordinate with WHO and other entities and cooperate on matters of shared interest.	
1540 Committee	Thanks to the EU / UNODA-Geneva regional workshops on BWC implementation (under the BWC Action), the common objectives of BWC and resolution 1540 are now promoted for integration into relevant national action plans	P 15/8
1540 Committee	With regard to operative paragraph 3 of resolution 1540 (account for/secure/physically protect BW including related materials), the 1540 matrix lists the following measures: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Measures to account for / secure production, use, storage, and transport of BW and related materials • Regulations for physical protection of facilities / materials / transports • Licensing / registration of facilities / people handling bio materials • Reliability check of personnel • Measures to account for / secure / physically protect means of delivery • Regulations for genetic engineering work • Other legislation / regulations related to safety and security of biological materials 	P 15/8

Agenda item 6: Standing agenda item: Review of developments in the field of science and technology related to the Convention (focusing in 2013 on advances in technologies for surveillance, detection, diagnosis and mitigation of infectious diseases, and similar occurrences caused by toxins in humans, animals and plants)

1. New science and technology developments that have potential for uses contrary to the provisions of the Convention

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
Brazil	The balance between security concerns and access to technological advancement is an issue to be carefully considered... countries possessing more advanced technology in biosciences should not hinder the access by developing countries to these technologies, and that the interdictions of Article I of the Convention should not result in unjustified technology denials	S 12/8 AM
India	It is important that these discussions cover all ongoing high-risk dual use research.	S 12/8 AM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
India	The measures taken to mitigate biological risks should be proportional to the assessed risk and not hamper legitimate peaceful activities including international cooperation.	S 12/8 AM
United Kingdom	As with many fields in the life sciences, advances in vaccine development have the potential for uses contrary to the provisions of the Convention. Knowledge gained through research on the pathogenicity of the disease agent and the host immune response to assist vaccine design could also be exploited for harmful purposes, for example, to design novel BW agents or alter the characteristics of existing agents to increase their suitability for BW use.	WP.8
United Kingdom	Advances in technologies that make vaccine production simpler, faster, cheaper and more efficient also have the potential to be used for BW agent production.	WP.8
United Kingdom	Concepts developed to deliver vaccines to specific cell types could also be used to design delivery platforms for harmful materials.	WP.8
Iran (NAM)	The rapid pace of developments in biological science and technology has implications for the implementation of the BWC, both in terms of S&T advances which can be used for purposes contrary to the objectives of the Convention and S&T advances which could be of special relevance for the implementation of the Convention as well as for assistance and cooperation to the developing countries.	S 14/8 AM
Iran (NAM)	There is no commonly agreed definition of biosafety and biosecurity in the Convention. The relevant national authorities should have the responsibility in defining and implementing such concepts, in accordance with relevant national laws, regulation and policies, consistent with the provisions of the Convention. The adoption of decisions and recommendations on this issue within the framework of the BWC belongs exclusively to the States Parties of the Convention.	S 14/8 AM
Iran (NAM)	Achieving necessary standards in the fields of biosafety and biosecurity requires capacity building, and is facilitated by, international cooperation and through strengthened implementation of Article X of the Convention.	S 14/8 AM
Iran (NAM)	Enhancing scientific and technological understanding through this agenda item will be inadequate if ways and means are not found for technology transfers by the developed countries to developing ones. The unhindered exchange of science and technology in the framework of the convention is also important in the context of enhanced national implementation of the Convention by the developing countries which in many circumstances lack resources- technological, financial and human – for effective implementation of all provisions of the Convention.	S 14/8 AM
Iran (NAM)	Recognize the importance of the BWC and its role in the total ban on all biological and toxin weapons. Multilateral negotiations aimed at concluding a non-discriminatory, legally binding agreement, dealing with all Articles of the Convention in a balanced and comprehensive would sustainably strengthen the Convention.	S 14/8 AM
Iran (NAM)	Collecting and disseminating information on S&T developments, including new research in areas relevant to the convention and exchanging information about databases and networks relevant to the Convention and ensuring access	S 14/8 AM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
	to such databases and networks and training of personnel without any unjustified limitation are of utmost importance.	
United States	DURC issues involve a wide range of stakeholders. It is appropriate and even necessary to discuss them in multiple venues, including BWC and WHO. It is important that participants share information across these venues so that the various streams of discussion cross-fertilize. Oversight should extend across the entire research life cycle, from conception through funding, conduct of experiments, and publication of results.	S 14/8 PM
United States	Oversight of DURC should fundamentally be done at the national level. States are the entities with most of the relevant legal authority. The relationship between researchers, institutions, funders, and governments is different in different countries, so no one-size-fits-all solution is possible, but States Parties should work to exchange experiences and best practices and, where possible, to develop shared principles.	S 14/8 PM
Pakistan	The potential dual nature of emerging technologies should not be used as a pretext for proscribing or restricting their availability to developing countries, for peaceful purposes.	
Australia	We need a carefully considered approach: the fact is that with the convergence of biology and chemistry, the same science is increasingly underpinning both treaties.	
Australia	A scientific advisory board is a very expensive process. In the BWC context, we would benefit more from an open-ended working group reviewing the advances in S&T relevant to the BWC.	

2. New science and technology developments that have potential benefits for the Convention, including those of special relevance to disease surveillance, diagnosis and mitigation

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
Sanofi	Innovative technologies (like synthetic biology) can be implemented industrially rather quickly and can thus promptly contribute to global health.	P 14/8 AM
Sanofi	A partner with a large network of industrial technologies/facilities and expertise is at least helpful if not necessary.	P 14/8 AM
Poland	Direct detection of the presence of bacteria... new methods: (a) Demonstration of the presence of antigen by immunological methods (agglutination, precipitation, luminescence, immunofluorescence) (b) Molecular probes (c) Amplification of nucleic acids	P 14/8 PM
Poland	Recent advances in detection and identification techniques could prove to be an essential component in the defence against biological attacks.	P 14/8 PM

Delegation	Text	Source
Poland	Sequence based such as pyrosequencing, which has the capability to determine short DNA stretches in real-time using biotinylated PCR amplicons, has potential biodefence applications.	P 14/8 PM
Poland	<p>Direct detection of the presence of viruses:</p> <p>(a) Direct IFA, e.g. content of bubbles in the case of <i>Herpes zoster</i></p> <p>(b) Serological detection of virus antigen (ELISA-RIA, e.g., Hb5Ag)</p> <p>(c) Molecular diagnostics based on DNA probes (more often used)</p> <p>(d) PCR (more often used)</p> <p>(e) Virus propagation (replaced by molecular methods), in the cell culture and incubated chicken embryos; in samples of animals, such as newborn mouse (a very expensive method used when other failures)</p> <p>(f) Electron microscopy (not very useful in routine diagnostics is used only in specialized laboratories)</p>	P 14/8 PM
United States	Recent advances in technology benefit diagnosis both at POC and at centralized laboratories by providing more rapid identification and more precise information about known and, in some cases, newly emerged pathogens.	WP.5
United States	For immunoassays, advances in technology have led to an increased speed of diagnostic test development using nucleic acid sequence information and synthetic biology for manufacturing specific antigens or antibodies used in those tests.	WP.5
United States	Recent advances in molecular assays include the application of “isothermal amplification” of nucleic acids; these assays can be performed without thermal cycling equipment while providing essentially the same information as more expensive polymerase chain reaction (PCR) testing.	WP.5
United States	High-throughput DNA sequencing is becoming faster and less expensive – and hence more frequently used for identifying unknown pathogens, outbreak sources and animal reservoirs. Parallel advances in computational biology are accelerating the analysis of enormous databases generated by sequencing technologies.	WP.5
United States	There is a recognized need for rapid POC diagnostics in low-resource environments to provide near-real-time assessment of disease outbreaks. Lateral flow immunoassays exemplify such devices; they use a simple test strip through which a sample (serum, saliva or urine) flows... Lateral flow immunoassays have been developed to detect many pathogens and toxins, including human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), hepatitis C virus, human papilloma virus, and malarial parasites, and their utility at the POC continues to grow. Lateral flow immunoassays are generally inexpensive, accurate, have good shelf lives, and require little training to use, but they cannot identify unknown pathogens.	WP.5
United States	Because of their high specificity and relative ease of development, nucleic acid-based diagnostics can rapidly be developed as kits to detect virtually any organism.	WP.5
United States	Nucleic acid-based diagnostics can be combined, or multiplexed, to create “panels” that simultaneously test for a variety of pathogens. Different commer-	WP.5

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
	cially available multiplex nucleic acid-based diagnostics yield substantially similar results with similar costs. The advantages of multiplexing are the ability to detect many pathogens in a single, rapid (1-7 hrs) assay and the potential to add panels as new pathogens emerge.	
United States	Nanoparticles (gold, carbon, magnetic) can be adapted for rapid detection of pathogens by adhering DNA or proteins (e.g., antibodies or antigens) to their surface.	WP.5
United States	Limited sequencing of a few genes encoded in pathogen DNA has become a common adjunct to standard laboratory microbiological testing and can identify pathogens at the strain level.	WP.5
United States	High-throughput sequencing, which simultaneously yields millions of DNA sequences, has become easier, faster and less expensive, and can be used to discover unknown pathogens as well as their biological characteristics.	WP.5
United States	Sequencing technologies can be used to study genomes, microbiomes and metagenomes... The metagenome can be used for identifying unknown viruses or bacteria by subtracting human sequences and focusing on known or novel microbial sequences.	WP.5
United States	High-throughput sequencing analyses are being applied to assess the overall state of health of an individual or population for identifying unknown microorganisms and for providing a high degree of precision in tracing outbreaks and determining if an outbreak is natural, accidental or deliberate.	WP.5
United States	New diagnostics are emerging from multidisciplinary collaborations that combine different approaches and understandings and distil inherently complex science and technology into simple devices that can be quickly deployed in the event of a disease outbreak.	WP.5
United States	The advances described herein strengthen and accelerate the ability of States Parties to detect and react quickly to an infectious disease outbreak, whether natural or deliberate, but have room for improved portability, sensitivity and specificity in dealing with unknown threats in complex samples.	WP.5
United States	The depth and breadth of analysis enabled by new diagnostics should reduce misunderstandings about sources of disease outbreaks, while building awareness about the pace and tempo of disease emergence.	WP.5
United States	Many new technologies are affordable for large reference or university-based diagnostic laboratories but are inaccessible to smaller units of health care. Thus, there is a need for developing inexpensive and mid-range technologies that can make scientific advances more readily available.	WP.5
United States	To be effective in disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis and mitigation, new and emerging technologies must include both POC devices for surveillance and platforms with higher resolution to deal with the problems of emerging diseases and acute outbreaks.	WP.5
United States	Advances in these areas create a safer and more secure world because of an increasing ability to detect, diagnose and mitigate emerging diseases, and because of the greater precision in determining the source and likely progression of infectious microorganisms.	WP.5

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
United States	To the extent that molecular and immunoassay tests are available, affordable and effective, they can also reduce reliance on culturing pathogens and on collections of reference samples and thus offer potential biosafety and biosecurity benefits.	WP.5
United Kingdom	Rapid advances in a number of enabling technologies including the ‘-omics’, bioinformatics, systems biology and immunology have assisted the development of new strategies, allowing the identification of new targets and reducing the timescale for vaccine development.	WP.8
United Kingdom	Traditional vaccine production methods have benefited from design improvements in fermenters and bioreactors, which have led to an increase in yield, portability and safety.	WP.8
United Kingdom	Single-use or disposable bioreactor systems have also progressed; these are easily installed, reduce costs, streamline validation, increase product consistency and reduce overall turnaround times.	WP.8
United Kingdom	The widening diversity of vaccine production methods now include: cell cultures and cell suspension bioreactors; recombinant DNA; metabolic engineering and synthetic biology; chemical peptide synthesis; and transgenic animals and plants.	WP.8
United Kingdom	Many developments in vaccine design result in elimination of the need for production in high containment facilities and reduction of manufacturing times.	WP.8
United Kingdom	An influenza vaccines based on recombinant DNA technology... produced in insect cell lines... offers the potential for faster start-up of the vaccine manufacturing process in the event of a pandemic, since it is not dependent on egg supply or live influenza virus.	WP.8
United Kingdom	Recent focus has been more on the use of transgenic plants as an alternative to traditional methods of vaccine production. The development of efficient plant-based expression strategies and new concepts for the purification of recombinant proteins has facilitated progress in this area. Antigens from several human and veterinary pathogens have been expressed in transgenic plants, e.g. rabies, hepatitis B, measles, avian influenza and anthrax.	WP.8
United Kingdom	Nano-vesicles have been shown to be capable of encapsulating antigens thus enhancing their intracellular delivery and increasing their temperature stability, which means that they require less care in handling and storage. Nano-vesicle technology is also suitable for a variety of non-parenteral routes of administration and has the additional benefit of helping to boost the host response to the vaccine.	WP.8
United Kingdom	A recent report has provided support for a novel vaccination concept that uses gold nanoparticles as a delivery vehicle for presentation of viral antigens to induce a protective immune response.	WP.8
United Kingdom	The development of nanotechnology-based skin patches has offered a potential alternative for vaccine delivery to overcome some of the disadvantages of needles and syringes... (a) a lower dose of vaccine is required... (b) the dry formulation of the patch is expected to minimise or eliminate the need for refrigeration during storage and transport.	WP.8

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
	<p>(c) It does not need to be administered by trained medical staff...</p> <p>(d) is anticipated to avoid needle-phobia, needle-stick injuries, cross-contamination</p> <p>(e) and costs associated with the disposal of the delivery device and packaging.</p> <p>All of these attributes have the potential to reduce costs considerably.</p>	
United Kingdom	Encapsulation of vaccines in silk matrices has been evaluated with the MMR vaccine, demonstrating that the matrices were capable of stabilising labile vaccines for more than six months over a range of tropical temperatures. Thus this has been suggested as a transformative approach to the cold chain system and a feasible path forward to provide more efficient and widespread distribution of vaccines and other labile therapeutics throughout the world.	WP.8
United Kingdom	Advances in vaccine development have wide reaching potential benefits for the mitigation of infectious diseases and are highly relevant to the BTWC. Wider availability and timely administration of vaccines will reduce the likelihood of effective and extensive BW use and will be a key factor in developing a global response to infectious disease outbreaks, whether natural, accidental or deliberate. Such capabilities would be important in the implementation of Article VII, in providing assistance to any State Party exposed to danger as a result of a violation of the Convention. The development of cheaper and more readily available vaccines is a significant issue for activities related to Article X, and for the wide range of other international initiatives for the development and application of scientific advances for the global prevention of disease.	WP.8
South Africa	Various advances have been made in the fields of molecular biology, nanotechnology, microfluidics and chemistry that can potentially aid in the rapid diagnosis of disease. This would ultimately benefit the patient through initiating therapy faster as well as monitoring therapeutic efficiency in a more cost effective manner.	WP.11
South Africa	More accurate and cost effective methods of pathogen characterization aid epidemiological studies and serve to further the promotion of public health and disease control. Next Generation Sequencing (NGS) technology has made large scale DNA sequencing more affordable which in turn leads to greater depth in phylogenetic studies. Additionally, the concept of RNA-seq, in which gene expression studies are carried out on NGS platforms, offer a viable alternative to microarray-based experiments.	WP.11
South Africa	Potential breakthroughs in public health may also have defensive spin-offs. Techniques used to rapidly detect and characterise common human pathogens, may also be utilised for biological warfare agents. This would be advantageous not only in expediting incident management but also for epidemiological (forensic) studies in securing the maximum amount of information regarding a biological weapons incident in the shortest amount of time.	WP.11
South Africa	Various advances have been made in the fields of microfluidics and nanotechnology which may aid the point of care diagnosis of TB and other diseases. A variety of mechanical, biochemical and electrical detection methods are in development for the detection of this organism	WP.11
South Africa	From a simpler, lower technology standpoint, the classical ELISA (Enzyme Linked Immunosorbency Assay) may be made field portable using lateral flow chromatography. This technology, commonly known for its use in home preg-	WP.11

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
	nancy testing, may also be used for, amongst others, tuberculosis screening in the field especially, in resource limited settings. The technology has been used widely by first responders in biological terrorism field-work and research continues to improve sensitivity for the detection of threat agents such as botulinum.	
South Africa	Since its inception in 2005 NGS has utterly shifted the paradigm in genomics research. Projects that were unaffordable before are now entirely possible using this technology or by subcontracting projects to any one of a number of commercial NGS laboratories.	WP.11
South Africa	One of the most rapidly expanding fields in microbiology is metagenomics, which is a sub-discipline that describes the analysis of the total nucleic acid content of a particular sample. This approach allows researchers to characterise a microbial community without purification and subculture of individual community members...	WP.11
South Africa	The metagenomics approach allows researchers to characterise the so-called virome (total viral complement of a host). Often times, the causative agent of disease cannot be determined using techniques such as PCR. In these instances a shotgun metagenomic approach has led to the identification of novel pathogens as well as a number of unknown genetic sequences	WP.11
South Africa	[Mass spectrometry] machinery required for... analyses is often expensive and not field portable. This paradigm is however rapidly changing with the miniaturisation of various MS instruments and the development of field-amenable MS sources (sample introduction and ionisation interfaces).	WP.11
United Kingdom	Plant-based bioreactor systems offer several potential advantages over other production methods, with relatively low costs of cultivation, scale up and maintenance for vaccine manufacture.	WP.8
United Kingdom	Applications in the field of forensic epidemiology, where isolates from outbreaks or incidents can be pinpointed to a specific origin by use of comparative genomics, would be of great utility in investigation of complaints related to violation of the Convention.	WP.1
United Kingdom	The application of advances in technologies, particularly in bioforensics, would be highly relevant in support of investigations under Article VI. Identification of the origin of a biological agent used in a BW attack could help significantly with attribution.	WP.1
Iran (NAM)	Advances in enabling technologies like bioinformatics; computational biology; DNA microarrays; gene synthesis technology; high-throughput mass spectrometry; high-throughput sequencing; nanotechnology; synthetic biology; systems biology; and whole-genome directed evolution are critical for future life sciences research and development. These enabling technologies have many benefits in faster, cheaper, and easier application of biological science and technology for both public health and security purposes, increased capacity and better understanding of disease and healthcare technologies by more people in more locations throughout the world. Furthermore new science and technology developments have many potential benefits for the Convention in improved health care, increasing capacity to diagnose and treat diseases, more efficient food production, more renewable energy resources and better pollution management. In this regard [there is a need for] a plan for active and fullest exchange of knowledge and technology in areas related to enabling and new	S 14/8 AM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
	technologies between developed and developing countries to ensure the unhindered flow of scientific information and technology.	
Iran (NAM)	Dual use nature of these technologies by itself should not in anyway hamper the free and fullest exchange of technologies between the members of the convention especially when some developed countries are freely engaged in many activities that rest in the domain of these new technologies in the framework of their bio-defense programs.	S 14/8 AM

3. Possible measures for strengthening national biological risk management, as appropriate, in research and development involving new science and technology developments of relevance to the Convention

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
Russian Federation	Consider the elaboration of common principles on the basis of which risk assessment and oversight of scientific research activities that have a dual use potential should be carried out during all phases starting from planning, through funding-related decision making to achieve concrete results. The issue could be considered in the context of experience exchange in updating national risk management approaches and standards. This is a contribution that we could make to the strengthening of the Convention during the intersessional meetings; and the arrangements could be formalized at the next review conference.	S 12/8 AM
Malaysia	We must develop oversight frameworks for biosafety and biosecurity.	S 12/8 AM
Switzerland	Responsible conduct of research by life scientists sensitised to potential dangers and the dual-use problem will continue to constitute both an important implementation measure of the BWC and a crucial element of any way forward to the issue at hand.	S 12/8 AM
Brazil	Applicable security guidelines should be established in accordance with domestic legislation, including in relation to international legal commitments	S 14/8 AM
Wain-Hobson	[In cases of concern:] (a) Freeze (b) need a public international conference with all the stakeholders (c) need independent risk and liability analysis (d) need a considered moral opinion	P 14/8
France	[In promoting dialogue between science and society, we need:] (a) the neutrality of the host organization or creation of an ad hoc resource (b) participation by representatives of concerned stakeholders, groups and experts (c) provision and circulation of information: mapping the field. Current state of knowledge, uncertainties and controversies	P 14/8

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
	(d) Development of links and bridges to other existing initiatives in the field	
	(e) The setting up of an interministerial group to track the ongoing development of the programme with a view to the possible submission to Government of the issues involved.	
WHO	<p>The Informal Consultation on DURC, convened by WHO in February 2013, brought together stakeholders from many sectors and disciplines to share perspectives and information about mechanisms to manage DURC, and the gaps which exist. The following points emerged from the discussion:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DURC is an issue for all countries and multiple stakeholders • The management of Dual-use research of concern-related risks should take into account all stages of the research cycle • Research oversight mechanisms are important • Managing DURC at country level demands a diversity of approaches. Communication across a broad range of sectors and stakeholders is essential. The audiences for education and training are diverse • Ethical considerations are fundamental to management of DURC 	P 14/8
United Kingdom	Critical importance of early consideration of all the implications of relevant scientific and technological advances, including the possible need to develop appropriate strategies for oversight and governance, including possible changes to existing safety and product licensing regulatory frameworks. Such measures would need to be designed to prevent prohibited activities without having adverse effects on legitimate activities	WP.8

4. Voluntary codes of conduct and other measures to encourage responsible conduct by scientists, academia and industry

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
Brazil	Defend a strictly voluntary basis for the adoption of codes of conduct.	S 14/8 AM
Indonesia	The development of a national code of conduct is necessary and timely in response to the flowering of biosafety laboratory facilities in the country in addition with the rise of several local issues on bioterrorism, and global issues on dual use research of concern.	S 14/8 PM
Indonesia	<p>The content of the code of conduct is to promote:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) awareness raising in all stakeholders (b) research and publication policy (c) accountability and oversight on all levels (d) accessibility of laboratories, etc. (e) internal and external communication and (f) shipment and transport. 	S 14/8 PM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
Indonesia	The definition of our Code of Conduct is a national prerogative with its own capacity and culture, and ‘no one size fits all’, therefore the best practice of biorisk management is to educate all stakeholders on biosafety and biosecurity.	S 14/8 PM
Indonesia	Critics of codes of conduct or codes of ethics often stress that self-governance will not stop accidents or deliberate misapplication of science. But although voluntary does have limitations, institutional enforcement is possible. Nevertheless, the important objective of a code of conduct is to raise awareness of the risks of life sciences and build a culture of responsibility.	S 14/8 PM
India	Education and awareness raising and other measures such as voluntary Codes of Conduct are a useful way of encouraging responsible conduct by scientists, academia and industry.	S 14/8
India	While national measures are taken to address issues related to DURC, it is important that discussions be continued here in the Convention covering all ongoing dual use research. States parties would benefit from knowing about such research trends early rather than post facto. An important aspect of these discussions is how to balance risks and benefits of biological sciences given their dual use nature. The measures taken to mitigate biological risks should be proportional to assessed risk and not hamper peaceful activities including international cooperation.	S 14/8
India	Concerning on going dual-use research of concern, biosafety and biosecurity, codes of conduct are useful way of conducting responsible scientific conduct in the context of the Convention. On this matter, the measures should be proportional and should not hamper scientific research and development.	S 15/8 AM
Iran (NAM)	Codes of Conduct remain the prerogative of the States Parties to decide on the development, content, promulgation and adoption of the code in accordance with relevant national laws, regulations and policies, consistent with the provisions of the Convention.	S 14/8 AM
Iran (NAM)	Codes of Conduct should avoid any restrictions on exchange of scientific discoveries in the field of biology for prevention of disease and other peaceful purposes. Subjecting scientific research and the free flow of scientific information to undue restrictions may amount to violation of obligations undertaken under Article X of the BWC.	S 14/8 AM
Japan	Complementing existing codes of conduct: Dual Use of Scientific Research Outcomes: Scientists shall recognize that there exist possibilities that their research results, contrary to their own intentions, may be used for destructive actions, and shall select appropriate means and methods as allowed by society in conducting research and publicizing the results.	P 14/8

5. Education and awareness-raising about risks and benefits of life sciences and biotechnology

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
Brazil	An approach focused on cooperation between States Parties would be more effective and constructive in raising awareness and building capacity	S 14/8 AM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
Japan	<p>Further challenges and next steps:</p> <p>(a) Raising awareness of scientists in all science fields that dual use could be concerned in their own research;</p> <p>(b) Education of life scientists on biosecurity, not only biosafety;</p> <p>(c) Educational tools and materials for biosecurity should be prepared urgently;</p> <p>(d) Effective mechanisms should be developed for concept/knowledge distribution;</p> <p>(e) Networking internationally and with national stakeholders.</p>	P 14/8

6. Science- and technology-related developments relevant to the activities of multilateral organizations such as the WHO, OIE, FAO, IPPC and OPCW

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
Switzerland	It is vital that the BWC does not lose touch with the rapid developments in biological sciences and technology... this important work cannot be pursued as sustainably and effectively as necessary in the current intersessional set-up... we need a more systematic and comprehensive review of scientific and technological developments and their bearings on the BWC.	S 15/8 AM
Switzerland	The OPCW Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) lessons learned after 15 years: The SAB can provide science and technology advice effectively if: questions are phrased clearly and are related to science and technology; the intention is not to “escape” a discussion in the Policy-Making Organs; States Parties do not attempt to politicize the Board; the SAB must have sufficient funding for meetings; it is important to analyse questions carefully (including policy dimension); SAB considers relevant information from all accessible sources in its deliberations; SAB stays away from policy debate.	P 15/8 AM
Switzerland	The benefits of the SAB: it helps to establish and “official OPCW view” on science and technology matters related to implementation of CWC.	P 15/8 AM
Ukraine	Consider the establishment of an open-ended working group to consider the implications of advances in science and technology, including the convergence of chemistry and biology, to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in the preparations for and at the next Review Conference	S 15/8 AM
United Kingdom	Lessons learnt on SAB: the Policy Making Organs cannot always decide what to do with the Scientific Advisory Board’s advice; however it stills needs to be given.	S 15/8 AM
Australia	We do need a very careful approach: the fact that the science underpins the treaty. There is a need of greater interaction between the experts that are involved in the CWC and those involved in the BWC.	S 15/8 AM
Australia	A scientific advisory board is a very expensive process, in the BWC context we would benefit more from an open-ended working group.	S 15/8 AM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
India	[On a board to provide science advice in the BWC:] this topic was discussed in the run-up of the Seventh Review Conference. Perhaps the idea at that time was not mature enough. The topic could be discussed further and kept in mind for the preparation of the next Review Conference.	S 15/8 AM
United Kingdom	Science, technology and engineering underpin both the BTWC and the CWC and it is important, for this reason, that there is closer and regular contact between experts dealing with these Conventions. This is particularly true in the context of biology-chemistry convergence and education and awareness raising on the Conventions and dual-use issues.	

7. Any other science and technology developments of relevance to the Convention

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
Switzerland	It is necessary to set up an effective mechanism that provides for a regular and systematic review of relevant developments in the life sciences.	S 12/8 AM
Ukraine	Whenever there are national or international meetings addressing science and technology developments, a summary should be prepared on the implications for the BWC and submitted by the national State Party in the case of national meetings and by the host State Party in the case of international meetings	S 14/8 AM
Japan	Regarding infectious diseases surveillance and diagnostics for biosecurity: (a) Rapidly growing worldwide health problem, drug-resistant infections, should be recognized. This phenomenon can be found in all groups of microorganisms including bacteria, virus, fungus and parasites. The spread of resistant micro-organisms is a major health security challenge not only for health experts but also for security sectors. (b) Member states should consider and make additional efforts in their disease surveillance mechanisms to cope with the anti-drug resistant microorganisms.	S 15/8 PM

Agenda item 7: Standing agenda item: Strengthening national implementation

1. A range of specific measures for the full and comprehensive implementation of the Convention, especially Articles III and IV

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
Russian Federation	Requirements for dealing with pathogens should be written into the legislation which constitutes one of the basic components of the implementation process.	S 12/8 AM
India	Strengthened implementation of Article III would ensure that the cooperation envisaged under Article X is not abused. At the same time it is important that factors like lack of technical capability in developing countries is not used to hamper international cooperation,	S 12/8 AM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
Switzerland	National implementation is a wide-ranging issue requiring action on multiple levels. The development and continuous adaptation of national legislation, regulations and associated control mechanisms as well as their enforcement is crucial. The rapid progress in biological science and technology and the ever present dual-use dilemma associated with it are challenging issues for national implementation as well.	S 12/8 AM
Mexico	National implementation is mandatory. We need to establish appropriate measures in order to implement the Convention.	S 15/8 AM
VERTIC	A legislative framework should cover the following areas: (a) definitions (biological weapon, biological agent, toxins, etc.) (b) prohibition of certain activities (c) extending the reach of the prohibitions to natural and legal persons and extraterritorially (d) national biosafety and biosecurity measures (e) transfer controls (f) legislative enforcement	P 15/8 PM
VERTIC	Approaches to national implementation of the BWC: (a) comprehensive stand-alone BWC law (b) 'weapons of mass destruction' law (c) Implementation through several laws and regulations	P 15/8 PM
ICRC	As a minimum, in addition to other requirements, States need to ensure that domestic law is capable of providing penal sanctions for any activity prohibited by the Convention	S 15/8 PM
China	Measures to strengthen national implementation such as the establishment of national implementation mechanism, the promulgation of relevant laws and regulations, as well as the establishment of regulations on biosafety and biosecurity management, can be important guarantees to implement the Convention and improve its effectiveness	S.12/8
China	The best compliance mechanism under the Convention is to conclude a protocol with a verification regime to enhance the effectiveness of the Convention comprehensively.	S 12/8
United Kingdom	Thinking on the long term future of the BTWC involves making incremental progress across a range of issues, such as those being addressed in the current intersessional process. This will help move us towards a position where more ambitious and synergistic approaches to compliance can be contemplated and realised with practical effect.	WP.1
United States	Implementation of necessary measures to prohibit and prevent the acquisition, development, or possession of biological weapons is a core legal obligation of the BWC, and critical to achieving the goals of the Convention.	S 15/8

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
United States	“Prohibition” is fairly straightforward. For practical reasons, it is essential to prohibit “inchoate acts” (e.g., conspiracy, facilitation, brokering) as well as possession and use: such measures allow governments to act before danger is imminent.	S 15/8
United States	Effective “prevention” is more complex. It calls for efficient export control measures, but also measures to control transfers or access to dangerous pathogens or key technologies within the borders of a country. It requires sound national frameworks for biosafety and biosecurity. And because relevant capabilities are so widely distributed, it calls for outreach and education efforts.	S 15/8

2. Ways and means to enhance national implementation, sharing best practices and experiences, including the voluntary exchange of information among States Parties on their national implementation, enforcement of national legislation, strengthening of national institutions and coordination among national law enforcement institutions

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
Indonesia	Implementation of the BWC should be an ongoing process for each State Party in order to achieve complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.	S 12/8 AM
Indonesia	Noting the importance of complementing WHO-based provisions with BWC-based provisions, enhance partnership between experts in biosecurity/non-proliferation and public health.	S 12/8 AM
France	Peer review allows the organizing State to review its own national implementation through several factors: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - an in-depth explanation of its national implementation scheme - visits illustrating the implementation of the said scheme - meetings with those responsible for this implementation 	S 15/8 AM
France	The aim (of peer review) is to allow the organizing State to strengthen its national implementation and practice an exchange of best practice with its peers.	S 15/8 AM
France	This type of initiative on a voluntary basis will strengthen the quality of the national implementation and cooperation between States Parties.	S 15/8 AM
France	The peer review mechanism is not a substitute for a verification protocol. The objective is not to develop universal standards for the implementation of the convention. The aim is to share experiences taking into account national circumstances and best practices when applicable.	S 15/8 AM
Germany	[There is a] need for continuous attention to [national implementation]. Laws might be newly enacted or amended, directives added... new situations may arise that require additional implementation measures in order to keep implementation of the BWC up to date.	S 15/8 AM
Germany	It is necessary to pay regular attention to national implementation, i.e. to have regular reviews and reporting, including through CBM E and the ISU National	S 15/8

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
	Implementation Database. We may want to consider a further enhancement of the structure of the database.	AM
Germany	In the current intersessional process, the meetings: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - could include reports of cooperative endeavours such as regional workshops or peer reviews - provide an opportunity to discuss relevant areas of implementation that need to be addressed by all states parties with a view to reaching a common understanding. 	S 15/8 AM
Germany	Identify in more concrete terms specific areas that need to be covered by implementation activities. This could also help structure reports and documentation.	S 15/8 AM
Malaysia	The challenge ... is the limitation of resources, in financial, technical and capabilities. We have also discovered cross-cutting areas in either technical expertise or in law enforcement that exists in other formal mechanisms such as the CWC National Authority and the Strategic Trade Secretariat. A new spectrum of work needs to be addressed, linking the various existing mechanisms and looking at the exiting legislations which may need to be amended.	S 15/8 AM
Benin	The solution on the national level would be raising awareness among all stakeholders. Education and awareness raising would be the mechanism to put in place national coordination.	S 15/8 AM
Benin	Codes of conduct without binding values will not be sufficient to develop national implementation. A more binding mechanism on the international level, combined with internal penalisation measures, and appropriate legislation could prove more effective.	S 15/8 AM
Switzerland	The rapid progress in biological science and technology and the ever present dual-use dilemma associated with it are challenging issues for national implementation.	S 15/8 AM
Switzerland	The issue of CBMs should be addressed from the standpoint of national implementation and under this very standing agenda item.	S 15/8 AM
Switzerland	National implementation and Article X are inextricably linked. National implementation of the core provisions of the BWC – in particular the adoption of the necessary national legislation – is an important prerequisite for cooperation and assistance to move beyond implementation support.	S 15/8 AM
Switzerland	A discussion on what constitutes compliance is necessary and timely.	S 15/8 AM
Russian Federation	Practical outcomes of researches performed under the state funded programs: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Innovative instrument and means for diagnostic and prevention of infections are developed and implemented in practice. - Continuous replacement of diagnostic equipment with more sophisticated tools and instrument is performed. - Special software and databases were developed and are modernized regularly. - A large number of special guidelines and recommendations was developed and published, including special documents on biological security. 	P 15/8 AM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
United States	There is not only a need in prohibiting, but preventing is also important, and even more challenging. A biosecurity framework regarding prevention (ensuring that highly dangerous pathogens are contained) is important.	S 15/8 AM
United States	We need better information with the status of national implementation within States Parties. We need better and more consistent information. It would also be easier to provide assistance whenever needed.	S 15/8 AM
Sweden	Internal interagency coordination is crucial, in this case a national laboratory cooperation for dangerous pathogens: (a) A cooperative forum between authorities ... has been fruitful. (b) Effective use of resources during an emergency: build redundancy in terms of staff and equipment; improve the laboratory capacity by efficient research and development; informal collaboration. (c) In practical terms, goals have been achieved: increase national diagnostic capacity; development of methods; harmonisation of methods; exercise and education. (d) Management of biosafety and biosecurity aspects (e) Expanding collaboration in the future could be envisaged	P 15/8 AM
VERTIC	Strengthening national implementation of the BWC: (a) identify a national Point of Contact to be responsible for the process (b) identify which obligations are already covered by existing legislation (c) confirm which approach to implementation best suits the state's situation (d) Convene an awareness-raising workshop for national stakeholders to explain (e) Convene a legislative drafting workshop involving key ministries, assistance providers to develop an action plan	P 15/8 PM
Mongolia	Learn from others' experiences, seek ways and means for improving the implementation process at the national level, including the improving of national legislation, the coordination of activities of respective national agencies, strengthening of our national capacities, as well as for defining the avenues of our possible contribution to the common efforts at the regional and international levels.	S 15/8 PM
Iran (NAM)	Some States Parties, especially developing countries, may require assistance and cooperation to strengthen their national capacities for the full implementation of all the provisions of the Convention. States Parties which are in a position to provide assistance and cooperation to other States Parties in capacity building to implement the Convention should do so, if requested.	S 15/8 AM
Iran (NAM)	It is necessary for the states parties to work together for enhancing national implementation by sharing best Practices and experiences, exchange of information on enforcement of national legislation, on possible ways for strengthening of national institutions and coordination among national law enforcement institutions and finally building national capacity through international cooperation.	S 15/8 AM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
Iran (NAM)	In a multilateral treaty like the BWC it is important to be collectively reassured about compliance with the convention's provisions. In this regard, reiterate the importance of multilateral negotiations aimed at concluding a non-discriminatory, legally binding agreement, including on verification provisions, dealing with all the Articles of the Convention in a balanced and comprehensive manner.	S 15/8 AM
Iran (NAM)	The case of H5N1 showed that we still have controversy around the areas that relate to the national implementation of the Convention and that some countries still don't have a clear picture about the authorized and unauthorized activities in the framework of the BWC. We believe that this case is very complex and important and its examination should be carefully continued in the meetings of the BWC as it covers different aspects that might affect the implementation of the Convention.	S 15/8 AM
Iran (NAM)	Activities related to bio-defence should not be a guise for offensive biological activities. In this regard it is necessary for states parties to work together for enhancing national implementation by sharing best practices and experiences, exchange of information on enforcement of national legislation, on possible ways for strengthening national institutions and coordination among national law enforcement institutions and finally building national capacity through international cooperation.	S 15/8 AM
Iran (NAM)	Proposals for peer review, compliance assessment, etc, have been mooted in the framework of the BWC. Some States see these as potential further measures for implementation of the Convention. All States Parties are obliged to take measures for national implementation of the Convention by virtue of them being Parties to the Convention. They do so by enacting national laws, regulations, policies and other measures and initiatives in accordance with their constitutional requirements. This sub- agenda item could be productively used by States Parties to exchange ideas on what further measures and initiatives could be adopted by States Parties at the national level to further the implementation of the Convention's provisions. Compliance with the Convention is a concept different from national implementation. In an international legal instrument such as the BWC the assurance of compliance with the Convention's provisions has to be collective through multilateral verification. In the past useful work has been done in this regard under the BWC in the Ad Hoc Group and NAM continues to attach high importance to preserving and eventually resuming that work.	S 15/8 AM
Iran (NAM)	The proposals on peer review compliance assessment were raised and evaluated in the Seventh Review Conference of the BWC and there was no consensus on such proposals. There are serious difficulties with such concepts in the framework of the BWC including inter alia that they may create a false sense of assurance regarding the national implementation of obligations arising from the Convention. All states parties [should] respect the mandate given by the Review Conference to the inter-sessional process and not reopen the fractious debates of the Review Conference.	S 15/8 AM
United States	Strongly support the EU initiative to produce an implementation handbook.	S 15/8
United States	The recommendations contained in our 2012 Working Paper on strengthening national implementation remain valid.	S 15/8

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
United States	In order to strengthen national implementation, States Parties need better information on the status of implementation today in other States Parties – to know what the situation is, and so a State Party can provide targeted assistance.	S 15/8
United States	Under this agenda item, States Parties should seek over the next two years to determine what information would be most useful and how best to collect it.	S 15/8
United States	VERTIC has conducted legislative surveys of most States Parties—these could provide a useful way to organize information on implementation and could make it possible to provide such information with very little effort.	S 15/8

4. National, regional and international measures to improve laboratory biosafety and security of pathogens and toxins

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
Mongolia	More efforts should be made on strengthening biosafety and biosecurity.	S 15/8 PM
United States	In the United States, the Select Agent Regulations restrict possession, use, and transfer of biological agents and toxins that have the potential to pose a severe threat to human, animal, and plant health, as well as animal and plant products. These regulations strengthen the United States' national implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention.	WP.4
United States	The following key biosecurity-related changes [were] made to the Select Agent Regulations in 2012: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) Designation of “Tier 1” BSAT. (b) Pre-access personnel suitability assessments for access to Tier 1 BSAT. (c) Ongoing assessment of personnel suitability with access to Tier 1 BSAT. (d) Training to implement the Tier 1 personnel suitability programs. (e) Reporting of incidents to appropriate entity and law enforcement officials. 	WP.4
United States	(Tier 1 BSAT) ... present the “greatest risk of deliberate misuse with the most significant potential for mass casualties or devastating effects to the economy, crucial infrastructure, or public confidence.” Of the current 65 select agents and toxins, 13 were designated as Tier 1 BSAT... determined to have the greatest ability to produce a mass casualty event or devastating effects to the economy, high communicability, low infectious dose, and a history of weaponization were recommended...	WP.4
United States	The Tier 1 designation allows for targeted enhancement of security measures to Tier 1 BSAT entities, while avoiding burdening other entities that do not possess, use, or transfer Tier 1 BSAT.	WP.4
United States	All entities possessing BSAT must be registered, have security plans, and ensure that personnel with access to BSAT receive a Federal Bureau of Investiga-	WP.4

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
States	tion (FBI) Security Risk Assessment (SRA). The 2012 changes to the Select Agent Regulations require—in addition to the SRA—that entities that possess Tier 1 BSAT must establish procedures for conducting “pre-access personnel suitability assessments” for individuals who will access Tier 1 BSAT..	
United States	With the 2012 changes in Select Agent Regulations, entities that possess Tier 1 BSAT must include in their security plans procedures for conducting ongoing suitability assessments for individuals that have access to Tier 1 BSAT. There must be an additional specific program in place (e.g., peer and self-reporting) to allow for the continuous assessment of behavioural indicators and help ensure the ongoing reliability of staff.	WP.4
United States	A key objective of ongoing personnel suitability assessments is to empower individuals to recognize and detect any threats to themselves or others. Insiders with access to select agents can pose a significant threat because they have the ability to bypass many security measures. Within select agent laboratories, behavioural indicators comprise a broad range of scenarios, from data falsification or manipulation, research sabotage or espionage, and unapproved experimentation, to more serious incidents of theft or violence. An ongoing personnel suitability assessment process can help to identify and mitigate such insider threats.	WP.4
United States	<p>To supplement the new pre-access and ongoing personnel suitability requirements for Tier 1 BSAT entities, HHS and USDA developed a personnel suitability guidance document, which incorporates recommendations from the FESAP and FBI. The guidance document addresses topics such as:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) The potential for insider threats and the need for personnel suitability assessments. (b) The concurrent but separate process of the FBI Security Risk Assessment and the entity’s pre-access suitability assessment. (c) Delineating the roles and responsibilities of entity leadership and personnel. (d) Information that might be collected and verified when conducting a personnel suitability assessment. (e) Reportable conditions or behaviours for ongoing self and/or peer review. (f) The development of a threat reporting mechanism. (g) Responding to reports in a consistent, prompt, and confidential manner. (h) Comprehensive staff training in areas such as insider threat awareness, behaviours of concern, self and peer review procedures, and entity policies regarding ongoing assessment and monitoring procedures. 	WP.4
United States	Entities that possess Tier 1 BSAT must provide procedures for training employees with access to Tier 1 BSAT on policies and procedures for reporting and evaluating concerns and identifying corrective actions that may be taken. Training is an important component of security, since awareness helps foster compliance with personnel suitability and reliability measures.	WP.4

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
United States	With the 2012 updates to the Select Agent Regulations, entities that possess BSAT must include procedures for how the Responsible Official will be informed of suspicious activity that may be criminal in nature and related to the entity, its personnel, or its BSAT material.	WP.4
Canada	<p>Canada has a robust federal system in place for the oversight of pathogens in Canada, with responsibility being shared between the Public Health Agency of Canada for human and animal pathogens (the Human Pathogens and Toxins Act, and select sections of the Health of Animals Regulations) and the Canadian Food Inspections Agency for foreign animal diseases (the Health of Animals Act and Regulations). In the past, there have been three biosafety and biocontainment standards in Canada, the Laboratory Biosafety Guidelines (PHAC), the Containment Standards for Veterinary Facilities (CFIA) and the Containment Standards for Laboratories, Animal Facilities, and Post-Mortem Rooms Handling Prion Based Agents (CFIA), sometimes all standards being applied in one laboratory, causing a compliance burden on stakeholders, and often confusion over if the standards were requiring the same thing for the same requirement.</p> <p>As such, PHAC and the CFIA decided to merge the three standards into one new, harmonized and updated biosafety standard, the Canadian Biosafety Standards and Guidelines, which was released June 20, 2013, to help regulated parties comply with requirements by clarifying and updating requirements, while at the same time shifting to a more performance-based approach. In order to achieve this, PHAC and the CFIA established two working groups, the Expert Working Group (EWG), which provided subject matter expertise to input and review all requirements in the standards and provide feedback on the guidelines, and the Biocontainment Engineering Science Working Group (BESWG), which provided, and continues to provide, a scientific challenge to the biocontainment requirements in the standard. The BESWG has representation from both the private and public sector as well as individuals of other regulatory groups. Members were selected based on level of expertise within the biocontainment industry, from both the engineering and science fields. One main task of the BESWG is to develop methods to investigate, and/or tests various biocontainment engineering issues and knowledge gaps within the biocontainment industry.</p> <p>The BESWG provides the unique opportunity for collaboration to occur on a National and International scale to achieve the same goal to update and harmonize biocontainment requirements using an evidence, performance and risk-based approach. This approach can be beneficial to all countries with varying levels of resources, but more input is needed for applications to suit lower resourced countries. As such, we are interested in obtaining input and representation from low-resource countries, to challenge current developed-country views on biosafety and biocontainment, with a view to highlight potential alternatives to traditional biocontainment requirements based on actual risks and evidence, which can be easier to implement in a low-resource setting and equally as safe.</p> <p>In Canada, having a working group with representation from all sectors with Federal Agency oversight, allows the BESWG to influence National policy with respect to biocontainment requirements.</p>	

5. Any potential further measures, as appropriate, relevant for implementation of the Convention

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
Indonesia	The most appropriate method in strengthening the Convention is indeed through multilateral negotiation aimed at concluding a non discriminatory, legally binding agreement, including on verification dealing with all articles of the Convention in a balanced and comprehensive manner.	S 12/8 AM
China	The best compliance mechanism under the Convention is to conclude a protocol with a verification regime to enhance the effectiveness of the Convention comprehensively.	S 12/8 AM
India	For want of provisions on verification of compliance, the prohibitions contained in the Convention critically depend on the commitment of States Parties to observe them. This also requires to States Parties for strengthening their national systems for biosafety and biosecurity.	S 15/8 AM
India	On compliance, a critical option is missing: the alternative of a multilateral legally binding mechanism for verification of compliance, acting as a deterrent, non discriminatory, balanced and objective mean against non-compliance.	S 15/8 AM
Australia	Risk-based regulation involves a plurality of public and private actors, instruments and purposes that can be grouped into three modes of governance: (a) Coercive regulation, or 'hard-law'; (b) Normative regulation, or 'soft law' (c) Mimetic regulation.	S 15/8 PM
United Kingdom	States Parties can better demonstrate their compliance by: (a) Providing detailed annual or periodic reporting on how they go about implementing the Convention domestically; (b) Providing and updating information on the ISU's National Implementation database and elsewhere, most notably to the UNSCR 1540 Committee; (c) Submitting annual detailed CBMs; (d) Submitting detailed national compliance reports to the BTWC Review Conferences; (e) Participating in a peer review process on national implementation or the compliance assessment concept; (f) Hosting visits to biodefence or other facilities in order to build an environment of openness and collaboration in national biodefence; (g) Conducting national biodefence conferences with open access to representatives of all States Parties	WP.1
United Kingdom	The Protocol declarations, along with some of the other suggestions for revised CBMs that have been made over the years, need to be taken into account in any discussion on whether additional information might help enhance assurance of compliance.	WP.1

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
United Kingdom	A peer review mechanism offers a promising avenue to explore in the near term as a means to enhance cooperation mechanisms under Article V.	WP.1
United Kingdom	<p>The arrangements for the Consultative Meeting process could be revisited to discuss means to strengthen the bilateral and multilateral aspects of Article V:</p> <p>(a) developing agreed procedures for conducting bilateral consultations in order to regularize the process and make it less open to interpretation by BTWC member states;</p> <p>(b) establishing a procedure by which a BTWC member state can request additional information about a particular facility or activity listed in another State Party's annual CBM declaration;</p> <p>(c) and establishing a Consultative Committee of Experts for multilateral consultations.</p>	WP.1
Australia	<p>A number of recent proposals provide States Parties with the opportunity to better demonstrate their compliance with the BWC and thereby enhance assurance for other States Parties. The proposals include, inter alia:</p> <p>(a) Additional information included in CBMs;</p> <p>(b) A compliance assessment process;</p> <p>(c) A Peer review mechanism; and</p> <p>(d) A Bio-transparency and Openness Initiative.</p>	WP.2
Australia	Additional information to the CBMs would enhance assurance of compliance. In light of the rapid developments in biological sciences and the biotechnology sector in the past 20 years, a key objective in this discussion would be to identify other types of information not in the current CBMs that would enhance assurance of compliance with the BWC. The focus should be on the type of information required in the current setting.	WP.2
Australia	The development of the consultation and cooperation mechanisms under Article V, including consideration of mutually agreed visits to sites of compliance concern, may assist in enhancing confidence in compliance.	WP.2
Australia	The rapid scientific and technological developments in the life sciences, increasing globalisation of capacity and activity in the life sciences and increasing devolution of that capacity and activity from state-based institutions to private actors underline a need for States Parties to address these questions in a fresh, critical and creative manner and to develop <i>concrete</i> responses which reflect <i>contemporary</i> scientific and technological reality.	WP.2
Switzerland	In principle, [we are] still in favour of a (multinational) legally-binding compliance framework. ... Such an endeavour is politically not feasible at the moment and simply duplicating arrangements that work fine for other conventions may not be adequate for the distinct characteristics of the biological weapons problem as well as the particular nature of progress in the life sciences.	WP.12
Switzerland	Assessing compliance is not straightforward in the current BWC framework, as the mere presence or absence of certain elements does not necessarily allow for a definite judgement on a State Party's compliance status but should rather be seen as an indication, which, when aggregated over time, may demonstrate certain patterns and allow for a more comprehensive evaluation. Being in	WP.12

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
	compliance includes both the presence and absence of certain activities and attitudes. We need to be realistic about the level of burden that certain, especially smaller States Parties with limited resources can cope with in meeting their obligations rather than automatically assume non-compliance.	
Switzerland	Demonstrating compliance with the BWC essentially consists of two distinct aspects. One aspect is for every State Party to communicate compliance by providing relevant information. Several tools already exist to this end but should be strengthened. The other aspect is for States Parties to consider, either individually or collectively, the information provided and to provide feedback thereon. Processes and mechanisms regarding the second aspect are, however, missing at this stage.	WP.12
Switzerland	<p>Compliance may be demonstrated, communicated and/or affected by the following elements:</p> <p>(a) Review, strengthen and broaden participation in the CBM process, including considering whether additional information to that which is already requested in the current CBMs would enhance assurance of compliance, as well as by exploring ways and means that allow for an analysis/discussion of the information provided and for addressing ambiguities, doubts and suspicions;</p> <p>(b) Increase efforts to ensure the full implementation of treaty obligations, including through detailed implementation/compliance reporting, e.g. in the framework of the quinquennial BWC Compliance Reports or by regularly submitting up-to-date information to the ISU national implementation database;</p> <p>(c) Submit yearly (tabular) reports compiled by the ISU on the basis of information provided by States Parties (through elements under (a) and (b) above) on the status of national implementation and national legislation in particular. Such a tool would allow States Parties to better demonstrate their compliance with the BWC and to generally assess the state of BWC implementation;</p> <p>(d) Develop (voluntary) approaches such as the compliance assessment concept put forward by Canada, the Czech Republic and Switzerland, which proposes to demonstrate compliance with the BWC by assessing a country's implementation of the treaty (e.g. through an examination of national legislation), or the peer-review mechanism suggested by UNIDIR and France;</p> <p>(e) Develop joint activities between States Parties under Article X, such as the Iraqi-Swiss biosafety/biosecurity expertise exchange project, which ideally may serve the two objectives of supporting implementation/compliance and enhancing assurance of compliance;</p> <p>(f) Host mutually agreed visits to biodefence and other relevant facilities in order to foster transparency and build an environment of openness and trust;</p> <p>(g) Organise international conferences on relevant BWC topics in order to foster regular exchange of views among States Parties;</p> <p>(h) Strengthen the UNSGM for the investigation of alleged use of biological weapons, which provides a capability that should be used for any investigations under Article VI as accepted by the Seventh Review Conference.</p>	WP.12

Delegation	Text	Source
	(i) As advances in science and technology may affect issues of compliance, including certain aspects of national implementation, questions of transparency and mistrust as well as investigations under Article VI, the establishment of a mechanism/working group that <i>systematically</i> reviews relevant developments in science and technology would be a key tool for identifying relevant advances and assessing their beneficial and/or detrimental impact on compliance, national implementation, investigations of alleged use, etc. as well as on the BWC and international security in general.	
Japan	<p>Compliance with the BWC requires, among others, the implementation of Article I by taking necessary measures as provided for in Article IV and the implementation of Article III. This could include the following:</p> <p>(a) Introduction of domestic laws, regulations, and other measures to prohibit and prevent the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I including the criminalization of prohibitions contained in the BWC</p> <p>(b) A comprehensive national export control</p> <p>(c) Appropriate measures for biosafety and biosecurity</p> <p>(d) The implementation system for aforementioned (a), (b), (c)</p> <p>(e) Effective implementation of aforementioned (a), (b), (c)</p> <p>In addition, efforts to develop a voluntary code of conduct as well as education activities or awareness-raising for scientists could ensure effective implementation of the BWC and contribute to enhancing compliance assurances.</p>	WP.18
Japan	<p>Given the implications of the rapid advancement of life sciences on Article I and III, full implementation of the BWC requires regular review of aforementioned national measures, responding to changing circumstances.</p>	WP.18
Japan	<p>States parties could better demonstrate their compliance and enhance assurance through a CBM submission which provides their implementation status on Article IV and their obligation to fulfil Article III. Additionally, voluntary initiatives to examine the status of implementation and to provide information periodically to the state parties could also contribute to building confidence among them.</p>	WP.18
Japan	<p>Sharing efforts on developing a voluntary code of conduct and activities of education and awareness-raising for scientists could also be a means to prove compliance on BWC.</p>	WP.18
Japan	<p>States Parties could better demonstrate their compliance by sharing information relating to their international cooperation efforts under Article X, which also serve the objectives of Article IV.</p>	WP.18
Japan	<p>The improvement and enhancement of Form E of the CBMs, which includes declaration of legislation, regulations and other measures of states parties could prove their commitment and contribute to enhancing assurances.... information provided to the 1540 Committee is a useful resource for states parties, and consideration should be given to how it can effectively be utilized in order to reduce the workload of the states parties. Additionally, the states parties should consider ways to effectively use each report actively hereafter.</p>	WP.18

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
Japan	National implementation measures taken by states parties are required to keep pace with the rapid advances in life sciences. In parallel, the development of a possible means for better demonstration of compliance and enhancement of assurances would be crucial.	WP.18
United States	Compliance, and ways in which States Parties can enhance confidence in mutual compliance, are legitimate topics for discussion under this standing agenda item. Developments in science and technology have enabled non-state actors, and consequently drawn new attention to the important role of Article III and IV obligations, as illustrated by the emphasis of a number of working papers at this session.	S 15/8 PM
United States	Confidence in compliance should be bolstered by strengthening the system of confidence-building measures, more robust use of compliance diplomacy to seek clarification and address concerns, and through voluntary initiatives to demonstrate greater transparency.	S 15/8 PM
Australia	The rapid scientific and technological developments in the life sciences, increasing globalisation of capacity ... address these questions in a fresh, critical and creative manner and to develop concrete responses which reflect contemporary scientific and technological reality. One example of a creative approach which was proposed earlier in the week is the risk-based regulation which involves the plurality, etc.	S 15/8 PM
Switzerland	We do not want this discussion on compliance to serve as a replacement for a legally binding protocol. Quite the contrary: The development and implementation of practical and incremental measures at the national and international level could not only reinforce assurances of compliance, but also potentially ease the way towards more stringent measures and mechanisms in due course.	S 16/8 AM
Switzerland	Demonstrating compliance with the BWC essentially consists of two distinct aspects. One aspect is for every State Party to communicate compliance by providing relevant information. Several tools already exist to this end but should be strengthened. The other aspect is for States Parties to consider, either individually or collectively, the information provided and to provide feedback thereon. Processes and mechanisms regarding the second aspect are, however, missing, at this stage.	S 16/8 AM
Denmark	We believe therefore that a possible measure to strengthen the biological weapons convention Article IV would be to ensure that we understand and define biosecurity in the same way. As a way forward in this matter, the Danish delegation would suggest to work on a common definition of biosecurity.	S 16/8 AM

Agenda item 8: How to enable fuller participation in the CBMs

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
Brazil	Strengthening CBMs cannot replace the existence of an effective verification regime based on a Protocol to the BWC, to be negotiated by States Parties	S 12/8 AM
Malaysia	Further steps should be implemented to ensure universal participation in the CBMs, create greater awareness on the CBM requirements, and also to con-	S 12/8 AM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
	duct regular training sessions to assist relevant parties in demonstrating their compliance in an open, systematic and continuous manner.	
Mexico	Review the way in which we submit reports to ensure that the information provided is useful and does generate confidence between States Parties. It would be highly desirable that the ISU can contribute in the future to the feedback on this exercise to ensure that we, the States, have the opportunity to perfect the national implementation of the BWC.	S 12/8 AM
Mexico	Each State needs to have an authority that looks at this and it would be very useful to raise awareness for the various sectors and governmental and non-governmental institutions that are involved in the implementation of the BWC, on its provisions, implications and content, as well as to create a contact base with regards to national networks on the areas that are of competence to the Convention. Mexico offers its national experience to States that might require to establish a national authority.	S 12/8 AM
Switzerland	In order to enable fuller participation, we need to address the CBM forms themselves. We need to assess whether we are asking the right questions in order to keep the declarations relevant and encourage broader participation in this important mechanism.	S 12/8 AM
Switzerland	The ultimate goal... must be to increase the political relevance of the CBM process, which in turn will increase participation.	S 12/8 AM
Switzerland	We... need to achieve common understanding on how we intend to handle and process the wealth of information submitted by States Parties in a systematic way and how we are going to address any ambiguities, doubts and suspicions in light of Article V's aim towards increased transparency.	S 12/8 AM
Switzerland	An easy-to-use electronic CBM tool could in fact enable fuller participation in the process	S 12/8 AM
China	CBMs are an important means for States Parties to enhance mutual trust... More States Parties should be encouraged to submit CBM data... CBMs submission is not obligatory in nature, and States Parties are different in national conditions and capacity, thus necessary support and assistance should be provided to those in need.	S 12/8 AM
United Kingdom	The key to effective and full CBM responses is to begin the collation process early and to ensure that all the relevant government agencies and departments that might hold the information required are identified, along with an internal point of contact. This underlines the importance of States Parties having effective arrangements to coordinate the acquisition of information from a potentially diverse range of organisations within and outside government.	S 12/8 PM
United Kingdom	It is important for States Parties who have not yet submitted a CBM return, or who have done so only periodically, to report on what specific assistance they need.	S 12/8 PM
United Kingdom	Creating a simple electronic submission and collation process for the States Parties and the ISU would be significant steps to improving returns.	S 12/8 PM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
United Kingdom	Revisit some of the proposed technical changes that were considered at the Seventh Review Conference, but were not adopted. It seems that the shortage of time, rather than a set of substantive objections, was the main reason for their non-acceptance.	S 12/8 PM
United Kingdom	If States Parties are unclear about the purpose the measures serve today and doubt whether those measures adequately meet the core requirement of preventing or reducing the occurrence of ambiguities, doubts and suspicions, then the rate and quality of annual CBM returns must inevitably suffer.	S 12/8 PM
United Kingdom	The rate of change and global diffusion of research and development in the life sciences and related technologies suggest that there are other activities that we might need to think about including as well.... It might be useful to have a greater level of transparency on activities and facilities in the CBM context.	S 12/8 PM
United Kingdom	Given sensitivities over vulnerabilities and capabilities, it is hard to see that there would be agreement to provide greater levels of detail on biodefence programmes and facilities. However, it may be useful to seek details of any internal or external oversight or review processes designed to ensure compliance with the obligations under the BTWC.	S 12/8 PM
United Kingdom	As new production technologies come along and are adopted extensively, the relevance of traditional vaccine production facilities may decline. There may be a case for extending the requirement to include facilities producing some vaccines licensed by a central agency.	S 12/8 PM
United Kingdom	Consider if there are other facilities that ought to be included within a future CBM package, such as those carrying out work that could change the characteristics of an agent in such a way that could increase its potential to cause harm; for instance, by altering the natural pathogenicity, host range and/or transmissibility of a pathogen.	S 12/8 PM
United Kingdom	Look at a formalised reporting system in CBM process of national and/or multi-national reviews conducted on research presenting a potential for misuse, as well as reporting on their outcomes. Clearly more consideration is needed of the challenges raised by scientific and technological developments.	S 12/8 PM
United Kingdom	Keeping the CBMs relevant and ensuring fuller and regular participation presents a challenge that requires constant attention. [There is a need for] a more systematic and fundamental consideration of CBMs at the next Review Conference.	S 12/8 PM
United States	We need not only to increase the level of participation, but we need to increase the use of the CBMs.	S 12/8 PM
United States	The value of CBMs comes from comparing with different forms of information. If clarification is needed: bilateral approach could be envisaged.	S 12/8 PM
United States	A CBMs network could be established via the ISU website.	S 12/8 PM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
Brazil	Lack of human and financial resources, as well as obstacles for intergovernmental coordination, could explain why some States Parties have not yet submitted CBMs.	S 12/8 PM
Brazil	By updating and simplifying CBMs, States Parties may find it easier to submit them annually.	S 12/8 PM
Brazil	Strengthened CBMs could not replace a verification mechanism, nor should they become compulsory.	S 12/8 PM
Germany	[There is a] need for a further substantive review of the CBM forms and the whole process.	S 12/8 PM
Germany	Encourage all states that have so far not participated regularly in the CBM process to report on their experiences and problems... so that help can be provided in a more targeted way and the participation figures can be increased. This could also provide valuable information for a subsequent revision of the CBM forms.	S 12/8 PM
Germany	A joint evaluation would make the reported information more meaningful, and a discussion of the results could also be considered. In this way, any possible misunderstandings could be cleared up quickly.	S 12/8 PM
Germany	An additional form could be established as a supplement to the CBM. This form would allow states parties to enter and view feedback or requests for explanations on the information submitted in any given CBM. Problems regarding the implementation of measures could also be reported and discussed in it.	S 12/8 PM
Germany	A transparent exchange on feedback, clarifications or problems between States Parties participating in the CBM could render the process more effective. The clarification mechanism as proposed in BWC/MSP/2013/WP.7 offers a good starting point for discussion and should be taken up at the next meeting of States Parties.	S 12/8 PM
Germany	The financial feasibility of a translation of the CBM reports into all UN languages should be examined... central translation would increase comprehensibility and facilitate evaluation.	S 12/8 PM
Germany	[Support] an enhanced role of the ISU in the CBM process as soon as this becomes feasible.	S 12/8 PM
Germany	Participation [in CBM process] is a politically binding obligation for all States parties	S 12/8 PM
Mexico	People are not aware, CBMs are not perceived as a priority, it is seen as a useless exercise. Inputs are key to completion of CBMs: sharing of experience and lessons learned could be a way to increase participation.	S 12/8 PM
Kenya	CBMs need to be taken more seriously. The tediousness it involves requires support, especially for developing countries. Sensitisation, raising awareness, and capacity building are key points.	S 12/8 PM
Cuba	The Seventh Review Conference made important efforts to reduce the information required and we should maintain this spirit. Oppose an unjustified increase of amount of information. Support the increase of understanding in the forms.	S 12/8 PM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
Pakistan	CBM are voluntary, they are not a tool for assessing the compliance of the treaty.	S 12/8 PM
Switzerland	The rate of participation is linked to the relevance of the information submitted. There is a need to discuss the content of the CBMs, we need to assess that the forms are asking the right questions.	S 12/8 PM
Switzerland	Expanding form E significantly, (instead of ticking a box), States Parties should submit detailed information on legislation.	S 12/8 PM
Switzerland	Production vaccines facilities should be captured by the forms.	S 12/8 PM
Switzerland	[Support] an easy-to-use electronic process and efforts to translate and make CBMs more accessible.	S 12/8 PM
Switzerland	Form E is a key compliance indicator.	S 12/8 PM
Switzerland	CBMs discussion should also be included in agenda item on strengthening national implementation in the following two years.	S 12/8 PM
United Kingdom	Relevance is crucial. Demonstrating clarity of purpose of CBMs is crucial. There are obstacles to that: it would be useful if those facing problems could share experience.	S 12/8 PM
United Kingdom	Utility of a regional seminar: those that have completed for the first time could share experience. Those facing problems could come to those regional meetings to explain the problems they are facing, why it is difficult.	S 12/8 PM
United States	Role of the Chair: ask those who are not submitting the CBMs what are blocking them from submitting it. What do you need, what is getting in the way? It would be easier for us to provide assistance. And help us know where to start.	S 12/8 PM
United States	Use of CBMs: who needs translation? Costs to translate would become extremely heavy if all CBM submissions are to be translated in all UN official languages.	S 12/8 PM
United States	Form E is less useful than the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 matrices.	S 12/8 PM
Belarus	On translation: we could work on bilateral level if assistance is needed. This could be a way to save significant financial resources.	S 12/8 PM
Belarus	We have achieved some threshold in submission of CBMs: (despite the many annual reminders), our efforts will be useless until we have legally binding submission. We should consider regional workshop, where neighbouring countries ask why other states are not submitting the CBMs.	S 12/8 PM
South Africa	Where we should start is going to the states that are regular non submitter “why you are not doing this?” An open analysis of why they are not submitting CBM is needed.	S 12/8 PM
Iran	CBM is a political and voluntary measure, so we should not over emphasize this process. Let it be based on merit. Two aims or pillars concerning CBMs: One pillar: to alleviate suspicion.	S 12/8 PM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
	Other pillar: to improve international cooperation. To create incentive for those who are filling the forms. The aim of the CBMs is to improve international cooperation	
Australia	We could consider informal bilateral discussion, which could avoid embarrassment. An informal session would be fruitful.	S 12/8 PM
United Kingdom	A clear single point of contact in the government department deemed most appropriate by the State Party must carry the sole responsibility for collating and submitting its CBM and for checking that all the questions are addressed.	WP.3
United Kingdom	If all States Parties met the requirement to submit a CBM return every year – including nil returns – this would help demonstrate a commitment to full participation and a readiness to further enhance transparency.	WP.3
United Kingdom	BWC/CONF.VII/7/WP.21 raised a number of issues that are also in need of attention in this context: the user-friendliness of the formats, their translation and the collective analysis or assessment of CBM returns – in other words how the information is used nationally by other States Parties.	WP.3
United Kingdom	It is primarily for those States Parties who have not yet submitted a CBM return, or who have done so only periodically, to describe what specific assistance and advice they need.	WP.3
United Kingdom	The overarching question is: how should the CBM regime evolve? Six sets of questions are relevant here: (a) Do we have clarity in the underlying purpose and how does this impact on return rate and on quality of returns? (b) Clarification on how the CBM regime should evolve in view of scientific and technological change – are we asking the right questions in light of modern technological capabilities and standards? (c) Are we looking for transparency in the right places? What sort of information do we need to know – again both individually and collectively – that will help prevent or reduce the occurrence of ambiguities, doubts and suspicions? (d) Are we including the most relevant facilities? For instance, should we still be seeking returns of facilities producing licensed human vaccines, and if so should we be seeking more information? Conversely, should we also seek to include returns on facilities producing licensed animal vaccines? (e) Do we need more data on high containment laboratories, and if so what sort? Have advances in biotechnology led to other types of relevant facilities? (f) Are there emerging areas of life science research that could benefit from further transparency, such as that highlighted by the recent debate on H5N1 research?	WP.3
Canada	The preparation and submission of CBMs could be greatly facilitated and improved through the creation and utilization of an electronic platform.	WP.7
Canada	an electronic submission platform that would allow States Parties to create, edit, revise, submit, print, access, consult, and search within CBMs, and allow public access to CBMs marked public by the submitting State Party should be developed.	WP.7

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
Canada	The Implementation Support Unit (ISU) could investigate the possibility of modeling an electronic CBM platform after the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Electronic Declarations for National Authorities (EDNA) system.	WP.7
Canada	[Consider] translating CBMs from their original language into additional UN languages. Translations could be performed through the ISU using voluntary contributions by States Parties, or by States Parties themselves on a voluntary basis.	WP.7
Canada	Several options for cooperation and assistance in CBM completion. Firstly, CBM completion workshops could be organized to support States Parties that require assistance to complete their annual CBM submissions. Such workshops would preferably be held in Geneva on the margins of the BTWC meetings or regionally on a voluntary basis. Another approach is to encourage bilateral cooperation on CBMs and the provision of assistance remotely, using the national point of contact list found on the restricted ISU website. Canada urges States Parties to update their national POC to ensure such communication is possible. Additionally, Canada suggests States Parties to share experiences, needs, questions, best practices, or any other information that could be useful for CBM cooperation/assistance at the 2013 Meeting of Experts and 2013 MSP. Lastly, recognizing that electronic and paper guidebooks are useful for States Parties completing their initial CBM submission	WP.7
Canada	States that have questions or comments about another country's submission should have the option to submit requests for clarification to the ISU, which would in turn engage with the relevant country to provide a response.	WP.7
Canada	As submissions cannot build confidence if information is misunderstood or unclear, States Parties should use the standing agenda item on “strengthening national implementation” to request clarifications to CBM submissions in a manner as non-confrontational as possible.	WP.7
United Kingdom	Scientific and technological developments in vaccine design and production need to be taken into account in review of the CBM process. In particular, development of vaccines that do not need containment facilities for production, or emergence of new production methods that are not-based on traditional fermentation technologies are relevant to discussions on which types of facilities will be of most interest to CBMs in future.	WP.8
United States	Call on all States Parties to designate National Points of Contact as agreed at the Sixth Review Conference and reiterated at the Seventh Review Conference, and request the Chair to follow up with those States Parties that have not done so.	WP.9
United States	Encourage States Parties who have not yet submitted annual CBM returns to do so.	WP.9
United States	Urge establishment of a CBM assistance network, coordinated by the ISU, to provide expert advice in an ongoing, consistent manner upon request	WP.9
United States	Urge States Parties in a position to do so to offer and coordinate assistance, training, translations, and workshops in support of CBM processes and submissions.	WP.9

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
United States	Further consider, in the context of the Standing Agenda Item on Strengthening National Implementation, options for gaining better information on national implementation measures in each State Party.	WP.9
United Kingdom	CBMs can be used to help inform national sovereign decisions on BTWC compliance assessment	S12/8 PM
United Kingdom	Keeping the CBMs relevant and ensuring fuller and regular participation presents a challenge that requires constant attention. Avoiding the issue is not an option. We all need to prepare thoroughly in the next few years, so that we can have a more systematic and fundamental consideration of CBMs at the next Review Conference.'	WP3
United Kingdom	A partial CBM return is better than no submission at all, and can be updated at a later time. The biggest hurdle is preparing it for the first time. That said, it is important to realise that as economies grow and biotechnologies expand, this may complicate the CBM compilation process.	
Belgium	The CBM- format could be modified so that it can include information about realized assistance and cooperation in the context of articles X and VII. With this modified CBM states parties would be able to demonstrate their implementation of the articles VII and X, increase transparency and build confidence. In the current situation states parties can demonstrate their implementation of art. X by means of separate reports. It would be more consistent and transparent if this would happen via the CBM.	S.16/8
South Africa	Participation by States Parties in the system is likely to remain low. The purpose and use of the whole system needs to be analysed and revised for States Parties to consider fulfilment of the obligation	S 12/8
Germany	Participation in CBM process is a politically binding obligation for all States Parties	S 12/8 PM
Benin	The establishment of an electronic database could facilitate the submission of CBMs.	S 15/8 AM
Benin	Each state should have a focal point in charge of CBMs and a network of focal points should be created, in order to facilitate the exchange of information.	S 15/8 AM
Switzerland	Instead of focussing solely on maximum biosafety level laboratories, we should also seek to address activities and related facilities pertaining to technologies relevant to the Convention, such as synthetic biology.	WP.13
Switzerland	Sharing additional information on measures related to biosafety and biosecurity in BSL4 facilities would add transparency in terms of the discussions revolving around the dual-use dilemma. Such measures would allow an assessment of the safe and secure application of said technologies.	WP.13
Switzerland	Declare information on biological defence programs in general and not only on biodefence research and development programs. Such information would also show capabilities and capacities of relevance to the Article X database.	WP.13
Switzerland	Share information on oversight mechanisms, such as information on biosafety and biosecurity boards overseeing research and development programs, directed toward ensuring compliance with the provisions of the Convention.	WP.13

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
Switzerland	Expand Form E significantly. Instead of only having to check a box... we should specifically ask for this information to be provided in Form E by stating that “States Parties shall submit detailed information on the respective legislation, regulations and other measures”.	WP.13
Switzerland	Add a sentence giving the opportunity to mention assistance offers and requests as follows: “States Parties should indicate areas in which assistance to further implementation of legislation, regulations and/or other measures would be welcomed or could be offered, providing a point of contact to whom such offers might be directed.”	WP.13
Switzerland	Asking for declarations of relevant animal vaccines facilities [is] an important issue to consider, in addition to declarations of human vaccine facilities.	WP.13
Switzerland	It is important to distinguish commercial production scales as opposed to small single lot productions for clinical trials that are only licensed for this particular purpose.	WP.13
Switzerland	Currently, Form G asks for vaccines produced on a State Party’s territory that are licensed by the State Party. Current trends in industry reveal that some companies produce vaccines on a State Party’s territory that are licensed exclusively in other sovereign states. These kinds of production facilities should be captured by Form G, but they are not.	WP.13
Switzerland	An easy-to-use electronic process for the CBMs could in fact “enable fuller participation in the CBMs”. Switzerland therefore commends the EU for its welcomed efforts in developing an electronic platform to, inter alia, compile, submit and retrieve CBM declarations.	WP.13
India	CBMs are a tool for building transparency, trust and confidence among States Parties in the implementation of the Convention. It is important that all States Parties strive to make CBMs submissions annually.	S 12/8 PM
India	A key challenge for the BWC and its CBMs is to make relevant ministries, departments, laboratories and institutions understand the importance of the Convention and its provisions so that they submit relevant information for preparation of national CBMs. In most cases these stakeholders have a number of other responsibilities, but need to prioritize the BWC requirements.	S 12/8 PM
India	In accordance with the mandate given to this inter-sessional programme by the Seventh Review Conference we believe that we should work towards finding measures to increase the number of States Parties making annual CBMs	S 12/8 PM
India	Possible areas of agreement could include: enhancing awareness nationally regarding CBMs, improving understanding of national activities to be reported in current CBM forms, assisting States Parties on request in preparing and submitting their CBMs, improving comprehensibility of CBMs through translations, greater efforts by the annual chair of BWC meetings requesting States Parties to make CBM submissions. As a first step, could focus on encouraging submissions by states which have never submitted CBMs.	S 12/8 PM
India	CBMs are not declarations and cannot be a tool to assess compliance for which the only method is a legally binding mechanism with verification provisions	S 12/8 PM
Iran (NAM)	CBMs are a tool of transparency and building trust and confidence among States Parties in the implementation of the Convention. They cannot be a tool	S 12/8

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
	to assess compliance for which the only method is a legally binding mechanism with verification provisions.	PM
Iran (NAM)	Further amendments to the CBMs forms were agreed to at the Seventh Review Conference in a constructive spirit shown by all States Parties. These amendments were aimed inter alia at increasing the number of States Parties which submit CBMs returns.	S 12/8 PM
Iran (NAM)	Hope that the new CBMs forms lead to an increase in the number of CBMs submissions as only a limited number of States Parties currently make CBMs submissions. Having agreed to the amendments to CBMs forms at the Review Conference, there is a need to allow time to the national stakeholders to adjust the amended forms.	S 12/8 PM
Iran (NAM)	Recall that the mandate for discussing this issue as agreed in the 7th Review Conference is “how to enable fuller participation in the CBMs”. This mandate is clear that the aim of the exercise is to increase the number of States Parties making CBMs submissions. NAM and Other States Parties are hopeful that the issue of CBMs will not be overemphasized in this inter-sessional process in a manner that complicates the whole CBMs process.	S 12/8 PM
Japan	Continuous efforts for improving the number of CBM participation, such as revising CBM forms, translating languages of CBM returns, and developing an electronic submission system are worth considering to increase the number of participants.	S 16/8 AM
Japan	Japan would like to propose a ‘step by step approach in CBM participation ‘ which will encourage state parties that have never submitted or have not annually submitted CBM returns to submit each CBM form separately or one by one, with a gradual accumulation.	S 16/8 AM
	The main objective of this proposal is to ease the burden of a CBM submission in the initial years. By taking steps to fill in the form, state parties can identify which component they have difficulties with and would require assistance. In accord, state parties can provide support to their specific needs. The CBM submission requires effort and coordination among national agencies.	
	This idea is illustrated with a timetable of 3 years. In the first year, efforts will focus on coordination among the relevant ministries and agencies at national level, in which form E will be submitted. The second year will allow for an updated form E, as well as the submission of form A and F. Then in the third year, CBM returns form A, E, F and form B, C, and G will be completed and submitted.	
United States	Reiterate U.S. 2012 proposal that BWC establish a CBM assistance network coordinated by the ISU; welcome the Canadian announcement that they have updated their CBM assistance information on BWC website and made it a formal offer of assistance in the database; U.S. intend to do the same.	S 12/8 PM
United States	CBMs have the same standing as any other decision of a Review Conference, and are no less binding than those portions of the document that record agreements about the scope of the Convention’s prohibitions. Submission is a responsibility of all States Parties.	S 12/8 PM
United States	To build greater confidence, we need more Parties submitting CBMs, but we also need to enhance use of CBMs. If nobody reads them, how is confidence increased? If the questions asked do not provide the right information, how is confidence increased?	S 12/8 PM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
United States	CBMs are useful, in conjunction with other sources of information, in drawing conclusions at the national level about the compliance of other States Parties with their obligations.	S 12/8 PM
United States	Discussion has addressed not only measures to improve the rate of submission, but proposals to improve the usability of the CBMs, or to make them more relevant. These issues are connected: more frequent and more visible use of more relevant CBMs will show that they matter, and encourage more countries to take them seriously and to submit.	S 16/8 AM
United States	Strongly support the EU's initiative to develop a freely available electronic platform for CBMs, as called for by the Seventh Review Conference	S 16/8 AM
United States	Many proposals have called for effective action to increase CBM submissions and to make the CBMs more useable and more relevant—but there is no common understanding of why States Parties do not submit CBMs or make greater use of them.	S 16/8 AM
United States	Those States Parties that have not submitted are best positioned to tell why, and how other States Parties can help. In the past have urged them to come to these meetings and share this information. Perhaps instead States Parties attending this meeting should approach them, in capitals, and ask.	S 16/8 AM
United States	States Parties should come to the MSP prepared to discuss how and to what extent they use CBMs, and what challenges they face—otherwise other States Parties won't know what is needed to make them more useful. Translation? Automation? Something else?	S 16/8 AM
United States	in order “to prevent or reduce the occurrence of ambiguities, doubts, and suspicions.” ...meeting this goal requires us not only to increase the number of States Parties submitting CBM reports, but to increase participation in the analysis and use of CBMs, for example by enhancing the accessibility and relevance of the information they contain. ... Submission of CBM reports – even universal submission – will not achieve that goal unless those submissions are complete, accurate, and consistent with other sources of information, and are actually examined by States Parties.	WP.9
United States	No single agency is likely to have oversight of all of these areas or ready access to all of the necessary information. ... This raises a number of challenges for the agency or individual charged with compiling the CBM report: identifying reportable facilities or activities; identifying points of contact who can provide the necessary information; maintaining the ability to do both over time (as both reportable facilities/activities and points of contact are subject to change); and ensuring the consistency of information provided by multiple agencies.	WP.9
United States	(a) Building a network of stakeholders: The completeness and accuracy of CBM returns depends in large part on the range and quality of the intra-governmental network of BWC stakeholders.	WP.9
	(b) Regular consultations: The Department of State hosts periodic meetings with representatives from the eight federal agencies that routinely provide data for the U.S. CBM return. This enables stakeholders to hear how other agencies gather data, and the CBM reporting process promotes transparency not only among States Parties, but within our government as well. Periodic meetings help	

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
	to identify problems and improve subsequent reporting.	
	(c) In 2010, in order to increase the completeness and accuracy of its CBM returns, the United States developed an “eTool” to standardize, collect, and aggregate those data that are required in the CBM forms. The eTool enables relevant U.S. Government personnel to directly input data about facilities and activities for which they have responsibility. Further, the eTool provides detailed instructions and standardized data fields to ensure accuracy and consistency.	
United States	<p>To meet the goal of building confidence, CBM reports must provide sufficient information to respond to the questions posed and to provide an appropriate level of transparency and clarity about activities... we have identified a number of steps, some of which have already been implemented, to make our reports more accessible and useful:</p> <p>... The United States will consistently include web links to publications listed on Form A along with their full references. On Form C, we have also included many web links to enable readers to learn in-depth about the many mechanisms in place to encourage publication and use of life science knowledge. We will consider use of web links in other parts of the CBM report where appropriate (for example, linking to legislation and regulations reported under Form E).</p> <p>... the United States provides additional information in Form E, describing what legislation, regulations, or guidelines have been developed or amended. We believe that the simple check-box approach agreed by States Parties provides insufficient transparency into what steps are being taken to implement the requirements of Articles III and IV. We encourage other States Parties to include such information in their submissions.</p>	WP.9
United States	...should not be a surprise that CBMs occasionally contain inaccurate or incomplete information. While completeness and accuracy are important, States Parties should not allow concerns over their ability to ensure completeness and accuracy to deter them from reporting. The United States has established a practice of submitting amendments or corrigenda in cases where we have discovered errors. ... this provides additional transparency and demonstrates the seriousness with which we take the CBM process, but it also recognizes the practical reality that CBM submissions may not always be perfect. Wider use of this approach might reduce any apprehensions that may be discouraging States Parties from submitting CBM returns.	WP.9
United States	The decision to make our submission publicly available required extensive interagency discussion to assess potential security concerns as well as legal/regulatory questions. The United States government determined that it was possible to manage these concerns in a publicly accessible CBM report. Public submissions allow academics and other analysts to study submissions and publish their analyses, which can then be drawn upon by States Parties. Since not every State Party has the resources to analyze all CBMs of potential interest, leveraging the resources of academic and other non-governmental analytical communities may enable greater use of CBM information. Today, roughly a third of all CBM submissions are publicly available.	WP.9
United States	The United States routinely makes use of the reports submitted by other States Parties under the Confidence-Building Measures. CBM reports are one of many sources of information we draw upon in reaching our national assess-	WP.9

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
	ments of the compliance of BWC States Parties with their obligations. By themselves, CBMs are of limited value. In most respects, their value emerges when they are compared with other information.	
United States	Form E provides so little information that it is effectively useless in trying to gauge whether and how a State Party is implementing the BWC. Although imperfect in some respects, the best source of organized, useful information for this purpose is the collection of national implementation matrices published by the UNSCR 1540 Committee. As recommended in our 2012 Working Paper on national implementation, States Parties should clarify what information about national implementation would be of greatest value and develop a means to gather it. Revising and expanding CBM Form E to ask for more information on relevant laws, regulations, and guidelines in a structured way would be one logical approach.	WP.9
United States	Not all inconsistencies or omissions are equally significant or require clarification. This is ultimately a decision that lies with each State Party as it reviews the returns. In cases where clarification is sought, Article V of the Convention allows for a wide range of consultative tools and approaches. In our experience, quiet, non-confrontational bilateral dialogue is often the most useful and appropriate tool, and one that we have used as recently as this year. When such an approach leads to constructive, substantive interchange, it can be effective in addressing concerns. When an approach is rebuffed or does not result in meaningful clarification, however, concerns are likely to be reinforced rather than allayed.	WP.9
United States	There is a clear need to improve the CBM process: The rate of submission remains very low. In addition, the quality of the reports submitted is uneven, and current reporting practices make analysis time- and labor-intensive, disadvantaging smaller States Parties. While 2013 marks the end of formal consideration of CBMs as an agenda item in the current intersessional process, it will be important for States Parties to remain engaged in efforts to address these issues in the coming years.	WP.9
United States	Develop a CBM assistance network. Such a mechanism could institutionalize a sort of CBM “experts group” that Parties could turn to for assistance. Those States Parties that have never submitted a CBM return would especially benefit from such a standing experts group, since building a strong national CBM process requires some initial refinement – a process that can be explained by those who have been through it. Finally, building a complete list of National Points of Contact would greatly facilitate the effectiveness of a CBM assistance network. Of 170 States Parties, only 80 (or 47 percent) have provided National Points of Contact since the Sixth Review Conference agreed on this measure in 2006.	WP.9
Ecuador	In the light of the scientific progress and technological progress that has been made in microbiology and biotechnology, as we have seen during the presentations made during this week, we do not require greater depth in the information that is required in the light of additional requirements in the formats or the forms established for the presentation or submission of CBMs. What we need to do is insist on the creation of a body or a mechanism that is binding, binding under the Convention, that ensures that the Convention is enforced, or rather is abided by the States parties and we propose that this initiative be dealt with in December this year during the Meeting of the States Parties.	S 16/8 AM

List of abbreviations

BSAT	Biological select agents and toxins
DURC	Dual-use research of concern
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
Iran (NAM)	Islamic Republic of Iran on behalf of the Group of the Non-aligned Movement and Other States Parties to the BWC
OIE	World Organisation for Animal Health
S&T	Science and technology
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
UNSGM	United Nations Secretary-General's mechanism for investigation of alleged use of biological and chemical weapons
VERTIC	Verification Research, Training and Information Centre
WHO	World Health Organization

Annex II

List of documents

<i>Symbol</i>	<i>Title</i>
BWC/MSP/2013/MX/1	Provisional agenda for the Meeting of Experts – Submitted by the Chairman
BWC/MSP/2013/MX/2	Provisional programme of work for the Meeting of Experts – Submitted by the Chairman
BWC/MSP/2013/MX/3	Report of the Meeting of Experts
BWC/MSP/2013/MX/INF.1/Rev. 1	Advances in science and technology related to the Convention – Background information document submitted by the Implementation Support Unit
BWC/MSP/2013/MX/INF.2	Challenges and obstacles to developing international cooperation, assistance and exchange – Background information document submitted by the Implementation Support Unit
BWC/MSP/2013/MX/INF.3 [English/French/Spanish only]	List of participants
BWC/MSP/2013/MX/WP.1 [English only]	We need to talk about compliance: A response to BWC/MSP/2012/WP.11 – Submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
BWC/MSP/2013/MX/WP.2 [English only]	BWC compliance – a conceptual discussion: preliminary views by Australia – Submitted by Australia
BWC/MSP/2013/MX/WP.3 [English only]	Confidence-building Measures: next steps to enable fuller participation – Submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
BWC/MSP/2013/MX/WP.4 [English only]	Key biosecurity-related changes made to the USA select agent regulations – Submitted by the United States of America
BWC/MSP/2013/MX/WP.5 [English only]	Developments in science and technology - diagnostics – Submitted by the United States of America
BWC/MSP/2013/MX/WP.6 [English only]	Identifying and addressing barriers to the emergency sharing of international public health and medical assistance – Submitted by the United States of America
BWC/MSP/2013/MX/WP.7 [English only]	Improving participation in the Confidence-Building Measure system – Submitted by Canada
BWC/MSP/2013/MX/WP.8 [English only]	Advances in science and technology: Vaccine development – Submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
BWC/MSP/2013/MX/WP.9 [English only]	Making the most of the Confidence-building Measures – Submitted by the United States of America

<i>Symbol</i>	<i>Title</i>
BWC/MSP/2013/MX/WP.10 [English only]	Implementation of the BTWC in South Africa – Submitted by South Africa
BWC/MSP/2013/MX/WP.11 [English only]	Advances in laboratory diagnostics, point of care detection, pathogen characterisation and potential benefits to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention – Submitted by South Africa
BWC/MSP/2013/MX/WP.12 [English only]	Compliance with the BWC: preliminary considerations by Switzerland - Submitted by Switzerland
BWC/MSP/2013/MX/WP.13 [English only]	Confidence-Building Measures: enabling fuller participation - Submitted by Switzerland
BWC/MSP/2013/MX/WP.14 ^{a/} [Chinese only]	Efforts of China in response to the epidemic of H7N9 avian influenza – Submitted by China
BWC/MSP/2013/MX/WP.15 [Arabic only]	International assistance and cooperation and its role in the implementation of the Convention – Submitted by Iraq
BWC/MSP/2013/MX/WP.16 ^{b/} [French only]	National implementation assessment report of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) – Submitted by France
BWC/MSP/2013/MX/WP.17 [English only]	Measures for full, effective and non-discriminatory Implementation of the Article X – Submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran on behalf of the Group of the Non-aligned Movement and Other States Parties to the BWC
BWC/MSP/2013/MX/WP.18 [English only]	Preliminary views on the paper entitled “We need to talk about compliance” – Submitted by Japan
BWC/MSP/2013/MX/CRP.1 [English only]	Draft elements for the compilation of the considerations, lessons, perspectives, recommendations, conclusions and proposals drawn from the presentations, statements, working papers and interventions on the topics under discussion at the Meeting – Submitted by the Chairman
BWC/MSP/2013/MX/CRP.2 [English only]	Draft report of the Meeting of Experts – Submitted by the Chairman
BWC/MSP/2013/MX/MISC.1 [English/French/Spanish only]	Provisional list of participants

^{a/} An English unofficial translation is included after the Chinese text.

^{b/} An English unofficial translation is included after the French text.