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ASAMBLEA GENERAL
Cuadragésimo primer período de sesiones
Temas 25, 127 y 136 del programa
provisional*

CONSEJO DE SEGURIDAD
Cuadragésimo primer año

LA SITUACION EN KAMPUCHEA
ARREGLO PACIFICO DE CONTROVERSIAS
ENTRE ESTADOS
DESARROLLO Y FORTALECIMIENTO DE LA
BUENA VECINDAD ENTRE ESTADOS

Carta de fecha 12 de septiembre de 1986 dirigida al
Secretario General por el Representante Permanente
de Kampuchea Democrática ante las Naciones Unidas

Tengo el honor de transmitirle, para su información, el texto de un memorándum titulado "La situación en Kampuchea en 1986 (Extractos de declaraciones oficiales y de informaciones de los medios de comunicación)".

Mucho le agradecería que se sirviera hacer distribuir el presente texto como documento oficial de la Asamblea General, en relación con los temas 25, 127 y 136 del programa provisional, y del Consejo de Seguridad.

(Firmado) THIOUNN Prasith
Representante Permanente

* A/41/150.

** El anexo se ha publicado en francés e inglés únicamente.

ANNEX

THE SITUATION IN KAMPUCHEA IN 1986

(EXCERPTS FROM OFFICIAL STATEMENTS AND THE MEDIA)

SEPTEMBER 1986

MEMORANDUM

THE SITUATION IN KAMPUCHEA IN 1986

(EXCERPTS FROM OFFICIAL STATEMENTS AND THE MEDIA)

(1) "The past seven years were seven years of hard and fierce struggle. However, during these times, the Kampuchean people's struggle has moved forward and won successive victories over the Vietnamese aggressors who are bogged down deeper and deeper and are facing total stalemate in the battlefield in Kampuchea.

"The Vietnamese enemy's total stalemate in Kampuchea was much clearer during last year 1985(*). They mobilized their forces larger than in the previous years to strike in one blow in order to extricate themselves from their stalemate. But the result was that they became even more bogged down at the western border as well as in the inland of Kampuchea..."

(2) "This year, the Kampuchean people's struggle under the leadership of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), with His Royal Highness Samdech NORODOM Sihanouk as President of Democratic Kampuchea, has been developing very favourably in all fields.

"..., our struggle has made another important step forward. The situation clearly shows the following:

- i. The Vietnamese enemy are completely in an impasse on the military field.
- ii. As a result of the defeats in the war of aggression in Kampuchea, there are in Vietnam increasing severe economic, social and political difficulties which are of such gravity that the Vietnamese leaders can no longer hide them and have to admit them openly.
- iii. On the international arena, Vietnam is more and more isolated.

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(1): "The Situation in Kampuchea (at the end of 1985)" - UN document A/41/98

(*) : "The Situation in Kampuchea in 1985" - UN document A/40/636

(2): "The Situation in Kampuchea (mid-April 1986)" - UN document A/41/313

A. THE MILITARY SITUATION

(3) *This year, the military situation of the Vietnamese aggressors* "has been worsening still further. More and more Vietnamese forces have been pinned down and continuously harassed in the Battle Zone 1 (around the Tonle Sap lake and the capital Phnom Penh - Ed.), including the capital city Phnom Penh and its surrounding areas, as well as in the Battle Zone 3 (other than Zone 1 and Zone 2 along the border Kampuchea-Thailand - Ed.)

Our forces attack constantly "the Vietnamese administrative centers in the villages and communes, liberating the inhabitants, Khmer soldiers and administrative committees forcibly enlisted by the Vietnamese to serve their war of aggression, and inspiring Khmer soldiers with patriotic spirit. As a result, the people and Khmer soldiers not only provide support and aid to the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea and other national resistance forces but also inform them, guide them and participate actively with them in the attacks against the Vietnamese aggressors. That's why since December 1985, we have been able to launch precise and efficient attacks against the Vietnamese aggressors inflicting upon them increasingly heavy losses in living forces and materials as shown by our attacks against Pochentong airport, Prek Phneou, provincial chief-towns of Kompong Speu, Kompong Thom, Siemreap, Battambang, etc."

(4) "There is impartial evidence from residents of Phnom Penh that (the) guerrillas are regularly within striking distance of the city. In September, they fired rockets into the capital's central fuel storage depot, a resident of the city said. The resident said the explosions had shaken buildings across a wide area. Only the failure of several of the rockets to fire saved the whole depot from destruction, he added."

(5) "In a rare military briefing for Western journalists, General Tran Cong Man, editor-in-chief of Vietnam's army newspaper, ... admitted that during the current dry season, the guerrillas 'harassed' the suburbs of the Kampuchean capital of Phnom Penh, the important northwestern provincial capital of Siemreap and other areas... Large areas of the country previously accessible to foreigners are now off limits for security reason..."

(6) *The National resistance forces* "are increasing their activity in almost every Cambodian province,... some close to Phnom Penh. Several diplomats suggest that the Vietnamese ... (are) secure in garrisons but did not control the countryside... An unusual confirmation of the seriousness

(3): "The Situation in Kampuchea (as of mid-April 1986)" - UN document A/41/313

(4): Barbara Crossette in The New York Times, Monday 23 December 1985

(5): The Nation Review, Thailand's English-language daily, 16 January 1986

(6): The New York Times, 5 April 1986

of the situation inside Cambodia has come from the Soviet newspaper Pravda. Disruption caused by the guerrilla war is adding to already severe economic problems of Cambodia, it was reported in Pravda, which added that in the countryside, the Cambodian Communist Party was attracting few members despite programs of ideological education..."

(7) "... It is noted that safety devices have been reinforced in Cambodia since summer 1985. In August of that year, the military service which is compulsory for all men from 18 to 30 years old, has been extended from 2 years to 5 years. Around the villages in some provinces, fences have been strengthened and a night curfew has been enforced.

"Since that time, the authorization of the police is required to move between districts. New identity cards have also been distributed. Since January 1986, in Phnom Penh, patrols have been reinforced and every group of 10 families must give 2 men for night guards. Same measures have been taken at least in some provincial cities.

"In a circular of the Cambodian Communist Party, broadcast on 3 April by Radio Phnom Penh, he (Heng Samrin, chief of the Phnom Penh regime - Ed.) has even specified that '*the new manoeuvres of the enemy forces have caused temporarily complicated problems, here and there, in this or that department...*'

(8) *In response to the attacks and, in particular, out of fear that the national resistance forces "might try to infiltrate Phnom Penh and attack the capital from its suburbs, the government has begun mobilizing workers from government ministries, hotels and other enterprises to remove shrubbery from around the city. In other moves, many villages in Kandal, Kompong Speu, Prey Veng, Svay Rieng and Kompong Cham provinces have built bamboo stockade fences around them in the style of the old strategic hamlets in Vietnam."*

"In Phnom Penh, a curfew is in force from 9 p.m. to dawn. In places such as Kompong Chhnang city, curfews begin as early as 6 p.m. In recent months, the government has clamped down on foreigners travelling very far from Phnom Penh, and it is becoming difficult to get permission to visit provinces."

(9) *In Phnom Penh, "a curfew is still in force from 9 p.m. to 5 a.m. and every cross-streets is guarded at night by soldiers or militiamen who check everything which moves. But as soon as it is dark, the population begin to quit the streets. The authorities have also reorganized the administrations*
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(7): Jean Claude Pomonti in Le Monde, 4-5 May 1986

(8): Nayan Chanda in Far Eastern Economic Review, 15 May 1986

(9): Laurent Maillard in AFP, 25 May 1986

of several quarters of the suburbs and launched during the last few months a large campaign to clear all around Phnom Penh: officially to create a 'green belt' of farmings, but also, according to most Western observers, to facilitate the control of the surroundings of the capital. Thus, the atmosphere remained appalling and a veiled anxiety over possible actions (of the national resistance forces - Ed.) is perceptible in discussion with the population. The city seems even to be, in early April, before the Khmer New Year and the 11th anniversary (of the founding of Democratic Kampuchea - Ed.) under a real war-scare awaiting the activities of the guerrillas... That perceptible tension in the capital seems fueled by the increase of the guerrillas activities in all the country, which has been confirmed by direct or indirect testimonies given by the international community working in Cambodia... Vietnamese officials have admitted last March in Hanoi, this new outbreak of the guerrilla operations."

(10) "The guerrillas are now at the gates of Phnom Penh, the airport of which has been attacked twice last month. A film shot with an amateur camera by a mquisard who has managed to get out of the country after a three-month walk, has been salvaged by Le Point. TFI (French TV - Ed.) has broadcast the main parts of it... The film allows us to follow a military unit whose objective is the destruction of an administrative committee of Kompong Chhnang, 70km north-west of Phnom Penh. These committees defended by about fifty soldiers and local militiamen, constitute the foundation of the politico-military apparatus set up by the Vietnamese army to cross-rule the country. They are, with the supply lines, the preference target of the attacks by the resistance forces. A recent evaluation shows the destruction, this year, of 1,200 of these posts. The military unit which attacks it is about one hundred men strong - in majority new recruits. That fighting company has made more than 300 kilometres openly from its starting base on the Dangrek mountain, natural border between Thailand and Cambodia. It has embarked on a flotilla of sampans few kilometres north of its objective. The combat zone can be identified by a very characteristic serrated three hills, and is located less than 100 kilometres from Phnom Penh. The film confirms, moreover, that the Vietnamese, like the Soviet in Afghanistan, are now using helicopters.

(11) "According to newcomers (Kampuchians fleeing the Vietnamese regime in Phnom Penh and seeking refuge in Thailand - Ed.) KPNLF (Khmer People National Liberation Front) soldiers are now operating in the provinces of Battambang, Oddar Meanchey, Siemreap, Kompong Cham, Prey Veng, Svay Rieng, Kompong Thom and Kandal. The troops from the Nationalist Sihanoukian Army (ANS) have been seen in Siemreap, Oddar Meanchey, Battambang, Stung Treng, Kandal and Prey Veng. As for the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea, they are everywhere..."

(12) "How goes the war for Cambodia's heartland? A Sihanoukist patrol in April through June this year showed that the resistance forces can still

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(10): Charles Fiori in Le Point, 9 June 1986

(11): Marie A. Martin, in The Bangkok Post, Thailand's English-language daily, 3 July 1986

(12): "Behind enemy lines" in Asiaweek of July 13, 1986 with several exclusive colour pictures taken during photographer-journalist Ken Guest's trip.

move relatively freely through a large swath of territory. With the group was Photojournalist Ken Guest, who filed a detailed report of his observations to Asiaweek.

"Some 22km from Battambang city, the nearly 500 'intervention troops' of force Prak Senn are seeking to link up with the Sihanoukists' main group. This is 1,153 strong and comprises mostly troops of the 1st Brigade, plus elements of several others. Close to Col. Prak Senn's column are a 400-strong Khmer People's unit and about 200 members of the (Democratic Kampuchea party - Ed.).

"The Sihanoukists had been greeted warmly along their route. Some villagers and soldiers of Heng Samrin's pro-Vietnamese administration reportedly give information and aid freely, others want money. Yet, reports Guest, 'in more and more instances the local population was the resistance.'

"The Heng Samrin side is also suffering from desertions. Prak Senn's force took seven in tow during the march south. Sweeping ahead of the column is another deserter, Soviet-trained ex-tank officer Thlang Chansovannarith."

(13) "In brief, for 7 years, the Vietnamese aggressors have been unable to extricate themselves from the networks of our guerrilla warfare. Even in many years to come, they will not be able to do better. We can assert that in the military field, the Vietnamese aggressors are now in a total impasse. So long as they refuse to put an end to their war of aggression in Kampuchea, they will never be able to extricate themselves from their inextricable difficulties in Kampuchea and in Vietnam itself. From year to year, their military forces, the moral of their soldiers, their economy and finances have been deteriorating..."

B. STRENGTHENING OF NATIONAL UNITY AGAINST THE VIETNAMESE OCCUPIERS

I. INTENSE AND INCREASING COOPERATION OF THE POPULATION, KHMER SOLDIERS AND MEMBERS OF THE PHNOM PENH PUPPET REGIME WITH THE NATIONAL RESISTANCE FORCES

(14) "The Khmer population in all provinces of our country, after more than seven years of life under Vietnamese domination, has seen that the Vietnamese are our worst enemies in every way and that the danger of the Vietnamization and colonization of our country is a deadly one for our nation, our

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(13): "The Situation in Kampuchea (as of mid-April 1986)" - UN document A/41/313

(14): H.R.H. Samdech NORODOM Sihanouk, President of Democratic Kampuchea, in his exclusive interview with Xinhua, of July 27, 1986

race, our culture, our national identity. Conscious of this danger, more and more people in the interior, including many compatriots working within the Heng Samrin administration, have declared their support for and desire to help the CGDK armed forces.

"The Western press, that of the free world, has not failed to realize that the Vietnamese in Cambodia and their puppets are faced with paralyzing difficulties in the form of the resistance... and that the Khmer patriots who are enrolled by the Vietnamese into the Heng Samrin army are in greater numbers turning their backs to the Viets, they are rebelling, revolting, staging mutinies against the colonialist oppressor and each day there are desertions..."

(15) "The Khmer self-defence guards, village or commune guerrilla units and soldiers forcibly enlisted by the Vietnamese enemy, have also increasingly fought back against the Vietnamese. On 15 December 1985, 700 Khmer soldiers of the 1st and 2nd regiments of the 2nd Division in western Leach front, uprised against the Vietnamese enemy, took over 2 Vietnamese tanks and courageously fought back the Vietnamese in Roleap (west of the provincial city of Pursat). On 17 December 1985, 150 Khmer soldiers uprised in Anlong Reap and joined the other group in Roleap to fight back the Vietnamese.

"The population forcibly rounded up and sent by the Vietnamese to the front of western Leach actively supported the Khmer insurgent soldiers and valiantly joined them in the fighting against the Vietnamese enemy for several days.

"These uprisings of the Khmer soldiers and of the population clearly testify to the fact that the people, the Khmer soldiers, self-defence guards, guerrilla units in villages or communes forcibly enlisted by the Vietnamese have been exasperated by the Vietnamese aggression and occupation. They can no longer stand idly and allow the Vietnamese to act at their will. The longer the Vietnamese enemy prolong their war of aggression in Kampuchea the hotter becomes the flame of anger of the whole people and nation of Kampuchea against the Vietnamese aggressors."

(16) "Eight hundred soldiers have defected from the Heng Samrin forces and two hundred from the Vietnamese forces in Kampuchea last month as Khmer resistance fighters intensified activities in the interior of the country, National Security Council Chief Prasong Soonsiri disclosed recently. While the destruction of roads and bridges obstructs logistical support for the front line forces, he said, the resistance has been able to win over greater and more active cooperation from the Khmer population who have become increasingly antagonistic towards the occupying forces from Vietnam... He said the Khmer people are providing the resistance with information on enemy movement..."

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(15): "The Situation in Kampuchea (as of the end of 1985)" - UN document A/41/98

(16): "1,000 Heng Samrin, Hanoi troops defect", Bangkok Sunday, Thailand's English-language journal, January 26, 1986

(17) "Vietnam recently moved all troops of its Kampuchean ally from the neighbourhood of the Khmer capital of Phnom Penh following a rebellion which also led to the dissolution of a Heng Samrin Division, a Thai military spokesman said yesterday. Supreme Command spokesman Lt. Gen. Vichit Bunyawat told a news conference that all the 13,000 troops guarding the capital now are Vietnamese. The replacement took place between late last month and early this month. Conflicts between Vietnamese and Heng Samrin military units have been reported intermittently and the latest incident in Koh Kong province in which Khmer troops of the 2nd Division staged an uprising against the 339th Vietnamese Division apparently deepened the distrust between the two allies."

(18) "The pro-Vietnamese authorities of Cambodia have commandeered buddhist monasteries and temples for propaganda meetings in favor of the army, in the framework of a vast campaign of recruitment... That campaign *'is the subject of a circular of the Central Committee of the ruling Communist Party in Phnom Penh, which was adopted at a time when the pro-Vietnamese army is apparently meeting problems of discipline'*. The circular requested the local authorities to arrange meetings so as *'to propagate information on the role of the armed forces and the duties of defences of all the population.'* That appeal indirectly confirms the assertions of Thailand and of the Khmer resistance about desertions in the pro-Vietnamese army ... The Phnom Penh army magazine, Revolutionary Army, in February, had already given an indication of problems of discipline and officering, criticizing a non specified numbers of units and commanders for their lack of enthusiasm and their low ideological level. A well-informed sources about military questions in Hanoi has recently admitted that Phnom Penh troops *'lack experience'* ..."

(19) "One worrying aspect of a (national resistance force - Ed.) attack on a district town in Prey Veng province in January was the reluctance of villagers to alert Phnom Penh or the Vietnamese about the presence of (national resistance - Ed.) units in the area... One of Hanoi's principal worries is the continuing inability of the Heng Samrin regime to grow strong and manage things of its own. Its presence in the country outside Phnom Penh is minimal, with huge chunks of the country described by East European sources as no man's land... Socialist sources in the capital concede that the government (the Phnom Penh regime - Ed.) is having difficulty maintaining discipline and, above all, motivating its soldiers to fight. This is one reason the government has extended the period of conscription from three to five years. In mid-February, the army newspaper, Kangtoap Padevat, admitted that *'a small number of units still do not have a clear understanding of their role and duties. They have not yet firmly built their forces and cannot be properly used...'* ..."

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(17): "Khmer troop moved from Phnom Penh", Thailand's English-language daily, The Nation, January 24, 1986

(18): Agence France Presse of 26 March 1986

(19): Nayan Chanda in Far Eastern Economic Review, 15 May 1986

(20) "The population inside Kampuchea is helping the resistance by remaining silent about their activities. The presence of the guerrillas is kept from the Vietnamese and food is provided to soldiers from the three groups (of the CGDK - Ed.)

(21) "At the Cambodian refugee camp in Thailand known as 'Site B', Vong Pho looks out of place. He is wearing the brown, wrinkled uniform of the Khmer People's Revolutionary Army, the Vietnamese-backed military of Cambodia. He has just defected and is eager to tell his story. 'I was forced to join the Army six years ago, just after Vietnam entered our country. I did not want to join, but we heard of many soldiers who had tried to defect but were executed. So I joined and moved up to commander of about 40 soldiers. We didn't see much action, although we heard of many attacks by the Khmer Rouge. There were many problems between the Vietnamese and our soldiers. In my company of 40 men, 22 joined me when we defected. We brought with us seven grenade-launchers, three large machine guns, and 14 (Soviet-made) AK-47 rifles. Other companies had many, many defectors. We had had a shortage of food and medicine... We decided to join the guerrillas. If we are united we can win.' "

II. NATIONAL UNITY WITHIN THE CGDK INCREASINGLY STRENGTHENED

(22) "It is and will be the duty of the CGDK and the tripartite armed forces to continually strengthen national unity and our determination to fight until the end, without a thought of retreat, against the Vietnamese aggressors, the Vietnamese colonialists in Kampuchea'. I have said it before, but I must say it again, it is my duty as a Khmer, as a patriot and traditional leader of my people to continue during the rest of my life, alongside other Khmer patriots, our fight for national liberation, our battle against the invader and foreign occupier, whoever it be, because it is a sacred duty for us."

(23) "The CGDK with Samdech NORODOM Sihanouk as President of Democratic Kampuchea has been more strengthened and more stable as a result of the progress made by the force of great national unity against the Vietnamese aggressors. The conditions in favour of the strengthening and development of the great national unity in the present and the future have increased.

"Each party is much more aware that no party can alone successfully fight the Vietnamese enemy and defend the country. Only when all parties join together their forces and capabilities, can they fight successfully the Vietnamese enemy at present and will they be able to defend the country in the future.

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(20): Marie A. Martin, French researcher, in Bangkok Post, Thailand's English-language daily, 3 July 1986

(21): Clayton Jones in The Christian Science Monitor, 28 August 1986

(22): H.R.H. Samdech NORODOM Sihanouk, President of Democratic Kampuchea, in his exclusive interview with Xinhua on 27 July 1986

(23): "The Situation in Kampuchea (at the end of 1985)" - UN document A/41/98

"Furthermore, all parties agree that the national unity should not be only within a tripartite coalition. After the total withdrawal of the Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea, any other forces who accept an independent, peaceful, neutral and non-aligned Kampuchea without any foreign military base will be welcome.

(24) "The eight-point proposal put forth through common consent by the CGDK for a political solution to the Kampuchean problem, shows the identical view of its three components. We have been further strengthening the mutual confidence in the present struggle as well as the identical view concerning the future of Kampuchea after the Vietnamese forces are compelled to withdraw from Kampuchea. The identical political view and the mutual confidence are of great importance to the three patriotic forces at present when they are united in their struggle against the Vietnamese aggressors within the CGDK with His Royal Highness Samdech NORODOM Sihanouk as President of Democratic Kampuchea, as well as in the future when they will continue to be united to defend and rebuild the country within the great national union and the great national reconciliation in an independent, united in her territorial integrity, peaceful, neutral and non-aligned Kampuchea without any foreign military force on her territory."

(25) "The Foreign Ministers noted the increasing co-operation and unity among the component parties of the CGDK in their political, diplomatic and military struggle, with a clear objective of liberating their country from Vietnamese occupation. They took note of the growing number and high morale of the nationalist resistance forces who are fighting more effectively to achieve that goal. The Foreign Ministers were particularly encouraged by the growing co-operation and support given by the Khmer people, including disenchanted followers of the Phnom Penh puppet regime to the CGDK."

(26) "On 9 April and again on 11 April (1986 - Ed.) guerrillas of (the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea - Ed.) and up to three companies from Sihanouk's Armée Nationale Sihanoukiste (ANS) are said to have taken part in joint operation against Vietnamese position 70 miles north-west of the Siemreap provincial capital. Five days later, ANS forces provided flank security in a second (National Army of Democratic Kampuchea - Ed.) strike against Battambang and its nearby airfield... Other joint operations have been reported by the KPNLF as taking place at about the same time..."

(27) "The resistance groups also seem to be cooperating more than in the past. Sihanoukists are met by local (National Army of Democratic Kampuchea - Ed.) commanders who advise about planned actions. The Sihanoukists adjust their routes to avoid the selected area shelling that is a common Vietnamese response to attack.

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- (24): "The Situation in Kampuchea (as of mid-April 1986) - UN document A/41/313
(25): "ASEAN joint communiqué on the situation in Kampuchea" published in Manila on 24 June 1986 - UN document A/41/452
(26): John McBeth in Far Eastern Economic Review, 15 May 1986
(27): "Behind enemy lines" in Asiaweek, 13 July 1986

**C. INEXTRICABLE AND GROWING ECONOMIC,
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES
IN VIETNAM**

(28) "Many of them (among cadres and party members), realizing difficulties in the economy and people's lives, are deeply concerned about how we are going to extricate ourselves from this difficult situation, and in general about our country's future... Some widespread phenomena among cadres and party members are corruption, bribery, smuggling, enrichment, dissolute and depraved living, feasting, and open bribery with presents... This situation exists everywhere and at every echelon. It has caused great wastage in productions and people's lives, degenerated cadres and party members, and diminished the public's confidence. It may be said that in no time before was there, in our party, a degeneration of virtues and the way of living as is the case now..."

(29) "Pham Van Dong, Vietnamese Prime Minister, has raised the present confidence crisis between the Vietnamese Communist Party and the population by stressing the necessity of a widespread purging of 'corrupt or incompetent' cadres. In an address made on 14 June during a visit to the provinces and published on Thursday by the Nhan Dan daily, Mr. Pham Van Dong stressed the necessity to 'strengthen the population's confidence in the party'."

(30) "The 1985 reforms have worsened the situation (400% of inflation) and aggravated the disparity among regions... In Hanoi and cities in the North and Centre Vietnam where poverty is more rampant than one year ago ... the fundamental fact is that the mass, within the Communist Party of Vietnam, now complain bitterly, demand deep changes and that they have means to exert pressure."

(31) "The number of Vietnamese 'boat people' reaching Thailand in the first five months of this year climbed by nearly 20% over the comparable period last year, a spokesman for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees said today. Some of the refugees told officials on arrival that they were fleeing from a new census in Vietnam that was intended to find and identify men who were evading military service. Other refugees said that worsening economic conditions were behind their decision to flee.

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(28): Le Duc Tho, member of Vietnam's Communist Party Central Committee Political Bureau, in "Pressing Tasks in Party Building Work", article published in Tap Chi Cong San and Nhan Dan of 5 May 1986 (FBIS 12 May 1986)

(29): AFF, 19 June 1986

(30): François Nivolon in "Le Triomphe de la pénurie" and "Vietnam: les masses sont lassées" - Figaro, 3 and 4 June 1986

(31): The New York Times, June 18, 1986

(32) "A Vietnamese civil servant had another explanation: 'Cambodia is difficult because it is not a clear war for us, one we all understand.'" The reality is brought home to Vietnamese cities and towns by amputees in their 20's. Many Vietnamese families, having suffered through the dangers and deprivations of three decades of fighting, are now fearful of losing another generation of sons to another war. When reporters visited a commune in northern Vietnam earlier this year, a poor farmer who had lost a leg in the independence struggle against the French more than 30 years ago showed visitors a portrait of a young man in uniform and explained: 'He was my son. He died in Cambodia.' The old man didn't know where, or how. 'A lot of people don't want to go to fight away from Vietnam,' said Nguyen Tri Hieu, a 24-year-old draft resister and deserter, adding that this did not mean they loved their country less or that the deep patriotism of the Vietnamese had diminished. 'In Cambodia there is no main goal,' he said. 'We are not fighting for our land. I would bleed for Vietnam, but I did not want to die for someone else's country.' "

(33) "There are more draft resisters among the boat people. For many Vietnamese families, a second or third generation of young men are going to war, this time in Cambodia. In Vietnam, there seems to be little commitment to that war among the young, and a great sense of weariness among older people being asked to sacrifice once more, their hopes of a better life.

"Vietnam, now one of the world's poorest nations, has health standards among the lowest in Asia, according to international organizations and officials in asylum nations. Children's nutritional levels have not improved in four years, UNICEF researcher recently discovered. According to Agence France Presse, the only Western news agency with a resident correspondent in Hanoi, UNICEF found that Vietnamese children were getting only 45 to 60% of the required daily caloric intake, 65 to 70% of protein and 25 to 30% of lipids, or fats. Meanwhile the population growth rate is 3.2% a year, one of the world's highest, Vietnamese officials report. The result, refugees say, is desperation."

(34) On February 1, 1986, Hanoi announced the dismissal of Deputy Prime Minister Tran Phuon, the author of the country's six-month-old economic reforms. "Dr. Vo Nhan Tri, former head of the Institute of Economy's World Economy Department in Hanoi during 1965-1975, told a panel discussion organized by Chulalongkorn University's Institute of Asian Studies that ... Tran was only a 'scapegoat' of the current Vietnamese economic policy which is tied up with its overall policy. He said that ... the standard of living of the Vietnamese people deteriorated because of the large share of its military spendings in its budget. The only way to stop the deterioration of the Vietnamese economy is for Hanoi to revamp its overall domestic and foreign policy."

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(32): "Southeast Asia was yields new crop of deserters" by Barbara Crossette in The New York Times of June 30, 1986

(33): "Boat People's Quandary: What Else Can We Do" by Barbara Crossette in The New York Times of July 11, 1986

(34): "More dismissals in Vietnam leadership predicted" in The Nation, Thailand's English-language daily, 14 March 1986

(35) "If Vietnam wants to solve its critical economic and political difficulties, it should look at the right problems and tackle the key cause, namely it should bring an end to its ruinous war of aggression in Kampuchea and mobilize its forces, funds and resources to rebuild its economy and improve the living conditions of its people. If Vietnam continues stubbornly to refuse to end its war in Kampuchea, no matter how sophisticated an economic reform it is turning to and no matter how many officials it is firing or appointing, it will never be able to redress the current economic fiasco."

D. FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF KAMPUCHEA

(36) "The Council of Ministers of the CGDK prompted by a genuine desire to seek a political solution to the problem of Kampuchea, has thoroughly examined and adopted a clear proposal on 17 March 1986 in order to bring about a political solution to the problem of Kampuchea..."

"This proposal... is based on the relevant United Nations resolutions adopted in the past 7 consecutive years and the International Conference on Kampuchea Declaration in 1981."

This eight-point proposal can be summed up as follows:

- i. Negotiations between the tripartite Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on the total withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea. The CGDK accepts that the withdrawal be proceeded in two phases within a definite period of time.
- ii. Cease-fire after the agreement on the process of the withdrawal of the Vietnamese forces.
- iii. Both the withdrawal of the Vietnamese forces and the cease-fire will be supervised by a UN observer group.
- iv. After the first phase of the Vietnamese forces withdrawal, Heng Samrin and his faction (installed in Phnom Penh by Vietnam - Ed.) get into negotiation with the CGDK in order to set up a quadripartite coalition government of Kampuchea in conformity with the spirit of the great national unity and national reconciliation, each of the four parties having the same rights as political forces in the national community.

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(35): Commentary of the Radio "Voice of Democratic Kampuchea", February 4, 1986

(36): Press Communiqué of the CGDK and Proposal of the CGDK for a political settlement to the problem of Kampuchea - UN document A/41/225

- v. The quadripartite coalition government of Kampuchea will hold free elections under the supervision of a UN observer group.
- vi. Kampuchea will be restored as an independent, united, peaceful, neutral and non-aligned country without any foreign base, and having a liberal democratic regime. Her neutrality will be guaranteed by the U.N.
- vii. Kampuchea welcomes, for her reconstruction, aid and assistance from all Western, Eastern, neutral and non-aligned countries.
- viii. Kampuchea will sign with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam a treaty of non-aggression and peaceful coexistence, and establish economic and trade relations with it.

(37) "The ASEAN Foreign Ministers discussed the eight-point proposal of the CGDK issued on 17 March 1986. They were impressed by the comprehensive nature of the proposal, the laudable attempt to address all aspects of the Kampuchean problem including the core issues of the total withdrawal of the Vietnamese troops, self-determination of the Kampuchean people, the concrete steps to bring about national reconciliation and Kampuchea's role and obligations in the regional and international context.

"The Foreign Ministers supported the eight-point proposal as it reaffirms ASEAN's resolve that the Kampuchean problem has to be solved by the Kampuchean people themselves. It is a viable proposal originating from the Kampuchean people themselves with the merit that it can serve as a constructive framework for negotiation. For this reason, the Foreign Ministers strongly urged the support of the international community for the eight-point proposal as it is reasonable and reflects a genuine effort by the CGDK to find a just and durable solution to the Kampuchean problem.

"The Foreign Ministers called upon the Socialist Republic of Vietnam to consider seriously the various positive aspects of the proposal and to reconsider its rejection. The Foreign Ministers urge the Socialist Republic of Vietnam to respond positively by engaging in direct and indirect talks with the CGDK with the participation of the Heng Samrin group."

(38) "The Twelve have noted the statement made by the member States of ASEAN during their conference in Bali on 28 April last in favour of the proposals formulated by Prince Sihanouk on 17 March last.

"The Twelve appreciate these developments, which represent a positive contribution to the search for a political solution to the Cambodian problem.

.../

(37): Joint ASEAN statement on the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea eight-point proposal, issued at Bali, Indonesia, on 28 April 1986 -

UN document A/41/325

(38): Joint statement by the twelve member States of the European Community regarding Cambodia - UN document A/41/378

"The Twelve express the hope that Vietnam will reconsider its refusal to regard Prince Sihanouk's proposals of 17 March as a viable basis for negotiation.

"The Twelve will continue to advocate a solution in accordance with the resolutions adopted by the United Nations and, in this spirit, they reaffirm their support for ASEAN's efforts with regard to Cambodia."

(39) "The European Parliament,

"Having regard to the global and balanced nature of the recent peace proposals put forward by the CGDK,

"Condemns once again all armed intervention on Cambodian territory,

"Calls for a cease-fire and the immediate withdrawal of Vietnamese troops to be negotiated at a very early date,

"Gives its full support, therefore, to the peace plan put forward by the tripartite CGDK,

"Endorses the Council's declaration that the proposals set out in the peace plan constitute a positive contribution to the search for a political settlement to the Cambodian problem,

"Appeals to the Vietnamese Government to reconsider its position vis-à-vis the proposed peace plan and to agree to open negotiations on the basis thereof."

"Condemns the Human right violations suffered by the people of Cambodia under military occupation."

(40) Up to date, more than 50 countries from the 5 continents have already expressed their support to the CGDK eight-point proposal of 17 March 1986.

"The Council of Ministers of the CGDK would like to reiterate its deep gratitude to the friendly countries the world over who have supported the Kampuchean people's struggle, especially the eight-point peace proposal of our CGDK.

"The Council of Ministers would like to appeal to those countries to continue to support our eight-point peace proposal. That would be a way to persuade Vietnam to accept to negotiate with our tripartite CGDK for a political solution to the problem of Kampuchea in order to restore peace and security in Kampuchea and to ensure peace, security and stability in Southeast Asian and Asian-Pacific regions... This eight-point peace proposal has become our National Charter for the present and for the future after the Vietnamese withdrawal from Kampuchea.

.../

(39): Resolution on the situation in Cambodia, adopted on July 11, 1986 by the European Parliament.

(40): Press Communiqué of the Council of Ministers of the CGDK, on 11 August 1986 - UN document A/41/533

"We are determined to do our utmost to transform this National Charter of ours into a real force inside the country and abroad in order to push for a political solution to the Kampuchean problem according to the profound aspirations of our people and nation in conformity with the relevant United Nations resolutions, free from any outside interference, resolutions which call on Vietnam to withdraw all its occupying forces from Kampuchea and to respect the right to self-determination of the Kampuchean people.

"We will spare no efforts so that Kampuchea will be an independent, united, peaceful, neutral and non-aligned country on the basis of the great national unity and national reconciliation between all Kampucheans, with Samdech NORODOM Sihanouk as President."

(41) "Vietnam should heed the call to reason of the overwhelming majority of the world community. It should realize that its increasing difficulties in all fields, political, economic, social, and the sentiments of weariness among Vietnamese cadres at all levels as well as its very isolation in the world are stemming from its war of aggression in Kampuchea where its troops are irremediably bogged down.

"The Hanoi authorities can only extricate themselves from those difficulties by responding positively to the generous and magnanimous gesture of the CGDK that is to accept the CGDK's eight-point proposal of 17 March 1986."

E. VIETNAMESE STUBBORN MANOEUVRES TO ANNEX KAMPUCHEA INTO VIETNAM'S "INDOCHINESE FEDERATION"

(42) "As the world community has been aware, the so-called '*Indochinese Foreign Ministers meeting*', like everything else in occupied Laos and Kampuchea, was directed and organized entirely by Vietnam.

"The Hanoi authorities continue to act as the master of the so-called '*Indochina Federation*'(*) by insisting on the elimination of one of the three CGDK partners. What they actually want is the capitulation of the CGDK. As they have not been able to fulfil their objective of eliminating the national resistance forces on the battlefield, they have attempted to achieve it through diplomatic manoeuvres. Their main undeclared goal is to weaken the national resistance forces so that they can easily eliminate them, and thereafter occupy forever Kampuchea.

.../

(41-42): Statement of the CGDK on the so-called "Indochinese Foreign Ministers meeting", on 31 August 1986 - UN document A/41/576

(*): For more detailed information on the Vietnamese expansionism, refer to "An Indochinese Federation under Vietnam's domination: Real strategic objective of the invasion and occupation of Kampuchea by Vietnam" UN document A/41/513

"As for the Vietnamese claim to withdraw its forces from Kampuchea by the year 1990, it is merely a deceitful statement for propagandist purposes. Such a promise of Vietnam is only the continuation of its opportunistic diplomatic manoeuvres. The world has witnessed how Vietnam's promises are to be trusted. For Hanoi, the diplomacy is only a means to achieve its strategic military goals. The Geneva accord of 1954, the accord on Laos of 1962, the Paris agreement of 1973, the Hanoi's 'solemn' statement in 1967 to respect the territorial integrity of Kampuchea within her present borders, the promise made in 1978 by Pham Van Dong to Thailand and other Southeast Asian countries that Vietnam would not attack Kampuchea, Vietnam's neighbour, and many other Vietnamese promises are there to testify that Vietnam has never kept its promises."

(43) "Vietnam likes to speak -deceitfully- of 'partial withdrawals' of its troops from Kampuchea and even goes so far as to announce a 'total withdrawal' of its troops by 1990 -provided however, it says, that others do not seek 'to take advantage of this withdrawal to undermine the security and peace in Kampuchea.' But is it not the Vietnamese invasion and occupation which have undermined the security and peace of Kampuchea for almost seven years now? In linking the 'total withdrawal' of its forces to such a condition, Vietnam clearly shows that it is determined to set up a 'pax vietnamica' in Kampuchea and to annex the country for ever. As the people, the Coalition Government and the armed forces of Democratic Kampuchea will never accept Vietnamese domination, it is clear that Vietnam has no intention whatsoever of withdrawing its aggression forces unless it is compelled to do so as a result of the irresistible development of our resistance and the political, diplomatic, financial and economic pressure of the international community.

(44) "'We will conclude our withdrawal by 1990, but we have all along said that if the situation requires it and the Kampuchean (Cambodian) government (Phnom Penh puppet regime - Ed.) deems it necessary, we will discuss the coming back of our troops.' Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister Hoang Bich Son recently told Asiaweek... 'And we have made a promise that we would come back if requested.' ... Such statements of late, raising the possibility of a post-1990 presence, show a marked change from earlier months, when officials blithely played down the conditions attached to the pull-out. In May, Vietnam published a 'partial troop withdrawal' for the fifth consecutive year. Thai and diplomatic observers have always seen these as simple troop rotations, since reports inevitably come in of new units arriving... A Vietnamese withdrawal rests on the ability of the Heng Samrin government's army to defend the country. Signs are that it still has a long way to go. Defectors tell of 50% desertion rates in their units."

.../

(43): H.R.H. Samdech NORODOM Sihanouk, President of Democratic Kampuchea, in his speech durant the debates on "The Situation in Kampuchea" at the 40th session of the UNGA - Monday 4 November 1985 - A/40/PV.60

(44): "Vietnam's 1990 Question" in Asiaweek of August 3, 1986

(45) "The Foreign Ministers (of the ASEAN) deplored Vietnam's continued pursuit of a military solution to the Kampuchean problem... (They) viewed Vietnam's recent so-called annual partial withdrawal of its troops from Kampuchea in May 1986 as mere troop rotation intended to mislead the international community, the Kampuchean people and the Vietnamese people themselves.... (They) noted with deep regret the absence of any genuine desire on the part of Vietnam for a negotiated and peaceful settlement as called for by an overwhelming majority of countries in the United Nations. ASEAN views Vietnam's pronouncements as variations of its well-known positions and pre-conditions that have not contributed towards a comprehensive political settlement of the Kampuchean problem. Vietnam's rejection of the eight-point proposal of the CGDK further illustrates the continuing inflexibility of its position on the Kampuchean problem. The Foreign Ministers called on the international community to continue to concern itself with the problem."

(45): Joint Communiqué of the ASEAN on the Situation in Kampuchea, issued at Manila on 24 June 1986 - UN document A/41/452