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**ГЕНЕРАЛЬНАЯ
АССАМБЛЕЯ**



**СОВЕТ
БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ**



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ГЕНЕРАЛЬНАЯ АССАМБЛЕЯ

Сороковая сессия

Пункты 22, 132 и 133 предварительной
повестки дня*

ПОЛОЖЕНИЕ В КАМПУЧИИ

РАЗВИТИЕ И УКРЕПЛЕНИЕ ДОБРОСОСЕДСКИХ
ОТНОШЕНИИ МЕЖДУ ГОСУДАРСТВАМИ

МИРНОЕ РАЗРЕШЕНИЕ СПОРОВ МЕЖДУ
ГОСУДАРСТВАМИ

СОВЕТ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ

Сороковой год

Письмо Постоянного представителя Демократической
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ANNEX

M E M O R A N D U M

T H E S I T U A T I O N I N K A M P U C H E A
I N 1 9 8 5

(Excerpts from official statements and the media)

AUGUST 1985

THE SITUATION IN KAMPUCHEA IN 1985

A. THE MILITARY SITUATION

I. SINCE LATE 1983 THE MAIN BATTLEFIELD HAS BEEN SHIFTED FROM THE WESTERN BORDER TO THE INLAND, IN THE TONLE SAP REGION, THE MOST POPULATED AND RICHEST REGION WITH NUMEROUS STRATEGIC SUPPLY LINES (HIGHWAYS, RAILWAY AND WATERWAYS)

1. In 1984, "the most striking fact was that the regular units of the national resistance forces were able to penetrate, stay and strengthen in the region of the Tonle Sap lake located in the heart of the country. They attacked several times the chief-towns of the 5 provinces around that lake namely Kompong Thom, Siemreap, Battambang, Pursat and Kompong Chhnang.

"The intensification of these attacks in that region marked thus another strategically important turning-point of the military struggle, a turning-point which will determine decisively the development of the war of national resistance."(1)

2. "Since last year (1983), we have divided the battlefields throughout the country into 3 main zones : we have designated the region around the Tonle Sap lake as the Battle Zone I because of its strategic importance which will decide the outcome of the war in Kampuchea. The Battle Zone II comprises the border area, and the remaining part of the country constitutes the Battle Zone III."(2)

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(1) "The struggle of the Kampuchean people for national survival has reached a strategically important turning-point" - Memorandum issued by the Department of Press and Information of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea, 15 August 1984.

(2) "The situation in Kampuchea, as of mid-April 1985" - UN document A/40/259.

3. The Vietnamese aggressors agree on that point:

"In Kampuchea at present ... from a general point of view, (the) struggle is taking place on two distinct fronts : a border front and an inland front. ... They (the national resistance forces) have ... set up logistical bases, opened points of entry at the border and created infiltration corridors to pour forces and weapons inland for guerrilla and sabotage activities, seizing land, controlling the population, building... forces, and so forth... It (the inland front) is the final place for deciding the success of the Kampuchean revolution (i.e. the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Kampuchea)..." (3)

II. WHY THE VIETNAMESE ENEMY HAVE MOBILIZED THEIR FORCES TO LAUNCH FIERCE ATTACKS ALONG THE KAMPUCHEA-THAILAND BORDER ?

4. "The resistance forces strike at the enemy everywhere inside Kampuchea. In the Tonle Sap area, our forces hit more strongly the Vietnamese enemy along the banks as well as deeper inside Kampuchea, seriously threatening them. If they try only to check our resistance forces inside Kampuchea, they are sure to lose their war of aggression in Kampuchea. That is why they are striving to concentrate their troops and attack us on the western border of Kampuchea for the purpose of checking us as well as propaganda..."(4)

5. The Vietnamese enemy "have failed to chase or wipe our forces out of the inland. On the contrary, the latter have been increased and strengthened in this area.

"It was in such an inextricable difficult situation that the Vietnamese politbureau in Hanoi and the high military commander of the Vietnamese occupying forces in Kampuchea, Le Duc Anh, drew up a strategic and decisive plan to wipe out the forces of Democratic Kampuchea at their bases along the western border

"The Vietnamese have mobilized up to 11 to 12 divisions of their occupying forces in Kampuchea with the additional 60,000 reinforcements sent from North, Central and South Vietnam to fight our forces at the Kampuchean western border. In these large scale operations, they have deployed their crack and shock troops surreptitiously sent in from North and Central Vietnam in order to destroy and take over the resistance forces' bases and strongholds according to their slogan, "*to seize the resistance forces' strongholds at all costs*" with a view to disrupting our supply routes in troops reinforcements as well as in military materials so as to ban the resistance forces from fighting them deep inside Kampuchea.

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(3) "The Vietnam People's Army and its lofty international duty in friendly Kampuchea" by General Le Duc Anh, Commander-in-Chief of the Vietnamese forces in Kampuchea, published in the VPA monthly magazine Tap Chi Quan Doi Nhan Dan, December 1984.

(4) Communiqué dated 3 February 1985 of the Council of Ministers of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea - UN document A/40/117 of 5 February 1985.

"In short, during this 7th dry-season 1984-1985, the resistance forces concentrated their efforts to fight deep inside Kampuchea especially in the Battle Zone I and in the five districts* near Phnom Penh, while the Vietnamese enemy have been fighting in western Kampuchea and along the western border in order to prevent the resistance forces from penetrating to the inland of Kampuchea ..."(5)

6. "Vietnam marks the 40th anniversary tomorrow (December 22, 1984) of the founding of its army, the world's third largest, which is still bogged down after 6 years of battling small guerrilla bands in Kampuchea ... Vietnam's estimated 160,000 to 180,000 troops in Kampuchea, backed by artillery and tanks, are being held to a stalemate by no more than 60,000 guerrillas...

" 'Never before has our people had such a strong army as today,' Communist Party Chief Le Duan said after Vietnamese troops in a lightning swoop toppled (the Government of Democratic Kampuchea) in Kampuchea in January 1979. Six years later the statement appears to be a hollow boast...

"A woman military doctor told Reuter Vietnamese troops were suffering more casualties now than two years ago. ...

"She said the 500-bed hospital at Kandal (Kampuchea) was often overcrowded during the dry-season from January to May when Vietnamese troops generally launched their offensives against the guerrillas. Those who could not be accommodated were evacuated to Cantho or Mytho in Southern Vietnam...(6)

III. THE RESULT OF THE MUCH PUBLICIZED VIETNAMESE MILITARY ATTACKS ALONG THE WESTERN BORDER

7. "The Vietnamese enemy have failed in their strategic plan to wipe out our forces at the western border albeit the use of large scale forces. On the contrary, they have lost a large number of their crack troops... (The resistance forces) have kept on carrying out their guerrilla attacks deep inside Kampuchea and have even extended them to the immediate vicinity of Phnom Penh ..." (7)

8. "The Council of Ministers (of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea) expressed its satisfaction over the favourable developments of the situation in every field, particularly on the ground, since the fifth meeting of the Council of Ministers on 3 February 1985. During this period,

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(5) "The situation in Kampuchea during the 7th dry-season (October 1984-April 1985) - UN document A/40/331 of 22 May 1985.

(6) Jose Katibak in "Vietnam's Army bogged down in Kampuchea on 40th Anniversary", Reuter, December 21, 1984.

(7) "The situation in Kampuchea during the 7th dry-season (October 1984-April 1985) - UN document A/40/331 of 22 May 1985.

* The five districts are Muk Kampoul, Ponhea Loeu, Oudong, Ang Snuol and Kandal Stung.

the resistance forces which have been operating in the Tonle Sap lake area for nearly three years already, have successfully increased their number and intensified their activities in the heartland of Kampuchea particularly around the Tonle Sap lake and nearby Phnom Penh." (8)

9. "The security is quite a crucial problem for the authorities in Phnom Penh ... The Vietnamese advisors multiply the security orders ... Measures to keep a watch on the markets inside the capital and controls after the curfew in force from 9 p.m. to 5 a.m. for six years have been reinforced ... Westerners have been discretely persuaded not to frequent markets ..." The representatives of the humanitarian relief organizations have been warned that they could be '*killed or taken as hostage*' ... The Soviet experts of about 2,000 use only helicopters for their journeys to the provinces. Whereas the journalists in Phnom Penh during these last weeks, they have had only short visits to provinces bordering the capital ..." (9)

10. "The Vietnamese have expelled the civilian populations from their bases along the border but they have not succeeded in bringing the resistance to heel - on the contrary, they seem to have contributed to the strengthening of the alliance (within the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea) ... Finally they have not at all diminished the support of ASEAN members to the Coalition ... They have rather increased their diplomatic isolation ..." (10)

11. "Correspondents who have visited Cambodia this month have confirmed guerrilla attacks within 20 miles of the capital, and Cambodian refugees arriving at the border with Thailand have reported an upsurge of incidents in various districts of the interior in the past two months. The level of guerrilla activity inside Cambodia right now is as high as it's ever been since the Vietnamese invasion, said a senior western diplomat in Bangkok." (11)

12. "While Vietnam's spectacular military campaign to stamp out all Khmer resistance bases along the Thai-Cambodian border has undoubtedly reaped propaganda dividends for Hanoi, latest reports suggest that widespread fighting deeper inside Cambodia has reached a new level of intensity ... (The national resistance forces) have spearheaded a resistance campaign to carry out almost daily attacks on Vietnamese troops, sabotaging lines of communication and hitting administrative centers ... The resulting situation, according to

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(8) Declaration of the Council of Ministers of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea on 28 August 1985 - UN document A/40/599*.

(9) James Burnett in Le Monde, 17 April 1985 (translated from French).

(10) Philippe Pons in Le Monde, 8 May 1985 (translated from French).

(11) "Vietnam's Vietnam? Hanoi's forces bogged down next door" by William Branigin in The Washington Post, 25 April 1985.

one diplomatic source, is a fierce war of attrition, ... fighting is worse than it's ever been (since Vietnamese invasion late 1978) ... Independent sources tend to confirm that (the national resistance forces) are indeed very active, carrying out sabotage operations to within 10Kms of Phnom Penh ... Other reports speak of burned-out trucks strewn along some of the main highways in Cambodia and frequent disruption of rail services because of guerrilla sabotage attacks. A ferry operating on the southern estuary of the Tonle Sap or Great Lake, was reportedly destroyed (by the national resistance forces) in January ..."(12)

13. "The Foreign Ministers (of the ASEAN countries) ... were particularly gratified at the steady growth and high state of morale of the resistance forces which, inspite of the ferocity of the Vietnamese dry-season offensive, are enjoying growing support from the Kampuchean people. They have also enhanced co-ordination of their actions in the field and have continued to cause serious disruption to the Vietnamese occupation forces."(13)

14. "The international aid agencies have detected growing dissent among the Kampuchean people against the Heng Samrin rule and Vietnamese control, and have concluded that '*nationalism reaction has become inevitable*'. In other words, they are convinced that nationalism has become a significant factor in the country."(14)

15. On 29 July 1985, the Vietnamese radio in Phnom Penh broadcast a state of emergency calling on all Vietnamese officials, soldiers and the Heng Samrin's group to be highly vigilant and be prepared for any eventualities, to oppose and prevent the resistance forces from carrying out activities inside the capital Phnom Penh. The radio broadcast the implementation of the following tight measures :

1. To control, search and watch closely the population living in Phnom Penh.
2. To control and check thoroughly persons going in or out of the city.
3. Strict enforcement of curfew during night time.

.../

(12) "The war continues" by Rodney Tasker in Far Eastern Economic Review of 9 May 1985.

(13) ASEAN Joint Communique on the situation in Kampuchea, issued at Kuala Lumpur on 9 July 1985 - UN document A/40/492 of 17 July 1985.

(14) The Nation Review, Bangkok, Tuesday, April 30, 1985.

**B. THE STRENGTHENING OF THE NATIONAL UNITY
WITHIN THE COALITION GOVERNMENT OF
DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA**

16. "The Council of Ministers (of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea) was of the view that the Vietnamese last-ditch military efforts against the three parties of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea during the current dry-season proved that the Coalition Government was gaining military strength as well as wider political influence in Cambodia and abroad. The Council also took note that the current murderous attacks by the enemy against the armed forces of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea and against the civilian population, far from loosening the bonds which unite the three factions of the Coalition together, have contributed to further reinforce these bonds, not only among the three parties but more and more between them and other Khmer patriots everywhere.

"The Council of Ministers is therefore determined to further enhance the unity in the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea with Samdech Norodom Sihanouk as President of Democratic Kampuchea in order to carry on the struggle against the Vietnamese enemy until their total withdrawal from Kampuchea in accordance with the relevant UN resolutions."(15)

17. "The meeting (of the Council of Ministers of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea) agreed on the importance of preserving the cohesiveness and harmony of the participating parties within the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea as crucial to the ultimate triumph of the struggle for national liberation of Cambodia.

"The meeting noted with satisfaction the status of existing cooperation in the military field among the three participating parties and the increasing of the activities of the resistance forces near and around the capital, Phnom Penh."(16)

18. "The unity within the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea has been consolidated. The national unity to carry on the struggle until the total withdrawal of the Vietnamese forces of aggression from Kampuchea has been strengthened. The Vietnamese manoeuvres aimed at splitting the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea have failed time and again."(17)

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(15) Communiqué dated 3 February 1985 of the Council of Ministers of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea - UN document A/40/117 of 5 February 1985.

(16) Communiqué of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea - UN document A/40/226.

(17) "The situation in Kampuchea, as of mid-April 1985" - UN document A/40/259.

19. "The ASEAN Foreign Ministers noted the increasing co-operation, unity and solidarity among the component parties of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea on all fronts in their struggle to liberate their country from Vietnamese occupation. They were particularly gratified at the steady growth and high state of morale of the resistance forces which, in spite of the ferocity of the Vietnamese dry-season offensive, are enjoying growing support from the Kampuchean people. They have also enhanced co-ordination of their actions in the field and have continued to cause serious disruption to the Vietnamese occupation forces."(18)

C. VIETNAM'S MANOEUVRES

20. For almost 7 years now, Vietnam has been increasingly bogged down in Kampuchea, facing more and more difficulties at home, and almost total isolation in the international arena. Yet, it refuses to heed the call of the international community to withdraw all its forces from Kampuchea in compliance with the relevant UN resolutions on Kampuchea. Furthermore, it has been trying hard to split the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea, the ASEAN and to sow confusion in the world public opinion, to deviate the root cause of the problem so as to occupy Kampuchea forever.

21. "They (the Foreign Ministers of the ASEAN countries)... expressed deep regrets and disappointment at Vietnam's persistent pursuit of a military solution in Kampuchea. Such military actions belied Vietnam's own professions for a negotiated solution of the Kampuchean problem and went against the appeals for restraint made to Vietnam by the international community... In continuing to pursue a military solution, Vietnam has not indicated any genuine desire for a negotiated and peaceful settlement as called by the overwhelming majority of countries at the United Nations. All the proposals of Vietnam have been thoroughly examined by ASEAN which found them to be variations of Vietnam's well-known positions and pre-conditions that have not contributed towards the comprehensive political settlement of the Kampuchean problem..."(19)

22. "Vietnam which affirmed that there was no problem of Kampuchea and that the situation in Kampuchea created by its invasion and occupation was '*irreversible*', admits now that there is quite a problem of Kampuchea and

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(18) ASEAN Joint Communique on the situation in Kampuchea, issued at Kuala Lumpur on 9 July 1985 - UN document A/40/492.

(19) ASEAN Joint Communique on the situation in Kampuchea, issued at Kuala Lumpur on 9 July 1985 - UN document A/40/492.

declares itself purportedly '*ready to negotiate*' a political solution. This new stand reflects the increasing difficulties encountered by the Hanoi's authorities in Kampuchea, in Vietnam itself and on the international arena. Nonetheless, this is only a political manoeuvre aimed at splitting the national unity within the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea and its near or far friends, and at sowing confusion within the international community. As a matter of fact, Vietnam demands the dissolution of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea who are now at the gates of the capital, the exclusion of some party and personalities of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea from the negotiations and elections which would be held only under the framework of the so-called '*constitution*' of the puppet regime in Phnom Penh. This demand reminds us of the similar one made by the Apartheid regime in South Africa with regard to Namibia ...

"..., one may ask of what right --if not the right of the jungle-- does Vietnam dispose to impose those conditions? In fact, that is but a manoeuvre aimed at making people forget the root cause of the problem of Kampuchea which is the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Kampuchea and thereby disregarding its logical solution that is the total withdrawal of the Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea. Vietnam hopes to obtain by diplomatic means what it cannot by military means. The Vietnamese tactics change but they always aim at the same objective."(20)

23. "...I would like to ask what right do we have to eliminate Pol Pot or Ieng Sary? Do you think the Kampuchean people hate Pol Pot? Perhaps the Khmer people want him. I don't know. But if they dislike Pol Pot and Ieng Sary, why don't we let the Kampuchean people to demonstrate their will through general elections?

"...The point is that if we are preoccupied with the elimination of the two Khmer Rouge personalities as a matter of principle despite the fact that it's not, then the issue will be blurred in our own mind. The Vietnamese want to blur the real issue by talking about the two personalities every day until you think that the two Khmer Rouge personalities are the Kampuchean issue and that if they were eliminated, the problem will be solved.

"We could not afford to forget the real issue, the root cause of the problem...

"What are the root cause of the Kampuchean conflict? Is it not the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Kampuchea and their installation of a puppet regime in Kampuchea?" (21)

.../

(20) Statements by the Permanent Representative of Democratic Kampuchea to the United Nations at the First Regular Session (1985) of the ECOSOC on 22 and 30 May 1985.

(21) Discussion between Thai academicians and Thai Foreign Ministry Officials in a closed door seminar jointly organized in Bangkok by the Institute of Asian Studies and the Foreign Ministry of Thailand on 6 April 1985 and published by The Nation Review of 25 April 1985.

24. "Representative Stephen J. Solarz, the Brooklyn Democrat who is known for liberal positions on foreign policy, is among those suspicious of Vietnam's intentions in Indochina. *'There never was a Pol Pot in Laos.'* Mr. Solarz said in a recent telephone interview, *'but there are still 50,000 Vietnamese troops there 10 years after the war.'* "(22)

D. THE REAL OBJECTIVE OF THE VIETNAMESE AGGRESSION AND OCCUPATION IN KAMPUCHEA

25. It has become clear to all now that for almost 7 years already, all Vietnam's activities in and relating to Kampuchea : its aggression, propaganda, diplomatic manoeuvres, etc., have aimed always at the same and only goal that is the annexation of Kampuchea into a Vietnamese "Indochinese Federation" which would become later on the 'Great Vietnam'.

26. In the same article published in the Vietnam People's Army magazine Tap Chi Quan Doi Nhan Dan (December 1984 issue) and of which the monthly magazine Vietnam Courier (No 4-1985) published some excerpts, General Le Duc Anh, wrote :

"... the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea ... must build ties of *special* solidarity, strategic alliance and close combat coordination according to a common strategic plan. ... *'Indochina is a single battlefield'*. That is a strategic view point, a major lesson and a law governing the existence and development of the three fraternal countries. ... The resolution of the 5th Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam points out: *'The special relationship among Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea conforms to the law governing the development of the revolution in the three countries. It has a vital significance for the destiny of the three nations...'* "

27. That is the essence of the doctrine of the "Indochina Federation" and of the so-called "Vietnam-Kampuchea-Laos special friendship and special solidarity". Such a doctrine dates from the founding of the Vietnamese Communist Party, in 1930, called at that time "Indochinese Communist Party".

Indeed, article 12 of Chapter Three of the Manifesto and Platform of the Vietnamese Workers' Party (the name of the "Indochinese Communist Party" from 1951 to 1976) issued on February 1951, read as follows :

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(22) "Cambodia issue again flares in U.S." by Colin Campbell in The New York Times of 29 April 1985.

"... the people of Vietnam are willing to enter into long term co-operation with the peoples of Laos and Cambodia, with a view to bringing about an independent, free, strong and prosperous federation of the States of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia."

A few weeks after the publication of that document, at the "National Congress of Unification" which merged the Vietminh Front into the Lien Viet, Ho Chi Minh stated : *"I am all the more happy that our people have been joined by the two brother peoples, Cambodia and Laos. We are going to realize soon the great union of Vietnam-Laos-Cambodia."* (quoted from "Voice of Vietnam", 19 March 1951)

Even more explicitly, a "top secret" Vietnam Workers' Party directive circulated 8 months later informed Party members that *"later on, when conditions permit this to be carried out, the three revolutionary parties of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos will be reunited to form a single party"*

On 24 February 1951, Vietnam News Agency wrote: *"... The Vietminh league is now planning to unite the national united fronts of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia into a national united front of Indochina, which will be called the Indochina National Independence League."* (23)

28. "In the years since America pulled out of Vietnam, the Communist victors have unleashed a series of pitiless attacks against their neighbors. And a nation portrayed by some American intellectuals as the repository of moral rectitude now stands exposed as the Prussia of South-East Asia." (24)

E. FOR A JUST AND LASTING SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF KAMPUCHEA

29. Time and again, on behalf of the people of Kampuchea and the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea, His Royal Highness Prince Norodom Sihanouk, President of Democratic Kampuchea has stated :

"We proclaim solemnly before this august Assembly, in conformity with the Resolutions of the United Nations, that as soon as Vietnam has totally withdrawn its troops from Kampuchea all will be possible in friendship between our two countries. We are ready to sign with Vietnam a treaty of peace and non-aggression implying the recognition and respect for territorial integrity of the two neighbouring nations within their present frontiers." (25)

.../

(23) "Vietnamese Communism, its origins and developments" by Robert F. Turner, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, California.

(24) "Vietnam in America - Ten years after the fall of Saigon" in the New York Times Magazine of 31 March 1985.

(25) Address before the 37th Session of the UN General Assembly, September 30, 1982.

"To the enemy, if they are wise enough to listen to the voice of reason, we propose to put an end to this secular hostility. We offer them, if they withdraw from our territory, to develop with them, with their present allies, as well as with all countries the world over, relations of friendship and cooperation based on the Five Principles of Peaceful coexistence, in equality, mutual respect and reciprocal interest. Kampuchea we will build up, will be independent, neutral, non-aligned, enemy of no one, friend of all those who are willing to be so. From this point of view, how could she worry a military powerful Vietnam, with 52 million inhabitants?" (26)

30. On 8 July 1985, at Kuala Lumpur, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers issued a Joint Statement on the Kampuchean problem as follows :

"The Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has consistently worked for a political settlement of the Kampuchean problem. In its continuing effort to propose initiatives that could help the process of a political settlement in Kampuchea, ASEAN has consulted the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea on the possibility of its entering into "*indirect*" or "*proximity talks*" with Viet Nam.

"The Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea has informed ASEAN that it is ready to enter into such talks with Viet Nam for the purpose of discussing the basic elements of a comprehensive and lasting settlement of the Kampuchean problem.

"The "*proximity talks*" between Viet Nam and the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea, which could also be attended by representatives of Heng Samrin as part of the Vietnamese delegation, will be exploratory in nature and on a continuing basis, and will be concerned with the following basic elements of a comprehensive political settlement :

- (a) Withdrawal of foreign forces from Kampuchea;
- (b) A United Nations Control and Supervisory Commission;
- (c) National reconciliation;
- (d) A United Nations-supervised election/exercise of self-determination.

"ASEAN appeals to Viet Nam to abandon the current policy of seeking a military solution to the Kampuchean problem. ASEAN urges Viet Nam to accept the reality and strength of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea under the Presidency of Samdech Norodom Sihanouk and to seek an agreement with the Coalition Government in the interest of the Kampuchean people, and the peace and stability of South-East Asia.

"ASEAN calls on Viet Nam to respond positively to these proposals." (27)

.../

(26) Address before the 39th Session of the UN General Assembly, September 25, 1984.

(27) UN document A/40/491 of 17 July 1985.

31. Instead of responding positively to these proposals, Vietnam continues to play diplomatic tricks aimed always at deviating the root cause of the problem of Kampuchea, splitting the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea, dividing the ASEAN and deceiving the world public opinion in order to occupy Kampuchea forever. On 16 August 1985, it claimed that it "will pursue the yearly gradual withdrawal (of its aggression forces) from Kampuchea and will conclude their total withdrawal by 1990. In case these withdrawals are taken advantage of to undermine the peace and security of Kampuchea... (it) will take appropriate measures."(28) That is, once again, sheer trick because :

1. "... the announcement of troop withdrawal formulated recently by the Hanoi leadership is nothing more than a ploy to deceive the international public opinion, when in fact the enemy is simply proceeding to a troop rotation as it was the case with previous so-called troop withdrawals."(29)

"The (ASEAN) Foreign Ministers were of the view that Vietnam's latest so-called annual partial withdrawal of its troops from Kampuchea in April 1985, which in fact had been mere rotation, was another attempt by Vietnam to mislead the international community, the Kampuchean people and Vietnamese people."(30)

2. By claiming to "take appropriate measures" if the so-called "withdrawals are taken advantage of to undermine the peace and security of Kampuchea", Vietnam makes it clear that it will never withdraw its forces from Kampuchea. Indeed the root cause of the undermining of peace and security in Kampuchea is the Vietnamese aggression and occupation of Kampuchea since 1979. Vietnam has no right whatsoever to invade and occupy Kampuchea. The people of Kampuchea and the national resistance forces under the leadership of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea led by H.R.H. Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, President of Democratic Kampuchea have every right to fight, on their own territory, the Vietnamese forces until they totally and unconditionally withdraw from Kampuchea.

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(28) Communique of 16 August 1985 in Phnom Penh.

(29) Communique of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea on 3 April 1985 - UN document A/40/226.

(30) ASEAN Joint Communique on the situation in Kampuchea, issued at Kuala Lumpur on 9 July 1985 - UN document A/40/492.

32. "The meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea reaffirmed the commitment of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea to bring about a peaceful settlement of the problem of Kampuchea within the framework of relevant United Nations resolutions and the Declaration of the International Conference on Kampuchea of July 1981.

"The Council of Ministers of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea would like to make it clear once more that Kampuchea has no desire at all to wage war. We need peace to rebuild our country and improve our people's standard of living.

"Our only wish is to live in peace and friendship with all countries near or far the world over.

"Both Vietnam, the aggressor, and Kampuchea, the victim, greatly suffer from the present war. If Vietnam puts an end to this war, both Kampuchea and Vietnam can enjoy peace which is a prerequisite to development, thereby contributing to the stability of the whole region.

"We would like to reaffirm that once the Vietnamese forces are withdrawn from Kampuchea, we are willing in good faith to sign with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam a treaty of peaceful co-existence, non-aggression, and mutual respect which could be guaranteed by the United Nations.

"Nevertheless, should Vietnam continue to refuse to negotiate peacefully the withdrawal of its occupying forces from Cambodia, we would be compelled to continue our struggle in close unity within our Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea with His Royal Highness Samdech Norodom Sihanouk as President of Democratic Kampuchea.

.....

"The Council of Ministers of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea fully endorses the proposal for "proximity talks" put forward by the ASEAN countries at their Foreign Ministers meeting in Kuala Lumpur (11-13 July 1985)....

"We sincerely hope that the Socialist Republic of Vietnam will give to this important proposal all the considerations it deserves and will not delay any longer its acceptance. The acceptance of this proposal by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam would constitute a great step towards a political solution of the problem of Kampuchea and would be surely greeted by all peace-loving countries as an important contribution to peace and security in our region and the world." (31)

.../

(31) Declaration of the Council of Ministers of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea on 28 August 1985 - UN document A/40/599#.

33. During these last 6 years, we have been encouraged by the favourable development of our struggle obtained thanks to the combination of two factors namely : on the one hand, the resolve and the national unity of our people around their Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea led by H.R.H. Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, President of Democratic Kampuchea, and on the other hand, the international support which has always been larger and stronger. We are firmly convinced that our endeavours in the struggle based upon the combination of these two fundamental factors will eventually end by a political solution based on the relevant UN resolutions on Kampuchea so as to enable Kampuchea to become once again an independent, peaceful, neutral and non-aligned nation in a South-East Asia becoming then, a genuine zone of peace, freedom and neutrality.

TITLES OF THE PICTURES

THE NATIONAL RESISTANCE FORCES DEEP INSIDE KAMPUCHEA, THE MAIN BATTLEFIELD

1. A unit of the Division 801 on its way to attack the Prek Kdam ferry on the Tonle Sap river (about 30 Km north of Phnom Penh) on 25 January 1985
- 2-3. The national resistance forces of the Division 801 in Tuol village and Batheay near Prek Kdam
4. The national resistance forces at Choeung Prey temple

THE NATIONAL RESISTANCE FORCES ALONG THE KAMPUCHEA-THAILAND BORDER

1. Dismantling mines laid by the Vietnamese enemy
2. Firing mortars to support ground troops assaulting a Vietnamese stronghold
3. An ammunition dump of the Vietnamese enemy destroyed
4. A Vietnamese stronghold captured

1



2




The national resistance forces deep inside Kampuchea, the main battlefield

4



3





The national resistance forces along the Kampuchea-Thailand border

