
**Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

21 August 2002

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Summary record of the 6th meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Wednesday, 10 April 2002, at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Salander (Sweden)

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02-32618 (E)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.30 p.m.

General debate (*continued*)

1. **Mr. Oubida** (Burkina Faso) recalled that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) had been concluded in an era of heightened international tensions and bilateral confrontation, and it had led to significant progress towards ending the arms race. However, the world had since become centred around a single strategic pole, which had the potential to undermine the Treaty and the non-proliferation regime through a lack of transparency.

2. Burkina Faso had committed itself fully to the Treaty and had ratified it in 1970. It had also ratified the Treaty of Pelindaba and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which signified his Government's understanding that the arms race would only serve to endanger international security and divert energy and resources from development.

3. It was time for States to ensure security for all by supporting the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and by continuing the process towards complete disarmament. The nuclear Powers should also observe International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreements. His delegation appealed to all nuclear-weapon States to join the NPT, particularly in the light of the dangerous situation in the Middle East.

4. The international community had reached a crossroads, and it was imperative that progress should be made in implementing the measures agreed at the 2000 Review Conference before 2005. The multilateral framework for negotiation must be strengthened to ensure that outcome.

5. **Mr. Onobu** (Nigeria) said that his delegation associated itself with the statement of Indonesia on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. At the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, Nigeria had warned that it would be a mistake to equate the indefinite extension of the Treaty with the indefinite extension of the possession of weapons of mass destruction by nuclear-weapon States. Regrettably, strategic and defence doctrines still placed reliance on nuclear weapons for security. His delegation viewed with dismay the failure of the Conference on Disarmament even to agree on an agenda, much less engage in negotiations. It joined the call to convene a

fourth special session of the General Assembly on disarmament.

6. Nigeria had ratified the CTBT and regretted that its entry into force had been delayed by the failure of the required number of designated States to ratify it. Urgent efforts were needed to make it operational.

7. His delegation underscored the urgency of achieving universality for the Treaty. It continued to support the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, and noted with satisfaction that a number of nuclear-weapon States had ratified the Treaty of Pelindaba. It urged the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East, as well.

8. It was important to look at ways and means of improving the functioning of the review process so that, instead of merely adopting procedural decisions, it could accomplish the purposes of the Treaty.

9. **Mr. Zeidan** (Lebanon) said that his delegation associated itself with the statement of Indonesia on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. Until the total elimination of nuclear weapons was achieved, all efforts should be made to ensure that security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States were guaranteed by a legally binding instrument that was both universal and unconditional. At the previous Review Conference, the nuclear-weapon States had made an unequivocal undertaking that they would work towards the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, but nothing had come of it thus far.

10. His delegation welcomed the continued emphasis on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in medicine, technology and development, but it was concerned at the refusal of the nuclear-weapon States to ratify the CTBT, preventing its entry into force. And of even more concern to Lebanon was the situation in the Middle East, where Israel was in possession of a nuclear arsenal. He reiterated the call made at the 2000 Review Conference for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

11. Lebanon had been among the first countries to sign the Treaty, and remained committed to achieving its universality. His delegation urged Israel to join the Treaty, and urged the nuclear-weapon States to keep their commitments to disarmament, just as the non-nuclear-weapon States had done in the area of non-proliferation. The steps towards disarmament had

already been laid down, and it only remained for the international community to observe them.

12. **Mr. Elmessallati** (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) said that his country had long attached the utmost importance to the full implementation of the NPT and the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Its determination to achieve those objectives was reflected in its accession to the NPT, to the Treaty of Pelindaba and its participation in various international forums aimed at achieving progress in that domain. It was regrettable that so much remained to be done before those objectives were realized and universal agreement on nuclear disarmament was attained.

13. The failure of nuclear-weapon States to dismantle their arsenals and of others to accede to the NPT were matters of particular concern. If the objective of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons had not yet been achieved, it was much less likely that the goal of comprehensive nuclear disarmament would be realized in the near future. Events since the 2000 Review Conference had thwarted the hopes and aspirations expressed in the Conference's Final Document. States nevertheless had a responsibility to make a serious and concerted effort to ensure that those countries that had not already done so signed and ratified the Treaty and subjected their nuclear installations to the IAEA safeguards system.

14. While the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya was most concerned at the modesty of the efforts made hitherto to curb nuclear proliferation, it was seriously alarmed at the failure of nuclear-weapon States to honour their commitments under the NPT. Indeed, the recent nuclear reassessment carried out by the United States Department of Defense suggested that new nuclear threats were emerging, with the country concerned openly talking of using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. That new policy was irresponsible and reckless, and the international community must use every means at its disposal to avert the dangers implied therein.

15. It was important that the Preparatory Committee should conduct its proceedings in a manner consistent with the principles, aims and procedures for promoting the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty. The Committee should give its consideration to substantive matters, such as the extent of compliance with the terms of the Treaty, the successes achieved, the

shortcomings that had been identified and the obstacles to future progress and implementation of resolutions aimed at strengthening the review process. The 1995 resolution on the Middle East and the conclusions contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference should also be reviewed.

16. His delegation was convinced of the need for full compliance with all commitments undertaken pursuant to the NPT, particularly articles I, II, III and VI thereof as well as its ninth to twelfth preambular paragraphs which required States to refrain from engaging in any form of regional or security arrangement involving the use of nuclear weapons or the provision of equipment, information, materials, facilities or devices for military purposes. Libya equally accorded importance to those provisions of the Treaty specifying the necessity of offering practical and technical assistance to all States parties without discrimination in the peaceful applications of nuclear power.

17. The international community had a responsibility to bring a halt to the arms race by establishing a specific timetable for complete nuclear disarmament and ensuring that nuclear-weapon States dismantled their nuclear arsenals. Negotiations should be conducted for that purpose in accordance with the terms of the Final Document of the 1978 First Special Session on Disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly. All nuclear-weapon States should engage in good faith negotiations on effective measures to bring a halt to the arms race at the earliest opportunity. Procedures should also be put in place to give effect to the advisory opinion delivered by the International Court of Justice towards that same end.

18. With regard to the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, Libya stressed the necessity that Israel should accede unconditionally and without delay to the NPT and should also place its nuclear installations under the IAEA safeguards system. In accordance with article I of the NPT, nuclear-weapon States should refrain from transferring nuclear weapons, other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or devices, directly or indirectly, to Israel or encouraging or inducing it to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices in any circumstances whatsoever. States should further refrain from transferring to Israel equipment, information, materials, facilities, resources, devices, technical expertise or any form of assistance in the nuclear

domain until such time as that country acceded to the Treaty and placed all its nuclear installations under international scrutiny. All States parties should further reaffirm their commitment to creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and ridding it of all weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

19. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya intended to continue its efforts to establish such a zone in the Middle East at the earliest juncture. It hoped that all States Parties would bear their responsibilities for contributing to that effort and would bring pressure to bear to ensure the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East as well as the terms of the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.

20. **Ms. Ballon de Amézaga** (Preparatory Commission, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization) said that, since the 2000 NPT Review Conference, 10 additional States had signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and 34 had ratified it. There was strong support for the CTBT, as evidenced by the 165 States which had signed it, with 90 ratifications in all.

21. Steady progress had been made in the establishment of the international monitoring system, with a global communications infrastructure connecting the monitoring stations to an international data centre in Vienna and to national data centres. On-site inspections were provided for as a final verification measure, and an initial draft of an operational manual had been completed, along with a long-range plan for training of inspectors.

22. The Commission was grateful for the strong support from States in the establishment of infrastructure for the implementation of the CTBT, as reflected in the financial support they had provided.

23. **Mr. Al-Naciri** (Observer for the League of Arab States) said that the League of Arab States attached the greatest importance to disarmament issues and that it was exerting every effort to make the Middle East a zone free from nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction. The League was participating in efforts to halt the proliferation of such weapons and to remove the threat of nuclear destruction hanging over an already tense and unstable situation in the Middle East.

24. Although all the members of the League of Arab States had renounced the nuclear option and acceded to

the NPT, efforts to create a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East were being hampered by Israel. Israel had failed to respond to Arab calls for the establishment of a just and comprehensive peace in the region based on the implementation of the relevant United Nations resolutions. It had likewise ignored Arab peace proposals, including the Saudi peace initiative recently adopted at the Arab Summit held at Beirut in March 2002.

25. The peace initiative was based on the firm belief that there was no military solution to the Middle East conflict. If regional peace and security were to be assured, Israel would have to accede to the NPT, place its nuclear facilities under the IAEA safeguards system and participate in the work of ridding the Middle East of all weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons.

26. In spite of the clear and balanced stance adopted by the Arab side, Israel continued categorically to refuse to do so, persisting in using the nuclear option to pressure the Arab side into accepting Israel's conditions for peace. The Arab side, for its part, was utterly convinced that the only real option lay in universal adherence to the Treaty by all States in the region and an end to Israel's policy of using the nuclear threat effectively to impede the establishment of a just, comprehensive and lasting peace in the Middle East.

27. For over 30 years the Arab States had been working to convince the international community of the justice of its demands in that regard. The General Assembly had adopted numerous resolutions concerning the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and every year adopted a resolution on the dangers of nuclear proliferation, calling, inter alia, for Israel to accede to the NPT and place its nuclear facilities under the IAEA safeguards system. The same demand was also enunciated in Security Council resolution 487 (1981) and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.

28. The League of Arab States had adopted resolution 6167, concerning the threat posed to Arab security by Israel's nuclear arsenal. Its provisions called on the Preparatory Committee to find ways and means of guaranteeing and monitoring the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and to issue a clear statement in its final report characterizing that resolution as an integral part of the review process. The Arab League had also stressed that nuclear-weapon

States and the other States concerned should submit a report to the chairpersons of the Review Conference and of the Preparatory Committees indicating the measures they had taken to promote the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East and to give effect to the provisions of the 1995 resolution. It was vital that the practical steps laid down in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference should be implemented in order to bring about general and complete disarmament in accordance with article VI of the NPT.

29. The League of Arab States was convinced that the States parties to the NPT, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, would not fail to establish a mechanism for the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East or to clearly and unequivocally draw attention to its importance in the final report of the current preparatory session. His delegation wished the Committee every success in that endeavour.

The meeting was suspended at 4.35 p.m. and rose at 6.05 p.m.