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**Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review  
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the  
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

18 September 2002

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**Summary record of the 4th meeting**

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, 9 April 2002, at 3 p.m.

*Chairman:* Mr. Salander . . . . . (Sweden)

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General debate (*continued*)

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02-32402 (E)

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*The meeting was called to order at 3.05 p.m.*

**General debate** (*continued*)

1. **Mr. Kuchinsky** (Ukraine) said that one of the most urgent security challenges facing the international community was the threat of nuclear proliferation. Efforts aimed at addressing that threat had to be based on extensive and constructive international cooperation. His delegation expected the current session of the Preparatory Committee to give impetus to the non-proliferation process. The primary focus of international efforts in that sphere should be on sustaining the viability of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as the central pillar of the global non-proliferation regime. Achieving universal adherence to the Treaty remained one of the urgent priorities of the world community. In 2000 Ukraine had ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), another key element of the global non-proliferation regime. However, it was deeply concerned that the prospects for the early entry into force of the CTBT were dimmer than ever before. In that regard, ratification first and foremost by nuclear-weapon States would enhance the stature of that treaty. Noting the importance that his delegation attached to adherence to the global moratorium on nuclear tests, he called upon nuclear-weapon States to further demonstrate their commitments in that sphere. Moreover, since the conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty would substantially facilitate nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, every effort should be made to overcome differences with respect to the programme of work of the Conference on Disarmament, paving the way for the resumption of negotiations on that issue.

2. The ongoing bilateral dialogue between the United States and the Russian Federation constituted the backbone of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. In that regard, on 30 October 2001, Ukraine had fulfilled its obligations under the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms by eliminating the last silo for the SS-24 intercontinental ballistic missiles. That fact clearly demonstrated his Government's efforts in the field of non-proliferation and disarmament. Ukraine considered the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) a vital element of the global non-proliferation regime. In August 2000, it had signed a protocol additional to the safeguards agreement between Ukraine and IAEA. In the light of threats posed by international terrorism and illicit trafficking in nuclear and related materials, it was extremely

important to enhance both international guidelines and the provisions of national legislation in the field of export controls and physical protection of nuclear material.

3. Lastly, with regard to security assurances to be provided by nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, he believed that credible negative security assurances in the form of an international legally binding instrument would substantially enhance the non-proliferation regime. Nuclear-weapon States should therefore strictly adhere to their pledges in that regard, in particular in the context of the results achieved by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference.

4. **Mr. Le Hoai Trung** (Viet Nam) said that his delegation fully associated itself with the statement of Indonesia on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. The Final Document adopted by consensus at the 2000 Review Conference had reiterated that the enhancement of the nuclear non-proliferation regime required international stability and could not be detached from the prevention of nuclear war and nuclear disarmament. The past two years had witnessed a number of events that adversely affected the goals of that conference, however. The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 had given rise to greater concern about possible acquisition by terrorist groups of weapons of mass destruction. Threats or actual use of force had led to increased tensions and flare-ups of bloody conflicts in a number of regions. The decision to abrogate the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) went against the principle of the irreversibility of nuclear disarmament agreements, leaving a vacuum that could lead to a renewed arms race including outer space. The Nuclear Posture Review by a nuclear-weapon State deviated from the security assurances under the NPT.

5. All States parties to the Treaty, especially the five nuclear-weapon States, must reaffirm their unequivocal commitment to the Treaty and fulfil their obligations under it. In view of recent developments, it had become urgent to find effective measures to prevent nuclear proliferation and promote disarmament. The IAEA safeguards system would play an indispensable role in the implementation of the Treaty.

6. His Government supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, and had acceded to the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty in 1995. He urged the nuclear-weapon States to ratify its

Protocol as soon as possible so as to contribute to the enhancement of peace and security in South-East Asia and the world.

7. Finally, his delegation was heartened by the agreement between some nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals, but that did not dispel its greater concerns regarding recent developments in disarmament. The current session of the Preparatory Committee must come up with concrete solutions for full implementation of the Treaty.

8. **Mr. Acuna** (Chile) said that his delegation associated itself with the statement of Indonesia on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and with that of Egypt on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition. Under the current circumstances faced by international disarmament, the meeting of the Preparatory Committee was of particular importance because it provided a forum for an exchange of views and information among the overwhelming majority of members of the international community who were parties to the Treaty. His delegation hoped that there would be progress in the implementation of the commitments made at the 2000 Review Conference before the 2005 Conference. Chile had made nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament a priority, and supported any bilateral or unilateral initiatives to achieve that objective.

9. An essential element in the fulfilment of disarmament and non-proliferation objectives was the creation of a climate of confidence that encouraged both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States to meet their commitments. A continuing lack of confidence would erode and even destroy the credibility of the Treaty regime, which would be inconceivable after the tremendous efforts made thus far by the international community. The new threats revealed by the events of 11 September required joint efforts in good faith and with confidence in the common objective of eradicating terrorism, especially the danger of nuclear terrorism. Another current danger was the possibility of the proliferation of ballistic missiles and other weapons of mass destruction, and therefore the work of the panel of experts on missiles, convened by the United Nations Secretary-General, was highly valuable.

10. At its current session, the Preparatory Committee must undertake a theoretical review of the 13 steps towards total disarmament adopted at the 2000 Review Conference and identify the obstacles to their realization. It was also important to emphasize the

establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. The establishment of the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) resulting from the ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, could serve as an example and inspiration for other regions of the world. The immediate objective of the establishment of such zones was the strengthening of regional security, but their ultimate objective was general and complete disarmament. Therefore, it would be extremely useful to convene an international conference of the States members of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

11. His delegation had already stated in a number of international forums its concern about the safe transport of radioactive materials, owing to the potentially disastrous consequences of an accident for the marine environment and for coastal States. More work was needed to fill in the gaps in the international legal order in the area of security measures for that type of transport.

12. His delegation agreed that the current session of the Preparatory Committee should be a forum for a comprehensive debate that would result in a document reflecting in a balanced manner the views expressed and providing guidelines for the work of the 2005 Review Conference.

13. It was important to remember that the Treaty was not an end in itself, but a starting point for negotiations and measures to facilitate progress towards nuclear disarmament. While non-nuclear-weapon States fulfilled their obligation not to develop such weapons, nuclear-weapon States must move towards their irreversible elimination. Chile, therefore, did not support an international order based on a fixed group of States possessing nuclear weapons while the great majority had proscribed them. The decisions of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference must be implemented, therefore, along with the entry into force of the CTBT and an agreement on a fissile material cut-off treaty. IAEA safeguards must also be enhanced.

14. His delegation hoped that the outcome of the meeting would be a renewed spirit of confidence in the validity and effectiveness of Treaty mechanisms in a context of transparency and universality.

15. **Mr. Jenkins** (United Kingdom) said that his delegation endorsed the statement of Spain on behalf of the European Union. It was a testimony to the value and resilience of the Treaty that it remained as relevant and important as when it had come into force, and was the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, the heart of the Treaty, were often described as if they were divergent, or as if non-proliferation benefited one group of countries and disarmament another, yet they were mutually reinforcing.

16. The Treaty had achieved near universality: there were 187 States parties, including all five nuclear-weapon States. Of the four countries which had not yet joined the Treaty, he called on India and Pakistan to work together to reduce nuclear tensions in their region by entering into a bilateral dialogue on confidence-building measures. He called on Israel to resolve international concerns about its nuclear status by acceding to the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State. Finally, he hoped that Cuba would reconsider its position on adherence to the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State. His delegation reaffirmed its support for the establishment of a verifiable zone in the Middle East free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

17. In some ways, the problems of non-proliferation were more acute than ever. The recent terrorist attacks had brought home the potential threat of the use of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors. Practical measures for the prevention of nuclear terrorism must be discussed, and implementation of strict export controls was a key element in advancing those objectives. His delegation also noted with regret that 51 States parties still did not have comprehensive safeguards agreements with IAEA. Priority should be placed on additional protocols strengthening those agreements, as well.

18. In the past decade, the compliance of two parties to the Treaty, Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, had been in doubt. The refusal of the Iraqi regime to meet its disarmament and monitoring obligations had led to real concerns that, in the absence of international inspection, it was attempting to re-establish its weapons-of-mass-destruction programmes. His delegation urged Iraq to comply fully with its United Nations disarmament and monitoring obligations, and the international community to recognize that in the face of that threat, inaction was not an option. His delegation welcomed the recent visit of the IAEA Technical Team to nuclear facilities in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and urged that country to abide by all its obligations under the 1994 Agreed Framework and to cooperate fully with IAEA inspectors. It must also end its destabilizing trade in missile technology and maintain its moratorium on the testing of ballistic missiles.

19. His Government had long supported the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme and welcomed the application of nuclear technologies to such areas of sustainable development as health, agriculture and the environment.

20. The United Kingdom had led the way in taking measures to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons to the minimum level necessary consistent with national security, and had taken a number of significant and irreversible steps to reduce its nuclear weapons. It had ratified the CTBT and had stopped production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and explosive devices. Having reduced its nuclear weapons to a single system at the minimum level necessary for national security, further unilateral steps it could take were limited. It continued to encourage mutual, balanced and verifiable reductions in the numbers of nuclear weapons worldwide. It therefore welcomed the encouraging signs from recent talks between the United States and the Russian Federation on reductions in their offensive nuclear arsenals, and hoped that the understandings being reached would take the form of a bilateral agreement.

21. His delegation called on those countries whose ratifications were necessary for the entry into force of the CTBT to make every effort to achieve that goal. Another step towards nuclear disarmament that would increase international confidence and combat proliferation was to ban the production of fissile material, and it was time for the negotiations on a treaty to begin. It would be disappointing if no progress had been made in that direction by the time of the 2005 Review Conference.

22. His delegation did not see the need to reach agreed recommendations or formal conclusions on the issues to be discussed; in-depth discussion would provide a solid foundation for the review process.

23. **Mr. Albin** (Mexico) said that in addition to the positive undertaking by nuclear-weapon States to eliminate their nuclear arsenals and to initiate practical steps towards nuclear disarmament, there was a sense of urgency to prevent the use of nuclear material and technologies for criminal purposes. Mexico considered it a priority to strive for full compliance with the NPT and complete fulfilment of the commitments made at the previous review conferences.

24. It was a source of disappointment that steps agreed on at the 2000 Review Conference had not been implemented. Mexico shared the concern at the development of a new generation of nuclear weapons

and the trend towards justifying such weapons as part of new security strategies. Unresolved issues of accountability with respect to compliance and Treaty obligations weakened the international non-proliferation regime.

25. Recent declarations had strengthened Mexico's conviction that an international legally binding instrument should be negotiated on negative security assurances against the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons among States parties to the NPT. Nuclear-weapon States should also make a binding commitment on non-first use of such weapons. The low number of ratifications of the CTBT had a negative impact on the entire disarmament and non-proliferation regime. On the other hand, the signature and ratification of the strengthened safeguards agreements of the States parties should be promoted as a means of strengthening the role of IAEA in the control of nuclear activities and increasing international confidence in the verification regime.

26. The Preparatory Committee should consider the reports submitted by the parties on the application of article VI of the NPT and on the 1995 Middle East resolution. Although all States parties had been invited to provide information, it was the special responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States to report fully on the steps taken to reduce their nuclear arsenals and on their achievements in the areas of irreversibility, transparency and verification. Mexico hoped that progress would be made towards objective quantitative and qualitative advances in nuclear disarmament.

27. Efforts of States parties to strengthen the international regime established under the Treaty must be enhanced by the contributions of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and representatives of civil society. His delegation was certain that the NGOs' proposals would enrich dialogue on the substantive issues.

28. Mexico attached great importance to educational activities on disarmament and non-proliferation. In that regard, it hoped the report to be presented by the group of experts at the fifty-seventh session of the General Assembly would include recommendations for governments and all sectors of society to raise awareness around the world of nuclear risk and the importance of strengthening disarmament and non-proliferation.

29. His delegation fully appreciated and supported efforts to reach agreement on the "indicative timetable" for the current session. It was also in favour of the

preparation of a document by the Chairman that would serve to identify the main elements of and positions taken in the substantive debates and as a basis for future deliberations.

30. **Mr. Thapa** (Nepal) said that in spite of the success of the 2000 Review Conference, which had culminated in agreement on 13 practical steps to achieve nuclear disarmament, progress was regrettably lacking and the international community had suffered a number of setbacks. Nuclear weapons were being viewed by some as important for the maintenance of security; the long stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament due to disagreement on starting negotiations on a fissile materials cut-off treaty and the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on effective international arrangements, and the low level of ratification of the CTBT were all disheartening.

31. Nevertheless, there were some positive signs for the future and constructive bilateral arms control steps could contribute to furthering multilateralism in nuclear disarmament. Nuclear test moratoriums should be maintained by nuclear-weapon States and other States with such capability and concerted efforts should be directed at discouraging nuclear weapons in South Asia. It was encouraging that the first session of the Preparatory Committee was taking place under the strengthened review process. Nepal was in favour of allocating specific amounts of time to consideration of nuclear disarmament and the resolution on the Middle East, and to a comprehensive discussion of other relevant issues, including the situation in South Asia and other regions where nuclear proliferation concerns were too serious to be ignored.

32. **Miss Durrant** (Jamaica) said that her delegation was disappointed at the limited progress made on the practical steps agreed on in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference. The likelihood of unscrupulous persons gaining access to nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction had to be considered in the context of the lack of any real progress towards the elimination of nuclear weapons. Jamaica shared the concern that the world was moving ever closer to the possibility of a nuclear disaster.

33. The Government of Jamaica fully supported the NPT and the work of IAEA in seeking to eliminate the spread and use of nuclear weapons, and had ratified the CTBT in November 2001. As a State party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, Jamaica firmly supported the maintenance of the Caribbean and Latin America as a nuclear-weapon-free zone and the initiative to promote

a nuclear-weapon-free zone within the southern hemisphere.

34. Among the positive outcomes of the 2000 Review Conference, Jamaica welcomed the endorsement of IAEA regulations for the safe transport of radioactive materials. The fact that States were encouraged to maintain those standards, and the recognition of the specific concerns of small island developing States and other coastal States represented an acknowledgement of the responsibility of the international community to ensure protection against the risks inherent in the transport of such materials. Deeply concerned by the safety and environmental risks, Jamaica wished to reiterate the need to strengthen measures and international regulations to protect States. She urged the international community to consider the establishment of a comprehensive regulatory framework to promote state responsibility in areas dealing with disclosure, liability and compensation. Furthermore, States involved in the trans-shipment of hazardous waste should provide relevant information to affected States regarding trans-shipment. While recognizing the right of States under article IV of the NPT to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, her delegation believed that such considerations should not undermine the sustainable development of other States.

35. **Ms. Mogaka** (Kenya) said that, in the belief that the most effective guarantee against the nuclear danger was the total elimination of nuclear weapons, her delegation was committed to nuclear disarmament and supported the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee. Recalling the unanimous conclusion by the International Court of Justice that there existed an obligation to conclude, in good faith, negotiations on nuclear disarmament under strict and effective international control, she said that regrettably no progress had been made. She urged all States to fulfil their obligations by launching multilateral negotiations on the nuclear disarmament programme with a view to an early conclusion of a convention prohibiting the development, production, use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

36. Kenya endorsed the position reached during the 2000 Review Conference on the commitment to eliminate nuclear weapons and welcomed regional commitments on the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones, which strengthened strategic stability. On the other hand, her delegation recognized the concerns of the Middle Eastern States which had yet to establish such a zone, especially given the current alarming

security situation in the region. The global scenario today was starkly different from that which had existed in 2000, when it was felt that the international community had reached a pinnacle in its efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons. Recent events, particularly the promotion of the doctrine of defence policies that could lead to the use of nuclear weapons, had eroded world confidence.

37. Furthermore, the abrogation of the ABM Treaty by one party threatened the current arms control and disarmament regime. Kenya believed that the continued development of missile defence systems by some States threatened to introduce a new arms race, as other States were bound to increase their nuclear arsenals in order to establish a balance. The collective provision of strategic stability was necessary for a stable and progressive disarmament process. Kenya therefore urged all States listed in annex 2 to the CTBT Treaty which had not yet ratified the Treaty to accelerate the ratification process with a view to achieving the Treaty's early entry into force. In the meantime, all States should maintain their moratorium on nuclear-weapon testing and non-nuclear-weapon States should be given the assurance that such weapons would not be used against them.

38. **Mr. Abbas** (Iraq) emphasized that the current session was being held in a climate in which certain States were seeking to impose on international relations the sovereignty of the law of force rather than the force of law. Consequently, the Preparatory Committee's current session offered an important opportunity to review overall compliance with the NPT on the basis of an objective assessment of achievements since the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences and the identification of areas for future improvement aimed at strengthening the implementation and effectiveness of the Treaty.

39. Nuclear non-proliferation was not an end in itself, but a means for achieving nuclear disarmament. The one could not be divorced from the other. It was regrettable that certain States were being allowed to maintain, develop and threaten to use their huge arsenals of nuclear weapons, while others were being denied access to nuclear technologies even for peaceful purposes. Such selectivity engendered feelings of frustration and undermined prospects for the early achievement of general and complete nuclear disarmament. Universal compliance with the Treaty was vital to the effectiveness of that instrument, and nuclear-weapon States should do their part by honouring their obligations pursuant thereto.

40. The nuclear threat had not disappeared with the end of the cold war; indeed, hegemonic forces were using it as an opportunity not only to begin a new arms race, but also openly to threaten to use nuclear weapons against other States. Thus, where once they served as a deterrent believed to help redress the international strategic balance, nuclear weapons currently posed a grave threat to international peace and security.

41. The United States Department of Defense had recently prepared and submitted to the United States Congress a report on plans for the use of nuclear weapons against the Russian Federation, Iraq, the Syrian Arab Republic, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The plans envisaged using such weapons against targets capable of mounting non-nuclear attacks and in response to sudden military attacks against the United States and its allies in which nuclear, chemical or biological weapons were used. Senior United States officials had confirmed the contents of the report and described various scenarios in which nuclear weapons might be used against the States concerned.

42. Not only did such plans constitute a grave threat to the principles and purposes of the United Nations, they also undermined over 50 years of work aimed at achieving nuclear disarmament. The relevant resolutions, including General Assembly resolution 56/25 B, made it clear that any such use of nuclear weapons would be a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity and that all States had a duty to actively participate in efforts to bring about conditions in international relations among States in which a code of peaceful conduct of nations in international affairs could be agreed upon and that would preclude the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The International Court of Justice had also delivered an advisory opinion declaring the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to be contrary to the rules of international law and the principles of humanitarian law.

43. In addition, by threatening to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty the United States had also failed to honour its commitments under Security Council resolutions 255 (1968) and 984 (1995).

44. It was a firm principle of international law that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons constituted a grave infringement of the rules governing

international relations and posed a threat to all humanity. Yet, that was precisely the threat which the United States had decided to create through its strategy based on hegemonic power. The way had been left open not only for nuclear war, but also for a new arms race involving the proliferation of missiles systems and of weapons of mass destruction. The United States position underscored the urgent need for a binding international instrument offering non-nuclear-weapon States security assurances pending the achievement of general and complete disarmament.

45. Iraq was eager for the Middle East region to become a nuclear-weapon-free zone in accordance with the provisions of the relevant resolutions and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference. In particular, it hoped that Israel would finally accede to the Treaty, open its installations for IAEA inspection and dismantle its stocks of weapons of mass destruction. Iraq also hoped that the provisions of paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) would be implemented so that its own disarmament efforts would form part of a general process of ridding the region of such weapons.

46. The 2005 Review Conference should undertake a serious and thorough review of the refusal by the Zionist entity to subject its nuclear installations to the IAEA safeguards system and of its rejection of appeals to accede to the Treaty. The savage attacks by that entity against the Palestinian people and its targeting of Palestinian villages and towns constituted acts of State terrorism that flagrantly violated the Charter of the United Nations and international law and posed a grave threat to international peace and security. They demonstrated the fragility of a situation which the aggressive policies of the Zionist entity had created.

47. Iraq endorsed the statement made by the Permanent Representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries stressing the importance of establishing a subcommittee to consider practical steps to be taken to achieve nuclear disarmament and also the establishment of a second subcommittee to make recommendations and create mechanisms for implementing the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

48. Sufficient time should be allocated for the examination of substantive issues relating to the implementation of the Treaty and of the resolution on the Middle East. Nuclear-weapon States should also honour their commitments under article VI of the

Treaty by conducting negotiations on bringing an early end to the arms race and establishing a disarmament timetable.

49. As the Final Document of the Arab Summit held at Beirut on 27 and 28 March 2002 had indicated, the security of the Middle East was constantly jeopardized by the fact that Israel held a stock of weapons of mass destruction, primarily nuclear weapons, and refused to accede to the Treaty or place its installations under international scrutiny.

50. The Preparatory Committee should adopt a document outlining a vision of the future that addressed the shortcomings of the past and stressed the need for universal ratification of the Treaty and the beginning of a serious disarmament effort. The Committee should also devise mechanisms for giving effect to the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, while also emphasizing the necessity of providing assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

51. Speaking in exercise of the right of reply, his delegation refuted the statement by the United Kingdom representative that Iraq had resumed development of weapons of mass destruction. The statement had not been based on any objective fact and the members of the Committee should therefore exercise the utmost caution before lending credence to it. Not only was the assertion false, it was wholly incompatible with the facts. Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction, as the experts of the defunct United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) had affirmed. The United Kingdom representative had probably read the book and articles written by Mr. Scott Ritter, formerly of UNSCOM, on that very subject. His delegation invited the United Kingdom Prime Minister, Mr. Tony Blair, to provide factual evidence at a time and place of his own choosing to support his allegations that Iraq was developing weapons of mass destruction. The facts were that Iraq neither possessed any weapons of mass destruction nor had it any intention of acquiring or developing them in the future.

52. **Mr. Enkhsaikhan** (Mongolia) said that his delegation fully subscribed to the consensus achieved at the 2000 Review Conference that the elimination of nuclear weapons was the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Similarly, it supported the determination of world leaders at the Millennium Summit to eliminate all weapons of mass destruction. He joined in the expression of concern that meaningful progress had not

been attained in that regard and urged nuclear-weapon States to provide legally binding security assurances to non-nuclear States. The strengthened review process was vitally important for achieving the goals and objectives of the NPT and further measures were necessary to implement the steps identified by the 2000 Review Conference.

53. Mongolia joined other States in their belief that universality of the NPT must be ensured, calling for full accession to the Treaty. His delegation wished to stress the need for the CTBT to enter into force, the importance of upholding moratoriums on nuclear testing, and the urgency of negotiating a fissile material cut-off treaty.

54. The first session of the Preparatory Committee was being held against the backdrop of disquieting international circumstances which highlighted the crucial importance of the international struggle to promote peace and security by reducing and eliminating weapons of mass destruction. Closer international cooperation was paramount in order to improve the physical protection of nuclear material, combat illicit trafficking in nuclear material and other radioactive sources and enhance protection of nuclear facilities against acts of terrorism. In that regard, IAEA safeguards, export controls and enhanced physical protection were crucial in preventing the illegal acquisition or misuse of nuclear material by States or non-State actors.

55. In the absence of the ABM Treaty, a realistic and balanced alternative should be found in the interest of promoting international peace and security. Mongolia therefore welcomed the commitment of the United States and the Russian Federation to reduce their strategic nuclear warheads in coming years through a legally binding agreement.

56. The development of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones, especially in regions of tension such as the Middle East, was crucial. Mongolia reiterated its profound concern at the serious deterioration of the situation in that region and the continued failure to comply with Security Council resolutions 1397, 1402 and 1403 (2002). Similarly, compliance with resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) was essential to a just and lasting solution that could eventually lead to coexistence of the State of Israel and Palestine within secure and recognized borders.

57. Mongolia was striving to institutionalize its nuclear-weapon-free status at the international level. In that regard he drew attention to document

NPT/CONF.2005/PC.1/2 and expressed gratitude for the organization of a United Nations regional meeting which had discussed ways and means of strengthening Mongolia's status in September 2001. The resulting Sapporo Report contained firm recommendations, including the possible elaboration of a legal instrument between the States concerned. Mongolia believed that the efforts of the international community to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons were greatly assisted by IAEA work on promoting the global nuclear safety regime through safeguards agreements and their additional protocols. In that connection, he announced that Mongolia had signed an additional protocol in September 2001.

58. **Mr. Rybakov** (Belarus) said that his Government was convinced that the NPT remained one of the most important elements of the system of global security and a key instrument in the efforts of the international community to prevent nuclear proliferation. Modern realities and challenges required a new level of responsibility in individual and collective decisions taken by States parties to the Treaty. Belarus had not only rejected the opportunity to possess nuclear weapons, but had also made a significant contribution to strengthening the NPT, strictly observing all obligations under the Treaty and the agreements reached during the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences.

59. While supporting the global aim of eliminating nuclear weapons, his delegation acknowledged the need for a realistic and balanced approach to the process of gradual disarmament, and welcomed efforts made by nuclear-weapon States in that direction. Further progress in reducing strategic nuclear weapons was required in order to maintain global strategic stability. He urged the two nuclear-weapon States which held the largest stockpiles to sign a legally binding agreement on the further irreversible reduction of strategic nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. Belarus wished to stress the significance of achieving universality by the accession of States with nuclear facilities which had not been placed under IAEA safeguards and, in that connection, supported efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

60. Nuclear disarmament should be complemented by practical steps to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Convinced that all nuclear tests should be prohibited, Belarus took the opportunity to launch an appeal to remaining States to sign and ratify the CTBT as soon as possible and called for

negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty within the Conference on Disarmament.

61. Belarus deeply regretted the recently announced nuclear posture review, which envisaged the development of new types of nuclear weapons. The review also considered the possibility of preventive nuclear strikes against a number of States, including non-nuclear-weapon States, thereby creating a dangerous precedent.

62. As a Party to the Standing Consultative Commission established under the ABM Treaty, Belarus wished to express its deep concern over the decision of the United States to withdraw from that Treaty. Such a rejection of the Treaty would inevitably lead to the development of new advanced systems of nuclear weapons, increased stockpiles of nuclear weapons and the militarization of outer space. Confronted with new threats to global security, the international community should pay special attention to the issues of nuclear terrorism and the protection of nuclear material.

63. It was extremely important to fully observe article IV of the NPT on cooperation in peaceful uses of atomic energy. Having suffered much damage after the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station, Belarus welcomed the efforts of the United Nations and individual countries to mitigate the consequences of the disaster.

64. **Mr. Nejad Hosseinian** (Islamic Republic of Iran) recalled that nuclear non-proliferation was an essential ingredient of international peace and security, in view of the destructive potential of nuclear weapons. The emergence of non-State actors in the international arena had drawn attention to the potential for nuclear weapons to be used as a means of intimidation and terror. The tragic events of 11 September had underscored the fact that international security was indivisible. In a world of increasing access to technology, all States faced similar threats and dangers.

65. In spite of its shortcomings, the NPT remained the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation regime. The decision of the States parties to extend it indefinitely had been made in order to avoid nuclear chaos and the disruption of international peace and security. If the 1995 and 2000 review processes had provided the road map for implementation of the Treaty, the current session should be used to make recommendations for further progress towards that end.

66. Unfortunately, developments since the 2000 Review Conference had not facilitated the implementation of the 13 practical steps set forth in its Final Document. Indeed, certain events had placed significant obstacles on the path towards disarmament. The persistence of certain parties in failing to accede to the Treaty and the rejection of the CTBT by one nuclear-weapon State were alarming.

67. No progress had been achieved with regard to the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. Israel's policies of expansionism, aggression and killing of innocent civilians knew no limit. The occupation of Palestinian territories and arrest, intimidation and killing of women and children continued uncurbed. Likewise, Israel persisted in defying international calls for the creation of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. The Committee should address that issue at its current session, since Israel's policy endangered regional and global security and challenged the Treaty itself.

68. The failure to achieve progress on the START-2 and START-3 negotiations was equally of concern. Lack of progress at the global level affected regional security and accelerated the arms race. Ongoing efforts to conclude agreements for further reductions of nuclear weapons were needed to bring the process back on track.

69. The United States decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty had serious implications for international peace and security. It was regrettable that some parties were urging nuclear-weapon States to develop extensive new missile defence systems in contravention of the obligations stipulated in the NPT. States should spare no effort to combat such developments.

70. The most serious setback, however, was to be found in the new nuclear assessment report prepared by the United States Department of Defense. The doctrine enunciated in the report indicated a drastic departure from the traditional practice of using nuclear weapons for the purpose of deterrence. The new policy, which involved using such weapons for operational activities contravened the letter and spirit of the NPT and would further lower the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons by allowing them to be used when conventional weapons could not effectively destroy targets, thereby expanding their scope.

71. The doctrine was a clear violation of United States obligations under international law and contravened assurances that had been given in that

regard at the highest level, including through the relevant Security Council resolutions. The doctrine also violated the terms of article VI of the NPT, calling for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and for nuclear disarmament by each of the parties and ran counter to the appeals of the 2000 Review Conference for the total elimination of nuclear arsenals and a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies. Moreover, it was totally at odds with the demands issued by the international community in various forums as well as the advisory opinion delivered by the International Court of Justice on the same theme.

72. The new doctrine not only signalled the beginning of a new arms race, it also expanded the role of nuclear weapons in conventional conflicts and against non-belligerent non-nuclear-weapon States. The doctrine presupposed the conduct of new nuclear tests in clear violation of the United States obligations under the CTBT and its unilateral moratorium on such tests.

73. The growing trend of undermining multilateral efforts aimed at addressing global threats gave cause for grave concern and required urgent and resolute universal action. The NPT offered a blueprint for the reduction of nuclear weapons with a view to their total elimination. Every step aimed at increasing the use of nuclear weapons undermined its objectives and violated its letter and spirit. The international community should stand united to preserve the integrity of the Treaty, for which the Preparatory Committee had particular responsibility at its current session.

74. **Ms. Jarbussynova** (Kazakhstan), noting that the events of 11 September had demonstrated the vulnerability of global security, said that efforts aimed at preventing terrorist organizations or non-State actors from possessing weapons of mass destruction were vital elements of the global strategy to combat terrorism. Multilateral efforts were needed to deal with the international nature of contemporary threats. Kazakhstan was convinced that the NPT was both a key instrument in efforts to stop the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and a treaty on disarmament.

75. There had been both positive and negative developments since the 2000 Review Conference. On the positive side, the inspection regime in the framework of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty had been completed and a seven-year period of

strategic offensive weapons reduction by the two major nuclear Powers had come to an end in 2001. On the other hand, some non-member States had continued to develop nuclear weapons. Despite those difficulties, all States parties must honour their commitments, thus ensuring progress in the nuclear disarmament process and further strengthening the credibility of the Treaty. In that regard, she urged those States which had not yet done so, to accede to the Treaty without delay and without conditions.

76. Kazakhstan had signed the CTBT in September 1996, believing that that action would help to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. It was regrettable, however, that a number of key countries had so far not taken appropriate legal actions to ratify the CTBT. Her delegation believed that the ABM Treaty played a vital role in maintaining strategic stability and regretted the fact that the withdrawal of the United States from the Treaty might pose new challenges, including the spectre of an arms race in outer space. She hoped, however, that some provisions of the Treaty could be implemented in the future.

77. In order to continue the disarmament process, it was not enough to create new strategic relations between two nuclear Powers. Rather, the Conference on Disarmament, as the multilateral body in that area, should begin negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty to complement the work of IAEA and the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty Organization. In that regard, it was necessary to start negotiations on preventing the arms race in and the militarization of outer space, which could lead to unpredictable consequences. The promotion of the provisions of the NPT should remain a priority subject of discussions within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament.

78. Noting that regional security and stability were vital to global peace and development, she said that her delegation attached great importance to the initiative to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia, which was becoming even more vital in the light of the current situation and recent acts of terrorism. Kazakhstan was confident that the establishment of such a zone in Central Asia and other regions of the world would constitute an important step towards strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime and promoting general and complete disarmament. Her delegation also supported the Mongolian Government's efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone. It was necessary to continue efforts aimed at creating an effective system of security in the region of Central

Asia in particular and in Asia as a whole. The newly established Shanghai Cooperation Organization was a step in the right direction. In that regard, given the current geopolitical situation, her Government considered it important to convene a summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia to consider security problems, including nuclear terrorism.

79. **Mr. Šahović** (Yugoslavia) said that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had, on the basis of the Successor Statement of 29 August 2001, become a party to the NPT because of its commitment to peace and the strengthening of international security through cooperation and disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament. Indeed, non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament were the preconditions for long-lasting stability throughout the world; that was why his delegation wished to emphasize the importance of fully implementing the decisions taken at both the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference. Specifically, the 13 practical steps laid down in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 decision entitled "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament" should be implemented. Moreover, the need for the universality of the treaty could not be overemphasized.

80. His Government, which was committed to the process of nuclear disarmament as a whole and realized that non-proliferation was closely connected with other aspects of nuclear disarmament, had signed the CTBT in July 2001 and expected the Yugoslav Parliament to ratify it shortly. Yugoslavia's accession to the NPT and signature and ratification of the CTBT were important steps towards ensuring universal implementation of those two major instruments in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The entry into force of the CTBT would also be a significant accomplishment in that regard. While it believed in a world free of nuclear weapons, Yugoslavia also believed that nuclear energy should be used for peaceful purposes under strict international control. It complied, in that regard, with all its obligations under the Treaty and maintained fruitful cooperation with IAEA. The Agency's safeguards system should be strengthened in order to prevent the unauthorized and uncontrolled use of nuclear material. One of the biggest concerns facing the international community was the possibility that weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, would fall into the hands of terrorist groups or individual terrorists. It was therefore important that firm measures should be taken

by countries individually and at the regional and global levels to prevent the acquisition by terrorist groups of weapons of mass destruction.

81. **Mr. Obidov** (Uzbekistan) said that the session of the Preparatory Committee was taking place at a time when international peace and security and the non-proliferation regime itself were threatened. The tragic events of 11 September underscored the need to strengthen global cooperation against nuclear proliferation and the threat of nuclear terrorism. For 30 years, the NPT had been the most important multilateral instrument in the area of disarmament, because of its near universality.

82. Uzbekistan had ratified the Treaty during the first year of its independence, and was committed to the implementation of its article VII. Along with its neighbouring countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, it had joined in the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia. The five countries were in the process of drafting an agreement to that effect, which would soon make Central Asia the fifth such zone in the world. Uzbekistan had also become a party to the CTBT and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and had concluded an additional protocol to its safeguards agreement with IAEA.

83. His delegation supported the efforts of the Secretary-General in the area of education for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and believed that those initiatives were very important to the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime and the review process. It also acknowledged the valuable assistance provided by the United Nations Department of Disarmament Affairs.

84. **Mr. Cappagli** (Argentina) said that all the delegations had to work closely together, demonstrating great flexibility, in order to determine what must be done to implement, in the best manner possible, the commitments undertaken under the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference. The almost universal nature of the NPT reflected the common will of the vast majority of the international community to achieve a world that was completely free of nuclear weapons. The Final Document was clear in its desire to promote accession to the Treaty of all States which were still outside that instrument. The Treaty's objectives with respect to nuclear disarmament would not be fully achieved until all nuclear weapons were completely eliminated. The unequivocal commitment of the nuclear powers to work towards the total

elimination of their nuclear arsenals, the inclusion of the principle of nuclear disarmament measures and the 13 practical steps towards nuclear disarmament enshrined in the Final Document, were strides in the right direction and must be upheld unreservedly.

85. The international nuclear non-proliferation regime was made up of a set of instruments which were crucial and which must be seen as a whole. Favouring some of them to the detriment of others would damage the regime as a whole and stray from compliance with the obligations stipulated in the Treaty.

86. Noting that the 2000 Review Conference had underscored the importance of the IAEA safeguards regime and the role of bilateral and regional safeguards in promoting transparency and mutual trust between neighbouring countries, he said that Argentina and Brazil had a common system of accountability and control of nuclear material which, for over 10 years, had deepened mutual trust between the two countries and formed the basis for progress in their relationship in nuclear matters. He was sure that regional safeguard schemes could play a role in other regions of the world. International standards for nuclear exports control had been established in order to ensure that nuclear energy would be used only for peaceful purposes. Nuclear export control regimes played a key role in preventing proliferation, while at the same time promoting nuclear cooperation for peaceful purposes.

87. The inalienable right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, which was acknowledged by the Treaty, was a priority for Argentina. The Treaty provided a proper framework for confidence-building and cooperation for the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, indicating how the application of nuclear technology could improve the well-being and quality of life of mankind and the legitimacy of international cooperation in that field. Nuclear activities for peaceful purposes should be conducted on the basis of transparency as well as in accordance with internationally accepted levels of nuclear security and physical protection. Those issues were particularly important in the light of the threats raised by the possibility of acts of nuclear terrorism. Accordingly, Argentina had supported the recent adoption by the Board of Governors of IAEA of measures designed to strengthen IAEA activities in order to prevent such threats.

88. **Mr. Than** (Myanmar) said that the changes that had occurred since the successful 2000 Review Conference were far from encouraging. Indeed, the

prevailing international political climate and security environment were not very conducive to arms control and disarmament. Nevertheless, the international community should maintain and carry forward the strengthened review process laid down by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference. Accordingly, all States parties, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, should submit the reports on the implementation of article VI of the Treaty, paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament" and the 13 steps towards nuclear disarmament laid down in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference to the Preparatory Committee and the 2005 Review Conference at their sessions.

89. His delegation, which attached great importance to the Treaty, its regime and the strengthened review process, believed that it was of the utmost importance for States parties to achieve universal membership of the Treaty. However, ostracizing or alienating those States still outside the Treaty would not be very helpful nor would it make it easier to achieve that goal. Instead, States parties, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, should enter into a security dialogue with the States that were still refusing to accede to the Treaty.

90. Turning to the issue of nuclear disarmament, he noted that, while the 13 practical steps constituted a commendable and vital plan of action for nuclear disarmament, very little progress had been made in their implementation. However, his delegation welcomed the progress that had been achieved in unilateral reductions and bilateral reductions of nuclear weapons. Despite the advisory opinion of 8 July 1996 of the International Court of Justice that there existed an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control, most of the 13 practical steps set out in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference were yet to be implemented. It was particularly discouraging that nuclear-weapon States had thus far not agreed on any measures to reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons and that the strategic nuclear doctrines of some of those States were still largely based on the first use of nuclear weapons. Moreover, owing to the inflexible positions of nuclear-weapon States, the Conference on Disarmament was still unable to commence negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

91. His delegation believed that the forthcoming sessions of the Preparatory Committee should set aside some time to address the vital question of security assurances and that the 2005 Review Conference should set up a subsidiary body or mechanism to deal effectively with the question of security assurances.

*The meeting rose at 6.05 p.m.*