
**Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

30 May 2002

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Summary record of the 2nd meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Monday, 8 April 2002, at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Salander (Sweden)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.20 p.m.

General debate (*continued*)

1. **Mr. Miranda y Elio** (Spain), speaking on behalf of the European Union, the associated countries Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Turkey, and, in addition, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, said that recent events had proved that no State on its own could keep its territory safe from the scourge of terrorism or the menace of access to weapons of mass destruction. The security and stability of the international community had been challenged by the proliferation of such weapons and their delivery systems. The international community had been forced to review its regimes and measures to deal with the security of nuclear installations, nuclear material and other radioactive material.

2. In September 2001 the European Council had adopted conclusions and a plan of action to give impetus to European Union efforts to combat terrorism. European Union foreign ministers had later adopted conclusions on the implications for the non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control policy, and firm measures in the fields of multilateral instruments, export control, international cooperation and political dialogue were expected to be formulated.

3. The European Union wished to reaffirm its commitment to General Assembly resolution 56/24 and the strengthening of universal norms. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had continued its activities to counter nuclear terrorist threats and had reinforced mechanisms for protection against nuclear terrorism. The European Union welcomed the decision taken by the Board of Governors to bolster international cooperation within the framework of its statute.

4. The European Union remained convinced that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) would continue to be the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime, and was committed to the effective implementation of the 1995 decisions and resolution, and the final document adopted by consensus at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT. The European Union hoped that preparations for the 2005 Review Conference would address the substantive and procedural issues as

provided by those undertakings. It was crucial that the Preparatory Committee should lay a solid foundation for the review process.

5. In spite of the appeals of the international community, four States remained outside the Treaty. Universal adherence was especially important for reinforcing the non-proliferation and disarmament objectives which were at the core of European Union policy. While acknowledging that Cuba had signed an IAEA additional protocol, the European Union urged Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan to unconditionally accede to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States, and to place their facilities under the safeguards agreements.

6. In terms of regional issues, the European Union was deeply concerned by the situation in South Asia and appealed to India and Pakistan to meet all requirements under Security Council resolution 1172 (1998) and to actively adopt all necessary measures to fulfil their stated intention. The European Union was committed to the implementation of resolutions on the Middle East, and NPT compliance would remain a main priority. The establishment of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction had been a cherished goal of the international community. All States in the region that had not yet done so should accede to the conventions on chemical and biological weapons, and the nine States parties in the region that had not yet concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements with IAEA should negotiate such agreements and bring them into force as soon as possible.

7. As a consequence of Iraq's refusal to comply with its obligations, IAEA had been unable to provide assurances pursuant to its mandate for more than three years. The European Union therefore called for the full implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1284 (1999), and the re-establishment of an effective disarmament, monitoring and verification regime in Iraq. It was to be hoped that the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and IAEA would soon be able to resume their work in Iraq.

8. The failure by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to honour its safeguards commitment was another area of concern. That Government's lack of cooperation with IAEA had created an impediment to

the Kedo project, a cornerstone of regional stability and security.

9. The European Union encouraged systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the NPT, as well as provisions contained in the 1995 “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament” and the final document of the 2000 Review Conference.

10. It was regrettable that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) had not taken effect. While urging the non-signatories and non-ratifying States to take prompt action to ensure the Treaty’s entry into force, the European Union urged all States with nuclear capability to abide by a moratorium and to refrain from any action that contravened the provisions of the CTBT. Along with the CTBT, the immediate commencement of negotiations for a fissile material cut-off treaty represented the next essential multilateral step in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Pending the entry into force of a cut-off treaty, the European Union urged all States to declare a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices.

11. The IAEA safeguards system was the fundamental pillar of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. It was therefore essential that all States that had not yet done so should conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA, including the additional protocols. The European Union strongly supported the decision to adopt a Model Additional Protocol which would lead to the strengthening of the safeguards system. All European Union member States had signed additional protocols and had either ratified them or were in the process of doing so.

12. Taking note of the United States decision to withdraw from the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM), the European Union welcomed the ongoing negotiations between the Russian Federation and the United States on strategic nuclear arms reduction, in the hope that such talks would further promote international stability. Measures taken to enhance disarmament should be enshrined in a legally binding instrument with provisions to ensure irreversibility, verification and transparency. Non-strategic nuclear weapons were an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process, and the European Union urged early negotiations on an effectively verifiable agreement on drastic reductions

in such weapons. The application of the principle of irreversibility to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures contributed to the maintenance and reinforcement of international peace, security and stability.

13. Furthermore, the European Union fully endorsed the call for increased transparency with regard to nuclear-weapon capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to article VI, and recognized the continued value of existing security assurances, as provided through the protocols of the nuclear-weapon-free zones and unilateral declarations of nuclear-weapon States. The European Union supported the signature and ratification by nuclear-weapon States of the relevant protocols on nuclear-weapon-free zones and looked forward to the early entry into force of the African nuclear-weapon-free zone.

14. The European Union supported the inalienable right of all parties to the NPT to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of the NPT.

15. It was important to note the unprecedented nature of the strengthened review process. In accordance with the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, the outcome of the first two sessions of the Preparatory Committee would be factually summarized, and participants were not compelled to reach agreement on a negotiated document. It should not be overlooked that a summary by the Chair would have to be submitted at the next session. Recommendations to the Review Conference should not be hastily drawn up before options had been adequately considered. Nevertheless, the preparatory work should be approached in a constructive manner, laying the foundation for compromise at the last session of the Preparatory Committee before the 2005 Review Conference.

16. The European Union welcomed flexibility in the overall role and structure of the enhanced review process, and believed that one of the more traditional tasks of the Preparatory Committee, procedural preparations, should not be omitted. Moreover, preparations should be carried out in a balanced fashion, with due consideration given to all aspects of the implementation of the NPT. The European Union hoped that the first session of the Preparatory Committee would make a positive start on the NPT review process. To that end, the Committee should not

devote excessive time to its own procedural matters, and decision-making should be based on consensus.

17. The 1995 decision to extend the NPT indefinitely confirmed the status of the Treaty as the most important international framework for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. The 2000 Review Conference had established clear guidelines for the achievement of the Treaty's objectives. In reaffirming its commitment to the strengthened review process, the European Union stood ready to enhance the Treaty in the fight against the danger of the spread of nuclear weapons, and pledged support for the achievement of the objectives set in the NPT and its review process.

18. **Ms. Valle Pereira** (Brazil), recalling her Government's position on the NPT, said that Brazil had been critical of the asymmetrical obligations under the Treaty, whereby nuclear-weapon States had increased, rather than reduced, their nuclear arsenals. Without a process of effective disarmament, the dangers of proliferation could not be avoided. Brazil had joined the NPT in 1998, having already been bound, under the Treaty of Tlatelolco, to the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy. In addition to participation in regional initiatives for the control of nuclear materials and confidence-building, Brazil's commitment to the peaceful use of nuclear energy had been enshrined in its Constitution since 1988.

19. The preparatory process for the 2005 Review Conference would test the willingness of States parties to honour their commitments and the expectations they had generated. There were worrying signs of initiatives which were not conducive to the achievement of the objectives of the NPT and the full implementation of the agreements reached at the 2000 Review Conference. The status of the Conference on Disarmament, the lack of urgency regarding the entry into force of the CTBT, regional tensions and the notification of withdrawal by one of the States parties to the ABM Treaty constituted trends which ran counter to the spirit of the NPT, among others.

20. Nuclear-weapon States should take immediate steps to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in security policies and defence doctrines. Multilateral and legally binding security assurances must be given to non-nuclear-weapon States in the form of an additional protocol to the Treaty, without prejudice to the assurances already given by the five nuclear-weapon States through treaties on nuclear-weapon-free

zones. International security issues affected all countries and required universal responses, within the framework of collective responsibility. Furthermore, Brazil welcomed the announcements on the reduction of nuclear arsenals. The principles of irreversibility and verification should be applicable to nuclear disarmament and arms control and reduction, and there should be no possibility of redeploying nuclear weapons currently in non-operational status.

21. Brazil wished to commend the work of IAEA, in the areas of both nuclear safety and the application of safeguards agreements under article III of the NPT, and supported the strengthening of the safeguards system based on comprehensive agreements with non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT, voluntary-offer agreements with nuclear-weapon States and limited-scope agreements with non-States parties. The strengthening of the system and the maintenance of a robust non-proliferation regime for all weapons of mass destruction was not sustainable without parallel positive developments in the fields of arms control and disarmament.

22. Brazil shared the concerns about the possibility of weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of terrorists. Such dangers highlighted the importance of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Effective measures must be taken with a view to the total elimination of nuclear weapons at an early date. If mutual cooperation prevailed over mutual suspicion, and if States demonstrated a spirit of cooperation and sense of responsibility, the new review cycle would confirm the credibility and vitality of the NPT.

23. **Mr. de la Fortelle** (France) said that the contribution of the NPT to security and development was more important than ever. The security challenge had acquired particular urgency in the light of the tragic events of 11 September 2001. The international community should focus on preventing terrorists from gaining access to weapons of mass destruction, on averting the spread of nuclear weapons, and on pursuing disarmament. Cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear power was one of the main tools which the international community could use to respond to the development challenge.

24. Greater international cooperation was crucial to the achievement of those aims. The NPT embodied the interests of all and was the foundation for such cooperation. France was fully committed to

implementing its provisions as well as the decisions of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. The need for multilateral non-proliferation and disarmament regimes had never been more evident, since the commitments and safeguards for which they provided could help counter the prevailing sense of uncertainty and instability.

25. In order to be effective, however, the provisions of the Treaty had to be strictly and universally applied. An honest review of compliance with the Treaty was an essential part of the Preparatory Committee's work and vital to maintaining the Treaty's credibility as well as avoiding the recurrence of the situations pertaining in Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

26. The credibility of the Treaty was also important in establishing a universal norm. France was therefore continuing its efforts to encourage those States that had not already done so to accede to and ratify the Treaty.

27. The Committee's current session was the first to be held since the adoption of the strengthened review procedure in May 2000. It should be used to conduct a thorough analysis of the international situation and a frank exchange of views on the application of the Treaty, and of the decisions and resolutions of the Review Conferences. Without such an effort, the 2005 Review Conference stood little chance of success.

28. His country looked forward to a balanced, structured and substantive debate in which no subject would be avoided or given precedence over others. Without a balanced approach, the Committee's work would lose credibility and international non-proliferation and disarmament efforts would be undermined.

29. In reaffirming its willingness to abide by its long-standing commitments under the NPT, his country was also mindful of the impact of the events of 11 September 2001 on the assessment of the risk of nuclear terrorism. It was convinced that priority should be given to ensuring the broadest possible accession to and strictest compliance with the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and to offering all States the requisite assistance for that purpose. Greater security of radioactive sources could be achieved if more States implemented the existing non-binding instruments and concrete international efforts were made in that domain. France supported the practical measures which the Director General of IAEA had proposed in that regard.

30. His country France was examining ways and means of taking account of the risk of terrorism in the area of export controls and had pursued efforts to guarantee greater transparency during its presidency of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and its working group. France equally supported the recommendations being prepared by the Zangger Committee in that domain.

31. The situation in Iraq was of particular concern. While it was encouraging that IAEA had been able to verify Iraq's physical inventory of nuclear material in 2000 and 2001, such verification could not replace the activities required to be performed by the Agency's inspectors pursuant to the relevant Security Council resolutions. Indeed, the Agency could no longer guarantee that Iraq was abiding by the commitments set forth in those resolutions. France appealed for the full implementation of those resolutions and urged Iraq to cooperate unconditionally with the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and with IAEA.

32. It was equally regrettable that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was evading its obligations. Its authorities should fully abide by their commitments, cooperate with IAEA and authorize IAEA inspectors to visit the sites concerned.

33. In spite of the difficulties, the international community had begun to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system so as to preserve its credibility and reliability. The improvement of the system with the introduction of additional protocols represented a vital element for the NPT verification process. However, only 62 additional protocols had been approved by the IAEA Board of Governors and less than half of those had entered into force. Those States that had not already done so should sign and implement an additional protocol at the earliest opportunity in order to strengthen international security and enhance cooperation as a matter of priority. The current session also offered an opportunity to promote generalized safeguards agreements and additional protocols in Africa.

34. Numerous States had renounced nuclear weapons in order to accede to the NPT. France, for its part, had taken practical measures to honour its commitments under article VI of the Treaty, basing its nuclear deterrence policy on the principle of strict sufficiency and reducing its nuclear arsenal in spite of growing uncertainty in the international security situation.

35. The 1995 Review and Extension Conference had adopted a programme of action aimed, inter alia, at concluding a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, opening and rapidly concluding negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and securing the commitment of nuclear-weapon States to progressively and systematically reducing their arsenals.

36. France had contributed significantly to the drafting and realization of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and provided considerable technical assistance to the CTBT Organization. Since the CTBT was a vital instrument in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, his country spared no effort to promote its entry into force, supporting in particular the provisions of article XIV thereof. The moratorium on nuclear testing had created an important norm and a vital prerequisite pending the entry into force of the CTBT. However, the entry into force of the CTBT was crucial to the long-term survival of that norm.

37. While a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons did not yet exist, it had been universally acknowledged as capable of playing an important role in the nuclear disarmament process. His country was willing to resume the negotiations towards its establishment.

38. A systematic and gradual approach to reducing nuclear weapons was needed with a view to eliminating them entirely. France was committed to the process as a voluntary one. While there was no one path to disarmament, the practical steps set forth in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference indicated the direction that all should follow. His country would continue to implement article VI of the NPT and the relevant provisions of decision 2 of 1995.

39. The voluntarist approach to be taken should be based on the principle of general and complete disarmament set forth in the Treaty and the relevant documents of the Review Conferences. In pursuing the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-diminished security for all, the principle of general and complete disarmament should be constantly kept in mind, since the one could not be divorced from the other.

40. The post-cold war period had been marked by substantial progress in non-nuclear disarmament with the establishment of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. However, the momentum had

subsequently been lost with the resumption of the arms race, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles, the paralysis of the Conference on Disarmament and the absence of any verification machinery for the Biological Weapons Convention. While deploring those developments, France had exerted every effort to reverse those setbacks.

41. Over the previous 10 years, it had terminated several of its nuclear programmes, reduced the number of delivery systems by half and entirely eliminated its ground-to-ground missiles, guaranteeing that they would never be reused. Air- and sea-launched missiles had also been substantially reduced and none of its nuclear weapons would be targeted in the future. France had applied the principle of irreversibility in dismantling its nuclear test sites and fissile material production facilities. It was also dismantling its Pierrelatte enrichment plant and its Marcoule retreatment plant.

42. His country had also offered more than 100 States parties without nuclear weapons security assurances, including through additional protocols signed at the regional level. It was actively pursuing consultations on an additional protocol to the Treaty of Bangkok and appealed to those African States that had not done so to ratify the Treaty of Pelindaba. France also supported the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia.

43. Global reduction of nuclear arsenals depended also on the outcome of negotiations between the United States and the Russian Federation. His country noted the decision of the United States to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. It hoped that consultations on a new strategic framework would result in binding commitments guaranteeing bilateral cooperation between the two States and the stability required for the nuclear disarmament process.

44. France relied on nuclear power for most of its electricity supply, using it to enhance safety, reduce greenhouse gas emissions and stabilize energy prices. The varied applications of nuclear power also benefited a growing number of countries.

45. However, the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear power required a climate of confidence based on security, safety and transparency. The security of nuclear material and installations presupposed effective, objective and transparent export controls and active and broad adherence to the IAEA safeguards

system. The need to prevent acts of nuclear terrorism was more urgent than ever. France supported efforts by IAEA to weld the responsibility of States for the formulation and implementation of policies to bilateral and multilateral cooperation against terrorism in order to coordinate international assistance efforts and create benchmarks for national policies.

46. Since security was crucial for the exploitation of nuclear power, all States should sign and ratify the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management.

47. His country did everything possible to ensure the safety of the transport of nuclear material. It offered all necessary information and assurances to countries potentially affected and believed that the 2003 Conference on the Safety of Transport of Radioactive Material would offer an opportunity to identify areas for further improvement and encourage broader application of existing instruments.

48. The development of the peaceful uses of nuclear power should be accompanied by greater transparency in order to reassure the public that nuclear power offered an environmentally sound and safe source of energy. International cooperation was also required towards that end.

49. France was particularly attached to offering broad access to peaceful applications of nuclear technology. His country fully supported the IAEA technical cooperation programme, and hoped that States would increase their contributions to it. France was the third net contributor to its technical assistance fund and supported additional cooperation, training and internship schemes. The more than 130 bilateral accords which France had concluded in that sphere bore testimony to its commitment to that area at the international level.

50. **Mr. Sun** Juon-yung (Republic of Korea) recalled that the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference had been the result of the international community's decision to reaffirm the central role of the NPT in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament efforts in the twenty-first century.

51. The current preparatory session was the first opportunity to increase the effectiveness of the review process on the basis of that document. In keeping with its terms, the session should also assess the

implications of the events of 11 September 2001 on the NPT process and should renew the commitment to nuclear arms control and to making the NPT regime more effective and resilient.

52. States parties to the Treaty should express their views and concerns to the fullest extent possible. The assessment of the current situation should be balanced and should not be overly pessimistic. The Committee should demonstrate its ability to meet new security challenges in the aftermath of the events of 11 September by identifying the nature of those challenges and ways and means of addressing them.

53. His delegation welcomed the efforts of IAEA to strengthen the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its proposals for enhancing global preparedness against nuclear terrorism. The international community needed to take concrete action to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to build trust among nations.

54. The Committee should help strengthen other multilateral instruments that supported the NPT regime as a whole and should help create the necessary political will to achieve progress through such instruments.

55. The current pace of nuclear disarmament fell short of expectations, while the 13 practical steps contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference had not yet been implemented. Since the process of nuclear disarmament was largely affected by strategic relations between nuclear-weapon States, particular attention should be paid to disarmament efforts such as those of the United States and the Russian Federation to formalize an agreement on nuclear weapons reduction. His delegation hoped that the agreement would boost the disarmament process. Nuclear-weapon States should do more to reduce nuclear weapons with a view to eliminating them entirely. Transparency and the implementation of relevant agreements should also be increased.

56. The future of the CTBT was a matter of particular concern. It was distressing that it had not come into effect five years after it had been opened for signature. His delegation welcomed the Final Declaration of the Second Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Treaty, which had affirmed that nuclear-weapon tests and explosions posed a serious threat to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament efforts.

57. Governments should not use failure by others to ratify the Treaty as an excuse for not doing so themselves. A moratorium should be maintained on nuclear testing as a minimum commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and an essential step towards disarmament. The signatories should establish the verification regime for the Treaty and provide political, financial and technical support for its implementation.

58. It was disturbing that negotiations had not yet begun on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. The members of the Conference on Disarmament should agree on a programme of work and begin negotiations on such a treaty without further delay.

59. The significance and urgency of universal adherence to the NPT had been highlighted by growing concern over the security of nuclear facilities and safety of nuclear material in the Middle East and South Asia. The Committee needed to send a strong message to the States concerned to implement Security Council resolution 1172 (1999) and the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review Conference.

60. Accession to the Treaty did not guarantee full compliance, however, as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had shown. The Agreed Framework of 1994 between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea did not represent a substitute for the Treaty. Under the Framework, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea maintained a freeze on graphite-moderated reactors and was bound to comply with its safeguards agreement with IAEA before the delivery of the key nuclear components for the light water reactor project by the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization. Since it would take three years to verify such compliance, his delegation hoped that the country concerned would cooperate with the Agency so that the project could begin without delay.

61. His delegation firmly believed in the pivotal role of the NPT in countering nuclear proliferation and that its future role would be invaluable and irreplaceable. Non-compliance remained a challenge to the NPT regime, and ongoing efforts to support the IAEA safeguards system were therefore required of all. Universalization of the additional protocol should be a key priority. His delegation welcomed the progress made on the IAEA integrated safeguards systems,

which was expected to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the current system.

62. His delegation remained committed to achieving the twin goals of the current session, namely to reaffirming the unreserved commitment of every State party to its Treaty obligations and to strengthening the instruments under the NPT regime in order to meet the new challenges ahead.

63. **Mr. Xu Xiaodi** (China) said that, not only had the provisions of the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference not been fully implemented, but that certain developments were having an adverse impact on the Treaty review process and undermining the international security environment. One such development was that the ABM Treaty, widely recognized by the international community as a cornerstone for maintaining strategic stability, was becoming history; other factors were the waning prospects for the entry into force of the CTBT, and the escalating violence and bloodshed in the Middle East. In order to attain the international community's long-cherished goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons, achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons and promoting security, stability, peace and development, the universality, authority and vitality of the NPT must be maintained and strengthened.

64. First, an international environment of stability, cooperation and mutual trust must be created. It was absolutely essential to guarantee the security of all countries, so that they would not want to acquire and control nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. It was essential to build on the progress achieved in nuclear disarmament in the post-cold-war era and to abandon the unilateralist pursuit of absolute security by individual countries. Instead, common security for all countries should be pursued through multilateral efforts. Acts that might endanger international peace and security and undermine trust among countries must be avoided. All States should work together to maintain global strategic stability and prevent an arms race in outer space. The countries with the largest nuclear arsenals bore special and primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament, while nuclear-weapon States should continue their moratoriums on nuclear-test explosions, refrain from developing new types of nuclear weapons and provide negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States unconditionally.

65. Second, the integrity of the international disarmament and arms control regime should be maintained. The vitality of the Treaty was closely related to other arms control treaties dealing with specific subjects. If such treaties were breached, the general targets of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation established by the Treaty would be beyond reach.

66. Third, countries must faithfully implement their obligations under the Treaty and their commitments stemming from review conferences. It was regrettable that some important provisions on nuclear disarmament and regional non-proliferation in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference had not been carried out; some had even been breached. That would most certainly have an impact on the authority of the Treaty and the documents from its review process and, therefore, undermine confidence in them.

67. China never engaged in and was resolutely opposed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons in any form. In order to fulfil its obligations in that regard, China had speeded up the enactment of export control legislation. It supported and participated in IAEA safeguards activities and had now completed the domestic legal procedures for the entry into effect of the protocol additional to the safeguards agreement between China and IAEA. The protocol had become effective in China on 28 March 2002, making his country the first nuclear-weapon State in which such a protocol had taken effect. That reflected China's commitment to strengthening the effectiveness of the safeguards regime and fulfilling its non-proliferation obligations.

68. As a result of the 11 September 2001 attack on the United States, it had become even more important and urgent to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear terror. In that regard, China supported the IAEA efforts to enhance security measures. His country had never shirked its responsibilities in the area of nuclear disarmament and had, inter alia, consistently advocated the complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons; never been involved in any nuclear arms race or deployed any nuclear weapons outside China; and believed that a comprehensive ban on nuclear-test explosions was an important step towards the complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons. Indeed, China supported the early entry into force of the CTBT and was committed to its ratification at an

early date. China also supported the efforts of the Conference on Disarmament to come up with a programme of work agreed by all parties and to begin negotiations in accordance with the mandates of the Shannon report.

69. His delegation believed that a balance should be struck between the Treaty's dual functions of non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The right of States parties to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes should not be restricted in the name of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Along with the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation, the key role of nuclear energy in generating pollution-free and efficient energy and in promoting the economic and social progress of developing countries must be affirmed and enhanced. That was an important condition for the Treaty to keep its vitality and for non-nuclear-weapon States to strictly abide by their commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons. China valued cooperation in the area of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy with other members of IAEA organized and coordinated by the Agency. The current session of the Preparatory Committee should focus on listening to the opinions of all parties, and its final result should be an objective reflection of the positions expressed. In view of the limited time available, it would be preferable for the Chairman to come up with an objective summary of the meeting's discussions.

70. **Mr. Caughley** (New Zealand) said that a fundamental prerequisite for promoting nuclear non-proliferation was continuous, irreversible progress in nuclear arms reduction. Noting that the meeting was taking place against a backdrop of comparative insecurity, he said that the horrific consequences of terrorism had been felt the world over. Indeed, his delegation remained highly concerned that terrorists might one day acquire or even use nuclear weapons. Obviously, the elimination of such weapons in their entirety would spare everyone much of that concern. In that regard, New Zealand, together with its partners in the New Agenda group, called for the implementation without delay of the 13 practical steps towards nuclear disarmament identified at the 2000 Review Conference. The New Agenda group wanted to see practical action to accomplish the unequivocal undertaking to achieve the total elimination of nuclear arsenals. The group called in particular for the early entry into force of the CTBT. While it was pleased that

there was no more testing in the Pacific region, it would like to see nuclear testing banned permanently everywhere in the world. The CTBT constituted an effective disarmament measure; he was confident that on entry into force, its verification system would prove to be sufficient to deter breaches. The space created under article VII of the NPT for the development of nuclear-weapon-free zones had been a key method of nuclear disarmament around the world. New Zealand, a party to the South Pacific Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty, hoped to promote, with other zone members in Africa, Latin America and South-East Asia, the concept of a southern hemisphere and adjacent areas free of nuclear weapons. In that regard, it hoped to help produce a declaration and in due course organize a conference to mark the fact that all the independent countries of the southern hemisphere were free of nuclear weapons.

71. While the Treaty made it explicit that countries should cooperate in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, at the same time there were significant nuclear safety challenges that countries must face together. It was to be hoped that nuclear industries in some States would not adversely affect the sustainable development of other States. A key challenge for the South Pacific region was the maritime transport of nuclear material. New Zealand once again called for the highest possible safety standards, for effective emergency response, liability and compensation arrangements and for adequate prior information and consultation with coastal States.

72. The current Preparatory Committee session offered the opportunity to take stock of the implementation of the undertakings made at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference and to work for further progress at the 2005 Review Conference. Adaptation to changing realities and consolidation were not mutually exclusive options.

73. **Mr. Loedel** (Uruguay) said that, despite the current gloomy prospects for global peace and security, the first session of the Preparatory Committee gave the international community a fresh opportunity to show that there was an alternative to the nuclear threat: a universal, respected and strengthened Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Uruguay, a consistent advocate of the prohibition of nuclear weapons and a signatory to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America,

welcomed the establishment of other nuclear-weapon-free zones throughout the world that reaffirmed the international community's moral conscience and repudiation of instruments of mass destruction. Such zones marked a concrete step towards global nuclear disarmament. In that regard, he appreciated the Mongolian Government's decision to make Mongolia a nuclear-weapon-free country as an example of how to contribute towards promoting stability in its own region. He urged those countries that had not yet done so to adhere on an individual or regional basis to those processes, which his delegation considered to be fundamental to the consolidation of an ever-wider area free of the nuclear threat. The nuclear-weapon States in particular were urged to honour their commitment to deactivate all their nuclear weapons and to begin a process of confidence-building and cooperation.

74. His delegation was convinced that the Treaty was a key instrument to attaining the goals sought and therefore reaffirmed the need to achieve universal membership of the Treaty not just because of the possibilities it offered for slowing down horizontal and vertical proliferation, but also for defining the balance that must obtain between the nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States. He could not see any other way of attaining positive results.

75. While it was encouraging that a considerable number of States had ratified the CTBT, the delay in its entry into force was a source of concern, since the achievement of that goal would show that the NPT would have sufficient backing to achieve the deterrent role that the international community had assigned to it. The Committee should devote priority attention to the lack of progress in the reduction or elimination of nuclear arsenals. In that regard, it should begin negotiations with a view to the implementation of the 13 practical steps, so that sustained and systematic progress could be made towards the actual elimination of nuclear weapons.

76. The review of the Treaty must include the concern of coastal States for broadly regulating the maritime transport of nuclear material and radioactive waste, which had increased since the beginning of the previous decade, further increasing the risks of accidents whose consequences were not difficult to imagine. The security guarantees necessary to avoid accidents were still lacking, and the international community must therefore come up with an appropriate response to a danger that could be contained.

77. **Ms. Bonilla-Merida** (Guatemala) said that the first session of the Preparatory Committee afforded a new opportunity to reaffirm the validity of the process for reviewing the Treaty and the commitments already entered into. It also provided an opportunity to make the best use of multilateral mechanisms in the nuclear sphere. The events of 11 September 2001 had catapulted the question of terrorism to the top of the global agenda, raising the possibility that nuclear weapons might be used not only by States but also by terrorists. In that regard, while priority should be accorded to ensuring global security, the fight against terrorism must not be allowed to roll back the progress already achieved. On the contrary, the best response to the new threats was to strengthen the commitments undertaken through the multilateral process. Indeed, the true challenge now facing the world in the area of disarmament was how to preserve and, where necessary, adapt the multilateral approach achieved during the cold war era to present-day global conditions. The key element in that approach, the NPT, was perhaps even more important today than it had been 30 years earlier.

78. On the basis of its belief that the nuclear-weapon-free zone established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco should not be exposed to the risk of a nuclear threat, Guatemala was joining in the efforts of other States in the region, together with those of the other three nuclear-weapon-free zones, to adopt a common policy vis-à-vis the nuclear-weapon States, in order to strengthen worldwide and regional peace and security.

79. Her country had recently signed an additional safeguards protocol which would enable it to contribute to further strengthening Latin America as a nuclear-weapon-free zone. That agreement would give Guatemala access to new forms of international cooperation and new technologies, enabling it to make better use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, a vital ingredient for development. While political conditions could determine priorities, no actions taken in the area of national security should be allowed to undermine or destabilize international security regimes. The Treaty was at a critical juncture, and its 187 States parties must seize the opportunity offered by the first session of the Preparatory Committee to reaffirm their determination to guard against the use and proliferation of nuclear weapons on the basis of an unequivocal commitment to the elimination of such weapons. They should also ensure that actions that ran counter to the

climate of confidence that had prevailed during the closing of the May 2000 Conference did not signal a weakening of the Treaty. She therefore called upon the parties concerned to redouble their efforts and muster the political will to put an end to the stagnation in which nuclear disarmament was mired; the commitment by some countries to disarm and by others to give up the possession of nuclear weapons must be fulfilled.

80. **Mr. Zakirov** (Kyrgyz Republic) said that his delegation would cooperate fully in the preparation of a set of substantive recommendations to be forwarded to the next session of the Preparatory Committee. Events since the previous Review Conference underscored both the tremendous value of the Treaty regime and the areas where improvement was needed. New initiatives were required to address the risks posed by nuclear terrorism, especially in the areas of the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities, strengthened export controls, and illicit trafficking in nuclear material.

81. Non-proliferation was one of the basic principles of his Government's foreign policy, and he acknowledged the support it had received in that area from the United Nations, IAEA and other international organizations. The Parliament was considering the ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention and a law on export controls for nuclear material.

82. Recent events had also given impetus to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia, and the five States of the region were united in their belief that its establishment would strengthen peace and security on a regional and global level, particularly in the light of the ongoing anti-terrorism campaign in Afghanistan.

83. His delegation regretted that the high expectations generated by the 2000 Review Conference for the most part had not been met. The programme of practical steps for nuclear disarmament had largely not been implemented. The continuing failure of the Conference on Disarmament to adopt a programme of work and the increasing reliance by some States on nuclear weapons were disturbing signs.

84. Attention must also be paid to the environmental consequences of past and present nuclear weapons programmes, including uranium mining and nuclear fuel cycle activities. He reiterated the call made at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference for

Governments and international organizations with expertise in the fields of clean-up and disposal to consider giving appropriate assistance in those areas. Education was also an important tool in disarmament and non-proliferation which was not being utilized fully.

85. If the non-proliferation regime was to meet the challenges of the coming century, the States parties must not fear change. The historic decisions of the 2000 Review Conference had provided a unique opportunity to ensure that the purposes of the Treaty were fulfilled. The events of the past year demonstrated the need to seize that opportunity.

86. **Mr. Wulf** (United States of America) said that the critical challenge of preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction required a comprehensive strategy with the multilateral treaties already in force as a key element. His Government continued to view the NPT as the bedrock of the global effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Like the Charter of the United Nations, the Treaty was one of only a handful of international instruments which truly approached universality.

87. The United States continued to support universal adherence to the Treaty. It was difficult to be optimistic about early action by the four non-parties, Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan, yet restraint in their nuclear programmes was essential. The goal of universality required efforts to enhance regional security in such areas of tension as the Middle East and South Asia. His delegation continued to recognize the validity of the goals of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and was deeply saddened by the recent tragic loss of life in the region. It hoped the parties could find a solution to the cycle of violence and move towards a better future for their long-suffering people.

88. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was a primary source of global instability and danger, and events since the 2000 Review Conference had reinforced that conclusion. On 11 September 2001, a terrorist group had attacked the United States, causing death and destruction on a scale rarely witnessed previously and killing innocent civilians from more than 80 nations. The spread of nuclear weapons to additional States not only increased the risk of nuclear war among nations, but of nuclear terrorism, and nations seeking nuclear weapons which also harboured terrorists represented a particularly severe threat to the

civilized world. Compliance with articles II and III of the Treaty by non-nuclear-weapon States was essential if its goals were to be achieved. Violations by Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea during the 1990s and their continued non-compliance underscored the dangers to the global community from such actions.

89. The continued widespread support of the international community for the Treaty, for IAEA safeguards and, in the case of Iraq, Security Council resolutions, had helped to reduce the nuclear threat those two States might otherwise have posed to regional and global security, yet the danger persisted. The international community must continue to insist on their full compliance with the Treaty, and IAEA must be allowed to exercise its full mandate both in Iraq and in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Vigilance was also needed for other parties whose membership in the Treaty belied their real intentions. Iraq had cloaked itself in the respectability of the Treaty while deliberately flouting its obligations. Parties must put such States on notice that a violation would be met with swift and firm action.

90. Nuclear-weapon States must have comprehensive nuclear export control systems and rigorous internal security programmes. The United States had long understood the need for strong regulation of its nuclear weapons programme, and had upgraded security at key sites even further since 11 September 2001. It had export controls to ensure strict compliance with article I of the Treaty and its obligation not to assist a non-nuclear-weapon State in the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons.

91. The application by IAEA of full-scope safeguards was the critical international verification tool to deter and detect would-be violators. The strength of the safeguards applied was absolutely critical to the future of the Treaty, and if parties came to suspect a widespread breakdown of their effectiveness, the consequences for the Treaty and for nuclear non-proliferation goals in general could be devastating. In demanding that IAEA should apply strong safeguards, the international community must also be prepared to provide it with the funds needed. It must also increase political support for progress in the conclusion of additional protocols. Keeping nuclear material out of the hands of terrorists required more than strict compliance with the Treaty, and his delegation looked forward to a discussion on ensuring the safety and security of peaceful nuclear programmes.

92. Turning to article VI, he said that cooperation between the United States and the Russian Federation throughout the 1990s had led to continued reductions in nuclear weapons and the withdrawal of hundreds of tons of fissile material from defence stockpiles. In vigorously seeking to develop a new relationship, President Bush had sought to replace mutual assured destruction with mutual cooperation. The United States was instituting a new concept of deterrence, no longer based solely on the threat of nuclear retaliation, with a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons and an increased emphasis on the role of advanced conventional forces, active and passive defences, intelligence capabilities and a revitalized defence infrastructure. Accordingly, the United States would reduce its strategic nuclear weapons to a level between 1,700 and 2,200 over the coming decade. President Putin had pledged that the Russian Federation would make similar reductions in its strategic forces, and the two countries were negotiating a legally binding agreement that would codify those reductions.

93. Finally, with reference to article IV, he said that the focus of nuclear cooperation had shifted from nuclear reactors used to generate electricity to an emphasis on the benefits of nuclear energy in sustainable development. IAEA had made commendable efforts to expand the contribution of nuclear energy in developing countries into applications ranging from increased agricultural productivity to expanded use of nuclear medicine.

94. The Preparatory Committee had an opportunity to consider ways to promote the full implementation of the Treaty without needing to draft recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference, which would allow more time to focus on exchange of information and advancing mutual understanding.

95. **Mr. Berg-Johansen** (Norway) said that the events of September 2001 had dramatically changed the international agenda, and among relevant resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly was a resolution on the need for further strengthening of multilateral arms control and non-proliferation regimes to combat international terrorism. In that regard, the NPT regime was of particular relevance. His delegation was disappointed that progress in implementing the action programme of the 2000 Review Conference had been slow, and in some cases had even been moving in the wrong direction. The value of non-proliferation efforts would also be

limited unless they were accompanied by progress in nuclear disarmament, and Norway thus placed priority on universal adherence to and the early entry into force of the CTBT. Self-imposed moratoriums on nuclear testing were useful, but they could not replace the legally binding commitments represented by ratification of the CTBT.

96. Norway welcomed further reductions in strategic nuclear warheads and the continued bilateral dialogue between the United States and the Russian Federation on a new strategic framework involving all significant aspects of their relationship, which would contribute to continued strategic stability. It also welcomed the specific inclusion of tactical nuclear weapons in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference. Every effort should be made to reduce those arsenals as well. Increased transparency by nuclear-weapon States regarding their nuclear capabilities and implementation of agreements pursuant to article VI of the NPT was important. Reporting should not be considered an option but an obligation, to promote transparency and enhance confidence in the overall Treaty regime.

97. The Conference on Disarmament had a special role in the implementation of the Final Document, and the lack of agreement on its programme of work had hampered progress. Norway was deeply disappointed by the stalemate in the Conference, which undercut its credibility. A fissile material cut-off treaty was essential as well, and negotiations should start without delay. The Conference on Disarmament should also begin work on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

98. Export control remained an important pillar of non-proliferation, and such existing structures as the Zangger Committee and national mechanisms were vital. It was in the interests of all to help those structures function smoothly. The IAEA safeguards system was another indispensable tool for promoting compliance, which must be kept under continued review. States required enhanced assistance in the implementation of the new integrated safeguards system, and his delegation was ready to consider increased funding for such activities. It was deeply concerned at continued allegations of non-compliance; it was in the interest of concerned countries to cooperate fully with IAEA.

99. Regional issues were an important part of the review process, and the situation in the Middle East

must be addressed from a perspective of universalization as well as compliance. However, other regional challenges, in particular in South Asia, also needed attention. The threat of international terrorism had made it even more necessary to ensure progress in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. A balanced and constructive session of the Preparatory Committee would demonstrate the commitment to make use of the opportunity to implement the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.

100. **Mr. Al-Bader** (Qatar) said that the use of nuclear weapons during the Second World War had been a harsh lesson for humanity. However, in implementing the non-proliferation regime, it was important to avoid a double standard where the activities of some States were overlooked.

101. A number of significant commitments had been made at the 2000 Review Conference, yet no progress had been made towards their implementation. The nuclear-weapon States were not moving towards disarmament, and the situation in the Middle East had deteriorated.

102. Adoption of a resolution establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would be important to that region, yet Israel was the only State in the region which was not a party to the Treaty and which was not subject to any IAEA safeguards. He called on Israel to accede to the NPT, to comply with safeguards, and to terminate its occupation of Palestinian territory.

103. **Mr. Mahmoud** (Iraq), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that since the meeting was part of the NPT framework, delegations should abide by its mandate. He invited interested delegations to read document S/2001/715, which reflected Iraq's unique and unprecedented level of cooperation in disarmament. As a party to the Treaty, it had an IAEA safeguards agreement which was valid until the end of 2002.

104. Any effort to address compliance and the nuclear threat in the Middle East must include the Zionist entity, which had threatened international peace and security since its establishment. It possessed weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, yet it had refused to comply with the NPT and numerous Security Council resolutions. It was also clear that United States policies towards the ABM Treaty were a

threat to the implementation of the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.

105. Two delegations had made specific reference to Security Council resolution 1284 (1999), but it was important to note that the system mentioned had been destroyed by outlaw United States aggression in 1998, in violation of Security Council resolutions. The attempt to entangle IAEA in a political controversy relating to the interpretation of Security Council resolutions and the use of mechanisms was intended to exert political pressure on Iraq and undermined the credibility and independence of IAEA.

The meeting rose at 6.15 p.m.