

## 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

13 May 2005

Original: English

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New York, 2-27 May 2005

### Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

#### Report submitted by Hungary

1. Hungary has submitted implementation reports to the second and third sessions of the Preparatory Committee, in accordance with step 12 of the 13 practical steps agreed upon at the 2000 Review Conference. As stated in these reports, Hungary continues to believe that a more general and comprehensive approach is necessary than the one outlined in step 12. The report of Hungary to the 2005 Review Conference follows the same patterns, reporting on activities related to the Treaty, but not directly to article VI of the Treaty or to regional issues.
2. The multilateral regime of nuclear non-proliferation has been subjected to unprecedented pressure recently. As a member of the European Union (EU), Hungary fully subscribes to the principles and objectives enshrined in the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, which states that “the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons must be preserved in its integrity”. Hungary considers the Treaty, which establishes the primary objective of preventing nuclear proliferation while ensuring the peaceful use of nuclear energy and technology, as the most important multilateral instrument in the field of non-proliferation and disarmament.
3. Hungary considers the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguard system as an indispensable mechanism to verify compliance with the Treaty and to ensure nuclear transparency. Such a system promotes confidence essential for peaceful nuclear cooperation. Hungary believes that the Model Additional Protocol, together with a comprehensive safeguard agreement, represents the verification standard and lends its full support to making the Additional Protocol mandatory under article III of the Treaty. Such a decision should be taken at the 2005 Review Conference.
4. The review period has marked important developments in the field of safeguards implementation in Hungary. In November 2004 the IAEA completed arrangements for the introduction of a State-level integrated safeguards approach for Hungary and started to implement the new approach. Together with Japan, Hungary was the first country with a nuclear power plant to implement integrated safeguards.

This new method of verification has the promising potential to increase the flexibility and effectiveness of the IAEA safeguards system. Hungary stands ready to closely cooperate with the Agency, with a view to achieving this goal.

5. Hungary regards the introduction and application of appropriate export control measures as an important tool for stemming the risk of clandestine nuclear programmes. As a participating State of the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), Hungary maintains and operates an effective national system of export controls and contributes to international efforts in this field. Hungary welcomes the adoption of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), requiring States to adopt domestic controls to prevent and preclude the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Hungarian experts participate regularly in interdiction exercises organized in the Proliferation Security Initiative framework (e.g., in Germany, Italy and Poland). Hungary has taken stock of the available administrative structure and the legislative instruments necessary for Hungary's participation in cooperation activities within the Proliferation Security Initiative framework.

6. Hungary follows with great interest the new initiatives aimed at preventing the proliferation of sensitive elements of the nuclear fuel cycle in a multilateral and non-discriminatory framework. The dual-use technologies, such as those related to uranium enrichment and reprocessing, are a source of concern. Hungary looks forward to a substantive and productive discussion of these issues at the 2005 Review Conference.

7. Hungary attaches great importance to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Efforts to achieve the Treaty's entry into force must be upheld. Hungary participated in the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Treaty in September 2003, which adopted a Final Declaration and Measures to Promote the Entry into Force of the Treaty. In the implementation of these measures and in furthering the goals of the Treaty, many important and challenging tasks remain to be tackled by States party to the CTBT and by the Preparatory Commission and its Provisional Technical Secretariat. Hungary, in its capacity as Chair of Working Group A of the Preparatory Commission, will also continue to do its utmost to bring about the earliest possible entry into force of the CTBT.

8. Hungary continues to support efforts to start negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. The Conference on Disarmament, the only multilateral negotiating body for disarmament affairs at the disposal of the international community, remains the right forum for such negotiations. Hungary welcomes the willingness and readiness of Member States to take up work on the fissile material cut-off treaty.

9. Hungary co-sponsored a working paper on disarmament and non-proliferation education and training at the third session of the Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP.17), as well as at the Review Conference. Education and training should receive more attention as part of the efforts of the international community to strengthen disarmament and non-proliferation for future generations.

10. Hungary remains fully committed to the Treaty, supporting wholeheartedly its strengthened review process. Hungary will, in the spirit of effective multilateralism, actively participate in the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty.