
2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Implementation of Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty pursuant to the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference with particular reference to the 13 practical steps

Report submitted by Argentina

Step 1

The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

Argentina was one of the 44 States whose ratification ensured the entry into force of the Treaty (art. XIV); as an original signatory, it ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty on 4 December 1998.

Argentina signed in December 1999 and ratified in February 2004 an agreement on the International Monitoring System under CTBT with the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization.

Thus, pending the entry into force of the Treaty, Argentina is actively involved in the establishment of an international monitoring system and has established on its territory a laboratory and eight stations (two infrasound; three seismological; three radionuclide) as part of the monitoring network.

Step 2

A moratorium on nuclear-weapons-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that Treaty.

While Argentina is of the opinion that, under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty step 2 is in principle expected of nuclear-weapon States, such step would take on special relevance pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Argentina also considers that nuclear-weapon-free zones make a significant contribution to international peace and security by closing them off to the use or threat of the use of nuclear weapons. Argentina is a party to the first

nuclear-weapon-free zone, the forward-looking Tlatelolco Treaty (1967), established in one of the most densely populated regions of the planet.

Step 3

The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.

In the Disarmament Conference, Argentina is a strong advocate for the commencement of negotiations on a fissile materials cut-off treaty. In that regard, over the past 10 years, it has called for the negotiation of a “non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable” treaty in accordance with the Shannon mandate.

While Argentina considers that verification is not only a fundamental component of any disarmament and non-proliferation agreements but is also at the core of such agreements, it would advocate making progress in the area of nuclear disarmament, thus avoiding sterile discussions. Argentina calls for the commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty without conditions.

Step 4

The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate establishment of such a body.

Argentina favours establishing a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament, which would help to advance the issues that Argentina would like the Conference on Disarmament to address pursuant to Article VI.

Step 5

The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures.

Argentina considers that the nuclear-weapon States that adopt nuclear disarmament and nuclear arms control and reduction measures should comply with the principle of irreversibility. Argentina hopes that such principle will be explicitly included in all the bilateral and multilateral instruments that are negotiated pursuant to Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; clearly, this is vital for the credibility of such arrangements.

Step 6

An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under Article VI.

This critical step enabled agreement to be reached at the 2000 Review Conference. The unequivocal undertaking by nuclear-weapon States signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to disarm should be complied with. Argentina would like to see concrete steps taken towards that end.

Step 7

The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions.

Argentina welcomed the entry into force in June 2003 of the Moscow Treaty signed between the Russian Federation and the United States of America and is convinced that it is a positive contribution to nuclear weapons reduction. Furthermore, as indicated under step 5 of the Final Document, Argentina recalls the need to ensure that such new efforts include measures that are consistent with the principle of irreversibility.

Argentina is concerned by the lack of progress under the START treaties, which provide for the dismantling and destruction of nuclear warheads and their delivery systems. In light of the June 2002 statement by the Russian Federation de-linking START II and tying the conclusion of negotiations on START III to the entry into force of START II, Argentina proposes that, in order to maintain the momentum achieved under START, the parties should consider, as a minimum, extending START I until 2009.

Moreover, Argentina considers the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty vital for strategic stability and international security; it therefore deplored the denunciation of the Treaty by the United States of America in December 2001.

Step 8

The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Argentina supports the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and looks forward to the completion of such instrument through agreement among the parties on the IAEA excess weapon origin fissile material verification system, including the irreversible elimination of such material.

Step 9

Steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all:

- **Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally;**
- **Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament;**
- **The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process;**
- **Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems;**
- **A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination;**
- **The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.**

Argentina endorses these proposed steps. It is concerned in particular about the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, a concept which covers non-strategic nuclear weapons or the development of advanced technologies that make it possible to use improved versions of nuclear weapons (in terms of size and deployment) in conventional scenarios. Argentina deplores the formulation of new security doctrines that do not rule out the use of nuclear weapons.

Step 10

Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes.

Argentina reminds nuclear-weapon States of the need to agree among themselves and to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material for non-military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements, to ensure that such material is not used in military programmes.

Step 11

Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

Argentina is an active participant in all international disarmament and non-proliferation forums, regimes and instruments dealing with both weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons.

Argentina's external policy in the areas of security, disarmament and non-proliferation is shaped by an integration strategy based on the establishment of confidence-building and transparent regional and global agreements.

Argentina rejects any arguments that make progress in nuclear disarmament contingent upon progress in conventional weapons. As Argentina has stated over the years at all relevant forums, it cherishes the hope that nuclear-weapon States will undertake negotiations on nuclear disarmament in good faith.

Step 12

Regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, by all States parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", and recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.

This report clearly demonstrates Argentina's commitment to the principle of submitting periodic reports under Article VI within the context of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty review process.

Step 13

The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

Argentina is convinced that since verification has proved to be a crucial tool of the nuclear non-proliferation regime — by verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes of States signatories to the Treaty — the required verification of future commitments by nuclear-weapon States within the context of disarmament will further the achievement of the principle of irreversibility and address objections to the strengthening of nuclear non-proliferation measures.
