2000 Review Conference of the

Parties to the Treaty on the

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.2000/1* 21 May 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

FINAL REPORT OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE 2000 REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

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I. TERMS OF REFERENCE AND ORGANIZATION OF WORK

1. At its fifty-first session, the General Assembly, in its resolution 51/45 A of 10 December 1996, took note of the decision of the parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, following appropriate consultations, to hold the first meeting of the Preparatory Committee in New York from 7 to 18 April 1997.

2. Accordingly, the Committee held its first session in New York from 7 to 18 April 1997. Following the decision taken at that session, the Committee held its second session at Geneva from 27 April to 8 May 1998 and its third session in New York from 10 to 21 May 1999. Progress reports covering the first two sessions of the Committee were issued, respectively, as documents NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/32 and NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/36.

3. At the first session of the Preparatory Committee, an understanding had been reached among delegations, according to which a representative of the Western Group should be proposed to chair the first session, a representative of the Group of Eastern European States should be proposed to chair the second session, a representative of the Group of Non-Aligned and Other States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should be proposed to chair the third session and a representative of the Group of Non-Aligned and Other States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should be proposed for the presidency of the 2000 Review Conference.

4. Pursuant to that understanding, at its first session, the Preparatory Committee elected Mr. Pasi Patokallio (Finland) to serve as Chairman of the first session. It also decided that Mr. Tadeusz Strulak (Poland) would be Chairman of the second session. It was further decided that, when not serving as Chairman, the chairmen of the sessions of the Preparatory Committee would serve as vice-chairmen of the Committee.

5. At its second session, the Committee was informed that the Government of Poland had proposed Mr. Eugeniusz Wyzner to succeed Mr. Strulak in his function as Chairman of the second session. Furthermore, at the same session, the Committee elected Mr. Andelfo Garcia Gonzales (Colombia) as Chairman of the third session and as Vice-Chairman of the second session, and Mr. Markku Reimaa (Finland) as Vice-Chairman of the Committee.

6. At its third session, the Committee had been informed that the Government of Colombia had proposed Mr. Camilo Reyes Rodríguez to succeed Mr. Garcia in his function as Chairman of the third session. At the third session, the Committee authorized its Bureau and the President-Elect to handle technical and other organizational matters in the period before the Conference. It also decided that the Chairman of the third session should open the Conference.

7. At its first session, the Committee adopted its agenda as contained in paragraph 8 of document NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/32.

8. Mrs. Hannelore Hoppe, Senior Political Affairs Officer, Department for Disarmament Affairs, served as Secretary of the Preparatory Committee. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was represented at all sessions.

9. Delegations of the following 158 States parties participated in one or more sessions of the Preparatory Committee:

Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

10. At its first session, the Committee decided that:

- Representatives of States not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) should be allowed, upon request, to attend as observers the meetings of the Committee other than those designated closed meetings, to be seated in the Committee behind their countries' nameplates and to receive documents of the Committee. They should also be entitled, at their own expense, to submit documents to the participants in the Committee. Accordingly, representatives of the following States not parties to the Treaty attended one or more sessions of the Committee as observers: Cuba, Israel and Pakistan;
- Representatives of specialized agencies and regional intergovernmental organizations should be allowed, upon request, to attend as observers the meetings of the Committee other than those designated closed meetings, to be seated in the Committee behind their organizations'

nameplates and to receive documents of the Committee. They should also be entitled, at their own expense, to submit documents to the participants in the Committee. The following intergovernmental organizations were represented as observers at meetings of the Committee: Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL), European Commission, South Pacific Forum, League of Arab States, Organization of the Islamic Conference and Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization;

- Representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) should be allowed, upon request, to attend the meetings of the Committee other than those designated closed, to be seated in the public gallery, to receive documents of the Committee and, at their own expense, to make written material available to the participants in the Committee. The Committee would also make time available at each session, during which the non-governmental organizations could make presentations. Representatives of over 70 non-governmental organizations attended each of the sessions of the Committee.

11. At its first session, the Committee decided to make every effort to adopt its decisions by consensus. In the event that consensus could not be reached, the Committee would then take decisions in accordance with the rules of procedure of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the parties to the NPT, which would be applied <u>mutatis mutandis</u>.

12. Also at its first session, the Committee decided to use Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish as its working languages.

13. In accordance with the Committee's decision at its first session, summary records were provided, at each session, for the Committee's opening meetings, the general debate and the closing meetings. The summary records of the first session were issued as documents NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/SR.1-3, 13 and 15. The summary records of the second session were issued as documents NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/SR.1-4 and 16. The summary records of the third session (NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/SR.1-3 and 19) are issued separately as annex I to the present report.

14. At each session, the Committee set aside meetings for a general exchange of views on issues related to all aspects of its work in the course of which many delegations made statements. In particular, the general exchange of views at the third session of the Committee included discussion on and consideration of any proposals on expected products of the 2000 Review Conference. All statements are reflected in the summary records of those meetings.

II. SUBSTANTIVE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE

15. The Committee held 21 meetings devoted to substantive discussions under agenda item 4, entitled "Preparatory work for the review of the operation of the Treaty in accordance with article VIII, paragraph 3, taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference

of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons". In doing so, the Committee used as a basis for a structured discussion the three sets of issues (clusters) contained in annex V to the final report of the Preparatory Committee for the 1995 Review and Extension Conference (NPT/CONF.1995/1).

16. At the first session, the Chairman put forward a working paper containing results of informal consultations on draft recommendations to the 2000 Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/32, annex II). The Committee then recommended that, at its second session, the official documents and other proposals submitted by delegations during the first session of the Preparatory Committee should be taken into account during further work on draft recommendations to the Review Conference and also the working paper submitted by the Chairman, which would be interpreted in the light of the official documents and proposals made by delegations. The Committee also recommended that it should continue, at its second session, the consideration of all aspects of the Treaty in a structured and balanced manner, in accordance with agenda item 4, entitled "Preparatory work for the review of the operation of the Treaty in accordance with article VIII, paragraph 3, taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons".

17. At its second session, the Committee allocated one meeting to the discussion on and consideration of any proposals on each of the following subject areas:

(a) The provision in paragraph 4 (b) of the "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

(b) The resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference; and

(c) Security assurances for parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

18. At its third session, the Committee allocated one meeting to the discussion on and consideration of any proposals on each of the following subject areas:

(a) The provisions in article VI of the Treaty and in paragraphs 3 and4 (c) of the "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation andDisarmament", dealing with "Nuclear Disarmament";

(b) The provision in paragraph 4 (b) of the "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" for "the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein"; and

(c) The "Resolution on the Middle East" adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

19. The Preparatory Committee considered in the process of the preparation of the 2000 Review Conference principles, ways and means for the implementation of the preamble and the articles of the Treaty and the Decisions and the Resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, in accordance with paragraph 4 of the decision on "Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty". The Chairman put forward a working paper on 14 May 1999 (annex II) containing elements of draft recommendations to the Review Conference. Following consultations on these proposals and other written proposals made by delegations (annex III), the Chairman put forward a revised working paper on 20 May 1999 (annex IV). Further consultations were held on elements contained in the Chairman's revised paper. In this regard the Preparatory Committee was unable to reach agreement on any substantive recommendations to the 2000 Review Conference.

20. The Committee had before it a number of documents submitted by delegations. The list of the documents submitted during the Committee's sessions is contained in annex V to the present report.

III. ORGANIZATION OF THE WORK OF THE REVIEW CONFERENCE

21. In the course of its sessions, the Committee considered the following questions relating to the organization and work of the Conference:

- (a) Dates and venue of the Conference;
- (b) Draft rules of procedure of the Conference;
- (c) Election of the President and other officers of the Conference;
- (d) Appointment of the Secretary-General of the Conference;
- (e) Provisional agenda of the Conference;

(f) Financing of the Review Conference, including its Preparatory Committee;

- (g) Background documentation for the Conference;
- (h) Final outcome of the Conference.

Dates and venue of the Conference

22. At its second session, the Committee reaffirmed its agreement, reached at its first session, that the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons would take place in New York from 24 April to 19 May 2000.

Draft rules of procedure of the Conference

23. At its second and third sessions, the Committee considered the draft rules of procedure for the Conference. At its third session, the Committee agreed to recommend to the Conference the draft rules of procedure as contained in annex VI to the present report.

Provisional agenda for the Conference

24. At its third session, the Committee adopted the provisional agenda as contained in annex VII to the present report. It also agreed to the proposed allocation of items to the Main Committees of the Conference as contained in annex VIII to the present report.

Financing of the Conference

25. At its second session, the Committee took note of the estimated costs of the Conference, including its Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/1), and agreed to the schedule of division of costs. At its third session, the Secretariat provided the Committee with revised estimated costs contained in document NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/24. The schedule of division of costs is contained in the appendix to the draft rules of procedure as contained in annex VI to the present report.

Background documentation

26. At its third session, the Preparatory Committee decided to invite the Secretary-General to prepare papers on various articles of the Treaty, taking into account the decisions on "Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty, and on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" and the "Resolution on the Middle East", adopted in 1995.

27. The following general approach should apply to the proposed papers (similar to the approach applied for the preparation of background documentation for the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference): all papers must give balanced, objective and factual descriptions of the relevant developments, be as short as possible and be easily readable. They must refrain from presenting value judgements. Rather than presenting collections of statements, they should reflect agreements reached, actual unilateral and multilateral measures taken, understandings adopted, formal proposals for agreements made and important political developments directly related to any of the foregoing. The papers should focus on the period since the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and on the implementation of the outcome of that conference, including the decisions on "Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty" and on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" and the "Resolution on the Middle East".

28. Specifically, the Secretariat of the United Nations is asked to prepare documents on the following topics to reflect developments related to the implementation of the Treaty and the outcome of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized:

(a) Implementation of the tenth preambular paragraph (comprehensive nuclear test ban), reflecting developments since the 1995 Review and Extension Conference;

(b) Implementation of articles I and II, drawing on the relevant discussions and results of all prior Review Conferences and taking into account recent and current developments in the area of nuclear non-proliferation. To the extent necessary, the paper would include cross-references to matters discussed in the paper by the IAEA on article III;

(c) Implementation of article VI, covering developments regarding cessation of the nuclear arms race, nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament;

(d) Implementation of article VII, addressing proposals for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones where they have not yet been established;

(e) Developments regarding security assurances, dealing with both positive and negative security assurances and reflecting developments in the Conference on Disarmament and the United Nations and proposals within the ambit of the NPT;

(f) Implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT, reflecting developments since 1995 with a view to realizing the objectives of the resolution;

(g) Realization of the goals of the Treaty in various regions of the world.

29. The Preparatory Committee also asks that the following be made available to the 2000 Review Conference;

(a) Documentation prepared by the IAEA regarding its activities relevant to articles III, IV and V;

(b) A memorandum from the General Secretariat of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) regarding its activities;

(c) A memorandum from the Secretariat of the South Pacific forum regarding its activities related to the Rarotonga Treaty;

(d) A memorandum from the Secretariat of the Organization of African Unity regarding its activities related to the Pelindaba Treaty; and

(e) A memorandum from the depositary of the Bangkok Treaty regarding its activities related to the Treaty.

Final outcome of the Conference

30. The Preparatory Committee at its third session decided to have a general exchange of views focused on the expected outcome of the 2000 Review Conference.

31. In accordance with article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty and taking into account the decisions and the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, in particular paragraph 7 of Decision 1, the Preparatory Committee recalled that the 2000 Review Conference, taking into account the work and reports of the Main Committees, should:

- Evaluate the results of the period which the 2000 Review Conference is reviewing, including the implementation of the undertakings of the States parties under the Treaty;
- Identify the areas in which and the means through which further progress should be sought in the future.

The 2000 Review Conference should also address specifically what might be done to strengthen the implementation of the Treaty and to achieve its universality.

32. The 2000 Review Conference should examine the functioning of the review process itself, taking account of experience since 1995, and may wish to reflect appropriately the conclusions of the examination.

33. The 2000 Review Conference can also consider and adopt other outcomes.

34. The outcome should reaffirm the validity and importance of the decision on "Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty", the decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", and the "Resolution on the Middle East" adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

IV. OFFICERS OF THE REVIEW CONFERENCE

35. At its third session, the Committee unanimously endorsed the candidacy of Mr. Jacob Selebi of South Africa for the presidency of the 2000 Review Conference.

36. Also at the third session, the Committee agreed to recommend that Main Committee I should be chaired by a representative of the Group of Non-Aligned and Other States (Colombia), Main Committee II should be chaired by a representative of the Group of Eastern European States (Poland) and that Main Committee III should be chaired by a representative of the Western Group (Finland).

37. The Committee also agreed to recommend that the post of Chairman of the Drafting Committee should be assumed by the representative of the Group of Eastern European States, and the post of Chairman of the Credentials Committee by a representative of the Group of Non-Aligned and Other States.

V. APPOINTMENT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE REVIEW CONFERENCE

38. At its first session, the Committee decided to invite the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in consultation with the members of the Preparatory Committee, to nominate an official to act as provisional Secretary-General of the 2000 Review Conference of the parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, a nomination to be confirmed by the Conference itself. At its third session, the Committee was informed that, in response to that request, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, following consultations with the members of the Preparatory Committee, had nominated Mrs. Hannelore Hoppe, Department for Disarmament Affairs, as provisional Secretary-General of the Conference. The Committee took note of that nomination.

VI. PARTICIPATION AT THE REVIEW CONFERENCE

39. The Committee also decided that invitations to States which, in accordance with the decision on participation, were entitled to participate in the Conference, as well as to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, should be issued by the Chairman of the third session of the Preparatory Committee.

VII. ADOPTION OF THE FINAL REPORT

40. The Preparatory Committee adopted its final report at its last meeting, on 21 May 1999.

ANNEX I

SUMMARY RECORDS OF THE MEETINGS OF THE THIRD SESSION OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE

[To be distributed individually as NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/SR.1-3 and 19]

ANNEX II

CHAIRMAN'S WORKING PAPER OF 14 MAY 1999

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review

Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on 14 May 1999

the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/29

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Third session New York, 10-21 May 1999

CHAIRMAN'S WORKING PAPER

The Preparatory Committee agreed on the following draft recommendations to 1. the Review Conference:

- 1. Reaffirmation of commitment to the preamble and the articles of the Treaty.
- 2. Reaffirmation of conviction that the treaty is essential to international peace and security and recognition of the crucial role of the Treaty in nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
- Reaffirmation of commitment to efforts designed to promote the full 3. realization and effective implementation of the provisions of the Treaty, as well as reaffirmation of the decisions on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and on strengthening the review process for the Treaty as well as the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Universality

- 4. Urgency and importance of achieving the universality of the Treaty; welcome the accessions of Andorra, Angola, Brazil, Chile, Comoros, Djibouti, Oman, United Arab Emirates and Vanuatu to the Treaty since 1995, bringing the number of States parties to 187. Also urge all States not yet party to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States to accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date, particularly those States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.
- 5. Undertake to make determined efforts towards the achievement of the goal of universality of the Treaty. These efforts by States parties might include the enhancement of regional security.

Non-proliferation

- 6. Reaffirmation that every effort should be made to implement the Treaty in all its aspects to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States parties to the Treaty. Emphasize the particular importance attached to the strict observance of articles I and II.
- 7. Reaffirmation by non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty of their commitments to the fullest implementation of Article II and to refrain from nuclear sharing with nuclear-weapon States, non-nuclearweapon States, and States not party to the Treaty for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements.
- 8. Reaffirmation of the condemnation of the nuclear test explosions in South Asia in 1998 as stated in Security Council resolution 1172 and General Assembly resolution 53/77 G, and the importance of full compliance with each of the measures identified in those resolutions. Urge all States that have not yet done so to become parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty without delay and without conditions.
- 9. Reaffirmation of the integrity of the Article IX, paragraph 3 of the Treaty and the commitment of all State parties not to accord any status or recognition to additional States that possess nuclear-weapon capabilities.
- 10. Reaffirmation that the cessation of all nuclear testing will contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process of nuclear disarmament leading to the ultimate objective of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and therefore to the further enhancement of international peace and security.

Nuclear disarmament

- 11. Reaffirmation of the commitment to fulfil with determination the obligations under article VI. Reaffirmation, in this context, by the nuclear-weapon States, of their unequivocal commitment to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, and to that end, agreement to pursue vigorously systematic and progressive efforts to further reduce nuclear weapons globally. Declaration of commitment to the achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. Declaration that the achievement of nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament, necessitates the cooperation of all States.
- 12. Recognition of the progress achieved in nuclear weapons reductions by the nuclear-weapon States, including those made unilaterally or bilaterally under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) process, as steps towards nuclear disarmament. Require that at an appropriate

stage the U.S. and the Russian Federation should be joined by the other nuclear-weapon States. Reaffirmation of the need to renew and revitalize this process, including accelerated efforts to ensure full implementation of the obligations under Article VI. Invite increased transparency by nuclear-weapon States on the dismantlement of tactical nuclear weapons.

- 13. Recognition of the importance for all States to make every effort to promote the earliest entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and urge all States, especially those whose ratification in accordance with article XIV of the Treaty ensures its entry into force, to sign and ratify the Treaty. Welcome of the ratifications that have taken place so far, including those by two nuclear-weapon States. Call on all States, pending the entry into force, to act so as not to defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty. Also call upon all States, to contribute to the work of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, in particular to its efforts to implement the Treaty's verification regime.
- 14. Reaffirmation of the need for the immediate commencement and the early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein. Such a treaty would be an essential measure of nuclear disarmament as well as of non-proliferation. Welcome the establishment in August 1998 of an Ad Hoc Committee in the Conference on Disarmament for this purpose, and urge its immediate re-establishment.
- 15. Reaffirmation that the provisions of Article V of the Treaty with regard to peaceful nuclear explosions are to be viewed in the light of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

- 16. Welcome and support of the steps taken to conclude further nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties since 1995, and reaffirmation of the conviction that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones freely arrived at among the States concerned, enhances global and regional peace and security, as a measure towards the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament. Support of proposals for such zones as in the Middle East and South Asia. Welcome of the initiative taken by states in Central Asia to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region.
- 17. Recognition of the importance attached by signatories and States parties to the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Pelindaba and Bangkok to establishing a mechanism for cooperation among their respective Treaty agencies. Welcome and support the report on the

establishment of nuclear-weapon-free-zones on the Basis of Arrangements Freely Arrived At Among the States of the Region Concerned, adopted by consensus by the Disarmament Commission on 30 of April 1999.

Security assurances

18. Reaffirmation of the view that further steps, which could take the form of an international legally binding instrument, should be considered to assure non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Welcome the establishment in March 1998 of and Ad Hoc Committee in the Conference on Disarmament on Negative Security Assurances, and urge its immediate re-establishment.

Safeguards

- 19. Welcome and support the adoption, in May 1997, of the Model Protocol Additional to the existent safeguards agreements to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the Agency's safeguards system; reaffirmation that IAEA is the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring, in accordance with the statute of the Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, compliance with its Safeguards Agreements.
- 20. Reaffirmation that new supply arrangements for the transfer of sources or special fissionable material or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon states should require as a necessary precondition, acceptance of IAEA full-scope safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
- 21. Support for the Agency's efforts to integrate safeguards measures arising from the Model Protocol Additional to existing Safeguards Agreements. Also urge all States that have Safeguards Agreements with IAEA to conclude as quickly as possible an Additional Protocol pursuant to INFCIRC/540.
- 22. Urge the nuclear-weapon States to include in Additional Protocols to their voluntary safeguards agreements those measures which they have identified as capable of contributing to the non-proliferation and efficiency aims of the Model Protocol.
- 23. Urge all States parties required by article III of the Treaty which have not yet done so to conclude with the International Atomic Energy Agency a comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. Additionally call on all States not parties to the Treaty to accept IAEA comprehensive safeguards.

24. Urge all States to implement, to the extent possible, IAEA's recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material, currently set forth in INFCIRC/225/Rev.3 and also urge all States parties to examine ways and means to strengthen the current regime.

Resolution on the Middle East

- 25. Recall that the adoption of the Resolution on the Middle East by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference constituted an integral part of the package of the 1995 outcome, and reaffirmation of the firm commitment to work towards the full implementation of that resolution. Recognition, in this regard, of the special responsibility of the depositary States as co-sponsors of this resolution.
- 26. To take note that since the adoption of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East all States of the region have become parties to the Treaty with the exception of Israel. To stress the urgent need for Israel to accede to the Treaty without further delay and to place all its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards, in order to enhance the universality of the Treaty and to avert the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.

Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

- 27. Reaffirmation of the commitment to the full implementation of article IV of the Treaty and the commitment to cooperation between State parties in the field of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty and the decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament".
- 28. Reaffirmation of the importance attached to the work of IAEA regarding multilateral technical cooperation in the development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and call again for every effort to be made to ensure that IAEA has the necessary financial and human resources to meet its responsibilities in the area of technical cooperation, safeguards and nuclear safety.
- 29. Reaffirmation that attacks or threats of attack on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes jeopardize nuclear safety and raise serious concerns regarding the application of international law on the use of force in such cases, which could warrant appropriate action in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.
- 30. Reaffirmation of the importance of nuclear safety as an essential prerequisite for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In this context, States parties attach importance to ensuring a successful review process under the Nuclear Safety Convention and note the adoption of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management as another contribution in this area.

31. Express the determination to prevent and combat illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and state the readiness to cooperate with each other, and support multilateral efforts to this end.

2. The following is a list of the specific proposals put forward by delegations for consideration by the Preparatory Committee on the understanding that the proposals are without commitment by the Preparatory Committee and without prejudice to the position of any delegation and that the list is not exclusive.

ANNEX III

PROPOSALS SUBMITTED BY DELEGATIONS CONCERNING THE CHAIRMAN'S WORKING PAPER

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review

Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on 18 May 1999

the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/26

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Third session New York, 10-21 May 1999

Working paper submitted by Malaysia

Proposal for the Establishment of a High Level Consultation Mechanism

The High Level Consultation Mechanism hereby proposed would provide the highest political intervention to address specific issues, which would be decided by States parties at its annual Preparatory Committee meetings or its 5-yearly Review Conferences.

High Level Consultation Meeting Towards Universality of the Treaty

Introduction

There exists a need to find constructive and innovative ideas in order to actively promote the universality of the Treaty, the cornerstone of international peace and security. It is the responsibility of all NPT States parties to pursue activities aimed at the eventual universality of the Treaty.

Ongoing efforts regarding the promotion of universality are welcomed. There are, however, inevitable stumbling blocks which occasionally appear and are difficult to surmount. With this in mind, an appropriate mechanism should be sought in order to complement and support the existing efforts towards universality.

Ongoing dialogue with the four States still outside the Treaty (Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan) would pave the way for accession to the Treaty when circumstances would allow. It would likewise engage these States in a systematic and constructive way, allowing all States parties to the NPT to actively participate in a process towards universality - to which all are committed. Indeed, if the international or respective regional situations were to deteriorate, it would be even more important to already have set in place a mechanism through which these States could discuss relevant issues with NPT States parties.

This mechanism could be useful at a time when the situations in the Middle East and South Asia are particularly difficult.

High Level Consultation Meeting

Our delegation proposes that there should be an annual high-level meeting between representatives of the NPT States parties and the four countries still outside the Treaty. This interaction would be based on an understanding that ongoing consultation and dialogue is needed in order to resolve outstanding issues preventing these countries from acceding at an early date.

The interaction would necessarily be a reciprocal exchange of ideas and views regarding the possible membership of the four. In this engagement, States parties of the NPT would present arguments on the benefits of NPT membership. Likewise, the four would be asked to provide information to States parties on their needs and ideas regarding their possible membership in the Treaty. A "finger pointing" exercise assigning blame would be avoided at all costs. The goal would be to promote meaningful dialogue between NPT members and non-members.

Specifically, this would entail:

- A yearly invitation by the depository States of the NPT to the four non-States parties to discuss NPT-related concerns in a high-level forum;
- The meeting would be convened and chaired by the current Chairman of the respective PrepCom or RevCon;
- Participants would include the Depositary States, the three PrepCom Chairs, the RevCon Chair of the respective five-yearly cycle of the NPT review process, and the four non-States parties on an individual basis;
- Ideally, this consultation would take place within the three months preceding a PrepCom or RevCon;
- In the "off year" in which a PrepCom or RevCon did not take place, the Chairman of the previous RevCon would chair the meeting;
- Further details would be subject and open to suggestion and agreement by States parties.

It is acknowledged that each State outside of the Treaty has a unique political and security context, which would be appropriately taken into consideration in the consultation mechanism. This exercise would require the cooperation of all States parties to deliver a simple but coherent message - that the universality of the NPT is in the interest of every nation of the world.

If this mechanism were to receive the unanimous support of delegations at this meeting of States parties, we would recommend that discussions begin immediately to make the appropriate preparations to allow this consultation mechanism to convene as soon as possible, with a second one following in the beginning of 2000. Failing consensus at this meeting, we request that the Chairman of this Preparatory Committee recommend to the Chairman of the Review Conference, that this mechanism be submitted for adoption at the RevCon session in 2000. It would then enter into effect in 2001.

The proposed language, subject to refinement and agreement is as follows:

"Realising the importance of preserving the integrity of the Treaty, and the urgency and importance of achieving the universality of the Treaty, the Third Preparatory Committee Meeting decides to establish a High Level Consultation Meeting Towards the Universality of the Treaty, and to report annually its progress to the future meetings of States parties of the Review Conference and Preparatory Committee meetings for consideration by States parties."

In the event that this proposal could not be agreed for adoption at this meeting, the appropriate language is proposed to be inserted in the Draft Chairman's Working paper as paragraph 5 bis as follows:

"Realising the importance of preserving the integrity of the Treaty, and the urgency and importance of achieving the universality of the Treaty, the 2000 Review Conference decides to establish a High Level Consultations Meeting Towards the Universality of the Treaty, and to report annually its progress to the future meetings of States parties of the Review Conference and Preparatory Committee meetings for consideration by States parties."

Our delegation requests that this working paper be added to the list of official documents of this PrepCom.

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review

Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on	NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/27 18 May 1999	
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons	ORIGINAL: ENGLISH	

Third session New York, 10-21 May 1999

Proposals for inclusion in the Chairman's working paper

Submitted by the Republic of Korea

The following wording to be included in the Chairman's working paper:

Non-proliferation

- Insert new paragraph as 7 bis

"Recognize that the proliferation of nuclear weapons constitutes a threat to international peace and security as stated in the UN Security Council Presidential Statement of 31 January, 1992. Underline the necessity of strengthening an effective mechanism, including, inter alia, the role of the Security Council, aimed at ensuring full compliance with the obligations under the provisions of the NPT."

Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone

- Add the following sentence at the end of paragraph 16

"Emphasize the importance of the full implementation of the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which entered into force between the two Koreas on 19 February 1992."

Safeguards

- Insert new paragraph as 23 bis

"Urge those States Parties to the IAEA full-scope Safeguards Agreements, which are not in compliance with the Agreements, to implement all obligations under the Agreements fully and unconditionally."

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/30 19 May 1999

the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Third session New York, 10-21 May 1999

Comments on the Chairman's working paper of 14 May 1999

Submitted by Australia

Non-proliferation

Paragraph 6

Add para 6 bis

Reaffirmation of the commitment by all Treaty Parties to full compliance with their Treaty obligations and recognition of the importance of full implementation of all relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions.

Nuclear Disarmament

Add new para under this section, perhaps as para 12 bis

Expression of Treaty Parties' expectation that more fissile material will be transferred from military use to peaceful nuclear activities and be placed under IAEA safeguards by those States that have already initiated such transfers, and encourage other States with unsafeguarded inventories of fissile material to consider taking similar steps.

New para under this section or at the end of para 14

Welcome the announcements made by some NWS that they have ceased the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

Add after para 31

Recognition of the obligation of NPT States parties to ensure that their exports of nuclear items do not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and recognition that coordination of national policies to this end can contribute to the non-proliferation objectives of the

NPT and facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technical information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, in accordance with Article IV.

Welcome for the two International Seminars on the Role of Export Controls in Nuclear Non-Proliferation held in 1997 and 1999, as well as other ongoing efforts by nuclear suppliers to respond to the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference's call for the promotion of transparency in nuclear-export controls.

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review

Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on 19 May 1999

the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/31

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Third session New York, 10-21 May 1999

Debate on Chairman's working paper

Proposals submitted by Austria

Paragraph 12

Add on new last sentence:

At the same time, invites increased transparency and information sharing by nuclear weapons States on possible as well as imminent security hazards, such as the overall security of existing nuclear weapons stocks of and impact of the Y-2-K-issue, and on other related areas of interest for the international community.

Paragraph 13

Recognition of the importance for all States to make every effort to promote the earliest entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and urge all States, especially those whose ratification in accordance with article XIV of the Treaty ensures its entry into force, to sign and ratify the Treaty. Welcome of the ratifications that have taken place so far, including those by two nuclear-weapon States. Call on all States, pending the entry into force, to act so as not to defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty. Also call upon all States to contribute to the work of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, in particular to its efforts to implement the Treaty's verification regime, including to provide the Preparatory Commission with the necessary financial means.

Paragraph 21

Support for the Agency's efforts to integrate safeguards measures arising from the Model Protocol additional to existing Safeguards Agreements. Confirm that the conclusion of Additional Protocols pursuant to INFCIRC/540 is a requirement based on Article III paragraph 1 of the Treaty and therefore urge all States that have Safeguards Agreements with the IAEA to conclude as quickly as possible such Additional Protocols.

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review

Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on	NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/32 19 May 1999	
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons	ORIGINAL:	ENGLISH

Third session New York, 10-21 May 1999

Proposed amendment to the Chairman's working paper of 14 May 1999

Submitted by Belarus

Amend paragraph 16 to read:

Welcome and support of the steps taken to conclude further nuclear-weaponfree-zone treaties since 1995, and reaffirmation of the conviction that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones freely arrived at among the States concerned, enhances global and regional peace and security, as a measure towards the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament. Support of proposals for such zones as in the Middle East, **South Asia and Central and Eastern Europe**. Welcome of the initiative taken by States to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region.

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review

Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on 19 May 1999

the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/33

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Third session New York, 10-21 May 1999

Proposal submitted by Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine

The following elements are proposed to be included in section "Nuclear disarmament" after paragraph 12:

Welcome the important contribution made by Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to the implementation of article VI of the Treaty through their significant measures in nuclear disarmament, in particular the voluntary decision to withdraw all tactical and strategic nuclear weapons from their territories, and taking note with satisfaction of the current efforts of those States to strengthen the Treaty through enhancing regional and global security.

Welcome the signing on 26 September 1997 by Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the United States of America of a number of significant agreements that contribute to ensuring the viability of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems.

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review

Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on	NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/34 19 May 1999
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons	ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Third session New York, 10-21 May 1999

Proposed amendments to the Chairman's working paper of 14 May 1999

Submitted by Belgium

Section on Non-proliferation

paragraph 7

Delete this paragraph.

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review

Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on 19 May 1999

the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/35

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Third session New York, 10-21 May 1999

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

Proposed by Brazil

Add paragraph 16 bis: "Recognition of the continuing contribution that the Antarctic Treaty and the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba are making towards freeing the Southern Hemisphere and adjacent areas covered by those treaties from nuclear weapons."

Add paragraph 16 ter: "Re-affirmation of the importance of ratification of the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba by all regional States, as well as of the continued work by all concerned States to facilitate adherence to the protocols to nuclear-weapon-free zones treaties by all relevant States that have not yet done so."

Paragraph 17 - Replace first sentence with: "Recognition of the commitment of States Parties to and signatories of the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba that are parties to the NPT to promote the common goals envisaged in those treaties, explore and implement further ways and means of cooperation, including the consolidation of the status of the nuclear-weaponfree Southern Hemisphere and adjacent areas."

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review

Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on	NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/36 19 May 1999	
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons	ORIGINAL:	ENGLISH

Third session New York, 10-21 May 1999

Proposals submitted by Canada

Elements for inclusion in the draft Chairman's working paper:*

<u>Welcoming</u> the indefinite extension of that Treaty as decided at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty;

<u>Emphasizing</u> that the preservation of the integrity of the Treaty and full compliance with its provisions are essential to international peace and security;

Comments on Chairman's working paper of 14 May

Paragraph 6

Delete the last phrase of the paragraph. (Canada agrees that Article I and II of the NPT are critical. That being said, we do not believe that articles of the Treaty should be graded)

Paragraph 8

In working paper PC.III/4, Canada has proposed specific paragraphs on substantive issues to be included in the final report of the Preparatory Committee, among which a section on Nuclear Tests. Canada would like the Preparatory Committee to address nuclear tests in the substantive part of its final report. As well, in working paper PC.III/2, Canada has proposed specific language to deal with the issue of the nuclear tests in South Asia. As the language that we proposed is very similar to paragraph 8 of the Chairman's working paper, Canada can support that paragraph.

 $[\]ast$ The elements proposed above are also tabled in NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/2, annex.

Safeguards

The Chairman's proposals in paragraphs 19 to 24 are largely acceptable to Canada as they reflect the proposals we made on that topic in our working paper PC.III/2.

Canada supports the proposal put forward by Japan for a restructuring of the section on Safeguards. That being said, in our view paragraph 24 would be better placed in the section dealing with "Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy".

Canada has serious reservation regarding the proposal put forward by Luxembourg for the addition of a new sentence at the end of paragraph 21 which would read as follows: "For non-nuclear weapon States that are parties to such an additional Protocol, the export controls of the nuclear suppliers should be alleviated for the benefit of these recipient States".

Regarding the Austrian proposal on paragraph 21, Canada would like to draw the Chairman's attention to paragraph 13 of Canadian working paper PC.III/2 which also touches the same issue.

Chairman's working paper Suggestions on the nuclear disarmament section

Note: Most suggestions are drawn from the Annex to the Canadian working paper distributed as NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/2.

 Paragraph 11, line 2: add "all States, especially" after "by". (Article VI includes two undertakings by all States party: see Canadian working paper PC.III/10.)

2. New paragraph 11 bis: "The achievement of the following programme of action is important for the full realization and effective implementation of Article VI:

(A) The START Process should be renewed, accelerated and fully implemented. The reduction targets established by the Russian Federation and the USA for START II and START III should be achieved; further substantial reductions should be pursued. The other three nuclear-weapon States should become directly engaged in this process in the near future.

(B) Additional measures (e.g. de-alerting; transparency; confidencebuilding) as regards nuclear weapons operations should also be pursued.

(C) Measures to reduce the threats posed by tactical nuclear weapons - their numbers and their deployment - should be negotiated and implemented.

(D) The earliest possible entry-into-force, drawing upon all measures consistent with international law, of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty should be achieved. The rejection of nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions as established by this Treaty is reaffirmed.

(E) The early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as initiated within the Conference on Disarmament, should be pursued. Appropriate and effective measures to deal with stocks of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices should also be identified and implemented.

(F) The five nuclear-weapon States should formally affirm a moratorium on the production of such fissile material pending negotiation of the Treaty.

(G) Mechanisms should be devised both within the NPT context and within other relevant bodies such as the Conference on Disarmament for exchanges of information and the substantive discussion of nuclear disarmament issues with a view to exploring possibilities for further progress on nuclear disarmament through national, bilateral and multilateral initiatives.

3. Paragraph 12: replace the last three sentences with the following: "The START Process should be renewed, accelerated and fully implemented. The reduction targets established by the Russian Federation and the USA for START II and START III should be achieved; further substantial reductions should be pursued. The other three nuclear-weapon States should become directly engaged in this process in the near future. Additional measures [e.g. de-alerting; transparency; confidence-building] as regards nuclear weapons operations should also be pursued. Measures to reduce the threats posed by tactical nuclear weapons - their numbers and their deployment - should be negotiated and implemented."

4. Paragraph 13: support new final sentence proposed by New Zealand.

5. Paragraph 14: add at the end the following: "Pending the Treaty's entry into force, the States Parties urge all states to observe a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. Further, the five nuclear-weapon States should formally affirm a moratorium on the production of such fissile material. Appropriate and effective measures to deal with stocks of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices should also be identified and implemented." [First sentence based on New Zealand proposal.]

6. New paragraph 15 bis: "Mechanisms should be devised both within the NPT context and within other relevant bodies such as the Conference on Disarmament for exchanges of information and the substantive discussion of nuclear disarmament issues with a view to exploring possibilities for further progress on nuclear disarmament through national, bilateral and multilateral initiatives."

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review

Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on 19 May 1999

the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/37

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Third session New York, 10-21 May 1999

Proposed elements to be included in Chairman's working paper

Submitted by China

In the Preambular part, add the following:

After paragraph 2:

Reaffirmation that all States parties commit themselves to respect one another's sovereignty and territorial integrity, abide by the Charter of the United Nations and the norms governing international relations, oppose the use or threat of use of force against other countries under any pretext, and never resort to force in the international relations without the authorization from the United Nations Security Council.

In the Nuclear Disarmament section, add the following:

Between paragraphs 11-12:

Commitment to refrain from engaging in the research, development or deployment of outer space weapon systems and missile defense systems that undermine strategic security and stability.

Commitment by all the nuclear weapon States to renounce the nuclear deterrence policy characterized by "first use of nuclear weapons" and withdraw all the nuclear weapons deployed on foreign soil to their own territory.

Reaffirmation that the U.S.A. and the Russian Federation, bearing special responsibilities for nuclear disarmament, should continue to reduce drastically their respective nuclear arsenals.

Between paragraphs 14-15:

Recognition that the commencement, progress and conclusion of FMCT negotiations are closely related to the development of international peace and security.

In the Nuclear-weapon-free zone section, add the following:

Between paragraphs 16-17:

States parties to the current nuclear-weapon-free zones, if they are States parties to other international or regional agreements at the same time, should ensure that their adherence to those agreements does not entail any obligations contrary to the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones should constitute a geographical entity whose boundaries are to be clearly defined by prospective States parties to the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty through full consultations with other States concerned, especially in cases where territories in dispute are involved, with a view to facilitating agreement of those States concerned.

In the Security Assurances section, add the following:

Before paragraph 18:

Commitment, without any condition, by all the nuclear weapon States not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, nor use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States, and conclude international legal instruments to this effect.

In the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy section, add the following:

Between paragraphs 28-29:

Reaffirmation that group export control regimes should be replaced by non-discriminatory and universally negotiated non-proliferation treaties.

Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on 19 May 1999

the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/38

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Third session New York, 10-21 May 1999

Comments on the Chairman's working paper of 14 May 1999

Submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Paragraph 4

Replace with

Urgency and importance of achieving the universality of the Treaty; welcome for the accessions of Andorra, Angola, Brazil, Chile, Comoros, Djibouti, Oman, United Arab Emirates and Vanuatu to the Treaty since 1995, bringing the number of States parties to 187. Urge all States not yet party to the Treaty, Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan, to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear weapon States at the earliest possible date.

Paragraph 7

Delete this paragraph

Paragraph 8

Replace with

Reaffirmation of the views expressed concerning the nuclear test explosions in South Asia in 1998 in UNSCR 1172 and General Assembly Resolution 53/77 G. Welcome the declared moratoria on further testing by India and Pakistan and their declared intention to sign the CTBT. Urge them to accede to the NPT and CTBT without further delay or preconditions.

Paragraph 12

Replace with

Recognition of the progress achieved in nuclear weapons reductions by the nuclear weapons States, including those made unilaterally, such as by the UK in the SDR, or bilaterally under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) process, as steps towards nuclear disarmament. Reaffirmation of the need to maintain this progress. Affirmation that at an appropriate stage, the US and

the Russian Federation should be joined by the other NWS to ensure full implementation of the obligations under Article VI. Invite increased transparency by the NWS on the dismantlement of tactical nuclear weapons.

Paragraph 13

Add after "nuclear-weapon States"; "(France and the United Kingdom)"

Paragraph 14

Add after the last sentence "welcome the announcements made by some NWS that they have ceased the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices".

Paragraph 16

Delete "as a measure towards the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and" to end of sentence and replace by "strengthens the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and contributes towards realising the ..."

Paragraph 18

Insert the full title of the Ad Hoc Committee, "Ad Hoc Committee on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use, or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and urges the ..."

Paragraph 20

There are a number of typographic errors. The paragraph should read:

Reaffirmation that new supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of the Agency's full-scope safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Paragraph 21

Add "Welcome the signature of such agreements by 36 non-nuclear weapons States".

Paragraph 22

Add "Welcome the signature of such agreements by China, France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America."

Paragraph 25

Delete last sentence

Paragraph 26

Insert as paragraph 26 (bis)

Affirmation of importance of full compliance of all States parties to the NPT in the region with their obligations under the NPT: reaffirmation of need for the establishment of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems

Paragraph 27

Delete "between States parties"

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review

Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on	NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/39 19 May 1999	
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons	ORIGINAL: ENGLISH	

Third session New York, 10-21 May 1999

Amendments on draft Chairman's working paper

Submitted by Egypt

- 1. The Preparatory Committee agreed on the following draft recommendations to the Review Conference:
 - Reaffirmation of commitment to the preamble and the articles of the Treaty and to the outcome of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT.
 - Reaffirmation of conviction that the treaty is essential to international peace and security and recognition of the crucial role that full implementation of the Treaty would have in nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
 - 3. Reaffirmation of commitment to efforts designed to promote the full realization and effective implementation of the provisions of the Treaty **and** of the decisions on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and on strengthening the review process for the Treaty as well as the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the **Treaty** on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

<u>Universality</u>

4. Urgency and importance of achieving the universality of the Treaty; welcome the accessions of Andorra, Angola, Brazil, Chile, Comoros, Djibouti, Oman, United Arab Emirates and Vanuatu to the Treaty since 1995, bringing the number of States parties to 187. Also urge all States not yet party to the Treaty to accede to the Treaty without any further delay, particularly those States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.

- 4 bis The conviction that the universal adherence to the NPT is an essential step towards strengthening barriers against the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and to this end urge Israel, the only State in the Middle East that is not yet a party to the Treaty and has not yet placed all its nuclear facilities under full scope IAEA safeguards, to accede to the Treaty without further delay and without prior conditions.
- 5. Undertake to make determined efforts towards the achievement of the goal of universality of the Treaty. These efforts should include the enhancement of regional security, particularly through committed and sustained efforts by all States party towards achieving universality of the Treaty in areas of tensions such as the Middle East where Israel remains the only State that has not yet acceded to the NPT.

Non-proliferation

- 6. Reaffirmation that every effort should be made to implement the Treaty in all its aspects to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States party to the Treaty. Emphasize the particular importance attached to the strict observance of articles I and II, both of which allow for no exceptions whatsoever, and are binding on them in times of peace as well as in times of war.
- 7. Reaffirmation by non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty of their commitments to the fullest implementation of Article II and to refrain from nuclear sharing with nuclear-weapon States, non-nuclearweapon States, and States not party to the Treaty for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements.
- 8. Reaffirmation of the condemnation of the nuclear tests in South Asia in 1998 as stated in Security Council resolution 1172 and General Assembly resolution 53/77 G, and the importance of full compliance with each of the measures identified in those resolutions. Urge all States that have not yet done so to become party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty without delay and without **prior** conditions.
- 8 bis Expression of deep concern over the alarm expressed that Israel continues to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and persists in pursuing ambiguous nuclear programs and policies. Urge Israel to become party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons without any further delay and without prior conditions.
- 8 ter Undertaking to suspend all forms and any kind of cooperation or assistance which would contribute to the nuclear program of Israel. Declaration of the commitment to exclusively prohibit the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of know-how or assistance, in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to Israel, as long as

it remains a non-party to the Treaty and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under the full-scope IAEA safeguards.

- 9. Reaffirmation of the integrity of the Article IX, paragraph 3 of the Treaty and the commitment of all States parties not to accord any status or recognition to additional States that possess nuclear weapon capabilities. Reaffirmation also, towards the attainment of this objective, of the commitment of all States parties to prohibit completely the transfer or sharing of all nuclear related equipment, information materials, facilities, resources or devices or the extension of scientific and technical assistance in the nuclear field to States non-party to the Treaty, without exception.
- 10. Reaffirmation that the cessation of all nuclear testing will contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process of nuclear disarmament leading to the ultimate objective of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and therefore to the enhancement of international peace and security.

Nuclear disarmament

- 11. Reaffirmation of the commitment to fulfil with determination the obligations under article VI. Reaffirmation, in this context by the nuclear-weapons States, of their faithful commitment to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, and their means of delivery, and to that end, agreement to pursue vigorously systematic and progressive efforts to further reduce nuclear weapons, globally and regionally. (delete <u>Declaration of commitment to the achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control</u>). Declaration that the achievement of nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament necessitates the cooperation of all States, and in particular the nuclear-weapon States.
- 11 bis Urge the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad-hoc committee under item 1 of its agenda with a negotiating mandate to address nuclear disarmament.
- 12. Recognition of the progress achieved in nuclear weapons reductions by the nuclear-weapon States, including those made unilaterally or bilaterally under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) process, as steps towards nuclear disarmament. Require that at an appropriate stage the US and the Russian Federation should be joined by the other NWS. Reaffirmation of the need to accelerate efforts to ensure full implementation of the obligations under Article VI, which would in turn assist to renew and revitalize the process of nuclear disarmament. Invite increased transparency by NWS on the dismantlement of tactical nuclear weapons.
- 13. Recognition of the importance for all States to make every effort to promote the earliest entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and urge all States, especially those whose ratification in accordance with Article XIV of the Treaty ensures its

entry into force, to sign and ratify the Treaty. Welcome of the ratification that have taken place so far, including those by **France and the United Kingdom**. Call on all States, pending the entry into force, to act so as not to defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty. Also call upon all States to contribute to the work of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in particular to its efforts to implement the Treaty's verification regime.

- 14. Reaffirmation of the need for the immediate commencement and the early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the **report** of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein. Such a treaty would be an essential measure of non-proliferation. Welcome the establishment in August 1998 of Ad Hoc Committee in the Conference on Disarmament for this purpose **under item 1 of its agenda "Cessation of Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament"**, and urge its immediate reestablishment.
- 15. Reaffirmation that the provisions of Article V of the Treaty with regard to peaceful nuclear explosions are to be interpreted in the light of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

16. Welcome and support of the steps taken to conclude further nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties since 1995, and reaffirmation of the conviction that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones freely arrived at among the States concerned, enhances global and regional peace and security, as a measure towards the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament. Support of proposals for the establishment of these zones where they do not yet exist, such as in the Middle East and South Asia. Welcome of the initiative taken by States in Central Asia to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region. Welcome the declaration by Mongolia of its nuclear-weapon-free status.

16 bis Welcome the consensus reached in the United Nations General Assembly since its thirty-fifth session that the establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East would greatly enhance international peace and security. Urge all States directly concerned to consider seriously taking the practical and urgent steps required for the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East as a first step towards the establishment in the same region of a zone free from all weapons of mass destruction.

17. Recognition of the importance attached by signatories and States parties to the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Pelindaba and Bangkok to establishing a mechanism for cooperation among their respective Treaty agencies. Welcome and support the report on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the Basis of Arrangements Freely Arrived at Among the States of the Region Concerned, adopted by consensus by the Disarmament Commission on 30 April 1999.

INSERT 1995 Resolution on the Middle East

- Reaffirmation of the provisions of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, and reaffirmation of the determination to work diligently towards its speedy implementation.
- Recognition that since the adoption of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, Djibouti, Oman and the UAE have become parties to the Treaty. Expression of deep concern that Israel continues to be the only State in the region which has not yet acceded to the Treaty and refuses to place all its nuclear facilities under the full-scope safeguards of the IAEA.
- Call upon Israel to acceded to the Treaty and to place all its nuclear facilities under the full-scope IAEA safeguards without further delay and without conditions.
- Undertaking by States parties to extend fullest cooperation and to exert their utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment in the Middle East of a zone free from nuclear weapons as an important prior step towards the establishment of a zone free from all weapons of mass destruction.

Security assurances

18. Reaffirmation of the view that further steps, which should take the form of an international legally binding instrument, should be negotiated and concluded to assure non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Welcome the establishment in August 1998 of an Ad Hoc Committee in the Conference on Disarmament on Negative Security Assurances and urge its immediate reestablishment.

<u>Safeguards</u>

- 19. Welcome and support the adoption, in May 1997, of the Model Protocol Additional to the existent safeguards agreements to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the Agency's safeguards system; reaffirmation that the IAEA is the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring, in accordance with the statute of the Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, compliance with its Safeguards Agreements.
- 20. Reaffirmation that new supply arrangements for the transfer of sources or special fissionable material or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special

fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapons States should require as a necessary precondition, acceptance of IAEA full-scope safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

- 21. Support of the Agency's efforts to integrate safeguards measures arising from the Model Protocol additional to existing Safeguards Agreements. Also urge all States that have Safeguards Agreements with IAEA to conclude as quickly as possible an Additional Protocol pursuant to INFCIRC/540.
- 22. Urge the nuclear-weapon States to include in Additional Protocols to their voluntary safeguards agreements those measures which have identified as capable of contributing to the non-proliferation and efficiency aims of the Model Protocol.
- 23. Urge all States parties required by Article III of the Treaty, which have not yet done so, to conclude with the International Atomic Energy Agency a comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. Additionally call on all States not parties to the Treaty to accept IAEA **Fullscope** Safeguards.
- 24. Urge all States to implement, to the extent possible, IAEA's recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material, currently set forth in INFCIRC/225/Rev.3 and also urge all States parties to examine ways and means to strengthen the current regime.

(Former Section on 1995 resolution on the Middle East)

Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

- 27. Reaffirmation of the commitment to the full implementation of Article IV of the Treaty and the commitment to cooperation between States parties in the field of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I, II and III of the Treaty and the Decision on the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.
- 28. Reaffirmation of the importance attached to the work of IAEA regarding multilateral technical cooperation in the development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and call again for every effort to be made to ensure that IAEA has the necessary financial and human resources to meet its responsibilities in the area of technical cooperation, safeguards and nuclear safety.
- 29. Reaffirmation that attacks or threats of attack on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes jeopardize nuclear safety and raise serious concerns regarding the **respect** of international law on the use of force in such cases, which could warrant appropriate action in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, **particularly those under Chapter VII.**

- 30. Reaffirmation of the importance of nuclear safety as an essential prerequisite for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In this context, States parties attach importance to ensuring a successful review process under the Nuclear Safety Convention and note the adoption of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management as another contribution in this area.
- 31. Express the determination to prevent and combat illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and state the readiness to cooperate with each other, and support multilateral efforts to this end.

2. The following is a list of (**delete** - *the*) specific proposals put forward by delegations for consideration by the Preparatory Committee on the understanding that the proposals are without commitment by the Preparatory Committee and without prejudice to the position of any delegation and that the list is not **conclusive**.

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/40 Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on 19 May 1999

the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Third session New York, 10-21 May 1999

Comments on the Chairman's working paper of 14 May 1999

Submitted by France

• Paragraph 3: amend the second part of the sentence: "(...) and reaffirm the importance of the decisions (...)".

• Paragraph 4: quote the names of the States non-parties to the Treaty: "Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan" and reorder part of the second sentence: "Also urge all States not yet party to the Treaty to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear weapon States at the earliest possible date (...)".

• Paragraph 7: refers to article II and to NNWS. Adds a new commitment, which goes beyond article II (no nuclear sharing with the NWS). Should be deleted (the importance of the strict observance of article II being mentioned in paragraph 6).

• Paragraph 8: should be redrafted in a more constructive and forwardlooking way with references to the implementation of UNSCR 1172:

"Affirmation of the importance of full implementation of all the provisions of UNSCR 1172 adopted after nuclear tests were conducted in South Asia. Notes that the States concerned have declared moratoriums on further testing and have said that they are willing to enter into legal commitments not to conduct any further nuclear tests and reiterate the need for such legal commitments to be expressed in legal form by signing and ratifying the nuclear CTBT".

- the last sentence is redundant with paragraph 4 and thus should be deleted.

• Paragraph 9: should be redrafted in a clearer way (what is the meaning of "any status and recognition"?): "any additional nuclear weapon-State". • Paragraph 10: should refer to the CTBT in the following way:

"Reaffirmation of the crucial importance of the CTBT for global efforts toward nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament and that the cessation of all nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion (...)".

• Paragraph 11:

- 1st sentence: replace "unequivocal" by "faithful", "firm" or "determined [wording from the 1995 P&O]".

- Replace in sentence 3 "declaration of commitment to the achievement (...)" by "reaffirmation, also, of commitment to the achievement (...)": this commitment is already ours.

• Paragraph 12: 2nd sentence: delete.

• Paragraph 13:

2nd sentence: quote France and the UK.
3rd sentence: the legal consequences of this sentence are not clear.
4th sentence: replace "to implement the Treaty's verification regime" by "to establish the Treaty's verification regime".

• Paragraph 16:

- amend second sentence, by deleting "South Asia" and adding "where there exists a consensus among the States of the region concerned, such as the Middle East and Central Asia" (there is no agreement in South Asia for such a zone). Delete by way of consequence the last sentence.

- Add a reference to the recent signature/ratification by NWS of relevant protocols of NWFZ Treaties (Rarotonga, Pelindaba).

• **Paragraph 18**: add a reference to UNSCR resolution 984: "Stresses the importance of the declarations by the NWS and the UNSCR 984, adopted unanimously on 11 April 1995, concerning both negative and positive security assurances".

• Paragraph 19: second part: should be further clarified.

• Paragraph 22: add after NWS "which have not yet done so".

• Paragraph 25, Paragraph 26: both need to be improved.

• **Paragraph 30**: the last part of the last sentence is too weak. Should be replaced by: "welcome the adoption of and urge all States to adhere to the Joint Convention ...".

• Additions to the paper:

The following items should be added:

1) In the "Nuclear disarmament" section

- in paragraph 12: welcome the significant unilateral reduction measures taken by France and the UK.

- after paragraph 13:

welcome, in the context of the implementation of the CTBT, the dismantlement by France of its nuclear test site.

- after paragraph 14:

underlines the importance of the dismantlement of weapon-grade fissile material production facilities, as done by France.

2) In the "Safeguards" section:

- underline the importance of the conclusions of the Moscow Summit on Nuclear Safety and Security of 19 and 20 April 1996 and initiatives stemming from it, notably the AIDA-MOX programme implemented by France, Germany, Italy and the Russian Federation for the safe and effective management of Russian excess weapons-grade plutonium.

3) In the "Peaceful Uses of nuclear energy" section:

- between paragraph 27 and paragraph 28: reaffirm the need for efficient export controls, precondition for a trustful nuclear trade, and welcome transparency efforts in that field.

- welcome the agreement reached in December 1997 among a group of nine countries on a set of guidelines for the management of plutonium in all peaceful nuclear activities.

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review

Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on	NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/41 19 May 1999	
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons	ORIGINAL: ENGLISH	

Third session New York, 10-21 May 1999

Proposed element to be included in the Chairman's working paper

Submitted by Turkey

In the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy Section, paragraph 31 should read:

"Express the determination to prevent and combat illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and state the readiness to cooperate with each other, and support multilateral efforts to this end, <u>inter alia</u>, <u>review of the Convention</u> <u>on the physical protection of nuclear materials at the earliest possible time</u>, with the aim of strengthening and broadening its scope."

Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on	NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/42 19 May 1999	
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons	ORIGINAL:	ENGLISH

Third session New York, 10-21 May 1999

Proposal submitted by Ireland

Replace paragraph 9 in the Chairman's paper by the following:

- Reaffirm that - in accordance with Article IX - States not currently States parties may only accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States.

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review

Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on	NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/43 19 May 1999	
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons	ORIGINAL:	ENGLISH

Third session New York, 10-21 May 1999

Chairman's working paper

Proposals submitted by Japan

Safeguards

- 19. Reaffirmation that International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring, in accordance with its Statute and its safeguards system, compliance with Safeguards Agreements;
- 20. Urge all States parties which have not yet done so to conclude a comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, as required by Article III of the Treaty;
- 21. Call on all States not party to the Treaty to accept comprehensive IAEA safeguards;
- 22. Welcome and support the adoption, in May 1997, of the Model Protocol Additional to existent Safeguards Agreements (laid down in document INFCIRC/540), designed to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the Agency's safeguards system as a contribution to global non-proliferation objectives;
- 23. Urge all States that have not yet done so to conclude as quickly as possible an Additional Protocol pursuant to INFCIRC/540; urge the nuclear-weapon States to include in their Additional Protocols those measures which they have identified as capable of contributing to the non-proliferation and efficiency aims of the Model Additional Protocol;
- 24. Reaffirmation that new supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon states should require as a necessary precondition adherence to the Treaty and acceptance of full-scope IAEA safeguards;

- 25. Support for the Agency's efforts to integrate safeguards measures arising from the Model Additional Protocol with the traditional safeguards measures, so as to achieve the optimum effectiveness and efficiency of the safeguards system;
- 26. Urge all States to implement, to the extent possible, the IAEA recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material, currently set forth in INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 and also urge all States parties to examine ways and means to strengthen the current regime.

1. <u>Non-proliferation</u>

(1) <u>New paragraph 7 bis (Non-proliferation)</u>

Insert the following new paragraph 7 bis:

"Reaffirmation of the concern of the States Parties with the cases of non-compliance of the Treaty by two States Parties which demand the close attention and effective response of the States Parties of the NPT."

(2) Amendment to paragraph 8 (Nuclear test explosions in South Asia)

Change the word "compliance with" in the third line to "implementation of."

- 2. <u>Nuclear disarmament</u>
- (1) <u>Amendment to paragraph 12 (START etc.</u>)

(a) Insert the following new second sentence:

"Call for the early entry into force of the START II and the early commencement and conclusion of the START III negotiations."

(b) Add the following elements to this paragraph (or insert them in a new separate paragraph) as further measures of nuclear disarmament by the nuclear weapon states in addition to the measures already mentioned in paragraph 12:

(i) further efforts by the five nuclear weapon states to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally and through their negotiations;

(ii) further efforts in dismantlement of nuclear weapons and safe and effective management of the resultant fissile materials; and

(iii)de-targeting nuclear warheads and taking nuclear forces off-alert including the removal of nuclear warheads from delivery vehicles.

(2) <u>Amendment to paragraph 14 (FMCT</u>)

Add the following point:

"Desirability of collective declaration by the nuclear-weapon states of a moratorium on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and the promotion, in parallel with an FMCT negotiations, of the transparency in such fissile materials, especially those in surplus."

(3) <u>New paragraph 14 bis (Multilateral discussions)</u>

Insert the following new paragraph 14 bis:

"Multilateral discussions on possible future steps on nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation."

3. <u>Safeguards</u>

(1) Amendment to paragraph 21 (Additional Protocol of IAEA)

Replace second sentence with the following:

"Urge all states which have not yet done so to conclude, as quickly as possible, Safeguards Agreement with IAEA and Additional Protocol pursuant to INFCIRC/540."

4. Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

(1) <u>New paragraph 28 bis (Export Control</u>)

Insert the following new paragraph 28 bis:

"Welcome the increased transparency in nuclear related export control regime and reaffirm the need to continue to promote it within the framework of dialogue and cooperation among all interested States Parties to the Treaty."

(2) <u>Amendment to paragraph 30 (Nuclear Safety</u>)

Add the following new sentence to this paragraph:

"Appeal to those states which did not sign and/or ratify these two Conventions to do so as early as possible."

Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on 19 May 1999

the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/44

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Third session New York, 10-21 May 1999

Amendments to the Chairman's working paper of 14 May 1999

Proposed by Kenya

Paragraph 18

Replace the word "view" with "need", and delete the words "which could".

Reaffirmation of the **need** to take steps in the form of an international legally binding instrument to assure non-nuclear weapon States Party to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Welcome the establishment in March 1999 of an Ad Hoc Committee in the Conference on Disarmament on Negative Security Assurances and urge its re-establishment.

Paragraph 28

Insert in the middle of the paragraph, the sentence in bold italics as indicated below. This additional sentence is wholly derived from Article IV of the Treaty.

Reaffirmation of the importance attached to the work of IAEA regarding multilateral technical co-operation in the development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world, call again for every effort to be made to ensure that IAEA has the necessary financial and human resources to meet its responsibilities in the area of technical co-operation, safeguards and nuclear safety.

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review

Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on	NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/45 19 May 1999

the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Third session New York, 10-21 May 1999

Chairman's working paper

Proposals submitted by Sweden

Paragraph 11:

Replace the second sentence with:

"Call upon the nuclear-weapon States to demonstrate an unequivocal commitment to the speedy and total elimination of their respective nuclear weapons and, without delay, to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to the elimination of these weapons, thereby fulfilling their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty."

Paragraph 12:

Insert before the last sentence:

"Call upon the nuclear-weapon States to pursue vigorously the reduction of reliance on non-strategic nuclear weapons and negotiations on their elimination as an integral part of their overall nuclear disarmament activities."

After paragraph 12:

Insert a new paragraph, a paragraph 12 bis:

"Stressing the importance of de-alerting and de-activating nuclear weapons, which would help prevent inadvertent, accidental or unauthorized launches and create beneficial conditions for continued disarmament efforts."

Paragraph 18:

Replace the whole paragraph with:

"Agreement that legally binding security assurances within the NPT frame-work would strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Pending the achievement of an international legally binding agreement on negative security assurances, it is imperative that the nuclear-weapon States scrupulously observe their unilateral commitments in this field."

Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on

the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/46 19 May 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Third session New York, 10-21 May 1999

Amendments to the Chairman's working paper

Proposed by Luxembourg

Under the heading safeguards, paragraph 21, page 4, add, after the last sentence, the following new sentence:

For non-nuclear weapon States that are parties to such an additional Protocol, the export controls of the nuclear suppliers should be alleviated for the benefit of these recipient States.

Add a new sentence at the end of paragraph 30:

Urge all States that have not yet done so to accede to these Conventions at the earliest possible date, particularly those States that operate nuclear installation.

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review

Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on	NPT/CONF.2000/PC.111/4/ 19 May 1999

the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Third session New York, 10-21 May 1999

Proposals to the Chairman's working paper

Submitted by Mexico

In the preambular part:

Paragraph 1 bis:

Reaffirmation that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Paragraph 3 bis:

Affirmation that all the articles of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons are binding on all States parties and at all times and in all circumstances.

In the section on non-proliferation:

Paragraph 10 (add at the end):

... and expressing that the qualitative development of nuclear weapons is contrary to the spirit and objectives of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on 19 May 1999

the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/48

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Third session New York, 10-21 May 1999

Proposal for the Chairman's working paper

Submitted by Mongolia

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

Add par. 17bis: "Welcome the declaration by Mongolia of its nuclear-weapon-free status, as a unilateral measure to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons on its territory, bearing in mind its unique conditions, as a concrete contribution to promoting the aims of nuclear non-proliferation."

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review

Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on	NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/49 19 May 1999	
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons	ORIGINAL:	ENGLISH

Third session New York, 10-21 May 1999

Proposals for the Chairman's working paper

Submitted by Myanmar

Nuclear Disarmament

- Insert a new para All States Parties reaffirm their unequivocal commitment to the goal of a speedy and total elimination of nuclear weapons.
- Replace para 11 The States Parties also reaffirm their commitment to
 with a new para The States Parties also reaffirm their commitment to
 fulfil with determination their obligations under
 Article VI, particularly by the Nuclear Weapons States
 to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion
 negotiations on effective measures for nuclear
 disarmament in all its aspects under strict and
 effective international control.

[Last sentence remains as it is.]

Security assurances

Replace para 18 with a new para

The States Parties reaffirm their conviction that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only genuine guarantee for non-nuclear weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Pending the achievement of such a goal, an international legally-binding instrument on a security assurances regime which will ensure the security of non-nuclear weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons must be urgently concluded.

The States Parties recognize that, by renouncing voluntarily their nuclear option, the non-nuclear weapon States Parties to the Treaty are entitled to receive legally-binding security assurances from the Nuclear Weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them.

The States Parties reaffirm their firm commitment to take further steps which should take the form of an internationally and legally binding instrument to assure non-nuclear weapon States Parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

[Last sentence remains as it is.]

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review

Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on	NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/50 19 May 1999	
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Third session New York, 10-21 May 1999

Proposed amendments to the Chairman's working paper of 14 May 1999

Submitted by the Netherlands

Section on Non-proliferation

paragraph 6

Delete final sentence ("Emphasize ... of articles I and II")

<u>paragraph 7</u>

Amend paragraph 7 to read: "Reaffirmation by all States Parties to the Treaty of their commitment to the full implementation of Articles I and II".

Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on 19 May 1999

the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/51

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Third session New York, 10-21 May 1999

Proposals for the Chairman's working paper of 14 May 1999

Submitted by New Zealand

Paragraph 8

Add the following after first sentence:

The States parties note that the States concerned have declared moratoriums on further testing and have said that they are willing to enter into legal commitments not to conduct any further nuclear tests and reiterate the need for such legal commitments to be expressed in legal form by signing and ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

Split paragraph after proposed insertion, making new paragraph for existing second sentence of paragraph 8, "Urges ... ", taking into account South African amendments.

Paragraph 13

13. Recognition of the importance for all States to make every effort to promote the earliest entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and urge all States, especially those whose ratification in accordance with article XIV of the Treaty ensures its entry into force, to sign and ratify the Treaty. Welcome of the ratifications that have taken place so far, including those by two nuclear-weapon States. Call on all States, pending the entry into force, to act so as not to defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty. Also call upon all States to contribute to the work of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, in particular to its efforts to implement the Treaty's verification regime. Pending the Treaty's entry into force, the States parties call on those States that have not yet done so to observe a moratorium on nuclear tests.

Paragraph 14

14. Reaffirmation of the need for the immediate commencement and the early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable

convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein. Such a treaty would be an essential measure of nuclear disarmament as well as of non-proliferation. Welcome the establishment in August 1998 of an Ad Hoc Committee in the Conference on Disarmament for this purpose, and urge its immediate reestablishment. Pending the Treaty's entry into force, the States parties urge all States concerned to observe a moratorium on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.

Paragraph 17

17. Recognition of the importance attached by signatories and States parties to the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Pelindaba and Bangkok in promoting the nuclear-weapon-free status of the Southern Hemisphere and adjacent areas, and to cooperation among their respective Treaty agencies. Welcome and support for the report on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free-zones on the Basis of Arrangements Freely Arrived At Among the States of the Region Concerned, adopted by consensus by the Disarmament Commission on 30 of April 1999.

Insert the following paragraph:

17*bis*. Urge all nuclear-weapon States that have not yet done so to ratify the Protocols to the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties.

Paragraph 30

Insert the following paragraph:

30*bis*. Affirmation that it is in the interests of all States that the maritime transportation of irradiated nuclear fuel, plutonium and high-level waste be conducted in compliance with international standards of safety and security. Call on those directly engaged in the maritime transportation of such radioactive materials to continue to provide information, consistent with safety and security requirements, about the timing, route and liability arrangements to States in the vicinity of such shipments.

Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on 19 May 1999

the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/52

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Third session New York, 10-21 May 1999

Proposals for the Chairman's working paper of 14 May 1999

Submitted by the Russian Federation

Paragraph 4

In the last but one line to place the words "as non-nuclear-weapon States" after the words "the Treaty".

Paragraph 12

Delete the last sentence.

Paragraph 21

In the first line after the words "Support of the Agency's efforts" include the words "made to strengthen the effectiveness and improve efficiency of the IAEA safeguards system and".

In the section "Peaceful uses of nuclear energy"

Introduce new paragraph:

28bis. The States parties deem it necessary to resolve the questions of enhancing the safety of nuclear power on the basis of new, inherently safe nuclear-power technologies. In this connection, the States parties propose the elaboration, under the auspices of IAEA, of an international project on the consideration of the possibility of creating such nuclear technologies which would ensure that energy is obtained with minimal risk from the point of view of non-proliferation.

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review

Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on	NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/53 19 May 1999	
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons	ORIGINAL:	ENGLISH

Third session New York, 10-21 May 1999

Comments on draft Chairman's working paper

Submitted by South Africa

- The Preparatory Committee agreed on the following draft recommendations to 1. the Review Conference:
 - 1 Reaffirmation of commitment to the Preamble and the Articles of the Treaty.
 - 2. Reaffirmation of conviction that the Treaty is essential to international peace and security and recognition of the crucial role of the Treaty in nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
 - 2.1 Recalling that the overwhelming majority of States entered into legally binding commitments not to receive, manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and that these undertakings have been made in the context of the corresponding legally binding commitments by the nuclear-weapon States of nuclear disarmament.
 - 2.2 Reiterating the ultimate goals of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.
 - Reaffirmation of commitment to efforts designed to promote the full 3. realization and effective implementation of the provisions of the Treaty, as well as reaffirmation of the decisions on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament" and on the "Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty" as well as the "Resolution on the Middle East" adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Universality

- 4. Urgency and importance of achieving the universality of the Treaty; welcome the accession of Andorra, Angola, Brazil, Chile, Comoros, Djibouti, Oman, United Arab Emirates and Vanuatu to the Treaty since 1995, bringing the number of States parties to 187. Also urge all States not yet party to the Treaty [as non-nuclear-weapon States] to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States at the earliest possible date without condition or delay and to take all the necessary measures which flow from adherence to the Treaty, particularly those States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.
- 5. Undertake to make determined efforts towards the achievement of the goal of universality of the Treaty. These efforts might include the enhancement of regional security.

Non-proliferation

- 6. Reaffirmation that every effort should be made to implement the Treaty in all its aspects to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States parties to the Treaty. Emphasize the particular importance attached to the strict observance of Articles I and II.
- 6.1 Reaffirmation by the nuclear-weapon States of their commitments to the fullest implementation of Article I and to refrain from nuclear sharing with nuclear-weapon States, non-nuclear weapon States, and States not party to the Treaty for military, and other nuclear explosive, purposes under any kind of arrangements.
- 7. Reaffirmation by non-nuclear-weapon State parties to the Treaty of their commitments to the fullest implementation of Article II and to refrain from nuclear sharing with nuclear-weapon States, non-nuclear weapon States, and States not party to the Treaty for military, and other nuclear explosive, purposes under any kind of [Delete -- Security] arrangements.
- 8. Reaffirmation of the condemnation of the nuclear test explosions in South Asia in 1998 as stated in Security Council resolution 1172 and General Assembly resolution 53/77 G, and the importance of full compliance with each of the measures identified in those resolutions. Urge those States and all other States that have not yet done so to become parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty without delay and without condition.
- 9. Reaffirmation of the [Delete -- integrity of the Article IX, paragraph 3 of the Treaty and the commitment] determination of all State parties not to accord any status or recognition to additional States that possess nuclear weapon capabilities.

- 9.1 Reiteration of the call on those States which possess the capabilities to produce nuclear weapons and which have not yet acceded to the NPT to reverse clearly and urgently the pursuit of all nuclear-weapon development or deployment, and to refrain from any action which could undermine regional and international peace and security and the efforts of the international community towards nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation.
- 10. Reiteration of the conviction that the cessation of all nuclear testing will contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process of nuclear disarmament leading to the ultimate objective of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and therefore to the further enhancement of international peace and security.

Nuclear disarmament

- 11. Reaffirmation of the commitment to fulfil with determination the obligations under Article VI. Reaffirmation, in this context, by the nuclear-weapon States, of their unequivocal commitment to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons and, to that end, agreement to pursue vigorously systematic and progressive efforts to further reduce nuclear weapons [Delete -- globally]. Declaration of commitment to the achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. Declaration that the achievement of nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament necessitates the cooperation of all States.
- 11.1 Recognition that there are a number of practical steps that the nuclear-weapon States can and should take immediately before the actual elimination of nuclear arsenals and the development of requisite verification regimes take place:
 - (a) [Previously paragraph 12] Recognition of the progress achieved in nuclear weapons reductions by the nuclear-weapon States, including those made unilaterally or bilaterally, under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) process, as steps towards nuclear disarmament. Call upon the United States and the Russian Federation to bring START II into force without delay and immediately thereafter to proceed with negotiations on START III with a view to its early conclusion [Move to 11.1 (c) -- Require that at the appropriate stage the United States and the Russian Federation should be joined by the other NWS.] [Move to 11.1 (b) -- Reaffirmation of the need to renew and revitalize this process, including accelerated efforts to ensure full implementation of the obligations under Article VI.] [Move to 11.1 (d) -- Invite increased transparency by NWS on the dismantlement of tactical nuclear weapons.]
 - (b) Reaffirmation of the need to renew and revitalize the START [Delete -- this] process, including accelerated efforts to ensure full implementation of the obligations under Article VI.

Reaffirmation of the call upon the nuclear-weapon States to demonstrate an unequivocal commitment to the speedy and total elimination of their respective nuclear weapons, and without delay to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to the elimination of these weapons.

- (c) Require that at the appropriate stage the United States and the Russian Federation should be joined by the other NWS in a seamless process leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
- (d) Reaffirm the need for the nuclear-weapon States to pursue vigorously the reduction of reliance on non-strategic nuclear weapons and negotiations on their elimination as an integral part of their overall nuclear disarmament activities. Invite increased transparency by NWS on the dismantlement of tactical nuclear weapons.
- (e) Proceed as an interim measure to the de-alerting of their nuclear weapons and, in turn, to the removal of nuclear warheads form delivery vehicles.
- (f) Examine further interim measures, including measures to enhance strategic stability and accordingly to review strategic doctrines.
- 11.2 Achievement of the following measures is important in the full realisation and effective implementation of Article VI, including the programme of action as reflected below:
 - (a) [Previously paragraph 13] Recognition of the importance for all States to make every effort to promote the earliest entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and urge all States, especially those whose ratification in accordance with article XIV of the Treaty ensures its entry into force, to sign and ratify the Treaty unconditionally and without delay. Welcome of the ratifications that have taken place so far, including those by two nuclear-weapon States. Call on all States, pending the entry into force, to act so as not to defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty. Also call upon all States to contribute to the work of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Bank Treaty, in particular to its efforts to establish the Treaty's verification regime.
 - (b) [Previously paragraph 14] Reaffirmation of the need for the immediate commencement and the early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein. Such a treaty would be an essential measure of nuclear disarmament as well as of

non-proliferation. Welcome the establishment in August 1998 of an Ad Hoc Committee in the Conference on Disarmament for this purpose under Item 1 of its Agenda "Cessation of Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament" and urge its immediate reestablishment.

- (c) Establishment of a subsidiary body to Main Committee I of Review Conferences, and the provision of specific time at all future meetings of Preparatory Committees, for a structured opportunity to deliberate on the practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons.
- (d) Establishment of an appropriate subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament at the Conference on Disarmament and, to that end, to pursue as a matter of priority its intensive consultations on appropriate methods and approaches with a view to reaching such a decision without delay.
- 11.3 Affirm that a nuclear-weapon-free world will ultimately require the underpinnings of a universal and multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument or a framework encompassing a mutually reinforcing set of instruments.
- 12-14 [Paragraphs 12 to 14 included under paragraphs 11.1 and 11.2 above]
- 15. Reaffirmation that the provisions of Article V of the Treaty with regard to peaceful nuclear explosions are to be viewed in the light of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

- 16. Welcome and support of the steps taken to conclude further nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties since 1995, and reaffirmation of the conviction that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones freely arrived at among the States concerned, enhances global and regional peace and security, as a measure towards the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament. Support of proposals for these zones in parts of the world where they do not exist, such as the Middle East and South Asia. Welcome of the initiative taken by States in Central Asia to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region. Welcome the declaration by Mongolia of its nuclear-weapon-free status.
- 16.1 Emphasise the importance of existing nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and of the signature and ratification of these treaties and of the relevant Protocols.
- 17. Recognition of the importance attached by signatories and States parties to the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Pelindaba and Bangkok to establishing a mechanism for cooperation among their respective Treaty agencies. [Delete -- Welcome and support the report

on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the Basis of Arrangements Freely Arrived At Among the States of the Region Concerned, adopted by consensus by the Disarmament Commission on 30 April 1999.]

Security assurances

- 18. Reaffirmation of the view that [Delete -- further] steps, [Delete -- which could take] taking the form of an international legally binding instrument, should be considered to assure non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Note [Delete -- Welcome] the establishment in March 1998 of an Ad Hoc Committee in the Conference on Disarmament on Negative Security Assurances.
- 18.1 Consideration by the 2000 Review Conference of a treaty on security assurances or a protocol to the NPT on security assurances with a view to its early adoption and signature.

Safeguards

- 19. Welcome and support the adoption, in May 1997, of the Model Protocol Additional to the existent safeguards agreements to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the Agency's safeguards system; reaffirmation that IAEA is the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring, in accordance with the statute of the Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, compliance with its Safeguards Agreements.
- 20. Reaffirmation that new supply arrangements for the transfer of sources or special fissionable material or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require as a necessary precondition, acceptance of IAEA full-scope safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear explosive device.
- 21. Support for the Agency's efforts to integrate safeguards measure arising from the Model Protocol Additional to existing Safeguards Agreements. Also urge all States that have Safeguards Agreements with IAEA to conclude as quickly as possible an Additional Protocol pursuant to INFCIRC/540.
- 22. Urge the nuclear-weapon States to include in Additional Protocols to their voluntary safeguards agreements those measures which they have identified as capable of contributing to the non-proliferation and efficiency aims of the Model Protocol.
- 23. Urge all States parties required by Article III of the treaty which have not yet done so to conclude with the International Atomic Energy Agency a comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. Additionally call on all

States not parties to the Treaty to accept IAEA comprehensive safeguards.

- 24. Urge all States to implement, to the extent possible, IAEA's recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material, currently set forth in INFCIRC/225/Rev.3 and also urge all States parties to examine ways and means to strengthen the current regime.
- 24.1 Placement of nuclear fissile material transferred from military use to peaceful nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards in the framework of the voluntary safeguards agreements in place with the nuclear-weapon States.

The Resolution on the Middle East

- 25. Recall that the adoption of the Resolution on the Middle East by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference constituted an integral part of the package of the 1995 outcome, and reaffirmation of the firm commitment to work towards the full implementation of that resolution. Recognition, in this regard, of the special responsibility of the depositary States as cosponsors of this resolution.
- 26. To take note that since the adoption of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East all States of the region have become parties to the Treaty with the exception of Israel. To stress the urgent need for Israel to accede to the Treaty without further delay and to place its nuclear facilities under full scope IAEA safeguards, in order to enhance the universality of the Treaty and to avert the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.

Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

- 27. Reaffirmation of the commitment to the full implementation of Article IV of the Treaty and the commitment to cooperation between States parties in the field of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I, II and III of the Treaty and the Decision on the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.
- 28. Reaffirmation of the importance attached to the work of IAEA regarding multilateral technical cooperation in the development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and call again for every effort to be made to ensure that IAEA has the necessary financial and human resources to meet its responsibilities in the area of technical cooperation, safeguard and nuclear safety.
- 29. Reaffirmation that attacks or threats of attack on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purpose jeopardize nuclear safety and raise serious concern regarding the application of international law on the use of force in such cases, which could warrant appropriate action in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

- 30. Reaffirmation of the importance of nuclear safety as an essential prerequisite for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In this context, States parties attach importance of ensuring a successful review process under the Nuclear Safety Convention and note the adoption of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management as another contribution in this area.
- 31. Express the determination to prevent and combat illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and state the readiness to cooperate with each other, and support multilateral efforts to this end.
- 2. The following is a list of the specific proposals put forward by delegations for consideration by the Preparatory Committee on the understanding that the proposals are without commitment by the Preparatory Committee and without prejudice to the position of any delegation and that the list is not exclusive.

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review

Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on	NPT/CONF.2000/PC.111/54 20 May 1999

the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NDM/CONTR 2000/DC TTT/CA

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Third session New York, 10-21 May 1999

Proposals by the United States of America

Proposals for the Chairman's working paper of 14 May 1999

Urgency and importance of achieving the universality of the Treaty. 4. Welcome the accessions of Andorra, Angola, Brazil, Chile, Comoros, Djibouti, Oman, United Arab Emirates, and Vanuatu to the Treaty since 1995, bringing the number of States parties to 187. Also call on all States not yet party to the Treaty - Cuba, India, Israel, and Pakistan - to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States at the earliest possible time, particularly those States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.

б. Add to end of sentence two: and United Nations Security Council Resolutions directly relevant to nuclear nonproliferation.

7. [Delete]

Express disappointment that not all States in the Middle East are 10.bis. parties to the CWC, BWC, or NPT, thus frustrating a goal of the Resolution on the Middle East, namely, the establishment of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems.

12. Recognition of the progress achieved in nuclear weapon reductions by the nuclear weapon states, including those made unilaterally, or bilaterally through the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) process. Require that an appropriate stage the U.S. and the Russian Federation should be joined by the other NWS. Reaffirmation of the need to revitalize this process. Affirmation of the need for vigorous efforts to ensure full implementation of the obligations of States Parties under Article VI. Invite increased transparency by NWS on implementation of Article VI.

16. Welcome and support of the steps taken to conclude further nuclear-weapon free zone treaties since 1995 and reaffirmation of the conviction that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones freely arrived at among the States concerned enhances global and regional peace and security as a step towards strengthening of the nuclear nonproliferation regime

and realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament. Support of proposals for such a zone in the Middle East. Welcome the initiative taken by States in Central Asia to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region. Welcome the conclusion of the agreement regarding the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and urge its rapid implementation. Urge that states in South Asia initiate steps to conclude a NWFZ in that region.

25. Recall that the adoption of the Resolution on the Middle East by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference constituted an important element of the 1995 outcome, and reaffirmation of the firm commitment to work towards the realization of the goals of that resolution. Recognition in this regard of the need for all States Parties to the Treaty, and in particular, the nuclear weapon states, to extend their cooperation and exert their utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment by regional parties of a Middle East zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.

26. To take note that since the adoption of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East all States in the region have become parties to the Treaty with the exception of one and that one other State in the Middle East remains in noncompliance with UNSC Resolutions concerning weapons of mass destruction having previously been found to be in noncompliance with two Articles of the NPT and that that State refuses to permit the IAEA to carry out inspections aimed at ensuring compliance with the nuclear component of relevant UNSC resolutions. To facilitate the realization of the goals of the Resolution on the Middle East, Stresses the urgent need for all States in the region to accede to the Treaty without delay and to place all their facilities under full scope IAEA safeguards and for all States in the region to comply immediately with UNSC resolutions pertaining to nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and permit inspections provided for therein. Stresses, additionally, the need for one State in Latin America and the Caribbean and two States in South Asia to accede to the NPT and the need for one State in Northeast Asia to comply fully with its NPT obligations. This will enhance the universality and effectiveness of the Treaty and strengthen the international nuclear nonproliferation regime.

Editorial

- 19. Change "existent" to "existing"
- 20. Change "specially" to "especially"

Proposed new paragraph 27 of the Chairman's Working Paper Rev.1

27. Encourage the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in regions for which consensus resolutions of the General Assembly exist, such as the Middle East and Central Asia, as well as the development of zones free from all weapons of mass destruction.

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review

Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on	NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/55 20 May 1999

the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Third session New York, 10-21 May 1999

Proposals submitted by Iran (Islamic Republic of)

Comments on the Chairman's working paper

1. Add the following after the first sentence of Para 5:

Particularly by the accession to the Treaty, at the earliest possible date, of states that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.

- 2. Second sentence of Para 6 should be deleted.
- 3. The following sentence should be added at the end of Para 9.

"Reaffirmation also, towards the attainment of this objective, of the commitment of all states party to prohibit completely the transfer of sharing of all nuclear related equipment, information, materials, facilities, resources or devices or the extension of scientific and technological assistance in the nuclear field to states non party to the treaty, without exception".

- 4. Para 12 should begin as following: "Welcoming the declaration of some NWSs regarding their nuclear weapons reductions, including
- 5. Para 16 should be replaced by Para 13 of last year Chairman's Working Paper.
- 6. Para 18 should read as follows:

"Reaffirming that further steps should be taken to conclude an international legally-binding instrument to assure

7. Para 19: Add at the end of the Para: Reaffirmation that nothing should undermine the IAEA in this regard and that the states which have concerns should direct such concerns, along with supporting evidence and information, to the Agency to consider, investigate, draw conclusions and decide on necessary actions in accordance with its mandate. Measures should be taken to ensure that the inalienable rights of all States Parties under the provisions of the preamble and articles of the Treaty are fully protected and that no state party is limited in the exercise of this right based on allegations of non-compliance not verified by the IAEA.

8. Reinsert the previously agreed Para as new Para. 27 bis as follows:

Reaffirmation of commitment to continue to take further steps for the full realization of the relevant provisions of the Treaty, taking into account the undertakings in the principles and objectives on the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

9. Add a new Para in the section on the Middle East Resolution as following:

The States Parties recommend that the 2000 Review Conference establish a subsidiary body to its Main Committee II to consider and recommend proposals on the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

10. Para. 29 bis should be added as following:

Any armed attack and threat of attack against nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes constitutes a violation of the principles of the UN Charter, international law and the Statute of the IAEA. It urges states parties therefore to make every effort, individually and within competent international fora, in particular IAEA, to take the necessary measures to prohibit such attacks against nuclear facilities under safeguard, inter alia, through adoption of an international legally-binding instrument to that effect.

11. New section on: Follow up mechanism:

The State Parties agree that to ensure the effective implementation of the Treaty, and of decisions and resolutions and documents adopted at the Review Conference, an open-ended standing committee, which would work inter-sessionally to follow up recommendations concerning the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, should be established by the Treaty's 2000 Review Conference. (Taken from paragraph 123 of the Durban Summit Document)

Proposed revision to paragraph 43 of the Chairman's working paper - Rev.1

43. Reaffirmation that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring, in accordance with its Statute and its safeguards system, compliance with Safeguards Agreements and that nothing should be done to undermine the authority of the IAEA in this regard. Stress that States parties that have concerns regarding non-compliance with the safeguards agreements of the Treaty by the States parties should direct such concerns, along with supporting evidence and information, to the Agency to consider, investigate, draw conclusions and decide on necessary actions in accordance with its mandate.

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review

Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on	NPT/CONF.2 20 May 199	000/PC.III/56 9
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons	ORIGINAL:	ENGLISH

Third session New York, 10-21 May 1999

NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONES

Proposed amendment by Croatia on behalf of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia

The Belarus initiative is once again being advanced in disregard of the wishes of the overwhelming majority of countries from the region, in contradiction to the universally agreed principle mentioned in the Guidelines. I should also like to recall that in accordance with the UNDC Guidelines on NWFZ's [paragraph 43] any proposal on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at should be considered in international fora <u>only</u> after consensus on the objective of such a zone has been achieved in broad consultations among countries from the region concerned. As this group of countries has stated on numerous previous occasions, this is far from being the case in our region.

Even though our delegations do not wish to prejudge the future relevance of similar initiatives, in view of the lack of consensus on this issue we are not in a position to accept any reference to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone or space in Central and Eastern Europe.

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review

the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Third session New York, 10-21 May 1999

> Proposed amendments to paragraph 27 of the Chairman's working paper - Rev.1

Submitted by Kyrgyzstan

Split paragraph 27 into two separate paragraphs. Paragraph 27 should end after the words "South Asia".

Paragraph 27 bis should read: "Welcome the initiative taken by states in Central Asia to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region".

ANNEX IV

CHAIRMAN'S REVISED WORKING PAPER OF 20 MAY 1999

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review

Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/58 20 May 1999

the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Third session New York, 10-21 May 1999

CHAIRMAN'S WORKING PAPER - Rev.1

- 1. Reaffirmation of commitment to the preamble and the articles of the Treaty and to the outcome of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT.
- 2. Reaffirmation of conviction that the preservation of the integrity of the Treaty is essential to international peace and security.
- 3. Recognition of the crucial role of the Treaty in nuclear non proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
- 4. Reaffirmation that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.
- 5. Recalling that the overwhelming majority of States entered into legally binding commitments not to receive, manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and that these undertakings have been made on the context of the corresponding legally binding commitments by the nuclear weapon States of nuclear disarmament.
- 6. Reiterating the ultimate goals of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.
- 7. Reaffirmation of commitment to efforts designed to promote the full realization and effective implementation of the provisions of the Treaty, as well as reaffirmation of the decisions on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament" and on "Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty" as well as the "Resolution on the Middle East" adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
- 8. Affirmation that all the articles of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons are binding on all States parties and at all times and in all circumstances.

Universality

- 9. Urgency and importance of achieving the universality of the Treaty; welcome the accessions of Andorra, Angola, Brazil, Chile, Comoros, Djibouti, Oman, United Arab Emirates and Vanuatu to the Treaty since 1995, bringing the number of States parties to 187.
- 10. Urge all States not yet party to the Treaty, Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States, at the earliest possible date, without condition or further delay, particularly those States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.
- 11. Undertake to make determined efforts towards the achievement of the goal of universality of the Treaty. These efforts should include the enhancement of regional security, particularly in areas of tension such as the Middle East and South Asia.

Non-proliferation

- 12. Reaffirmation that every effort should be made to implement the Treaty in all its aspects to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States parties to the Treaty.
- 13. Reaffirmation by nuclear weapon States Parties to the Treaty not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices, directly or indirectly.
- 14. Reaffirmation by non-nuclear weapon States Parties to the Treaty not to receive from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices, directly or indirectly.
- 15. Expression of the concern of the States Parties with the cases of non-compliance of the Treaty by two States Parties which demand the close attention and effective response of the States Parties of the NPT.
- 16. Condemnation of the nuclear test explosions in South Asia in 1998. Note that the States concerned have declared moratoriums on further testing and their willingness to enter into legal commitments not to conduct any further nuclear tests by signing and ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
- 17. Reaffirmation that in accordance with Article IX, States not currently States parties may accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States.
- 18. Reiteration of the call on those States which possess the capabilities to produce nuclear weapons and which have not yet acceded to the NPT to reverse clearly and urgently the pursuit of all nuclear-weapon development or deployment, and to refrain from any action which could undermine regional and international peace and security and the efforts of the

international community towards nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation.

19. Reaffirmation that the cessation of all nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion will contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process of nuclear disarmament leading to the ultimate objective of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and therefore to the further enhancement of international peace and security.

Nuclear disarmament

- 20. Reaffirmation of the commitment to fulfil with determination the obligations under article VI. Reaffirmation, in this context, by all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, of their unequivocal commitment to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, and to that end, agreement to pursue vigorously systematic and progressive efforts to further reduce nuclear weapons. Declaration of commitment to the achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. Declaration that the achievement of nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament, necessitates the cooperation of all States.
- 21. Recognition of the progress achieved in nuclear weapons reductions by the nuclear-weapon States, including those made unilaterally or bilaterally under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) process, as steps towards nuclear disarmament. Recognition also of the unilateral reduction measures taken by the other nuclear weapon States.
- 22. Recognition that there are a number of practical steps that the nuclearweapon States can and should take immediately before the actual elimination of nuclear arsenals and the development of requisite verification regimes take place:
 - a) Call upon the United States and the Russian Federation to revitalize the START process by bringing START II into force without delay, and immediately thereafter to proceed with negotiations on START III with a view to its early conclusion.
 - b) Require that in the near future the United States and the Russian Federation should be joined by the other NWS, in a seamless process leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
 - c) Reaffirm the need for the nuclear-weapon States to reduce further their reliance on non-strategic nuclear weapons and to pursue negotiations on their elimination as an integral part of their overall nuclear disarmament activities.
 - d) Invite increased transparency by NWS on the dismantlement of nuclear weapons and ensure the effective management of the resultant fissile materials.

- e) Proceed with interim measures to prevent accidental or unauthorised launches, such as de-alerting, de-targeting and de-activating their nuclear weapons, and removing nuclear warheads from delivery vehicles.
- f) Examine further interim measures, including measures to enhance strategic stability and accordingly to review strategic doctrines.
- 23. Achievement of the following measures is important in the full realisation and effective implementation of Article VI, including the programme of action as reflected below:
 - a) Recognition of the importance for all States to make every effort to promote the earliest entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and urge all States, especially those whose ratification in accordance with article XIV of the Treaty ensures its entry into force, to sign and ratify the Treaty unconditionally and without delay. Welcome of the ratifications that have taken place so far, including those by two nuclear-weapon States (France and the United Kingdom). Call on all States, pending the entry into force, to act so as not to defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty. Also call upon all States to contribute to the work of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, in particular to its efforts to implement the Treaty's verification regime, including to provide the Preparatory Commission with the necessary financial means.
 - b) Reaffirmation of the need for the immediate commencement and the early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the report of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein. Such a treaty would be an essential measure of nuclear disarmament as well as of non-proliferation. Welcome the establishment in August 1998 of an Ad Hoc Committee in the Conference on Disarmament for this purpose under Item 1 of its Agenda "Cessation of Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament", and urge its immediate reestablishment.
 - c) Welcome the announcements made by some NWS that they have ceased the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and call upon all NWS to declare collectively a moratorium on the production of such material for such devices.
 - d) Establishment of a subsidiary body to Main Committee I of Review Conferences, and the provision of specific time at all future meetings of Preparatory Committees, for a structured opportunity to deliberate on the practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons.

- e) Urge the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad-hoc Committee under Item I of its Agenda with a negotiating mandate to address nuclear disarmament.
- 24. Welcome the important contribution made by Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, in the implementation of Article VI of the Treaty through their significant measures in nuclear disarmament, in particular the voluntary decision to withdraw all tactical and strategic nuclear weapons from their territories, and taking note with satisfaction of the current efforts of those States to strengthen the Treaty through enhancing regional and global security.
- 25. Affirm that a nuclear-weapon-free world will ultimately require the underpinnings of a universal and multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument or a framework encompassing a mutually reinforcing set of instruments.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

- 26. Welcome and support of the steps taken to conclude further nuclear-weaponfree-zone treaties since 1995, and reaffirmation of the conviction that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones freely arrived at among the States concerned, enhances global and regional peace and security, strengthens the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and contributes towards realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament.
- 27. Support of proposals for the establishment of NWFZ where they do not yet exist, such as in the Middle East and South Asia and welcome of the initiative taken by states in Central Asia to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region.
- 28. Welcome the declaration by Mongolia of its nuclear-weapon-free status, as a unilateral measure to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons on its territory, bearing in mind its unique conditions, as a concrete contribution to promoting the aims of nuclear non-proliferation.
- 29. Welcome the conclusion of the agreement regarding the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula and urge its rapid implementation.
- 30. Recognition of the continuing contribution that the Antarctic Treaty and the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba are making towards freeing the Southern Hemisphere and adjacent areas covered by those treaties from nuclear weapons.
- 31. Reaffirmation of the importance of ratification of the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba by all regional States, as well as of the continued work by all concerned States to facilitate adherence to the protocols to nuclear-weapon-free zones treaties by all relevant States that have not yet done so.
- 32. Welcome the consensus reached in the United Nations General Assembly since its thirty-fifth session that the establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East would greatly enhance international peace and

security. Urge all States directly concerned to take the practical and urgent steps required for the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East as a first step towards the establishment in the same region of a zone free from all weapons of mass destruction.

33. Welcome the report on the "Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free-zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned", adopted by consensus by the Disarmament Commission on 30 of April 1999.

The 1995 Resolution on the Middle East

- 34. Recall that the adoption of the Resolution on the Middle East by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference constituted an integral part of the package of the 1995 outcome, and reaffirmation of the firm commitment to work towards the full implementation of that resolution. Recognition, in this regard, of the special responsibility of the depositary States as cosponsors of this resolution.
- 35. Reaffirmation of the provisions of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, and reaffirmation of the determination to work diligently towards its speedy implementation.
- 36. Recognition that since the adoption of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, Djibouti, Oman and the UAE have become parties to the Treaty. Expression of deep concern that Israel continues to be the only state in the region which has not yet acceded to the Treaty and refuses to place all its nuclear facilities under the full-scope safeguards of the IAEA.
- 37. Call upon Israel to accede to the Treaty and to place all its nuclear facilities under the full-scope IAEA safeguards without further delay and without conditions.
- 38. Recognition of the need for all States Parties to the Treaty, and in particular, the nuclear-weapon States, to extend their cooperation and exert their utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment by regional parties of a Middle East zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.
- 39. Affirmation of the importance of full compliance of all States parties to the NPT in the region with their obligations under the Treaty. Note that one State in the Middle East remains in noncompliance with the Treaty and with United Nations Security Council Resolutions concerning weapons of mass destruction, and that this State continues not to allow IAEA inspections.

Security assurances

40. Reaffirmation that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only genuine guarantee for all non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Pending the achievement of such a goal, a legally-binding negative security assurances regime which will ensure the

security on non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons must be urgently concluded.

- 41. Welcome the establishment in March 1998 in the Conference on Disarmament of an Ad Hoc Committee on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon states against the use, or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and urge its immediate reestablishment.
- 42. Reiterate the need for the commitment, without any condition, by all the nuclear weapon States not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, nor use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States, and conclude international legal instruments to this effect.

Safeguards

- 43. Reaffirmation that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring, in accordance with its Statute and its safeguards system, compliance with Safeguards Agreements.
- 44. Urge all States parties which have not yet done so to conclude with the IAEA a full-scope Safeguards Agreement, as required by article III of the Treaty. Urge those States Parties to the IAEA full-scope Safeguards Agreements, which are not in compliance, to implement all obligations under the Agreements fully and unconditionally.
- 45. Call on all States not parties to the Treaty to accept comprehensive IAEA safeguards.
- 46. Welcome and support the adoption, in May 1997, of the Model Additional Protocol to existent Safeguards Agreements (laid down in document INFCIRC/540), designed to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the Agency's safeguards system as a contribution to global non-proliferation objectives. Welcome the signature of such agreements by 36 non-nuclear weapon States.
- 47. Urge all States that have not yet done so to conclude as quickly as possible an Additional Protocol pursuant to INFCIRC/540. Urge the nuclearweapon States, which have not yet done so, to include in their Additional Protocols those measures which they have identified as capable of contributing to the non-proliferation and efficiency aims of the Model Additional Protocol.
- 48. Placement of nuclear material transferred from military use to peaceful nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards in the framework of the voluntary safeguards agreements in place with the nuclear-weapon States.
- 49. Reaffirmation that new supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon states should require as a necessary

precondition adherence to the Treaty and acceptance of full-scope IAEA safeguards.

- 50. Support for the Agency's efforts to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the IAEA safeguards system and to integrate safeguards measures arising from the Model Additional Protocol with the traditional safeguards measures.
- 51. Urge all States to implement, to the extent possible, the IAEA recommendations on physical protection of nuclear material, currently set forth in INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 and also urge all States parties to examine ways and means to strengthen the current regime.
- 52. Underline the importance of the conclusions of the Moscow Summit on Nuclear Safety and Security of 19 and 20 of April 1996, and the initiatives stemming from it.

Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

- 53. Reaffirmation of the commitment to the full implementation of article IV of the Treaty and the commitment to cooperation in the field of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I, II and III of the Treaty and the Decision on the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.
- 54. Reaffirmation of the importance attached to the work of IAEA regarding multilateral technical cooperation in the development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and with due consideration of the needs of the developing areas of the world, call again for every effort to be made to ensure that IAEA has the necessary financial and human resources to meet its responsibilities in the area of technical cooperation, safeguards and nuclear safety.
- 55. Reaffirmation of the importance of nuclear safety as an essential prerequisite for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In this context, States parties attach importance to ensuring a successful review process under the Nuclear Safety Convention and note the adoption of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management as another contribution in this area. Urge all States that have not yet done so to accede to these Conventions at the earliest possible date, particularly those States that operate nuclear facilities. Welcome the agreement reached in December 1997 among a group of nine countries on guidelines for the management of plutonium in all peaceful nuclear activities.
- 56. Affirmation that it is in the interest of all States that the maritime transportation of irradiated nuclear fuel plutonium and high-level waste be conducted in compliance with international standards of safety, security and environmental protection. Call on those directly engaged in the maritime transportation of such radioactive materials to continue to provide information, consistent with safety and security requirements,

about the timing, route and liability arrangements to States in the vicinity of such shipments.

- 57. Consideration of the potential contributions from new, inherently-safe nuclear-power technologies in enhancing the safety of nuclear power. In this connection, to propose the elaboration, under the auspices of IAEA, of such a project to ensure that energy is obtained safely with minimal risk from the point of view of non-proliferation.
- 58. Recognition of the obligation of NPT states parties to ensure that their exports of nuclear items do not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and recognition that co-ordination of national policies to this end can contribute to the non-proliferation objectives of the NPT and facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technical information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, in accordance with Article IV.
- 59. Reaffirm the importance of non-discriminatory and universally binding nuclear control regimes. Welcome for the two International Seminars on the Role of Export Controls in Nuclear Non-Proliferation held in 1997 and 1999, as well as other ongoing efforts by nuclear suppliers to respond to the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference's call for the promotion of transparency in nuclear-export controls.
- 60. Reaffirmation that attacks or threats of attack on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes jeopardize nuclear safety and raise serious concerns regarding the respect of international law on the use of force in such cases, which could warrant appropriate action in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, particularly those under Chapter VII.
- 61. Express the determination to prevent and combat illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and state the readiness to cooperate with each other, and support multilateral efforts to this end, inter alia review of the Convention on the physical protection of nuclear materials at the earliest possible time with the aim of strengthening and broadening its scope.

ANNEX V

LIST OF DOCUMENTS

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NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/1 and Rev.1 Aqenda NPT/CONF.2000/PC.1/2 Statement by the delegations of France, China, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament at the Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/3 Cluster one: article VI, submitted by New Zealand NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/4 Cluster one, submitted by Canada NPT/CONF.2000/PC.1/5 Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, submitted by Egypt on behalf of the States members of the League of Arab States that are parties to the Treaty Letter received on 10 April 1997 from the NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/6 Russian Federation and the United States of America addressed to the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, transmitting the joint statements from the March 1997 Summit Meeting between the Presidents of the United States of America and the Russian Federation, held in Helsinki NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/7 Cluster two, submitted by Canada NPT/CONF.2000/PC.1/8 Cluster two: article VII, submitted by New Zealand NPT/CONF.2000/PC.1/9 Some possible elements to be taken into account in the review process, submitted by

Japan

- NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/10 Letter dated 10 April 1997 from the Chairman of the Working Group on Disarmament of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries addressed to the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee
- NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/11 General considerations to be taken into account by parties to the review process, submitted by the Marshall Islands
- NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/12 Cluster two: nuclear-weapon-free zones, submitted by Mongolia
- NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/13 Cluster one: transparency measures, submitted by Norway
- NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/14 Cluster two: article VII, submitted by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan
- NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/15 Proposals for inclusion in the report on the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, submitted by China
- NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/16 and Corr.1 Draft protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to assure non-nuclear-weapon States parties against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, submitted by Myanmar, Nigeria and the Sudan

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/17 Cluster one: nuclear disarmament, submitted by Ireland

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/18 Cluster three, submitted by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/19 Cluster two: nuclear-weapon-free zones, submitted by Belarus

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/20 Cluster one: nuclear disarmament, submitted by Sweden

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	Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, submitted by the Russian Federation
NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/22	Proposals for inclusion in the report on the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, submitted by South Africa
NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/23	Draft recommendations for the report on the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, submitted by the European Union
NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/24	Non-proliferation and International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards: statement by France
NPT/CONF.2000/PC.1/25	Cluster three, submitted by Canada
NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/26	Nuclear disarmament: statement by France
NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/27	Implementation of article IV: statement by France
NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/28	Cluster three: conversion of nuclear materials to peaceful uses, submitted by Norway
NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/29	Views on a "rolling document" for the strengthened Treaty review process, submitted by Canada
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Proposed language for inclusion in the report of the Preparatory Committee on its second session, submitted by Canada

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Possible products of the Non-Proliferation Treaty's strengthened review process: (a) the Preparatory Committee; (b) the 2000 Review Conference, working paper submitted by South Africa

Letter dated 4 May 1998 from the head of the delegation of Uzbekistan addressed to the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee, transmitting a working paper by the delegations of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan

Letter dated 4 May 1998 from the alternate leader of the delegation of Myanmar addressed to the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee, transmitting a statement by the ASEAN countries on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty

Cluster three: Peaceful uses of nuclear energy, working paper submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran

Cluster three: Peaceful uses of nuclear energy, working paper submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran

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NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/24 and Corr.1 Letter dated 4 May 1998 from the deputy head of the delegation of Poland addressed to the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee, transmitting a statement by the delegations of Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

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NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/28 Language to be included in the Chairman's working paper, submitted by Sweden

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NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/32 Letters dated 7 May 1998 from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Permanent Mission of Qatar, in Geneva, addressed to the Secretariat of the Preparatory Committee, transmitting the

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NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/25 Third session of the NPT Preparatory Committee, working paper submitted by Angola, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Ghana, Guatemala, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Mali, Malaysia, Malawi, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Samoa, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Togo, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia and Zimbabwe NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/26 Working paper submitted by Malaysia NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/27 Proposals for inclusion in the Chairman's working paper, submitted by the Republic of Korea NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/28 Note by the Secretariat Chairman's working paper of 14 May 1999 NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/29 NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/30 Comments on the Chairman's working paper of 14 May 1999, submitted by Australia NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/31 Debate on Chairman's working paper, proposals submitted by Austria NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/32 Proposed amendment to the Chairman's working paper of 14 May 1999, submitted by Belarus NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/33 Proposal by Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/34 Proposed amendments to the Chairman's working paper of 14 May 1999, submitted by Belgium NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/35 Nuclear-weapon-free zones, proposed by Brazil NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/36 Proposals by Canada NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/37 Proposed elements to be included in

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NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/39 Amendments on draft Chairman's working paper, submitted by Egypt

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/40 Comments on the Chairman's working paper of 14 May 1999, submitted by France

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NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/42 Proposal by Ireland

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Proposal for the Chairman's working paper, submitted by Mongolia

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Proposed amendments to the Chairman's working paper of 14 May 1999, submitted by the Netherlands

Proposals for the Chairman's working paper of 14 May 1999, submitted by New Zealand

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ANNEX VI

DRAFT RULES OF PROCEDURE

DRAFT RULES OF PROCEDURE

I. REPRESENTATION AND CREDENTIALS

Delegations of Parties to the Treaty

Rule 1

1. Each State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (hereinafter "the Treaty") may be represented at the Conference of the Parties to the Treaty (hereinafter the "Conference") by a head of delegation and such other representatives, alternate representatives and advisers as may be required.

2. The head of delegation may designate an alternate representative or an adviser to act as a representative.

Credentials

Rule 2

The credentials of representatives and the names of alternate representatives and advisers shall be submitted to the Secretary-General of the Conference, if possible not less than one week before the date fixed for the opening of the Conference. Credentials shall be issued either by the head of the State or Government or by the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Credentials Committee

Rule 3

The Conference shall establish a Credentials Committee composed of the Chairman and two Vice-Chairmen elected in accordance with rule 5, and six members appointed by the Conference on the proposal of the President. The Committee shall examine the credentials of representatives and report to the Conference without delay.

Provisional participation

Rule 4

Pending a decision of the Conference upon their credentials, representatives shall be entitled to participate provisionally in the Conference.

II. OFFICERS

Election

<u>Rule 5</u>

The Conference shall elect the following officers: a President and thirtyfour Vice-Presidents, as well as a Chairman and two Vice-Chairmen for each of the three Main Committees, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee. The officers shall be elected so as to ensure a representative distribution of posts.

Acting President

Rule 6

1. If the President is absent from a meeting or any part thereof, he shall designate a Vice-President to take his place.

2. A Vice-President acting as President shall have the same powers and duties as the President.

Voting rights of the President

<u>Rule 7</u>

The President, or a Vice-President acting as President, shall not vote, but shall appoint another member of his delegation to vote in his place.

III. GENERAL COMMITTEE

Composition

Rule 8

1. The General Committee shall be composed of the President of the Conference, who shall preside, the thirty-four Vice-Presidents, the Chairmen of the three Main Committees, the Chairman of the Drafting Committee and the Chairman of the Credentials Committee. No two members of the General Committee shall be members of the same delegation and it shall be so constituted as to ensure its representative character.

2. If the President is unable to attend a meeting of the General Committee, he may designate a Vice-President to preside at such meeting and a member of his delegation to take his place. If a Vice-President is unable to attend, he may designate a member of his delegation to take his place. If the Chairman of a Main Committee, the Drafting Committee or the Credentials Committee is unable to attend, he may designate one of the Vice-Chairmen to take his place, with the

right to vote unless he is of the same delegation as another member of the General Committee.

Functions

<u>Rule 9</u>

The General Committee shall assist the President in the general conduct of the business of the Conference and, subject to the decisions of the Conference, shall ensure the coordination of its work.

IV. CONFERENCE SECRETARIAT

Duties of the Secretary-General of the Conference

<u>Rule 10</u>

1. There shall be a Secretary-General of the Conference. He shall act in that capacity in all meetings of the Conference, its committees and subsidiary bodies, and may designate a member of the Secretariat to act in his place at these meetings.

2. The Secretary-General of the Conference shall direct the staff required by the Conference.

Duties of the Secretariat

<u>Rule 11</u>

The Secretariat of the Conference shall, in accordance with these rules:

- (a) Interpret speeches made at meetings;
- (b) Receive, translate and circulate the documents of the Conference;
- (c) Publish and circulate any report of the Conference;

(d) Make and arrange for the keeping of sound recordings and summary records of meetings;

(e) Arrange for the custody of documents of the Conference in the archives of the United Nations and provide authentic copies of these documents to each of the depository Governments; and

(f) Generally perform all other work that the Conference may require.

<u>Costs</u>

Rule 12¹

The costs of the Conference, including the sessions of the Preparatory Committee, will be met by the States Parties to the Treaty participating in the Conference in accordance with the schedule for the division of costs as shown in the appendix to these Rules.

V. CONDUCT OF BUSINESS

Quorum

<u>Rule 13</u>

1. A majority of the States Parties to the Treaty participating in the Conference shall constitute a quorum.

2. To determine whether the Conference is quorate, any State Party may call for a roll call at any time.

General powers of the President

Rule 14

1. In addition to exercising the powers conferred upon him elsewhere by these Rules, the President shall preside at the plenary meetings of the Conference; he shall declare the opining and closing of each meeting, direct the discussion, ensure observance of these Rules, accord the right to speak, ascertain consensus, put questions to the vote and announce decisions. He shall rule on points of order. The President, subject to these Rules, shall have complete control of the proceedings and over the maintenance of order thereat. The President may propose to the Conference the closure of the list of speakers, a limitation on the time to be allowed to speakers and on the number of times the representative of each State may speak on the question, the adjournment or the closure of the debate and the suspension or the adjournment of a meeting.

2. The President, in the exercise of his functions, remains under the authority of the Conference.

¹ It is understood that the financial arrangements provided by rule 12 do not constitute a precedent.

Points of order

<u>Rule 15</u>

A representative may at any time raise a point of order, which shall be immediately decided by the President in accordance with these Rules. A representative may appeal against the ruling of the President. The appeal shall be immediately put to the vote, and the President's ruling shall stand unless overruled by a majority of the representatives present and voting. A representative may not, in raising a point of order, speak on the substance of the matter under discussion.

Speeches

<u>Rule 16</u>

1. No one may address the Conference without having previously obtained the permission of the President. Subject to rules 15, 17 and 19 to 22, the President shall call upon speakers in the order in which they signify their desire to speak.

2. Debate shall be confined to the subject under discussion and the President may call a speaker to order if his remarks are not relevant thereto.

3. The Conference may limit the time allowed to speakers and the number of times the representative of each State may speak on a question; permission to speak on a motion to set such limits shall be accorded only to two representatives in favour of and to two opposing such limits, after which the motion shall be immediately put to the vote. In any event, the President shall limit interventions on procedural questions to a maximum of five minutes. When the debate is limited and a speaker exceeds the allotted time, the President shall call him to order without delay.

Precedence

Rule 17

The Chairman of a committee may be accorded precedence for the purpose of explaining the conclusion arrived at by his committee.

Closing of list of speakers

Rule 18

During the course of a debate the President may announce the list of speakers and, with the consent of the Conference, declare the list closed. When the debate on an item is concluded because there are no more speakers, the President shall declare the debate closed. Such closure shall have the same effect as closure pursuant to rule 22.

Right of reply

<u>Rule 19</u>

Notwithstanding rule 18, the President may accord the right of reply to a representative of any State participating in the Conference. Such statements shall be as brief as possible and shall, as a general rule, be delivered at the end of the last meeting of the day.

Suspension or adjournment of the meeting

Rule 20

A representative may at any time move the suspension or the adjournment of the meeting. No discussion on such motions shall be permitted and they shall, subject to rule 23, be immediately put to the vote.

Adjournment of debate

<u>Rule 21</u>

A representative may at any time move the adjournment of the debate on the question under discussion. Permission to speak on the motion shall be accorded only to two representatives in favour of and to two opposing the adjournment, after which the motion shall, subject to rule 23, be immediately put to the vote.

Closure of debate

Rule 22

A representative may at any time move the closure of the debate on the question under discussion, whether or not any other representative has signified his wish to speak. Permission to speak on the motion shall be accorded only to two representatives opposing the closure, after which the motion shall, subject to rule 23, be immediately put to the vote.

Order of motions

Rule 23

The motions indicated below shall have precedence in the following order over all proposals or other motions before the meeting:

- (a) To suspend the meeting;
- (b) To adjourn the meeting;

- (c) To adjourn the debate on the question under discussion;
- (d) To close the debate on the question under discussion.

Submission of proposals and substantive amendments

<u>Rule 24</u>

Proposals and substantive amendments shall normally be submitted in writing to the Secretary-General of the Conference, who shall circulate copies to all delegations. Unless the Conference decides otherwise, proposals and substantive amendments shall be discussed or decided on no earlier than twenty-four hours after copies have been circulated in all languages of the Conference to all delegations.

Withdrawal of proposals and motions

<u>Rule 25</u>

A proposal or a motion may be withdrawn by its sponsor at any time before a decision on it has been taken, provided that it has not been amended. A proposal or a motion thus withdrawn may be reintroduced by any representative.

Decision on competence

Rule 26

Any motion calling for a decision on the competence of the Conference to adopt a proposal submitted to it shall be decided upon before a decision is taken on the proposal in question.

Reconsideration of proposals

<u>Rule 27</u>

Proposals adopted by consensus may not be reconsidered unless the Conference reaches a consensus on such reconsideration. A proposal that has been adopted or rejected by a majority or two-thirds vote may be reconsidered if the Conference, by a two-thirds majority, so decides. Permission to speak on a motion to reconsider shall be accorded only to two speakers opposing the motion, after which it shall be immediately put to the vote.

VI. VOTING AND ELECTIONS

Adoption of decisions

<u>Rule 28</u>

1. The task of the Conference being to review, pursuant to paragraph 3 of article VIII of the Treaty, the operation of the Treaty with a view to ensuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized, and thus to strengthen its effectiveness, every effort should be made to reach agreement on substantive matters by means of consensus. There should be no voting on such matters until all efforts to achieve consensus have been exhausted.

2. Decisions on matters of procedure and in elections shall be taken by a majority of representatives present and voting.

3. If, notwithstanding the best efforts of delegates to achieve a consensus, a matter of substance comes up for voting, the President shall defer the vote for forty-eight hours and during this period of deferment shall make every effort, with the assistance of the General Committee, to facilitate the achievement of general agreement, and shall report to the Conference prior to the end of the period.

4. If by the end of the period of deferment the Conference has not reached agreement, voting shall take place and decisions shall be taken by a two-thirds majority of the representatives present and voting, provided that such majority shall include at least a majority of the States participating in the Conference.

5. If the question arises whether a matter is one of procedure or of substance, the President of the Conference shall rule on the question. An appeal against this ruling shall immediately be put to the vote and the President's ruling shall stand unless the appeal is approved by a majority of the representatives present and voting.

6. In cases where a vote is taken, the relevant rules of procedure relating to voting of the General Assembly of the United Nations shall apply, except as otherwise specifically provided herein.

Voting rights

<u>Rule 29</u>

Every State party to the Treaty shall have one vote.

Meaning of the phrase "representatives present and voting"

<u>Rule 30</u>

For the purposes of these Rules, the phrase "representatives present and voting" means representatives casting an affirmative or negative vote. Representatives who abstain from voting are considered as not voting.

Elections

<u>Rule 31</u>

All elections shall be held by secret ballot, unless the Conference decides otherwise in an election where the number of candidates does not exceed the number of elective places to be filled.

Rule 32

1. If, when only one elective place is to be filled, no candidate obtains in the first ballot the majority required, a second ballot shall be taken, confined to the two candidates having obtained the largest number of votes. If in the second ballot the votes are equally divided, the President shall decide between the candidates by drawing lots.

2. In the case of a tie in the first ballot among the candidates obtaining the second largest number of votes, a special ballot shall be held among such candidates for the purpose of reducing their number to two; similarly, in the case of a tie among three or more candidates obtaining the largest number of votes, a special ballot shall be held; if a tie again results in this special ballot, the President shall eliminate one candidate by drawing lots and thereafter another ballot shall be held in accordance with paragraph 1.

<u>Rule 33</u>

1. When two or more elective places are to be filled at one time under the same conditions, those candidates, in a number not exceeding the number of such places, obtaining in the first ballot the majority required and the largest number of votes shall be elected.

2. If the number of candidates obtaining such majority is less than the number of places to be filled, additional ballots shall be held to fill the remaining places, provided that if only one place remains to be filled the procedures in rule 32 shall be applied. The ballot shall be restricted to the unsuccessful candidates having obtained the largest number of votes in the previous ballot, but not exceeding twice the numbers of places remaining to be filled. However, in the case of a tie between a greater number of unsuccessful candidates, a special ballot shall be held for the purpose of reducing the number of candidates to the required number; if a tie again results among more than the required number of candidates, the President shall reduce their number to that required by drawing lots.

3. If such a restricted ballot (not counting a special ballot held under the conditions specified in the last sentence of paragraph 2) is inconclusive, the President shall decide among the candidates by drawing lots.

VII. COMMITTEES

Main Committees and subsidiary bodies

Rule 34

The Conference shall establish three Main Committees for the performance of its functions. Each such Committee may establish subsidiary bodies so as to provide for a focused consideration of specific issues relevant to the Treaty. As a general rule each State Party to the Treaty participating in the Conference may be represented in the subsidiary bodies unless otherwise decided by consensus.

Representation on the Main Committees

<u>Rule 35</u>

Each State Party to the Treaty participating in the Conference may be represented by one representative on each Main Committee. It may assign to these Committees such alternate representatives and advisers as may be required.

Drafting Committee

<u>Rule 36</u>

1. The Conference shall establish a Drafting Committee composed of representatives of the same States that are represented on the General Committee. It shall coordinate the drafting of and edit all texts referred to it by the Conference or by a Main Committee, without altering the substance of the texts, and report to the Conference or to the Main Committee as appropriate. It shall also, without reopening the substantive discussion on any matter, formulate drafts and give advice on drafting as requested by the Conference or a Main Committee.

2. Representatives of other delegations may also attend the meetings of the Drafting Committee and may participate in its deliberations when matters of particular concern to them are under discussion.

Officers and procedures

Rule 37

The rules relating to officers, the Conference secretariat, conduct of business and voting of the Conference (contained in chaps. II (rules 5-7), IV (rules 10-11), V (rules 13-27) and VI (rules 28-33) above) shall be applicable, <u>mutatis mutandis</u>, to the proceedings of committees and subsidiary bodies, except that:

(a) Unless otherwise decided, any subsidiary body shall elect a chairman and such other officers as it may require;

(b) The Chairmen of the General, the Drafting and the Credentials Committees and the Chairmen of subsidiary bodies may vote in their capacity as representatives of their States;

(c) A majority of the representatives on the General, Drafting and Credentials Committees or on any subsidiary body shall constitute a quorum; the Chairman of a Main Committee may declare a meeting open and permit the debate to proceed when at least one quarter of the representatives of the States participating in the Conference are present.

VIII. LANGUAGES AND RECORDS

Languages of the Conference

Rule 38

Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish shall be the official languages of the Conference.

Interpretation

<u>Rule 39</u>

1. Speeches made in a language of the Conference shall be interpreted into the other languages.

2. A representative may make a speech in a language other than a language of the Conference if he provides for interpretation into one such language. Interpretation into the other languages of the Conference by interpreters of the Secretariat may be based on the interpretation given in the first such language.

Language of official documents

Rule 40

Official documents shall be made available in the languages of the Conference.

Sound recordings of meetings

Rule 41

Sound recordings of meetings of the Conference and of all committees shall be made and kept in accordance with the practice of the United Nations. Unless otherwise decided by the Main Committee concerned, no such recordings shall be made of the meetings of a subsidiary body thereof.

Summary records

Rule 42

1. Summary records of the plenary meetings of the Conference and of the meetings of the Main Committees shall be prepared by the Secretariat in the languages of the Conference. They shall be distributed in provisional form as soon as possible to all participants in the Conference. Participants in the debate may, within three working days of receipt of provisional summary records, submit to the Secretariat corrections on summaries of their own interventions, in special circumstances, the presiding officer may, in consultation with the Secretary-General of the Conference, extend the time for submitting corrections. Any disagreement concerning such corrections shall be decided by the presiding officer of the body to which the record relates, after consulting, where necessary, the sound recordings of the proceedings. Separate corrigenda to provisional records shall not normally be issued.

2. The summary records, with any corrections incorporated, shall be distributed promptly to participants in the Conference.

IX. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MEETINGS

<u>Rule 43</u>

1. The plenary meetings of the Conference and the meetings of the Main Committees shall be held in public unless the body concerned decides otherwise.

2. Meetings of other organs of the Conference shall be held in private.

X. PARTICIPATION AND ATTENDANCE

Rule 44

1. <u>Observers</u>

(a) Any other State which, in accordance with article IX of the Treaty, has the right to become a Party thereto but which has neither acceded it to nor ratified it may apply to the Secretary-General of the Conference for observer status, which will be accorded on the decision of the Conference.² Such a State shall be entitled to appoint officials to attend meetings of the plenary and of the Main Committees other than those designated closed meetings and to receive documents of the Conference. An observer State shall also be entitled to submit documents for the participants in the Conference.

(b) Any national liberation organization entitled by the General Assembly of the United Nations³ to participate as an observer in the sessions and the work of the General Assembly, all international conferences convened under the auspices of the General Assembly and all international conferences convened under the auspices of other organs of the United Nations may apply to the Secretary-General of the Conference for observer status, which will be accorded on the decision of the Conference. Such a liberation organization shall be entitled to appoint officials to attend meetings of the plenary and of the Main Committees other than those designated closed meetings and to receive documents of the Conference. An observer organization shall also be entitled to submit documents to the participants in the Conference.

2. The United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency

The Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, or their representatives, shall be entitled to attend meetings of the plenary and of the Main Committees and to receive the Conference documents. They shall also be entitled to submit material, both orally and in writing.

3. <u>Specialized agencies and international and regional intergovernmental</u> organizations

The Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, the South Pacific Forum, other international and regional intergovernmental organizations, the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization and any specialized agency of the United Nations may apply to the Secretary-General of the Conference for observer agency status, which will be accorded on the decision of the Conference. An observer agency shall be entitled to appoint officials to attend

 $^{^{\}rm 2}$ It is understood that any such decision will be in accordance with the practice of the General Assembly.

 $^{^3}$ Pursuant to General Assembly resolutions 3237 (XXIX) of 22 November 1974, 3280 (XXIX) of 10 December 1974 and 31/152 of 20 December 1976.

meetings of the plenary and of the Main Committees, other than those designated closed meetings, and to receive the documents of the Conference. The Conference may also invite them to submit, in writing, their views and comments on questions within their competence, which may be circulated as conference documents.

4. <u>Non-governmental organizations</u>

Representatives of non-governmental organizations who attend meetings of the plenary or of the Main Committees will be entitled upon request to receive the documents of the Conference.

Appendix (to rule 12)

SCHEDULE FOR THE DIVISION OF COSTS

1. The attached schedule shows the allocation of costs between States based on the participation of States in the first, second or third sessions of the Preparatory Committee.

2. The schedule for the actual division of costs will be subject to review in the light of participation of States in the Conference, except that the shares designated in the schedule with an asterisk will remain as shown in the schedule. The balance of costs will be divided among the other States Parties participating in the Conference in accordance with the United Nations assessment scale prorated to take into account differences between the United Nations membership and the number of States Parties participating in the Conference. For States Parties that are not members of the United Nations, the share will be determined on the basis of the similarly prorated scale in force for determining their share in the activities in which they take part.

SCHEDULE

	Share of estimated total costs
	(percentage)
Albania	0.002
Algeria	0.063
Angola	0.007
Antigua and Barbuda	0.001
Argentina	0.805
Armenia	0.004
Australia	1.082
Austria	0.700
Azerbaijan	0.008
Bahamas	0.011
Bahrain	0.012
Bangladesh	0.007
Belarus	0.042
Belgium	0.806
Benin	0.001
Bhutan	0.001
Bolivia	0.005
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.004
Botswana	0.007
Brazil	1.073
Brunei Darussalam	0.015
Bulgaria	0.008
Burkina Faso	0.001
Cambodia	0.001
Cameroon	0.009
Canada	1.993
Cape Verde	0.001
Central African Republic	0.001
Chile	0.099
China	0.910*
Colombia	0.080
Congo	0.002
Costa Rica	0.012
Côte d'Ivoire	0.007
Croatia	0.022
Cyprus	0.025
Czech Republic	0.078
Denmark	0.505
Djibouti	0.001
Dominican Republic	0.011
Ecuador	0.015
Egypt	0.047
El Salvador	0.009
Eritrea	0.001
Estonia	0.009
Ethiopia	0.004
Fiji	0.003
-	

Share of estimated total costs (percentage)

	(percentage)
Finland	0.396
France	7.140*
Georgia	0.005
Germany	7.192
Ghana	0.005
Greece	0.256
Guatemala	0.013
Guyana	0.001
Haiti	0.001
Holy See	0.001
Honduras	0.002
Hungary	0.088
Iceland	0.023
Indonesia	0.137
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	0.117
Iraq	0.023
Ireland	0.163
Italy	3.967
Jamaica	0.004
Japan	15.011
Jordan	0.004
Kazakhstan	0.035
Kenya	0.005
Kuwait	0.093
Kyrgyzstan	0.004
Lao People's Democratic Republic	0.001
Latvia	0.012
Lebanon	0.012
Lesotho	0.001
Liberia	0.001
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	0.090
Liechtenstein	0.004
Lithuania	0.011
Luxembourg	0.050
Madagascar	0.002
Malawi	0.001
Malaysia	0.134
Maldives	0.001
Mali	0.001
Malta	0.010
Marshall Islands	0.001
Mauritania	0.001
Mauritius	0.007
Mexico	0.726
Micronesia (Federated States of)	0.001
Monaco	0.003
Mongolia	0.001
Morocco	0.030
Mozambique	0.001

Share of estimated total costs (percentage)

	(percentage
Myanmar	0.006
Namibia	0.005
Nepal	0.003
Netherlands	1.191
New Zealand	0.161
Nicaragua	0.001
Niger	0.001
Nigeria	0.023
Norway	0.445
Oman	0.037
Panama	0.009
Papua New Guinea	0.005
Paraguay	0.010
Peru	0.072
Philippines	0.059
Poland	0.143
Portugal	0.314
Qatar	0.024
Republic of Korea	0.734
Republic of Moldova	0.007
Romania	0.041
Russian Federation	8.000*
Samoa	0.001
San Marino	0.001
Saudi Arabia	0.410
Senegal	0.004
Singapore	0.131
Slovakia	0.026
Slovenia	0.045
Solomon Islands	0.001
South Africa	0.260
Spain	1.890
Sri Lanka	0.009
Sudan	0.005
Suriname	0.003
Swaziland	0.001
Sweden	0.787
Switzerland	0.887
Syrian Arab Republic	0.047
Tajikistan	0.003
Thailand	0.124
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	0.003
Тодо	0.001
Trinidad and Tobago	0.012
Tunisia	0.020
Turkey	0.321
Turkmenistan	0.004
Uganda	0.003
Ukraine	0.139

Share of estimated total costs (percentage)

United Arab Emirates	0.130
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	6.130*
United Republic of Tanzania	0.002
United States of America	32.820*
Uruguay	0.035
Uzbekistan	0.018
Vanuatu	0.001
Venezuela	0.117
Viet Nam	0.005
Yemen	0.007
Zambia	0.001
Zimbabwe	0.007

ANNEX VII

PROVISIONAL AGENDA

PROVISIONAL AGENDA

- 1. Opening of the Conference by the Chairman of the third session of the Preparatory Committee.
- 2. Election of the President of the Conference.
- 3. Statement by the President of the Conference.
- 4. Address by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
- 5. Address by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
- 6. Submission of the final report of the Preparatory Committee.
- 7. Adoption of the rules of procedure.
- 8. Election of Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of the Main Committees, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee.
- 9. Election of Vice-Presidents.
- 10. Credentials of representatives to the Conference:
 - (a) Appointment of the Credentials Committee;
 - (b) Report of the Credentials Committee.
- 11. Confirmation of the nomination of the Secretary-General.
- 12. Adoption of the agenda.
- 13. Programme of work.
- 14. Adoption of arrangements for meeting the costs of the Conference.
- 15. General debate.
- 16. Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its article VIII, paragraph 3, taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference:
 - (a) Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament and international peace and security:
 - (i) Articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1 to 3;
 - (ii) Article VI and preambular paragraphs 8 to 12;

- (iii) Article VII with specific reference to the main issues in(a) and (b);
- (b) Security assurances:
 - (i) United Nations Security Council resolutions 255 (1968) and 984 (1995);
 - (ii) Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
- (c) Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards and nuclear-weaponfree zones;
 - (i) Article III and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5, especially in their relationship to article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7;
 - (ii) Articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1 to 3 in their relationship to articles III and IV;

(iii) Article VII;

- (d) Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to the inalienable right of all Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II:
 - (i) Articles III (3) and IV, preambular paragraphs 6 and 7, especially in their relationship to article III (1), (2) and (4) and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5;
 - (ii) Article V.
- (e) Other provisions of the Treaty.
- 17. Role of the Treaty in the promotion of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and of nuclear disarmament in strengthening international peace and security and measures aimed at strengthening the implementation of the Treaty and achieving its universality.
- 18. Reports of the Main Committees.
- 19. Consideration and adoption of Final Document(s).
- 20. Any other business.

ANNEX VIII

PROPOSED ALLOCATION OF ITEMS TO THE MAIN COMMITTEES OF THE CONFERENCE

PROPOSED ALLOCATION OF ITEMS TO THE MAIN COMMITTEES OF THE CONFERENCE

1. The Preparatory Committee agreed to recommend for consideration by the Conference the following allocation of items to the three Main Committees, with the understanding that the remaining items would be considered in the plenary.

2. It is understood that all articles, preambular paragraphs and agenda items allocated to the Main Committees shall be reviewed in their interrelationship.

3. The Preparatory Committee recalled that the question of an overlap of issues being discussed in more than one Committee should be resolved in the General Committee, which would coordinate the work of the Committees so that the substantive responsibility for the preparation of the report with respect to each specific issue is undertaken in only one Committee.

4. The Preparatory Committee also noted that subsidiary bodies could be established within the Main Committees. Some delegations proposed the establishment of subsidiary bodies under Main Committee I on nuclear disarmament and under Main Committee II on the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East. Some delegations proposed that such decisions should be taken by the Review Conference. The Preparatory Committee decided that the question of the establishment of subsidiary bodies would be considered and resolved by the Review Conference.

1. <u>Main Committee I</u>

<u>Item 16</u>. Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its article VIII, paragraph 3, taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference:

(a) Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament and international peace and security:

- (i) Articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1 to 3;
- (ii) Article VI and preambular paragraphs 8 to 12;
- (iii) Article VII, with specific reference to the main issues considered in this Committee.
- (b) Security assurances:
 - (i) United Nations Security Council resolutions 255 (1968) and 984 (1995);
 - (ii) Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Item 17. Role of the Treaty in the promotion of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and of nuclear disarmament in strengthening international peace and security and measures aimed at strengthening the implementation of the Treaty and achieving its universality.

2. <u>Main Committee II</u>

<u>Item 16</u>. Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its article VIII, paragraph 3, taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference:

(c) Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards, and nuclear-weapon-free zones:

- (i) Article III and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5, especially in their relationship to article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7;
- (ii) Articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1 to 3 in their relationship to articles III and IV;
- (iii) Article VII.
- (e) Other provisions of the Treaty.

Item 17. Role of the Treaty in the promotion of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and of nuclear disarmament in strengthening international peace and security and measures aimed at strengthening the implementation of the Treaty and achieving its universality.

3. <u>Main Committee III</u>

Item 16. Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its article VIII, paragraph 3, taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference:

(d) Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to the inalienable right of all Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II:

- (i) Articles III (3) and IV, preambular paragraphs 6 and 7, especially in their relationship to article III(1), (2) and (4) and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5;
- (ii) Article V.

Item 17. Role of the Treaty in the promotion of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and of nuclear disarmament in strengthening international peace and security and measures aimed at strengthening the implementation of the Treaty and achieving its universality.
