
Conference on Disarmament

7 August 2012

English

Final record of the one thousand two hundred and sixty-sixth plenary meeting

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Tuesday, 7 August 2012, at 10.10 a.m.

President: Mr. Jean-Hugues Simon-Michel(France)

The President (*spoke in French*): Colleagues, if you agree, I suggest that we start. Good morning, everyone. I call to order the 1266th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

As indicated in document CD/WP.571/Rev.1, entitled “Schedule of Activities”, today’s plenary meeting will be devoted to the subject of: “Revised effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons”.

However, before we commence our discussions of this subject, I should like to give the floor to delegations that would like to make a statement on another subject. I will begin by giving the floor to the Ambassador of Japan. Ambassador Mari Amano, you have the floor.

Mr. Amano (Japan): Sixty-seven years ago yesterday, on 6 August, an atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. Three days later, on 9 August, another one was dropped on Nagasaki. As a result, a great number of people were killed and injured, and even today many of the survivors, whom we call *hibakusha*, continue to suffer in pain. Since the bombings, the resolve of Japan to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons has been unshakeable. Nonetheless, every year when we commemorate those tragic events, we renew afresh our determination to rid the world of nuclear armaments. For my part, I also reaffirm my own determination and would like to once again appeal to the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community, to overcome the current stalemate.

In order to realize the total elimination of nuclear weapons, gaining the broad understanding and support of civil society and the people of the world is imperative. Already 67 years have passed since the bombings and the *hibakusha* are now advancing more and more into old age. Given this situation, Japan considers that conveying accurately the realities of nuclear weapons to the future generations, especially disarmament and non-proliferation education to the young, is immensely important. This will prevent the memories of those tragedies from fading away and contribute to maintaining international momentum towards nuclear disarmament. On this point, I am sure you will all recall the appeals by the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the Special Communicators for a World without Nuclear Weapons and other *hibakusha*, for the abolishment of nuclear weapons at last year’s First Committee and this year’s first Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference. Japan will continue to take advantage of opportunities such as these to make the voices of the *hibakusha* heard.

Alongside its individual efforts, Japan is also actively cooperating with the United Nations on disarmament and non-proliferation education. This week, on 10 and 11 August, we will be holding, in conjunction with the United Nations University, a conference in Nagasaki called the Global Forum on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education. At this meeting, we will provide to various actors involved in the field of education, including Governments, civil society, international organizations, experts and educators, an opportunity to share their perceptions on disarmament and non-proliferation education. We will also raise timely issues like the Middle East weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone. We hope that by deepening discussions on issues such as this the participants will gain an appreciation of the current state of affairs in the region and consider practical approaches to resolving issues. Furthermore, from the end of this month the United Nations Disarmament Fellowship Programme will begin once again and the 25 fellows participating in this year’s programme will soon visit Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Under the Fellowship Programme, 761 diplomats from various countries have travelled to those cities. Japan plans to continue to support this valuable programme. Closer to us here, a permanent exhibition on the atomic bombings was established in the Palais des Nations last November. It is only a short walk from this plenary room and I encourage everyone to actively visit it.

Japan aims to carry on these efforts in support of nuclear disarmament. We must recognize, however, that as members of this distinguished body, we all have a responsibility to respond to the voices of the *hibakusha* and carry on in our task of achieving a peaceful and secure world free of nuclear weapons. As such, the present 15-year hiatus in the Conference is far too long. Japan believes in light of current international circumstances that, rather than pursuing the elimination of nuclear weapons at a stroke, it is necessary to move forward in a steady, step-by-step manner. For that purpose, commencing negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices is the next logical step, and it is the step that has been called for by the vast majority of the international community. We think the Conference on Disarmament is the right venue for those negotiations, but in the event that these do not occur, it stands to reason that we must consider other options. With only a short period of time remaining in this year's session, Japan hopes that the Conference accelerates its work to overcome the impasse, and to that end Japan stands ready to exert its maximum efforts.

The President (*spoke in French*): I thank the Ambassador of Japan for his statement on the occasion of the anniversary of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, those dramatic events in our contemporary history, and would now like to ask whether any other delegation would like to make a statement on a subject that is not on our agenda. That does not seem to be the case.

By way of an introduction to this meeting, I will briefly summarize, under my own responsibility, some of the main elements that I took away from the meeting that was held on this same subject on 12 June last. Eighteen States, in addition to the President, made statements at the meeting. Some recalled how important this issue is for them.

Reference was made to United Nations Security Council resolution 984 (1995) of 11 April 1995 and to the national declarations by States at the Conference on Disarmament that provide the underpinnings for the Security Council resolution. As far as my own country is concerned, its declaration carries the force of an international law that creates legal obligations.

Some members and observer countries called on the countries that had made those declarations to reaffirm their commitment to them in the relevant forums and to sign protocols to treaties providing for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

Some States indicated that unilateral declarations were not enough and that what they were interested in was an international convention.

Nuclear-weapon States recalled that they had acceded to protocols to various regional treaties providing for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. The protocols offered assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against States in those zones and that applied to a large number of countries.

Finally, most countries with nuclear weapons or military nuclear capacities restated the main points of their doctrine.

At this stage, the following delegations are on today's list of speakers: Cuba, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, the People's Democratic Republic of Korea, and Egypt. I now give the floor to the first speaker on the list, the delegation of Cuba. You have the floor.

Mr. Quintanilla (Cuba) (*spoke in Spanish*): We are gathered once more at this forum to discuss negative security assurances. On 12 June last, we held a preliminary exchange of views in which the positions of the different members of the Conference were reviewed.

We should now like to clarify the position of Cuba on this subject. Our country reaffirms its position that the complete elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute assurance against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. We are convinced that as long as nuclear weapons exist, there will always be a risk of their proliferation and possible use.

Pending the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, however, there is an urgent need, in our view, to secure agreement on an unconditional, universal and legally binding instrument offering assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. That instrument may be clear, unimpeachable and unambiguous and address the concerns of all parties.

The right of non-nuclear-weapon States to protection from nuclear attack or the threat of the use of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States must be recognized.

Cuba supports the unanimous conclusion reached by the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue and to conclude negotiations in good faith with a view to achieving nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

At the same time, our country fully endorses the objectives set out in United Nations General Assembly resolution 65/54, entitled "Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation", in which the General Assembly reaffirms that multilateralism is the core principle in resolving disarmament and non-proliferation concerns, a point that clearly applies to negative security assurances.

Our country is concerned by certain strategic defence doctrines that not only justify the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons but also promote indefensible theories about international security based on the promotion and development of nuclear deterrence policies adopted by military alliances.

In our view, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of agreements that have been entered into freely and that take account of the decisions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at the First Special Session Devoted to Disarmament contributes to the promotion of nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this context, we recognize the importance of the nuclear-weapon-free zones established pursuant to the Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Semipalatinsk treaties, as well as the decision by Mongolia to declare itself a nuclear-weapon-free country.

We do not, however, subscribe to the argument that the declarations made by nuclear-weapon States are sufficient or that security assurances should only be provided in the context of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Given that they have limited geographical scope, the security assurances provided to States in nuclear-weapon-free zones cannot substitute for universal and legally binding assurances. Moreover, unilateral promises or measures are as mutable as Governments and their policies, which is why we do not believe or have any confidence in security that is delivered in this way.

Looking back at some of the history, Cuba recalls that the need for security assurances was identified by non-nuclear-weapon States in the 1960s and was an explicit issue discussed during the final phases of the negotiations on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968. Non-nuclear-weapon States considered the response of nuclear-weapon States, as articulated in Security Council resolutions 255 (1968) and 984 (1995), to be incomplete, partial and qualified. There is still a need for these assurances to be provided.

My country recognizes the importance of reaching agreement on a universal, legally binding instrument on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. The adoption of

such an instrument would be an important step towards meeting the goals of arms control, nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects.

At the discussion held on 12 June, not a single country objected to engaging in a dialogue on this subject. We do not understand why certain delegations (which have no objection to discussing the matter either) are making those negotiations conditional upon holding negotiations on a fissile material treaty. We should like to know how it is that these two themes can be so intimately intertwined that the one cannot be discussed without the other. We believe that the present state of affairs can be attributed to double standards on disarmament issues and a lack of political will.

The President (*spoke in French*): I thank the representative of Cuba and now give the floor to the Ambassador of Indonesia.

Mr. Yusup (Indonesia): Achieving total global nuclear disarmament remains the highest priority for the Government of Indonesia. No country should possess nuclear weapons.

For countries like Indonesia that have rescinded the nuclear weapons path, it is important that they be given unambiguous, legally binding and universal security assurances by the nuclear-weapon States. It is regrettable that despite committing to pursuing negative security assurances towards non-nuclear-weapon States, the nuclear-weapon States have not yet supported concrete advancement on a universal and legally binding instrument on NSAs. Nor have we witnessed any tangible progress on the subject of negotiating a nuclear-weapons convention, prevention of an arms race in outer space, or a fissile material treaty in accordance with the Shannon mandate.

We believe that the nuclear-weapon-free zones are an essential regional effort in our pursuit of creating a nuclear-weapon-free world. Our commitment to strengthening and expanding nuclear-weapon-free zones has never wavered.

In this regard Indonesia wishes to underline the resumption of the direct consultations between nuclear-weapon States and parties to the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone during the Indonesian chairmanship of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) last year. The consultation resulted in an understanding on the accession of the nuclear-weapon States to the Protocol on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. This development will allow early accession of the nuclear-weapon States to the Protocol to the Bangkok Treaty. Indonesia hopes the signing of the Protocol could be realized soon. We would like to extend our appreciation to the nuclear-weapon States for the constructive engagement demonstrated during the consultation.

Indonesia commends the first preparatory meeting for the Third Conference of States Parties and Signatories of Treaties that establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia on 27 April 2012. We believe that it will provide a robust foundation for the success of the Third Conference in 2015, in which Indonesia will serve as President.

Indonesia underscores the urgency of establishing a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. In this regard, we will lend full support to Ambassador Jaako Laajava, Under-Secretary of State of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, as Facilitator for the 2012 conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

In conclusion, we would like to emphasize that there is an urgent need for an early agreement on a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. My delegation views the establishment of an ad hoc committee or a working group dealing with negative security assurances is pertinent.

The President (*spoke in French*): I now give the floor to Mr. Mohammed Hassan Daryaei, the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Mr. Daryaei (Islamic Republic of Iran): Mr. President, at the beginning allow me to express our appreciation for the manner in which you are guiding the work of the Conference on Disarmament.

NSAs were the cornerstone of the package that helped the final conclusion of the NPT. The non-nuclear-weapon States decided to join the NPT, being aware of the discriminatory nature of this treaty, on the understanding that they would not be the target of use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. That is why, in the resolution for the adoption of the NPT, the General Assembly requested the then negotiation body to consider urgently the proposal that the nuclear-weapon States should give an assurance that they would not use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States without nuclear weapons on their territories.

The history of the developments related to the negative security assurances is indicative of a close linkage between the NPT and NSAs. In response to the insistent requests of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT, the nuclear-weapon States made individual statements to the Conference on Disarmament, and the Security Council, in its resolution 984 (1995), took note of the statements made by each of the nuclear-weapon States at the verge of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. NSAs were also part of the package for the indefinite extension of the NPT. Therefore the issue of NSAs and the conclusion of the NPT and its indefinite extension are linked together and nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility in this regard. The credibility of the non-proliferation regime depends on the degree of fulfilment of the promises of the nuclear-weapon States as the highest beneficiaries of this international regime.

The nuclear-weapon States made some unilateral declarations. Subject to the full commitment of nuclear-weapon States to their declarations, these assurances remain partial, declarative and limited with no legal burden on the part of nuclear-weapon States and do not constitute at all credible assurances. Let alone the recent developments that some nuclear-weapon States fully breach these commitments and in a flagrant manner explicitly and implicitly threaten the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT. The reluctance of some nuclear-weapon States to start negotiations on NSAs is further evidence of their duplicity in following nuclear disarmament. NSAs would not provide any technical difficulties or excuse to resort to technical difficulties. The Conference has witnessed a proposal that was a one-sentence treaty. Indeed, if there would have been political will and honesty rather than hypocrisy and duplicity, this negotiation would have been very simple and should have reached concrete results many years ago. It is deplorable that after more than 32 years of presenting this issue to the Conference, NSAs still elude us and we still live with the wish to start negotiation on NSAs.

The recent developments are not at all conducive to the goal of NSAs and the resistance in this regard is indicative of scenarios for possible use of nuclear weapons. The beneficiaries of positive security assurances, under the nuclear umbrellas, are supporting the status quo either by supporting the reliability and modernization of the nuclear arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States that give them that umbrella or by being satisfactorily silent on the lack of progress on NSAs and ignorant of the threats emanating from some of the nuclear-weapon States against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT, officially and repeatedly proclaimed by the high-ranking officials of some nuclear-weapon States. These threats are a blatant breach of the Charter of the United Nations, the agreed principles in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the illegality of use of such weapons, and the package for conclusion and extension of the NPT, and should not be tolerated any more. The international community should not await the deployment of

such weapons to react. Such policies and practices seem to have learned no lesson from the massacre of Hiroshima and Nagasaki that this morning was referred to by the distinguished Ambassador of Japan. I had the opportunity to visit Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1998, under the United Nations Disarmament Fellowship. To see the horrible consequences, effects of the use of nuclear weapons, I recommend those countries who are repeatedly threatening others by use of nuclear weapons to at least visit once Hiroshima and Nagasaki. These kinds of threat should be condemned and not be condoned or repeated anymore.

While we believe that nuclear-weapon-free zones are positive steps towards strengthening global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, we reject the arguments stating that security assurances should only be granted in the context of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Insistence on these kinds of weak arguments only results in further weakening the package of the conditions for conclusion and extension of the NPT and puts the credibility of this treaty into jeopardy.

The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of the provisions of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament is a positive step and important measure towards strengthening global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. In the context of nuclear-weapon-free zones, it is essential that nuclear-weapon States provide unconditional assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all States of the zones. As the initiator for the proposal for the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of all nuclear weapons, since 1974 we firmly support the speedy establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. But it is a matter of serious concern that due to the highest level of double standards and discrimination by some nuclear-weapon States in generously rewarding and pampering the non-NPT State party of the region, and at the same time exerting the highest pressure and threat against the NPT States parties, the only obstacle for the creation of such a zone in the region, i.e., the non-NPT State party, feels no pressure to move in the direction of creation of such a zone in the Middle East.

In fact the shameful discrimination by some nuclear-weapon States creates a special situation for the non-NPT State party in the Middle East, which puts its protégé beyond and above any international norms and regulations.

It is clear that unilateral declarations cannot substitute the internationally legally binding commitments. The assurances provided under protocols to treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones are also subject to many conditions and are far from the expectation of non-nuclear-weapon States. All of these vicious developments have put the non-nuclear-weapon States more than ever under the real threat of possible use of nuclear weapons.

We remain convinced that the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is their total elimination through transparent, verifiable and irreversible measures, in accordance with article VI of the NPT and as stipulated in the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in 1996. Pending achievement of that goal, nuclear-weapon States must provide legally binding credible and effective security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of weapons, therefore, the conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States should be pursued as a matter of priority by the international community. We propose that the Conference establish an ad hoc committee to negotiate on a draft of a legally binding instrument on the illegality of the use of nuclear weapons and providing unconditional security assurances by the nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT as a matter of urgency.

The President (*spoke in French*): I thank our Iranian colleague and now give the floor to the representative of Iraq. You have the floor, Ambassador Abbas.

Mr. Abbas (Iraq) (*spoke in Arabic*): Mr. President, at the outset, I should like to express my deep appreciation to you for the professional manner in which you have guided the meetings of the Conference on Disarmament. I can assure you of the full support and cooperation of the Iraqi delegation as you carry out your tasks.

Ensuring universal accession to the international treaties on weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, universal compliance with those treaties, without any distinction, and the total elimination of such weapons is vital to providing the international community with genuine assurances against the use or threat of use of these weapons and to establishing international peace and security. Notwithstanding the positive initiatives taken in the international arena in recent years, the fact that most nuclear arsenals are still being maintained and that new nuclear weapons and delivery systems are being developed remains a cause for concern and poses a threat to mankind. Agreement must be reached on the negotiation of a binding international instrument that offers assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States and on the ways in which this goal can be achieved. While the provision of negative security assurances constitutes an essential step in the right direction and a fair and legitimate demand on the part of States that have voluntarily renounced the military nuclear option by acceding to the NPT, it cannot substitute for the realization of complete nuclear disarmament. Consequently, we once more appeal to the Conference to continue with its work and to take practical measures with a view to establishing a binding legal framework for the delivery of assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States.

While the two Security Council resolutions and the recommendations of the United Nations General Assembly on the positive and negative assurances that most non-nuclear-weapon States are seeking to represent an attempt to move forward on this issue, the fact of the matter is that the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly have added nothing new to these resolutions. It is a well-known fact that the United Nations is opposed to the use of force or the threat of force in international relations by means of weapons of any kind, let alone nuclear weapons, which are highly destructive, and that the United Nations requires members to assist it in any action taken in accordance with the Charter, having established principles that form the basis and the essence of the Charter. The resolutions adopted subsequently have added nothing new and offer nothing that is really original to guarantee the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. This is another failure, in terms of the assurances that should be offered to protect non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

While the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones contributes to regional security and stability, it is no substitute either for meeting the demand for multilateral negative security assurances, which represents a legitimate and pressing need. Notwithstanding the support from the international community for the establishment of a zone free from nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, and notwithstanding the sincerity of the call made to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East along the same lines as in other regions of the world, progress has not been on a par with that achieved in some regions of the world. This is due to the complex nature of the Middle East situation, specific features of the political relations between the States of the region, the types of conflicts that occur in the region, and external interference, which is a source of instability. The introduction of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction into such a tense and unstable environment, in the context of an arms race, can only add to the dangers. Perhaps this underscores the importance of doing everything possible to establish a zone free of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East so as to avert the risk of destructive wars.

I take this opportunity to express our profound appreciation for the sincere and unstinting efforts of sponsor States to convene a conference on the Middle East in 2012 in

Helsinki, based on the outcome document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. I also thank the host country, Finland, and the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland, the conference facilitator, for the tireless efforts made to make a success of the conference and to achieve tangible results that will lead to a process that will contribute to the establishment of peace and security in the region and thus to international peace and security.

The President (*spoke in French*): I thank the representative of Iraq and now give the floor to the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Mr. Jon Yong Ryong (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): Providing negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States becomes a vital issue in the light of nuclear disarmament. Unfortunately, however, certain powerful States persist with their assessments, with their assertions on the issue of non-proliferation alone, while evading the provision of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States.

It is also in today's world that nuclear weapons estimated at over 20,000 are still in existence. It is also in today's world that sovereign States are often targeted, being threatened by nuclear weapons while mankind itself as a whole is being threatened for its existence.

One State with the largest stockpiles of nuclear weapons, having designated specific countries as the target of pre-emptive nuclear strikes, has thrown up an operational plan for nuclear attacks and it is conducting nuclear war exercises under that plan in a disguised manner. The international relations in which a certain country is free to pose nuclear threats while others are exposed to the threats should no longer be tolerable. The provision of negative security assurances is essential to the existence of non-nuclear-weapon States and promotion of the global process of nuclear disarmament. The demand of non-nuclear-weapon States is an unconditional and legally binding guarantee of nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances. Such a demand is fairly justifiable. Non-nuclear-weapon States are therefore entitled to receive negative security assurances from nuclear-weapon States. We hold that nuclear-weapon States should revoke nuclear threats towards non-nuclear-weapon States and provide them with unconditional and legally binding security assurances. Nuclear-weapon States should abandon a nuclear doctrine based on pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. They should also remove the nuclear umbrella over their allies and withdraw all nuclear weapons deployed outside their own territories. Pending the achievement of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, nuclear-weapon States should commit themselves not to be the first to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances and respond to the negotiations for concluding such an international legal instrument as early as possible.

In this regard, we reiterate the support for the proposal to immediately establish a subsidiary body to negotiate effective international agreement assuring non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

The nuclear deterrent of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea serves as a reliable guarantee for protecting the supreme interests of the State and the security of the Korean nation from outside Powers' threat of aggression and firmly safeguarding peace and stability in the region.

Accordingly, it does not give any threat to non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones which have existed in various regions of the world. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea will sincerely implement its international commitment as a responsible nuclear-weapon State.

The President (*spoke in French*): I now give the floor to the Ambassador of Egypt.

Mr. Badr (Egypt) (*spoke in French*): Mr. President, this is the first time that I have taken the floor under your presidency. I wish to congratulate you on your effective work and to assure you that Egypt will cooperate in order to reach the objective.

(*spoke in English*)

I would also like to seize this opportunity to express to the great Japanese people our greatest solidarity and sympathies on the commemoration of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

As an Ambassador to Tokyo, but also as a human being who has visited Hiroshima and Nagasaki more than 10 times, we express our great solidarity and recall the words of the Japanese Emperor Hirohito, to bear the unbearable and to suffer the insufferable. This is a moment to reflect (*spoke in Japanese*) on the great sufferings of the Japanese people and to commit — as Ambassador Amano, my friend, said today — to use this day to reflect on how we all must get rid of nuclear weapons once and for all and to use this body effectively.

And now let me speak in Arabic to address the issue at hand.

(*spoke in Arabic*)

At the outset, I should like to stress that the final and complete elimination of nuclear weapons is the only genuine assurance against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. However, until that goal is achieved, non-nuclear-weapon States that are parties to the NPT will continue to have a legitimate and pressing demand that they should be provided with legally binding and unconditional negative security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States. This demand is frequently repeated in the Final Documents of the NPT review conferences, including the most recent conference of 2010. It is also found in the Final Document of the First Special Session on Disarmament held by the General Assembly in 1978 (SSOD-1), which mentions the importance of efforts by nuclear States to establish effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. It seems that, notwithstanding the years that have passed and the end of the cold war, nuclear States have failed to meet this demand and to embark on meaningful and genuine negotiations on effective arrangements to provide legally binding and unconditional negative security assurances. Non-nuclear-weapon States do not consider the positive assurances provided by nuclear-weapon States in 1968, in Security Council resolution 255 (1968), to be sufficient. The unilateral, qualified assurances that nuclear-weapon States provided pursuant to Security Council resolution 984 (1995) are not sufficient either.

In recent years, there has been a shift in the position of some nuclear-weapon States on negative security assurances. This must be encouraged and welcomed, although it is still not enough and does not meet the legitimate demands of the non-nuclear-weapon States that are parties to the NPT. Initiatives or political declarations that are not legally binding have not been and will not be sufficient to create the climate of trust and level of compliance needed in international relations. Some nuclear-weapon States, furthermore, still refuse to affirm that they will not use or threaten to use their nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States that are parties to the NPT.

I should like to refer to the call made by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, over which Egypt has the honour to preside over at present, for legally binding and unconditional assurances to be provided in this area. I should also like to refer to the paper that the New Agenda Coalition submitted in 2003 to the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference. The paper contained the text of a draft protocol on non-proliferation that was a possible basis for ensuring that the five nuclear-weapon States provide non-nuclear-weapon States that are parties to the NPT with negative security

assurances. The text could be used as the starting point for negotiations on this subject. The Conference on Disarmament has been discussing negative security assurances for a long time. Indeed, it set up a subcommittee on negative security assurances in 1998 raising other subjects that some now view as a priority for the Conference.

We have repeatedly heard certain nuclear States argue that there is no need to establish a legally binding treaty that provides negative security assurances and that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones could serve in its place. We have also heard certain nuclear States express their determination to promote nuclear-weapon-free zones, including through the ratification of protocols on the subject. Egypt welcomes any efforts to promote nuclear-weapon-free zones, including the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. We call on all nuclear States to ratify the protocols on these zones without entering any reservations to them. It is clear that nuclear-weapon-free zones cannot under any circumstances serve as a substitute for legal and unconditional commitments by the five nuclear States to providing negative security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States that are parties to the NPT. Both objectives — legal commitments to providing negative assurances and nuclear-weapon-free zones — complement one another and are both additional steps towards ridding the world of nuclear weapons.

The establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction is important, not just because provision is made for it in a whole range of resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, the Security Council, United Nations entities, the International Atomic Energy Agency and in the NPT, but because the establishment of such a zone would make a direct and tangible contribution to achieving the goal of strengthening the security of all the States in the region. It would also contribute to international peace and security, since developments in the region show that it is in everyone's interests to rid the region as a whole of all nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. In this connection, I welcome the resolution adopted in 2010 to convene a conference in 2012 to discuss the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. We also welcome the steps taken in this regard, including the designation of Ambassador Layava as special facilitator for the conference and of Finland as the host country. We hope that the conference, to be attended by all States in the Middle East region, will be convened on schedule and will be successful. I should like to say that the outcome of this conference will determine whether or not we are serious about the decisions and commitments that we make. For us, it is critical to the credibility of the disarmament regime as a whole. We therefore stress the importance of the success of the 2012 conference on the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and of full compliance with the 1995 resolution on the Middle East adopted at the NPT Review and Extension Conference pursuant to which the Treaty was extended indefinitely by acclamation. We call on the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the States that endorsed the 1995 resolution on the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, in their capacity as the conveners of the 2012 conference, to redouble their efforts and give the highest priority to supporting a successful conference and the achievement of its aims.

The President (*spoke in French*): I thank the Ambassador of Egypt for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Algeria.

Mr. Khelif (Algeria) (*spoke in French*): The delegation of Algeria welcomes the opportunity to take the floor in order to reiterate its position on negative security assurances, the subject of today's plenary, and hopes that this exercise will lead to an exchange of views that will enable us to understand one another better and to act as one.

Negative security assurances are of critical importance to meeting the need of non-nuclear-weapon States for assurances against the use or threat of use of such weapons. The delivery of such assurances is not a favour that is granted at the discretion of nuclear-weapon States. It is only right that a State, like Algeria, that has chosen to join the nuclear non-proliferation regime should be given credible and effective negative assurances to ensure its survival and protect it from the use of such weapons. As confirmed by the delegations that spoke earlier, the most effective guarantee against the use of such weapons is clearly the total and complete elimination of these weapons in accordance with article VI of the NPT.

As the Ambassador of Japan has just reminded us in his statement on the commemoration of the bombings of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, more than 60 years after the event, it is imperative — there is a moral and political imperative — that the total and complete elimination of nuclear weapons in conformity with article VI of the NPT should be effected. Allow me to recall some important dates and documents of relevance to the subject of today's discussion.

According to the Charter of the United Nations, which was signed at San Francisco on 26 June 1945, in particular Article 2, paragraph 4 thereof, States Members are required to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State. In our view, these provisions of the Charter provide the main legal framework in which the question of negative security assurances should be addressed.

In November 1966, when the process for the establishment of a nuclear non-proliferation treaty was launched, the United Nations General Assembly, in resolution 2153 (XXI), urged States to conclude a nuclear non-proliferation treaty and called on the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, the predecessor of the Conference on Disarmament, to "consider urgently the proposal that the nuclear-weapon Powers should give an assurance that they will not use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States without nuclear weapons on their territories".

In the Final Document of the First Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament (1978), which was adopted by consensus, nuclear-weapon States were called upon to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Here, we should like to draw attention to paragraphs 32 and 59 of the Final Document in particular.

Moreover, in 1995, after the Review Conference had decided to extend the NPT indefinitely, the States parties agreed, in paragraph 8 of Decision 2, that further steps should be considered to assure non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. According to the Decision, these steps could take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument.

In its resolution 984 (1995), the Security Council affirms that, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, any aggression with the use of nuclear weapons would endanger international peace and security.

Today, 42 years after the adoption of the NPT, how do matters on this issue now stand? Do the existing arrangements meet the legitimate security aspirations of non-nuclear-weapon States? The existing negative assurances regime is based on measures adopted in the framework of Security Council resolution 268 (1969), the unilateral declarations of 1978 and 1982, and the declarations cited in Security Council resolution 984 (1995). Other measures are envisaged in the protocols to treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones or bilateral agreements.

In recent years, we have seen some positive developments in the new American nuclear procedure. However, the delegation of Algeria remains of the view that the current regime is insufficient to respond to the specific security requirements of non-nuclear-weapon States, as was noted by many of the delegations that made statements yesterday. Unilateral declarations by nuclear-weapon States, which moreover are accompanied by conditions, are not legally binding instruments.

In your introduction, Mr. President, you mentioned that certain States view unilateral declarations as giving rise to obligations. If that were so, there would not be any political problem and the Conference would have no difficulty embarking on negotiations to codify the obligations set out in the unilateral declarations in a legally binding instrument.

Conditions are furthermore attached to the assurances offered in the context of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Moreover, not all regions of the world have this status, notably those where tensions are particularly high. The Middle East region is a case in point.

Algeria is fully committed to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in conformity with the resolution adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. The attainment of this goal is an essential condition for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the region. Algeria welcomes the efforts by the facilitator, Mr. Laajava, to convene the 2012 conference with a view to ensuring that the purposes of the 1995 resolution are achieved effectively.

Every year since 1990, the General Assembly has adopted a resolution that calls, in vain, on the Conference on Disarmament to actively continue intensive negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement and concluding effective international arrangements to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Regrettably, these resolutions cannot be implemented because of the attitude of certain nuclear Powers which claim that the resolutions are incompatible with certain policies on nuclear deterrence. As a solution to our security requirements, we are asked to make do with unilateral assurances or, at best, with assurances offered under treaties on nuclear-weapon-free zones. We should like to make it clear that these assurances are much more a reflection of how nuclear-weapon States perceive the issue of security than of the actual security requirements of non-nuclear-weapon States.

Some nuclear-weapon States are upgrading their nuclear arsenals in order to be able to maintain a so-called "credible" deterrence capacity, to safeguard vital interests, to meet anticipated challenges in absolute terms or to react to attacks in which other weapons of mass destruction are used. Thus, nuclear doctrines open up opportunities for these weapons to be used, even against non-nuclear-weapon States, and sometimes undermine the existing commitments made to providing assurances.

We recognize that Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations affords States the right to a legitimate defence. So, we can understand now a particular instrument might be incompatible with a State's legitimate defence interests, but we simply cannot understand how a legal norm that would safeguard non-nuclear-weapon States against the use of these weapons could be a threat or an obstacle to the legitimate defence of another State. Moreover, we consider that the right to a legitimate defence cannot serve to justify the use or the threat of use of such weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States, since that would be incompatible with the fundamental principles of humanitarian law, and would perhaps even negate them.

The delegation of Algeria would like to recall that in resolution 1653 (XVI) of 1961, the General Assembly states that the use of nuclear weapons is contrary to the spirit, the letter and the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations. Moreover, in an advisory

opinion issued in July 1996, the International Court of Justice concludes that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is generally incompatible with the international law norms applicable in armed conflict, in particular the rules of international humanitarian law.

This trend in deterrence doctrines fuels our demand for effective security assurances to be provided in the framework of a legally binding instrument. Irrevocable assurances of this kind would build confidence between States and add to the credibility of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. They would also contribute to nuclear disarmament, and if the NPT causes some tension, it is precisely because it does not give non-nuclear-weapon States the sense of security that they need.

Algeria, as a member of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, calls for the establishment of a legally binding, universal instrument that offers unconditional assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. It supports the annual resolutions in which the General Assembly calls for a subsidiary body to be established in the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate such an instrument in the framework of a full and balanced programme of work.

Decision CD/1864, to which countless delegations here have alluded over the course of the session, offers us a framework for beginning substantive work with a view to conducting negotiations on this issue and on all the other elements of the programme of work. The delegation of Algeria is of the view that the Decision was adopted out of a desire to move forward gradually and arrive, over the long term, at agreements on all the elements of a programme of work. We understand the differences of opinion over the appropriate framework for holding negotiations on this subject, but we still believe that the mandate set out in Decision CD/1864 and endorsed in the Action Plan adopted by the 2010 NPT Review Conference (Action 7), is sufficiently flexible to take everyone's concerns into account.

Lastly, I should like to raise an issue that the Ambassador of Japan touched upon in his statement, when he talked about the importance of taking a gradualist approach that focuses on the phased elimination of nuclear weapons. We should like to say that the delegation of Algeria also supports a gradualist approach, although we would prefer a global convention on nuclear disarmament. However, the question is: How are we to achieve this phased elimination? The Group of 21 and the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries have already put forward ideas concerning a phased plan of action for nuclear disarmament, and the question that we at the Conference are being asked is: How do we develop this plan of action?

The delegation of Algeria considers the Conference on Disarmament to be the appropriate framework for reaching agreement on such a phased plan. Action on nuclear disarmament should not be left up to ad hoc arrangements or measures taken behind closed doors. So, we agree with the approach of delineating a phased vision of nuclear disarmament, but we consider the Conference on Disarmament to be the appropriate framework for reaching consensus on such a framework.

The President (*spoke in French*): I thank the representative of Algeria for his statement and I now give the floor to the Ambassador of the United States of America.

Ms. Kennedy (United States of America): Mr. President, let me recall my statement on negative security assurances which I made on 12 June. I would like today to return to some of the points I made at that time about the value of nuclear-weapon-free zones. We believe that the most appropriate way of implementing legally binding negative security assurances is through adherence to the relevant protocols to establish nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties.

We have long supported properly crafted nuclear-weapon-free zones which, when rigorously implemented under appropriate conditions, can contribute to regional and international peace, security and stability. Such treaties in our view can only be negotiated on a regional basis with compliance by all regional parties and under appropriate conditions unique to each region. They provide valuable regional support to the NPT and the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, as the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference recognized.

Let me just touch today on two zones, South-East Asia and the Middle East.

I appreciated the comments made by our new colleague from Indonesia, Ambassador Yusup, on a South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. Speaking as one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, the United States remains strongly committed to signing the Protocol to the Treaty of Bangkok. Work is indeed continuing so that the members of ASEAN and the five permanent members of the Security Council can reach that mutual goal of signature. We believe that such a step will make an important contribution to the global non-proliferation regime and to regional and international security.

With regard to the Middle East, the United States continues to support the goal of the Middle East weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone in common with many of the speakers today, including our distinguished former President, Ambassador Badr. We recognize that practical conditions will need to be in place to realize this long-term effort, including regional peace and security and full compliance by regional States with non-proliferation obligations. We also recognize that the impetus for a Middle East WMD-free zone, must come from the region since it cannot be imposed from outside. The United States is lending its full support to the Facilitator of the conference on a Middle East WMD-free zone, the distinguished Finnish Under-Secretary, Ambassador Laajava. Regional States now have the primary responsibility to ensure that this conference can be carried out in an unbiased and constructive manner to allow the participation of all of their neighbours.

Let me also offer a special salute to Mongolia in this twentieth anniversary year of its declaration of its nuclear-weapon-free status. We support the measures taken by Mongolia to consolidate and strengthen this status, reflecting its unique geographic position.

Finally, I listened very attentively to our friend and colleague, Ambassador Amano. Let me just note that our Ambassador to Tokyo attended the commemoration in Japan, as he has previously, and described it as “powerful and moving”. I myself have attended meetings with the *hibakusha*. We all bear witness to the innocent victims of war, all wars, around the world, and let me close Mr. President with a reference to the goal of a world without nuclear weapons, so fervently embraced by my own President, President Obama.

The President (*spoke in French*): Thank you, Madam Ambassador. The next delegation on my list is South Africa. Ambassador Michiel Johannes Combrink, you have the floor.

Mr. Combrink (South Africa): We did not envisage taking the floor on this issue today. However in the interests of the debate, allow me to once again repeat the position of South Africa on the issue under discussion today.

At the outset, I wish to place on record that the issue of negative security assurances remains of importance to South Africa. Since becoming a State party to the NPT in 1991, South Africa has consistently argued that genuine security cannot be achieved by the non-nuclear-weapon States abandoning the nuclear weapons option alone. In this context the Heads of State and Government of the Non-Aligned Movement and the members of the

New Agenda Coalition have also consistently reaffirmed that the total elimination of nuclear weapons remains the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of such weapons. They also agreed that, pending the total elimination of all nuclear weapons, efforts aimed at the conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States should be pursued as a matter of priority.

The events of Nagasaki and Hiroshima commemorated this month provide a vivid reminder about the unacceptable humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons and why the total elimination of these inhuman and indiscriminate instruments should no longer be postponed.

During the 2003 Preparatory Committee for the NPT Review Conference and the 2005 Review Conference, South Africa, together with its partners in the New Agenda Coalition (NAC), submitted a working paper on the issue of negative security assurances, together with elements of a draft treaty, as Ambassador Badr pointed out earlier. My delegation believes that the key concepts of that working paper remain valid, as does the continued need for the provision of negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States to address their legitimate concerns pending the total elimination of all nuclear weapons. The NAC working paper makes a reference to the 1996 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use by States of nuclear weapons in armed conflict, where it was decided unanimously that there is nothing in either customary or conventional law that specifically authorizes the threat or use of nuclear weapons and that the threat or use of force by means of nuclear weapons that is contrary to Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations and that fails to meet all the requirements of Article 51 is unlawful. South Africa regards the provision of security assurances as a key element of the NPT, which remains the primary nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament agreement. All States parties to the NPT are bound by the grand bargain of the Treaty, whereby the five nuclear-weapon States agreed to legally binding commitments to pursue nuclear disarmament, on the basis of which the non-nuclear-weapon States have forgone the nuclear weapons option.

Since the legally binding undertaking by non-nuclear-weapon States not to develop nuclear weapons was given in the context of the NPT, it follows logically that security assurances should be granted under the NPT umbrella. Regrettably, despite progress on the reduction of the overall number of operational nuclear arms, there has been little substantive progress on nuclear disarmament. Continued reliance on nuclear weapons in security doctrines, the development of new types of nuclear weapons and qualitative improvements to existing arsenals have led to increased insecurity among non-nuclear-weapon States. As States that have renounced the nuclear weapons option, the provision of security assurances in a codified manner would serve as a confidence-building measure as we work towards the achievement of a world without nuclear weapons. It is sometimes claimed that the nuclear-weapon States have already granted security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States, as we have heard earlier today, either by way of resolutions or in the context of nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties. If there is indeed such a commitment, there should be no objection to codifying such assurances in a universal legally binding instrument. Legally binding security assurances will not only contribute to international confidence and security but will also facilitate the process of the elimination of nuclear weapons.

While some proponents of a nuclear-weapon-free world have started questioning whether the issue of negative security assurances is not perhaps part of the old Cold War thinking, my delegation remains convinced about the necessity of establishing a legally binding framework that would provide credible assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons until such time as we achieve our goal of

the total elimination of all nuclear weapons. As long as these weapons exist, they will pose a threat to humanity. In order to address this threat, my delegation believes, a further step towards nuclear disarmament could also include a legally binding commitment banning the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons within the framework of a legally binding commitment towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Such an instrument would be consistent with the 1996 ICJ advisory opinion on the legality of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and could serve as a useful interim step towards the eventual total elimination of nuclear weapons.

We look forward to a continued engagement on these important matters.

The President (*spoke in French*): I thank the representative of South Africa for his statement and I now give the floor to Mr. Oyarce, the Ambassador of Chile.

Mr. Oyarce (Chile) (*spoke in Spanish*): We were not planning to make a statement on this subject. I was somewhat hesitant, as other delegations probably were as well, because it is not easy to come up with additional elements or ideas beyond those discussed on 12 June. Realistically, I would say that our value-added is to draw attention to the importance of a topic that has a bearing on nuclear disarmament. In this connection, we should like to thank the Ambassador of Japan for his comments. I had the opportunity to take part in the fellowship programme to which he referred, and I can attest to the fact that his country fully values the ethical and political importance of education in this domain.

Today, we heard a report on how the issue of negative security assurances has evolved and the legal background for this analysis. Mention was made of the Charter of the United Nations and the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, in other words, of the legal dimension, but also of what I would describe as the objective political constraints.

We have various proposals that have not led to any specific agreements, and so non-nuclear-weapon States are faced with a systematic threat. Hence, securing a binding commitment remains more of a political than a legal challenge, I would say. This becomes clear every time that we discuss this subject and it was also evident at the NPT Review Conference.

There is clearly a need to continue to deal with this subject realistically, bearing in mind the objective constraints, to which I have already alluded. Objectively speaking, the importance accorded to nuclear weapons in the power relations shaped by military doctrines poses a threat both to those who possess nuclear weapons and those who do not.

As long as ambiguity remains an integral part of deterrence, effective convergence on codification will be difficult to achieve.

We view negative security assurances as offering protection that is transitory and revocable. The concept of transitoriness and revocability is a key one. We know that the only valid guarantee is complete and verified disarmament, but until such time as objective change occurs in this domain, this Conference must focus its efforts on ways of genuinely strengthening the non-proliferation regime.

This is a political and legal necessity, if we are to create a sustainable global security environment. As repeatedly stated, we appreciate the unilateral declarations made by the nuclear Powers but view them as limited measures, since declarations of this kind are subject to reservations and could be withdrawn. We also need to draw attention — as has been done here repeatedly — to the importance of Security Council resolutions and of other statements adopted by the United Nations while also recognizing their well-known limitations.

The creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones can contribute to regional and international security and stability. These types of treaties must take account of conditions in each region. Nuclear-weapon-free zones are regional mechanisms that support the NPT non-proliferation regime, as was recognized at the 2010 Review Conference.

The subject of nuclear-weapon-free zones is often addressed under the rubric of negative security assurances. Opinions on this point may differ, but it is clear that nuclear-weapon-free zones are no substitute for efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament, nor do they negate the aspiration of a group of countries to negotiate a binding agreement on negative security assurances.

We are a party to the Tlatelolco Treaty, and we believe that nuclear-weapon-free zones offer a very useful means of building confidence in the current circumstances and an example of effective multilateral action. The Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) has experience in this area on which we should draw.

So, the promotion of nuclear-weapon-free zones in different regions of the world is, as already stated here, an extremely positive step in the context of disarmament and non-proliferation. The third conference to be held in 2015 will offer a fresh political opportunity to address this subject.

The successive analyses made and the statements delivered at this session show that this is a subject of concern to everyone, even if there are differences of perceptions or focus. While it is clear that the idea of an international convention on negative security assurances poses problems for some countries, we at this forum must be able to hold substantive and open discussions on this issue, with a view to formulating recommendations on all aspects of negative security assurances. It is clear, then, that this subject must be part of any effort to come up with a programme of work.

The President (*spoke in French*): I thank the Ambassador of Chile and now give the floor to the delegation of the Republic of Korea.

Mr. Lee Joo-il (Republic of Korea): Negative security assurances can play a role in strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime, providing an incentive to forgo acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. Since the relevant protocols to nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties represent one of the most effective ways of implementing negative security assurances, we welcome the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones around the world. However, I do not share the view that unconditional negative security assurances should be given to all non-nuclear-weapon States. Non-compliance of NPT States parties as well as the withdrawal by a State party, in breach of its NPT obligations pose a threat to international peace and security. Therefore, my delegation believes that negative security assurances should be provided only to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT that fully comply with their non-proliferation obligations.

In addition, I would like to make a brief comment on the statement by the delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. I just want to remind the delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that United Nations Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) clearly state that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea cannot have the status of a nuclear-weapon State in accordance with the NPT in any case, and that other resolutions decided that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea should abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner.

The President (*spoke in French*): I thank the delegation of the Republic of Korea. I note that the delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is asking for the floor.

Mr. Jon Yong Ryong (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): My delegation has asked for the floor to respond to the intervention by the South Korean delegate. Serious here is the act of the South Korean delegate of inciting confrontation between the North and South of Korea in this international forum. South Korea has neither justification nor face to talk about a nuclear deterrent of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. If there are any threats on the Korean Peninsula, they come from South Korea as a servant of the outside force that is pursuing a hostile policy towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Nevertheless, South Korea talks loudly of someone's threats; this is a shameless argument, just like a thief crying "Stop thief!"

The nuclear deterrent of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is not for recognition by someone. It is entirely for defending the country against aggression by an outside force. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has never recognized United Nations Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009). Its nuclear deterrent promotes stability on the Korean Peninsula and contributes to international peace and security.

The President (*spoke in French*): I have no more speakers on my list. I would like to check that no other delegations wish to take the floor. I see now that the delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran is asking for the floor.

Mr. Daryaei (Islamic Republic of Iran): We are now in the holy month of Ramadan and the feeling of spirituality is very high, so I would like to take this opportunity to sincerely thank God that the Republic of Korea is not a nuclear-weapon State with this kind of mentality.

The President (*spoke in French*): Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? I give the floor to the delegation of Nigeria.

Mr. Laro (Nigeria): On 14 March 2007, the then Foreign Minister of my country, Professor Joy Ogwu, who is now our Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York and the President Designate of the 2012 review conference of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, said here in this room that when we fail to focus on what others perceive as a threat or danger we not only create division and mistrust, we also create conditions that encourage the quest for alternative options for self-preservation. Professor Ogwu also said, and it is worth repeating, that non-nuclear-weapon States upholding the non-proliferation regime deserve to be rewarded with negative security assurances, and denying negative security assurances encourages proliferation.

The Nigerian delegation has consistently supported the establishment of a legally binding instrument providing negative security assurances, and we would like to use this opportunity to reiterate that support.

The President (*spoke in French*): Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? It seems not.

At the request of Germany, which will assume the presidency on 20 August, I would now like to draw attention to a practical matter. I would like to recall — admittedly, somewhat ahead of time, but forward planning is better for the organization of delegations — I would like, then, to recall that Monday, 20 August is a United Nations holiday. Therefore, the consultations that are normally held by the rotating presidents of the year and the meeting of the P6 with the regional coordinators cannot be held on Monday, 20 August. They will take place on Tuesday, 21 August, presumably at the usual time, i.e. at 11 a.m. So, it will be 11 a.m. for the meeting of the rotating presidents and 11.30 a.m. for the meeting of the presidents with the regional coordinators. The plenary meeting of the

Conference on Disarmament will be convened the same day, that is Tuesday, 21 August, but there will be a time change. The meeting will be held at 3 p.m.

I will repeat this information next week so that all delegations can make their arrangements.

Ladies and gentlemen — colleagues — our work has come to an end for today. The next formal plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held next Tuesday, 14 August, at 10 a.m. in this chamber.

The meeting rose at 11.50 a.m.