

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.1010
7 March 2006

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE THOUSAND AND TENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 7 March 2006, at 10.20 a.m.

President: Mr. PARK In-kook (Republic of Korea)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 1010th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the conclusion of the plenary meeting last Thursday I invited you to take into consideration the following elements for the debate to be held this week: the role of nuclear weapons in security policies; strengthened transparency; the principle of irreversibility; and FMCT, the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

As I have already indicated, these are not sub-items of the issue of nuclear disarmament but only indicative guidelines that could help delegations to make our deliberations more interactive and structured.

I would like to inform you that the compilation of various suggestions and proposals made during the plenary meetings last week is still under way, and more time is needed to finalize the process. As soon as the compilation is finalized, I will distribute it to delegations.

Today I have two speakers on my list for this plenary meeting: Germany and the Republic of Korea. I now give the floor to the Ambassador of Germany, Mr. Bernhard Brasack.

Mr. BRASACK (Germany): I must say, Mr. President, I think the statement that I am going to make fits into the programme that you have just indicated.

The aim of German policy in the area of nuclear disarmament remains a world that is free of the threat of nuclear weapons. The final goal of the process of nuclear disarmament is the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

This goal was formulated and enshrined in the Final Document of SSOD-1 in 1978, which also laid the basis for this important body, the Conference on Disarmament, and the agenda that we adopted again early at the beginning of this year's CD session.

It was again made explicit in the "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament" adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, and in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, in which the nuclear-weapon States subsequently declared their "unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals" as part of the 13 practical steps to implement article VI of the NPT.

These decisions did not occur in a vacuum. It was the end of the cold war, the end of the East-West confrontation, which brought with it these new opportunities for practical and concrete measures in the field of nuclear disarmament reflected in the commitments of these documents. Nuclear arms reductions have taken place since the end of the cold war, namely the ratification of the Moscow Treaty in 2002. Nevertheless, there is a continuing need for an overall reduction and more progress in reducing the arsenals in the pursuit of gradual, systematic nuclear disarmament.

(Mr. Brasack, Germany)

Here we have also to recognize the application of the principle of irreversibility to guide all measures in the field of nuclear disarmament and arms control, as a contribution to the maintenance and reinforcement of international peace, security and stability.

Arms control measures should respect the legitimate security interests of all States and promote stability at the same time.

If the multilateral treaty regime is to remain credible it must be made more effective. Progress in arms control should also be measured against the record of compliance with existing agreements. Particular emphasis has to be placed on a policy of strengthening compliance. Such a policy must be geared towards stringent verification instruments to enhance the detectability of significant violations. Arms control agreements touch upon vital security interests of the parties to the Treaty. Their implementation must therefore be subject to effective and reliable verification. Agreed arms control measures must exclude possibilities for circumvention.

Disarmament presupposes confidence. Confidence is the result of openness and predictability. It is therefore important to increase the transparency of relevant activities. Confidence creates more security, which makes reductions possible. Arms reductions cannot by themselves guarantee peace and stability. Developing an exchange of views on security concepts, military strategies and doctrines and their relationship to existing potentials is equally essential.

At the same time, the international security situation has become in many ways even more complex. Especially at the regional level, conflict potential has increased. The threats posed by the continuing proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery have become more pronounced. Developments during the last years have given rise to mounting concerns regarding continuing proliferation and non-compliance with the non-proliferation obligations of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The possible risk of nuclear weapons programmes being pursued under the cover of civilian nuclear programmes is a matter of particular concern.

Political solutions to all the different problems, fears and ambitions of countries in the regions most prone to proliferation will not be easily achievable in the short term. Therefore the policy must be to prevent, deter, halt and, where possible, eliminate programmes of concern, while making every effort to deal with their underlying causes.

The NPT remains the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. Both are fundamentally important; both are priorities and neither of them should be dealt with at the expense of the other. The NPT is the most universal multilateral treaty in disarmament. The possession of nuclear weapons by States outside the NPT and non-compliance with the Treaty's provisions by States party to the Treaty risk undermining non-proliferation and disarmament efforts.

It is of paramount importance to maintain its authority and its integrity in all its aspects. Furthermore, pursuing universal adherence to the Treaty stands for strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime and thus contributing to enhanced regional and international security and stability.

(Mr. Brasack, Germany)

We observe growing frustration regarding the slow progress in the field of nuclear disarmament. Germany regrets that the 2005 NPT Review Conference contributed to that frustration instead of giving new impetus to the process of nuclear disarmament.

Non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control can make an essential contribution to the global fight against terrorism by reducing the risk of non-State actors gaining access to weapons of mass destruction, radioactive materials and their means of delivery.

The complete elimination of nuclear weapons can be achieved only by an incremental approach, with the 13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive implementation of article VI by the 2000 NPT Review Conference as the performance benchmark for the disarmament process. Continued tangible progress towards irreversible and verifiable nuclear disarmament is indispensable.

First and foremost, we have to start negotiations in the CD to prohibit the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In this context, I recall paragraph 36 of the common position of the European Union relating to the 2005 NPT Review Conference, which “[appeals] again to the Disarmament Conference for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of a non-discriminatory, universally applicable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, without preconditions, and bearing in mind the Special Coordinator’s report and the mandate included therein”. An FMCT would constitute a substantial new nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation measure, a proof of effective multilateralism and an essential building block of our international security system.

As part of the overall nuclear disarmament process, non-strategic nuclear weapons must be reduced as well in a verifiable and irreversible manner on all sides. In Germany, there is a serious public debate on this issue which calls for practical steps. The European Union common position on the 2005 NPT Review Conference also highlights this aim. In it, the European Union takes up a step-by-step approach that was advocated in a working paper that Germany presented to the first Preparatory Committee for the seventh NPT Review Conference. An incremental approach is needed with first rather modest confidence-building measures, for example, the reaffirmation of the 1991-1992 Presidential nuclear initiatives by the United States of America and the Russian Federation, as well as a voluntary exchange of information by all nuclear-weapon States on existing holdings of non-strategic nuclear weapons, taking into account the protection of confidential information.

Furthermore, the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty at the earliest possible date is of key importance to any progress in this field. That is why Germany calls upon all States that have not yet signed and ratified the Treaty, and in particular those whose ratification is required for early entry into force, to do so without delay and without conditions.

(Mr. Brasack, Germany)

Germany fully supports the establishment of an appropriate subsidiary body in the CD to deal with nuclear disarmament, as called for in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Overcoming the stalemate of the CD would give decisive impetus to the process of nuclear disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Brasack of Germany for his statement. I now give the floor to the representative of the Republic of Korea, Dr. Kang Kyung-wha, the Director-General for International Organizations at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Republic of Korea.

Ms. KANG (Republic of Korea): Mr. President, let me begin by saying how heartened and proud I am to be sitting next to you and to seeing you preside over the session.

It gives me great honour to speak in this historic chamber, where landmark arms control treaties were produced in the past.

I would like to express my heartfelt appreciation to you and the other Presidents for your hard work in trying to create a common approach to re-energize the CD in the face of nine years of stalemate.

My delegation is satisfied with the fact that the exercise got off to a good start last week with focused debates on nuclear disarmament. Reading the statements sitting in Seoul, I was greatly encouraged by the eagerness with which many delegations expressed their intention to go deeper into the debate on nuclear disarmament. Knowing that the debate during the past plenaries has been full of in-depth discussions on concrete ideas, I would today just like to offer a brief and general statement on the Republic of Korea's position on nuclear arms reduction.

Nuclear disarmament is vitally important to lasting international peace and security.

We thus acknowledge the significance of the progress made in the reduction of nuclear warheads thus far and the commitments for further reductions under the Moscow Treaty. But we would like to see deeper cuts in the numbers and measures to assure irreversibility to military uses.

In this sense, the Republic of Korea welcomes the Russian Federation's willingness to go below the level of reduction stipulated in the Moscow Treaty, as indicated by Ambassador Loshchinin at the last plenary.

But progress in nuclear disarmament has not matched the rapidly rising expectations of the post-cold-war era. The gap between the records of nuclear-weapon States and the expectations of non-nuclear-weapon States remains wide. Non-nuclear-weapon States have become increasingly concerned about the role of nuclear weapons in the policies and military doctrines of some nuclear-weapons States.

Closing this gap is imperative in restoring trust between nuclear-weapons States and non-nuclear-weapon States.

(Ms. Kang, Republic of Korea)

In this vein, we welcome the information provided by some nuclear-weapons States during the last four plenary sessions.

They identified useful elements for further elaboration, such as the role of nuclear weapons in security policy, ways to strengthen transparency, the principle of irreversibility, and FMCT.

We believe elaboration by the nuclear-weapons States on the role of nuclear weapons in their military doctrines will contribute towards dispelling unnecessary misgivings about their intentions. A proactive attitude by the nuclear-weapons States is essential. Written submissions of their positions on this issue as official documents of the CD would be greatly appreciated by the non-nuclear-weapon States.

Furthermore, we need also to seek ways to strengthen transparency concerning nuclear warhead stockpiles, disarmament implementation, and so forth. Strengthening transparency not only contributes towards building confidence among nuclear-weapons States, but also provides useful reference materials for non-nuclear-weapon States to assess progress in nuclear disarmament. As Ireland suggested in its last intervention, we may take a phased and evolutionary approach. We would like to hear the views of the nuclear-weapons States on this point.

In particular, taking into consideration the institutional deficit to make use of such information at multilateral levels, it is suggested that the nuclear-weapons States jointly work out a practical formula to be implemented in a systematic way and on a regular basis.

The issue of irreversibility has assumed increasing importance among nuclear-disarmament-related issues in the face of the possibility of nuclear terrorism. Safe storage and the destruction of excess material resulting from disarmament measures have become vital to international peace and security. These materials must be permanently and irreversibly disposed of.

At the multilateral level as well as at the bilateral level, significant efforts are under way in this regard. In particular, we expect the full implementation of the Trilateral Initiative and its expansion to other nuclear-weapons States to assure the transparency and irreversibility of this process. Progress in this area, coupled with continued progress in the reduction of warheads, will no doubt help to build confidence on the issue of fissile materials.

Among the four core issues of the CD, FMCT remains the priority for Korea. Like many others, we believe that negotiations on FMCT should start immediately. We should not prejudge what the treaty is to say.

In this sense, we hope that during the focused debates on FMCT in May, our deliberations will be organized along the normal structure of arms control treaties, so that they may serve as a springboard for progress in the future.

(Ms. Kang, Republic of Korea)

The international community is in a bind, where mistrust and accusations permeate every level of multilateral disarmament forums, while unreserved cooperation involving all nations is urgently called for to effectively address the security threats of the day. Sadly, the CD has exemplified the situation.

Against this bleak background, the six presidencies of 2006 have worked very hard in seeking a breakthrough. The current Korean presidency is expected to set the tone for the rest of the year. We are encouraged to detect a modicum of cautious optimism in this regard.

Focused and interactive debates on CD issues themselves cannot produce definitive results. But still they serve as stepping stones as delegations continue to search for solutions to CD issues in the years to come.

In this sense, I hope that at the end of this year, we will all be celebrating the good results of the outstanding efforts of the six Presidents.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Dr. Kang for her statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair and the six presidencies.

This concludes my list of speakers for this morning's session. Does any delegation wish to take the floor at this time? Ambassador Mine, you have the floor.

Mr. MINE (Japan): I would like to thank Dr. Kang for her very clear statement, which was full of interest and motivation. I was also quite pleased to hear the statement of the German Ambassador, Mr. Brasack. I would like to take advantage of the presence of Dr. Kang, which is a rare opportunity, to ask her a question which has been bothering me personally for a long time, particularly concerning what we have debated today, including FMCT and other items, irreversibility, verifiability and other aspects of nuclear disarmament. I hope these questions will not embarrass her. What I would like to ask her is what she thinks about the five Ambassadors' formula, which deals with the four major items - nuclear disarmament, negative security assurances, PAROS and FMCT all together. In a sense I am stepping into a certain technical area. You must be occupied with other areas, but if you have some basic view of this "package", I would be very pleased to learn from you about the future direction of our efforts to deal with this item of the five Ambassadors' proposal, which had significance at a certain point, and which we still support in a formal position. I think it is useful to look at whether this is still valid or not.

The PRESIDENT: I give the floor to the representative of Venezuela, Ambassador Raquel Poitevien Cabral.

Ms. POITEVIEN CABRAL (Venezuela) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, as I am taking the floor for the first time during your term, I wish to say how pleased my delegation is that you are presiding over our debates and assure you of our support, as in the case of the Ambassadors who have preceded you, and who have done an excellent job.

(Ms. Poitevien Cabral, Venezuela)

All delegations are aware of the position of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela with respect to the issue that is before us today, nuclear disarmament. This delegation supports the statement made by the Ambassador of Iraq on behalf of the G-21 on 28 February 2006.

Venezuela attaches the highest priority to the issue of nuclear disarmament, and is convinced of the need to proceed to the total elimination of nuclear weapons as the only effective means of addressing various challenges arising from their mere existence, such as proliferation and what is referred to as nuclear terrorism. While Venezuela commends the efforts made by various Powers in reducing nuclear weapons and also international assistance in this area, we consider that work needs to be stepped up to enable us to move towards the objective of a world free of such lethal weapons, their use and the threat of their use. Venezuela, which is proud to belong to the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in the world, located in Latin America and set up under the Treaty of Tlatelolco, supports the establishment of new such zones and, in this connection, urges all States that are not yet members of one of these zones to work towards their establishment, especially in the complex region of the Middle East.

Similarly, Venezuela, as a State party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, shares the frustration of the international community at the failure of the Seventh Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. We urge States that have not yet signed or ratified these agreements to do so, insofar as both instruments are indispensable to peace and international security. We also call for the implementation of the 13 practical steps identified at the 2000 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The entry into force of this treaty is a moral imperative that will curb the development of new nuclear weapons. While we support all efforts aimed at nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, we are of the view that these should not divert our attention from the legitimate interest of States in having nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Thus we reiterate the importance of States placing their nuclear facilities under the IAEA safeguards regime. This will undoubtedly increase confidence among States in this area and will allow for the unimpeded development of their nuclear programmes for peaceful purposes.

In order to face the challenges of nuclear disarmament, Venezuela urges this Conference on Disarmament to proceed to the establishment of an ad hoc committee to address nuclear disarmament, as proposed by the five Ambassadors. Despite the fact that we are in favour of the negotiation of an agreement on nuclear disarmament, we also join in supporting this proposal if it will allow for the adoption of a programme of work for this Conference on Disarmament and the consequent establishment of such subsidiary bodies as are considered necessary.

Lastly, Venezuela wishes to express its deep concern at the existence of military doctrines which still contemplate the use of nuclear weapons, increase the possible justifications for their use, or advocate the need to develop more and better nuclear weapons. Also, we note with surprise the statement made by one nuclear Power raising the possibility of using its nuclear arsenal against States that do not possess such weapons. We join in the reiterated appeals of many non-nuclear-weapon States that States which have nuclear weapons should offer them negative security assurances by means of a legally binding international instrument.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Venezuela, Ambassador Poitevien Cabral, for her statement and her kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the Netherlands, Ambassador Johannes Landman.

Mr. LANDMAN: (Netherlands): We felt last week we had a fruitful and frank exchange of views on the issue of nuclear disarmament. There were many speakers, and we were pleased with the transparency shown by several, in particular by the nuclear-weapon States, in accounting for their production measurements of nuclear warheads in recent years. We continue to encourage the nuclear-weapon States which have not yet done so to follow that example.

My authorities were also pleased to note that a cross-regional understanding emerged about negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty as being the next logical step towards nuclear disarmament, since it is our strong conviction that an FMCT would benefit all of the CD members. Of course there are different views expressed on what such a treaty should entail, for instance, on scope and verification. This, however, should not prevent us from entering into negotiations at the earliest opportunity. Differences should be accommodated during negotiations. Starting negotiations on an FMCT as a first step towards nuclear disarmament at this stage should therefore no longer be postponed. It has been said before and I shall say it again today: it is time the CD started working again. And after starting negotiations on FMCT, which will, for sure, take several years to conclude, the CD would, we believe, have gained momentum and would be ready to tackle the remaining issues on the agenda in a much more propitious environment. My Government, like Germany and the Republic of Korea said before me, is for a phased approach, and for sure, we are ready to engage in such further negotiations.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Landman of the Netherlands for his statement. I now give the floor to Ambassador Trezza of Italy.

Mr. TREZZA (Italy): I would like at the outset to welcome Dr. Kang Kyung-wha, whom I happen to know personally and who is, I think a brilliant representative of the diplomacy of the Republic of Korea.

I would like to take this opportunity to make some comments on the written statements which have been presented today by my German colleague and by the representative of the Republic of Korea, and to say that my delegation fully shares the approach of these two delegations, the focus that they have put on some specific aspects of the issue of nuclear disarmament, which are clearly of relevance. I underline in particular the fact that both of these delegations have mentioned the results, although insufficient, which have taken place in the field of nuclear disarmament, including after the end of the cold war. They mentioned in particular the Moscow Treaty, the principles of transparency and other important aspects of this multifaceted reality which is nuclear disarmament. Both delegations also underlined the priority that they dedicate to the FMCT, an issue that was also raised by our colleague from the Netherlands, and this concept of our discussions here on FMCT as a possible springboard for a real negotiation on this important aspect. I just wanted to underline that we welcome these statements.

(Mr. Trezza, Italy)

We also listened carefully to the statement made by our colleague from Venezuela, indicating in particular the great importance of what has been achieved in Latin America with regard to nuclear disarmament through the Tlatelolco Treaty. We certainly appreciate that. We should also read the whole statement more carefully, which is in any case of great interest to us.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Trezza for his statement. I now give the floor to Ambassador Paul Meyer of Canada.

Mr. MEYER (Canada): Let me congratulate those colleagues who participated, I think, in a particularly rich discussion of this broad theme of nuclear disarmament last week, and also today I was particularly struck by the common interest in the theme of transparency, and I do think when we look at the challenge of nuclear disarmament, there is a vital preliminary role that is played by transparency, both in terms of getting the facts clear and agreed, and secondly, in the confidence-building that it provides, and I think we can develop this further.

You referred to a compilation of ideas. I would think there is a lot of scope, building on the very helpful interventions of the United States and Russian delegations in this debate. I think we could seek to formulate that transparency in a further step. I would ask those delegations to consider whether they might be able to provide an annual indication since the Moscow Treaty came into effect, in 2003, I believe, of the reduction types that have been achieved under that to date, and secondly, a projection of, let us say over the next five years, again on an annual basis, what they intend to achieve in terms of further progress on reductions. Clearly, that would only be an indicative timetable on the projection and subject to various developments, but I think it could serve a great purpose in indicating the glide slope consistently downward as those two countries move to implement this significant agreement.

A third element that goes a little bit beyond mere transparency - but I think it would serve as an important confidence-building measure if the two countries - the two parties - could agree on what the final destination was. You recall the Treaty is formulated with a result of between 1,700 and 2,200, I believe, strategic systems. I think if they could agree soon on a final number there, preferably, I will confess, a lower number, perhaps the low end of that spectrum, I think that, too, could also serve an important purpose.

We heard from our German colleague just now that it is also in the area of non-strategic nuclear weapons where some information exchange, I think, would serve an important confidence-building purpose. We recognize that there are security considerations here at play, but surely they do not pertain when we are just talking about aggregated totals, rather than elements that would be site-specific. So here again, I think building on the accomplishments already done, this would be a further way of advancing these purposes.

That is regarding the element of transparency. Regarding the challenge of this body and how we continue to move beyond our general statements to some greater engagement with the substance of the issues that we have before us, I think we need to make further progress here as

(Mr. Meyer, Canada)

well. I am conscious that we have six Friends of the Presidents that have been named, very distinguished colleagues among us. I am sure they are honoured to have been selected in this way, but I suspect they would be even more honoured, and even more pleased, if they could be given something substantive to do relating to the purposes of this Conference.

Mr. President, you outlined, at the end of last week, and you reiterated again today, certain major themes that have emerged from the discussion: the role of nuclear weapons in security policy; transparency, which I have just referred to now; irreversibility; and a fissile material cut-off treaty. Could I suggest that each of those themes might warrant being assigned to a Friend or Friends of the Presidents and they be asked to take this work forward in an informal mode, presumably, to see if we can extract more value from our discussions and ideally identify some measures of practical utility relating to those themes? I think that is a way in which we could make better use of these individuals, and frankly, better use of the time available to this Conference.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Meyer of Canada for his interactive comment and statement. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this time? Ambassador Mary Whelan of Ireland has the floor.

Ms. WHELAN (Ireland): Mr. President, could I commend you on the way you have conducted the focused discussion last week and continued the discussion this week? And I think you have indeed extrapolated the four themes that have come out of our discussion to date. Like Canada, we would like to explore ways of deepening that discussion, so that we don't have the sense that we have done nuclear disarmament items 1 and 2, now let's move on to the next focused discussion. In other words, I would like to pursue the question of how we can give some more depth to our deliberations over the next few weeks, and in that context, I look forward very much to the appearance of the compilation document and would like to ask when we can expect to see that document.

Could I also thank very much Dr. Kang Kyung-wha for her reference to the Irish statement last week? - and we would certainly look forward to working with other delegations on the issue of transparency, if that were something that people felt we could take further at this session.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Whelan of Ireland for her brief comment. I wonder if there are any other delegations who want to take the floor. That does not seem to be the case.

Before I adjourn this meeting, I will give the floor to Dr. Kang of the Republic of Korea.

Ms. KANG (Republic of Korea): Thank you for giving me the floor again, Mr. President, and let me just thank the distinguished Ambassador of Japan for his warm words of welcome and the questions that he has addressed to me, and also to Ambassador Trezza - it is certainly very heartening to see a familiar, friendly face in this forum, which is rather new to me - and also to the distinguished Ambassador of Ireland for her kind words as well.

(Ms. Kang, Republic of Korea)

Regarding the question from the Japanese Ambassador on our position on the A-5 proposal on the work programme, I do believe that my colleagues here in Geneva have expressed our position on many occasions and that is that we remain flexible in the process of building consensus on the A-5 proposal. I take it that the question arises from our reference to the FMCT in the statement. We do not believe that that is in contradiction to our flexibility on the A-5 proposal. We do believe the FMCT, on its own merits, deserves priority.

The PRESIDENT: Before I conclude today's meeting, taking this opportunity, I want to make clear my intention on how I will run the remaining sessions. As Ambassador Rapacki clarified on 9 February, each President will have a general debate session and a focused structured debate session. During the general debate session, we will allow for a rolling discussion on all agenda items, without prejudice to the right of member States to raise any issue, based on rule 30 of our rules of procedure.

The nature of the four sub-elements which I suggested at our last plenary session is just indicative and a guideline for the purpose of a more constructive and interactive debate. In that sense, if I reiterate our position, any member State could raise any issues. So based on that principle, I encourage all member States to actively participate in a more interactive pattern, as we have today.

Mr. ORDZHONIKIDZE (Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations): At the end of the morning meeting, we heard interesting proposals as to further procedures of the CD coming from the Canadian Ambassador and the Irish Ambassador. It would be good for the CD to think about these proposals and have some kind of reaction, because obviously those proposals could, if they are going to be acceptable, form a new atmosphere and could form a new step, even, in the work of the CD. So I believe those proposals are quite important ones from the point of view of the practical work of the Conference.

The PRESIDENT: This concludes our plenary meeting of this morning. The next plenary meeting will be held on Thursday, 9 March 2006, at 10 a.m. sharp in this conference room, to give the floor to the Croatian Ambassador.

The meeting rose at 11.10 a.m.