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# Conference on Disarmament

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## **Bangladesh on behalf of member States of G-21**

### **Working paper**

### **Negative security assurances**

1. The Group of 21 reaffirms that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Group remains convinced that as long as nuclear weapons exist, so also will the risk of their proliferation and possible use remain with us.
2. Pending the achievement of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, the Group reaffirms the urgent need to reach an early agreement on a universal; unconditional and legally-binding instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Such an instrument should be clear, credible, without any ambiguity, and should respond to the concerns of all the parties.
3. The Group believes that there is a need to recognize the right of non-nuclear-weapon States not to be attacked by or threatened by the nuclear-weapons States with the use of nuclear weapons and strongly calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to refrain from any such action or threat, whether implicit or explicit.
4. The Group underlines the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.
5. The Group highlights the objectives laid down in resolution 67/38 of the General Assembly entitled "Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation", which, among other things, reaffirms multilateralism as the core principle in resolving disarmament and non-proliferation concerns.
6. The Group remains deeply concerned at strategic defense doctrines, which not only set out rationales for the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, but also maintain unjustifiable concepts on international security based on promoting and developing military alliance's nuclear deterrence policies.
7. The Group believes that, pending the total elimination of all nuclear weapons, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned and taking into account provisions of the First Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament

(SSOD I), is a positive step and important measure towards strengthening global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. In this context, the Group welcomes the nuclear-weapon-free zones established by the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba, Semipalatinsk and Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free-status. The Group reiterates that in the context of nuclear-weapon-free zones, it is essential that nuclear-weapon States provide unconditional assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all States of the zones.

8. The Group reiterates its support for the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of all nuclear weapons. To this end, the Group reaffirms the need for the speedy establishment of nuclear-weapon-free-zone in the Middle East in accordance with the resolution 487 (1981) and resolution 687 (1991), paragraph 14 of the Security Council and the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly adopted by consensus. The States Parties of the Group of 21 to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons recall the deliberations of the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference that took place between 22 April and 3 May 2013 in Geneva. In this context, they express their profound disappointment on not convening the Conference on the establishment in the Middle East a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in 2012 as scheduled and agreed upon by a consensus decision contained in the final document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. While strongly rejecting the alleged impediments for not convening the Conference on schedule, the States Parties of the Group of 21 to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons urge the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Russian Federation, to convene the Conference without any further delay in order to avoid any negative repercussions for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. They also recall in this context their statement reaffirming that Israel is the only impediment in the creation of such a zone in the Middle East. The States Parties of the Group of 21 to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reiterate their call for the full implementation of the recommendations for follow-on actions adopted at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, particularly the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East that was an essential element of the package of decisions at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and of the basis on which the Treaty was indefinitely extended without a vote.

9. While the Group believes that the nuclear-weapon-free zones are positive steps towards strengthening global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, it does not subscribe to the arguments stating that declarations that have been made by the nuclear-weapon States are sufficient, or that security assurances should only be granted in the context of nuclear-weapon free zones. In addition, given their geographical limitation, security assurances guaranteed to States-members of nuclear-weapon-free zones cannot substitute for universal legally-binding security assurances.

10. The Group recalls that the demand for security assurances was raised by the non-nuclear-weapon States in the 1960s and it crystallized in 1968 during the concluding phase of the negotiations for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The response of the nuclear-weapon States reflected in resolutions 255 (1968) and 984 (1995) of the Security Council was considered incomplete, partial and conditional by the non-nuclear-weapon States. The demand for assurances therefore persists.

11. The Group accepts that while various approaches exist, efforts to conclude a universal and legally-binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States should be vigorously pursued. The Group considers that the conclusion of such an instrument would be an important step towards achieving the objectives of arms control, nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation in all its aspects.

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