Conference on Disarmament

13 September 2011

Original: English

Nigeria on behalf of member States of G-21

Working paper

Negative Security Assurances

1. The Group reaffirms that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Group remains convinced that as long as nuclear weapons exist, so also will the risk of their proliferation and possible use remain with us.

2. Pending the achievement of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, the Group reaffirms the urgent need to reach an early agreement on a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Such an instrument should be clear, credible without any ambiguity, and should respond to the concerns of all the parties.


3. The Group believes that there is a need to recognize the right of non-nuclear weapon States not to be attacked by or threatened by the nuclear weapons States (NWS) with the use of nuclear weapons and strongly calls upon the nuclear weapon States to refrain from any such action or threat whether implicit or explicit. This position is a long-standing one.

4. The Group underlines the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

5. The Group highlights the objectives laid down in **General Assembly resolution 65/54** entitled "Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation", which, among other things, reaffirms multilateralism as the core principle in resolving disarmament and non-proliferation concerns.

6. The Group remains deeply concerned at strategic defense doctrines, which not only set out rationales for the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, but also maintain unjustifiable concepts on international security based on promoting and developing military alliance's nuclear deterrence policies.

7. The Group believes that the establishment of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs), on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned and taking into account provisions of the first UN General Assembly devoted to Disarmament (SSOD1), is a positive step and important measure towards strengthening



global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. In this context, the Group welcomes the NWFZs established by treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba, Semipalatinsk and Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free-status. The Group reiterates that in the context of nuclear-weapon-free zones, it is essential that NWS should provide unconditional assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all States of the zones.

8. The Group reiterates its support for the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of all nuclear weapons. To this end, the Group reaffirms the need for the speedy establishment of NWFZ in the Middle East in accordance with the Security Council Resolution 487 (1981) and paragraph 14 of the Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) and the relevant General-Assembly resolutions adopted by consensus. The G21 States Parties to the NPT welcome the 2010 NPT Review Conference endorsement of convening in 2012 a conference to be attended by all States of the Middle East on the establishment of a Middle East Zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.

9. While the Group believes that the NWFZs are positive steps towards strengthening global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, it does not subscribe to the arguments stating that declarations that have been made by the nuclear-weapon States are sufficient, or that security assurances should only be granted in the context of nuclear-weapon free zones. In addition, given their geographical limitation, security assurances guaranteed to states-members of nuclear weapon free zones cannot substitute for universal legally binding security assurances.

10. The Group recalls that the demand for security assurances was raised by the nonnuclear weapon States in the 1960s and it crystallized in 1968 during the concluding phase of the negotiations for the NPT. The response of the nuclear-weapon States reflected in Resolutions 255 (1968) and 984 (1995) of the Security Council was considered incomplete, partial and conditional by the non-nuclear-weapon States. The demand for assurances persists.

11. The Group accepts that while various approaches exist, efforts to conclude a universal and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States should be vigorously pursued. The Group considers that the conclusion of such an instrument would be an important step towards achieving the objectives of arms control, nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects.