

裁 军 谈 判 会 议

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2008 年 8 月 26 日格鲁吉亚常驻代表 致裁军谈判会议秘书长的信，其中转交 格鲁吉亚目前局势最新情况全文

我谨转交 2008 年 8 月 26 日格鲁吉亚代表团在裁军谈判会议第 1115 次全体会议上所作的关于俄罗斯联邦对格鲁吉亚领土进行军事侵略的声明全文 * 及附件。

谨请作出安排，将本信全文以及所附声明和附件作为裁军谈判会议的正式文件印发。

常驻代表
大 使
乔吉·戈尔吉拉泽(签名)

* 所作声明见 CD/PV.1115。

格鲁吉亚常驻代表乔吉·戈尔吉拉泽大使谨借此机会向尊敬的裁军谈判会议介绍格鲁吉亚目前局势的最新情况，这是上周会议期间讨论的议题。

从法律上讲，格鲁吉亚遭受了俄罗斯联邦全面的军事侵略，违反了《联合国宪章》的原则和规则，其中包括禁止在国家间使用武力和尊重格鲁吉亚的主权和领土完整。俄罗斯联邦以所谓格鲁吉亚奥塞梯人权利遭到侵犯为借口实施其不法行为，这是很不光彩的。格鲁吉亚不参与关于俄罗斯联邦以其辩解作为侵略行为理由的辩论，只想指出，一般而言，国际社会不赞同为所谓“保护公民/侨民”动用武力，因为这违背了《联合国宪章》的原则而且在没有安理会授权的情况下缺乏正当性。具有讽刺意味的是，即使可以说俄罗斯的论点有正当推理，但俄罗斯联邦却从未使用任何国际机制作为讨论其关注的适当场所。在格鲁吉亚的阿布哈兹和格鲁吉亚的南奥塞梯大规模颁发俄罗斯护照之后，俄罗斯的辩解令人生疑而且违反了主权原则和睦邻原则。¹ 它还使人进一步质疑这种干预的真正目的和动机，特别是在没有事先向国际社会征求对有关问题的意见的情况下。²

至于格鲁吉亚茨欣瓦利地区大规模平民死亡问题，俄罗斯联邦以此作为另一个法律理由为干预行动辩护，这种事实既未得到人权观察社等国际人权组织的确认，也未得到俄罗斯执法机关的确认。³ 很不幸，在敌对行动中有平民伤亡，我们为这些平民感到哀痛，因为在武装冲突中任何平民生命的损失都是一个悲剧事件。

格鲁吉亚境内所有平民成为俄罗斯联邦侵略行为的直接受害者，这是极为不幸的。尤其是，俄罗斯武装力量的行为违反了国际人道主义法规定的关于作战手段与

¹ 欧安组织高级事务专员就保护少数民族和海外公民问题发表声明，见以下网站：

<http://www.osce.org/item/32663.html>

² 特别是，不允许国际人道主义组织进入俄罗斯军队控制的区域。只有红十字国际委员会在进行了长时间的谈判后才被允许进入格鲁吉亚的茨欣瓦利地区。

³ 人权观察社报告说，在发生敌对行动期间，有据可查的平民死亡人数少于 100 人。人权观察社进一步指出，在发生敌对行动期间，袭击针对的是军事目标，而非平民——见以下网站：

<http://hrw.org/english/docs/2008/08/10/georgi19581.htm> 据俄罗斯检察署调查人员的报告，格鲁吉亚南奥塞梯仅有 133 名平民死亡——见以下网站：www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1013890&ThemesID=301

方法的主要原则。在法国总统萨科齐先生以欧盟主席身份斡旋下，格鲁吉亚和俄罗斯联邦两国总统于 2008 年 8 月 15 日至 16 日签署了停火协议之后这些侵犯行为还在继续。8 月 23 日，在军事占领格鲁吉亚部分领土仅一周后，俄罗斯当局宣布从格鲁吉亚本境撤军，然而，仅部分完成了撤军。截至今日，俄罗斯军队还占领着格鲁吉亚茨欣瓦利冲突地区之外的格鲁吉亚本境。⁴ 俄罗斯的行为不仅公然违反了停火协议，此外，俄罗斯武装部队的抢劫、掠夺、摧毁财产、羁押和非人道对待平民、即决处决和劫持人质等行为(包括在俄罗斯武装力量控制下的领土上)使局势进一步恶化。

说起作战手段与方法的违反，似乎俄罗斯现当局忘记了费奥多尔·马顿斯在起草国际人道主义法条约时所遵循的人道原则。在过去两周，平民目标(城市、医院、学术设施、教堂)都受到了军事袭击，违反了区别原则。在撤离格鲁吉亚部分被占领土时，俄罗斯武装部队在铁路、民用基础设施和办公机构布设了地雷，这些地方在人道主义法的相关准则下本身不算是军事目标。这些行为的目的实际上是为了增加人道主义危机、制造经济障碍和恐吓普通平民。本声明附有平民目标遭受袭击/轰炸的发生时间和信息。

格鲁吉亚特别提请裁谈会注意俄罗斯武装力量使用了集束弹药和对平民有滥杀滥伤作用的其他类型作战手段。尤其是，俄罗斯武装力量广泛使用[并留下]了 9M72 “伊斯坎德”(SS-26 顽石)、短程战术弹道导弹“托契卡-U”(SS-21 圣甲虫)、“冰雹”和“飓风”多管火箭发射系统、多种改装的集束弹药(包括 RBK-250)。本声明附有集束弹药图片。

俄方遗留下了大量未爆炸弹药和杀伤人员地雷，多是故意设置在道路、草地和农场上的，每天都造成平民伤亡。目前局势给数十万希望返回其永久居住点的境内流离失所者带来了严重后果。

除民用目标和平民人口外，俄罗斯武装力量还以格鲁吉亚的环境为目标——以燃烧弹轰炸波约米的山区和 Tsemi 拓居点。大片林地被焚烧，包括国家公园受保护

⁴ 这意味着，俄罗斯武装力量除继续呆在格鲁吉亚的阿布哈兹和南奥塞梯之外，仍在敌对行动发生前由格鲁吉亚当局控制下的领土上，例如，靠近戈里镇的村庄、波季港和邻近地区，上科多里等地区。

植物种在内的数百公顷特有植物群被烧毁，违反了《特定常规武器公约第三号议定书》。⁵

今天，格鲁吉亚仍在期待俄罗斯政府遵守《停火协议》，信守诚信，离开被其武装部队占领的格鲁吉亚领土。在这方面，格鲁吉亚呼吁国际社会所有成员支持将问题解决办法和建立信任进程国际化，使所有相关国际组织和机制积极参与其中。

⁵ 第二条第 4 款明确禁止以森林或其他种类的植被作为燃烧武器的攻击目标，《禁止或限制使用某些可被认为具有过分伤害力或滥杀滥伤作用的常规武器公约第三号议定书》：(《禁止或限制使用燃烧武器议定书》)1980 年 10 月 10 日。

Annex

[ENGLISH ONLY]

Timeline of Russian Aggression in Georgia

DOCUMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF GEORGIA
25 AUGUST 2008
TBILISI

The Government of Georgia invites the international community and journalists to verify the information laid out in the timeline below.

PURPOSE OF THIS DOCUMENT

In seeking to justify its invasion of Georgia, Russia has claimed that its forces entered Georgian territory only after a purported “surprise Georgian assault” on Tskhinvali; however, Moscow continues to refuse to make public the time at which Russia launched its invasion into Georgia.

As the following timeline makes clear, Georgian Government forces advanced into the Tskhinvali region only after days of intensive shelling that caused civilian deaths in villages under Georgian control—and after confirmation that a massive Russian land force had begun invading Georgia through the Roki Tunnel.

This was the culmination of months of meticulous planning by Russia; 40,000 Russian troops were soon occupying Georgia, as part of a simultaneous land, air and sea assault, unfolding a premeditated strategy that had little to do with Russia’s stated claim of protecting its recently created “citizens” in the Tskhinvali region.

This document is organized into the following three sections:

- I. RUSSIAN ESCALATION 2004-AUGUST 2008: Russian Policy Toward Georgia in the Months Before the Invasion**
- II. KEY POINTS: The Days Before, During & After Russia’s Invasion of Georgia**
- III. DETAILED CHRONOLOGY: THE DAYS BEFORE, During & After Russia’s Invasion of Georgia**

I. RUSSIAN ESCALATION 2004-JULY 2008: Key Developments in the Russian Military & Political Escalation Before the Invasion of Georgia

- **Georgian peace proposals repeatedly rejected by Russia (2004 onwards):** Beginning in 2004, the Georgian Government has repeatedly proposed to launch a genuine peace process for South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Years of stalemate had left all ethnic populations in both conflict zones impoverished and without any effective protection of basic rights; Georgians in particular were targeted and persecuted on ethnic grounds. The Russian Federation and separatist leaders have rejected Georgia's peace initiatives each and every time they have been proposed—even when the international community backed the initiatives. As a result, South Ossetia and Abkhazia have become hubs for acute criminal activity, including kidnapping, extortion, counterfeiting, smuggling of arms and drugs. At least one case of nuclear smuggling has been confirmed (Annex 1).
- **Russia gains stranglehold over separatist governments (2005 onwards):** In recent years, Moscow has been exerting an increasingly strong hold over the separatist governments; since 2005, Russian military and civilian officials seconded from Moscow effectively have been governing South Ossetia (Annex 2).
- **Russia builds illegal base near Tskhinvali (2006):** In spring 2006, Russian forces illegally build of a forward military base in the strategically located town of Java (north of Tskhinvali). The base has capacity for 2,500 soldiers, and includes substantial fuel-storage capabilities for tanks and other armored vehicles.
- **CIS arms/economic embargo lifted illegally by Moscow (March 2008):** In March, the Russian Federation unilaterally—and illegally—withdraws from a CIS economic and arms embargo imposed in 1994 on the secessionist region of Abkhazia, Georgia.
- **International community condemns Russia's legal recognition of S. Ossetia & Abkhazia (April 2008):** On April 16, Moscow sharply escalates tensions by decreeing the establishment of legal links between Russia and the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia; this is a form of de facto annexation of Georgian territory and draws sharp rebukes from the entire international community—including the EU, the US, the OSCE, and others, who call for the immediate reversal of this Russian decision.
- **United Nations confirms Russia downs Georgian aircraft over Georgian airspace (April 2006):** On April 20, a Russian fighter jet downs an unarmed Georgian drone (MIA) over Georgian airspace (near Ganmukhuri), an act of aggression confirmed by formal UNOMIG and OSCE investigative reports. (Annex 3)
- **Russia increases troop strength & introduces paratroopers into Abkhazia (May/June 2008):** In the following weeks, Russia continues to unilaterally increase its troop strength in Abkhazia, without fulfilling its legal obligation to seek the consent of Georgia; among other moves, it deploys paratrooper units, which are incompatible with the existing format for peacekeeping.

- **Russia moves illegal heavy weaponry & offensive forces into Abkhazia (May/June 2008):** In direct contravention of all peacekeeping norms and agreements, Russia introduces additional offensive military troops and heavy weaponry in Abkhazia, verified by UNOMIG.
- **Russian railroad troops sent to Abkhazia to prepare rails for invasion (May 26, 2008):** On May 26, Russia sends more than 400 hundreds of Ministry of Defense “railroad troops” into Abkhazia to reinforce the rail infrastructure needed for military action; these troops do not belong to any peacekeeping unit.
- **As peace plan advances, Russian provocations move to S. Ossetia (July 2008):** In July, as the efforts by Georgia and the international community to advance peace proposals for Abkhazia are gathering pace, the focus of Russian provocations suddenly shifts to South Ossetia.
- **Separatists attempt to assassinate S. Ossetian unionist leader (July 3, 2008):** On July 3, South Ossetian separatists attempt to assassinate Dimitry Sanakoyev, the Head of the Temporary Administration of South Ossetia; three policemen are injured.
- **Russia defiantly acknowledges violating Georgian airspace (July 10, 2008):** On July 9, Four Russian military aircraft violate Georgian airspace on the eve of US Secretary of State Rice’s visit to Georgia. Although Russia continually violates Georgian airspace, this is the first time Moscow acknowledges it has done so deliberately.
- **Russia undertakes large-scale military exercises near S. Ossetia: & Abkhazia (July 2008):** Russia launches large-scale military exercises (July 15-August 2) in the immediate vicinity of Georgia’s northern border; they are named “Caucasus 2008.” The Russian Defense Ministry claims that the exercises, involving over 8,000 troops and 700 pieces of military hardware, are aimed at preparing for “special peace enforcement operations” in the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. During the exercise, anti-Georgian leaflets are distributed entitled “Know Your Enemy” .
- **Russian troops fail to redeploy (August 2 2008):** Russian troops participating in the exercise do not re-deploy from the region when the exercises are finished.
- **Separatists reject German-mediated peace plan (July 18, 2008):** On July 18, Abkhaz separatists reject a German-mediated peace plan and refuse to attend peace talks scheduled in Berlin.
- **EU organizes peace talks, separatists fail to appear (July 22-24, 2008):** On July 22-24, the EU tries to hold talks in Brussels between representatives of the Government of Georgia and the South Ossetian separatists, with the participation of the Russian Federation. The separatists refuse to participate, initially objecting to the title of Minister Yakobashvili— “Minister for Reintegration.” In response, the Georgian Government appoints Mr. Yakobashvili as a Special Envoy for Conflict Resolution. The separatists once again refuse to attend the talks on unspecified grounds.

- **OSCE proposes peace talks, separatists reject proposal (late July 2008):** OSCE Chairman in Office, Finnish Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb, proposes talks in Helsinki in early August between South Ossetian separatists and the Georgian Government. The separatists reject the proposal.

II. KEY POINTS: The Days Before, During & After Russia's Invasion of Georgia

- **July 3:** One month before Russia's invasion into Georgia, separatists try to assassinate Dimitri Sanakoyev, Head of the Temporary Administration of South Ossetia. A remote control road bomb exploded while Mr Sanakoyev's cortege was passing by. Five policemen accompanying Mr. Sanakoyev were wounded. Mr. Sanakoyev—a former separatist fighter and defense minister in the separatist government - laid down his arms in 2006 to promote the peaceful re-integration of the region with the rest of the country under a broad autonomy arrangement. Mr. Sanakoyev was elected in democratic elections and administered up to 50% of the territory of the region.
- **July 29:** For the first time since last major hostilities, separatist militia begin intensively shelling ethnically mixed villages under Georgian control, including those of them where the Georgian peacekeepers held their check-points, with large-caliber artillery (greater than 82 mm) which is prohibited by existing agreements. This fact is formally acknowledged by the Head of "Peacekeeping Forces, "Russian General Marat Kulakhmetov on August 4 (he makes specific reference to the shelling on villages under Government control on August 1 and 2 with high caliber artillery). Shelling of this magnitude continues on a regular basis through August 7, in advance of the Russian land invasion into Georgia.
- **1 August:** A pickup truck carrying six police officers of MIA of Georgia is hit by two remote-control explosive devices (IED) on the Eredvi-Kheiti bypass road, close to the Government controlled enclave north of the city of Tskhinvali. Five policemen are severely wounded.
- **3 August:** Russian media outlets report the large-scale mobilization of volunteers across the Russian North Caucasus, including pledges by Cossacks to deploy mercenary troops into Georgia.
- **4 August:** The separatists announce the evacuation of the civilian population from Tskhinvali and from the separatist controlled villages of the region.
- **5 & 7 August:** At the request of President Saakashvili, Special Envoy Temur Yakobashvili twice attempts to negotiate with separatists, but his requests are rebuffed.
- **7 August:** The Special Envoy of Russia's Foreign Ministry, Yuri Popov, fails to mediate preliminary agreed talks on a ceasefire, citing refusal by the separatists, while shelling of Villages under Government control continues.

- General Kulakhmetov, during the meeting in Tskhinvali with Special Envoy Yakobashvili, declares that he cannot contact the separatist leaders, and that Russian “peacekeepers” cannot stop the separatist attacks; General Kulakhmetov admits that the separatists were shooting from the vicinity of Russian “peacekeeping” posts.
- In spite of casualties among Georgian peacekeepers and civilians killed by separatist fire, President Saakashvili orders an immediate ceasefire and calls for negotiations. He reaffirms the Government’s proposal to grant broad “European standard” autonomy to the region, and offers Russia to serve as a guarantor. President Saakashvili also announces an unconditional amnesty for separatists who agree to cease hostilities.
- Despite the ceasefire declared by President Saakashvili, the separatists intensify their shelling of villages under Georgian control and Georgian peacekeeper posts.
- Approximately 150 armored vehicles and military trucks of the Russian regular army stream into the Roki Tunnel and head towards Tskhinvali. In response to the entry of Russian armed forces into Georgian territory, the Georgian military enters the conflict zone in the region.
- Russia claims that its forces entered Georgian territory only after a purported “surprise Georgian assault” on Tskhinvali; however Russia continues to refuse to make public the time at which it launched its invasion into Georgia.
- **8 August:** The Ministry of Defense of Russia and various senior officials claim that Georgian forces “have killed 2,000 civilians” in Tskhinvali.
- **11 August:** Human Rights Watch representative say that Russia purposely exaggerated casualty figures in Tskhinvali, leading to revenge killings against the ethnic Georgian population (Annex 4).
- **21 August:** The Russian Prosecutor General’s Office reports significantly lower civilian casualty figures in the South Ossetia region at 133. There is a strong likelihood that the majority of these casualties were separatist militiamen, as local officials frequently refer to non-Russian servicemen as civilians (Annexes 5 and 6).
- **9–24 August:** Following the retreat of Georgian armed forces towards Tbilisi, the Russian armed forces and paramilitary groups conduct widespread atrocities, including the burning, looting, kidnapping, raping, and summary executions of Georgian civilians inside and outside the zone of conflict. Within the zone of conflict, entire villages of Eredvi, Avnevi, Nuli, Kurta, Achabeti, Tamarasheni, Kekhvi, Disevi, etc., are deliberately burned and destroyed, resulting in the ethnic cleansing of Georgians. Many of these events are confirmed in reports issued by international human rights organizations. (Annex 7).

III. DETAILED CHRONOLOGY: The Days Before, During & After Russia's Invasion of Georgia

28 July: Separatist units open fire at joint peacekeeping forces and an OSCE observer group moving towards the village of Chorbauli (Znauri district), thus disrupting monitoring activity.

29 July: Separatists open fire at villages under Government control to the north of Tskhinvali. They fire at a group of OSCE observers, working with the joint peacekeeping forces, who are on their way to the village of Andzisi. (Annex8) 120 mm mortars and grenade launchers target a Georgian peacekeeping checkpoint near the village of Sarabuki.

30 July: A Georgian police car, traveling between the villages of Kekhvi and Sveri, is fired upon from positions in the separatist-controlled village of Andzisi.

31 July: The joint monitoring group of the JPKF and the OSCE mission observe large-scale fortification works undertaken by the separatists on two checkpoints between Tskhinvali and the village of Ergneti.

1 August: A pickup truck carrying six Georgian police officers is hit by two remote-control explosive devices (IED) close to a Georgian enclave north of the city of Tskhinvali. Five policemen are severely wounded. Later that day, separatists open fire with machine guns and grenade launchers on the villages under Government control Kvemo Nikozi, Zemo Nikozi, Avnevi, Ergneti, and Eredvi. Attacks also are directed at Georgian police and peacekeepers checkpoints. In the village of Nuli, one person is wounded and several houses damaged. Georgian peacekeepers checkpoint in Sarabuki comes under attack. In the village of Ergneti, one person is wounded and two houses are damaged. Separatists reported, that six separatist militia are killed and 12 wounded after Georgian police open fire in response.

2 August: Six civilians and one servicemen of MIA of Georgia are injured after separatists shell villages under Georgian control in the conflict zone overnight. The villages of Zemo Nikozi, Kvemo Nikozi, Nuli, Avnevi, Eredvi, and Ergneti come under intense large-caliber mortar fire the separatists. Georgian law enforcers initially shoot back in self-defense, but are soon ordered to cease fire in order not to escalate the situation.

3 August: The separatist government starts an evacuation of the civilian population from the city of Tskhinvali and villages under separatist control of the region. The evacuation continues for the next two days.

Russian media outlets start a massive propaganda campaign against Georgia, advocating for volunteers and militias to support separatists in South Ossetia. Representatives of major Russian television networks (i.e. NTV, RTR, ORT, Ren TV, TVC, etc.) are on-site in Tskhinvali.

South Ossetia media sources report the mobilization of volunteers from across the North Caucasus of Russia.

4 August: General Marat Kulakhmetov, Head of the “Peacekeeping Forces, “formally acknowledges the shelling of Georgian positions with illegal (large-caliber) artillery. (Annex 9). On the evening of August 4, the medical and communication units of Russia's 58th Army

enter South Ossetia, according to human intelligence received by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia.

Eleven artillery gunships (2S1-“Gvozdika”) in the possession of separatists are relocated from Java to the villages of Andzisi, Dzari, and Tsrui, close to Tskhinvali, according to intelligence provided to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia.

5 August: 3 tanks and 2 military trucks with armed soldiers are reported moving towards the village of Avnevi. According to telephone intercepts, separatist internal affairs minister M. Mindzaev (formerly head of the General Staff of the Ministry of Interior of North Ossetia, Russia and former head of the Alfa Special Forces Group during Russia’s operation in Beslan) orders a massive attack on—and the elimination of—the village Dvani (SigInt)*.

*Here and below signal interceptions are cited. They are available upon request.

Special Envoy Temur Yakobashvili visits the conflict zone Tskhinvali, meets Russian General Marat Kulakhmetov, to agree the next meeting for 7 August to defuse the situation.

A journalist of *Le Figaro*, Laure Mandeville later quotes a Russian soldier in Gori who says that Russian troops began moving from Shali in the Chechnya region of Russia towards Georgia on August 5.

6 August: Approximately 150 volunteers from the North Caucasus arrive in Tskhinvali as reported by local television; militants from other North Caucasian republics join separatist units.

Russian and local employees working on the military base in Tskhinvali are temporarily dismissed. Shops and other offices are closed, as reported on local television.

In the late afternoon at approximately 16: 00, separatists open mortar fire from the villages of Pranevi, Ubiati, and Khetagurovo at ethnically mixed and Georgian-controlled villages of Eredvi, Prisi, Avnevi, Dvani, and Nuli. Khetagurovo was the main artillery base of the separatists. This attack continues until approximately 19: 00.

A lull is then observed for one hour, with attacks resuming at 20: 00 and lasting until late into the night. Georgian government forces fire back in order to defend their positions and the civilian population. As a result of intensive cross-fire during the night, two servicemen of the Georgian battalion of the Joint Peacekeeping Forces are injured. The separatist regime also claims several persons are injured on their side. Despite these provocative, targeted attacks on peaceful civilians and on Georgian police and peacekeeping forces, the Government of Georgia decides not to respond with heavy fire, in order not to escalate the conflict.

7 August: In a morning interview with Russian TV (NTV) and news agencies, South Ossetian separatist leader Eduard Kokoity declares that if the Georgian government does not withdraw its forces from the region, he will start “to wipe them out.” The Georgian military forces to which he refers are peacekeepers legally present in the South Ossetia conflict zone.

Georgian Special Envoy Temur Yakobashvili visits the conflict zone on August 7 to meet with representatives of the separatists. He meets General Marat Kulakhmetov, in Tskhinvali; Kulakhmetov states that he cannot contact the separatist leader Kokoity, and that Russian peacekeepers cannot stop the separatist attacks. Kulakhmetov admits that the separatists are

shooting from the vicinity of Russian peacekeeping posts. During this meeting, at approximately 16: 00, General Kulakhmetov suggests to Minister Yakobashvili that the Government of Georgia declare a unilateral ceasefire.

The Special Envoy of Russia's Foreign Ministry, Yuri Popov fails to arrive to Tskhinvali, as previously agreed together with Minister Yakobashvili, citing a flat tire and a flat spare tire. When he finally reaches Tskhinvali, Popov meets Kokoity, and afterwards concedes that he cannot convince the separatists to hold urgent talks with Minister Yakobashvili (Annex 10).

Earlier, at approximately 00: 15, separatists begin attacking the villages of Eredvi, Prisi, and Vanati, with artillery, including mortars and grenade launchers. Simultaneously, the separatists attack the Sarabuki Heights, where Georgian peacekeepers are stationed. Three Georgian peacekeepers are wounded during the Sarabuki attack. The fighting in this area continues until approximately 10: 00.

At approximately 11: 00, separatists resume shelling the Georgian villages of Nuli, Avnevi, Vanati, from the village of Khetagurovo. Three Georgian servicemen are injured; a Georgian law enforcers return fire towards the village where the firing comes from, Khetagurovo, killing two separatists and wounding two others. At approximately 14: 00, the Georgian peacekeeping checkpoint in Avnevi is shelled, including again from Khetagurovo, killing two Georgian peacekeepers and eight civilians. Phone conversation interception of separatist militia confirming the death of Georgian military servicemen and civilians is available (Sigint)*.

After the killing of civilians and Georgian peacekeepers, at approximately 14: 30, Georgian armed forces receive intelligence that Russian troops that had still not redeployed from July's North Caucasian military exercises have been put on high alert and have received orders to prepare to march towards the Georgian border.

At approximately 14: 30, Georgian forces mobilize tanks, 122mm howitzers, and 203mm self-propelled artillery in the direction of the administrative border of South Ossetia, in an effort to deter further separatist attacks, and to be in a position to defend the Russian-Georgian border in the event that Russia invades.

At approximately 17: 00, Minister Yakobashvili calls General Kulakhmetov to inform him of the Government of Georgia's decision to implement a unilateral ceasefire.

At approximately 17: 10, Georgian peacekeepers unilaterally cease fire to defuse tensions.

At 18: 40, Minister Yakobashvili holds a press conference to discuss the results of his visit to Tskhinvali, and announces the decision of the Government of Georgia to call for and implement a unilateral ceasefire.

At 19: 10, in a televised address, President Saakashvili declares a unilateral ceasefire and calls for the separatists to respect it and resume talks.

At approximately 20: 30, a Government controlled village of Avnevi comes under separatist mortar fire from Khetagurovo.

The chairman of the separatist Security Council, Anatoly Barankevich (a long-standing Russian military officer, who served for four years as First Deputy of the Military Commissioner in Chechnya), tells the local TV that armed groups of Cossacks are headed towards South Ossetia to “fight against Georgian forces” .

At 22: 30, separatists fire at the Government -controlled village of Prisi and Tamarsheni, from Tskhinvali and the mountain of Tliakana, wounding civilians.

At 23: 30, separatists open heavy fire on all Georgian peacekeepers’ positions around Tskhinvali, including the villages of Tamarasheni and Kurta; the Kurta police station is destroyed.

At 23: 30, Georgian Government receive multiple human intelligence reports that about 150 armored vehicles and trucks with Russian soldiers are approaching the Roki Tunnel from Russia and moving towards Tskhinvali. Multiple signal intercepts of separatist security and military officials at around 3am and later confirm that columns are stretched from Roki to Java. (Sigint)*.

At 23: 50, for the first time, and in response to the entry of Russian armed forces into Georgian sovereign territory, Georgian armed forces enter military action—using armor, including tanks, 122mm howitzers, and 203mm self-propelled artillery system Dana.

At approximately 00: 45 on August 8, Georgian forces fire artillery rounds at the invading Russian forces on roads being used by a Russian column already moving south of the Roki Tunnel.

After Russia’s Full-Scale Invasion: 8 August to present

Outside Tskhinvali

On August 8, after advancing into the conflict zone of South Ossetia, Georgian armed forces seized control of a significant number of villages around Tskhinvali during a five-hour period (Tsinagara, Orchosani, Didmukha, Muguti, Gromi, Dmenisi, and Artsevi). During the fighting, Georgian armed forces encountered substantial Russian forces and separatist militias on the Zara bypass road leading to the northeastern part of Tskhinvali and the village of Khetagurovo, which had been substantially re-enforced with advanced artillery systems, armored vehicles, and self-propelled artillery. In response, Georgian artillery shelled both positions. Georgian artillery and aviation conducted a targeted attacks on the Gupta bridge, where Russian armed columns where entering Tskhinvali.

Outskirts of Tskhivali and Inside Tskhinvali

Tskhinvali is a small regional town, located in a river valley, approximately 75 kilometers from Tbilisi. Immediately prior to the conflict, the population was approximately 7,000, based on local intelligence estimates and on-the-ground reports. Following the mass evacuation on August 3-5, the number of residents decreased substantially.

Several Georgian positions were under attack from points on the outskirts of town, specifically from Verkhny Gorodok (the location of the Russian “peacekeepers” on the non-residential southwest portion of the city). This was the first position in the immediate vicinity of Tskhinvali that Georgian forces targeted using GRAD multiple-rocket launching

systems, following repeated warnings to the Russian “peacekeeping” forces not to allow their positions to be used for attacks. Soon thereafter, Georgian artillery (again using GRADs) targeted stockpiles of munitions and fuel depots located on the western part of the city—outside civilian areas—and military barracks in the northwest part of Tskhinvali—also outside civilian areas.

At approximately 11: 00, once Georgian forces had secured the heights around Tskhinvali, Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior forces entered the city of Tskhinvali. These forces came under fire from positions around the main government compound, located in the center of Tskhinvali. In response, Georgian forces employed precise artillery system Dana (not GRAD) against the ministries of defense, interior, intelligence (KGB), and the main government building of the separatists.

Russian aviation bombed Georgian positions on a continuous basis inside and around Tskhinvali once Government forces began advancing on the town. Russian aviation continued bombing in and around Tskhinvali for the next two days (until late in the day on August 10).

At approximately 14: 00, Georgian forces took control of most of Tskhinvali. At 15: 00, Georgian forces declared a 3-hour ceasefire to establish a humanitarian corridor.

Georgian forces began a phased retreat from Tskhinvali during the evening of August 9. Forces re-positioned themselves south of the city.

During the two days that Georgian forces were in control of separatist controlled villages (from August 8) there were no credible reports of looting or abuse of civilian populations, according to international human rights organizations. The ethnic Ossetian population in the conflict zone was not displaced, unlike the ethnic Georgian population under the Russian occupation. The only village that sustained severe damage was the village of Khetagurovo due to the location of substantial amounts of military equipment and forces around the villa. After Government forces seized Khetagurovo, there was no cruel or degrading treatment of the civilian population, as documented by Human Rights Watch (Annex 11).

Russian Attacks & Invasion Outside the Conflict Zone

Ethnic Cleansing of Georgian Villages

Beginning on August 8 at 09: 45, Russian aviation bombed a series of civilian and military targets across Georgia, outside the zone of conflict in South Ossetia, damaging infrastructure and causing significant civilian casualties. (annex 12) These targets include but are not limited to:

1. Gori and surrounding villages (including civilian infrastructure)
2. Marneuli airfield, central Georgia
3. Vaziani airfield, central Georgia
4. Kopitnari airfield, western Georgia
5. Oni (civilian areas), western Georgia
6. Poti port, western Georgia

7. Baku-Supsa oil pipeline, central Georgia
8. Anaklia, western Georgia
9. Zugdidi, western Georgia
10. Upper Abkhazia/Kodori Gorge, Abkhazia region
11. Tbilisi (aircraft factory and civilian radar facility in Tbilisi airport)
12. Khelvachauri, Ajara region
13. Shiraki, eastern Georgia
14. Senaki airport and military base, western Georgia
15. Kaspi, central Georgia
16. Khashuri district villages, central Georgia
17. Borjomi National Park, central Georgia.

International human rights groups have documented seeming targeting of civilian objects by the Russian regular troops. (Annex 11a).

The Russian Federation's nationwide bombing campaign included the use of SS-26 "Iskander" short-range tactical missiles used against the Baku-Supsa oil pipeline. Russian forces also used short-range tactical missiles SS-21 "Tochka-U" on the cities of Poti and Gori. In the villages around the town of Gori, Russian forces used "Hurricane" missiles. Cluster bombs were used extensively in Gori and nearby villages, including Ruisi and Shindisi. (Annexes 12 and 13)

On August 10, the Russian navy landed in the port city of Ochamchire and launched an unprovoked attack in Upper Abkhazia/Kodori Gorge using artillery and massive air bombing. Until this point, there had been no hostilities in Abkhazia, Georgia. This attack began only after Georgian armed forces, located at the Senaki military base, were re-deployed eastward (August 9).

On August 12, Russian forces invaded the western Georgian town of Zugdidi and the strategic port of Poti.

Over 100 Georgian civilians are still being kept as hostages in inhumane conditions in the prison of Tskhinvali (Annex 14).

Following the retreat of Georgian armed forces towards Tbilisi, until today the Russian armed forces and paramilitary groups conduct widespread atrocities, including the burning, looting, kidnapping, raping, and summary executions of Georgian civilians inside and outside the zone of conflict. Within the zone of conflict, entire villages of Eredvi, Avnevi, Nuli, Kurta, Achabeti, Tamarasheni, Kekhvi, and Disevi, are deliberately burned and destroyed, resulting in the ethnic cleansing of Georgians. These atrocities have been committed after all military clashes in the area were over. Many of these events are confirmed in reports issued by international human rights organizations (Annex 7).

Currently the Russian troops continue to occupy significant parts of Georgia – Annex 15.

Russian Illegal Check-points in Georgia

Locations of the Russian illegal check-points in the Eastern Georgia, including Shida Kartli, other adjacent areas of "South Ossetia" and "South Ossetia" itself according to the MIA sources as of August 25 2008:

1. Perevi (Sachkhere district)
2. Ghodora (Sachkhere district)
3. Muguti (Znauri district)
4. Ali (Khashuri district)
5. Ptsa (Kareli district)
6. Variani (Gori district)
7. Karaleti (Gori district)
8. Shavshvebi (Gori district)
9. Ergneti (Gori district)
10. Tsiara (Java district)

Note: There are approximately 60 Russian servicemen and 4 armoured vehicles stationed in each place. The vehicles often move from one place to another "patrolling" the nearby territories and villages.

11. Ikoti in Akhlagori district (7 infantry combating vehicles, 1 armoured vehicle, 6 Ural-type vehicles, 2 Gaz-66 vehicles, 1 military power shovel, 1 mobile medical unit, 2 grenade-launchers, trenches are dug, 100 Russian servicemen)
12. Approximately 150 armoured vehicles are stationed on the territory between villages Meghvrekisi and Brotsleti in the Gori district.

Locations of the Russian check-points in the Western Georgia according to the MIA sources as of August 25 2008:

Samegrelo-Zemo Svaneti Region

1. Village Teklati (near city Senaki), on the territory of the former mechanical plant (5 armoured vehicles, 1 crane, 2 Ural-type vehicles, 1 vehicle with communication systems, 1 UAZ-type vehicle, 1 Vilis-type car, 1 large army tent, trenches are dug, 40 Russian servicemen)
2. Village Pirveli Maisi (Khobi district), near former Georgian police check-point (2 armoured vehicles, 2 Ural-type vehicles, 1 UAZ-type vehicle, 1 large army tent, trenches are dug, 40 Russian servicemen)
3. Between villages Shua Khorga and Chaladidi (Khobi district), so called Poti Minor, near the turning to Kulevi oil terminal (4 armoured vehicles, 2 Ural-type vehicles, 1 large army tent, 30 Russian servicemen)

4. Village Menji, Bakaraia neighborhood (Senaki district), on the territory of sanatorium "Menji", 10 meters from railroad (3 armoured vehicle, 4 Ural-type vehicle, 2 cranes, 1 military power shovel, 1 large army tent, 40 Russian servicemen)
5. Village Kantisubani, between Tsalenjikha-Chkhorotsku road section (3 armoured vehicles, 2 Ural-type vehicles, 1 large army tent, trenches are dug, 30 Russian servicemen)
6. Crossroad at the entrances of villages Chale and Muzhava in the Tsalenjikha district (3 armoured vehicles, 1 Ural-type vehicle, 20 Russian servicemen)
7. Town Chkhorotsku, on the territory of former airfield, near Senaki-Chkhorotsku highway (3 armoured vehicles, 2 Ural-type vehicles, 1 vehicle with electricity generator, 2 large army tents, 40 Russian servicemen)
8. Nabada settlement, at the entrance of Poti (2 armoured vehicles, 1 Ural-type vehicle, 1 UAZ-type vehicle, 1 military power shovel, 1 large army tent, 30 Russian servicemen)

Upper Abkhazia/Kodori Valley


9. Gentsvisi
10. Omarishara
11. Sakeni
12. Chkhalt'a
13. Kvapchara

Note: Due to the extremely difficult situation in the region, obtaining accurate numbers on Russian and Abkhaz military deployment is difficult. All sources report substantial Russian and Abkhaz deployments in the region.


In addition, deputy head of the Russian General Staff, colonel-general Anatoly Nogovitsin stated during the press-conference on August 22, 2008 that the Russian armed forces established new check-points in the following locations:

14. Khudoni
15. Jikmuri
16. Ochamchire
17. Gupagu
18. Meore Gudava
19. Anaklia
20. Mount Kvira


Note: The Russian side has not denied existence of the abovementioned check-points throughout Georgia.




The Invasion of Georgia by Russian Federation



Places Bombed by Russian Side





The Invasion of Georgia by Russian Federation




Places Bombed by Russian Side


Situation by 22 August






The Invasion of Georgia by Russian Federation









"Additional Security measures" envisaged by ceasefire agreement not applicable to this area as defined by President Sarkozy's letter.

● New Check-Points of Russian Side after Invasion of Georgia (by 25.08.2008: Ochamchire, Meore Gudava, Jikmuri, Gupagu, Anaklia, Khudoni, Kvira, Mujava, Pirveli Maisi (Khobi), Chkhorotsku, Menji, Nabada (Poti), Patara Poti, Teklati, Kantisubani. In Upper Abkhazia: Gentsvishi, Omarishara, Sakeni, Chkhalt'a, Krabch'ara









Georgians look at the remnants of a bomb dropped by Russian aircraft on the village of Ruisi, near South Ossetia, Tuesday, Aug. 12, 2008. Human Rights Watch has identified the weapon as a RBK-250 cluster bomb. © 2008 AP Photos



Tochka-U (NATO Scarab B)




Iskander-M (NATO SS-26 Stone)



Baku-Supsa Pipeline



Baku-Supsa Pipeline



Baku-Supsa Pipeline

Cluster Bombs (RBK-250)