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### Report on the activities of the Office of Internal Oversight Services

Programme budget for the biennium 2008-2009

## **Follow-up audit of the management of special political missions by the Department of Political Affairs**

### **Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services**

**“The Department of Political Affairs has made some progress in implementing Office of Internal Oversight Services recommendations, but more needs to be done to ensure effective and efficient backstopping of special political missions”**

#### *Summary*

Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 63/261, the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) conducted an audit of the management of special political missions by the Department of Political Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, as a follow-up to the previous OIOS report (A/61/357).

Special political missions play a key role in preventing, controlling and resolving conflicts, in addition to post-conflict peacebuilding. The Department of Political Affairs manages 24 of the 27 special envoys and advisers of the Secretary-General, as well as sanctions monitoring groups and field missions.

The main objective of the audit was to determine whether the recommendations contained in the previous OIOS report had been implemented, and to assess mitigating controls in place to address some high-risk areas that were identified by the risk assessment by OIOS of the Department and similar assessments conducted by the Department and the Board of Auditors. Those high-risk areas included: (a) internal governance and accountability mechanisms; (b) strategic planning and management; and (c) backstopping of special political missions and the Department's

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\* A/64/150.



coordination strategy with partners. The audit also considered relevant findings and recommendations from other OIOS audits and evaluations of special political missions.

Of the 15 recommendations made in the previous OIOS audit, six had been implemented, seven were still in progress and two have been closed without implementation, as they had been overtaken by the establishment of the Department of Field Support.

The main findings are as follows:

(a) The implementation of recommendations to address the risks of duplication of responsibilities and unclear accountability was still in progress. The revision of the mandate of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to clearly reflect its responsibilities for directing the substantive operations of special political missions under its leadership was nearing completion. The criteria for assigning the responsibility to lead a field mission to either the Department of Political Affairs or the Department of Peacekeeping Operations had yet to be finalized. The Executive Office of the Secretary-General indicated that the lead department policy would be updated once the mandates of the two Departments were revised. In updating the lead department policy, the paramount economic consideration in assigning the lead department should be to avoid building up in the Department of Political Affairs similar capacities already existing in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Field Support, or both;

(b) The development of a support strategy and service-level agreement between the Departments of Political Affairs and Field Support for the provision of administrative support to special political missions was still in progress; hence the Organization was still exposed to the risk of unclear responsibilities. OIOS would like to clarify that it is the responsibility of the Department of Political Affairs to ensure that the signed service-level agreement specified the type and level of services that the Department of Field Support should provide to special political missions. It is also important to ensure that the Department of Political Affairs sources the capacity for administrative and logistical support from the Department of Field Support and does not seek to build additional capacity within itself to provide backstopping support capacity that is already available in the Department of Field Support. *The Department of Political Affairs stated that it should not and would not seek to set up a logistics pillar or field personnel and finance division; however, the Department of Political Affairs required a few additional posts to enable regional divisions to better interface with the technical pillars of the Department of Field Support in order to improve support to specific missions. The Department of Political Affairs would seek to establish a small integrated operational team-type unit (a small special political mission support unit) in its Executive Office, with the necessary staff, preferably with specific work experience in the Department of Field Support, providing an interface with that Department in order to ensure smoother collaboration and service delivery.* The service-level agreement between the Departments of Political Affairs and Field Support should define the level of interface and coordination and specify the resources required in that regard, if necessary. Also, the capacity for interfacing and coordinating with the Department of Field Support should be included as part of a comprehensive review of the capacity of the Department of Political Affairs at Headquarters for the management and backstopping of special political missions;

(c) The development of policies and standard processes and guidelines as a tool for equipping the Department of Political Affairs desk officers to backstop special political missions was still in progress. Also, the Department of Political Affairs needed to develop standard operating procedures for the start-up planning for special political missions to facilitate the deployment of new such missions. Without such policies and guidelines, there was a risk that the management and backstopping of special political missions from Headquarters might be inconsistent or lacking in quality;

(d) The OIOS recommendations relating to the improvement of the quality of the budgets of special political missions had been implemented; however, the audit found that the control of the Department of Political Affairs over the preparation of the budgets of special political missions could be further improved. There was no documentation showing that heads of mission and Department of Political Affairs managers had adequately performed all the required layers of budget reviews stipulated in the annual strategic guidance of the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs;

(e) The Department of Political Affairs did not have a proper performance management system to measure and monitor how effectively the regional divisions and their staff were managing special political missions. The responsibilities of regional divisions and their staff had not been clearly defined. Also, the regional divisions did not include in the budgets of the Department for the bienniums 2008-2009 and 2010-2011 any performance indicators relating to the management and backstopping of special political missions because the Department had only recently added the backstopping responsibility of the regional divisions as a core activity in the draft of its revised mandate, notwithstanding that the Department of Political Affairs had always been responsible for managing special political missions. The Department needed to develop and use, complementarily with respect to the existing results-based budgeting framework, appropriate performance indicators for regional divisions originating from the Secretary-General's compact with the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs;

(f) A recent OIOS audit of a special political mission found incidents that undermined the mission's working environment. Although heads of mission are responsible for ensuring a professional and ethical working environment in the field, OIOS is of the view that it is the responsibility of the Department of Political Affairs, as the lead department for field special political missions, to guide and monitor them on an ongoing basis;

(g) The development of accountability mechanisms for heads of special political missions led by the Department of Political Affairs had not been finalized, for example, the application of the Secretary-General's compact with senior managers to heads of mission had not been finalized, and not all heads of mission had agreed with the human resources action plans for their respective missions to improve the accountability of heads of mission on human resources management. As such, the reporting line and accountability between the concerned entities and officials at Headquarters and in the field remained unclear;

(h) From 1999 to 2009, the budgets of special political missions increased almost tenfold, from \$47.5 million to \$461.2 million (a three-fold increase without the budgets for the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq), but there was no corresponding increase in the

overall budget of the Department of Political Affairs. OIOS also found that the budget of the Department of Political Affairs did not distinguish the requirements for managing special political missions from those for other Department activities. Although a draft of the Department of Political Affairs mandate now recognized managing and backstopping of special political missions as a core activity, the Department of Political Affairs did not have a corresponding dedicated capacity for such a purpose. As regards large special political missions such as UNAMI, when the Department was, exceptionally, assigned the lead role, it should propose to the General Assembly an appropriate mechanism to use mission posts at Headquarters to ensure that it had stable and adequate capacity for providing backstopping services.

The Department of Political Affairs has made some progress in implementing the recommendations made by OIOS in its previous report, but more needs to be done to ensure effective and efficient backstopping of special political missions. OIOS will continue to follow up on the implementation by the Department of Political Affairs of the recommendations that are still in progress. In addition, OIOS makes a number of recommendations to address other issues identified in the present audit.

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## I. Introduction

1. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 63/261, the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) conducted an audit of the management of special political missions by the Department of Political Affairs, as a follow-up to the previous OIOS report (A/61/357).

2. Special political missions, which are an integral part of the mandate of the Department of Political Affairs, play a key role in preventing, controlling and resolving conflicts, in addition to post-conflict peacebuilding. The Department of Political Affairs, under its current mandate (see ST/SGB/2000/10), is responsible for providing political guidance and instructions to special envoys and special representatives of the Secretary-General. Moreover, the Secretary-General, in his report on the strengthening of the Department of Political Affairs (A/62/521 and Corr.1), reaffirmed the Department's mandate in conflict mitigation, preventive diplomacy, post-conflict peacebuilding and the good offices of the Secretary-General.

3. Special political missions have ranged in size from a one-person entity, in the case of the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara, with an annual budget of \$0.3 million to the 2,100-strong United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) with an annual budget of \$178.4 million. As at June 2009, there were 27 special political missions, as detailed in the annex to the present document, with a total combined budget of \$461.2 million for the period from 1 January to 31 December 2009 and 4,531 authorized posts (see A/63/346 and Corr.1 and Add.1-7 and Add.1/Corrs.1 and 2 and Add.3/Corr.1). The Department of Political Affairs is the lead department responsible for managing 24 special political missions, and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations is the lead department for two such missions; one special political mission — the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate — is a stand-alone entity. The proposed programme budget for the Department of Political Affairs for the biennium 2008-2009 (see A/62/6 (sect. 3) and A/62/521 and Corr.1) totalled \$74.2 million, comprising \$69.1 million from the regular budget and \$5.1 million from extrabudgetary resources. The authorized staffing of the Department of Political Affairs as at April 2009 comprised 269 posts, including 49 posts recently approved for the strengthening of the Department (see General Assembly resolution 63/261) and the United Nations Liaison Office at Addis Ababa.

4. At United Nations Headquarters, the day-to-day management of special political missions is assigned to the regional divisions of the Department of Political Affairs, which are responsible for backstopping the missions, including by: (a) providing strategic and executive direction to missions on all issues related to the implementation of their mandates; (b) planning strategic focus and reprioritization in response to changes in political and other situations; (c) ensuring that all aspects of operational and administrative management of special political missions are adequately supported; (d) monitoring and overseeing the implementation of mandates; and (e) ensuring that missions fulfil the reporting requirements of the Secretary-General to Member States. The Executive Office of the Department of Political Affairs provides administrative support to the small cluster I and II missions, while the Department of Field Support supports cluster III and IV missions (see annex).

5. The main objective of the audit was to determine whether the recommendations contained in the previous OIOS report had been implemented and to assess the mitigating controls in place to address some high-risk areas that were identified by the OIOS risk assessment of the Department of Political Affairs and similar assessments conducted by the Department and the Board of Auditors. Those high-risk areas included: (a) internal governance and accountability mechanisms; (b) strategic planning and management; and (c) backstopping of special political missions and the coordination strategy of the Department of Political Affairs with partners. The audit also considered relevant findings and recommendations from other OIOS audits and evaluations of special political missions. Those included:

(a) Audit of the Secretariat's structure for managing and sustaining peacekeeping operations (A/63/837): the Secretariat is yet to develop the necessary governance and accountability mechanisms to ensure effectiveness and accountability in peacekeeping operations;

(b) Comprehensive audit of the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (AP2009/646/01): strong leadership, accountability and adherence to the United Nations code of conduct and ethics are necessary to address systematic management and administrative problems;

(c) Triennial review of the implementation of recommendations made by the Committee for Programme and Coordination at its forty-sixth session on the in-depth evaluation of political affairs (E/AC.51/2009/3);

(d) Report of OIOS on the in-depth evaluation of political affairs: field special political missions led by the Department of Political Affairs but supported by the Department of Field Support (E/AC.51/2008/2);

(e) Audit of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the United Nations Support to the Cameroon and Nigeria Mixed Commission (AP2007/560/02 and 03);

(f) Comprehensive audit of the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) (AP2007/560/04).

6. Of the 15 recommendations made in the previous OIOS audit, 6 had been implemented, 7 were still in progress and 2 had been closed without implementation, as they had been overtaken by the establishment of the Department of Field Support. The following sections of the report discuss in detail the status of implementation of each of the 15 recommendations.

## **II. Roles and responsibilities of the Department of Political Affairs and other departments**

### **A. Division of responsibilities between the Departments of Political Affairs and Peacekeeping Operations**

7. Any structure with multiple organizational units performing similar tasks is exposed to the risks of duplication of responsibilities and unclear accountability. Under the current Secretariat structure, both the Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations have political affairs officers performing similar tasks, such as: (a) maintaining up-to-date information on the

political situation and providing political and diplomatic analysis and related reports to the Secretary-General; (b) fulfilling the Secretary-General's reporting responsibility to Member States; and (c) leading field missions by planning, launching and managing them. To address those risks, OIOS made the following recommendations in its previous report:

**Recommendation 1: The Department of Peacekeeping Operations should propose to the Secretary-General an updated mandate that clearly reflects its responsibilities for directing the substantive operations of the special political missions in addition to peacekeeping operations.**

**Recommendation 3: The Secretary-General should develop and disseminate clear criteria for assigning the lead responsibility for managing the field missions to ensure transparency so that all parties involved have a clear understanding of their respective operational functions and responsibilities.**

**Recommendation 4: The Secretary-General should amend the official mandates of the Departments of Political Affairs and Peacekeeping Operations to include reference to the lead department policy in order to enhance its visibility and transparency.**

8. With regard to recommendation 1, OIOS found that the mandate of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations has yet to be finalized; hence, its current mandate does not accurately reflect its present roles and responsibilities for directing the substantive operations of special political missions. During the audit by OIOS of the Secretariat's structure for managing and sustaining peacekeeping operations, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations provided OIOS with a copy of a draft of its revised mandate, including its expanded responsibility for special political missions. OIOS notes that the revision of the mandate of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations is nearing completion, but, until that is finalized, the implementation of recommendation 1 will be considered to be in progress. *The Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support stated that the Secretary-General's Bulletin was with the Office of Legal Affairs, having undergone formal review and clearance by the Department of Management.*

9. With regard to recommendations 3 and 4, OIOS found that the criteria for assigning the responsibility to lead a field mission to either the Department of Political Affairs or the Department of Peacekeeping Operations have not yet been finalized. The Executive Office of the Secretary-General indicated that the lead department policy would be updated once the mandates of the two Departments were revised; hence there are still no clear criteria nor is there a transparent decision-making mechanism to determine the department that should lead a special political mission. OIOS therefore considers the implementation of recommendations 3 and 4 as in progress. *With regard to recommendation 4, the Department of Political Affairs disagreed that a reference to the lead department policy was required in the Secretary-General's Bulletin, which was a public document. The lead department document and the process for designating the lead department needed to be discretionary and, as such, should remain an internal document for internal purposes.* OIOS maintains its view that the policy requires visibility and transparency.

10. The lead department concept was introduced in 1999 (see A/53/854/Add.1 and Corr.1) when a review of the relationship between the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Political Affairs was conducted to analyse the functions of regional divisions in each Department, including by addressing possible overlaps and duplication. At that point, it was clarified that responsibility of the lead department was to carry out all activities described in paragraph 4 above and to ensure coordination with other organizational entities concerned. The Department of Political Affairs generally takes the lead in preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacebuilding; the Department of Peacekeeping Operations takes the lead in peacekeeping.

11. In his 2002 report on the strengthening of the United Nations: an agenda for further change (A/57/387 and Corr.1), the Secretary-General reported that there was a need to give a sharper definition to the existing lead department policy. The Department of Political Affairs was to include in its focus preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention and peacemaking and to intensify its engagement in policy formulation across the full spectrum of the Secretariat's tasks in the domain of international peace and security. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations was to be the lead department for planning and managing all peace and security operations in the field, including those where the majority of personnel were civilians. The report also mentioned that the arrangement would not prejudice the current formula for financing these operations.

12. OIOS notes that field missions led by the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Political Affairs are in most cases distinct and assigned in accordance with the present definition, as outlined in A/53/854/Add.1 and Corr.1 and A/57/387 and Corr.1. In the view of the Office of Internal Oversight Services, that definition is based strictly on substantive considerations and does not include economic factors. In updating the lead department policy, a paramount economic consideration in assigning the lead department should be to avoid building up in the Department of Political Affairs similar capacities already existing in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Field Support or both. For example, the assignment of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to lead UNAMA and the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB), both political missions, could be considered as an exception to the present lead department policy. The assignment of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to lead UNAMA, however, effectively recognized the economic factors related to the size of a special political mission; this is to a great extent correlated with the lead department focus, i.e., preventive diplomacy as opposed to peace and security operations. As the Organization has already made heavy investment in the capacity of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to manage large field operations over the years, OIOS is of the opinion that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations should be the lead department for all large special political missions unless a conscious and deliberate decision is made, on an exceptional basis, that the political or other benefit would be far greater than the economic advantages if a large special political mission were assigned to the Department of Political Affairs as the lead department. There is therefore a need for further definition of the criteria for assigning the lead department in order to ensure a fully transparent decision-making process and to mitigate the risk of developing parallel structures to support special political missions and other field missions assigned to the Department of Political Affairs. *The Department of Political Affairs did not agree with the comment of OIOS that the*



*assignment of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to lead UNAMA effectively recognized the economic factors related to the size of a special political mission. The Department of Political Affairs further stated that, while that may have been true at the time when the Office of Mission Support was still an integral part of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the establishment of the Department of Field Support as a service provider to both the Departments of Political Affairs and Peacekeeping Operations had now removed those economies of scale within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and had instead provided the Department of Field Support with the capability to provide service to both Departments' missions, regardless of size. The Department of Political Affairs was of the opinion that going forward, and with the provision of an integrated operational teams-type structure within the Executive Office of the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Political Affairs would be equally equipped to manage large missions, as demonstrated by its management of both the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) and UNMIN, both viewed as success stories by the General Assembly and the Security Council. OIOS accepts that the creation of the Department of Field Support has changed the approach for the provision of administrative and logistics support services to missions. That change, however, does not impact the support provided by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in areas related to military affairs, United Nations police, mine-action service, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and other areas. Considering the heavy investment in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to manage large missions, OIOS would reiterate that in general the Department of Peacekeeping Operations should be the lead Department for all large special political missions.*

## **B. Division of responsibilities between the Departments of Political Affairs and Field Support**

13. Lack of clarity in the responsibilities of the Departments of Political Affairs and Field Support in monitoring the support activities provided to special political missions poses the risk of a responsibility gap that may adversely impact the implementation of the mandates of special political missions. The previous report of OIOS identified the risk of a responsibility gap in the monitoring and oversight of the use of resources allocated to special political missions. While in 2005 the Department of Political Affairs assigned to the then Office of Mission Support in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations the logistical and administrative support functions for field missions, terms of reference or operational agreements for such arrangements were not developed to address accountability and monitoring issues. OIOS therefore recommended that:

**Recommendation 6: The Department of Political Affairs should establish a monitoring and oversight mechanism in the form of an operational agreement with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations [the former Office of Mission Support within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, now the Department of Field Support] to address accountability for the budget resources of field missions in which the Departments carry out their respective substantive direction and administrative support functions.**

14. OIOS found that the development of a support strategy and service-level agreement between the Departments of Field Support and Political Affairs, as recommended in the audit by OIOS of the Secretariat's structure for managing and sustaining peacekeeping operations, has not yet been implemented; hence the Organization is still exposed to the risk of unclear responsibilities. OIOS would like to clarify that it is the responsibility of Department of Political Affairs to ensure that the signed service-level agreement specifies the type and level of services that the Department of Field Support should provide to special political missions. The Department of Political Affairs is also responsible for monitoring and overseeing the performance of the Department of Field Support in accordance with the standards and terms agreed in the service-level agreement. OIOS therefore considers the implementation of recommendation 6 as in progress.

15. Following are examples of the functions and performance standards that should be specified in the service-level agreement:

(a) According to a recent OIOS evaluation (E/AC.51/2008/2), special political missions raised concerns regarding the inadequacy of the recruitment process and the inability to quickly deploy staff with the right skills. As at 31 March 2009, the average vacancy rate in special political missions was 25 per cent. The Department of Political Affairs needs to determine and agree in its service-level agreement with the Department of Field Support the performance goal on recruitment;

(b) OIOS audits of the special political missions (AP2007/560/02 and 03 and AP2009/646/01) found weaknesses in internal control and non-compliance with regulations and rules, mainly owing to the hiring of inexperienced and untrained staff, the absence of an internal control framework appropriate for special political missions and insufficient management and oversight by the Department of Political Affairs. For example, special political missions were procuring goods and services without the authority to perform such a function and without a formal local committee on contracts. Special political missions also did not have proper information systems to administer procurement and property management. Moreover, it was not clear when to rely on the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for certain administrative tasks. The Departments of Political Affairs and Field Support need to consider those factors and the relevant performance indicators when finalizing the service-level agreement. The Department of Field Support had indicated that the weaknesses noted would be addressed in the service-level agreement.

16. It is also important to ensure that the Department of Political Affairs sources the capacity for administrative and logistical support from the Department of Field Support for clusters III (United Nations offices, peacebuilding support offices and commissions; see annex) and IV (UNAMA and UNAMI) missions and does not seek to build additional capacity within itself to provide backstopping support capacity that is already available in the Department of Field Support.

17. *The Department of Political Affairs stated that OIOS had missed a key aspect in the ability of the Department of Political Affairs to manage special political missions. The Department of Political Affairs did not have integrated operational teams, which, taking into consideration the support strategy of the Department of Field Support, were meant to address the gap between the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support in the management of specific missions*

in the field. The Department of Political Affairs further commented that integrated operational teams of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations were meant to provide mission-level support, while the Department of Field Support would deal with: the definition of strategy, policy and standards, the high-level managerial oversight of operations; training and capacity-building; resource stewardship; and reporting. In that support strategy, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations integrated operational teams were expected to continue managing mission-specific, cross-cutting policy and operational issues. The Department of Field Support was expected to interact with the integrated operational teams to address all mission issues that typically involved more than one division of the Department of Field Support and that were of a non-recurrent type. The expectation of the Department of Field Support was that the lead department would provide the necessary resources to integrate the various service pillars in the Department of Field Support for support at the mission-level; the Department of Field Support did not see coordination as part of its role.

18. The Department of Political Affairs stated that it should not and would not seek to set up a logistics pillar or field personnel or finance divisions. However, the Department of Political Affairs required a few additional posts to enable regional divisions to better interface with the technical pillars of the Department of Field Support in order to improve support to specific missions. The Department of Political Affairs would seek to establish a small integrated operational team-type unit (a small special political mission support unit) in its Executive Office, with the necessary staff, preferably with specific work experience in the Department of Field Support, providing an interface with the Department of Field Support and resulting in smoother collaboration and service delivery. That was the original idea expressed in the Secretary-General's proposals to strengthen the Department of Political Affairs (A/62/521, paras. 322 and 326-336), which was rejected, however, by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions and the General Assembly. The Department of Political Affairs further commented that, without such an interface, it could not effectively manage the operations for which it had ultimate responsibility.

19. The service-level agreement between the Departments of Political Affairs and Field Support should define the level of services required to provide adequate backstopping support capacity to missions. The service-level agreement between the Departments of Political Affairs and Field Support at Headquarters level should define the level of interface and coordination and specify the resources in that regard, if necessary. Also, the Department of Political Affairs, as discussed later in the present report, should conduct a comprehensive review of its capacity at Headquarters for the management and backstopping of special political missions with a view to ensuring that this core function is performed effectively and efficiently. The necessary capacity for interface and coordination with the Department of Field Support should be included as part of that review.

### **C. Coordination between the Department of Political Affairs and other United Nations partners**

20. The Department of Political Affairs draws on and coordinates with other United Nations departments and entities when special political missions need guidance and direction on a wide range of substantive issues, including human

rights and humanitarian and development matters. Such coordination is not without risk, namely, that of failing to effectively maximize the complementarities and synergies between the Department of Political Affairs and other United Nations partners. The creation of the Peacebuilding Support Office also posed a further risk of duplication. To address those risks, OIOS made the following recommendations in its previous report:

**Recommendation 2: The Department of Political Affairs should propose that the Secretary-General update the Department's mandate as the focal point within the United Nations for post-conflict peacebuilding to reflect the recent establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission and the Peacebuilding Support Office in order to clarify its responsibilities for managing and directing special political missions.**

**Recommendation 13: The Department of Political Affairs should develop, in coordination with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, a working-level methodology for establishing interdepartmental task forces and relevant terms of reference specifying functional responsibilities in managing the field missions.**

**Recommendation 14: The Secretary-General should ensure that his strategy of forming interdepartmental task forces as promulgated in the lead department policy is being implemented effectively, thereby improving cooperation and coordination between the Departments of Political Affairs and Peacekeeping Operations.**

**Recommendation 15: The Department of Political Affairs, in coordination with the Peacebuilding Support Office, should develop terms of reference that specify their respective roles and responsibilities in peacebuilding activities and formulate a coordination strategy to prevent possible duplication and overlap.**

21. OIOS found that, as regards the recommendations relating to the Peacebuilding Support Office (recommendations 2 and 15), the revision of the mandate of the Department of Political Affairs has yet to be finalized. The Department of Political Affairs has provided OIOS with a draft of its revised mandate, which reaffirms its role as the lead unit for post-conflict peacebuilding, with a provision stating that it will use the expertise of the Peacebuilding Support Office on peacebuilding. OIOS considers the implementation of recommendations 2 and 15 as in progress.

22. With regard to the recommendations relating to the interdepartmental task forces (recommendations 13 and 14), Decision No. 2008/24 of the Secretary-General had reaffirmed that integration was the guiding principle for all conflict and post-conflict situations where the United Nations had a country team and a multidimensional peacekeeping operation or a special political mission. By that Decision the Secretary-General instructed the lead departments to maintain task forces at Headquarters for each integrated United Nations presence to ensure coherent and consistent support and policy guidance. Following that Decision, the Department of Political Affairs has established nearly a dozen integrated task forces for special political missions. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations has also established similar task forces, called interdepartmental mission task forces. All Department of Political Affairs integrated task forces have detailed terms of reference. In light of the action taken, OIOS considers recommendations 13 and 14 as implemented.

23. To assess how the Department of Political Affairs meaningfully used integrated task forces, OIOS reviewed the coordination efforts by the United Nations on Somalia, where the Department of Political Affairs was the lead department. OIOS found that the Somalia working-level integrated task force met once every two months, contrary to the required frequency of once every two weeks. Further, some partners stated that discussions at the integrated task force working-level meetings were often limited to information-sharing rather than decision-making. OIOS is making a new recommendation in the present report (recommendation 1 below) for monitoring the functioning of integrated task forces to ensure greater complementarities and synergies between the Department of Political Affairs and other United Nations partners.

### **III. Key management issues requiring the attention of the Department of Political Affairs**

#### **A. Standard policy, procedures and guidelines for managing special political missions**

24. To address the risk that the management and backstopping of special political missions from Headquarters may be inconsistent or lack quality, OIOS in its previous audit made the following recommendations:

**Recommendation 10: The Department of Political Affairs should develop a set of standard operating procedures that provides desk officers with better management tools and increases the quality and consistency of the Department's support for special political missions.**

**Recommendation 12: The Department of Political Affairs should develop exit strategies for all special political missions and present them in the proposed programme budgets to the General Assembly and periodic reports to the Security Council.**

25. Despite ongoing efforts by the Department of Political Affairs to develop standard operating procedures and guidelines, most of them were still in draft stage at the time of the present audit, e.g., guidance on the management of special political missions (field missions) by the Department of Political Affairs; guidance and templates on Department of Political Affairs end-of-assignment reports; and standard operating procedures on debriefing of senior managers in Department of Political Affairs-supported special political missions. Other management tools, such as the Department's Intranet portal, had not been finalized. OIOS therefore considers the implementation of recommendation 10 as in progress.

26. As regards recommendation 12, OIOS found that the annual budget instructions of the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs to all special political missions now require the submission of a "future outlook for the mission and information on possible completion and exit strategy". The instructions require special political missions to indicate, inter alia, how long the mission is expected to operate, which factors would determine the possible closing of the mission, who would inherit the task of the mission and what the transitional arrangement would be. In light of the action taken by the Department of Political Affairs, OIOS considers recommendation 12 as implemented.

### **Guidelines for start-up planning**

27. OIOS audits found long delays in the start-up of UNMIN (AP2007/560/04) and the United Nations Office for West Africa (AP2007/560/02). Recognizing the need for start-up missions to be fully and immediately functional, the Department of Political Affairs initiated the development of standard operating procedures in that area, such as the guidelines on strategic assessment and some parts of the guidance on the management of special political missions. OIOS is making a new recommendation (number 2 below), since the Department of Political Affairs still lacked guidelines on certain operational aspects of mission start-up, including the following:

- (a) Target deployment turnaround time from the date of mandate approval to the date the mission becomes reasonably operational;
- (b) Formal process for the selection of and succession planning for the heads of missions to ensure timely and transparent recruitment for leadership positions;
- (c) Modalities for integrated special political missions, which the Department of Political Affairs is in the process of developing. The Department needs to ensure that Decision No. 2008/24 of the Secretary-General, discussed in paragraph 22 above, is fully addressed, i.e., that the modalities take into consideration the programmes and budgets of all the Organization's capacity in the same country, such as the United Nations country team, in order to maximize the impact of the United Nations combined response and to minimize the risk of duplication.

## **B. Controls over the submission of special political mission budgets**

28. While the Department of Field Support provides, as an adviser, technical support for the budgeting process for special political missions, the Department of Political Affairs and the heads of mission are responsible for budget reviews, particularly as to the linkage between mission mandates, expected accomplishments, activities and strategic direction, all of which drive the financial resources needed. Controls relating to the review of budgets are intended to mitigate the risk that budget components such as expected outputs and accomplishments might not be properly set or properly linked to resources requested by providing the necessary layers of accountability over budget preparation, review and submission. To address that risk, the previous OIOS report made the following recommendations:

**Recommendation 5: The Department of Political Affairs should request the Department of Management to revise the current budget presentation by categorizing the entities funded under section 3B in order to clearly indicate the lead department responsibility for each operation.**

**Recommendation 7: The Department of Political Affairs should establish a formal working group for budget review, consisting of the representatives of the Under-Secretary-General, the regional divisions and the Executive Office of the Department.**

**Recommendation 8: The Department of Political Affairs should request resources in the context of the programme budget for the biennium 2008-2009 to appoint a staff member with budget expertise as the Department's overall focal point for overseeing and monitoring the budgets of the special political missions.**

**Recommendation 9: The Department of Political Affairs, in consultation with the Department of Management, should enhance budgetary controls by issuing performance reports of expenditures for the special political missions annually rather than biennially, to ensure that variance analysis is conducted annually.**

29. OIOS found that:

(a) The budget presentation for special political missions indicated that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations was the lead department for administrative management while the Department of Political Affairs was the lead for substantive management because the then Office of Mission Support within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations had been in charge of administrative support. The creation of the Department of Field Support as a service provider to the Department of Political Affairs clarified that the Department of Political Affairs was the lead department with regard to substantive matters for special political missions assigned to it. In the cases of UNAMA and BINUB, the proposed budgets and supplementary information for special political missions indicated the Department of Peacekeeping Operations instead of the Department of Political Affairs as the lead department. OIOS therefore considers recommendation 5 as implemented;

(b) The Department of Political Affairs has established, within its Executive Office, a formal working group for budget review. OIOS therefore considers recommendation 7 as implemented;

(c) Recommendation 8 has been overtaken by the establishment of the Department of Field Support and has been closed without implementation. The service level agreement between the Departments of Political Affairs and Field Support discussed above should determine how to monitor and oversee the budgets of special political missions, using the relevant expertise of the Department of Field Support and the existing internal controls of the Secretariat without building duplicative capacity in the Department of Political Affairs;

(d) The supplementary information to the annual proposed budgets for special political missions for 2009 included variance analysis for expenditures on an annual basis. That allowed Department of Political Affairs managers, heads of missions and legislative bodies to prepare and approve the annual budget for special political missions in a timely manner. OIOS therefore considers recommendation 9 as implemented.

30. Despite the implementation of recommendations 5, 7 and 9, OIOS is of the opinion that the control of the Department of Political Affairs over the preparation of the budgets of special political missions could be further improved. There was no documentation showing that heads of missions and Department of Political Affairs managers had adequately performed all the required layers of budget reviews stipulated in the annual strategic guidance of the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs. To ensure that budget reviews are properly documented, OIOS is making a new recommendation (number 3 below).

## C. Performance management and accountability

### Department of Political Affairs staff and regional divisions

31. An inadequate performance evaluation mechanism may result in the inability to measure the effectiveness of the regional divisions, managers and staff of the Department of Political Affairs in managing and backstopping special political missions. To address that risk, the previous report of OIOS made the following recommendation:

**Recommendation 11: The Department of Political Affairs should strengthen its performance evaluation of special political mission management activities by utilizing the number of policies it addresses for use by the missions and their staffing vacancy rates as performance indicators in the Department's results-based budgeting framework, and clearly link them with the Performance Appraisal System of desk officers and their managers.**

32. While the weakness being addressed by the above recommendation, i.e., inadequate performance evaluation, continued to exist, the recent restructuring of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations has overtaken parts of the recommendation in that the management of vacancy rates at special political missions is no longer the responsibility of the Department of Political Affairs; the Department of Field Support will now bear this responsibility.

33. More importantly, OIOS found that the regional divisions of the Department of Political Affairs did not include in the Department budgets for the bienniums 2008-2009 and 2010-2011 any performance indicators relating to the management and backstopping of special political missions because the current mandate of the Department of Political Affairs did not include them as core activities of the regional divisions, notwithstanding that the Department of Political Affairs has always been responsible for managing special political missions, except for those missions under the leadership and management of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. OIOS is pleased to note that the Department of Political Affairs has recently added the backstopping responsibility of the regional divisions as a core activity in the draft of its revised mandate. OIOS also notes that the compacts of the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs with the Secretary-General and between the Assistant Secretaries-General in the Department of Political Affairs have clearly identified the responsibility of the Department of Political Affairs for managing special political missions; however, that activity can be reflected in the Department's results-based budget only after the biennium 2012-13. As an interim measure, OIOS recommends that the Department of Political Affairs develop and use, complementarily with respect to the existing results-based budgeting framework, appropriate performance indicators for regional divisions originating from the Secretary-General's compact with the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs. OIOS is closing recommendation 11 and making a new recommendation (number 4 below) to strengthen the evaluation of the performance of the regional divisions in managing special political missions and to address the following weaknesses:

(a) The responsibility of the regional divisions and their managers and staff for the backstopping of special political missions was not clearly defined. The recent evaluation by OIOS (E/AC.51/2009/3) showed that only three regional divisions had provided evidence of their workplans and that only two of the three divisional workplans had linked their objectives to the compact;



(b) The performance appraisal system of the desk officers, team leaders and division directors reviewed by OIOS did not specify detailed responsibilities for managing special political missions. Therefore, there was no assurance that the performance appraisal system was used to evaluate the performance of relevant Department of Political Affairs personnel at Headquarters against goals and expected success criteria in managing special political missions.

#### **Working environment at field special political missions**

34. A recent OIOS audit of a special political mission (AP2009/646/01) found interpersonal conflicts, poor management, a lax work environment and limited staff knowledge of core competencies, ethics, code of conduct and procedures for disciplinary matters and grievances, which undermined the working environment of the mission. Although the heads of missions are responsible for ensuring a professional and ethical working environment in the field, OIOS is of the opinion that it is the responsibility of the Department of Political Affairs, as the lead department for field special political missions, to guide and monitor those missions. OIOS notes that the senior management of the Department of Political Affairs had clearly demonstrated its commitment on that matter in the compacts of the Under-Secretaries-General and Assistant Secretaries-General; however, the Department has not clearly defined the responsibilities of the regional divisions and the heads of missions for:

(a) Monitoring the compliance of special political missions with the annual performance appraisal system evaluation requirement and various mandatory ethics training such as the integrity awareness initiative and courses on the prevention of workplace harassment, sexual harassment and abuse of authority and on ethics and integrity in the workplace;

(b) Providing easy access to and regularly informing the field special political mission staff about existing United Nations mechanisms on the handling of grievances such as the appeals and performance appraisal system rebuttal mechanisms, the Ethics Office, the Ombudsman's Office and the Staff Counsellor's Office;

(c) Developing a strategy on training, career management and mobility for staff at field special political missions using already existing systems within the Secretariat.

35. Also, the OIOS audit of the United Nations Office for West Africa found that there were delays in reporting to a group of donors, which may undermine the reputation of the Organization and disrupt the continuity of funding, as the agreement with donors stipulated that the release of the next instalments of contributions was conditional upon timely and satisfactory reporting. As at April 2009, seven special political missions had received contributions totalling \$7.6 million from donors. That required periodic reporting to donors; however, the Department of Political Affairs did not prescribe the monitoring of the reporting of special political missions to donors as part of the duties of desk officers in any guidelines, and there was no evidence that Department desk officers had monitored the reporting of special political missions to donors. The Executive Office of the Department of Political Affairs informed OIOS that it would prescribe such monitoring as a responsibility of desk officers.

### Heads of special political missions

36. OIOS noted the following weaknesses regarding the accountability of heads of missions:

(a) The directive (called general guidance) of the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, which delegates most responsibilities regarding the operation of special political missions to heads of missions, has not been issued to all heads of missions. That situation may result in unclear accountability, particularly because the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2008-09 for the Department of Political Affairs (A/62/6 (sect. 3)) provides that the substantive responsibility for special political missions rests with the Department of Political Affairs;

(b) The development of other accountability mechanisms for heads of missions (for special political missions led by the Department of Political Affairs) has not been completed, e.g.:

(i) The application of the Secretary-General's compact with senior managers to heads of missions. *The Department of Political Affairs agreed with the need for developing the compacts but commented that implementation would be resource-intensive;*

(ii) Not all heads of missions have agreed with the human resources action plans for their respective missions to improve the accountability of heads of missions for human resources management.

## D. Resource arrangement for the backstopping function of the Department of Political Affairs

37. From 1999 to 2009, the budgets of special political missions increased almost tenfold, from \$47.5 million to \$461.2 million. Excluding the budgets for UNAMA and UNAMI from the latter figure, there was approximately a threefold increase, from \$47.5 million to \$134.4 million, but there was no corresponding increase in the overall budget of the Department of Political Affairs. OIOS also found that the Department's budget did not distinguish the requirements for managing special political missions from those for other Department activities. Although a draft of the Department of Political Affairs mandate now recognizes managing and backstopping of special political missions as a core activity, the Department did not have a corresponding dedicated capacity for such a purpose.

38. The authorized staffing of the regional divisions of the Department of Political Affairs comprises 111 posts, including 27 of the additional 49 posts recently approved. The Department is conducting a workload analysis and developing a methodology for support arrangements for special political missions to establish dedicated capacity. In that regard, the Department has reported (A/62/512 and Corr.1) to the General Assembly that the preliminary results of its analysis indicated the need for 25 additional posts in the Department of Political Affairs and 26 in the Department of Field Support for backstopping. *The Department of Political Affairs stated that it would request, through the annual special political mission budget process, additional resources to support the backstopping of missions to be funded from the special political mission provisions of the regular budget.*

39. The General Assembly approved in March 2009 an additional 49 posts in the Department of Political Affairs at Headquarters in response to the Secretary-General's proposal to strengthen the Department. None of those posts, according to

DPA, were intended for the management of special political missions; instead, they were aimed at strengthening mainly the preventive diplomacy and mediation capacity of the Department. In the opinion of OIOS, the Department's reform proposal did not make such distinction clear. The analysis did not show statistics of how resources were going to be distributed for the management of special political missions and for the performance of other major duties, which need to be included in future proposals to the Assembly. Such statistics will serve as a tool for the Assembly to identify the existing resources of the Department of Political Affairs and assess whether additional resources are needed for the management of special political missions. In the case of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations Office of Operations, which has 110 posts, there was no need for such statistics, as the Office's mandate and resources are used exclusively for tasks related to field missions, including special political missions.

40. As regards large special political missions such as UNAMI (cluster IV), when the Department of Political Affairs is exceptionally assigned the lead role, the Department should propose to the General Assembly an appropriate mechanism to use mission posts at Headquarters to ensure that it has stable and adequate capacity for providing backstopping services, bearing in mind that such a mechanism must not in any way build up any similar capacities for backstopping that may already exist in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

## IV. Recommendations

### Recommendation 1

41. The Department of Political Affairs should closely monitor the implementation of the integrated task force coordination strategy to ensure that coordination of efforts between the Department and other United Nations partners is maximized and that the risk of duplication in managing special political missions is mitigated.

42. *The Department of Political Affairs accepted recommendation 1.*

### Recommendation 2

43. The Department of Political Affairs, in consultation with the Department of Field Support, should develop guidelines for mission start-up planning covering: (a) target deployment turnaround time; (b) the formal process for the selection of and succession planning for heads of missions; and (c) the definition of standard modalities to choose from for establishing integrated missions aiming to maximize the impact of all United Nations capacity in the country.

44. *The Department of Political Affairs accepted recommendation 2. The Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support also concurred with the recommendation, stating that the mission start-up guide, coordinated by the Peacekeeping Best Practices Section of the Policy, Evaluation and Training Division of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, was in an advanced stage of development. Further, a standard operating procedure on vacancy management and succession planning for senior mission appointments in peacekeeping operations and special political missions was promulgated in March 2009.*

**Recommendation 3**

45. The Department of Political Affairs should require heads of missions and Department regional division managers to document their review of special political mission budgets, in accordance with the control activities specified in the annual strategic guidance provided by the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs.

46. *The Department of Political Affairs accepted recommendation 3, stating that this process was already in place. The missions submit their budgets, which have been cleared by the heads of missions, to Department of Political Affairs desk officers, with the approval process in the mission documented in situ. Once the budgets arrive in the Department of Political Affairs, there is a clear approval process that goes through the respective directors, to the Assistant Secretaries-General, to the Under-Secretary-General, for transmission to the Department of Field Support for costing, then back to the Department of Political Affairs divisions for final review before approval by the Under-Secretary-General for onward forwarding to the Office of the Controller. OIOS found, however, that the process was not sufficiently documented to provide assurance that responsible managers had adequately reviewed the budget submissions.*

**Recommendation 4**

47. The Department of Political Affairs should clearly define the responsibility of the regional divisions and staff in their performance appraisal system to measure and monitor how effectively the regional divisions are managing and backstopping special political missions. Performance goals and indicators should be developed in close connection with the compact of the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs with the Secretary-General, divisional workplans and individual staff performance appraisals.

48. *The Department of Political Affairs accepted recommendation 4, stating that it would be immediately implemented in the new performance appraisal system cycle.*

**Recommendation 5**

49. The Department of Political Affairs should clearly define the responsibilities of the heads of special political missions and the managers of the regional divisions at Headquarters, including for: (a) monitoring the compliance of special political missions with the performance appraisal system and various United Nations-wide mandatory ethics training; (b) keeping staff of special political missions informed on how to handle appeals and grievances; (c) developing a strategy on staff training, career management and mobility, in order to strengthen the control environment and promote a professional and ethical working environment in field missions; and (d) monitoring reporting by special political missions to donors.

50. *The Department of Political Affairs accepted recommendation 5.*

**Recommendation 6**

51. The Secretary-General should expedite the implementation of accountability mechanisms for heads of special political missions led by the Department of Political Affairs, including the application of the Secretary-General's compact to heads of missions, to ensure adequate performance measurement and clear reporting lines and accountability.

52. *The Executive Office of the Secretary-General accepted recommendation 6 after consultation with the Departments of Political Affairs, Field Support, Peacekeeping Operations and Management, stating that detailed actions to implement that recommendation would be discussed in the next Management Performance Board meeting in September 2009.*

#### **Recommendation 7**

53. The Department of Political Affairs should conduct a comprehensive review of its capacity at Headquarters for the management and backstopping of special political missions, with a view to ensuring that this core function is performed effectively and efficiently. Such a review should show statistics on how resources are going to be distributed for the management of special political missions and for the performance of other major duties, which need to be included in future proposals to the General Assembly.

54. *The Department of Political Affairs accepted recommendation 7, stating that this would be done in 2010, once an evaluation of the impact on the strengthening of the Department was complete.*

#### **Recommendation 8**

55. The Department of Political Affairs should propose to the General Assembly an appropriate mechanism for using mission posts at Headquarters to ensure that it has stable and adequate capacity for providing backstopping services for large special political missions when the Department is assigned as the lead department on an exceptional basis, bearing in mind that such a mechanism must not in any way build up any similar capacities for backstopping that may already exist in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

56. *The Department of Political Affairs accepted recommendation 8, stating that it might submit a proposal, on a trial basis, in the context of the 2009 special political mission budget. The Department of Political Affairs did not agree, however, with the comments of OIOS that the mechanism proposed should “bear in mind that such a mechanism must not in any way build up any similar capacities for backstopping that may already exist in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations”. OIOS acknowledges that the creation of the Department of Field Support has changed the approach for the provision of administrative and logistical support to missions; however, that change does not impact the support capacity already existing in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in areas related to military affairs, United Nations police, mine action service, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and other areas. Considering the heavy investment in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to manage large missions and in order to avoid the building of duplicative structures, OIOS would reiterate that in general the Department of Peacekeeping Operations should be the lead department for all large special political missions.*

(Signed) Inga-Britt **Ahlenius**  
Under-Secretary-General  
Office of Internal Oversight Services

## Annex

## Special political missions by cluster

<i>Name</i>	<i>Requirements for 2009 (in thousands of dollars)<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Number of staff</i>	<i>Lead department</i>	<i>Administrative support department</i>	<i>Head of mission: title/level</i>
<b>Cluster I. Special and personal envoys, special advisers and personal representatives of the Secretary-General and Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon</b>					
1 Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Myanmar	586.1	3	Department of Political Affairs	Department of Political Affairs	Special Adviser to the Secretary-General/Under-Secretary-General (USG)
2 Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus	5 648.6	24	Department of Political Affairs	Department of Field Support	Special Adviser to the Secretary-General/USG
3 Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide	880.8	6	Department of Political Affairs	Department of Political Affairs	Special Adviser to the Secretary-General
4 Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara	346.4	1	Department of Political Affairs	Department of Political Affairs	Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General/USG
5 Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004)	611.6	3	Department of Political Affairs	Department of Political Affairs	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General/USG
6 Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon	5 463.5	81	Department of Political Affairs	Department of Field Support	Special Coordinator of the Secretary-General/USG
7 Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Lord's Resistance Army-affected areas	1 491.2	6	Department of Political Affairs	Department of Field Support	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General/USG
<b>Total</b>	<b>15 028.2</b>	<b>124</b>			
<b>Cluster II. Sanctions monitoring teams, groups and panels</b>					
1 Monitoring Group on Somalia	1 393.8	2	Department of Political Affairs	Department of Political Affairs	Not applicable
2 Panel of Experts on Liberia	542.8	—	Department of Political Affairs	Department of Political Affairs	Not applicable
3 Group of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire	1 334.0	1	Department of Political Affairs	Department of Political Affairs	Not applicable
4 Group of experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004)	1 523.8	1	Department of Political Affairs	Department of Political Affairs	Not applicable
5 Panel of Experts on the Sudan	1 384.8	2	Department of Political Affairs	Department of Political Affairs	Not applicable

<i>Name</i>	<i>Requirements for 2009 (in thousands of dollars)<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Number of staff</i>	<i>Lead department</i>	<i>Administrative support department</i>	<i>Head of mission: title/level</i>
6 Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1526 (2004) concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities	3 952.3	10	Department of Political Affairs	Department of Political Affairs	Not applicable
7 Support to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004)	2 719.7	5	Department of Political Affairs	Department of Political Affairs	Not applicable
8 Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED)	7 955.4	38	CTED; Department of Political Affairs provides Secretariat support servicing the Counter-Terrorism Committee	CTED has its own administrative support capacity	Executive Director/ Assistant Secretary-General (ASG)
<b>Total</b>	<b>20 806.6</b>	<b>59</b>			

**Cluster III. United Nations offices, peacebuilding support offices and commissions**

1 Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa	5 778.2	30	Department of Political Affairs	Department of Field Support	Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG)/USG
2 United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic	9 308.3	96	Department of Political Affairs	Department of Field Support	SRSG/ASG
3 United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau	4 829.7	32	Department of Political Affairs	Department of Field Support	Representative of the Secretary-General (RSG)/D-2
4 United Nations Political Office for Somalia	6 154.1	81	Department of Political Affairs	Department of Field Support	SRSG/USG
5 United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone	15 204.0	73	Department of Political Affairs	Department of Field Support	Executive Representative of the Secretary-General (ERSG) and UNDP Resident Coordinator/ASG
6 United Nations support to the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission	7 685.4	22	Department of Political Affairs	Department of Field Support	SRSG/USG
7 International Independent Investigation Commission	4 056.7	73	Department of Political Affairs	Department of Field Support	Commissioner/USG
8 United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia	1 788.2	25	Department of Political Affairs	Department of Field Support	SRSG/ASG
9 United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi	39 025.4	452	Department of Peacekeeping Operations	Department of Field Support	ERSG/ASG

<i>Name</i>	<i>Requirements for 2009 (in thousands of dollars)<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Number of staff</i>	<i>Lead department</i>	<i>Administrative support department</i>	<i>Head of mission: title/level</i>
10 United Nations Mission in Nepal	4 840.8	309	Department of Political Affairs	Department of Field Support	RSG/D-2
<b>Total</b>	<b>98 670.8</b>	<b>1 193</b>			
<b>Cluster IV. United Nations Assistance Missions in Afghanistan and Iraq</b>					
1 United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan	178 436.2	2 100	Department of Peacekeeping Operations	Department of Field Support	SRSG/USG
2 United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq	148 287.8	1 055	Department of Political Affairs	Department of Field Support	SRSG/USG
<b>Total</b>	<b>326 724.0</b>	<b>3 155</b>			
<b>Grand total</b>	<b>461 229.6</b>	<b>4 531</b>			

<sup>a</sup> All figures are from A/63/346 except those for the United Nations Political Office for Somalia, the International Independent Investigation Commission and the United Nations Mission in Nepal, which are from A/63/346/Add.6.