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Report on the activities of the Office of Internal Oversight Services

Comprehensive management audit of the Department of Safety and Security

Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services

"Governance and coordination issues need to be addressed as a priority to strengthen the Department of Safety and Security and to effectively mitigate the security risks facing the United Nations"

Summary

In its resolution 61/263 of 4 April 2007, the General Assembly had requested the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) to conduct a comprehensive management audit of the Department of Safety and Security. The audit focused on three areas: (a) the structure of the Department of Safety and Security; (b) the recruitment procedures and the implementation of section XI of Assembly resolution 59/276 of 23 December 2004, by which the Department had been established and (c) the interaction, cooperation and coordination of the Department of Safety and Security with other Secretariat entities, including but not limited to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

The Office of Internal Oversight Services concluded that in order to improve and strengthen the Department of Safety and Security and to effectively mitigate the security risks facing the United Nations, a number of critical issues, including governance and coordination, needed to be addressed as a priority. In this regard:

• Stakeholders in the United Nations security management system had voiced concerns regarding the effectiveness of the Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMN), which is an advisory body on safety and security. In particular, there were concerns that the Network did not review and promulgate policies in a timely manner and did not adequately reflect the needs of all members, and that the ineffectiveness of the Network might lead to the



disintegration of the United Nations security management system. In the view of OIOS, there is an urgent need to review the functions and structure of the Network in order to address these risks.

- The document entitled "Lines of Reporting, Responsibilities and Administrative Arrangements for Security and Safety Services at Offices Away from Headquarters and Regional Commissions" issued by the Department of Safety and Security in June 2006, is ambiguous and does not clearly delineate the roles, responsibilities and reporting lines of the Department and officials with safety and security responsibilities at offices away from Headquarters and regional commissions. Also, this document is not consistent with the framework for accountability established for the United Nations security management system. In the opinion of OIOS, these weaknesses lead to diminished accountability and could compromise the safety and security of United Nations staff.
- The absence of clearly delineated roles and responsibilities of divisions and units of the Department of Safety and Security in the areas of crisis management, and policy development and implementation, has caused an apparent redundancy of these functions within Department headquarters.
- The impediments connected to the existing Staff Regulations and Rules of the United Nations, which prevent the Department of Safety and Security from professionalizing and creating a career path for security personnel in the United Nations security management system, need to be addressed. These impediments relate to the harmonization of contractual arrangements, establishment of security personnel profiles, and standardization of recruitment practices throughout the United Nations security management system.
- The mechanisms established by the Department of Safety and Security to facilitate interaction, cooperation and coordination between the Department and other Secretariat departments were generally adequate, but coordination mechanisms have not been fully complied with at some duty stations and field locations. Isolated operational failures could have been effectively addressed through proper monitoring by the Department.

OIOS has made a series of recommendations on how to address these as well as other issues identified in the present report.

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I. Introduction

1. In its resolution 61/263 of 4 April 2007, the General Assembly requested the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) to conduct a comprehensive management audit of the Department of Safety and Security. The audit focused on three areas: (a) the structure of the Department of Safety and Security; (b) the recruitment procedures and the implementation of section XI of Assembly resolution 59/276 of 23 December 2004, by which the Department had been established; and (c) the interaction, cooperation and coordination of the Department of Safety and Security with other Secretariat entities, including but not limited to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

2. By its resolution 59/276, section XI, on a strengthened and unified security management system for the United Nations, the General Assembly decided to establish the Department of Safety and Security to provide leadership within the United Nations system on matters concerning the safety and security of staff, operations and premises, while stressing that the effective functioning of security operations on a decentralized basis at the country level as proposed by the Secretary-General required a unified capacity for policy, standards, coordination, communication, compliance and threat and risk assessment.

3. The resource requirements of the Department of Safety and Security for the biennium 2006-2007 under the regular budget were \$171.7 million (before re-costing). This amount included the United Nations share of the jointly financed¹ safety and security costs totalling \$40.6 million. According to the programme budget for the biennium 2006-2007, the Department has 1,645 established regular budget posts, of which 847 are jointly financed. These posts are located at United Nations Headquarters in New York, offices away from Headquarters, regional commissions and field locations throughout the world.

II. Governance and overall coordination of security matters

4. Governance and coordination issues need to be addressed as a priority to strengthen the Department of Safety and Security and to effectively mitigate the security risks facing the United Nations. In section XI of its resolution 59/276, the General Assembly identified several imperatives, through:

(a) Stressing that the effective functioning, at the country level, of security operations on a decentralized basis required a unified capacity for policy, standards, coordination, communication, compliance and threat and risk assessment;

(b) Recognizing the need for the urgent implementation of a unified and strengthened security management system;

(c) Emphasizing that the primary responsibility for ensuring the safety and security of United Nations staff and premises rested with the host country;

¹ Certain costs for safety and security are jointly financed, based on a cost-sharing formula endorsed by the General Assembly, by participating organizations of the United Nations security management system including the United Nations system agencies, programmes and funds and the Secretariat, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund.

(d) Recognizing the importance of achieving the highest levels of professionalism and expertise within the United Nations security management system.

An organigram of the Department of Safety and Security and the security management system is contained in the annex to the present report.

A. Role of the Inter-Agency Security Management Network in supporting a unified security management system

5. To address the needs of the United Nations organizations that constitute the unified security management system envisaged by the mandate of the Department of Safety and Security, the Department has relied upon the already existing framework for the development and implementations of policies. According to the United Nations Field Security Handbook (2006 ed.),² which the Department considers to be the comprehensive policy document for the United Nations security management system, the framework for developing the policies of the United Nations security management system includes the Inter-Agency Security Management Network, which is chaired by the Department and reports to the High-level Committee on Management of the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination. The Network was established effective January 2002 during the time of operation of the now defunct Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator to review policies governing the security operations of the United Nations system agencies, funds and programmes in the field. Since 2005, the Network's role has been expanded to include the review of all existing and proposed safety and security policies, procedures and practices of the entities of the United Nations security management system.

6. It is noteworthy that the Inter-Agency Security Management Network has no decision-making power per se, as it is required to submit all policy recommendations to the High-level Committee on Management, which decides on them and advises the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination on how they should be implemented. A risk assessment by OIOS of the Department of Safety and Security conducted subsequent to the audit highlighted stakeholders' concerns regarding the effectiveness of the Network. In particular, there was a concern that policies were not being reviewed and promulgated in a timely manner, and that the policies did not adequately reflect the needs of all members of the Network. Also as highlighted in paragraphs 8 to 10 and 43 of the present report, there is a lack of clarity regarding the status of the Department of Field Support and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, both of the United Nations Secretariat, in the Network. There was a further concern that the ineffectiveness of the Network might lead to disintegration of the United Nations security management system. In the view of OIOS, there is an urgent need to review the functions and structure of the Network in order to address these risks.

² This edition of the United Nations Field Security Handbook includes the approved framework for accountability that existed during the time of operation of the former Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator. The revised framework for accountability, which was taken note of by the General Assembly in its resolution 61/263 of 4 April 2007, was transmitted by the Department of Safety and Security in April 2007 to all officials with safety and security responsibilities.

B. Conformity of the Department of Safety and Security with the framework for policy development

At its April 2005 meeting, the Inter-Agency Security Management Network 7. had noted that, given the existence of a worldwide threat, the differentiation between Headquarters and field locations from a security perspective was no longer valid. Accordingly, the Network reviewed the United Nations Field Security Handbook, which describes the roles and responsibilities of Chief Security Advisers who are also the heads of safety and security services at Headquarters, offices away from Headquarters and regional commissions. In addition, in March 2007, the Network reviewed and agreed upon the policy document entitled "United Nations Security Management System Arrangements for Headquarters Locations", which pertains specifically to Headquarters, offices away from Headquarters and regional commissions. However, the Department of Safety and Security itself did not always adhere to the requirement that all policies should be reviewed by the Network with regard to some policies covering the safety and security services at Headquarters, offices away from Headquarters and regional commissions. At the time of the audit, the Department had been working on 13 priority policy areas for the safety and security services, including career development, early retirement, and weaponsrelated policies. The Department believed that those policies were internal to the Department and fell outside the purview of the Network. In the view of OIOS, this contradicted the concept of a unified capacity for policy.

C. Safety and security policies for Secretariat departments

8. The focal points for safety and security at the organizations constituting the United Nations security management system are responsible for liaising with the Department of Safety and Security and the Inter-Agency Security Management Network on all policy and procedural matters. Although the Department of Peacekeeping Operations had been divided into two departments in early 2007, namely, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support, as of the date of the audit, the Department of Field Support had yet to appoint a focal point. Consequently, the focal point for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, who was appointed prior to the reorganization, also serves as the de facto focal point for the Department of Field Support.

9. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations informed OIOS that its views had not been properly considered by the Inter-Agency Security Management Network and that its participation in the Network had not sufficiently impacted on the policy debate of the United Nations security management system. Therefore, it believed that the policies of the Network had not addressed the unique circumstances and needs of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. For example, uniformed personnel (that is to say, military observers and civilian police), who are neither civilian staff under the Staff Rules nor part of the military contingents in peacekeeping missions, are currently not covered by the United Nations security management system. In the view of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Network, which was established prior to the creation of the Department of Safety and Security, continues to focus primarily on the needs of the United Nations system agencies, funds and programmes. 10. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations stated that it had been invited to attend the plenary sessions of the Inter-Agency Security Management Network but, as indicated in paragraph 43, had not attended any meetings since 2005 and its status in the Network had still not been clarified. The Department noted that Network activities were not limited to the plenary sessions because working groups met prior to the Network plenary sessions to identify key issues and decide the Network agenda and strategies. The Department is not a party to these working groups and has therefore been able to influence neither the Network agenda nor its strategies.

III. Organizational structure of the Department of Safety and Security

A. Need to formalize the structure of the Department of Safety and Security

11. Primarily owing to long negotiations on the new framework for accountability for the United Nations security management system, issuance of the required Secretary-General's bulletin describing the functions of each unit of the Department of Safety and Security has been delayed. The framework for accountability, which specifies the roles and responsibilities of all actors in the United Nations security management system, including the Department of Safety and Security, was taken note of by the General Assembly in its resolution 61/263. The Department explained that it had delayed the issuance of the Secretary-General's Bulletin on the organization of the Department pending the approval of the framework for accountability. However, at the time of the audit, the publication of the bulletin had been further delayed pending a decision by the General Assembly on the programme budget for the biennium 2008-2009, which included a proposal by the Department of Safety and Security.

12. OIOS notes that the reports of the Secretary-General (A/59/365 and Corr.1 and Add.1/Corr.1) on a strengthened and unified security management system of the United Nations had been among the impetuses for the adoption by the General Assembly of section XI of its resolution 59/276, by which the Department of Safety and Security was established. Although a more comprehensive review of the structure of the Department by a dedicated change management expert had been envisaged, as indicated in paragraph 14 of document A/59/365/Add.1 and Corr.1, the Department informed OIOS that its structure was based solely on the recommendations contained in the aforementioned reports of the Secretary-General, which in turn had been based on the comprehensive study of security requirements conducted by a specialized security firm recruited by the Department of Management and supervised by the Deputy Secretary-General. The Department of Safety and Security stated that it had tried, but failed, to obtain the report of the comprehensive study of security requirements conducted by the specialized security firm. However, the Department of Management informed OIOS that all records pertaining to safety and security had been provided to the Department of Safety and Security upon its creation.

13. The structure of the Department of Safety and Security, which has yet to be set out in a Secretary-General's bulletin, includes the major organizational units and capacities authorized by the General Assembly in its resolution 59/276. In particular, in that resolution the Assembly subsumed the security management components of the office of the United Nations Security Coordinator, the Safety and Security Service at Headquarters, the security services at offices away from Headquarters and regional commissions, and the civilian security component of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations into a single security management framework. As at the time of the audit, the structure of the Department of Safety and Security included the Office of the Under-Secretary-General, including the Policy, Planning and Coordination Unit, the Compliance, Evaluation and Monitoring Unit and the Executive Office; the Division of Regional Operations, including the Office of the Director, Threat and Risk Capacity, the Operations Section, the Communications Centre, the five regional desks and one peacekeeping desk, and the Field Security Operations; the Division of Headquarters Security and Safety Services,³ including Headquarters Security and Safety Services and Security and Safety Services at offices away from Headquarters and regional commissions; and Field Support Services, including the Critical Incident Stress Management Unit and the Training and Development Section.

14. In the view of OIOS, the delay in formalizing the structure provides the Department of Safety and Security with the opportunity to reassess how it could be more appropriately structured in order to effectively and efficiently respond to its mandate. As discussed directly below, in conducting the assessment, the Department must consider the need to: (a) clearly delineate its roles and responsibilities vis-à-vis those of Designated Officials at offices away from Headquarters and regional commissions (paras. 15-17); (b) clarify the responsibilities and lines of reporting of Chief Security Advisers at offices away from Headquarters, regional commissions and other field locations (paras. 18-19); (c) clarify the roles and responsibilities of the divisions and units within the Department (paras. 20-24); and (d) realign as warranted the staffing levels of the current structure (paras. 25-27).

B. Need for clarity in roles and responsibilities of Designated Officials at offices away from Headquarters and regional commissions

15. Prior to the establishment of the new framework for accountability, the Department of Safety and Security, in June 2006, had issued a document entitled "Lines of Reporting, Responsibilities and Administrative Arrangements for Security and Safety Services at Offices Away from Headquarters and Regional Commissions". While the framework for accountability discusses the roles and responsibilities of all actors in the United Nations security management system, the document on "Lines of Reporting, Responsibilities and Administrative Arrangements" specifically addresses offices away from Headquarters and regional commissions. At the time of the audit, the Department of Safety and Security and concerned officials at offices away from Headquarters and regional commissions

³ The programme budget for the biennium 2008-2009 identifies this division as the Division of Security and Safety Services, whereas the programme budget for the biennium 2006-2007 identifies it as the Division of Headquarters Security and Safety Services.

were using this document as the source of guidelines/standard operating procedures for reporting and assignment of responsibilities.

16. In the opinion of OIOS, the content of this document is ambiguous and creates confusion. The document states that the Designated Official is responsible for ensuring that the goal of the United Nations security management system is met at the duty station but it also says that it is the Department of Safety and Security that is responsible for "ensuring implementation for the security aspects of United Nations activities". The document also states that the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security is responsible for the overall safety of United Nations civilian personnel but then goes on to say that the Under-Secretary-General shares responsibility for security with the Designated Official at the duty station. It is not made clear how this "sharing" of responsibility should be achieved.

17. The Department of Safety and Security acknowledged that the document was ambiguous and did not clearly delineate the roles and responsibilities of the Department and officials with safety and security responsibilities at offices away from Headquarters and regional commissions. In the opinion of OIOS, ambiguity in establishing responsibilities for safety and security leads to diminished accountability and compromises the safety and security of United Nations staff. The Department should therefore ensure that any revisions made to the document are aligned to the framework for accountability of the United Nations security management system.

C. Need for clarity in lines of reporting of the Chief Security Adviser at offices away from Headquarters, regional commissions and other field locations

18. The Chief Security Adviser is the security professional appointed by the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security to advise the Designated Official and the Security Management Team on their security functions at the duty station. In this advisory capacity, the Chief Security Adviser reports both to the Designated Official and to the Department of Safety and Security. The Chief Security Adviser also heads the Security and Safety Service at offices away from Headquarters and regional commissions, and in integrated missions,⁴ is responsible for managing the Security Section of the peacekeeping/special political mission. In this operational capacity, the Chief Security Adviser reports to the Designated Official and to the Department.

19. The Chief Security Adviser also reports to the Department of Safety and Security because the Department is responsible for his/her technical supervision and for providing policy direction and operational guidance; however, the nature and scope of technical supervision, policy direction and operational guidance were not sufficiently clear. For example, the meaning of "technical supervision" varied depending on who interpreted the expression. Ambiguity regarding the responsibility of the Department for the technical supervision, direction and operational guidance of the Chief Security Adviser had caused tension between the

⁴ An integrated mission is one that has a Country Team comprising United Nations system agencies, funds and programmes, and a peacekeeping mission under the overall authority of a single Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

Chief Security Adviser and the Designated Official at one of the offices away from Headquarters. Eventually, the Department reassigned the Chief Security Adviser. However, this does not resolve the bigger issue regarding lack of clarity on policy and operational matters, and on the reporting lines of the Chief Security Adviser, which needs to be addressed.

D. Need for clarity in the functions of the units within the Department of Safety and Security structure

20. The following specific examples relating to crisis management capacity and policy development and implementation capacity indicate the need for further clarity on the roles and responsibilities of the divisions and units in the Department of Safety and Security in order to prevent possible overlap/duplication of functions and inefficient use of resources in the areas of policy development, implementation, crisis management and field support.

Crisis management capacity

21. Under the programme budget for the biennium 2008-2009, the Department of Safety and Security received seven additional posts for establishing crisis management capacity in the form of a unit within the Field Support Service. This Crisis Management Unit is responsible for information management, for coordinating the establishment of procedures, policies and agreements and for augmenting the existing Communications Centre of the Division of Regional Operations during crises.

22. The Crisis Management Unit adds to a number of existing but separate units and organs with crisis management capacities. At the time of the audit, the existing organs and units with certain crisis management responsibilities included (a) the Communications Centre with seven General Service staff; (b) the Crisis Management Unit within the Safety and Security Service in New York with five staff; and (c) specifically designated field surge capacity in 15 locations for crisis response in the field which could be mobilized to a crisis zone in case of need. The Department of Safety and Security concurred that all crisis management units needed to be merged.

Policy development and implementation

23. According to the report of the Secretary-General on a strengthened and unified security management system for the United Nations (A/61/531):

(a) The Divisions of Regional Operations and Safety and Security Services are responsible for updating security and safety guidelines and directives and for "coordinating the standardization of safety and security policies and monitoring their implementation", respectively. However, these responsibilities should fall under the purview of the Policy, Planning and Coordination Unit, which reports to the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security;

(b) The Divisions of Regional Operations and Safety and Security Services are responsible for monitoring the implementation of established security and safety policies, although this falls within the purview of the Compliance, Evaluation and Monitoring Unit. 24. The Department of Safety and Security informed OIOS that policy development and monitoring are peripheral to the Divisions of Regional Operations and Safety and Security Services. However, this fact is not clarified in the report of the Secretary-General (A/61/531) or in any other official document.

E. Staffing levels of the current structure

25. According to document A/59/365/Add.1 and Corr.1, security and safety services specialists had been engaged to conduct an external validation of the staffing proposals across duty stations, using industry best practices and the Headquarters minimum operating security standards. As indicated in paragraph 12 above, the report of the security and safety services specialists could not be located by the Department of Safety and Security and thus OIOS could not review it.

26. Regarding the posts for field security personnel that are jointly financed by participating organizations in the United Nations security management system, the Department of Safety and Security acknowledged that the "initial requirements were not based on any formal risk and threat assessment but were the result of discussions held by the consultant on an inter-agency basis to determine where security personnel were required as well as how many security officers were needed at each location". Contrary to this assertion, however, among the conclusions of the ninth session of the High-level Committee on Management (4 and 5 April 2005) was the following:

Organizations reiterated their concern about the lack of consultation during the process that had led to the adoption of General Assembly resolution 59/276. This had resulted in a lack of critical financial information at the time of preparation of the budgets of the organizations and in the consequent difficulty that they would face in providing coverage for security costs that were subject to cost-sharing (see CEB/2005/3, para. 15).

27. There was no indication that the required additional posts for the Headquarters units of the Department of Safety and Security such as: the Threat and Risk Assessment Unit; Policy, Planning and Coordination Unit; Compliance, Evaluation and Monitoring Unit; Training and Development Section; Critical Incident Stress Management Unit; and the regional desks were validated by the security and safety services specialists or based on any benchmarking practice.

IV. Human resources management

28. In its resolution 59/276 establishing the Department of Safety and Security, the General Assembly had stressed the importance of professionalizing and creating a career path for security personnel in the United Nations security management system. The Department informed OIOS that it considered harmonization of contractual arrangements, establishment of profiles, and standardization of recruitment practices throughout the United Nations security management system to be critical for fully addressing the goals expressed in resolution 59/276. In its resolution 61/263, the Assembly had requested OIOS to conduct a management audit of, inter alia, recruitment procedures and the implementation of section XI of

Assembly resolution 59/276. In this context, OIOS reviewed whether the Department had implemented section XI regarding the recruitment procedures that would professionalize and create a career path for security personnel in the United Nations security management system.

A. Harmonization of contractual arrangements

29. As of the date of this audit, the issue of harmonization of contractual arrangements had been unresolved. In addition, there are no rules and administrative instructions on the redeployment of locally recruited security personnel across duty stations. As shown in the table below, there are five categories of personnel performing security functions under different contractual arrangements. These differences are accounted for by, inter alia, appointments under different series of Staff Rules, and pertain as well to the post classifications for security personnel performing similar functions, as well as to the organizations issuing the contracts.

Status of the five different categories of security personnel

Types of security personnel	In Department of Safety and Security staffing table	Supervised by Department of Safety and Security	Organization issuing the contract	Local recruits (series of staff Rules/category)	International recruits (series of Staff Rules/category)
Security personnel at Headquarters, offices away from Headquarters and regional commissions	Yes	Yes	United Nations Secretariat	Security Service (SS), General Service (GS)	100 series: Professional (P)
Field security personnel	Yes	Yes	United Nations Development Programme	100 series: GS	200 series: Project Personnel (L)
Department of Peacekeeping Operations mission- appointed security personnel	No	Yes ^a	United Nations Secretariat	300 series: GS	300 series: P, Field Service (FS)
Single-agency security personnel	No	No	United Nations system agencies, programmes and funds	Unknown	Unknown
Non-United Nations security personnel (outsourced security services)	No	No	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown

^a Department of Safety and Security-supervised Department of Peacekeeping Operations mission-appointed security personnel at integrated United Nations missions but not at non-integrated missions.

30. The Department of Safety and Security stated that the differences in contractual arrangements impeded the redeployment of security personnel between duty stations. The Department also believed that differences in the conditions of service of security officers, primarily owing to differences in sources of funding, could affect the morale of security personnel and potentially derail the concept of an integrated security management system. In the Department's view, the provisions of

General Assembly resolution 59/276, which stressed the importance of professionalizing and creating a career path for security personnel in the United Nations security management system, pertain to all categories of security personnel, including those locally recruited and classified at the Security Service and General Service levels.

31. During the past three years, the Department of Safety and Security has taken a number of steps to address the issue of harmonization of conditions of service without success, since the General Assembly has not decided on this issue. For example, in 2005, the Department had initiated a review process with the Office of Human Resources Management, the Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Accounts, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund. In 2006, the Department again raised this issue through the report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly (A/61/531). The Assembly in its resolution 62/248 of 3 April 2008 decided that the continued consideration of the harmonization of conditions of service was necessary and would be a matter of priority at its sixty-third session, with a view to implementing the new contractual arrangements and conditions by 1 July 2009.

32. The Department of Safety and Security stated that it anticipated a resolution of the issue concerning harmonization of conditions of service through the ongoing human resources management reforms under the purview of the Department of Management. However, although the human resources management reforms propose the appointment of United Nations staff under one series of Staff Rules, OIOS believes that this will not fully eliminate the current impediments to redeploying security personnel across different duty stations. For instance, the human resources management reforms will not address the mobility issue for locally recruited staff as well as for internationally recruited security personnel holding United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) contracts.

33. The staff selection system of the United Nations Secretariat (see administrative instruction ST/AI/2006/3 of 15 November 2006) considers individuals with UNDP contracts external candidates irrespective of whether they apply for a lateral move or for a promotion. Therefore, the internationally recruited security personnel, who are on the staffing table of the Department of Safety and Security and consequently should be considered Secretariat staff, may be at a disadvantage when applying for vacancies at Headquarters, offices away from Headquarters and regional commissions, because they are external candidates by virtue of their UNDP contract.

34. Currently, there are no rules or administrative instructions governing the redeployment of locally recruited staff across duty stations of the Secretariat. To move to another duty station, locally recruited security personnel must resign from their parent duty station and retake the entry test for the desired duty station, which impedes their mobility.

35. Consequently, a new set of rules for locally recruited security personnel is needed to address the mobility requirements. To achieve this, the Secretariat may consider using the Security Service post category to distinguish the locally recruited security personnel from other locally recruited administrative staff members. Currently, the Security Service level is used only for locally recruited security personnel in New York. Locally recruited security personnel at other duty stations

are under the General Service category, which has a salary scale different from that for the Security Service category.

B. New profile of security personnel

36. Nearly three years after the request of the General Assembly, the profile of security personnel remains incomplete. To date, the Department of Safety and Security has drafted a profile only for the next generation of internationally recruited security personnel at field locations in August 2007; it has yet to establish a new profile for all other categories of security personnel. The draft profile for internationally requirements and career path, including tour of duty to be undertaken, before the security personnel can be considered for promotion.

37. The Department of Safety and Security explained that it had been unable to complete the profile for security personnel at all levels primarily because its main focus had been the filling of new posts authorized by the General Assembly. The Department also stated that it had focused on the profile of the internationally recruited field security personnel because redeployment within that group was possible, since all security personnel in this group held UNDP contracts. The Department believes that until the contractual arrangements for security personnel throughout the United Nations security management system are harmonized, it is of little use to prepare profiles for other categories of security personnel, including the safety and security personnel at Headquarters, offices away from Headquarters, regional commissions and peacekeeping and special political missions, and agency-specific security personnel.

38. The Department of Safety and Security has no authority to harmonize contractual arrangements of security personnel throughout the United Nations security management system. However, it is within the Department's purview to propose a new profile of security personnel at all levels focusing primarily on recruitment strategy and entry requirements.

C. Recruitment standards

39. The recruitment standards established by the Inter-Agency Security Management Network for the field security personnel (see table) have not been consistently applied throughout the United Nations security management system. In reviewing the 2007 vacancy announcements, OIOS found that the required minimum years of relevant experience for security personnel at Headquarters and for security personnel at offices away from Headquarters were the same but that the minimum years of required relevant experience for security personnel in the field were significantly higher. For example, the experience requirement for an L-4 in the field was 12 years, whereas the experience requirement for a P-5 at Headquarters and offices away from Headquarters was only 10 years.

40. The Department of Safety and Security explained that the experience requirements for the field positions were based on recruitment standards established by the Inter-Agency Security Management Network, while the experience requirements for comparable posts at Headquarters, offices away from Headquarters and regional commissions were based on the classification guidelines of the United

Nations Secretariat. However, OIOS also found that the Department had not always complied with the recruitment standards established by the Network for field positions. For instance, the Network requires a minimum of 16 years experience for an L-5, but the Department of Safety and Security had indicated a requirement of only 15 years experience in a recent vacancy announcement. On the other hand, for an L-4, the Network requires 10 years for a candidate with a master's degree, but the Department had advertised in its vacancy announcement that a minimum of 12 years experience was required for candidates with an advanced/master's degree.

D. Training

41. In 2006 and 2007, the Training and Development Section of the Department of Safety and Security had trained mainly security professionals and managers with security responsibilities. During the past three years, out of the 20 training standards developed by the Training and Development Section, the Section delivered training on 6. While the Section was relying on the training components at the field and Headquarters duty stations to deliver the training, it was not monitoring the activities conducted by these training components. Consequently, the Training and Development Section was not in a position to ascertain whether all security personnel had been adequately trained using the common training standards.

V. Interaction, cooperation and coordination of the Department of Safety and Security with other Secretariat departments

A. Interaction, cooperation and coordination of the Department of Safety and Security with other Secretariat departments at Headquarters

42. OIOS considers the interaction, cooperation and coordination of the Department of Safety and Security with other Secretariat departments at Headquarters to be generally adequate. For example, there is a Standing Committee comprising the Under-Secretaries-General of the Department of Safety and Security, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and the Department of Field Support which meets regularly to discuss issues connected with security. Senior management officials of both the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat and the Department of Safety and Security confirmed that they did collaborate during the United Nations Consolidated Appeals Process used for mobilizing resources for humanitarian assistance in order to ensure that safety and security aspects were properly reflected in the Consolidated Appeals Process. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the Department of Safety and Security officials also confirmed that they were cooperating on an ongoing project that would ensure security coverage for Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs clientele in the field security system that were not currently covered by the United Nations security management system, that is to say, the non-governmental organizations.

43. However, the Department of Safety and Security informed OIOS that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Field Support, and the

Department of Political Affairs had not participated in the meetings of the Inter-Agency Security Management Network. The Department of Field Support had not yet appointed a security focal point, while the Department of Political Affairs had only recently appointed a new one. The present Department of Peacekeeping Operations security focal point is leaving for another duty station; thus, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations needs to appoint a replacement. The focal points are supposed to represent their respective departments in the meetings of the Network; thus, timely appointment of the focal point is important. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations has participated in only one meeting of the Network since the creation of the Department of Safety and Security. As indicated in paragraph 10, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations focal point believed the Network had not sufficiently addressed the concerns of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in the proposed policies.

B. Interaction, cooperation and coordination of the Department of Safety and Security with offices away from Headquarters, regional commissions and other field locations

44. Interaction, cooperation and coordination between the Department of Safety and Security and offices away from Headquarters, regional commissions and other field locations should occur in accordance with the following mechanisms:

(a) At offices away from Headquarters and regional commissions, the Designated Official for security chairs the Senior Management Group comprising Executive Directors or the equivalent for United Nations organizations having their headquarters or a stand-alone office in the same country. The Senior Management Group should meet once a year and should be convened in the case of impending crisis or serious security developments. At other field locations, the Department of Safety and Security-appointed Designated Official for security chairs the Security Management Team consisting of representatives of heads of agencies at the field location. The Security Management Teams should meet regularly to discuss and make decisions on safety and security issues at the field location;

(b) The Chief Security Adviser to the Designated Official for security should report periodically to the Department of Safety and Security on operational and administrative matters. At offices away from Headquarters and regional commissions, the Chief Security Adviser chairs the Security Advisory Group comprising security focal points. The Security Advisory Group should act as an advisory body to the Senior Management Group and meet regularly to consider issues related to security policies and operations, facilitate coordination and information dissemination, and formulate recommendations to the Senior Management Group. At other field locations, the Chief Security Adviser chairs the Security Cells comprising single-agency security officials at those field locations.

45. In the opinion of OIOS, the above-described mechanisms, if functioning as intended, are adequate to provide interaction, coordination and cooperation of the Department of Safety and Security with other Secretariat departments at offices away from Headquarters, regional commissions and other field locations. To ensure that the mechanisms work as intended, they must be periodically verified. The Department has a Compliance, Evaluation and Monitoring Unit which, in the view of OIOS, should be used to identify and report any non-compliance with the

established mechanisms that may impact on security operations. The Unit only recently received its full complement of staff, and has started identifying appropriate modalities for its compliance visits. The work planning process for this Unit has not been structured so as to properly identify the nature, timing and extent of compliance visits. There is no planning cycle; and the workplan is determined based on informal consultations held by the Unit with Department officials. With the appropriate modalities, the Unit should have been able to identify, in a more timely manner, the following conditions identified by OIOS, which indicated ineffective interaction, ineffective cooperation and ineffective coordination at some offices away from Headquarters and field locations:

(a) At one office away from Headquarters, the Designated Official for safety and security informed OIOS that owing to unresolved issues regarding his authority over other heads of United Nations organizations at that duty station, it was difficult for him to convene meetings of the Senior Management Group.

(b) Primarily owing to difficulties experienced by the Designated Official at another office away from Headquarters in convening a formal meeting of heads of organizations at that duty station, the required meetings of the Senior Management Group were held informally. Since records of the meetings of this Group are not maintained, it might be difficult for the Secretary-General to assign accountability for non-compliance of this Group with safety and security policies;

(c) At one peacekeeping mission, the Chief Security Adviser disagreed with the Chief of the Joint Operations Centre on whether the staff at the Centre should receive direct tasking from their parent organization. Security officers at the mission have inadequate experience and training, and the Chief Security Adviser also indicated that there were weaknesses with respect to the regional Security Management Teams. Communications remained a problem across many duty stations: training on use of communications equipment was inadequate and some communications equipment was not functioning properly at this mission;

(d) Another peacekeeping mission confirmed that no exercise had been carried out to test the Security Evacuation Plan. The warden system in this mission was not operational mainly owing to the incompleteness of the security section database on residential information, a situation further compounded by the large number of staff involved;

(e) In another peacekeeping mission, the operating procedures used were outdated, Area Security Coordinators were not adequately trained, and the guidelines provided to wardens were inadequate;

(f) In yet another peacekeeping mission, the Security Cell was not established; security and crisis management training was not provided to some agency members in the Security Management Team; the warden system was not operating efficiently and effectively because it operated on a voluntary basis and no one wanted to take this responsibility; and there had been a lack of exchange of information during a crisis involving the host country in March 2007, as a result of which the host country did not inform or protect United Nations staff;

(g) Different radio frequencies of the handsets used in two peacekeeping missions hampered communication among the security personnel;

(h) The Designated Official of one peacekeeping mission complained of the lack of a clear chain of command for the Chief Security Adviser and of his lack of control over Chief Security Advisers because they were Department of Safety and Security staff.

VI. Recommendations

46. OIOS issued 16 recommendations to the Department of Safety and Security to improve the Organization's security structure and its responsiveness to the security environment. Several of the recommendations may have budgetary implications for the United Nations. As a general observation, the Department of Management advised that any of the recommendations that involved restructuring or additional resources must be reviewed and analysed in accordance with the established budgetary procedures and presented to the General Assembly for its consideration. Comments made by the Department of Safety and Security in response to the recommendations are presented in bold.

Recommendation 1

47. The Department of Safety and Security should initiate a review of the Inter-Agency Security Management Network mechanism to assess whether it is functioning effectively and efficiently, and is fulfilling the needs of the organizations of the United Nations security management system. The results of this review should be presented to the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination through the High-level Committee on Management.

48. The Department of Safety and Security responded that the Inter-Agency Security Management Network comprises representatives from United Nations system agencies, funds and programmes who report to their governing bodies and therefore any review of the Network must be conducted through the Highlevel Committee on Management/United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination. According to the Department, while it is part of the United Nations security management system, the Department is not mandated to conduct a review on its own. Nevertheless, the Department advised that the High-level Committee on Management had established a Steering Group on 27 August 2008, which was discussing recommendation 1, and a security management system-wide response was being generated. The Department will communicate to OIOS the outcome of the Steering Group's decision on how to take the recommendation forward.

Recommendation 2

49. The Department of Safety and Security should ensure that all proposed policies for safety and security services at Headquarters, offices away from Headquarters and regional commissions are submitted to the Inter-Agency Security Management Network for consideration. The Department of Safety and Security accepted this recommendation stating that it would ensure that all policies pertaining to the United Nations security management system were considered by the Inter-Agency Security Management Network.

50. The Department of Safety and Security should review and clarify, in consultation with the Inter-Agency Security Management Network, the role of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support in policy development and address the reasons why they have not attended the meetings of the Network. In particular, the Department should address whether the unified security management network system adequately covers all types of personnel under the responsibility of these Departments.

51. The Department of Safety and Security accepted this recommendation stating that it acknowledged the leadership role that it played in ensuring the safety and security of staff, operations and premises. In addition, the Department stated that it had been assured by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Field Support and the Department of Political Affairs that focal points would be designated and required to attend the meetings of the Inter-Agency Security Management Network. According to the Department of Management, the addition of other types of personnel such as uniformed personnel (for example, military police and civilian police) to the security management network may add substantial costs to the United Nations and may form a precedent for other personnel to be included. Any addition of these personnel would also have ramifications for the cost-sharing arrangements agreed to by the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination. Therefore, in the opinion of OIOS, the Department of Safety and Security should perform appropriate analyses to determine the cost implications of implementing this recommendation.

Recommendation 4

52. The Department of Safety and Security should, based on its three years of experience and using the report commissioned by the Department of Management on the comprehensive study of security requirements and other relevant studies, reassess its structure in consultation with the Inter-Agency Security Management Network. Based on the results of the reassessment, it should finalize and publish the Secretary-General's bulletin describing the organization of the Department of Safety and Security, including the functions of its divisions and units.

53. The Department of Safety and Security accepted this recommendation and stated that it intended to reassess its structure in the context of the upcoming security review. Pursuant to the conclusions of the review, the Department of Safety and Security will proceed to finalize the Secretary-General's bulletin. The Department of Management commented that any restructuring/reorganization of the Department of Safety and Security would need to be considered in the light of any changes recommended in the report to the General Assembly on the independent review of United Nations security that evaluated the strategic issues vital to the delivery and enhancement of the security of United Nations personnel and premises. Any changes as approved by the Assembly would form the basis of the changes to the Secretary-General's bulletin.

54. The Department of Safety and Security should initiate appropriate operational procedures/guidelines for consideration by the Inter-Agency Security Management Network and approval by the High-level Committee on Management, clarifying the role and responsibilities of the Department and the Designated Officials at offices away from Headquarters and the regional commissions. Any clarifications should be aligned to the framework for accountability, as appropriate.

55. The Department of Safety and Security accepted this recommendation, stating that the current arrangements with the Designated Officials at the offices away from Headquarters and the regional commissions needed to be revisited and that this would be carried out in the context of the upcoming security review.

Recommendation 6

56. The Department of Safety and Security should clarify the objectives and scope of the Department's technical supervision, policy direction and operational guidance provided to the Chief Security Advisers at offices away from Headquarters, regional commissions and other field locations and should reassess, on this basis, the reporting lines of the Chief Security Adviser.

57. The Department of Safety and Security accepted this recommendation and stated that it would be carried out in the context of the upcoming security review. In addition to a review of the arrangements with the Designated Officials, there will be a reassessment of the Chief Security Adviser/Security Adviser reporting lines.

Recommendation 7

58. The Department of Safety and Security should ensure that the merging of Secretariat resources dealing with crisis management into a proposed Department Crisis Management Unit is based on a clear crisis management strategy developed in consultation with participating members of the United Nations security management system.

59. The Department of Safety and Security accepted this recommendation and stated that all crisis management resources within the Department would be merged to make the most effective use of the resources. In connection with this recommendation, the Department of Management noted that, while the Department of Safety and Security had a crisis management capacity, there also existed a peacekeeping situation centre and a Business Continuity Management Unit within the Office of Central Support Services which managed business continuity including after a crisis, and that these had not been merged within the Department of Safety and Security. In implementing this recommendation, the Department of Safety and Security, in consultation with the Department of Management and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, should consider the need to incorporate these capacities within the Department of Safety and Security.

60. When reassessing its structure, the Department of Safety and Security should clearly identify the major functions of its divisions and units including the Divisions of Regional Operations and Safety and Security Services; the Policy, Planning and Coordination Unit; the Compliance, Evaluation and Monitoring Unit; and, if and when established, the new Crisis Management Unit.

61. The Department of Safety and Security accepted this recommendation and stated that the roles and responsibilities would be reassessed in the context of the upcoming security review.

Recommendation 9

62. The Department of Safety and Security should, in consultation with the Inter-Agency Security Management Network, reassess its current staffing levels using industry best practices and standards, and the report of the consultant commissioned by the Department of Management, which is referred to in documents A/59/365 and Corr.1 and A/59/365/Add.1 and Add.1/Corr.1.

63. The Department of Safety and Security accepted this recommendation and stated that it intended to reassess its current staffing levels in the context of the upcoming security review. The Department of Management commented that any change to the structure or staffing levels of the Department of Safety and Security must be considered by the General Assembly.

Recommendation 10

64. The Department of Safety and Security should request the Office of Human Resources Management to review the feasibility of harmonizing the contractual arrangements of locally recruited security personnel in order to facilitate the introduction of rules to address the mobility requirements of these personnel.

65. The Department of Safety and Security accepted this recommendation and stated that it would present a proposal to the Office of Human Resources Management for consideration. According to the Department of Management, the proposed introduction of one series of Staff Rules (see the report of the Secretary-General on detailed proposals for streamlining United Nations contractual arrangements (A/62/274)) would resolve the Department of Safety and Security-related issue of some professional staff's serving under different sets of Staff Rules. However, it will not eliminate the current impediments to contract harmonization for field staff on United Nations Development Programme contracts and impediments to mobility of these contract-holders and locally employed security staff. The Department of Management also noted that the proposal of the Department of Safety and Security presented to the Office of Human Resources Management for eliminating the impediments to contract harmonization for field staff on United Nations Development Programme contracts and impediments to mobility of these contract-holders and locally employed security staff might have budgetary implications and could create a precedent for the wider General Service, as security staff in most duty stations were part of this category. Therefore, any proposal in this regard should be closely analysed by the Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Accounts.

66. The Department of Safety and Security should perform a detailed analysis of the impediments to deploying security personnel between duty stations, consider the extent to which the United Nations human resources management reforms would address such impediments, and identify solutions for the remaining impediments.

67. The Department of Safety and Security accepted this recommendation and stated that it would conduct the analysis, taking into account any developments that might arise in relation to the ongoing General Assembly review of contractual arrangements and conditions of service for field staff.

Recommendation 12

68. The Department of Safety and Security should complete a new profile of security personnel for all levels focusing on recruitment strategy and entry requirements.

69. The Department of Safety and Security accepted this recommendation and stated that it was in the process of finalizing a new profile for security personnel at all levels.

Recommendation 13

70. The Department of Safety and Security should take the lead role in coordinating the harmonization of recruitment standards for security personnel across the United Nations security management system.

71. The Department of Safety and Security accepted this recommendation and stated that it would coordinate and harmonize recruitment standards for all security personnel in the Department. The Department will present a proposal to the Inter-Agency Security Management Network for harmonization of recruitment standards for all security personnel across the United Nations security management system. However, implementation of any standard will remain the prerogative of each agency, fund and programme.

Recommendation 14

72. The Department of Safety and Security should monitor whether, and ensure that, all security personnel are adequately trained in accordance with the established common training standards and have the capability to perform their functions, particularly in their capacity to respond effectively to security crises.

73. The Department of Safety and Security accepted this recommendation and stated that it would implement the recommendation by January 2009.

Recommendation 15

74. The Department of Safety and Security should ensure that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support appoint security focal points as soon as practicable and facilitate their participation, as well as that of the Department of Political Affairs, in the meetings of the Inter-Agency Security Management Network.


75. The Department of Safety and Security accepted this recommendation, stating that it had been assured by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Field Support and the Department of Political Affairs that focal points would be designated and required to attend the meetings of the Inter-Agency Security Management Network.

Recommendation 16

76. The Department of Safety and Security should establish a formal risk assessment and planning process in order to enhance its ability to promptly identify, report and correct non-compliance with established mechanisms for interaction, cooperation and coordination.

77. The Department of Safety and Security accepted this recommendation and stated that it would be implemented by October 2008.

(*Signed*) Inga-Britt **Ahlenius** Under-Secretary-General for Internal Oversight Services



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