



General Assembly

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Open-ended Working Group taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations¹

Geneva 2016

Item 5 (b) of the provisional agenda

Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations: recommendations on other measures that could contribute to taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations, including but not limited to: (i) transparency measures related to the risks associated with existing nuclear weapons; (ii) measures to reduce and eliminate the risk of accidental, mistaken, unauthorized or intentional nuclear weapon detonations; and (iii) additional measures to increase awareness and understanding of the complexity of and interrelationship between the wide range of humanitarian consequences that would result from any nuclear detonation

Panel II on substantively addressing recommendations on other measures that could contribute to taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations, including but not limited to: (a) transparency measures related to the risks associated with existing nuclear weapons; (b) measures to reduce and eliminate the risk of accidental, mistaken, unauthorized or intentional nuclear weapon detonations; and (c) additional measures to increase awareness and understanding of the complexity of and interrelationship between the wide range of humanitarian consequences that would result from any nuclear detonation

Submitted by the Chair-designate

¹ Established pursuant to resolution 70/33 of the General Assembly of the United Nations.



Mandate

1. Pursuant to United Nations General Assembly resolution 70/33, entitled “Taking forward multilateral disarmament negotiations”, adopted in December 2015, the United Nations General Assembly decided to convene an open-ended working group in Geneva to “substantively address concrete effective legal measures, legal provisions and norms that will need to be concluded to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons” (operative paragraph 2).
2. The open-ended working group “shall also substantively address recommendations on other measures that could contribute to taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations, including but not limited to (a) transparency measures related to the risks associated with existing nuclear weapons; (b) measures to reduce and eliminate the risk of accidental, mistaken, unauthorized or intentional nuclear weapon detonations; and (c) additional measures to increase awareness and understanding of the complexity of and interrelationship between the wide range of humanitarian consequences that would result from any nuclear detonation” (operative paragraph 3).

Objectives

3. This panel will focus on operative paragraph 3. It aims to address other measures that could contribute to taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations, including but not limited to:
 - (a) transparency measures related to the risks associated with existing nuclear weapons;
 - (b) measures to reduce and eliminate the risk of accidental, mistaken, unauthorized or intentional nuclear weapon detonations; and
 - (c) additional measures to increase awareness and understanding of the complexity of and interrelationship between the wide range of humanitarian consequences that would result from any nuclear detonation.

Guiding questions

4. What are the challenges facing global nuclear weapon governance and how can it be strengthened?
5. What are the risks associated with nuclear weapons? What transparency measures exist, and how should they be supplemented?
6. How can compliance with transparency measures be achieved and completeness of information verified?
7. How can transparency measures be strengthened to help assess and reduce the risk of accidental, mistaken, unauthorized or intentional nuclear weapon detonations?
8. What mechanisms should be put in place to provide assurance for reliable, safe and secure control over nuclear weapons, and how would such mechanisms reduce the risk of accidental, mistaken, unauthorized or intentional nuclear weapon detonations?
9. What role could nuclear weapons States play in providing positive security assurances to non-nuclear weapon States, and in mitigating the possible devastating humanitarian impact and aftermath of a nuclear weapon detonation event in non-nuclear weapon States?

10. How can awareness and understanding be enhanced about the complex ways in which the wide range of humanitarian consequences resulting from any nuclear detonation event in a populated area would interrelate?

11. What other elements could contribute to attaining and maintaining a world without nuclear weapons?

Panelists

(a) Transparency measures related to the risks associated with existing nuclear weapons

- Mr. Tariq Rauf, Director, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-proliferation Programme.

(b) Measures to reduce and eliminate the risk of accidental, mistaken, unauthorized or intentional nuclear weapon detonations

- Ms. Beyza Unal, Research Fellow, Nuclear Weapons Policy, International Security Department, Chatham House;
- Mr. Pavel Podvig, Programme Lead, WMD Programme, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR).

(c) Additional measures to increase awareness and understanding of the complexity of and interrelationship between the wide range of humanitarian consequences that would result from any nuclear detonation

- Mr. John Borrie, Chief of Research, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR).
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