

**Security Council**

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**Letter dated 17 October 2011 from the Chair of the
Security Council Committee established pursuant to
resolution 1572 (2004) concerning Côte d'Ivoire addressed
to the President of the Security Council**

On behalf of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572 (2004) concerning Côte d'Ivoire, and in accordance with paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 1980 (2011), I have the honour to transmit herewith the midterm report of the Group of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire.

I would appreciate it if the present letter and the attached report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(Signed) Maria Luiza Ribeiro **Viotti**
Chair

Security Council Committee established pursuant to
resolution 1572 (2004) concerning Côte d'Ivoire



Letter dated 20 September 2011 from the Group of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire addressed to the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572 (2004) concerning Côte d'Ivoire

The members of the Group of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire have the honour to submit herewith the midterm report of the Group, prepared in accordance with paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 1980 (2011).

(Signed) Ilhan **Berkol**

(Signed) Omayra **Bermúdez-Lugo**

(Signed) Joel **Salek**

(Signed) Manuel **Vazquez-Boidard**

Report of the Group of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire pursuant to paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 1980 (2011)

Contents

	<i>Page</i>
Abbreviations	5
I. Introduction	6
II. Investigation methodology	7
III. Cooperation with stakeholders	7
A. Cooperation with the Government of Côte d'Ivoire	7
B. Cooperation with the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire	7
IV. Arms	8
V. Finance	8
A. Financing the purchase of arms	9
1. Transactions to finance military activities and the purchase of arms	9
2. Economic measures and compliance with the sanctions regime	10
B. Financial challenges related to the sanctions regime	13
VI. Diamonds	13
A. Diamond mining in northern Côte d'Ivoire	14
B. Ministry of Mines and Energy	16
C. Kimberley Process Certification Scheme	16
D. Diamond revenues	18
VII. Customs and transport	18
A. Situation with respect to customs	19
B. Situation with respect to transport	20
C. Monitoring capacity of UNOCI	21
D. Transit Interarmées	21
E. Acquisition of vehicles for military use	22
F. Exemption requests to the arms embargo	22
VIII. Individual sanctions	22
A. Charles Blé Goudé	23
B. Eugène N'goran Kouadio Djué	23
C. Martin Kouakou Fofié	23
D. Laurent Gbagbo	23

E.	Simone Gbagbo	24
F.	Désiré Tagro	24
G.	Pascal Affi N'Guessan	24
H.	Alcide Djédjé	24
IX.	Recommendations	24
A.	Finance	24
B.	Diamonds	25
C.	Customs and transport	25
D.	Individual sanctions	25
Annexes		
I.	Meetings and consultations held by the Group of Experts in the course of its mandate	26
II.	Ground and aerial images of main diamond fields in the Séguéla area	27

Abbreviations

BCEAO	Central Bank of West African States
CFAF	CFA franc
CGFCC	Comité de gestion de la filière café-cacao
COJEP	Congrès panafricain des jeunes et patriotes
FAFN	Forces armées des Forces nouvelles
FRCI	Forces républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire
GDP	Gross domestic product
GRPIE	Groupe de recherche et de plaidoyer sur les industries extractives
KP	Kimberley Process
KPCS	Kimberley Process Certification Scheme
OIC	Office ivoirien des chargeurs
PETROCI	Société nationale d'opérations pétrolières de la Côte d'Ivoire
SODEMI	Société pour le développement minier de la Côte d'Ivoire
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire

I. Introduction

1. In a letter addressed to the President of the Security Council dated 7 July 2011 (S/2011/419), the Secretary-General announced his appointment of four members of the Group of Experts as follows: Ilhan Berkol (Turkey, customs expert), Omayra Bermúdez-Lugo (United States of America, diamond expert), Joel Salek (Colombia, finance expert) and Manuel Vazquez-Boidard (Spain, regional expert). A Political Affairs Officer of the United Nations Secretariat, Manuel Bressan, assisted the Group.

2. The Group of Experts commenced its work on 20 July 2011. During the reporting period, its activities included meetings with Member States, international and regional organizations and Government authorities in Côte d'Ivoire to obtain information relevant to the Group's investigations. Members of the Group visited Belgium and France in September 2011, in addition to conducting field visits throughout Côte d'Ivoire during the reporting period. In the second part of its mandate, the Group intends to intensify its field-based investigations within Côte d'Ivoire and in the region, in addition to visiting a number of Member States in pursuit of information relevant to its investigations.

3. The Group commenced its investigations after the 2011 post-electoral crisis in Côte d'Ivoire, dedicating particular attention to contacting and improving cooperation with the members of the new Ivorian Administration.

4. The Group is extremely concerned that the 2011 post-electoral crisis in Côte d'Ivoire has resulted in the circulation of large amounts of weapons and ammunition, all through the country, that are still unaccounted for. This situation has important national and regional implications, since numerous caches of weapons have been found in areas near the border with Liberia, and Liberian mercenaries are still active in remote parts of western Côte d'Ivoire. At the time of writing the present report, more than 170,000 Ivorian refugees in Liberia have not returned to Côte d'Ivoire, which is testament to the fact that the security situation in Côte d'Ivoire, and notably in the west of the country, remains a challenge for the Ivorian authorities.

5. The Group also notes that, after the 2011 post-electoral crisis, forces loyal to the previous Ivorian Administration still remain active abroad, notably in Liberia and Ghana.

6. The Group understands that the ultimate security and political stabilization of Côte d'Ivoire may depend on the timely holding of free, democratic and transparent legislative and municipal elections. The organization of these elections in a country with deep political divisions, inadequate electoral infrastructure, and precarious security conditions, still remains an important challenge.

7. Numerous interlocutors have emphasized the commitment of the Administration of President Ouattara in planning the restructuring of the national economy and of fundamental sectors of Côte d'Ivoire, such as the national army, police, gendarmerie, customs and judicial system, and the overall redeployment of State officials.

8. The Group welcomes these efforts to re-establish law and order, good governance and transparency and to restore the country's economic infrastructure and the State's authority in Côte d'Ivoire, and stresses the importance of the complete, effective and substantial control of the whole territory by the new Administration. The Group notes that the lack of such control over Ivorian territory by State officials and their

ineffective redeployment represent a risk of possible violations of the sanctions regime imposed by the Security Council.

II. Investigation methodology

9. In each of its investigations, the Group has endeavoured to seek incontrovertible documentary evidence to support its findings, including physical evidence provided by markings applied to arms and ammunition. When such specific evidence is not available, the Group requires at least two independent and credible sources to substantiate a finding.

10. The Group conducted, when possible, investigations in each of its mandated fields to evaluate potential violations of relevant Security Council sanctions.

11. The Group notes that although its mandate was extended by the Security Council on 28 April 2011 pursuant to paragraph 13 of Council resolution 1980 (2011), four of its five experts were appointed on 7 July 2011, and the remaining (arms) expert has yet to be appointed.

12. The present document is the midterm report of the Group, provided pursuant to paragraph 14 of resolution 1980 (2011). In order not to compromise a number of ongoing investigations, the Group has chosen not to disclose specific details of a number of its enquiries in this report.

III. Cooperation with stakeholders

13. In accordance with resolution 1980 (2011), the Group of Experts continued its cooperation with the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) and Force Licorne, and exchanged information with the Mission's Integrated Embargo Cell on measures taken to monitor the sanctions regime and possible violations thereof. This section presents issues related to the Group's cooperation with stakeholders in Côte d'Ivoire, including the Government of Côte d'Ivoire and UNOCI.

A. Cooperation with the Government of Côte d'Ivoire

14. At this early stage of the mandate, the Group of Experts have benefited from the good cooperation and assistance provided by the new Government of Côte d'Ivoire. The Group's requests for meetings and information-sharing have usually been granted and resulted in a better understanding of the political and security situation after the recent conflict and the identification of possible breaches of the sanctions regime. The Group looks forward to the continuation and further improvement of cooperation with the Ivorian authorities.

B. Cooperation with the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire

15. During the current mandate, the Group of Experts wishes to note the important support provided by UNOCI. The Mission continues to provide successive Groups of Experts with offices, transport and administrative support. The Group also expresses its appreciation for the consistent support provided by the UNOCI

Integrated Embargo Cell, which has proved to be an effective partner in all of the Group's fields of investigation.

IV. Arms

16. The Group is mandated by the Security Council to monitor the implementation of the sanctions regime concerning Côte d'Ivoire, notably the arms embargo. As cited above, at the time of writing the present report, the arms expert of the Group had not yet been appointed. As a result, the Group has not been able to properly monitor the embargo on weapons and related materiel, and was similarly unable to follow up pending investigations from previous mandates.

17. During the first part of its mandate, the Group visited Côte d'Ivoire on two occasions. After the post-electoral crisis, thousands of weapons still remain unaccounted for and pose a threat to the stabilization of the country, notably in the west of the country and along the border with Liberia. The Impartial Forces and the Forces républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire (FRCI) have seized important quantities of arms and ammunition, including heavy weapons, at various former Presidential sites and in different districts of Abidjan.

18. A wide range of interlocutors, including UNOCI, Force Licorne and Ivorian officials, have conveyed their concerns to the Group regarding the absence of an arms expert, and have transmitted relevant information concerning possible breaches of the sanctions regime before and during the 2011 post-electoral crisis.

V. Finance

19. Immediately after the end of the 2011 post-electoral crisis, multiple findings of new arms caches throughout the country, made by UNOCI, Force Licorne and the current Administration, strongly suggest that the Government of former President Gbagbo had invested large amounts of the State's budget in the purchase of arms and related materiel.

20. It is important to recall that the Group's mandate includes the examination of sources of funding for the purchase of weapons, as set forth in paragraph 7 (b) of Security Council resolution 1727 (2006), which refers to investigations "on the sources of financing, including from the exploitation of natural resources in Côte d'Ivoire, for purchases of arms and related materiel and activities".

21. In this connection, previous Groups of Experts had already documented how some State agencies and companies were at risk of being used as a source of funds for arms purchases (see para. 129 of the Group's April 2011 report, S/2011/271).

22. The Group considers that its previous assessments were accurate concerning the use of revenues coming from State agencies to purchase arms and related materiel in violation of the sanctions regime. These assessments are also supported by recent and ongoing investigations by the current Government of Côte d'Ivoire and by numerous attempts by the previous Administration to destroy evidence of such transactions.

23. This section of the report presents a summary of the transition from the financial chaos that marked the post-electoral crisis to the commencement of a

functioning economy. The Group considers that rebuilding a more transparent economic system is of fundamental importance in order for the Ivorian authorities to comply with the sanctions regime.

A. Financing the purchase of arms

24. The Group notes with concern how, in an apparent deliberate effort to destroy all evidence of financial embezzlement, the former Government of President Gbagbo destroyed, at almost every ministerial agency, multiple records that may have assisted the Group in determining the nature of the diversion of public funds and their use in violation of the arms embargo.

25. During its meetings with Government officials from the Internal Revenue Service and the Customs Authority, the Group was informed that a great deal of these offices' files and equipment, including computers and official vehicles, were stolen during the 2011 post-electoral crisis.

26. These events, while making it difficult to build a trail of financial transactions that could be linked or related to the purchase of arms, reinforce the concerns expressed in previous Group of Experts reports concerning the diversion of funds for the purchase of arms and related materiel in violation of the sanctions regime. Many of the suspicious transactions were reportedly made through verbal agreements in order to avoid possible retracing, investigation and prosecution.

1. Transactions to finance military activities and the purchase of arms

27. It is important to note that previous Groups of Experts had already expressed concerns about the possible diversion of funds from Government agencies during the Administration of former President Gbagbo, highlighting that some 50 Government agencies, operating in various economic sectors, managed quasi-fiscal tax revenues that were not accounted for in the Government's official budget. The lack of budget accountability left these revenues open to mismanagement, embezzlement and diversion, the latter constituting a severe risk for possible sanctions violations (see para. 129 of S/2011/271).

28. The Group is also currently investigating incidents, which reportedly occurred in December 2010 and January 2011, in which aircraft transported some 125 boxes, containing a multimillion amount in CFAF funds, from Abidjan to the western city of Daloa. This amount was reportedly being transferred on behalf of the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO), and the Group is awaiting confirmation of this information from the Central Bank. The Group cannot rule out the prospect that these funds were, in fact, used to finance military activities and the purchase of arms and related materiel in violation of the sanctions regime.

29. The Group continues to focus on this and similar transactions and will provide a full analysis in its final report of April 2012.

30. The Group has, at the same time, high expectations for the results of the auditing campaign initiated in June 2011 by President Ouattara with respect to 43 Ivorian Government agencies suspected of being a conduit for the embezzlement of funds and partly used for the purchase of arms and related materiel.

31. In this context, the Minister of Justice of Côte d'Ivoire informed the Group during a meeting on 6 September 2011 that preliminary reports with the results of the auditing of 20 of the 43 agencies have already been established, and the whole process of investigation will be finalized by the end of October 2011.

2. Economic measures and compliance with the sanctions regime

32. The 2011 post-electoral crisis in Côte d'Ivoire had a severe impact on the country's economy. According to the International Monetary Fund, economic growth is projected to be negative by the end of 2011, at -6.3 per cent.

33. A combination of factors led to this situation, namely the closure of BCEAO as well as the majority of private banks in Côte d'Ivoire, the economic sanctions imposed by the European Union in 2010-2011 against 121 individuals and entities,¹ including the most important State-owned companies such as the Société nationale d'opérations pétrolières de la Côte d'Ivoire (PETROCI) and the Comité de gestion de la filière café-cacao (CGFCC), and the closure of the seaports of Abidjan and San Pedro (see paras. 139-141, 143, 144, 147 and 148 of S/2011/272).

34. In an attempt to restore an efficient economic system, the new Administration of President Ouattara put in place a series of economic measures in early July 2011, notably a series of audits of 43 Government agencies, which are of paramount importance to safeguard compliance with the embargo. The Group is convinced that good governance practices are a useful measure to deter the diversion of funds for the purchase of arms.

35. The Group will continue to follow up and investigate during the remainder of the mandate the effectiveness of the measures in place, with a view to reassuring compliance with the sanctions regime.

36. For this purpose, the section below includes the results of the Group's investigations into traditional industries that generate the most revenue for the State with regard to the sources of financing, including from the exploitation of natural resources such as cocoa, oil, minerals and timber that could be used to purchase arms and related materiel.

(a) Cocoa

37. The cocoa industry is critical to the health of the country's economy. In 2010, cocoa exports represented 15.6 per cent of Ivorian GDP. During the 2011 post-electoral crisis, cocoa exports came to a complete halt after President Ouattara called for a ban on exports on 24 January 2011. Exports resumed by the end of April 2011, when the conflict was stabilized.

38. One of the consequences in the international market of the temporary ban on cocoa exports was that prices experienced an unprecedented high of \$3,730.25 per ton on 3 March 2011, while by contrast, the ban negatively affected the work and income of thousands of families and a large number of cocoa businesses in the country.²

¹ See <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:341:0045:0048:EN:PDF>; <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:093:0010:0015:EN:PDF>; <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:183:0027:0027:EN:PDF>.

² International Cocoa Organization, *Quarterly Bulletin of Cocoa Statistics*, vol. XXXVII, No. 3 (cocoa year 2010-2011), table 7.

39. The above notwithstanding, according to the International Cocoa Organization, despite the political crisis and owing to ideal weather conditions, Ivorian cocoa production is expected to reach 1.47 million tons in 2011 (with an approximate value of \$3.9 billion), surpassing the 1.242 million tons of the previous year.³

40. The Group looks forward to a meeting with the Ministry of Agriculture with a view to analysing the reforms the new Administration has adopted in the cocoa industry, given the fact that in the previous Government, large amounts of taxes paid to CGFCC were unaccounted for in the country's budget, and on occasions, used for the purchase of arms (see para. 134 of S/2011/271 and para. 22 of S/2006/204).

41. In this regard, on 6 September 2011, during a meeting with the Minister of Justice, the Group requested information concerning the investigations into 30 senior members of CGFCC who had been arrested in 2009 (see paras. 136 and 137 of S/2011/271).

42. The Minister informed the Group that during the 2011 post-electoral crisis those detainees had been released, and he indicated that he would provide the Group with the information about the results of such investigations. The trials on these particular cases will restart in October 2011.

43. The Group will therefore continue its investigations into the cocoa industry and believes that close monitoring is necessary to prevent Government revenues derived from this commodity being used for the purchase of arms and related materiel, in violation of the sanctions regime.

(b) Oil

44. In 2010, crude oil exports represented 13 per cent of Ivorian GDP. Previous Groups of Experts reported how the management of oil revenues had been opaque to the point that a sum of approximately \$380 million dollars per year, an amount equal to that of Côte d'Ivoire's annual military budget, presents a serious risk of misappropriation, including the diversion of oil revenues for the purchase of arms and related materiel in violation of the embargo (see paras. 144-154 of S/2011/271).

45. The Group welcomes the efforts of the Government of Côte d'Ivoire to increase transparency in the oil industry and acknowledges the cooperation of the Ministry of Mines and Energy in having provided the Group with a status report that describes the review of the country's crude oil industry exerted by an ad hoc committee (Comité de suivi des enlèvements de pétrole brut). The committee comprises a number of representatives of various Government agencies, namely, hydrocarbons, taxes, customs, the State oil company PETROCI, a private auditing company and representatives of private oil associated companies.

46. The status report is dated 28 July 2011 and covers the country's crude oil extraction from 1 April to 30 June 2011, as shown in table 1 below.

³ Ibid.

Table 1
Distribution and development of crude oil by entities, April-June 2011

<i>Entity</i>	<i>Net quantities in bbls (oil barrels)</i>	<i>Percentage</i>	<i>Value in United States dollars</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Private companies	1 715 525	51.60	195 693 015	52.09
PETROCI	45 684	1.37	5 193 382	1.38
State	1 563 248	47.02	174 811 772	46.53
Total	3 324 457	100	375 698 169	100

Source: Côte d'Ivoire, Comité de suivi des enlèvements de pétrole brut (Ministry of Mines and Energy), "Rapport sur les enlèvements de pétrole brut. Deuxième trimestre 2011", July 2011.

47. The report concludes by stressing how the Government has complied with all its commitments in this sector, including the registration of revenues from oil and gas in the State's budget, the recovery of the industry's returns for the State treasury, the submission of monthly reports to the International Monetary Fund that include tables with crude oil extraction, and finally, the production of quarterly reports.

48. The Group recognizes that this is the first time it has received information from the Ivorian authorities regarding the oil sector and encourages the Government to continue exerting great vigilance and supply the Group with further financial information on the oil industry, therefore avoiding the possibility that State revenues, especially those derived from Ivorian natural resources, may be used in violation of the sanctions regime.

(c) Mining industry

49. The Group is aware of the importance of continuing to monitor and report on all natural resources in the country that have the potential to be used for the purchase of arms and related materiel in violation of the sanctions regime.

50. Owing to its late appointment, the Group did not have the opportunity to visit mining locations, namely gold and manganese mines, throughout the country.

51. However, the Group received from the Ministry of Mines and Energy a chart with the locations of all existing mines and looks forward, during the remainder of its mandate, to organize visits in order to follow up previous Groups' findings related to the mining industry (see paras. 175-182 of S/2011/271).

52. Field visits will also allow the Group to have updated statistics and investigate if revenues collected for the exploitation of those natural resources are at risk of diversion in violation of the embargo.

(d) Timber

53. The Ministry of Water and Forestry provided the Group with data on forestry production in the country from 2004 to 2009. However, the Ministry expects to have more comprehensive and complete data on quantities and potential related taxation once field verifications of all forest exploitation areas of the western, northern and central regions are possible.

54. In a similar manner as for other natural resources, the Group intends to continue its investigations with a view to preventing potential diversions of revenues derived from the timber industry for the purchase of arms.

B. Financial challenges related to the sanctions regime

55. Although the Government has claimed on several occasions to have reunified its financial institutions from the former north-south divide, the Group notes that taxes are still being collected in northern Côte d'Ivoire by deputies appointed by former zone commanders who are not accountable to the central Government, and not by the newly appointed administrative authorities (prefects). The official explanation is that revenues are used to pay the salaries of military units in the north.

56. The Group believes that it is important to accelerate the process of reunification of the financial system ("unicité des caisses") for two main reasons: firstly, it will allow the central Government to rebuild the economy; and secondly, it will ensure compliance with the arms embargo by preventing the diversion of moneys for the purchase of arms and related materiel.

VI. Diamonds

57. The restrictions imposed on Côte d'Ivoire by resolution 1643 (2005) continue to fail to prevent the export of Ivorian rough diamonds.

58. Production in the diamond fields of northern Côte d'Ivoire has been ongoing since the establishment of the sanctions regime. In Séguéla, there has been an increase in the number of diamond-mining areas in operation since the Group's last visit in February 2011, suggesting that the trade in rough diamonds is likely to have continued to reach international markets during the recent post-electoral military crisis.

59. Regional as well as international buyers continue to procure diamonds from the mines of Séguéla, and neighbouring countries continue to be the major transit points for the trafficking of Ivorian rough diamonds.

60. Based on estimates made by the Group in 2010, revenues from the sale of rough diamonds could range between \$12 million and \$23 million. Although the Group has been unable to obtain clear information on the use of diamond revenues for the purchase of arms and related materiel, it cannot rule out the prospect of arms acquisitions by either the former Forces nouvelles or by forces loyal to Laurent Gbagbo in breach of the embargo.

61. The Group was informed by the Government that the structure of the former Forces nouvelles treasury system, known as La Centrale, has been abolished. The closure of La Centrale is likely to provide some insight into the amount of revenues generated by diamond sales and the use of such revenues; however, the information that can be obtained from such records will depend on the successful transfer of these documents to the central Government. The Group requested a copy of these records in a letter addressed to the Ministry of Finance; however, no answer had been provided at the time of the drafting of this report.

62. Although the Government drafted in 2003 legislative measures to incorporate into law the institutional and technical structures required by the Kimberley Process

Certification Scheme (KPCS), it was unable to implement these measures owing to civil unrest and the takeover of the diamond fields by the Forces nouvelles.

63. The Ministry of Mines and Energy has expressed interest in having Côte d'Ivoire "re-integrated" into the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, but the term "re-integration" in itself must be examined, as owing to the political circumstances of the country at the time, Côte d'Ivoire never became an active participant in the Kimberley Process (KP).

64. Since the end of the post-electoral crisis there has been some engagement by the Government with stakeholders involved in the Ivorian diamond sector. On 14 and 15 June 2011, the Groupe de recherche et de plaidoyer sur les industries extractives (GRPIE), which is an Ivorian non-governmental organization, in collaboration with the Directorate of Mines of Côte d'Ivoire, organized a national workshop in Abidjan with the support of Partnership Africa Canada. The aim of the workshop was to discuss the issues concerning the smuggling of Ivorian rough diamonds and the implementation of the Kimberley Process in the "new" Côte d'Ivoire. The workshop was attended by representatives of the mining industry, the UNOCI Integrated Embargo Cell, the National Unit for the Processing of Financial Information in Côte d'Ivoire, civil society and consultants in the diamond sector. The Group met with representatives of GRPIE on 11 August 2011.

65. In addition to GRPIE, the Friends of Côte d'Ivoire, which is an ad hoc committee of the Kimberley Process Working Group on Monitoring, has also been actively monitoring the events in Côte d'Ivoire's diamond sector since 2009. The aim of the group is to identify critical needs related to compliance with the Kimberley Process not only for Côte d'Ivoire, but also for other countries in the region. The Ministry of Mines and Energy has recently engaged with GRPIE through its participation in several teleconferences.

66. In the context of the current internal security situation within Côte d'Ivoire, which includes allegations of human rights violations, the proliferation of unclaimed weapons left behind by both sides and scattered throughout the country, the possibility of the reconsolidation of opposition groups and the prospect of renewed hostilities as a result of the upcoming legislative elections, the Group is of the view that revenues from the sale of diamonds continue to have the potential to be used for the purchase of arms and related materiel in breach of the sanctions regime.

67. The Group considers that the restoration of State control and the rule of law in the mining areas, which at present is non-existent (as anyone with the purchasing power to do so can approach miners in the field and procure diamonds), is imperative in order to avoid the risk of further violations of the sanctions regime.

A. Diamond mining in northern Côte d'Ivoire

68. The situation in Côte d'Ivoire's diamond fields has not changed dramatically following the post-electoral crisis. Diamond mining in northern Côte d'Ivoire continues unabated and there is a lack of oversight and control of diamond operations. This occurs despite the redeployment of Government officials from the Ministry of Mines and Energy.

69. On 10 August 2011, the Group of Experts, with the assistance of UNOCI, conducted overflights of the Séguéla area, which is the principal diamond-mining

area in Côte d'Ivoire. Reconnaissance focused on targets that had been identified during ground inspections conducted by the Group in February and August 2011.

70. The Group conducted field inspections of eight diamond-mining areas within Séguéla including the following diamond deposits: Pessaka, Bobi dyke, an extension of Bobi dyke, Dualla, Dabanani, Djibeni, Forona, Diarabana, and also of an area that had been mined by the Ivorian Administration during the late 1980s.

71. Several attempts were made at accessing other deposits, namely, Oussougoula, Siana and Wongué, but these were unsuccessful because access was limited during the rainy season.

72. Smaller subsistence mining operations (other than those described in this section) occur throughout the Séguéla area, but production from these sites is likely to be negligible.

73. The table below includes the global positioning system (GPS) coordinates of the areas visited by the Group during the first two weeks of August 2011. Annex II depicts the ground and aerial images that correspond to these coordinates (no aerial images were obtained for the Siana, Oussougoula or Wongué deposits).

74. Although the Group observed only a moderate number of artisanal miners working in the diamond fields, it noticed an increase in the number of diamond-mining areas being worked. However, the Group notes that an increase in the number of active mining areas does not necessarily imply an increase in rough diamond output.

Table 2
Diamond mining deposits within the Séguéla area

<i>Name of diamond deposit or area in which deposit was found (ground inspections)</i>	<i>Latitude</i>	<i>Longitude</i>
1. Zanda Ramka	08°09.394'N	006°34.173'W
2. Area near Bobi dyke (known as Bobi dyke II)	08°09.165'N	006°34.544'W
3. Abandoned washing area (former SODEMI operation)	08°08.307'N	006°34.879'W
4. Dualla	08°08.239'N	006°34.857'W
5. Dabanani	08°08.409'N	006°35.064'W
6. Djibeni	08°08.473'N	006°34.419'W
7. Wongué (body of standing water impeded access to deposit; coordinates are for area nearby)	08°14.898'N	006°36.557'W
8. Forona	08°07.798'N	006°37.068'W
9. Oussougoula (body of standing water impeded access to deposit; coordinates are for area nearby)	08°06.089'N	006°36.912'W
10. Diarabana dyke	08°11.050'N	006°35.744'W
11. Bobi dyke	08°10.539'N	006°34.020'W
12. Siana (body of standing water impeded access to deposit; coordinates are for area nearby)	08°03.832'N	006°33.310'W

Source: Group of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire.

B. Ministry of Mines and Energy

75. The Ministry of Mines and Energy cooperated with the Group and facilitated in a timely manner the provision of relevant documents that were requested shortly after the Group's visits to the respective Ministry departments in Abidjan. However, the Group has yet to receive a copy of the country's Mining Law and related legislative documents for its analysis. Other specific questions conveyed to the Ministry through the Group's two formal written communications have yet to be answered, and the responses will be analysed and included in the Group's final report.

76. The Group held meetings with the Minister of Mines and Energy, the Director of Mines, and the Director of Mining Development in Abidjan on 1 September 2011. During these visits, the Ministry emphasized that it lacks the resources to effectively carry out all of its functions, particularly in the north. Ministry officials who were redeployed to the north after the 2011 post-electoral crisis cannot carry out basic duties such as overseeing the activities in the diamond mines, as they lack vehicles to carry out such inspections. The Group also learned that although customs officials have also been redeployed to the north, they have not been tasked with overseeing diamond-mining activities.

77. The Group also enquired about the progress made by the Government towards meeting the requirements for the eventual lifting of the embargo on the export of Ivorian rough diamonds. The details of the measures that the new Government has in place are outlined in section C below.

78. Since the end of the 2011 post-electoral crisis, the Ministry of Mines and Energy has received 15 applications for diamond-mining licences, 10 of which are from cooperatives and 5 from individuals.

C. Kimberley Process Certification Scheme

79. The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme came into effect on 1 January 2003, at the same time that the former Government of Côte d'Ivoire was in the process of signing the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, which called for reconciliation and the settlement of long-standing issues between the Government and the Forces nouvelles rebel group. In 2003, the country's diamond fields, which are located in northern Côte d'Ivoire, were already under the control of the Forces nouvelles.

80. The Kimberley Process had set the date of 1 May 2003 as the cut-off for the Certification Scheme to be implemented by all participating countries. After that date, only participant countries were allowed to trade in rough diamonds with each other. New applicants for participation were given until 31 July 2003 to implement national legislation. Côte d'Ivoire passed legislation to enact the appropriate laws and regulations that would implement and enforce the Certification Scheme on 30 May 2003 under Decree No. 2003-143.

81. The Kimberley Process, which was established to find a solution to the international problem of conflict diamonds, is based not only on national certification schemes but on internationally agreed minimum standards.

82. In order to become a participant, each country must establish a system of internal controls designed to eliminate the presence of conflict diamonds from its chain of production. This entails tracking the diamonds from their source in the

diamond fields to the point at which these are exported. In the case of Côte d'Ivoire, the former Government was never able to implement this provision, as stated above; at the time the legislation was passed, the diamond fields were already under the control of the Forces nouvelles.

83. As a requirement to become a participant in the Certification Scheme, each country must create a Kimberley Process certificate, which is to accompany each shipment of rough diamonds during export. The Ministry of Mines and Energy informed the Group that such a certificate exists for Côte d'Ivoire. According to officials from the Ministry, the certificate was created in 2003 and approved by the Central Bank of Belgium.

84. In addition to such a certificate, Côte d'Ivoire must meet a series of minimum standards for compliance which include:

(a) Establishing a system of internal controls designed to eliminate the presence of conflict diamonds from shipments of rough diamonds imported into and exported out of its territory;

(b) Designating an importing and exporting authority or authorities;

(c) Ensuring that rough diamonds are imported and exported in tamper-resistant containers;

(d) Amending or enacting appropriate laws or regulations to implement and enforce the Certification Scheme and to maintain dissuasive and proportional penalties for violations;

(e) Collecting and maintaining relevant official production, import and export data.

85. Of the five items outlined above, perhaps the most complex is item (a) — establishing a system of internal controls — which contains a series of general and specific recommendations according to the nature of each country's diamond sector. These include recommendations for the control of the country's diamond fields; its small-scale diamond mining; its rough diamond buyers, sellers and exporters; export and import processes; and shipments to and from free trade zones.

86. According to the Ministry of Mines and Energy, Côte d'Ivoire has met several of the minimum standards for compliance. The Ministry informed the Group that it will provide documentation to support this. The Group, however, has thus far only received a copy of Decree No. 2003-143 and awaits the receipt of the remaining relevant documentation.

87. Participation in the Certification Scheme is open on a global, non-discriminatory basis to all applicant States willing and able to fulfil the requirements. Any applicant wishing to participate in the Certification Scheme should:

(a) Signify its interest by notifying the Chair of the Kimberley Process through diplomatic channels. This notification should include information identifying the State's designated authorities or bodies responsible for implementing the provisions of the Certification Scheme;

(b) Provide the Chair with information on the State's relevant laws, regulations, rules, procedures and practices.

88. Côte d'Ivoire has yet to address the Chair (which in 2011 is the Democratic Republic of the Congo), expressing its interest in becoming a participant in the Certification Scheme and providing the Kimberley Process with the necessary information outlined above in items (a) and (b).

D. Diamond revenues

89. As the Group of Experts has indicated in previous reports, rough diamonds have been sold and exported from Côte d'Ivoire. Revenues obtained from these sales are known to have previously contributed to the strengthening of the Forces nouvelles regional administrative structures by funding them through taxes on trade and transport, including the taxation on diamond production through La Centrale.

90. Prior to the 2011 post-electoral crisis, reports from various sources indicated that not all diamond sales took place within the framework of La Centrale, and that revenues from the sale of diamonds benefited and continue to benefit third parties other than that of the former elements of the former Forces nouvelles.

91. The Group has to date been unable to establish a direct link between the possible diversion of revenues from diamond-mining activities and the purchase of weapons by either party involved in the conflict. However, ongoing investigations by the Group suggest that Abidjan might have also been a centre of diamond trafficking for the purpose of purchasing weapons during the post-electoral crisis. The Group intends to convey the results of these investigations in its final report.

92. This information raises questions concerning the extent of the trade in Ivorian diamonds, not only during the conflict but prior, as the information implies the existence of some type of network that crossed political and military lines and serviced both a rebel-controlled north, where all the diamond fields are found, as well as a Government-controlled south, which had no access to these diamond fields.

93. If this information is verified by facts, then diamonds perhaps played an even greater role than previously thought, and the Group cannot rule out the possibility that diamond revenues were used for the acquisitions of arms by both sides involved in the conflict.

94. The abolishment of La Centrale may provide an opportunity to gain some insight into the way revenues from diamond mining might have been diverted for the purchase of weapons. The information that can be obtained from such records will, however, depend on the successful transfer of these documents from the accountants of La Centrale to the central Government authorities.

95. The Group of Experts intends to follow up this information and report its findings in its final report of April 2012.

VII. Customs and transport

96. The new customs authorities have assured the Group of Experts of their full cooperation. Nevertheless, normalization of the situation has not yet been accomplished, and control of customs outside Abidjan still remains a challenge.

97. Gradually, customs revenues are returning to their normal level. According to the new Director-General of Customs, from May to August 2001, customs revenues reached CFAF 331 billion and are expected to reach CFAF 778 billion by the end of 2011.

98. In a meeting with the Group of Experts and the Integrated Embargo Cell on 12 August 2011, the Director-General of Customs of Côte d'Ivoire acknowledged that during the former Administration a mechanism for the diversion of public funds had been utilized to finance purchases of arms and ammunition and pay foreign mercenaries and elements of the Jeunes Patriotes. The procedure was to divert part of the customs revenues paid to BCEAO into fictitious accounts, opened to benefit certain individuals. The Group intends to further investigate this mechanism.

99. To date in the current mandate, the Group of Experts has conducted customs and transport-related investigations in the areas of Abidjan and the north of Côte d'Ivoire. The Group met stakeholders, governmental authorities and organizations in order to gather information. The Group also continued to investigate the Transit Interarmées, the customs agency of the Ministry of Defence. Similarly, the Group continued its investigations into the import of vehicles for military use.

A. Situation with respect to customs

100. Since the end of the 2011 post-electoral crisis, the security situation in the country has continued to be unstable. In the north of the country, FRCI are responsible for maintaining security owing to the absence of police and gendarmerie. This instability delays the deployment of the official Administration.

101. At the time of the drafting of this report, the Group of Experts observes that some customs agents are deployed on the northern borders, working together with former Forces armées des Forces nouvelles (FAFN) elements who lack proper customs training. For instance, in Pogo, on the border with Mali, since the beginning of September 2011, about 20 customs agents have been deployed, and 15 of them are former FAFN. The lack of training and experience of the former FAFN elements destined to survey the borders may have implications on the sustainability of the collection of taxes and customs duties.

102. On the borders with Mali and Burkina Faso, customs officers are unable to operate safely and efficiently owing to continuous threats coming from armed escorts employed by local private businessmen. As a consequence, there is an increased risk of violations of the sanctions regime owing to lack of proper control.

103. For instance, in Ouangolodougou and Laleraba, between Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso, there are currently 45 customs agents, approximately 30 of whom are former FAFN. These agents are under the threat of people smuggling arms, gasoline, coffee and cocoa to the detriment of the customs revenue. Most advanced positions near the border with Burkina Faso are currently under the control of unidentified armed men.

104. Mobile roadblocks are increasing. Men in uniform still collect taxes on behalf of the zone commanders and La Centrale; even though La Centrale has officially

been abolished, it will continue to collect revenues until the financial system has been reunified.⁴

105. Customs agents have not yet been deployed in western Côte d'Ivoire because of security reasons. The Director-General of Customs informed the Group in September 2011 that in the coming weeks, deployment of customs officers is expected to commence. In the west, "Dozos" are in charge of the security of citizens.⁵ The border with Liberia is still not secure, and pro-Gbagbo militias and mercenaries are free to commit criminal acts in areas near the border. This situation does not allow for the collection of taxes nor for any kind of monitoring of the transfer of goods.

106. In the eastern part of the country, in Noé, Government customs agents have been deployed, even though FRCI elements still control some activities related to customs. Near the Ghanaian border, some pro-Gbagbo elements are still active and impose taxes on locals. In the region of Aboisso, the area is under the control of armed young elements, probably armed during the post-electoral crisis.

107. Owing to poor security conditions, lack of control at the borders and low-level racketeering on the roads through mobile and fixed roadblocks, the Group is concerned by the possible movement of arms and ammunition from neighbouring countries into Côte d'Ivoire.

B. Situation with respect to transport

108. Transit goods still provide numerous opportunities for Ivorian parties to make money illicitly (see paras. 215-223 of S/2011/272). During the post-electoral crisis, the level of transit transactions diminished drastically because of the hostilities and the sanctions imposed by the European Union on the seaports. In April 2011, all transactions stopped until the week after the arrest of former President Gbagbo. Subsequently, transit convoys have resumed under the protection of FRCI, reaching usual levels in May/June 2011.

109. The Office ivoirien des chargeurs (OIC) monitors transit commerce from the ports of Abidjan and San Pedro to neighbouring States, including Ghana. OIC suffered considerably from the post-electoral crisis and was nearly bankrupt. Its staff have been restructured and there has been a new board of directors since 22 August 2011. OIC offices and vehicles were also ransacked in the southern part of the country.

110. In the direction of Mali and Burkina Faso, transport taxes have remained the same (see S/2011/272, table 7). In addition, new taxes imposed by zone commanders are collected at mobile roadblocks by former FAFN elements. There are also additional checkpoints between Tiébissou and Bouaké that did not exist before. OIC hopes that if the Official Administration could be deployed in the north, all checkpoints would disappear by the end of 2011.

⁴ Declaration of Colonel Major Bamba Sinima, on 29 August 2011; source: <http://Côte-d-ivoire.en24heures.com/les-forces-nouvelles-percevront-encore-des-taxes-pour-un-certain-temps-declare-le-colonel-major-bamba-sinima>.

⁵ Traditional hunters that are authorized by the local administration to protect citizens; Dozos are often organized in a corporation. They are estimated to number 2,000 in the west of Côte d'Ivoire.

111. From the CFAF 100,000 paid by transporters for escort by OIC, a sum of CFAF 25,000 is still paid to La Centrale in cash without official receipts,⁶ and CFAF 50,000 is kept by OIC. The new governmental authorities do not officially recognize this system but they will tolerate it until a new agreement has been reached.

112. According to OIC representatives, customs officers are deployed in Bouaké and Ferkessédougou but the customs offices do not yet function. Transporters are reporting that they have to pay additional taxes per truck directly to zone commander offices through an intermediary; the amounts per truck vary from CFAF 50,000 to CFAF 500,000. This additional tax did not exist before the 2011 post-electoral crisis.

113. OIC intends to reorganize and harmonize transport costs in both directions (to and from Abidjan), with a unique payment by the transporter under the guarantee of the Ministry of Transport. OIC staff have already begun to accompany trucks with GPS trackers belonging to OIC from Abidjan to Burkina Faso.

114. On the basis of the above-mentioned, the Group is concerned by the lack of oversight by State authorities of the transport of cargo to and from neighbouring countries. It is the Group's view, based on an assessment of the extensive movement of transit cargo between Burkina Faso and Mali prior to the post-electoral crisis, that a significant amount of revenue must have been generated from such trade. The Group cannot dismiss the possibility that such revenues were used for the purchase of arms and related materiel in breach of the embargo (see para. 405 of S/2011/271).

115. The Group also reiterates that overloaded trucks coming from Burkina Faso and Mali do not meet international standards for cargo, which indicates that customs officials at both sides of the border are not executing their functions when inspecting these trucks. In the absence of proper inspections, it appears to be the case that the customs officials of Burkina Faso and Mali are either unwilling or lack the capacity to implement measures to effectively control embargoed items.

C. Monitoring capacity of UNOCI

116. The Integrated Embargo Cell of UNOCI continues to monitor the seaport and airport of Abidjan. The Integrated Embargo Cell Quick Reaction Task Force also conducts additional checks. In its previous reports, the Group stressed the need for UNOCI to implement physical inspections of cargo based on a risk-assessment strategy (see S/2010/179, paras. 122 and 155, and S/2011/271, paras. 411-414).

D. Transit Interarmées

117. In its previous reports, the Group also highlighted the important role that Transit Interarmées, the customs agency of the Ministry of Defence, could have played in the organization of eventual arms imports for the previous regime. Despite several attempts, the Group could not obtain import statistics of Transit Interarmées (see paras. 227-231 of S/2011/272).

118. From the Group's perspective, Transit Interarmées played a negative role in the enforcement of the embargo because Ivorian customs had no control over its

⁶ The amount previously paid to La Centrale was CFAF 70,000.

import of equipment for the Ministry of Defence, and the Group was already aware that, at a minimum, vehicles (see annex VIII of S/2011/272), telecommunication and military material were being imported through Transit Interarmées for military use, thus representing a clear breach of the sanctions regime.

119. During the current mandate, the Group has obtained, after many requests in previous years, access to the lists of such imports for the year 2010 thanks to the collaboration of the new customs administration.

120. The list contains 170 registers of imports made by companies and individuals. Imported goods include a variety of explosives, arms, ammunition, bombs, grenades and other matériel. The list clearly shows that the sanctions regime was deliberately violated through Transit Interarmées.

121. Moreover, the list shows that Transit Interarmées operated beyond its mandate and acted as a forwarding agency for private companies and individuals. Further investigations by the Group will endeavour to discern to what ends the funds generated by those activities have been used.

122. As such, the Group intends to have complete information and analysis of all the documents that will be made available on Transit Interarmées activities in the final report.

E. Acquisition of vehicles for military use

123. The important role played by vehicles destined for military use during the Ivorian post-electoral crisis demonstrates that the Group's concerns expressed in its previous reports concerning acquisitions of vehicles by Ivorian armed and security forces were justified. The Group believes that vehicles for military use are serious force multipliers (see paras. 232-239 of S/2011/272). The Group is investigating possible sales of vehicles during the post-electoral period in breach of the sanctions regime.

124. The Group underlines that, in conformity with paragraph 9 of resolution 1980 (2011), acquisition of vehicles for military use should occur through an exemption request conveyed by the Government to the Sanctions Committee.

F. Exemption requests to the arms embargo

125. For traceability purposes and monitoring of the embargo, any item destined to be imported to Côte d'Ivoire through an exemption procedure according to paragraph 9 of resolution 1980 (2011), should be communicated in advance to the UNOCI Integrated Embargo Cell, and to the Group of Experts if applicable, with all details of the items, including the transport details.

VIII. Individual sanctions

126. The Group continues to investigate possible violations of the targeted sanctions on individuals according to measures imposed by paragraphs 9 and 11 of resolution 1572 (2004), as renewed by paragraph 1 and amended by paragraph 4 of

resolution 1643 (2005). These individuals are: Mr. Charles Blé Goudé, Mr. Eugène N'goran Djué and Mr. Martin Kouakou Fofié.

127. In addition, in accordance with paragraph 12 of resolution 1975 (2011), targeted sanctions were also applied against Mr. Laurent Gbagbo, Ms. Simone Gbagbo, Mr. Désiré Tagro, Mr. Pascal Affi N'Guessan and Mr. Alcide Djédjé.⁷

A. Charles Blé Goudé

128. The Group is aware of numerous media reports indicating that Mr. Blé Goudé is outside the country, which would constitute a clear violation of the travel ban. In an interview to the press on 18 August 2011, Mr. Blé Goudé maintains the view that he is “in exile”.⁸

129. The Group has been alerted that from his current location, Mr. Blé Goudé still exercises leadership over the Congrès panafricain des jeunes et patriotes (COJEP) and intends to reactivate his political network in Côte d'Ivoire.

130. The Group has received credible information indicating that Mr. Blé Goudé has assumed different identities and is likely to be moving around some neighbouring countries to Côte d'Ivoire.

131. On 1 July 2011, the Government issued an international arrest warrant calling for the apprehension of Mr. Blé Goudé for serious violations of human rights.

B. Eugène N'goran Kouadio Djué

132. The Group has been informed by the Ministry of Justice of Côte d'Ivoire that there are no current judicial proceedings against Mr. Djué and that he is committed to the process of reconciliation and has provided assistance in the disarmament process of elements of COJEP in the district of Yopougon-Abidjan.

C. Martin Kouakou Fofié

133. The Group notes that on 3 August 2011, Mr. Fofié was appointed by the current Government as the military commander of Zone 10 of the country and is based in Korhogo.

134. During a meeting with the Ministry of Justice on 6 September 2011, the Group was informed that any questions concerning Mr. Fofié and his possible violations of individual sanctions should be submitted to the Ministry of Defence.

D. Laurent Gbagbo

135. In a meeting with the Ministry of Justice on 6 September 2011, the Group was informed that Mr. Gbagbo has been indicted for economic crimes against the State

⁷ See www.un.org/sc/committees/1572/listtable.html.

⁸ Source: <http://news.abidjan.net/h/407872.html>.

of Côte d'Ivoire. Mr. Gbagbo is reportedly under house arrest at a military facility near the city of Korhogo, in the zone under the control of Mr. Fofié.

E. Simone Gbagbo

136. In a meeting with the Ministry of Justice, on 6 September 2011, the Group was informed that Ms. Gbagbo has also been indicted for economic crimes against the State of Côte d'Ivoire. Ms. Gbagbo is said to be under house arrest in Odienné. According to the prosecutor, Ms. Gbagbo will be transferred shortly to the local prison.

F. Désiré Tagro

137. The Group was informed by the Ministry of Justice that Mr. Tagro died in Abidjan on 13 April 2011. The Group understands that the Committee has requested confirmation from the Ivorian authorities in this regard.

G. Pascal Affi N'Guessan

138. The Group was informed by the Ministry of Justice that Mr. N'Guessan has been indicted for the commission of economic crimes, threat to national defence, establishment of armed bands, participation in an insurrectionary movement and rebellion, and plotting against the authority of the State of Côte d'Ivoire. He is reported to be currently under arrest in a prison in the town of Bouna.

H. Alcide Djédjé

139. The Group has been informed that Mr. Djédjé, the former Permanent Representative of Côte d'Ivoire to the United Nations, is currently under arrest in the prison of Boundiali. He is being indicted for the commission of economic crimes, endangering State security, blood crimes and theft in Côte d'Ivoire.

IX. Recommendations

A. Finance

140. The Group recommends that the Government of Côte d'Ivoire continue to improve its cooperation with the Group of Experts, particularly by supplying information concerning the results of audits of Government agencies and companies, in order to increase financial and economic transparency and reaffirm its readiness to comply with the sanctions regime.

141. The Group recommends that the Government take all necessary measures to effectively accelerate the process of financial reunification and centralization of the Ivorian financial system, in order to avoid the possible diversion of funds in violation of the sanctions regime.

B. Diamonds

142. In the Group's view, the current political and security situation in Côte d'Ivoire, in which the restructuring of the security sector and the effective reunification of the State have yet to be achieved, calls for the continuation of the embargo on Ivorian diamonds as established pursuant to resolution 1643 (2005), in particular given the absence of a functioning administrative structure or State authority to oversee mining activities in the northern part of the country.

143. The Group recommends that the Government of Côte d'Ivoire make an official request to the Chair of the Kimberley Process to invite a delegation of Kimberley Process experts to assess the measures taken by the Government of Côte d'Ivoire in establishing a transparent, effective and verifiable system to implement the Certification Scheme.

144. The Group recommends that the Government continue to engage and exchange information with all stakeholders in the diamond sector including non-governmental organizations such as GRPIE, and Friends of Côte d'Ivoire, in order to establish a dialogue that can assist the Government in fighting diamond smuggling.

C. Customs and transport

145. The Group recommends that, at the time of the arrival of exempted arms and related materiel as well as vehicles in Côte d'Ivoire, the UNOCI Integrated Embargo Cell and the Group of Experts, as necessary, must proceed with the physical verification of items and any related correspondence regarding exemption requests, before any taking of possession of the items by a forwarding agency and/or the recipient.

146. The Group recommends that UNOCI permanently employ a customs consultant for its Integrated Embargo Cell in order to improve its surveillance capacity.

147. The Group recommends that the neighbouring countries of Côte d'Ivoire, in particular Burkina Faso and Mali, enforce stricter customs controls on all transit shipments destined for, or leaving, the territory of Côte d'Ivoire.

D. Individual sanctions

148. The Group recommends that all Member States, in particular neighbouring countries of Côte d'Ivoire, remain vigilant and enforce the sanctions imposed by the Security Council against individuals as set forth by paragraphs 9 and 11 of resolution 1572 (2004), and renewed by paragraph 1 and amended by paragraph 4 of resolution 1643 (2005), and paragraph 12 of resolution 1975 (2011).

149. The Group recommends that the Sanctions Committee explore with INTERPOL the preparation of INTERPOL/United Nations special notices for the individuals whose names are contained in the travel ban and assets freeze lists.

Annex I

Meetings and consultations held by the Group of Experts in the course of its mandate

Belgium

Government

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Multilateral and bilateral entities

European Commission; Chair of the Kimberley Process Working Group on Monitoring; Antwerp World Diamond Centre; Chair of Kimberley Process Working Group of Diamond Experts

Côte d'Ivoire

Government

Ministry of Defence; Ministry of the Interior; Ministry of Public Function; Ministry of Water and Forestry; Ministry of Justice; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of Economic Infrastructure; Ministry of Mines and Energy; Chief of Staff of FRCI; General Directorate of Customs; General Directorate of Taxation; General Directorate of Mines and Energy

Diplomatic missions

Embassy of Belgium; Embassy of France; Embassy of the United States of America

Multilateral and bilateral entities

Force Licorne; UNOCI; International Cocoa Organization

France

Government

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The Netherlands

International Criminal Court

United States of America


Government

Department of State; Department of the Treasury; United States Geological Survey

Annex II

Ground and aerial images of main diamond fields in the Séguéla area

Figure I
Aerial view of Forona deposits



Source: Group of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire.

Figure II
Aerial view of Forona; close-up of deposit No. 1



Figure III
Aerial view of Forona; close-up of deposit No. 2



Figure IV
Forona: ground view of deposit No. 1 (latitude/longitude: 08°07.798'N;
006°37.068'W)



Figure V
Piles of diamondiferous gravel stored on site for future washing



Figure VI
Aerial view of Diarabana dyke (latitude/longitude: 08°11.050'N; 006°35.774'W)



Figure VII
Ground view of Diarabana dyke



Figure VIII
Diarabana dyke: pile of diamondiferous gravel



Figure IX
Bobi dyke (latitude/longitude: 08°10.539'N; 006°34.020'W)



Figure X
Bobi dyke



Figure XI
Zanda Ramka deposit (latitude/longitude: 08°09.394'N; 006°34.173'W)



Figure XII
Mounds of washed gravel leftover from previous SODEMI operation
(latitude/longitude: 08°08.307'N; 006°34.879'W)



Figure XIII
Dualla deposit (latitude/longitude: 08°08.239'N; 006°34.857'W)



Figure XIV
Dabanani deposit (latitude/longitude: 08°08.409'N; 006°35.064'W)



Figure XV
Djibeni deposit covered by vegetation and water as a result of the rainy season
(latitude/longitude: 08°08.473'N; 006°34.419'W)



Figure XVI
Wongué deposit: diamondiferous gravel grouped into piles for later washing
(latitude/longitude: 08°15.385'N; 006°36.961'W)

