



Security Council

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Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to the statement of the President of the Security Council of 31 October 2001 (S/PRST/2001/30), in which the Council requested me to submit reports at least every four months on the situation in Somalia. The report covers developments since my last report of 23 October 2006 (S/2006/838). The present report has a particular focus on the rapidly evolving political and military situation in Somalia, including the dislodging of the Union of Islamic Courts by the forces of the Transitional Federal Government assisted by Ethiopian troops. The report includes an update on the security and human rights situation, and on the humanitarian and development activities of the United Nations agencies and programmes. Pursuant to resolution 1725 (2006), the report also provides an update on plans to deploy a regional peace support mission to Somalia.

II. Main developments in Somalia

2. The period under review saw rapid changes in the political and security landscape in Somalia. The Union of Islamic Courts, which had gained control of 8 of the country's 18 administrative regions, was dislodged between 24 December 2006 and early January 2007 by the military forces of the Transitional Federal Government and Ethiopia. Remnants of the Union of Islamic Courts militia were then pursued in southern Somalia by Transitional Federal Government and Ethiopian forces. Clashes between Union of Islamic Courts militia and forces allied to the Transitional Federal Government began on 21 October 2006 near the town of Buale in the Middle Juba region. Other clashes followed around the town of Burhakaba in the Bay region, 60 kilometres (km) south-east of Baidoa.

3. Following the request of the African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Security Council adopted resolution 1725 (2006) modifying the arms embargo on Somalia and, inter alia, authorizing the deployment of an AU/IGAD force to protect the Transitional Federal Government in Baidoa. The resolution also emphasized the need for continued dialogue between the transitional federal institutions and the Union of Islamic Courts. Efforts were made to revive the Khartoum peace process initiated under the auspices of the League of Arab States, which stalled following the postponement of the third round of talks in



October 2006 owing to differences between the two parties over preconditions and procedural issues. Preconditions set by the Union of Islamic Courts included the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from Somalia. The Union of Islamic Courts also objected to Kenya serving as co-chair of the talks on behalf of IGAD. Following the postponement of the Khartoum talks, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden, the then Speaker of the Transitional Federal Parliament, travelled to Mogadishu with a number of parliamentarians, reportedly to encourage the Union of Islamic Courts to resume dialogue with the Transitional Federal Government. Although the Speaker and the Union of Islamic Courts leadership reached an agreement, the Transitional Federal Government refused to accept it on the basis that the Speaker had not consulted with either the Parliament or the Transitional Federal Government.

4. The adoption of resolution 1725 (2006) was welcomed by the Transitional Federal Government but rejected by the Union of Islamic Courts. The latter claimed that the deployment of foreign forces in the country was tantamount to an invasion of Somalia by Ethiopia. Intermittent clashes followed in the Bay region, and, on 7 December 2006, the Union of Islamic Courts took the town of Idale and arrived on the outskirts of Daynune, a Transitional Federal Government military training camp some 30 km south of Baidoa. The fighting soon dissipated, but on 12 December 2006, both sides elevated their verbal attacks, accusing each other of relying on support from foreign elements. Yusuf Mohamed Siyad Indhaade, the Defence Chief of the Union of Islamic Courts, gave Ethiopia seven days to withdraw its forces from Somalia or face a major conflict. On 20 December 2006, just one day after the Union of Islamic Courts deadline, heavy fighting broke out once more in the Bay region and soon spread to the central Galkayo, Hiran and Middle Shabelle administrative regions, where Union of Islamic Courts forces had been confronting warlords of the former Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism, who were allied with the Transitional Federal Government.

5. On 23 December 2006, the Union of Islamic Courts leaders called for jihad against the Ethiopian troops and appealed to foreign fighters for support. In an apparent response to those statements, the Ethiopian Government, on 24 December 2006, admitted that it had combat troops inside Somalia. In an official statement, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi said that his Government had taken self-defensive measures and started counter-attacking the aggressive extremist forces of the Islamic Courts and foreign terrorist groups. The Transitional Federal Government forces, supported by Ethiopian ground and air forces, engaged with the Union of Islamic Courts forces on a front stretching more than 400 km, from the lower Juba Valley in the south to the region of Galkayo in central Somalia. Within days, the towns of Bandiradley (Galkayo), Beletweyne (Hiran), Bulo-barde (Middle Shebelle), Burhakaba (Bay) and Dinsor (Bay) fell to the Transitional Federal Government/Ethiopian coalition. Mogadishu and the key port city of Kismayo also fell to the Transitional Federal Government coalition on 28 December 2006 and 1 January 2007, respectively.

6. Remnants of the Union of Islamic Courts forces withdrew to the southern reaches of Ras Kamboni and Afmadow in the Lower Juba region, where they fought against the Transitional Federal Government/Ethiopian coalition. On 8 January 2007, the United States announced that it had carried out an air strike against suspected terrorists linked with Al-Qaeda, who were believed to be fighting alongside the Union of Islamic Courts forces near Afmadow. At the same time, the Transitional Federal Government announced the closure of Somalia's borders, on

security grounds, and called on the international community, particularly the neighbouring States, to help enforce this ban. Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, the former head of the executive committee of the Union of Islamic Courts, reportedly surrendered to the Kenyan authorities on 21 January 2007. On 8 February 2007, Sheikh Sharif flew to Yemen.

7. After the fall of the Union of Islamic Courts, the semblance of order and security that the Union of Islamic Courts had created in Mogadishu began to deteriorate. Roadblocks and checkpoints returned, together with banditry and violence, despite the efforts of the Transitional Federal Government to improve security in the capital. On 3 January 2007, Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Gedi announced a three-day moratorium during which armed groups in Mogadishu were to hand over their arms. He warned that if they did not comply, the Transitional Federal Government would carry out forced disarmament. Demonstrations against the plan followed on 7 January 2007, in south Mogadishu. Tensions subsided after the Transitional Federal Government announced the suspension of its forced disarmament programme. On the same day, the Prime Minister nominated a 30-member committee to work on modalities for restoring peace and stability in the capital, but violent incidents targeting Ethiopian and the Transitional Federal Government forces prompted the Transitional Federal Government, with parliamentary approval, to impose emergency laws, allowing President Yusuf to govern the country by decree for a period of three months.

8. On 19 January 2007, unidentified gunmen attacked Villa Somalia, the official Mogadishu residence of the President, with grenades and explosives. Three days later, an attack on Ethiopian forces in Mogadishu left at least four people dead and several others wounded. On 24 January 2007, a mortar attack on the Mogadishu international airport killed one person and injured three others. The attack occurred soon after a United Nations flight had landed, but there were no injuries to United Nations personnel. Since then, several violent incidents, including mortar attacks, have targeted the Transitional Federal Government and Ethiopian troops in Mogadishu, in particular the nascent police force that has been deployed in the city to restore law and order. No one has claimed responsibility for these incidents. In the course of February 2007, insecurity continued to increase dramatically in Somalia, with almost daily gun, grenade and mortar attacks, most of them hitting the capital. The security situation also remained volatile in the south-west and Lower and Middle Juba regions and in the Kismayo area. The Ethiopian Government started to withdraw its troops in three phases. It also initiated training of former armed elements to be integrated into Somalia's armed forces.

9. The fall of the Union of Islamic Courts has also brought to the fore some of the inter- and intra-clan rivalries that had been suppressed during the conflict. Serious clan-related fighting was reported in Bardera (Gedo region), Tayeglo (Bakool region) and elsewhere. The Transitional Federal Government has yet to establish effective authority or to establish law and order in Mogadishu and other main population centres. The true intentions and future influence of the former warlords also remain to be seen.

10. Public resentment of the continued presence of Ethiopian troops in Somalia has created a volatile situation, which has seriously constrained humanitarian delivery and emergency operations in the centre and south of the country. Although the Transitional Federal Government has claimed that it is making substantial gains

against the Union of Islamic Courts remnants, fighting continues, especially in the Ras Kamboni and Bad-Madow areas. On 24 January 2007, a United States gunship was reported to have launched a second air strike against suspected Al-Qaeda operatives in southern Somalia.

11. On 10 January 2007, President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed held separate meetings at Villa Somalia with former Somali Presidents Ali Mahdi Mohamed and Abdikassim Salad Hassan. His goal was to build confidence with their local Hawiye communities. On 12 January 2007, President Yusuf and Prime Minister Gedi met at Villa Somalia with several former warlords, including Mohamed Qanyare Afrah, Muse Sudi Yalahow, Omar Mohamed 'Finish', Abdi Nure Siyad and Abdi Hassan Awale Qaybdid. At the end of the meeting, the former warlords reportedly agreed to disarm and integrate their militias into the national army and police services. However, at the time of the meeting, militiamen of Mohamed Qanyare Afrah clashed with the Transitional Federal Government guards outside Villa Somalia and six militiamen died as a result.

12. Reacting to the recent developments in south-central Somalia, the three main political parties in "Somaliland" issued a press statement on 14 January 2007, reaffirming the independence of "Somaliland" from the Transitional Federal Government. They said that the people of "Somaliland" would oppose any claim over their sovereignty.

13. On 15 January 2007, President Yusuf appointed a new administration for the Benadir district, which includes Mogadishu. On 17 January 2007, the Transitional Federal Parliament held an extraordinary session in Baidoa, under the chairmanship of the Second Deputy Speaker, Osman Elmi Boqore, to consider a motion of impeachment against Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden. The Speaker was accused, inter alia, of abandoning his responsibilities and supporting armed opposition groups bent on destabilizing the Transitional Federal Government. The vote for impeachment was carried by 183 in favour and 9 against. On 31 January 2007, the Parliament elected Aden Mohamed Noor Madobe, former Minister of Justice, as its new Speaker. The newly elected Speaker was sworn in on 3 February 2007. In his address to Parliament, he promised to take part in the reconciliation process and appealed to the group of parliamentarians allied to his predecessor to return to Somalia. On 7 February 2007, Prime Minister Gedi reshuffled his Cabinet, with the approval of the President. In line with the agreed power-sharing formula, he gave seven ministerial posts to each of the four major clans and named three ministers from the fifth clan.

III. Activities of the United Nations and the international community

14. With the impasse in the Khartoum talks in the last quarter of 2006 and the growing rift between the Speaker and the Transitional Federal Government, my Special Representative, François Lonseny Fall, engaged in shuttle diplomacy with a view to promoting peace and stability in Somalia. On 20 November and 4 December 2006, he visited Baidoa and Mogadishu, respectively, in an effort to revive the dialogue. He appealed to the Transitional Federal Government leaders to maintain the unity of the transitional federal institutions and to resolve their differences with the Speaker. He urged the Union of Islamic Courts to halt their military expansion

and encouraged both parties to return to the Khartoum talks without preconditions. He also undertook a regional tour to promote peace and stability in Somalia and the region. The tour included Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, the Sudan, Uganda and Yemen. In the course of the mission, he also had discussions with the leadership of AU, IGAD and the League of Arab States.

15. The International Contact Group on Somalia was also actively engaged in the region. The Contact Group met in Nairobi on 19 October 2006, and strongly urged the leadership of the Transitional Federal Government and the Union of Islamic Courts to attend the third round of talks at Khartoum. The Contact Group expressed concern over the increasing militarization of Somalia and recognized the need for the parties to abide by earlier commitments. The Contact Group also recommended that the Khartoum process be co-chaired by the League of Arab States and Kenya, as Chair of IGAD. The aim was to harmonize regional initiatives and present a common approach to peace and security in Somalia.

16. Following the postponement of the Khartoum talks, the League of Arab States and Kenya continued their efforts to revive the dialogue. A Kenyan delegation visited Mogadishu in mid-November 2006, hoping to allay some of the misgivings of the Union of Islamic Courts about IGAD's proposed co-chairmanship of the talks. Discussions followed on 1 and 2 December 2006, in Djibouti, between delegations from the Union of Islamic Courts, the IGAD secretariat and Kenya.

17. On 5 January 2007, the Contact Group met in Nairobi and confirmed its readiness to provide immediate support for the stabilization of Somalia based on Security Council resolution 1725 (2006), the effective functioning of the transitional federal institutions, and the provision of humanitarian and recovery assistance. The Contact Group also emphasized the need to launch without delay an inclusive process of political dialogue and reconciliation embracing representative clans, religious and business leaders, women's groups and other representatives of civil society who reject violence and extremism.

18. The European Union Commissioner for Humanitarian and Development Aid, Louis Michel, visited Baidoa and Mogadishu on 20 December 2006. He urged both parties to avoid conflict and to resume dialogue at the earliest opportunity. On 7 January 2007, some members of the Contact Group met with representatives of civil society who fled from Mogadishu to Nairobi to exchange views on the way forward.

19. After the routing of the Union of Islamic Courts, my Special Representative travelled to Mogadishu on 18 January 2007, and met with President Yusuf at Villa Somalia. He commended the President for his efforts to promote reconciliation in Mogadishu, including reaching out to clan elders and former Presidents Abdikassim and Ali Mahdi; and for the agreement he made with the former warlords to disarm their militias. He encouraged the President to continue his efforts to improve security, advance reconciliation and preserve the unity of the transitional federal institutions. While in Mogadishu, he also met with representatives of civil society.

20. The situation in Somalia was also one of the main issues on the agenda of the eighth ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union held in Addis Ababa from 29 to 30 January 2007, which I attended. I had the opportunity at that gathering to discuss the situation in Somalia with various regional leaders, including the Presidents of Djibouti, Kenya and Somalia, the Prime

Minister of Ethiopia and the Chairperson of the AU Commission. I encouraged all partners to impress upon the Somali Government the importance of engaging in an inclusive political process in order to create favourable conditions for the deployment of a peace support mission and to promote reconciliation in Somalia. On the sidelines of the meeting, on 30 January 2007, President Yusuf announced his intention to call a national reconciliation congress, which would be inclusive of all but extremist Islamists.

21. The independent national reconciliation commission of the transitional federal institutions held a multi-stakeholder workshop in Mogadishu from 3 to 12 February 2007, with support from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the participation of the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS). The objectives of the workshop, attended by 250 participants, were to identify ways to improve the security situation in Mogadishu and develop a consensus around a voluntary process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

22. The International Contact Group on Somalia met again on 9 February 2007, in Dar es Salaam, during which the members reiterated the need for the Transitional Federal Government to establish broad-based and representative institutions and an all-inclusive political process, as envisaged in the Transitional Federal Charter.

IV. Deployment of a peace support mission

23. Since the adoption of resolution 1725 (2006), efforts have been under way to expedite the deployment of a peace support mission to Somalia. The AU Peace and Security Council met on 19 January 2007 to discuss implementation of the resolution, and subsequently revised its original deployment plan for the peace support mission previously known as the Peacekeeping Mission of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in Somalia (IGASOM). When it became clear that IGAD would be unable to deploy IGASOM, it was decided that the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) would be deployed, at the strength of nine infantry battalions, with 270 police officers and a civilian component. The AU Peace and Security Council approved the deployment of AMISOM for six months to contribute to the initial stabilization phase in Somalia, and it requested the United Nations and the Security Council to provide all the support necessary for the speedy deployment of AMISOM, including the review of resolution 1725 (2006), in the light of the recent developments in Somalia and the provision of financial support. The AU Peace and Security Council also urged the Security Council to consider authorizing a United Nations operation in Somalia that would take over from AMISOM at the expiration of its six-month mandate.

24. Kenya, on behalf of IGAD, sent delegations to several African countries in January 2007 to encourage their participation in the peace support mission. President Yusuf travelled to Rwanda for the same purpose. AU sent a mission to Mogadishu in January 2007 to discuss the deployment of AMISOM with the Transitional Federal Government. Uganda has agreed to provide up to two battalions for the operation, and Burundi, Ghana and Nigeria are considering contributing troops for this mission. Other AU member States are considering providing logistical and transport support for AMISOM, including Algeria, which has offered airlift support. On 12 February 2007, the AU Commission convened a meeting with Uganda and other potential troop contributors, as well as with AU partners, to

discuss logistical and financial aspects related to the deployment of AMISOM and to establish a coordination mechanism to ensure adequate support for its deployment.

25. The United States announced that it would provide \$14 million, as well as strategic airlift support, to assist the peace support mission. The Foreign Ministers of the European Union (EU) met in Brussels on 22 January 2007, and expressed readiness to consider support in the order of 15 million euro from the African Peace Facility as soon as the necessary requirements are met, including authorization by the United Nations. The EU offer of financial support for AMISOM is within the framework of a concerted global effort to encourage an all-inclusive political dialogue and genuine reconciliation in Somalia.

26. On 28 January 2007, an extraordinary meeting of IGAD member States was held on the sidelines of the AU summit in Addis Ababa. The meeting included all IGAD members, except Eritrea. The meeting welcomed the decision of AU to deploy a peace support mission to Somalia and called on the Security Council to take all necessary measures to convert AMISOM into a United Nations peace support mission, as per the decision of the AU Peace and Security Council.

27. In response to a request from the Chairperson of the AU Commission for the United Nations to send experts to assist in supporting the development of a detailed operation plan for AMISOM, I dispatched a small team of technical experts from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and UNPOS to Addis Ababa in early February to jointly assess the planning support and other requirements of AU for the establishment and management of AMISOM. Based on those consultations, it was concluded that AU will need to augment considerably its headquarters capacity in Addis Ababa with a number of planning specialists in different areas. AU is currently exploring how its partners, including the United Nations, could support it in this regard, including ways to source staff and generate funding.

V. Humanitarian situation

28. The humanitarian situation in south-central Somalia has deteriorated over the last three months due to the compounded effects of the flood emergency and the intensification of conflict. Heavy rains in Somalia and the Ethiopian highlands during November 2006 brought large-scale flooding to parts of southern Somalia, displacing an estimated 454,000 people in the Juba and Shabelle riverine regions. At the time of the floods, 1.8 million people were already in urgent need of humanitarian assistance and protection. Of those, 1.1 million were in the southern regions, where the flooding occurred.

29. A multi-agency flood response was mounted to assist affected communities. However, many flood victims were also living in areas where the humanitarian community had a minimal operational presence due to prevailing insecurity. To overcome those difficulties, a United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination team was deployed and two helicopters were mobilized by the World Food Programme (WFP) to provide coordination and logistical support to the efforts of United Nations agencies and partner non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

30. With the onset of conflict on 24 December 2006, flood response activities virtually ground to a halt when the United Nations and NGOs had to relocate their

staff to Nairobi and air operations were suspended following the announcement by the Transitional Federal Government of the closure of the borders of Somalia for security reasons. Overland access to south-central Somalia was further complicated following the decision of the Government of Kenya on 25 December 2006 to seal its border on security grounds. The approval given on 7 February 2007 by the Government of Kenya for humanitarian assistance to enter Somalia via overland routes is a welcome development that will enable humanitarian actors to assist vulnerable groups, including some 5,000 Somali internally displaced persons who were dispersed along the border with Kenya waiting to cross for over a month.

31. It is estimated that some 70,000 people were displaced by the recent fighting in south-central Somalia. Humanitarian access has resumed in Wajid, Baidoa and Galkayo, but remains limited elsewhere, including in Jowhar, Merka and Mogadishu. In addition, Kismayo, where a possible outbreak of Rift Valley Fever is a serious concern, remains inaccessible to United Nations flights, given the lack of security guarantees by the Transitional Federal Government. However, road conditions have improved and convoys operated by private contractors have resumed, enabling the maintenance of a minimum level of assistance.

32. The 2007 consolidated appeal for Somalia is currently funded at only 2 per cent of the requirements. The appeal seeks \$237 million for 128 projects through 14 United Nations agencies, 16 international NGOs and nine local NGOs. The appeal covers eight key sectors (access; food security and livelihoods; protection; shelter; health; nutrition; water and sanitation; education) and three cross-cutting sectors (early recovery; gender and HIV/AIDS; and logistics and support services). The appeal will be revised in the light of the post-*deyr* food security assessment, which indicates an improvement in the overall food security situation in south-central Somalia following abundant rains, with a significant exception being the riverine areas in Gedo and the Juba Valley, where farmland was damaged by the floods and planting hindered by overall insecurity.

VI. Human rights and protection

33. The general human rights situation in Somalia has been aggravated by continued insecurity. Particular concerns include the displacement of populations, restrictions on the media and human rights defenders, and violations of the human rights of women and children, as well as infringements on civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights.

34. Most of the people displaced by the recent fighting were believed to be supporters of the Union of Islamic Courts and were displaced following serious threats from Ethiopian and Transitional Federal Government troops. Kenya's decision to seal its border with Somalia effectively stranded these people near the border town of Doble without assistance or protection. The Kenyan authorities also deported back to Somalia 420 Somalis who were registered with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on the Kenyan side of the border. The action of the Kenyan Government was criticized by UNHCR and the international community as a clear violation of international law. The Kenyan authorities also apprehended about 34 individuals suspected of being Union of Islamic Courts fighters and handed them over to the Transitional Federal Government during the second half of January 2007. Their identities were not

disclosed and the conditions of their deportation were perceived to be in contravention of the international humanitarian framework, which implies a specific protection mechanism. The fate of those individuals is not known.

35. Particular protection concerns arising from the recent conflict have included the harassment and detention of aid workers by Ethiopian and Transitional Federal Government forces. There have been acts of retaliation against individuals considered to have sympathized with the Union of Islamic Courts and against specific groups, including the Oromos. Reports from Somali human rights organizations indicate a general atmosphere of fear in Mogadishu, with Ethiopian and Transitional Federal Government forces involved in regular house-to-house searches.

36. Limits to freedom of expression are a serious concern throughout Somalia. Several radio stations were closed down and several journalists arrested during the period under review. In October 2006, the Union of Islamic Courts authorities shut down the East Africa Radio station based in Mogadishu for its alleged links with Bashir Raghe Shirar, a former warlord, and for alleged misinformation campaigns. Three journalists who covered the fighting between the Transitional Federal Government and the Union of Islamic Courts were arrested by the Transitional Federal Government while returning from Burhakaba to Baidoa. In December 2006, the Secretary General of the National Union of Somali Journalists was arrested and held for one day by the Union of Islamic Courts in Mogadishu without being given any specific reason. Following the imposition of emergency law, the Transitional Federal Government on 15 January 2007 ordered three radio stations in Mogadishu (Shabelle Radio, Radio HornAfrik, and Voice of the Koran) and the office of Al-Jazeera Television to be closed. The Transitional Federal Government accused them of inciting violence, but the ban was lifted the following day after discussions with the broadcasters.

37. In “Puntland”, the smuggling of Somali and Ethiopian nationals from Bossasso to Yemen continued during the final quarter of 2006, with around 11,015 individuals, mainly Somalis and Ethiopians, undertaking this perilous journey by sea. In a bid to avoid the Yemeni coast guard, the smugglers usually force their passengers to leave the ships when still far from shore. In 2006, some 637 Somalis and Ethiopians reportedly drowned.

38. Following a decree by “Puntland” authorities on 25 September 2006, hundreds of Somali internally displaced persons were arrested and sent back to south-central Somalia. In addition, the authorities, without applying the provisions of international human rights and humanitarian laws, deported 1,370 Ethiopian migrants back to Ethiopia. These deportations, in poor conditions aboard trucks, were reported to be life-threatening. While recognizing the right of “Puntland” authorities to deport foreigners who reside illegally in “Puntland”, the international community has urged the authorities not to deport Ethiopians who could be in need of international protection and whose lives and safety could be endangered if they are returned to Ethiopia. As a result of these concerns, a pre-screening centre was set up by the international community, with the approval of the “Puntland” authorities.

VII. Operational activities to promote peace

A. Reconstruction and Development Framework for Somalia and transition planning

39. The United Nations country team has identified priorities for the United Nations system for the next six months in south-central Somalia to provide assistance to the Somali people in line with the priorities of the Reconstruction and Development Framework for Somalia. The priorities focus on support to the stabilization of south-central Somalia through the strengthening of the transitional federal institutions. This aim can be achieved only through inclusive dialogue for reconciliation and the provision of urgent services to the population, so as to achieve noticeable improvements in the lives of Somalis. Components of the plan include: (a) institutional capacity-building focused on a number of key institutions and local administrations; (b) support to the establishment of the rule of law and security, in particular through policing and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; (c) the provision of urgent basic social services via the Transitional Federal Government and local government, as envisaged in the Transitional Federal Charter and the Reconstruction and Development Framework, in particular through a back-to-school campaign and essential health services; (d) urgent assistance to vulnerable internally displaced persons, including assisting authorities with small-scale resettlement programmes; and (e) employment and livelihood recovery for peace. The plan is based on and is complementary to the activities and priorities identified in the Somalia consolidated appeals process for 2007.

40. The joint needs assessment began in mid-2005 to provide an assessment of rehabilitation and transitional recovery needs and a five-year reconstruction and development plan for Somalia. This consultative and participatory process has been coordinated jointly by the United Nations and the World Bank, working in partnership with the Somali authorities and other stakeholders, particularly civil society and donors. Based on the findings of the joint needs assessment, the Reconstruction and Development Framework for Somalia was prepared, and is in the last phases of consultation and finalization. It lays out national priorities, with a costed results-based matrix, for the next five years at the national level as well as in three region-specific plans. The overarching goal of the framework is to promote peace and reduce poverty. It will serve as the framework for all development interventions in Somalia in the coming years.

41. In the second half of 2006, the United Nations country team, under the leadership of the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia, took a resolute stance towards stronger integration among the agencies and to align their agency-specific country programmes starting in 2008. The United Nations country team has begun work on a United Nations transition plan that will cover the period 2008-2009, in order to align its support with identified national priorities in the Reconstruction and Development Framework and to ensure a concerted and focused approach of the United Nations country team in support of the transition period.

B. Governance

42. The Prime Minister of the Transitional Federal Government created a task force chaired by the Deputy Minister of Interior to coordinate a district-based process of reconciliation, as a preamble to the participatory selection of district councils. Supported by UNDP and the United Nations Office for Project Services, the process was effective in achieving locally accepted administrations. The process, led by members of Parliament from relevant clans, with civil society facilitation, links local governance to federal authorities and aims to address underlying local conflicts that have fuelled warlordism over the past 15 years. The process has concluded in the Bay and Bakool regions, with the exception of two districts. The task force is expected to cover all regions of south-central Somalia within nine months, giving priority to Mogadishu and border districts. The task force is leading a participatory process to develop a city charter for the Mogadishu administration, to be followed by a participatory process to select the relevant authorities.

43. The participation of women in governance offers hope for a shift from clan-based conflict towards local governance for service delivery. On 9 December 2006, the Prime Minister decreed a quota of 30 per cent for women in all government institutions, including the civil service and district and regional councils. On the same day, the “President” of “Puntland” issued a similar decree mandating a quota of 20 per cent for women in all “Puntland” government institutions. The “Puntland” administration began immediately to appoint women members to existing district councils. With the support of UNDP, the “Puntland” administration concluded its five-year plan, harmonized with the joint needs assessment findings.

44. UNDP continues to play a key role in facilitating the Transitional Federal Parliament session that began in Baidoa in early 2006. During the ongoing parliamentary session, several bills have been passed pertaining to: the Government budget; the establishment of a civil service commission; plans to establish district and regional administrations; and the formation of a national reconciliation commission.

45. Under its Trust Fund for Peacebuilding, UNPOS recently implemented a peace and reconciliation project in the Sool and Sanaag regions. The key objective of the project is to support community-level reconciliation and peacebuilding in order to promote an environment conducive to peaceful and harmonious coexistence among clans.

C. Judiciary and the rule of law

46. In October 2006, a seminar to support the reactivation of the judiciary was held in Baidoa. As a result, Supreme Court judges and members of the Judicial Service Council were appointed by the Transitional Federal Government President. The Judicial Service Council has also re-established regional courts in the Bay and Bakool regions.

47. With support from UNDP, the Transitional Federal Government trained 600 graduates of Labatinjirow Police Training Centre in December 2006. The police have been deployed in Baidoa and Mogadishu to strengthen the rule of law and security and to secure Government institutions. The police deployment is part of a larger initiative to re-establish the Somali Police Force. UNDP and the Transitional

Federal Government are currently working together to strengthen law enforcement in Mogadishu.

D. Community-driven recovery

48. In partnership with the World Bank, the United Kingdom Department for International Development and the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) is spearheading a community-driven recovery initiative to strengthen local capacities to respect and protect the rights of women and children through a participatory dialogue on rights. By the end of 2006, 15 community development committees had collaborated with 7 district councils to improve social capital and expand social service delivery. This initiative has demonstrated the importance of good governance and reconciliation at the district level. Several other United Nations agencies are involved in promoting community-led recovery, including the International Labour Organization, which is operating programmes for rapid employment creation through the provision of public services such as garbage collection.

E. Internally displaced persons

49. There are almost 1 million internally displaced persons in Somalia. As in other conflict situations, most are moving to urban slums, where the majority of inhabitants lack adequate shelter and basic services. Somalia's slum population has increased 500 per cent since 1995. During the reporting period, UNDP completed a census of some 7,000 settlements in conjunction with partners and local counterparts, gathering vital socio-economic data. A Millennium Development Goals report for Somalia containing these findings will be published at the end of February 2007. UN-Habitat has been responsible for implementing the Somalia Urban Development Programme in "Somaliland" and "Puntland". It also coordinates a number of inter-agency initiatives for internally displaced persons countrywide. These activities combine community participation and municipal capacity-building with capital investments in shelter and infrastructure. For Mogadishu, the United Nations priorities for the coming six months include integrated planning for medium-term resettlement of, and immediate assistance to, those internally displaced persons who are currently living in public buildings.

F. Health

50. As part of the response to flooding and conflict in south-central Somalia, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria distributed over 161,700 insecticide-treated nets by mid-January 2007, reaching the vast majority of the initial priority target of 101,242 children under the age of five and pregnant mothers. The Global Fund's ongoing initiatives to provide artemisinin-based combination therapy and rapid diagnostic test kits for malaria have helped combat the risk of a large scale outbreak.

51. The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) responded to the needs of women of reproductive age and pregnant women in flood-affected areas during the humanitarian crises in south-central Somalia to ensure that reproductive health was

integrated into the emergency response. UNFPA provided reproductive health supplies for safe motherhood and antenatal care, including sets of emergency equipment for the provision of hospital level emergency obstetric care, and personal hygiene kits for women through health centres, including three mobile health clinics to meet the needs of internally displaced persons.

52. UNFPA improved safe motherhood and comprehensive antenatal services for women in south-central Somalia (Huddur district) through support to mother and child health clinics, which provide assisted delivery, including emergency obstetric care, and training to midwives and traditional birth attendants, and facilitated delivery referrals to clinics from the surrounding area.

53. Limited data indicates an HIV/AIDS prevalence rate of around 1 per cent in Somalia. A comprehensive surveillance plan is in place, and the threat of HIV/AIDS has galvanized a united front in “Puntland”, “Somaliland” and south-central Somalia. With support from the international community, line ministries and civil society, including religious leaders, are building partnerships in all regions to avoid a major epidemic. The establishment of AIDS commissions and secretariats in each region offers the possibility for all Somalis to coordinate their efforts in this area. Somalis already have one agreed strategic framework to combat infection. They are now working on a single integrated prevention, treatment, care and support mechanism guided by a harmonized monitoring and evaluation framework that promotes shared technical management, coordination and information exchanges. The HIV/AIDS response is a building block for reconciliation efforts at a technical level, above politics.

54. At the General Assembly high-level meeting on HIV/AIDS in New York in June 2006, “Puntland”, “Somaliland” and south-central Somalia, led by the Transitional Federal Government Minister of Health, agreed to ambitious and realistic national targets for HIV prevention, treatment, care and support towards the goal of universal access by 2010. The three Somali entities also hosted a meeting in Hargeisa aimed at concrete action on the regional partnership to address HIV vulnerability and cross-border mobility in the Horn of Africa. Representatives of AIDS commissions from Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, the Sudan, “Somaliland”, “Puntland” and south-central Somalia discussed ways of jointly responding to HIV vulnerability among mobile populations and the host populations with whom they interact.

55. During the reporting period, UNICEF continued to support the establishment of national AIDS commissions and capacity-building for Somalia’s three zones. These multisectoral local government institutions are now operational in “Somaliland”, “Puntland” and south-central Somalia. In particular, the South and Central AIDS Commission continued efforts to scale up awareness campaigns during the emergency situation. Acutely aware of the danger of increased prevalence among populations on the move and under stress, the Commission has continued its work in a volatile and insecure environment. Surprisingly, results tallied from Global Fund projects during this period have shown that despite floods and conflict, there has been an overall increase in the number of people reporting to voluntary counselling and testing sites and participating in awareness-raising activities.

56. UNFPA supported awareness-raising activities and events targeting young people in “Puntland” through outreach and mass media on how to protect themselves from HIV/AIDS infection, sexually transmitted illnesses and pregnancy.

UNFPA also strengthened the capacity of youth organizations and individual youths (peer-to-peer) to raise awareness of youth on reproductive health issues, including on HIV/AIDS and sexually transmitted illnesses.

G. Water and sanitation

57. UNICEF successfully mounted a rapid response across flood-affected areas of Somalia despite limited access to many locations and the withdrawal of international staff in September 2006. The dedication and commitment of the national staff facilitated a robust relief operation in many of the hardest hit locations, utilizing pre-positioned stocks of emergency relief supplies. Over 75,000 vulnerable people were reached by the end of November 2006 and over 265,000 people by mid-January 2007. During the initial response in the severely affected areas of Hiran, water trucking was also used to ensure that about 32,000 people had access to safe drinking water. Hygiene-related activities reached over 115,000 people, resulting in improved knowledge of the benefits of adopting safe hygiene practices.

H. Gender

58. UNFPA, the United Nations Development Fund for Women and UNDP initiated a joint programme with the aim of developing a national gender policy framework for Somalia, including for gender mainstreaming of the Transitional Federal Government and the “Somaliland” and “Puntland” administrations. A 16-day campaign of activism to end violence against women was held from 25 November to 10 December 2006, for the first time spearheaded by the ministries responsible for gender. The campaign advocated for women’s human rights issues and for more technical support to the ministries of gender in such areas as gender budgeting.

59. To mobilize support against the severe violation of women’s human rights that comprise female genital cutting/female genital mutilation, and to advocate for the eradication of the practice, UNFPA facilitated a series of round tables in “Somaliland” and “Puntland” for experts, community and religious leaders and high-level officials from the two administrations. UNFPA also supported awareness-raising among journalists in “Somaliland” on sexual- and gender-based violence and strengthened their capacity to monitor and report on violations of women’s human rights in Somalia.

I. Child protection

60. The child protection monitoring and reporting mechanism, established in accordance with Security Council resolution 1612 (2005), is in the process of finalizing an annual report for submission to the Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict, outlining six grave violations of children’s rights in Somalia. While many reported violations were a result of inter-clan conflict, the majority resulted from increased tension and conflict between the Union of Islamic Courts and the Transitional Federal Government and their respective allied forces. The monitoring and reporting mechanism is gathering concrete data on grave

violations perpetrated by the Union of Islamic Courts and the Transitional Federal Government and other parties in Somalia. These include denial of humanitarian access, the killing and maiming of children, increased recruitment and use of children in armed forces and groups, attacks on schools and hospitals, and abductions.

61. In December 2006, the United Nations Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia formally reminded both the Union of Islamic Courts and the Transitional Federal Government of their obligations to uphold international standards and laws concerning the recruitment of children under the age of 18 into armed forces and groups, and to ensure the immediate release of any children in these forces. This was followed by a letter to the Transitional Federal Government in early January 2007 from the UNICEF Representative, calling for the release of children who had participated in the recent conflict as combatants or in supporting roles. UNICEF sought the safe return of these children to their families. Both letters urged parties to take a public stand against the use and recruitment of children in their forces. In mid-January 2007, the UNICEF Representative again raised the issue in person with the Deputy Prime Minister, who agreed to take the issue before Parliament and the President for immediate action.

VIII. Observations

62. The current situation may represent the best opportunity that Somalia has had in years to find a long-term solution to its protracted conflicts by putting in place a functioning and effective state under the framework of the Transitional Federal Charter. At the same time, the risks of renewed and prolonged insecurity will increase unless the Transitional Federal Government is able to rapidly consolidate its authority and ensure stability and the rule of law. In order to do so, the Transitional Federal Government must reach out to key political and social forces in Somalia and engage in an inclusive dialogue. The aims are to make the transitional institutions more representative, promote national reconciliation and broaden acceptance of the Transitional Federal Charter as the framework for governance until the elections envisaged for 2009.

63. The challenges ahead are enormous. There is a need to improve security, provide basic social services to the population, strengthen the capacity of governance institutions, and embark on the socio-economic reconstruction of the country. The United Nations will continue to support the Government and civil society to meet these challenges and to turn the page on a dark period in Somalia's history. However, while the international community can assist, the primary responsibility for moving the process forward lies with the Somali authorities and people.

64. Dialogue and reconciliation are essential prerequisites to achieve these tasks. I welcome the steps taken so far by the Transitional Federal Government towards dialogue, peace and reconciliation. I encourage the Transitional Federal Government to make the process as inclusive and transparent as possible and to engage with all the key stakeholders, including clan elders, religious leaders, business groups, women's groups and other representatives of civil society. Those who renounce violence and extremism and pledge to constructively engage in achieving a sustainable political settlement in Somalia should be included in the process. An

inclusive dialogue and a genuine political process are the only ways to achieve a sustainable peace that denies dissatisfied groups a rallying point for conflict. The dialogue should address critical political and security issues, including a comprehensive ceasefire and an agreed framework for disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating Somalia's militias, consistent with the National Security and Stabilization Plan. I urge the international community to provide the transitional federal institutions with the necessary support to sustain the dialogue process and establish representative local administrations conducive to peacebuilding.

65. The Transitional Federal Charter provides the framework for the way forward. The Charter gave the Transitional Federal Government five years in which to draft and complete a federal constitution and organize elections. It is therefore essential that the Transitional Federal Government take the necessary steps in the time remaining, while maintaining a spirit of dialogue and consensus. The Transitional Federal Government needs to be proactive in this regard. It needs to step away from its entrenched positions and send a positive signal to its international partners, who are standing ready to support an inclusive process of dialogue and reconciliation.

66. Warlords were responsible for much of the conflict in Somalia of the past 16 years. They defied and undermined the authority of the present Transitional Federal Government and spread insecurity in the country. It is my hope that they will abide by the agreement reached with President Abdullahi Yusuf to disarm their militias. I also want to caution against any assumption that the fall of the Union of Islamic Courts will automatically bring peace to Somalia. There are clear indications that a significant number of "spoilers" remain active in Somalia. I am particularly disturbed by the growing insecurity in Mogadishu and the continuation of military operations in other areas. I condemn all acts of violence in Somalia and call on all parties to cease hostilities and engage in peace efforts.

67. There is an urgent need to stabilize the situation in Somalia to help create the conditions conducive for dialogue and reconciliation and to facilitate the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces. I welcome the decision of AU to deploy troops in Somalia for an initial period of six months, as well as the intention of Ethiopia to withdraw its forces. I appeal to the international community to assist AU in mobilizing the funds and other assistance necessary for the deployment of AMISOM. To be effective, it should be well planned, well prepared and well equipped, and robust enough to make a difference on the ground. But, above all, I would like to emphasize that a viable political process is also crucial from a peacekeeping perspective. Peacekeepers should be deployed in support of, rather than as a substitute for, a political process. Otherwise, they could quickly be perceived as partial and become a party to the conflict.

68. In accordance with resolution 1744 (2007), I intend to send a technical assessment mission to the AU headquarters and, security conditions permitting, to Somalia to examine the political and security situation and the possibility of a United Nations peacekeeping operation following the AU deployment. I will then provide the Council with recommendations covering the United Nations further engagement in support of peace and security in Somalia, as well as further recommendations on stabilization and reconstruction.

69. In the meantime, the United Nations will continue its efforts to address the serious humanitarian needs in Somalia. I encourage the international community to continue to generously support relief and development assistance efforts in the

country. I call on all Somali parties to provide unhindered humanitarian access for relief efforts, as well as guarantees for the safety and security of humanitarian aid workers, and to respect the fundamental human rights of all people in Somalia.

70. Recent developments in Somalia amply demonstrate the degree to which national and regional security conditions are intertwined in the Horn of Africa. Long-term security for Somalia will not be possible without addressing the regional aspects of the crisis. In this regard, I wish to underscore the need to explore measures to deal with the regional dimension of the Somali crisis and to find ways to address the security concerns of Somalia and its neighbours.

71. Finally, I wish to reaffirm my deep appreciation to my Special Representative for his leadership and continued efforts to foster inclusive dialogue and reconciliation among the Somali people. I call upon all Somali parties and Member States to continue to give him their fullest support and cooperation in pursuit of this goal.
