



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1998/1110
23 November 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS
OBSERVER MISSION IN ANGOLA (MONUA)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 15 of Security Council resolution 1202 (1998) of 15 October 1998, in which the Council, inter alia, requested me to submit a comprehensive report by 23 November 1998 in order to enable it to consider the future role of the United Nations in Angola and to make recommendations regarding ways of improving the implementation of the measures imposed on the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) by the Security Council. It covers developments since my last report, dated 8 October 1998 (S/1998/931).

II. POLITICAL ASPECTS

2. During the period under review, the peace process in Angola continued to be stalled. UNITA is still refusing to implement its most important commitments under the Lusaka Protocol (S/1994/1441, annex), including the demilitarization of its forces and the extension of State administration throughout the country.

3. At the same time, there have been no contacts between the Government and Mr. Jonas Savimbi and his group, and the joint mechanisms established for the implementation of the peace process at the national and local levels, including the Joint Commission, have been paralysed. Mutual mistrust between the two parties remained pervasive. In addition, the Government continued to be reluctant to allow my Special Representative, Mr. Issa B. Y. Diallo, to establish direct contacts with Mr. Savimbi and his group.

4. During the period under review, I have been in contact with all parties concerned. In this context, I met on 15 October 1998 with General Higino Carneiro, the Angolan Vice-Minister for Territorial Administration and Deputy Head of the Government delegation to the Joint Commission. On 21 October, I replied to a message from Mr. Savimbi, which was made available to members of the Security Council. In my letter, I expressed extreme concern over the unravelling of the peace process in Angola and urged Mr. Savimbi to complete all pending tasks under the Lusaka Protocol without

further delay. I also called upon Mr. Savimbi to respond to the proposals presented to him by my Special Representative in a letter dated 6 October 1998.

5. In collaboration with the representatives of the three observer States to the Angolan peace process (Portugal, the Russian Federation and the United States of America), my Special Representative has considered ways of revitalizing the peace process. In this connection, Mr. Diallo met, on several occasions, with the Government delegation to the Joint Commission to explain the implications of Security Council resolution 1202 (1998) of 15 October. The Government reaffirmed its refusal to pursue any dialogue with Mr. Savimbi and reiterated its position that the recently established UNITA Renovation Committee should represent UNITA in the Joint Commission. Mr. Diallo also maintained regular liaison with the UNITA leadership in Bailundo and Andulo, in particular with UNITA Vice-President Dembo. During these contacts, Mr. Diallo conveyed to Mr. Savimbi's party the expectations of the international community and impressed upon UNITA the urgent need to cooperate fully in the earliest implementation of the Lusaka Protocol.

6. My Special Representative also met with the members of the Provisional Political Commission of the UNITA Renovation Committee. The Commission solicited the assistance of the United Nations for the reintegration of demobilized UNITA soldiers, particularly in agricultural projects. It expressed its willingness to see the Angolan Government resume the demobilization project known as the Fourth Branch of the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA), which is aimed at training and temporarily incorporating former soldiers into the FAA in order to engage them in public reconstruction projects.

7. The UNITA Renovation Committee held its general conference at Luanda from 13 to 15 October 1998. Two hundred and eighty delegates from 17 of the 18 Angolan Provinces participated in the conference. In a final communiqué, the conference announced the setting up of a Provisional Political Committee to run the affairs of the movement until the next party congress. The conference also decided to retain all the UNITA deputies in the National Assembly, reversing an earlier decision to suspend 15 of the 70 deputies belonging to UNITA. By doing so, a possible controversy was avoided at the opening of the current session of the Assembly on 20 October 1998. However, the issue of the leadership of the UNITA parliamentary group remained unresolved. The group had earlier met and designated Mr. Chivukuvuku as its leader, but at the end of the National Assembly session the President of the Assembly announced that the UNITA Renovation Committee had nominated another person, Mr. Manuvakola, who had just taken his seat in the parliament as the leader of the UNITA parliamentary group.

8. On 27 October 1998, by a decision adopted by 115 votes in favour, none against and 61 abstentions, the National Assembly abrogated the law granting a special status to Mr. Savimbi as the leader of the largest opposition political party, which was promulgated in accordance with the Lusaka Protocol. This decision was attributed to Mr. Savimbi's failure to fulfil his party's obligations under the Protocol.

9. From 9 to 16 and on 18 November 1998, my Special Representative travelled to South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Côte d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso and Gabon to consult with regional leaders on the ways and means of restoring the Angolan

peace process. He met with Presidents Nujoma, Mugabe, Bédié and Compaoré, as well as South African Foreign Minister Nzo and his Deputy, Mr. Pahad, with whom he discussed the dangerous developments in Angola and the position taken by the Security Council. Mr. Diallo also solicited their support for the scrupulous implementation of the Lusaka Protocol, both within the framework of bilateral and subregional efforts. The leaders visited by Mr. Diallo were critical of Mr. Savimbi's attitude and stressed the need to increase international pressure on him to fulfil his commitments. They also reiterated their support for the Lusaka peace process and the continued presence of the United Nations in Angola. Most regional leaders stressed the need for a political solution in Angola, but also felt that the existing sanctions regime should be strengthened.

III. MILITARY AND SECURITY ASPECTS

10. The security situation throughout the country remained precarious, in particular in the northern and north-eastern regions where the Government and UNITA forces have continued to conduct extensive military operations. The renewed fighting reported in Lunda Sul, Benguela and Cunene Provinces has led to the further deterioration of security conditions there. As a result of the prevailing insecurity, the free circulation of people and goods has been impeded in many areas of Angola.

11. In the northern region, Government forces regained control of Songo, Maquela do Zombo, Quitexe and Puri, and are still fighting over several areas in Uige and Cuanza Norte Provinces. UNITA forces, allegedly joined by some rebel elements from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, gained temporarily control of some localities in these provinces and launched numerous attacks in an unsuccessful attempt to capture areas in the vicinity of the city of Uige. UNITA, however, continues to control the eastern parts of Cuanza Norte Province. The north-eastern region remained the most affected, owing to renewed military operations aimed at gaining control over the diamond-mining areas, as well as the strategic highway linking the cities of Malange and Saurimo with Luanda.

12. In Malange Province, FAA is still holding the corridor in the north and south of the city and has recaptured Caculama, Muxique, Cambondo and Catala. However, UNITA forces recently took over N'Gola Luige and Quiuaba N'Zogi in the north of the city of Malange and reportedly blew up the Lombe river bridge. They have continued to intermittently obstruct main roads and conduct harassing operations against FAA and the Angolan National Police (ANP). FAA utilized its air as well as long-range artillery equipment to contain UNITA, while consolidating its positions in the areas of Luremo, Milando and Cafunfo and was preparing to clear other areas of UNITA resistance.

13. Angolan Government forces are present in the areas of Andrada and Dundo in Lunda Norte Province in an attempt to prevent any UNITA incursions from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. They have also launched offensive operations in Lunda Sul Province, capturing Muconda, Mureige and Tchiluge, the latter being an important base facilitating UNITA transborder movements. Reports of fighting in Cunene and Benguela Provinces confirm the Government's intentions to dislodge UNITA from its bases in Caicumá and to block UNITA movements.

/...

14. Although the freedom of movement of the personnel of the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) has continued to be restricted by local FAA and ANP officials, in general the Mission has enjoyed good cooperation at the provincial and national levels. This has made it possible for MONUA military observers to conduct limited monitoring and investigation of ceasefire violations.

15. Within the framework of its reconfiguration exercise (see paras. 34 and 36 of the report of 8 October 1998 (S/1998/931)), MONUA has relocated 50 of the 65 military personnel who had been deployed to United Nations team sites in the UNITA strongholds of Andulo and Bailundo. As at 20 November, a total of 15 personnel remained to be relocated from these two locations. The withdrawal of United Nations personnel, which has been affected by bad weather conditions and the poor state of the airstrip in Andulo, is being conducted in phases. All efforts are being made to relocate the remaining MONUA personnel to safer areas as soon as possible. MONUA will continue to take all possible measures to enhance the security of its team sites and to ensure the safety and security of its personnel.

16. The total strength of the military component of the Mission stands at 677 personnel, with three infantry companies (407 personnel), a helicopter and a signals unit, 90 military observers and 40 staff officers. On 11 November, the Romanian Government notified me of its intention to withdraw its infantry company (137 personnel) in December 1998. The Secretariat has asked Romania to reconsider its decision. The Secretariat is also pursuing its efforts to identify a replacement for the Portuguese military hospital, which was repatriated at the request of the Portuguese Government on 7 October 1998.

IV. POLICE ASPECTS

17. Civilian police observers continued, to the extent possible, to carry out their tasks as provided for in the Lusaka Protocol and the relevant Security Council resolutions. However, their patrols and monitoring activities have been seriously affected owing to the deteriorating security conditions in the country, restrictions and frequent lack of cooperation from both local Government and UNITA officials.

18. Police observers are still monitoring the activities of ANP, particularly in the areas previously under UNITA control, in order to promote its neutrality, fairness and respect for fundamental human rights. The attitude of some ANP elements towards the civilian population in these areas has often been a cause for concern: there are numerous reports and allegations of illegal arrests and detentions. In this connection, MONUA continues to seek the Government's cooperation in launching a training programme for the ANP on internationally accepted police procedures and standards.

19. According to MONUA, ANP is still providing generally acceptable security protection to UNITA representatives in Luanda. The civilian police component of MONUA, in collaboration with the Mission's human rights observers, carried out patrols and visited prisons to monitor the human rights situation in several provinces. In the majority of the detention centres visited, civilian police

and human rights observers reported poor living conditions and facilities. In an effort to facilitate the free movement of people, the civilian police conducted regular patrols and visited the checkpoints established by ANP and FAA, as well as private security companies in various parts of the country. Although there has been no increase in the number of illegal checkpoints, MONUA has confirmed many reports about bribery, harassment and restrictions perpetrated at these checkpoints. In the meantime, there has been no progress in the implementation of the important task of disarming the civilian population, which is vital for the consolidation of peace and security in Angola.

V. HUMAN RIGHTS ASPECTS

20. The deterioration of the security situation has been accompanied by an increasing number of reports of human rights abuses committed against the civilian population, in particular in Uige, Malange, Huambo and Bié Provinces. MONUA received a number of reports of allegations of indiscriminate and summary killings, torture and ill-treatment, harassment and intimidation, abductions, destruction of property and forcible displacement reportedly committed in the course of attacks on villages and ambushes by UNITA elements. Attacks, but also rumours of attacks, have led to the continued displacement of civilians. In Uige Province, new rounds of forcible recruitment into FAA and ANP, as well as the persisting abduction of civilians by alleged UNITA forces are a source of serious concern. The arbitrary arrest and killing of some suspected UNITA members by security forces were also reported in the northern region in October 1998.

21. As part of its institution-building activities, the human rights component of MONUA accepted an invitation to take part in the training, at the provincial level, of ANP personnel and civic educators on the application of human rights principles in law enforcement activities. MONUA is currently working with the Government to build on these ad hoc initiatives in order to develop a longer-term programme. Visits to prisons and detention centres in Huila and Bié Provinces by human rights and civilian police officers (see para. 19 above) underlined the need to assist the Government in solving resource and other problems in this important area.

22. Despite the serious difficulties, a number of non-governmental organizations, religious and professional groups are still willing to engage in the promotion and protection of human rights in the country. In conjunction with two Angolan non-governmental organizations and with the involvement of three Government ministries, the human rights component organized a three-day conference in which 23 different non-governmental organizations from 11 Provinces participated in discussing the modalities of their cooperation aimed at strengthening civic education and human rights activities. Religious and other organizations have also sought the support of MONUA in establishing networks of human rights promoters. Radio, television and theatre are particularly effective media to improve the exchange of ideas between and within civil society and the Government on a better understanding of human rights issues.

23. The observations made in my last report to the Security Council (S/1998/931) that human rights activities should continue in order to assist the Angolans in strengthening the rule of law and promoting good governance in the country remain valid.

VI. HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS

A. Relief and rehabilitation

24. The humanitarian situation in the country has further deteriorated as a result of the growing insecurity and instability in several regions of Angola and the disruption of the rehabilitation of the social and economic structures and services. The intensification of military activities and attacks on villages and ambushes in various areas in the northern part of the country have forced civilians to flee their homes. As a consequence, the confirmed number of internally displaced persons since January 1998 has reached the level of 331,000, which reflects an increase of over 150,000 persons since 1 September 1998. The humanitarian community has therefore concentrated its efforts on the negotiation of temporary settlements for these internally displaced persons in areas where arable land can be provided by the Government and seeds and tools can be distributed by humanitarian agencies. Population displacements have also placed an enormous burden on families and communities hosting internally displaced persons. As a consequence, most of these communities have also become a part of the vulnerable population.

25. Lack of access to the affected populations - owing to growing insecurity - has prevented the humanitarian community from carrying out its activities adequately. While the situation is extremely fluid, humanitarian agencies currently do not have access to approximately 50 per cent of the country, including the northern, eastern and central regions. The World Food Programme (WFP) has been compelled to rely on expensive air transport to reach provincial capitals, but is often not able to venture beyond the city limits. Therefore, information on the state of health, nutrition and general conditions of about 30 per cent of the Angolan population is limited. In the latest series of tragic incidents involving the humanitarian personnel, on 14 November 1998, one WFP worker was shot in Kuito (Bié Province) by some unidentified armed elements. On the following day, a convoy of 40 food aid trucks, including United Nations escorts, was held up in Alto Hama (Huambo Province) owing to reported fighting in the area, but was subsequently able to return to the city of Huambo.

26. Although Angola experienced generally favourable harvests in 1997 and in early 1998, it is estimated that the country is still required to import some 470,000 metric tons of food aid. WFP anticipates that the structural food deficit for 1999 is not likely to decrease. United Nations agencies will continue to address these problems during the next year by providing foodstuffs to the most vulnerable population, while trying to avoid creating dependency on food assistance.

27. I am extremely concerned by the dire living conditions of the vulnerable groups in Angola. Recent findings indicate that the health, education and social service sectors have been severely affected by the protracted conflict.

/...

Most public health facilities lack equipment and regular medical supplies. Subsequently, Angolans are forced to buy medicines on the black market at exorbitant prices, while 40 per cent of the population does not have access to health services. This situation is likely to worsen with the beginning of the rainy season, during which the incidence of malaria increases greatly. With a mortality rate of almost 30 per cent among children under the age of five, Angola ranks among the world's worst for this critical health indicator. There are also reports of increased malnutrition cases mainly affecting young children. Unless the situation improves, it is feared that many lives will be lost to preventable diseases and that a new generation of children without primary education will emerge in Angola.

28. A number of United Nations programmes and agencies are actively supporting the Government in strengthening its capacity to coordinate humanitarian activities and to respond to the needs of the population. Within the framework of the Capacity-Building Project of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Reintegration, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), in collaboration with United Nations agencies and other partners, is assisting in enhancing the institutional capacity of Angola to facilitate the reintegration of displaced persons and to establish a national emergency response capacity.

29. United Nations agencies and their humanitarian partners in Angola are finalizing the 1999 Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeal that will seek approximately US\$ 66 million for emergency and life-sustaining activities for the vulnerable populations. I appeal to donor countries to contribute generously to this appeal, which would also assist the Government in its efforts to assume most of its responsibilities regarding the provision of basic services to the needy population. Given the prevailing humanitarian crisis in Angola, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, on 2 November 1998, approved the extension of the mandate of the United Nations Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit through 1999.

30. It is vital that all parties in Angola respect international humanitarian law and the safety and security of relief workers and allow unimpeded access to vulnerable populations wherever they are located.

B. Social reintegration of demobilized soldiers

31. The implementation of the programme for the social reintegration of demobilized soldiers is seriously affected by the political and security situation in the country and its rural outreach services have been restricted in all provinces. Under the conditions of phase IV of the security plan, programme staff has been withdrawn from all provinces. Where circumstances permit, the programme continues to support the rehabilitation of the social infrastructure and offer to demobilized soldiers vocational training and micro-enterprise development courses. However, an increasing number of the already settled demobilized soldiers and their families are forced to flee their communities because of the pervasive violence in the countryside. In the meantime, the Angolan Government has recently approved the creation of the Fourth Branch of FAA, known as the National Reconciliation Corps (see para. 6 above), which would

provide for the rehabilitation of approximately 170,000 demobilized soldiers and their families from both FAA and UNITA.

C. Demining

32. Although security conditions do not facilitate an adequate implementation of the demining programme, the Government and UNDP have agreed that the suspension of all activities must be avoided at all costs. Operations of the seven demining brigades have been restricted to the perimeters of the provincial capitals and have subsequently been suspended in four areas. Numerous reports of mine incidents and, in particular, extensive new mine laying make it increasingly difficult to raise international awareness and to obtain financial support for the programme. Currently, available funds will allow the continuation of programme activities, albeit at a reduced level, until the end of 1998. The United Nations intends to request the international community to provide adequate support for this important demining programme through the 1999 Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeal.

VII. SOCIO-ECONOMIC ASPECTS

33. The acute economic difficulties confronting Angola are compounded by several factors. These include the fact that, owing to military and security concerns, the Government has delayed some important economic decisions, in particular the implementation of its medium-term programme for stabilization and economic recovery for 1998-2000. The heavy dependence of the Angolan economy on the oil sector, which has been seriously affected by the slump in the world oil market, is also contributing to the crisis. The above factors have led to the current major macroeconomic imbalances, including a high rate of inflation, a rapidly deteriorating foreign exchange rate, excessive fiscal deficits and a rapid growth in money supply, as well as several months of unpaid wages and salaries of public servants. By the end of September 1998, the cumulative monthly rate of inflation had reached 45.2 per cent and the foreign exchange rate fluctuated widely from the official rate. The parallel market value of the national currency, the Kwanza, has accelerated rapidly. These developments have severely affected the social sector, which has to bear the consequences of any reduction in the planned expenditures. Clearly, recent economic developments will have a negative impact on the living conditions of Angolans, an increasing number of whom continue to engage in various activities in the informal sector as a way to survive.

VIII. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

34. The General Assembly, by its resolution 52/8 C of 26 June 1998, appropriated an initial amount of US\$ 43.6 million gross, equivalent to \$10.9 million gross per month, for the maintenance of MONUA for the period from 1 July to 31 October 1998. Additional appropriation for the maintenance of the Observer Mission beyond 31 October 1998, based on my proposed budget of some US\$ 140.8 million gross for the period from 1 July 1998 to 30 June 1999 (see A/52/799/Add.1), is pending further consideration by the General Assembly.

/...

Therefore, should the Council decide to extend the mandate of MONUA, as indicated in paragraph 42 below, the cost of maintaining the Observer Mission would be within my proposed budget for the period from 1 July 1998 to 30 June 1999. In the interim, pursuant to Security Council resolution 1202 (1998), in which the Council extended the mandate of MONUA until 3 December 1998, I have obtained the concurrence of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions to enter into commitments in the amount of \$10.9 million gross for the maintenance of the Observer Mission for the month of November 1998. As at 31 October 1998, unpaid assessed contributions to the UNAVEM/MONUA special account amounted to \$109 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at that date amounted to \$1.6 billion.

IX. OBSERVATIONS

35. Since my last report, dated 8 October 1998 (S/1998/931), there has been no progress in the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol. The overall political, military and security situation in the country has further deteriorated. The dialogue between the Government and Mr. Savimbi and his movement has ceased. The joint mechanisms, including the Joint Commission, are not functioning and preparations for a military showdown continue. As a result MONUA is, in fact, unable to carry out most of its mandated tasks and the prospects for reactivating the peace process look bleak.

36. I am extremely concerned about these negative developments. I remain convinced that there can be no lasting military solution to the conflict in Angola and that only a political settlement on the basis of the Lusaka Protocol can help avoid further suffering for the Angolan people.

37. As indicated in my previous reports, UNITA and its leadership in Bailundo bear the primary responsibility for the current crisis. It will only be possible to resolve this crisis if UNITA takes concrete action to implement, without further delay, all of its commitments under the Lusaka Protocol, including the demilitarization of all UNITA forces and the extension of State administration throughout the country. I therefore call upon Mr. Savimbi to respond to the letter dated 6 October 1998 addressed to him by my Special Representative, which contains several specific proposals aimed at putting the peace process back on track.

38. Meanwhile, my Special Representative, who has been maintaining liaison with all parties concerned in Luanda, including various elements of UNITA, is still unable to establish direct contacts with Mr. Savimbi. In a related development, the recent abrogation by the National Assembly of the law granting the special status to Mr. Savimbi might prevent all possibility of political accommodation. While it is clear that Mr. Savimbi and his party are mainly responsible for the present deadlock, the rejection of all contacts and dialogue with him is not likely to advance the cause of peace and national reconciliation, at least in the foreseeable future.

39. At the same time, as became apparent during the visit of my Special Representative to several African countries, it is important that all Member States concerned, in particular the countries in the region, make every effort

/...

to cooperate actively in the strict implementation of the measures imposed by the Security Council.

40. In view of the prevailing insecurity throughout the country, I would like once again to remind both parties of their ultimate responsibility for ensuring the safety and security of all United Nations personnel. Any attempt to restrict the freedom of movement of peacekeepers, especially in volatile situations, is absolutely intolerable. In this connection, I deplore the tragic incident during which a humanitarian worker was killed in Kuito (Bié Province) on 14 November. I have instructed MONUA, in view of the security situation, to continue to adjust its deployment on the ground and to pursue the reconfiguration of the United Nations presence in Angola, as indicated in paragraph 36 of my above-mentioned report (S/1998/931).

41. On the eve of the fourth anniversary of the signing of the Lusaka Protocol on 20 November 1994, a Government representative reportedly stated that, unless MONUA and the Troika participated in a Joint Commission meeting together with the UNITA Renovation Committee, the Government would resolve the remaining issues of the Protocol "bilaterally" with the Renovation Committee. I have not so far received any official clarification concerning this statement. In this connection, it is worth recalling that when the Lusaka Protocol was concluded, the parties to the conflict explicitly urged the United Nations to assist them in its implementation. As mandated by the Security Council, over the past four years the United Nations has helped the Angolans to create and maintain space for peace and political reconciliation. The United Nations can be proud of what the international community has done to promote these noble objectives in Angola.

42. Having said this, I feel that, despite the absence of any progress towards the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol and the relevant Security Council resolutions, the international community should remain engaged in order to dissuade the parties, as far as possible, from a return to war. Accordingly, I propose that the mandate of MONUA be extended for another short period of up to three months, on the understanding that if the security situation were to become untenable, I would immediately revert to the Security Council and submit further recommendations, including, if necessary, the withdrawal of MONUA.

43. On the humanitarian side, the observations contained in my previous report to the Security Council remain valid. Accordingly, I appeal to the international community to provide the acutely needed financial and other resources in order to allow the continued delivery of emergency relief assistance to vulnerable groups in Angola. I also call upon the donor community to contribute generously to the forthcoming Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeal for Angola.

44. In conclusion, I would like to pay tribute to all MONUA staff, as well as to the personnel of the United Nations programmes, funds, agencies and the non-governmental organizations working in Angola for their commendable work under extremely difficult conditions. I also wish to express my appreciation to the three observer States and their representatives in Angola and to all Member States concerned for their tireless efforts in support of the Angolan peace process.

/...

Annex

United Nations Observer Mission in Angola: contributions
as at 17 November 1998

| Country | Military observers | Civilian police observers | Staff officers ^a | Troops | Total |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------|-------|
| Argentina | - | 15 | - | - | 15 |
| Bangladesh | 3 | 20 | 1 | - | 24 |
| Brazil | 4 | 11 | 2 | - | 17 |
| Bulgaria | 3 | 17 | - | - | 20 |
| Congo | 2 | - | - | - | 2 |
| Egypt | 3 | 15 | - | - | 18 |
| France | 3 | - | - | - | 3 |
| Gambia | - | 4 | - | - | 4 |
| Ghana | 3 | 6 | - | - | 9 |
| Guinea-Bissau | 2 | 4 | - | - | 6 |
| Hungary | 3 | 8 | - | - | 11 |
| India | 5 | 11 | 8 | 135 | 159 |
| Jordan | 3 | 19 | - | - | 22 |
| Kenya | 3 | 6 | - | - | 9 |
| Malaysia | 4 | 20 | - | - | 24 |
| Mali | 3 | 20 | - | - | 23 |
| Namibia | - | - | 2 | 134 | 136 |
| New Zealand | 3 | - | - | - | 3 |
| Nigeria | 4 | 15 | - | - | 19 |
| Norway | 3 | - | - | - | 3 |
| Pakistan | 3 | - | 1 ^b | - | 4 |
| Poland | 4 | - | - | - | 4 |
| Portugal | 4 | 40 | 4 | 42 | 90 |
| Romania | - | - | 4 | 138 | 142 |
| Russian Federation | 3 | - | 3 | 100 | 106 |

/...

| Country | Military observers | Civilian police observers | Staff officers ^a | Troops | Total |
|-----------------------------|--------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------------|--------|-------|
| Senegal | 4 | - | - | - | 4 |
| Slovakia | 3 | - | - | - | 3 |
| Spain | - | 14 | - | - | 14 |
| Sweden | 3 | 14 | - | - | 17 |
| United Republic of Tanzania | - | 3 | - | - | 3 |
| Ukraine | 3 | - | 1 | - | 4 |
| Uruguay | 3 | 31 | 2 | - | 36 |
| Zambia | 3 | 22 | 8 | - | 33 |
| Zimbabwe | 3 | 22 | 4 | - | 29 |
| Total | 90 | 339 | 40 | 547 | 1 016 |

^a Including military police.

^b A military specialist in the demining school.
