



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1995/231
28 March 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA
SUBMITTED IN PURSUANCE OF PARAGRAPH 13 OF SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 954 (1994)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of resolution 954 (1994) of 4 November 1994, by which the Security Council decided to extend the mandate of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) for a final period until 31 March 1995. In paragraph 13 of the resolution, the Council requested me to report to it before 31 March 1995 on the situation in Somalia and to submit suggestions concerning the role that the United Nations could play in Somalia beyond that date.

2. The present report covers the political developments since my last report (S/1994/1166) dated 14 October 1994. It includes a general assessment of what has been achieved by the United Nations in Somalia in political, humanitarian, military and security matters and the police and justice programme, as well as financial aspects, followed by a section on the withdrawal of UNOSOM II. The report also presents some thoughts on the role that the United Nations could play in Somalia beyond the conclusion of UNOSOM II's mandate on 31 March 1995.

II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE LAST REPORT

3. On 14 October 1994, 12 factions and organizations associated with the Somali National Alliance (SNA) announced in a memorandum their decision to convene a national reconciliation conference in Mogadishu on 27 October 1994. They appealed to the leaders of four of the signatories to the Addis Ababa agreement (S/26317) aligned with the Group of 12, namely the Somali Democratic Movement (SDM), the Somali National Front (SNF), the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) and the United Somali Party (USP), to join them in that conference and, inter alia, requested UNOSOM II to extend invitations for the conference to the Chairmen of 16 factions and organizations listed in the memorandum. These 16 factions included splinter groups from the Somali African Muki Organization (SAMO), the Somali National Union (SNU) and the Southern Somali National Movement (SSNM), which have no official standing within the context of either the Addis Ababa agreement or the Nairobi declaration (S/1994/614, annex I).

4. Following the publication of the memorandum of 14 October 1994, my Special Representative urged all Somali leaders to intensify their consultations in order to facilitate the convening of a broad-based or all-inclusive national reconciliation conference, which would include the representatives of all the recognized factions from the two sides, namely the SNA and the Group of 12.

5. On 17 October 1994, the Group of 12 addressed an appeal to the SNA for the two sides to come together in a broad-based conference with the participation of all signatories to the Addis Ababa agreement and the SNM. The Group of 12 adopted a charter on 23 October 1994 by which it officially reconstituted itself into the Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA), an umbrella organization of 14 factions and organizations originally formed in February 1994. Mr. Ali Mahdi was elected Chairman of the Alliance.

6. Despite the intensive contacts and informal consultations that followed, the two sides did not succeed in reaching agreement on the convening of an all-inclusive conference. Consequently, my Special Representative appealed to the SNA factions to postpone the convening of their conference in order to allow more time for consultations with the SSA. On 26 October 1994, the SNA factions announced the postponement of the convening of their conference to 1 November 1994 in deference to the impending visit of the Security Council mission to Somalia.

7. The Security Council mission, led by H.E. Mr. Colin Keating, Permanent Representative of New Zealand, visited Somalia from 26 to 27 October 1994 and met with the leaders of the SSA and the SNA factions and organizations respectively to convey to them the special message from the Security Council on the situation in Somalia and on the future of the United Nations presence there (see S/1994/1245, annex II).

8. On 1 November 1994, however, the SNA factions convened their unilateral conference in south Mogadishu with a view to establishing an interim Government within 45 days. On the same day, my Special Representative issued a statement in which he pointed out that the unilateral decision of the SNA factions to hold their own conference was contrary to the understanding reached between them and all other concerned factions that invitations for a national reconciliation conference would be extended by UNOSOM II to the leaders of recognized factions, after the completion of the necessary consultations. On this basis, my Special Representative declined an invitation to attend the SNA-sponsored unilateral conference in an observer capacity. From that point on, there was a rift between General Aidid and my Special Representative, who continued to take the position that the national reconciliation conference must be all-inclusive and that the United Nations would not be in a position to support a partisan Government.

9. Mr. Ali Mahdi, on his part, convened a parallel meeting of SSA leaders in north Mogadishu to prepare their response to the anticipated announcement of an interim Government by the SNA-sponsored conference. On 3 November 1994, the SSA leaders informed my Special Representative that they had completed contingency plans to establish their own national Government in the event that the SNA-sponsored conference unilaterally announced an interim Government. They also expressed the view that the SNA-sponsored conference contravened all

agreements previously reached among the recognized factions and reiterated their position that the solution to the Somali crisis could come only from a national reconciliation conference with the participation of all recognized political organizations and all strata of Somali society, including traditional chiefs and elders, religious leaders, intellectuals, and women.

10. My Special Representative continued to emphasize to both sides the need to have a genuine all-inclusive and broad-based conference, and offered facilities at UNOSOM II headquarters for the SSA and the SNA factions to hold further consultations aimed at reaching agreement to this end. He warned both sides that UNOSOM II would extend the necessary assistance only for such a conference.

11. The SSA and the SNA factions eventually appointed six representatives each, who held a series of meetings in south Mogadishu from 4 to 8 November 1994 to discuss substantive issues relating to the convening of a national reconciliation conference, including the question of a preparatory meeting. The meetings, however, resulted in a stalemate. Subsequently, in further efforts to break this deadlock, UNOSOM II facilitated two meetings at its headquarters between Mr. Ali Mahdi and Col. Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, Chairman of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), who had been mandated by the SNA factions and organizations to discuss on their behalf the convening of an all-inclusive conference with the SSA. At the request of both the SNA and the SSA, UNOSOM II also arranged for General Mohamed Said Hersi "Morgan", Vice-Chairman of SPM/SSA, to travel from Kismayo to Mogadishu for consultations. While in Mogadishu, General Morgan met separately with Mr. Ali Mahdi and the SSA factions and with Col. Abdullahi Yusuf in an effort to reconcile the SSA and the SNA factions. Other faction leaders from the two sides held meetings at UNOSOM II headquarters with a view to facilitating agreement between them.

12. These efforts did not yield any further progress and, by the beginning of December 1994, the parallel SNA conference and the SSA meeting were indicating their intentions to announce their separate Governments. These potentially destabilizing moves have not so far materialized and the SNA conference and the SSA meeting are still in session. Their discussions have reportedly focused on the nature of a federal system of government, the powers of the central Government vis-à-vis regional authorities, the distribution of government posts and the drafting of a transitional charter. It was also reported that the four committees established at the opening of the SNA-sponsored conference to deal with reconciliation, rehabilitation, security and drafting of a charter respectively had completed their work.

13. My Special Representative visited Addis Ababa on 29 December 1994 to meet with President Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia and discuss ways of bringing Mr. Ali Mahdi and General Aidid together to resolve their differences over the convening of a genuine national reconciliation conference. President Meles Zenawi has been acting under the mandate of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD). Following these discussions, the President of Ethiopia sent a fact-finding mission to Somalia at the beginning of January 1995, which maintained close contact with my Special Representative. Subsequently, at the beginning of March 1995, President Meles Zenawi dispatched to Somalia a delegation of ethnic Somali leaders from Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti in order to persuade political

and traditional leaders throughout the country to come together and work for national reconciliation.

14. Also in December 1994, a delegation of the League of Arab States (LAS) visited Somalia and met with the SSA and the SNA factions to assist in expediting the process of national reconciliation. Subsequently, LAS, jointly with OAU and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), held a meeting on Somalia in Cairo on 22 and 23 February 1995 at which the United Nations participated as an observer. The participating organizations agreed on the need to continue and intensify joint efforts to assist the Somalis in reaching national reconciliation as soon as possible. To that end, they decided to send a joint mission to Addis Ababa to hold consultations with the Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution at a date to be determined.

15. Meanwhile, contacts between the SSA and the SNA factions continued through January and February 1995 to discuss new initiatives offered by both sides to break the political impasse. On 6 February, the SSA formally presented its plan of action, which is a proposal for national reconciliation in Somalia. The proposal called for the convening of a unified and all-inclusive national reconciliation conference on 25 February 1995 or any other agreed date, which would include representatives from the SSA, SNA, SNM and Mr. Egal's alliance from the north-west, as well as traditional chiefs and elders, religious leaders, intellectuals and women. The United Nations would play a mediatory and supportive role in the preparation and convening of the conference. In a press conference on that occasion, Mr. Ali Mahdi stressed that the SSA plan of action was merely a proposal that was subject to modification. Expressing the hope that the SNA would react favourably to the proposal, he stressed that no one political faction or alliance could form a Government of national unity.

16. In the weeks preceding the withdrawal of UNOSOM II, my Special Representative held discussions, initiated in January 1994 and continued since then, with the SNA and the SSA to urge them to form joint committees to manage the operations of the Mogadishu seaport and airport. In January 1995, the SSA and the SNA succeeded in establishing a negotiating committee. Following the announcement of the SSA plan of action, the SNA-SSA negotiating committee was given a wider mandate to coordinate political and economic matters relating to reconciliation among the Habr Gedir and Mudulood clans, work out modalities for bringing General Aidid and Mr. Ali Mahdi together and merge the two separate conferences/meetings on national reconciliation sponsored by the SNA and the SSA respectively.

17. On 19 February 1995, Mr. Ali Mahdi and Mr. Osman Hassan Ali "Atto", a high-ranking official of the SNA, had a meeting that led to significant political developments during the last two weeks of UNOSOM II's withdrawal. On 21 February 1995, a peace agreement was signed by General Aidid and Mr. Ali Mahdi on behalf of the SNA and the SSA respectively to promote national reconciliation and a peaceful settlement. In that agreement, the two sides, inter alia, accepted the principle of power-sharing; pledged not to seek the presidency through military means but through democratic elections; agreed to the resolution of disputes through dialogue and peaceful means; and agreed on a common platform for tackling problems. It also included provisions for the

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confinement of "technicals" to designated areas and discouraged the open carrying of arms in the streets of Mogadishu. In addition, it called for the removal of roadblocks and the reopening of the main markets in the city.

18. In another significant development, on 23 February 1995, the two sides reached agreement on the establishment of two joint committees to manage the operations of the Mogadishu airport and seaport. This agreement was endorsed by General Aidid and Mr. Ali Mahdi. It provides a basis for cooperation between the Somali parties and organizations within the United Nations system. UNOSOM II and the United Nations agencies have committed themselves to provide assistance to the two committees. The Mogadishu seaport was reopened to civilian traffic on 9 March under the administration of the joint committees of the SSA and the SNA. The reopening of the seaport resulted from the signing of a third agreement between Mr. Ali Mahdi and General Aidid on 5 March 1995. This agreement allowed for the resumption of operations at the seaport in view of the need to offload ships and dhows carrying badly needed commodities. On 8 March, the two leaders initialled a fourth agreement to establish a security committee comprising militia and police officers from both sides. The security committee would ensure the exclusion of unauthorized "technicals" from the airport and seaport and arrange for the police force to provide security inside these facilities, while joint militias with specially marked "technicals" would secure the outer perimeters as well as the routes used to deliver commodities to the markets.

19. My Special Representative has extended an invitation to the chairmen of the two committees to visit Nairobi for consultations with the United Nations Coordination Team (UNCT) (see para. 35 below) in order to discuss arrangements for reactivating civilian operations at the airport and seaport. One subject to be discussed is the return to Mogadishu of the equipment for operating the seaport and airport facilities, without which only small ships can be serviced. This equipment, currently stored in the United Nations logistics base in Brindisi, Italy, will be returned to Mogadishu when conditions permit. In the meantime, I agreed provisionally with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) that it would continue to act in civil aviation matters with regard to Somalia, pending further guidance from the Council and/or the re-establishment of governmental authority in Somalia.

20. The signing of these agreements has had a salutary effect on the political process as a whole, with both the SNA and the SSA emphasizing that there will be no more war between them. My Special Representative has reported that, on the basis of the agreements reached, the SNA and the SSA militias are presently collaborating in providing security at the Mogadishu airport and seaport in cooperation with the Somali police force. As a result of these agreements and arrangements, the situation in Mogadishu has improved, and it is understood that both sides have now settled down to serious discussions on the convening of a broad-based national reconciliation conference. Also on their agenda are the establishment of a regional council and the appointment of a governor for the Benadir region (Mogadishu).

21. During the reporting period, UNOSOM II continued to encourage and assist the Somali people to establish district councils. On 20 November 1994, it certified the district council for the city of Kismayo, bringing the number of

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district councils to 58 out of a total of approximately 92. In addition, 8 out of a total of 18 regional councils have also been established. There is continued interest in the formation of district and regional councils. In recognition of their importance, I authorized UNOSOM II, during its withdrawal phase, to donate to them some essential equipment, including generators, water pumps, office equipment and furniture. In Mogadishu, I also approved the donation of four generators in order to facilitate the continued provision of potable water to the city and its surrounding villages. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has agreed in principle to support institution-building in Somalia in the post-UNOSOM II era and to extend necessary assistance to the regional and district councils to strengthen their capacity for local government and administration. UNDP is currently discussing funding arrangements in regard to assistance to these councils with interested donors, including the Life and Peace Institute of Sweden.

III. ASSESSMENT OF THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN SOMALIA

A. Political aspects

22. From the beginning of the United Nations involvement in Somalia, the attainment of cease-fires and the promotion of national reconciliation have been among the Organization's major goals. To help to achieve national reconciliation, two major conferences were held with the assistance and support of the United Nations, namely the National Reconciliation Conference in March 1993, which yielded the Addis Ababa agreement, and the consultations in Nairobi in March 1994, which led to the Nairobi declaration. There was significant representation of the civil society of Somalia at each of these major conferences. More than 250 representatives of community organizations, elders, scholars, as well as women's groups, participated in the Addis Ababa Conference, while a significant number of elders was present at the consultations in Nairobi. Although the implementation of these agreements has been forestalled by subsequent developments, the two agreements continue to serve as the major frame of reference in the Somali parties' discussions of a political settlement.

23. The United Nations has also sponsored interclan reconciliation meetings at the local level. These include the Jubaland Peace Conference in June and August 1993, the Garowe Peace and Cooperation Conference in December 1993, the Digil/Merifle-Rahanweyn-Aulihan Conference in Bardera in February 1994, the Lower Juba Region Reconciliation Conference in June 1994 and the Absame Reconciliation Conference from June to July 1994. These conferences, and the agreements that resulted from them, have significantly contributed to the prevention of interclan fighting, largely limiting the area of conflict to south Mogadishu.

24. The United Nations has also helped to arrange a series of cease-fires, starting in February 1992, when the consultations that I had convened with the representatives of Mr. Ali Mahdi and General Aidid yielded the first cease-fire agreement in Mogadishu. That cease-fire was expanded into a nationwide cease-fire in January 1993. When a resumption of fighting in Kismayo threatened

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the relative peace in the Lower Juba area in February 1994, my Acting Special Representative was instrumental in re-establishing the cease-fire. He also used the occasion to bring the numerous parties concerned to intensive consultations in Nairobi, which led to the Nairobi declaration in March 1994. More recently, my Special Representative has worked closely with prominent elders to mitigate the sporadic, but at times intense, interclan fighting that resumed in south Mogadishu in June 1994. Combined with the stabilizing effect of the peace-keeping force, these efforts have contributed greatly to the achievement and maintenance of relative peace in Somalia as a whole.

25. As already mentioned, UNOSOM II has certified 58 district councils to date, including the 2 district councils in the Sanaag region in the north-west, which were formed in response to the wishes of the people there. It has also certified 8 regional councils out of a total of 18. UNOSOM II, in collaboration with the Life and Peace Institute, has given assistance to district and regional councils by refurbishing or rebuilding their offices and providing them with administrative kits and equipment, as well as by organizing seminars for district and regional counsellors in administration and management. In addition, the Life and Peace Institute has assisted district and regional councils through food-for-work projects. The SNA's opposition to the formation of these councils, however, has prevented the creation of the Transitional National Council (TNC), which the Addis Ababa agreement envisaged would be formed from the representatives of the district and regional councils. It is hoped that these councils will be able to function as partners of the international community in rehabilitation and development when security permits.

B. Humanitarian aspects

26. By 1992 Somalia was a devastated country. The magnitude of human suffering was overwhelming as hundreds of thousands of lives were lost as a result of civil war, drought and famine. In the famine zones, approximately one third of all Somali children under the age of five died from starvation and diseases related to malnutrition. Out of a total estimated population of 8 million Somalis, 4.5 million lives were at risk, including 1 million children. Farms were destroyed, livestock killed, food harvests burned and homes razed to the ground. Some 2 million persons had been violently displaced from their home areas and fled either to neighbouring countries or elsewhere within Somalia. Towns and cities were plunged into a nightmare of insecurity. All institutions of governance, and at least 60 per cent of the country's basic infrastructure, had disintegrated.

27. Despite these conditions of anarchy and extreme insecurity, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and a number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) determinedly maintained a continuous presence in the country, providing humanitarian relief to hundreds of thousands of Somalis. Although the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) - already present in the north of Somalia - recommenced operations in Mogadishu in December 1991 and was joined three months later by the World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations involvement in the delivery of humanitarian assistance began in earnest in mid-1992. Through the combined efforts of the United Nations, ICRC and NGOs, humanitarian assistance programmes expanded and over a quarter of a million

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lives are estimated to have been saved during the famine emergency, while millions of Somalis were able to benefit from humanitarian relief.

28. Since then, the humanitarian situation in Somalia has changed dramatically in a number of respects. Drought conditions, which were particularly acute in 1992 and 1993, have improved considerably. In 1994, the April-June Gu (short rain) season harvest was very successful and reached close to 75 per cent of pre-war production of basic cereals, while the September-January Der (long rain) harvest exceeded pre-war levels. The timely provision of food and non-food relief through the humanitarian assistance programme also contributed significantly to the prevention of a new famine emergency. At the height of the famine between 1992 and 1993, WFP delivered an average of 35,000 tons of food per month to approximately 1.5 million Somalis. By the end of 1994, food-for-work schemes had replaced free distribution as the main mode for delivery of food assistance, and the number of direct recipients of relief assistance from WFP dropped to around 21,000 people per month, with a further 280,000 Somalis benefiting from food-for-work schemes. By December 1994, WFP was delivering up to 6,000 tons of food monthly and in 1995 it plans to channel around 10,000 tons of food into Somalia each month. WFP intends to use its food resources as an incentive to encourage Somalis to participate in a variety of institutional rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes, while continuing to provide supplementary feeding assistance and food to vulnerable groups when necessary.

29. Since the start of the relief and emergency programmes of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) in 1992, vegetable and cereal seeds, farm tools and pesticides have been successfully distributed to around 300,000 destitute farmers and their families. More recently, the efforts of humanitarian organizations in the areas of agriculture and fisheries have focused mostly on sustainable agricultural and rural development under the direction of FAO. United Nations agencies and NGOs have worked to resuscitate Somalia's agricultural production by assisting in the rehabilitation of agricultural infrastructure and capacity-building. A UNICEF-supported project in southern Somalia provided seeds and tools to support the resettlement of 60,000 displaced farmers. In 1994, FAO provided targeted community assistance in agriculture and livestock to approximately 80,000 farming families, moving away from large-scale distribution of seeds and tools. The provision of veterinary drugs and the vaccination of animals by FAO and NGOs has led to a reactivation of exports, with an estimated total of around 500,000 livestock having been exported since 1993.

30. Up to 1.5 million Somalis, or roughly 25 per cent of the total population, were displaced inside Somalia or in neighbouring countries between 1991 and mid-1993. Of this number, a total of 121,630 refugees and 45,327 internally displaced persons have been successfully reintegrated into their home areas with the assistance of the United Nations agencies, national and international NGOs, ICRC and the Intergovernmental Organization for Migration (IOM). As conditions in their home areas improved, a further 80,430 refugees have returned to Somalia spontaneously. Approximately 500,000 Somali refugees remain in neighbouring countries. While the numbers of internally displaced persons registering to return home doubled from 71,000 in June 1994 to over 150,000 in December 1994,

there are still 350,000 internally displaced persons, almost half of whom are in Mogadishu.

31. Between 1992 and 1995, UNICEF and its NGO partners vaccinated well over 1 million Somali children and women against diseases such as measles, tuberculosis and tetanus. Since 1992, UNICEF has provided supplementary food and other assistance for approximately 600,000 beneficiaries. These include, since May 1993, an average of 65,000 vulnerable children and women per month, as compared to 168,000 in January 1993. These figures, considerably lower than those prior to May 1993, reflect generally improved food availability in much of central and southern Somalia. Access by the Somali population to health services and facilities has improved greatly. The factors contributing to this development include the continuing distribution by the World Health Organization (WHO) of essential drugs and medical supplies to cover the needs of some 2.2 million Somalis since 1992, as well as the availability, under the auspices of UNICEF and WHO, of the skilled services of an additional 1,800 professional health workers who have been trained and technically supervised in emergency preparedness, health planning and management, and in the diagnosis and treatment of malaria, tuberculosis, cholera and other illnesses. WHO provided basic drugs and medical equipment to 11 hospitals, 113 national NGOs and 46 international NGOs working in the health sector. Logistical support and other assistance is being provided by UNICEF for the rehabilitation of the public health infrastructure, including some 450 health posts, centres and hospitals.

32. Between 1991 and 1992 the lack of access to potable water resulted in devastatingly high rates of mortality and morbidity from diarrhoeal diseases. Since June 1992, UNDP has operated the Afgoy well-field which provides piped water to over 1 million residents of Mogadishu and which has been rehabilitated to 40 per cent of its pre-war efficiency, a factor that has contributed greatly to preventing the spread of large-scale epidemics caused by contaminated water from shallow wells. Agencies estimate that the cholera epidemic that struck various parts of Somalia during the early months of 1994 caused 1,349 deaths out of a reported total of 34,789 cases. This epidemic would have wrought much greater devastation in the absence of a functioning water supply system. WHO has established laboratories in Somalia for water-testing and for the diagnosis of cholera and other epidemics. Over the past three years, UNICEF has assisted in the reactivation of 8 urban water supply systems, the chlorination of more than 1,200 water sources daily during the cholera epidemic and the construction of 380 wells and 12 boreholes, thereby increasing access to potable water to over 1.5 million people in Somalia.

33. Similar developments have taken place in the field of education. Since January 1993, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has catered for the educational needs of more than 250,000 children through the reintroduction of a standardized curriculum, the provision of more than 1 million textbooks and teacher guides. UNESCO has also provided teacher training for 267 schools with a total student population of over 150,000. UNICEF, in conjunction with UNESCO, has trained 550 primary school teachers throughout Somalia. Access to education for Somalis has expanded through UNESCO's teacher emergency packages, developed for use in rural areas and in refugee and internally displaced person camps where school buildings do not exist or are in a state of disrepair. UNESCO also continues to carry out

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workshops and refresher courses for headmasters and teachers in Somalia, and has carried out a mine-awareness campaign for 30,000 Somali refugees in camps in Kenya. To date, more than 500,000 Somalis have received basic education and training through UNESCO programmes. Since 1993, UNICEF has helped to form school committees in 115 communities, provided material and rehabilitation assistance to around 450 schools, including community-based Koranic schools and undertaken activities that have benefited over 150,000 pupils in Somalia.

34. In the light of these developments, the humanitarian assistance programme in Somalia has shifted its focus towards a consolidation of its achievements. The challenge for the United Nations and its humanitarian partners is to sustain this progress in Somalia's conflict-ridden environment and, concomitantly, to move forward to rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction, without prejudice to emergency relief where this is necessary.

35. To meet this challenge in a post-UNOSOM II era, a United Nations Coordination Team (UNCT) was established under the chairmanship of the UNDP Resident Representative, who is also the Humanitarian Coordinator. With the assurances provided by the donor consortium for Somalia, i.e. the Somalia Aid Coordination Body, that it will maintain support to humanitarian programmes in Somalia, UNCT is, among other things, interacting with national and international NGOs as well as with the donor community in an effort to harmonize and ensure coherence among the activities of operational partners. The Humanitarian Coordinator also intends to formalize a coordinated relationship with recognized district and regional councils to ensure that the task of rebuilding Somalia also lies in the hands of dedicated and capable Somalis.

36. The United Nations agencies and organizations will monitor and report on the humanitarian situation in Somalia through the continued presence of national and international humanitarian staff working throughout the country. To improve the coordination of activities and programmes of the humanitarian partners, the active linkages established by UNCT with the donor and NGO communities will be intensified at the field level to maximize the use of available resources among the humanitarian partners.

37. The humanitarian agencies expect that for the foreseeable future they will continue to operate in a context of political unrest and against a background of uncertainty. Their commitment to remain in Somalia depends on the demonstration of good will and cooperation by the Somali people and leaders. Without the active support of the Somali people, it is unlikely that future humanitarian programmes will meet with much success, and more than likely that the gains, made through the combined efforts of international agencies and committed Somali partners, will be undone.

38. In the absence of national institutions capable of coping even with minor emergencies, Somalia will remain vulnerable to future disasters. Humanitarian relief needs will almost certainly continue for a while, requiring targeted interventions on the part of the humanitarian agencies so as to ensure that the country does not revert to another crisis. To this end, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat launched a United Nations consolidated inter-agency appeal for Somalia, covering a period of six months beginning in January 1995. The agencies requested a total of US\$ 70 million for

their activities during the first half of 1995. Most of the activities will be community-based and will thus rely fully on the involvement of the Somali people. United Nations agencies will provide support to capacity-building programmes, while assisting local NGOs as well as community-based organizations in the areas of relief and initial rehabilitation. The focus will encompass assistance in the areas of agriculture, fishing and reconstruction. At present, UNDP continues with the implementation of integrated, community-based rehabilitation that includes schools and water systems. It has also launched credit schemes for women, as well as activities aimed at income generation. The ongoing implementation by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) of quick impact programmes is providing the stability required for the return in 1995 of some of the over 500,000 Somalis who remain refugees. Its renovation and rehabilitation of essential facilities complements the activities of IOM with internally displaced persons.

39. One of the critical issues for Somalia will be the need to provide jobs for the large numbers of unemployed and thus to contribute to the revitalization of the economy and stimulate the productive capacities of communities devastated by war. The United Nations agencies have factored this consideration into their planning for 1995. Another critical issue for the humanitarian agencies and for the Somali people is that of demobilization. In 1994, around 25,000 demobilized militia were assisted by UNDP and other United Nations agencies. The success of the demobilization programmes planned by the agencies in 1995, through the provision of skills training and food-for-work incentives, will have far-reaching effects for the peace and reconciliation process and for the stability of the country.

40. It is essential that the progress made by the United Nations agencies, international organizations and national and international NGOs over the past three years should not be reversed. To date the United Nations appeal for Somalia has received less than 10 per cent of the resources requested. I urge the international donor community to provide funding for the activities planned by United Nations agencies and other relief organizations. Such funding is urgently needed not only for the achievement of these objectives, but also to ensure that Somalis are in a position to rebuild their society and break the cycle of despair.

C. Deployment of military personnel

41. Following the introduction in mid-1992 of 50 unarmed military observers and 500 security personnel, the United Nations deployed up to 30,000 military and logistic personnel after the withdrawal of the Unified Task Force in Somalia (UNITAF) in early May 1993. In addition to the mandate approved by the Security Council for the establishment of a secure environment in which humanitarian assistance could be delivered and distributed safely, the UNOSOM forces undertook activities ranging from providing security escorts for humanitarian convoys to conducting specialized courses for the Somali police. They also assisted in the implementation of community development projects and in the provision of medical aid to Somali civilians.

D. Police programme

42. It will be recalled that UNOSOM II was mandated to assist Somalis in the re-establishment of a 10,000-strong Somali police force by the end of 1994. However, financial constraints made it necessary to reduce the contemplated force strength to 8,500. As of 1 March 1995, this number was operational in Somalia, 2,000 of them being deployed in the north-west region.

43. The police training programme was actively pursued and, by the end of 1994, a total of 2,179 policemen of all ranks had attended refresher courses to revitalize lost or waned police skills resulting from years of absence from work as a result of the collapse of the Somali State machinery four years ago.

44. At the end of January 1995, Somali police were operational in 82 district stations. The police officers had a visible presence on the roads and in various communities. They engaged in foot or mobile patrols and other forms of static and fixed-point duties, receiving complaints from the public and conducting investigations into criminal cases. Under the programme, vehicles, communication equipment, typewriters, stationery, fuel and lubricants were supplied to the police to assist them in the discharge of their duties. Substantial quantities of police uniforms were also received from donors. Following the commencement of the withdrawal of UNOSOM II, vehicles and military equipment in stock from supplies provided by the donor community were shipped out of Somalia at the request of donor Governments.

45. The police programme administered by UNOSOM II was funded from voluntary contributions in cash and in kind by the donor community. International support for the programme, which included payment of salaries for the Somali police, will cease on 31 March 1995 with the expiry of the UNOSOM II mandate and the exhaustion of resources in the Trust Fund established for this purpose. Unless resources are made available to continue the programme beyond that date, the whole police programme will be jeopardized and security conditions in a number of areas might deteriorate. I appeal to the donor community for additional voluntary contributions for the Somali police programme that could be channelled through appropriate agencies operating in Somalia.

E. Justice programme

46. During the reporting period, training was provided by UNOSOM II for judicial personnel in judicial administration and ethics, juvenile justice, sentencing practices and attitudes, human rights and the rule of law. Currently, there are 11 appeal courts, 11 regional courts and 46 district courts functioning in all regions and 46 districts of Somalia, with a total staff of 374. All of these courts have been supported by UNOSOM II, including through the repair/refurbishment of some of the court and prison facilities. In addition, some vehicles were supplied.

47. UNOSOM II also provided support to 12 prisons, including food, water and medical services for inmates. Six hundred and seventy two custodial guards were certified and paid by UNOSOM II. WFP supplied dry rations and vegetable oil to the prisons.

48. Arrangements have been concluded with UNESCO to begin educational and vocational training programmes at the prisons, starting with Mogadishu Central Prison. UNESCO also expressed interest in taking over and continuing these components of the project after the departure of UNOSOM II.

F. Financial aspects

49. The total cost of UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II (1 May 1992-28 February 1995) was approximately US\$ 1.64 billion. Contributions received for the Trust Fund for Somalia as of 10 March 1995 amounted to \$21.6 million, consisting of \$21.5 million for the re-establishment of the Somali police force and judicial system and \$0.1 million for the support of UNOSOM II forces. Expenditures from the Fund for the re-establishment of the Somali police force and judicial system were authorized in the amount of \$15.2 million.

50. The General Assembly, by its resolution 49/229 of 23 December 1994, provided an amount of \$253,704,400 gross (\$250,495,600 net) for the maintenance of UNOSOM II for the period from 1 October 1994 to 28 February 1995. The revised cost estimate for the final mandate period from 1 October 1994 to 31 March 1995 will be submitted to the resumed forty-ninth session of the General Assembly.

51. It should be noted that the cash-flow situation of the special account of UNOSOM II remains precarious. As of 10 March 1995, unpaid assessed contributions to the account since the inception of the Operation totalled \$387.2 million (\$15.0 for UNOSOM and \$372.2 for UNOSOM II). Consequently, reimbursement of troop costs has been made only up to the period ending 30 September 1994. In addition, amounts are outstanding for contingent-owned equipment. The total unpaid contributions to all peace-keeping operations as at 10 March 1995 totalled \$1,679 million.

IV. WITHDRAWAL OF UNOSOM II

52. The initial phase of withdrawal of UNOSOM II forces, following the Security Council's decision to that effect, entailed redeploying troops to Mogadishu from Baidoa, Baledogle, Afgoye and Kismayo. The pull-back from Kismayo was supported by an Indian naval task force, comprising two frigates, one logistic ship and six helicopters. Between 28 December 1994 and 5 January 1995, the Zimbabwean and Malaysian contingents were repatriated. The personnel of the Pakistani hospital was repatriated on 11 January 1995. Force headquarters staff was reduced by 50 per cent by 15 January 1995 and relocated from the Embassy Compound to the airport.

53. By 2 February 1995, with the repatriation of the Indian, Zimbabwean and Malaysian contingents, some force headquarters personnel and those of the Pakistani hospital, UNOSOM II troop strength was reduced to 7,956, comprising Pakistani, Egyptian and Bangladeshi contingents and the remaining force headquarters personnel. As the withdrawal accelerated, military support provided by UNOSOM troops to United Nations agencies, human rights organizations and NGOs still engaged in humanitarian activities was greatly reduced. With the

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major reductions starting in mid-February, it was no longer possible for UNOSOM II troops to extend the necessary protection to humanitarian agencies within the city of Mogadishu. Accordingly, agencies were advised to evacuate their international staff to Nairobi by 14 February 1995.

54. The Humanitarian and Southern Compounds were vacated on 30 January 1995, leaving one platoon of the Pakistani Brigade to secure those buildings in the Southern Compound that were required for the tactical defence of the airport. The UNOSOM II administration moved ahead of schedule in vacating the University and Embassy Compounds and completed the task by 31 January 1995. Consequently, the Pakistani Brigade and all troops located in the area were relocated to the airport on 2 February 1995. Thereafter, all troops were concentrated in the airport, new seaport complex and the old seaport area.

55. From 8 to 10 February, Mr. Kofi Annan, Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations, went to Somalia to review preparations for the complex final phase of the operation, in which a combined task force, commanded by Lt. General Anthony C. Zinni (United States of America) and composed of forces from France, India, Italy, Malaysia, Pakistan, the United Kingdom and the United States, was to assist the withdrawal. Mr. Annan met with my Special Representative, the Force Commander and civilian and military personnel from UNOSOM II, representatives of the United Nations humanitarian agencies and the NGOs and the Commander of the combined task force. He also examined possible arrangements for the continued United Nations presence in Somalia.

56. The withdrawal of UNOSOM II proceeded with minimal interruption. Under the plans elaborated by UNOSOM II in consultation with the combined task force, it was decided that the withdrawal would be completed by 6 March 1995, three weeks ahead of the time-limit set by the Security Council.

57. The final phase of the troop withdrawal started with the repatriation of approximately 1,750 Pakistani personnel from 12 to 15 February. This was followed by the repatriation of the Egyptian brigade, comprising 1,160 personnel, from 17 to 20 February. From 23 to 27 February, an additional 2,600 personnel from the Pakistani contingent and force headquarters staff were repatriated, leaving a balance of approximately 2,500 Pakistani and Bangladeshi military personnel, which constituted the UNOSOM II rearguard.

58. The Mogadishu seaport was handed over to the combined task force and closed to commercial traffic on 28 February. My Special Representative and his staff, as well as the Force Commander and the last remaining staff of the force headquarters, left Mogadishu by air on 28 February 1995. The withdrawal of the rearguard of UNOSOM II commenced on 27 February 1995 and was successfully completed on 2 March 1995. The combined task force forces that had landed in Mogadishu on 28 February 1995 to cover the withdrawal of UNOSOM II also departed from Mogadishu on 3 March without any casualty, thereby bringing operation "United Shield" to a successful conclusion.

59. The withdrawal of all international staff from Somalia was completed on 28 February 1995 with the exception of 25 United Nations civilian personnel and 11 contractual logistic staff plus 1 shipping representative. This group supervised the shipment of the last consignments of UNOSOM II assets committed

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to the mission's rearguard. They were removed from Mogadishu with the UNOSOM II military rearguard on 3 March 1995. In addition to contingent-owned equipment, over 156,000 cubic metres of United Nations-owned and United Nations-leased assets valued at about US\$ 120 million were shipped out of Somalia by sea and air during the last two months of UNOSOM II's presence. The UNOSOM II offices have been temporarily relocated to Nairobi. Force headquarters closed its operations in Nairobi on 8 March 1995. The withdrawal from Somalia was thus successfully completed well ahead of schedule in an orderly and organized manner, with all the soldiers and international staff of UNOSOM II, as well as the troops of the combined task force, able to leave Somalia safely.

60. Equipment worth US\$ 235,761, which was vital for the support of local communities, was donated to Somali district councils. United Nations agencies operating in Somalia requested that some of UNOSOM II's residual assets be transferred to them, in order to facilitate the continuation of their humanitarian assistance and development projects after the withdrawal of UNOSOM II. Arrangements were made to sell some of these assets to them at depreciated cost.

61. Special arrangements were also made for the custody of UNOSOM II's communications equipment (estimated value US\$ 500,000), which was moved to Nairobi. As soon as conditions allow the return of the United Nations political and agency offices to Mogadishu, the communications equipment will be brought back to Somalia to serve the needs of these offices.

V. OBSERVATIONS

62. The present report marks a point of transition in the efforts of the United Nations to succour a people and a country caught in the throes of famine, civil war and the collapse of all institutions of government. It has been a difficult mission that did not attain all the objectives that the Security Council set for it. Nevertheless, as the preceding sections of the present report have shown, the United Nations Operation in Somalia can claim major accomplishments, especially when one recalls that in late 1992 3,000 men, women and children were dying daily of starvation and this tragedy was ended by the international relief effort. As far as national reconciliation is concerned, the international community, through the efforts of UNITAF and UNOSOM I and II, strove to create an environment conducive for the Somali leaders to achieve this goal. The most the international community could do for the Somali parties was to afford every opportunity for them to agree among themselves on the modalities to re-establish their political and administrative structures based on a broad-based reconciliation, leading to the reconstruction of their country. If the political will to achieve a durable compromise was lacking, the responsibility lies with the Somali leadership.

63. Against this background, the Security Council took the decision under resolution 954 (1994) to withdraw UNOSOM II from Somalia by the end of March 1995. The Council had been prepared to pursue its peace-keeping efforts as long as it felt that the United Nations presence was receiving the cooperation of the Somali factions, thus enabling it to make a significant contribution. However, over the last few months, it was concluded that the

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United Nations presence in Somalia was no longer promoting national reconciliation. There was no clear evidence of political will on the part of the warring parties to negotiate a mutually acceptable solution. Agreements reached under United Nations auspices unravelled and security continued to deteriorate, especially in Mogadishu. United Nations peace-keepers and humanitarian convoys were threatened and, in a number of instances, viciously attacked. The Somali leaders did not heed repeated warnings, including from the Council's own special mission in October 1994, that if they did not show a minimum of political will the United Nations presence would have to be reconsidered. In these circumstances, continuation of UNOSOM II could no longer be justified.

64. The experience of UNOSOM II has thus confirmed the validity of the point that the Security Council has consistently stressed in its resolutions on Somalia, namely that the responsibility for political compromise and national reconciliation must be borne by the leaders and people concerned. It is they who bear the main responsibility for creating the political and security conditions in which peacemaking and peace-keeping can be effective. The international community can only facilitate, prod, encourage and assist. It can neither impose peace nor coerce unwilling parties into accepting it.

65. There are also important lessons to be learned about the theory and practice of multifunctional peace-keeping operations in conditions of civil war and chaos and especially about the clear line that needs to be drawn between peace-keeping and enforcement action. The world has changed and so has the nature of the conflict situations which the United Nations is asked to deal with. There is a need for careful and creative rethinking about peacemaking, peace-keeping and peace-building in the context of the Somali operation. Some of my initial conclusions may be found in my recent position paper, the "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace" (S/1995/1).

66. On numerous occasions, I have stated that the withdrawal of UNOSOM II does not mean that the United Nations is abandoning Somalia. The United Nations agencies and organizations, as well as NGOs, have voiced their determination to continue humanitarian operations in Somalia. In 1994, they worked at introducing primary rehabilitation as the protective measure for sustaining the success achieved in the emergency relief phase. Their focus in the post-UNOSOM II era will be on rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction, without prejudice to emergency relief where that is necessary. The fulfilment of this objective will also, however, depend primarily on the willingness of the Somali people to cooperate effectively and reliably with the agencies and NGOs. In view of the current security situation, all their international staff left Mogadishu on 14 February for other parts of Somalia and Nairobi. As of 20 March 1995, 30 international staff continue to operate in the country. As soon as the security situation permits, the international staff will return to Mogadishu where the agencies have retained skeleton offices run by Somali staff. Elsewhere in the present report, I have referred to the critical funding needs for the activities planned by United Nations agencies and for the police and justice programmes.

67. The experience of UNOSOM II has demonstrated the vital link between humanitarian assistance, which is geared towards the immediate amelioration of

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emergency situations, and assistance in achieving national reconciliation, which is necessary to ensure stability in the long term so that the positive results of humanitarian assistance can be preserved and a recurrence of the tragedy avoided. The two must go together; one cannot be a substitute for the other. With this in mind, I will continue to make available my good offices to assist the Somali factions to arrive at a political settlement and I will maintain a political presence in the area for this purpose. The size and mandate of that presence will depend on whether the Somali factions want the United Nations to play a facilitating or mediating role and are ready to cooperate with it. Its location should be in Mogadishu but this will depend, initially at any rate, on security considerations. It was because of the lack of security in Mogadishu that I directed my Special Representative to move temporarily to Nairobi at the end of February; but it remains my intention to re-establish a United Nations political presence in Mogadishu as soon as practicable.

68. For the time being, I have instructed my Special Representative to remain in Nairobi, pending further instructions, in order to monitor the situation in Somalia and coordinate United Nations humanitarian activities there. I expect to be in a position to take decisions about the level and mandate of the United Nations political presence in Mogadishu by mid-April 1995, at which time I shall report my intentions to the Security Council. My present inclination is to maintain a small political office there consisting of a representative with a small support staff.

69. During the past few weeks, there have been some signs that the withdrawal of UNOSOM II may have triggered among Somali leaders an enhanced awareness of their responsibilities. If some Somali leaders perceived the presence of a large number of peace-keeping troops as a hindrance, this has now been removed, possibly encouraging them to restart a political process in their country. I am encouraged by the fact that the withdrawal of UNOSOM II has coincided with the signing of agreements that have so far helped to avert fighting over the sea and airports in Mogadishu and allowed the reopening of the Mogadishu seaport. During the last four weeks, Mr. Ali Mahdi and General Aidid concluded four political agreements which the SNA and the SSA are implementing in a joint effort. It is the first time since the Nairobi declaration of March 1994 that the two leaders have put their signatures to any peace agreement. These indications of a possible rapprochement between them may justify the hope that the Somali leaders will find the strength and the courage to pursue a more productive peace process in the coming weeks. While the recent history of Somalia suggests that such signs must be examined with caution, they could develop into an encouraging trend.

70. Elsewhere in the present report, I have given an account of the successful withdrawal of UNOSOM II with the generous support of the combined task force's "United Shield" operation. This was a complex exercise that required a sophisticated planning effort. It was implemented in a skilful and coordinated manner. I wish once again to express my gratitude to the Member States that joined together to support the United Nations in this way. It was an inspiring instance of international cooperation and mutual assistance.

71. In conclusion, I should like to record my appreciation to my Special Representative, Ambassador James Victor Gbeho, and the UNOSOM II Force

Commander, General Aboo Samah Bin Aboo Bakar, as well as to their predecessors, all of whom have demonstrated high qualities of leadership in difficult circumstances. My gratitude also goes to all the UNOSOM II civilian staff, international and Somali, and to the soldiers of all ranks from many countries who devoted themselves to translating into reality the commitments of the United Nations to the people of Somalia. This expression of appreciation applies equally to the personnel of the combined task force. Above all, I wish to pay a profound tribute to the UNOSOM II military and civilian staff, to the officials of United Nations agencies and programmes and to the staff of NGOs who made the supreme sacrifice to help Somalia in its hour of need. Finally, I should like to express my deep sympathy to the families of those who lost their lives as a result of the tragedies that befell Somalia over the past few years.
